WAR 09-17-2022-to-09-23-2022__THEWINDSofWAR

Housecarl · Sep 17, 2022

(267) 08-27-2022-to-09-02-2022__THEWINDSofWAR

(268) 09-03-2022-to-09-09-2022__THEWINDSofWAR

(269) 09-10-2022-to-09-16-2022__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

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ALERT - RUSSIA INVADES UKRAINE - Consolidated Thread

Dr. Mark P. Barry @DrMarkPBarry 12m It's possible Putin's restraint in not escalating the war in Ukraine is because he knows he risks losing even China's tacit support. If Putin escalates, he throws China under the bus; and Xi could respond by isolating Russia. Who knows what was privately...

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CHAT - Since it looks like Russia's military may be a paper tiger...

Unlike almost all the other countries on this planet.....our only saving grace is the guns we have behind EVERY BLADE OF GRASS!! And....GOD of course. :sal: the chinese have 3 guns behind every blade of grass. i don't remember where i read this, maybe here. the chinese aren't shipping much...

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WAR - BREAKING NEWS HEAVY FIGHTING in KHERSON Ukraine Russians Fleeing City - LIVE

An apparent live feed, BREAKING NEWS HEAVY FIGHTING in KHERSON Ukraine Russians Fleeing City View: https://youtu.be/SvGe7rhtfvc

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WAR - Ukraine's Top General Doesn't Rule Out "Limited" Nuclear War

...there's probably no such thing, really. Fair use cited so on and so forth. https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/ukraines-top-general-doesnt-rule-out-limited-nuclear-war Ukraine's Top General Doesn't Rule Out "Limited" Nuclear War by Tyler Durden Friday, Sep 09, 2022 - 06:55 AM...

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WAR - The Kharkov game changer - Pepe Escobar

Sept 13th 2022 This is an existential war. A do or die affair, Pepe Escobar writes. Wars are not won by psyops. Ask Nazi Germany. Still, it’s been a howler to watch NATOstan media on Kharkov, gloating in unison about “the hammer blow that knocks out Putin”, “the Russians are in trouble”, and...

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WAR - Regional conflict brewing in the Mediterranean

OSINTdefender @sentdefender 2h There are Unconfirmed reports that Turkish Armored Units are being transported from the Turkish Mainland by Ferry to the Demilitarized Greek-Claimed Island of Imbros, this comes less than 24 hours since President Erdogan said a Turkish Attack on Greece could not...

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WAR - Greek forces fire on a ship in Aegean Sea amid rising danger of war with Turkey

Greek forces fire on a ship in Aegean Sea amid rising danger of war with Turkey On Saturday, the Greek coast guard opened fire on the Comoros-flagged ship Anatolian, as it sailed in international waters 11 nautical miles off the Turkish island of Bozcaada at the Aegean Sea entrance of the...

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WAR - Main Armenia Versus Azerbaijan War Thread - Open Hostilities Underway Now

MoD of Armenia @ArmeniaMODTeam (1/2) The statement ofthe Armenian MoD The claims of the #Azerbaijan'i MoD that the shelling was started by the #Armenia'n side are completely #false. Moreover, the military-political leadership of was preparing an obvious information base for this provocation...

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WAR - CHINA THREATENS TO INVADE TAIWAN

Taiwan warns Russia, China ties 'harm' international peace - Insider Paper AFP Taiwan said on Friday ties between Russia and China were a threat to global peace and that the international community must resist the “expansion of...

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ALERT - The Winds of War Blow in Korea and The Far East

https://twitter.com/Apex_WW Apex @Apex_WW Update: South Korea National Security Advisor: South Korea, U.S., Japan agree there will be no soft response in case of North Korea nuclear test "Should North Korea conduct its seventh nuclear test, our (SK, U.S., Japan) reaction will certainly be...

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WAR - Main Persian Gulf Trouble thread

Israel Radar @IsraelRadar_com Iran's supreme leader Khamenei cancelled all public appearances due to illness, is currently under medical observation, @kann_new reports; full details about his health condition unknown at this time. 12:03 PM · Sep 16, 2022·Twitter Web App Iran’s Supreme...

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Back Door Proliferation: The IAEA, AUKUS And Nuclear Submarine Technology – OpEd

In Vienna, China’s permanent mission to the United Nations has been rather exercised of late. Members of the mission have been particularly irate with the International Atomic Energy Agency and its…

www.eurasiareview.com

Back Door Proliferation: The IAEA, AUKUS And Nuclear Submarine Technology – OpEd

September 18, 2022 Binoy Kampmark 0 Comments
By Binoy Kampmark

In Vienna, China’s permanent mission to the United Nations has been rather exercised of late. Members of the mission have been particularly irate with the International Atomic Energy Agency and its Director General, Rafael Grossi, who addressed the IAEA’s Board of Governors on September 12.

Grossi was building on a confidential report by the IAEA which had been circulated the previous week concerning the role of nuclear propulsion technology for submarines to be supplied to Australia under the AUKUS security pact.

When the AUKUS announcement was made in September last year, its significance shook security establishments in the Indo-Pacific. It was also no less remarkable, and troubling, for signalling the transfer of otherwise rationed nuclear technology to a third country. As was rightly observed at the time by Ian Stewart, executive director of the James Martin Center in Washington, such “cooperation may be used by non-nuclear states as more ammunition in support of a narrative that the weapons states lack good faith in their commitments to disarmament.”

Having made that sound point, Stewart, revealing his strategic bias, suggested that, as such cooperation would not involve nuclear weapons by Australia, and would be accompanied by safeguards, few had reason to worry. This was all merely “a relatively straightforward strategic step.”

James M. Acton, co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, was far less sanguine. “[T]he nonproliferation implications of the AUKUS submarine deal are both negative and serious.” Australia’s operation of nuclear-powered submarines would make it the first non-nuclear weapon state to manipulate a loophole in the inspection system of the IAEA.

In setting this “damaging precedent”, aspirational “proliferators could use naval reactor programs as cover for the development of nuclear weapons – with the reasonable expectation that, because of the Australia precedent, they would not face intolerable costs for doing so.” It did not matter, in this sense, what the AUKUS members intended; a terrible example that would undermine IAEA safeguards was being set.

A few countries in the region have been quietly riled by the march of this technology sharing triumvirate in the Indo-Pacific. In a leaked draft of its submission to the United Nations tenth review conference of the Parties to the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT RevCon), Indonesia opined that the transfer of nuclear technology for military purposes was at odds with the spirit and objective of the NPT.

In the sharp words of the draft, “Indonesia views any cooperation involving the transfer of nuclear materials and technology for military purposes from nuclear-weapon states to any non-nuclear weapon states as increasing the associated risks [of] catastrophic humanitarian and environmental consequences.”
At the nuclear non-proliferation review conference, Indonesian diplomats pushed the line that nuclear material in submarines should be monitored with greater stringency. The foreign ministry argued that it had achieved some success in proposing for more transparency and tighter scrutiny on the distribution of such technology, claiming to have received support from AUKUS members and China. “After two weeks of discussion in New York, in the end all parties agreed to look at the proposal as the middle path,” announced Tri Tharyat, director-general for multilateral cooperation in Indonesia’s foreign ministry.

While serving to upend the apple cart of security in the region, AUKUS, in Jakarta’s view, also served to foster a potential, destabilising arms race, placing countries in a position to keep pace with an ever increasingly expensive pursuit of armaments. (Things were not pretty to start with even before AUKUS was announced, with China and the United States already eyeing each other’s military build-up in Asia.)

The concern over an increasingly voracious pursuit of arms is a view that Beijing has encouraged, with Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian having remarked that, “the US, the UK and Australia’s cooperation in nuclear submarines severely damages regional peace and stability [and] intensifies the arms race.”

Wang Qun, China’s Permanent Representative, told Grossi on September 13 that he should avoid drawing “chestnuts from the fire” in endorsing the nuclear proliferation exercise of Australia, the United States and the UK. Rossi, for his part, told the IAEA Board of Governors that four “technical meetings” had been held with the AUKUS parties, which had pleased the organisation. “I welcome the AUKUS parties’ engagement with the Agency to date and expect this to continue in order that they deliver their shared commitment to ensuring the highest non-proliferation and safeguard standards are met.”

The IAEA report also gave a nod to Canberra’s claim that proliferation risks posed by the AUKUS deal were minimal given that it would only receive “complete, welded” nuclear power units, making the removal of nuclear material “extremely difficult.” In any case, such material used in the units, were it to be used for nuclear weapons, needed to be chemically processed using facilities Australia did not have nor would seek.

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning was less than impressed. “This report lopsidedly cited the account given by the US, the UK and Australia to explain away what they have done, but made no mention of the international community’s major concerns over the risk of nuclear proliferation that may arise from the AUKUS nuclear submarine cooperation.” It turned “a blind eye to many countries’ solemn position that the AUKUS cooperation violates the purpose and object of the NPT.”

Beijing’s concerns are hard to dismiss as those of a paranoid, addled mind. Despite China’s own unhelpful military build-up, attempts by the AUKUS partners to dismiss the transfer of nuclear technology to Australia as technically benign and compliant with the NPT is dangerous nonsense. Despite strides towards some middle way advocated by Jakarta, the precedent for nuclear proliferation via the backdoor is being set.

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Binoy Kampmark

Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge. He lectures at RMIT University, Melbourne. Email: bkampmark@gmail.com

Housecarl · Sep 17, 2022

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Top US general warns China on nukes - Taipei Times

Bringing Taiwan to the World and the World to Taiwan

www.taipeitimes.com

Sun, Sep 18, 2022 page1

Top US general warns China on nukes
TREATIES ESSENTIAL: Beijing is not a party to any nuclear arms agreement such as the New START that was signed with Russia, a US strategic command official said
- By Jonathan Chin / Staff writer, with CNA
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The US must take seriously nuclear threats that could be made by Beijing, especially with regard to an invasion of Taiwan, but China could still be deterred by US nuclear forces, a top US general told the Senate Armed Services Committee on Thursday.
US Air Force General Anthony Cotton made the remark as he appeared before the committee vetting his nomination by US President Joe Biden to lead the US Strategic Command, the Washington Post reported.

China’s nuclear ambitions have grown dramatically since 2018 when “minimal deterrence” was Beijing’s preferred strategy, the four-star general was quoted as saying.

The doctrine of maintaining a limited number of nuclear weapons and launch platforms for defensive purposes no longer seems to be held by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, he said.

“We have seen the incredible expansiveness of what they’re doing with their nuclear force — which does not, in my opinion, reflect minimal deterrence. They have a bona fide triad now,” Cotton said, referring to the triplicate ability to deliver nuclear weapons from sea, air and land.

The Pentagon assessed that China’s aim was to achieve “regional hegemony,” he said.

The US cannot deal with the threat of an aggressive, nuclear China in the same way it once addressed Russia, as Beijing is not a party to any nuclear arms control agreement such as the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or New START, which Moscow and Washington signed in 2010, Cotton said.

However, US strategic weapons continue to effectively deter would-be nuclear aggressors, he said.

“Russia and China both understand that we have a strong, resilient nuclear force that is offering deterrence to ourselves, and extended deterrence to our enemies,” Cotton said.

Meanwhile, Germany is observing with concern China’s military build-up and its drills with Russia, while signaling its commitment to a Western rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific Region, German Minister of Defense Christine Lambrecht said.

Germany’s current focus on the Ukraine war does not mean it would takes its eyes off security developments elsewhere, she said in an interview in Berlin.

“We are naturally observing China’s build-up with concern, and are observing very exactly every single step there,” Lambrecht said.

Germany is joining other Western nations in showing more muscle in the Indo-Pacific region amid growing alarm over Beijing’s territorial ambitions, even at the risk of irking its top trade partner.

Berlin last year sent its first warship in almost 20 years to disputed waters in the South China Sea, and this month sent 13 military aircraft to joint exercises in Australia.

“Through our presence and participation in the exercises, we are sending clear signals,” Lambrecht said. “We are on the side of the partners who stand for a rules-based order.”

Each military has its own equipment, so countries need to practice together to identify and solve any problems, she said.

The Australia drills had proven “very constructive” and shown that Germany could fulfill its commitment to partners in the region, as well as to NATO.

Asked if Germany would send a warship through the Taiwan Strait as the US had, Lambrecht said: “It’s not about provoking or escalating the situation in any way ... Instead, our approach is to de-escalate.”

Germany’s relationship with China has long been centered on mutually beneficial business exchanges, with China’s rapid economic expansion driving its own growth.

“We must now become more independent in other sectors, not just energy,” she said. “We are bound to China through economic relations, but that must not stop us from taking clear positions on certain decisions.”

Additional reporting by Reuters

Housecarl · Sep 17, 2022

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Tactical Nuclear Weapons - Geopolitical Futures

There has been endless speculation that Russia might use nuclear weapons in Ukraine. Given that Russian President Vladimir Putin has mentioned their use

geopoliticalfutures.com

Tactical Nuclear Weapons

Thoughts in and around geopolitics.
By
George Friedman
-
September 16, 2022

There has been endless speculation that Russia might use nuclear weapons in Ukraine. Given that Russian President Vladimir Putin has mentioned their use on several occasions, that concern is clearly justified. Given that mentioning something can either indicate intent or simply be a bluff, there is reason for scrutiny. Either way, a discussion of nuclear weapons is in order.

The first task is to define the two important classes of nuclear weapons: the strategic and the tactical. They differ in size, of course, although this is not as significant as it might appear. There are tactical nuclear weapons with power greater than the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. There are others whose yield is not much greater than a large artillery round.

The real distinction is the mission. Strategic weapons are designed to render the opposing nation unable or unwilling to resist by destroying its critical infrastructure and at least significant elements of its population. Tactical nuclear weapons are designed to add additional force to battles limited in scope and being fought for limited intents. A strategic nuclear attack on Ukraine would involve nuclear strikes on major cities, production facilities and transport. Its intent would be to rapidly render Ukraine unable to function. A tactical nuclear attack would be intended to destroy Ukrainian forces engaged in battle with conventional Russian forces. Both tactical and strategic nuclear weapons intend to defeat the enemy, but strategic weapons intend a definitive destruction of the enemy nation, while tactical weapons intend the defeat of more limited forces and hope to compel capitulation on a particular battlefield. The size of the nuclear weapon required for this could vary and might be larger than the Hiroshima bomb, and yet it still could be considered a tactical nuclear weapon. Again, it is not the weapon’s size but its mission that draws the line.

The United States developed tactical nuclear weapons in the 1960s. Their purpose was to deter or defeat a potential Soviet armored thrust into West Germany. The theory was that U.S. forces would withdraw from the front for several miles, and then the large-scale Soviet thrust would be annihilated by a tactical nuke. Since tactical nuclear weapons were expected to have limited fallout, U.S. armor could move forward through the gap(s).

Of course, massed artillery at the same distance could achieve the same end. The problem that the tactical nuclear weapon was intended to solve was the inevitable inaccuracy of conventional weapons. An artillery piece had to know the precise location of its target as it fired, and then be able to hit it. This is difficult enough on its own, but the time between firing and impact complicated the mission, as the target could avoid the strike simply in the context of normal maneuvering. Moreover, Soviet counter-battery fire would likely descend, requiring rapid redeployment and making a second round impossible.

Tactical nuclear weapons overcame this problem by having a wider radius of destruction, though not too large or it would put the firing platform at risk. Other shortcomings include the blinding effect of a nuclear detonation on both sides, the (limited) radiation zone and the coming world of hurt as enemy aircraft came in to destroy the nuclear launcher. In solving one problem, tactical nuclear weapons would paint a target for the Soviets.

The development of precision-guided munitions (PGMs) made the tactical nuclear weapon even less useful. During Desert Storm, a Tomahawk cruise missile fired from a U.S. ship could hit a Baghdad building’s third floor, the second building from the right. (This actually happened.) Initial guidance came from GPS, then TERCOM (or terrain contour matching). A picture of the ground and terminal point would be fed into the missile’s computer along with directional instructions, allowing it to eliminate the accuracy problems that tactical nukes were trying to solve and to do so without necessarily creating a threat to its own troops.

PGMs, both in artillery shells and longer-range missiles, meant that fire could be laid down as needed without the need for a saturation attack. And the range they could achieve meant that the launch mechanism was not necessarily in danger after firing. In Ukraine, PGMs of various sorts are being used by both sides. In the early part of the war, Russian tanks were destroyed by anti-tank missiles. The Ukrainians were more widely dispersed, and even a tactical nuclear weapon would have had minimal effect. As that is now changing, the use of tactical nuclear weapons is conceivable, but the Russians have other means to achieve similar outcomes.

I feel at this point like the guy who relaxed and learned to love nuclear weapons. I plead not guilty. But the need for an area kill weapon has made the tactical nuke, with frequent collateral damage on its own side, much less compelling. In the many wars fought since the tactical nuclear weapon was introduced, it has never been used. This is due not to sentiment but to utility. The utility of large strategic nuclear weapons seems to be intact, but there are more effective ways to destroy targets without saturating the area. Of course, there is also the psychological effect of using them. But the tactical use of nuclear weapons always has political costs and raises questions about how the United States, always unpredictable, would react.

Housecarl · Sep 17, 2022

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Counterforce Strategies Are A Threat To Nuclear Deterrence Stability – Analysis

By Vice Admiral Vijay Shankar (Retd) * Early atomic bombs were crude city-annihilators. Their ability to bring enormous and horrific civilian destruction was demonstrated by the US in 1945. The two…

www.eurasiareview.com

Counterforce Strategies Are A Threat To Nuclear Deterrence Stability – Analysis

September 17, 2022 IPCS 0 Comments
By IPCS

By Vice Admiral Vijay Shankar (Retd) *

Early atomic bombs were crude city-annihilators. Their ability to bring enormous and horrific civilian destruction was demonstrated by the US in 1945. The two bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki caused 2,14,000 primary fatalities to a combined population of 6,13,000 and an unknowable number of secondary and tertiary casualties.

Targeting Concepts

The use of nuclear weapons is governed by two basic targeting concepts: counterforce and countervalue. The former emphasises strikes on military forces, both nuclear and conventional, and their infrastructure and logistics. The latter focuses on economic targets and population centres. A countervalue doctrine is limited in complexity and demands relatively simpler capabilities. During the Cold War, it led to a rather macabre belief that ‘assurance of mass destruction’ would bring about a balance of terror that in turn guaranteed stability. It contributed to an amassing of arsenals whose aggregate yield could destroy the world many times over. The counterforce doctrine, on the other hand, suggests that nuclear war could be limited and nuclear forces could be used to disarm the adversary of their nuclear weapons; almost as if the side adopting a counterforce doctrine controls retaliation options available to the victim.

Both targeting concepts lose sight of a cardinal principle of international relations: that war has political purpose. The destruction of purpose debases the application of force to a savage, all-obliterating clash. Ironically, we note today how nuclear-armed states are adopting postures that increase the prospects of the use of nuclear weapons in armed conflict.

Bernard Brodie provided an intellectual framework for avoiding nuclear war in 1946. In his seminal work, The Absolute Weapon, he suggested, “Thus far, the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on, its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost no other useful purpose.” Brodie recognised that the possibility of ‘total destruction’ inherent in the use of nuclear weapons made victory unachievable. At the same time, its political value lay in the threat it posed by manipulating an adversary’s mind.

Evolution of Nuclear Weapons and Political Purpose

In examining the evolution of nuclear deterrence theory, we note there is an allegorical tendency to correlate the nature of war with the changing characteristics of the nuclear weapon. War, as Clausewitz pointed out, has an enduring nature that is defined by four continuities: a political dimension, a human dimension as characterised by military genius, pervasiveness of uncertainty, and the contest of opposing resolve. All of these exist within a historical, social, and political context. While the dynamics that govern the characteristics of nuclear weapons are, in the main, influenced by the human ability to harness technology, it is apparent that if either political purpose were lost or the human dimension removed, then war itself would be deprived of meaning.

Given a human being’s facility to exploit technology, nuclear weapons have evolved in three distinct phases. First, from a weapon of use to an instrument that ensured a balance of terror. Second, the threat of mutually guaranteed destruction has developed into a contrivance for bargaining and devising compromises. Third, it comes full circle to a bizarre situation that today attempts to justify nuclear war. This progression has lost sight of the political and human impact of use.

Counterforce Strategic Narrative

For a state, a strategic narrative is a lodestone to avoid returning to the trauma of the past, around which such a narrative was built and accepted. Its essence is often reflected in simple but pithy mantras such as ‘War on Terror’, ‘mutually assured destruction’, or ‘counterforce doctrine’. The narrative that governs policies of nuclear-armed states has largely been stimulated by that which emerged in the US, and been systematised in the wake of the first nuclear attacks, through the Cold War and in its aftermath of a multipolar world.

In today’s strategic milieu, the lines between nuclear arsenals and conventional weapons have become dangerously intertwined with new offensive technologies such as precision hypersonic glide vehicles, which pose a potent threat to the security of nuclear weapons and the stability of a deterrent relationship. The narrative urges a ‘nuclear counterforce’ strategy that determines policy and fashions a first-strike strategic posture. And so we note with some alarm that a nuclear-armed state, when confronted by another, may decide to use precision nuclear or conventional counterforce in a first strike, to annul the possibility of being a victim of a nuclear attack. In this context, the reported Russian policy of ‘escalate to de-escalate’ and the US deployment of low yield nuclear weapons are both confounding as they, presume the total domination of the escalation ladder.

The blurring of conventional and nuclear deterrence is apparent in the increasing integration of conventional and nuclear warfighting doctrines. The US 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, which stresses the possibility of nuclear weapon use in response to non-nuclear attacks, is a case-in-point. The long-held view that nuclear weapons are exceptional has been set aside. In its place, a dramatic escalation to nuclear warfighting is advocated. That such use could provoke an unpredictable set of nuclear responses has been eerily blanked-out. Concepts that promote ‘first use’ of nuclear weapons are not new—tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) were deployed with decentralised release authority during the Cold War. Recognising the catastrophic hazards of pre-delegation, presidential nuclear initiatives attempted to remove all TNWs from the battlefield.

Conclusion

Counterforce strategies intrinsically translate to heightened nuclear risks as they prompt a ‘first strike’. The premise that responses to nuclear escalation can either be predictable or controlled is flawed. To the contrary, foreclosing the option to use nuclear weapons first would not only enhance deterrence stability and reduce the role played by nuclear weapons in security policy, but also provide greater political legitimacy. A no first use (NFU) nuclear policy therefore provides sagacity to a troubled world, in its deference for greater security and, indeed, for survival.

*Vice Admiral Vijay Shankar (Retd) is Distinguished Fellow, IPCS, and former Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Forces Command of India.

Housecarl · Sep 17, 2022

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Retired F-22s should go to Japan, not the boneyard

The Pentagon wants to retire dozens of F-22s rather than upgrade them, with the Department of Defense saying it can use the US$1 billion or so saved to upgrade its forces elsewhere. …

asiatimes.com

AEROSPACE

Retired F-22s should go to Japan, not the boneyard

Pentagon wants to scrap not upgrade the fighters but they can still play a major deterrent role in the Pacific against China

By STEPHEN BRYEN
SEPTEMBER 15, 2022

The Pentagon wants to retire dozens of F-22s rather than upgrade them, with the Department of Defense saying it can use the US$1 billion or so saved to upgrade its forces elsewhere.

But these F-22s are very important and sending them into retirement when they can be a very effective deterrent for others is potentially a major mistake. Japan (like Israel) has long wanted F-22s, which can play a major deterrent role in the Pacific and challenge almost anything China throws at them.

If they are removed from service, these two dozen F-22s will go to the boneyard at the Davis-Monthan Air Force Base in Tucson, Arizona. There, they will slowly rot in the sun and some of their parts may be scavenged by the Air Force.

The F-22 is a very capable and very expensive airplane. Brand new, the flyaway cost was $120 million when the first aircraft entered service in 2005. Translated into current dollars, the cost for a new one would be $182 million.

But the per plane cost also should include research and development, which would bring the 2005 cost to $334 million, or $507 million in 2022 dollars.

Calculated that way, the value of the two dozen F-22 aircraft the Air Force wants to retire is around $12.2 billion – assuming they were in good shape, which they are not.

The Air Force has admitted that the cost of upgrading all the F-22s planned for retirement would be just shy of $1 billion, a fraction of the investment so far.

Only the US has the F-22 and it remains a crucially important air superiority fighter.

The F-22 has a number of advantages compared with the cheaper, more tactical F-35. For starters, the F-22 has a smaller radar cross-section than the F-35, which sometimes is referred to as semi-stealthy. Moreover, the F-22:

is far more maneuverable than the F-35,
has a better thrust-to-weight ratio,
has two engines instead of one (a significant safety factor),
has greater firepower because the F-22 is a much larger platform and,
can operate at a higher ceiling.

Again, it can serve as an air superiority fighter, which the F-35 is not. While the F-35 is among the slowest of modern jet fighters at Mach 1.6, the F-22 is among the fastest at 2.25 Mach.

Where the F-22 is not as modern makes for a shorter list:

It does not have the more advanced electronics and computers of the F-35 and therefore is less suited to netcentric operations, and
It does not carry certain types of weapons (although it can be modified for them).

But by far the most important feature of the F-22 is that it can knock out enemy air defenses and radars, as well as win in air-to-air combat, clearing the way for non-stealth fighters, fighter bombers and conventional bombers to take out enemy assets such as missile launch sites and command centers.

The F-22 is clearly the envy of the Chinese military and China would be hard-pressed to beat off an attack by F-22s.

So the question arises: Why not upgrade the F-22s proposed for retirement and offer them to America’s allies, especially Japan? The full-time presence of F-22s on Japanese territory would make China think twice about its chance to win if, for example, a conflict broke out over Taiwan or the Senkaku islands.

One possible barrier is a 1999 law that said the US was not allowed to develop an export version of the F-22. Of course, the F-22 is already developed and the upgrades would be the same as for the F-22s in the fleet. Even so, the 1999 law is often interpreted as a presumption against any export of the jet.

Originally, that 1999 rider to US defense legislation was to keep our adversaries from getting their hands on the F-22 and exploiting its technology. But China has already stolen all the relevant plans for the F-22. Even so, the Chinese probably still lack technology that would be critical to really competing with the F-22.

Their best try is the Chengdu J-20, which is now deployed but also remains a work in progress. Whatever we really know about it is classified, but most experts say that J-20 engines, among other components, are not nearly as good as the Pratt and Whitney F119 engines on the F-22.

Currently, the J-20 uses Shenyang Lining WS-10C engines, and there is a plan to upgrade to a new engine, the Xian WS-15. But little is known about the reliability of the Chinese engines, or even if they perform as advertised.

In any case, even if the J-20 was as good as the F-22, if US-made F-22s are not in the region it will be a challenge for Japan to stay in the fight. Either the US will have to deploy its own F-22s at all times in Japan, or give Tokyo the ability to match the Chinese by providing F-22s.

For very little money, Japan – if it got the F-22s that are otherwise headed to the scrap heap – would have an equalizer in the region, one of considerable strategic significance.

The US and its allies today are being challenged by China and maintaining the balance of power is proving more and more difficult. A simple amendment to US legislation would enable Japan to get the retired F-22s, assuming, of course, the Japanese want them.

Since they wanted them before, now is the right time for the Japanese to ask for them again.

Stephen Bryen is a senior fellow at the Center for Security Policy and Yorktown Institute. Follow him on Twitter at @stevebryen

Housecarl · Sep 17, 2022

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Japan, US Discuss Longer Range Missiles to Counter China

At a defense ministers’ meeting, Japan gets U.S. support to bolster its defenses with “counter strike capabilities.”

thediplomat.com

Japan, US Discuss Longer Range Missiles to Counter China

At a defense ministers’ meeting, Japan gets U.S. support to bolster its defenses with “counter strike capabilities.”

By Thisanka Siripala
September 16, 2022

Japan’s Defense Minister Hamada Yasukazu met his U.S. counterpart Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin at the Pentagon on September 14, where both sides said Japan and the United States are planning to integrate defense strategies in response to worsening regional tensions over Taiwan.

From Washington, D.C., Hamada stated that Japan is considering “counterattack capabilities” to strengthen its defense capabilities as a part of a revised National Security Strategy. The Japanese defense minister is advocating for a drastic overhaul of Japan’s defense posture in the wake of five Chinese missiles landing in Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) last month during Chinese military exercises around Taiwan.

During the 90-minute meeting, Austin expressed “strong” support for Japan’s plans. He stated that “China’s coercive behavior in the Taiwan Strait and the waters surrounding Japan is provocative, undermines stability and is unprecedented.”

Japan is surrounded by increasingly unfriendly nuclear-armed neighbors, namely North Korea, China, and Russia. Against that backdrop, there are concerns Japan can no longer defend itself by only intercepting incoming missiles. Hamada outlined Japan’s intention to procure long-range, standoff missiles, which are said to be capable of striking enemy forces beyond their radar systems.

There is also debate whether the procurement of longer-range missiles, which have the capacity to strike enemy bases, especially missile launch sites, is a violation of the constitution. Japan is restricted by its pacifist constitution to an exclusively defensive stance. Constitutionally, Japan’s Self-Defense Forces are allowed to preemptively attack if an enemy is preparing to launch an attack on Japan. But the precise definition of an “anticipated armed attack situation” could leave Japan on the sidelines at the critical moment.

Japan plans to double military spending to 2 percent of GDP over the next five years – on par with NATO member states. Japan’s Defense Ministry is requesting $40 billion next fiscal year, putting it on track to become the world’s third largest military spender after the U.S. and China. But China’s military spending has risen for 26 consecutive years and is almost 200 times higher than Japan, at $229 billion in fiscal year 2022.

China also possesses operational hypersonic missiles that fly at five times the speed of sound. Japan and the U.S. will need to play a game of catchup as China’s hypersonic missile technology is thought to be decades ahead. During the defense ministers’ meetings, Japan and the U.S. agreed to cooperate on intelligence gathering and joint technological research to intercept hypersonic missiles.

The Japan-U.S. alliance provides Japan with extended deterrence but Japan also hopes procuring longer-range missiles will also serve as a deterrent. Some experts in Japan have expressed concern at to whether the U.S. is a reliable ally. Austin reaffirmed the United States’ “unwavering commitment to the defense of Japan.” He added that Japan is also backed by a “full range” of U.S. nuclear and conventional defense capabilities.

Japan’s post-war pacifist constitution outlaws “war as a means to settle international disputes involving the state.” This year, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has been stepping up its efforts toward constitutional revision and aims to push the issue for wider public discussion. A Mainichi Shimbun opinion poll conducted in May showed that two-thirds of the public are in favor of Japan acquiring “counter-strike” abilities.

On August 29, a month into his tenure as defense minister, Hamada stated that the “international community has entered a new crisis phase that presents the greatest challenge since World War II.” China’s threats to take over Taiwan by force also gives the ruling LDP more scope to persuade the public to consider Japan’s security realities rather than focusing on constitutional principles.

Housecarl · Sep 17, 2022

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Editorial: Japan needs new strategies for N. Korea 20 yrs after Pyongyang Declaration - The Mainichi

Sept. 17 marked the 20th anniversary of the signing of the Japan-North Korea Pyongyang Declaration agreement. Then Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro K

mainichi.jp

Editorial: Japan needs new strategies for N. Korea 20 yrs after Pyongyang Declaration

September 17, 2022 (Mainichi Japan)

Sept. 17 marked the 20th anniversary of the signing of the Japan-North Korea Pyongyang Declaration agreement. Then Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi visited the North Korean capital to meet with then leader Kim Jong Il, and the two parties agreed to normalize their diplomatic relations at an early date.

In the declaration, Japan expressed "deep remorse and a heartfelt apology" over its wartime colonial rule over Korea. Kim, on the other hand, admitted to Pyongyang's abduction of Japanese nationals and apologized during his talks with Koizumi, and in the declaration promised to prevent a recurrence.

However, the normalization of diplomatic ties between the two countries is yet to be achieved. This is because North Korea has repeatedly been dishonest when it comes to responding to the abduction issue, and also its development of nuclear weapons and missiles has further soured the bilateral relationship.

While it is true that the Pyongyang Declaration led to the return of five Japanese abductees including Kaoru Hasuike and his wife for the first time in 24 years, of the Japanese abductees recognized by Tokyo, the abductions of Megumi Yokota and 11 others remain unsolved.

The abduction issue is a matter of people's lives and safety that cannot be compromised. We must hurry to solve this issue as the aging parents and family members of the abductees continue to wait for their loved ones' return home.

-- Japan cannot compromise on North Korea's abduction of its people
Over the past two decades, situations surrounding Japan-North Korea relations have deteriorated significantly.

Kim Jong Un took over the Workers' Party of Korea chairmanship and accelerated nuclear arms and missile development. North Korea now possesses the capability to produce nuclear warheads that can be carried by missiles, and is developing small tactical nuclear weapons. It's believed that Pyongyang is preparing for its seventh nuclear test.

Kim Jong Un has been hinting at using nuclear weapons against South Korea. The Supreme People's Assembly, equivalent to Japan's Diet, just last week passed a bill allowing for the preemptive use of nuclear arms.

Pyongyang is also working on intercontinental ballistic missiles with enough range to hit the U.S. mainland, as well as trajectory-shifting missiles that are hard to be intercepted. Nuclear missiles that were non-existent 20 years ago have become a realistic threat to the international community including Japan.

Amid all this, the effects of pressure on North Korea have become limited, as the international community is divided due to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. A symbolic moment was observed during a U.N. Security Council meeting in May this year, when China and Russia vetoed a resolution for enhanced sanctions against North Korea. Beijing and Moscow in the past agreed to strict sanctions targeting Pyongyang, but this time the two superpowers shifted their stance.

Behind this recent change was North Korea's move to get close to China and Russia. Pyongyang has mended its ties with Beijing, which is deepening conflict with Washington, through repeated communications with the Chinese leader. North Korea also voted against the U.N. General Assembly resolution condemning Russia over its invasion of Ukraine, and recognized the two "republic" states in eastern Ukraine declared as "independent" by pro-Russian forces.

The six-party talks working toward a resolution to North Korea's nuclear weapons program remain stalled. The dialogue had continued for six years since 2003 following the Pyongyang Declaration, but failed to bear fruit.

Kim Jong Un tried to have the U.S. lift sanctions by holding a series of meetings with former President Donald Trump. Kim's attempt failed as he refused to give up nuclear arms.
-- Nuclear threat allows no room for negligence

Amid increasingly gloomy international affairs, what is needed of Japan is to rebuild its strategies dealing with North Korea. Around the time the Pyongyang Declaration was signed 20 years ago, the then Koizumi administration used economic cooperation as a lever to make North Korea act. It was Japan's unique diplomatic efforts while paying attention to the situation at the time.

Pyongyang then was in the middle of recovering from a serious financial crisis, and was seeking to approach the international community. Kim Jong Il had a summit meeting with South Korea for the first time and established diplomatic relations with major European countries one after another. He was also motivated to get close to Japan to receive a significant amount of economic aid.

For Japan, meanwhile, normalizing diplomatic relations with North Korea was a leftover agenda unsolved for over half a century from the end of World War II.

The succeeding Japanese administrations since Koizumi's, however, haven't shown strategic thinking to break the deadlock.

Former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe emphasized North Korea's abduction of Japanese nationals as the top priority issue. In response to the Washington-Pyongyang summit meeting, Abe all of a sudden called to hold a Japan-North Korea summit without conditions, but it never materialized. Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, who follows Abe's steps, hasn't found a clue as to how to defuse the situation.

To make Pyongyang act again, Japan will likely need a strategy covering security framework-building in Northeast Asia. To do this, Japan-South Korea relations must be improved first and tri-party cooperation among Japan, the U.S. and South Korea strengthened. There should be room for working with China when it comes to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

A stable Korean Peninsula is crucial in achieving regional peace. Japan must exhaust all diplomatic efforts to achieve this goal.

By Bill Gertz - The Washington Times - Sunday, September 18, 2022

The growing ties between China and Russia are sparking new fears among U.S. war planners that the nuclear powers will soon pose a unified nuclear threat, the Air Force general nominated to head the nation’s nuclear deterrence arsenal told Congress.

Gen. Anthony J. Cotton, currently commander of the Air Force Global Strike Command and nominee for Strategic Command commander, told a Senate confirmation hearing in response to repeated questioning that a China-Russia nuclear axis would require stronger U.S. nuclear deterrent forces and new thinking on how the U.S. would respond to a nuclear challenge.

The general’s comments were made the same day Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin were meeting in Uzbekistan for their first face-to-face talks in seven months. Both leaders called for increasing cooperation in the growing strategic partnership.

Mr. Xi said China supports working with Russia on their “core issues.” In February, Mr. Xi signed an agreement with Mr. Putin stating there are “no limits” to cooperation between the two.

U.S. intelligence has revealed that China is rapidly expanding its nuclear forces and is expected to have more than 1,000 warheads by the end of the decade, along with new missiles, submarines and bombers to deliver them. China recently tested a new space-based hypersonic strike weapon called a fractional orbital bombardment system that can deliver nuclear warheads to targets on Earth from any trajectory.

Satellite images also revealed that China is building silos for an estimated 360 missiles that U.S. defense officials say will be used for new DF-41 multiwarhead ICBMs.

For its part, Russia recently finished a major program to modernize its large nuclear forces, adding new heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and submarines. Moscow also is fielding cutting-edge strategic weapons that include a hypersonic missile, a nuclear-armed drone torpedo and a nuclear-powered cruise missile.

The U.S. nuclear modernization program is facing risks that aging strategic systems will not be replaced on time, Gen. Cotton told lawmakers last week.

The Congressional Budget Office estimates the modernization will cost $634 billion through 2030. The costs will cover new Columbia-class nuclear missile submarines, Sentinel ground-based ICBMs and B-21 Raider strategic bombers. Nuclear command and control and a new “Long-Range Standoff Missile” also are included.

“The current program of record is the absolute minimum U.S. Stratcom requires to provide effective strategic deterrence,” he said in written answers to committee questions. The command plans to maintain the aging force of missiles, bombers and submarines until replacements can be deployed. Funding delays in the modernization could undermine deterrence against China and Russia.

“Where possible, we must pursue every opportunity to accelerate modernization,” Gen. Cotton said.

Sen. Tim Kaine, Virginia Democrat, questioned the four-star general on the new deterrent posture that requires shifting from focus on a single adversary, Russia, to one that now must include Russia and China working together. He noted that for decades U.S. nuclear policy assumed China and Russia would never grow close based on a history of enmity and differing cultures.

“But they’re getting closer and closer every day, and often, they’re doing things not only just the two of them but with Iran, North Korea, sometimes with Turkey,” he said. “Now we have two nuclear competitors, and evidence demonstrates that they are increasingly working together,” Mr. Kaine said.

Gen. Cotton said the command is conducting an assessment of the issue: “If confirmed, that assessment has to continue.”

Strategic Command also will seek to understand how to execute deterrence missions against a joint Chinese and Russian nuclear threat, he said.

“We’ll dive into where I can get a better understanding, to your point, of what does it look like when you have two near-peer adversaries that act differently, that might work together, [or] might not work together,” Gen. Cotton said.

Double deterrence

Gen. Cotton told Sen. Josh Hawley, Missouri Republican, that the U.S. military needs to think very seriously about the force requirements for deterring China and Russia at the same time to at least 2030. Being able to deter both nations simultaneously is “going to be critical for us,” he said.

Part of that process will require the president and his administration to formulate national objectives to meet the dual threat.

Gen. Cotton said the speed of China‘s buildup in particular, including the 360 new silos, “is absolutely incredible.”

“As recent as 2018, we were describing China as having minimal nuclear deterrence,” he said. “We would have probably had a conversation stating that it was about regional hegemony. Today, they’re building ground-based ICBM silos. They have the H-6N nuclear-capable medium bomber that has strategic-capable launch platform.”

Gen. Cotton also said U.S. nuclear deterrence is a backstop to conventional military forces that are working to deter China from attempting to take control of Taiwan following Russia’s bold aggression against Ukraine.

“Conventional and nuclear [deterrence] work hand in hand,” he said.

China understands that a credible U.S. nuclear deterrent will “make them think twice before engaging with us,” he added.

War planners have improved the integration of conventional and nuclear forces for deterrence by “leaps and bounds,” Gen. Cotton said.

During his testimony, Gen. Cotton diverged from the position of current Stratcom commander, Adm. Charles Richard, who opposed the Biden administration decision to cancel development of a sea-launched, nuclear-armed cruise missile. The Biden administration canceled the cruise missile over the objections of Adm. Richard and other senior military leaders, who argued the missile is needed to fill deterrence gaps against China.

Congress added up to $45 million in funds for the new cruise missile in the current defense authorization bill.

Gen. Cotton said he would like to review the cruise missile capability before offering his views on whether the program should resume or be killed off as the Biden administration sought to do.

• Bill Gertz can be reached at bgertz@washingtontimes.com.

Housecarl · Sep 22, 2022

Hummmm.........

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Escalation Management and Nuclear Employment in Russian Military Strategy - War on the Rocks

We are seeking to fill two positions on our editorial team: An editor/researcher and a membership editor. Apply by Oct. 2, 2022. Editor’s Note: After

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ESCALATION MANAGEMENT AND NUCLEAR EMPLOYMENT IN RUSSIAN MILITARY STRATEGY

MICHAEL KOFMAN AND ANYA LOUKIANOVA FINK
SEPTEMBER 19, 2022
COMMENTARY

Editor’s Note: After the Russian military collapse in and around Kharkiv Oblast, there is now renewed concern that Russian leaders could behave unpredictably and use nuclear weapons to halt the Ukrainian offensive, or to intimidate the leadership in Kyiv to settle the conflict on terms favorable to Moscow. In June 2020, Anya Fink and Michael Kofman took to our pages to explain Russian nuclear doctrine, including how strategists in Moscow view the use of strategic and nonstrategic weapons to terminate a conflict, or to deter NATO intervention in a regional war. This is a lightly revised and updated version of that article. Don’t miss our members-only podcast with Dr. Fink and our comprehensive guide to Russia’s war against Ukraine.

Academics and arms control wonks are poring over the painfully worded text of a new Russian policy, reading the tea leaves for insights into Russian nuclear strategy. But don’t mistake this new policy document for revelations of plans, or a disclosure on the nuances of Russian nuclear strategy. Declaratory policies should be taken for the contrived signaling documents that they are, seeking to deter with ambiguity.

On June 2 Russia released the Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Sphere of Nuclear Deterrence. Characteristically, the long and awkwardly worded title preceded a brief six-page declaratory policy that is intentionally ambiguous on key considerations, substantiating a spectrum of nuclear employment options and strategies. True to its word, the policy offers some basic principles, wrapped in normative language to forearm Russian arms control negotiators, but its contents will not settle the debate on Russian nuclear strategy anytime soon.

Russian nuclear strategy has been the subject of vigorous debates in recent years. Some believe it hides a plan to compel war termination through early use of nuclear arms after a case of aggression, i.e., escalate to de-escalate; others see it primarily as a defensive deterrent to be used in exigent circumstances. Analysts have argued that Russia’s lowered nuclear threshold is a myth, a temporary measure born out of conventional inferiority. Others believe that “escalate to de-escalate” does not exist as a doctrine, or that the term itself should be terminated because the real strategy is escalation control.

Each perspective offers a kernel of truth, but none of these views captures Russian nuclear strategy and thinking on escalation management in a satisfactory or comprehensive manner. The debate on escalate to de-escalate and Russia’s supposed lower nuclear threshold has often missed the plot and degenerated into two camps with broadly divergent interpretations. More importantly, the Russian military’s theory of victory and how it developed, or why the military thinks these specific stratagems might work, are often missing considerations.

CNA’s Russia Studies Program recently concluded a study on Russia’s strategy for escalation management, or intra-war deterrence, across the conflict spectrum from peacetime to nuclear war. The research consulted a representative sample of over 700 Russian-language articles from authoritative military publications over the past three decades. Delving into the current state of Russian military strategy and thinking on these subjects, we found that the Russian defense establishment has developed a mature system of deterrence and a coherent escalation management strategy, integrating conventional, strategic, and nonstrategic nuclear weapons. Russian thinking on deterrence and escalation management is the result of decades of debates and concept development. Official policies, strategies, and doctrines offer glints of the thinking behind Russian nuclear strategy, using refereed terms and concepts whose actual contents are discussed extensively in military writings.

In this article we lay out key components of Russia’s nuclear strategy and thinking on escalation management, premised on deterrence by what the Russian military calls “fear-inducement” and deterrence through the limited use of force. The simplistic view characterizing Russian strategy as “escalate to de-escalate” or “escalate to win” is not correct, but neither are the commonly voiced counterarguments that suggest no Russian strategy for limited nuclear use exists, or that it was simply a stopgap measure born out of conventional inferiority. Russia does have a strategy for escalation management, seeking to dissuade, intimidate, or achieve de-escalation at key transition points and early phases of conflict, from peacetime through large-scale and nuclear war. These stratagems work by integrating the threat to inflict damage with nonnuclear and nuclear capabilities, ideas based on “dosed” damage, and applying force in a progressive manner, in an attempt to raise the adversary’s expected costs well above the desired benefits.

What Problems Is Russian Nuclear Strategy Solving?

One of the challenges in reading Russian military strategy is understanding the typology of conflicts, because different instruments or deterrence approaches are applied depending on the type of war being discussed. The Russian military doctrine breaks down conflict types into armed conflict, local war, regional war, and large-scale war. Nuclear war is imagined as a large-scale nuclear exchange or strategic nuclear retaliation. We forgo discussion of nuclear war, in which Russian strategic nuclear forces are postured to conduct a retaliatory strike, launch on attack, or, as the new state policy suggests, possibly launch on warning. This aspect of Russian nuclear strategy is not especially controversial, nor has it changed in recent years. Indeed, most official Russian statements, and stylized comments by President Vladimir Putin, try to speak only to Russia’s strategic nuclear forces posture, sidestepping the role of nonnuclear and nonstrategic nuclear weapons, while both of those arsenals grow in size.

The main applicable conflict archetypes considered include a local war, a limited conflict typically between two states, akin to conflicts between Russia and Ukraine or Russia and Georgia; regional war, which involves a coalition-sized fight and represents the smallest version of a possible Russia-NATO conflict; and large-scale war, which is a war between coalitions and great powers involving multiple theaters or regions.

The purpose of Russia’s escalation management strategy is to deter direct aggression, preclude a conflict from expanding, prevent or preempt the use of highly damaging capabilities against the Russian homeland that could threaten the state or the regime, and terminate hostilities on terms acceptable to Moscow.

Since the 1980s, Soviet military strategists and senior leaders have sought to address the challenge posed by the precision revolution. They have been grappling with the threat of massed aerospace attack, in which the United States would employ long-range precision-guided weapons, electronic warfare, with tactical and long-range aviation, elements of which could be conducted directly from the United States. In the mid-2000s, the Russian military feared a disarming conventional strike (and some analysts still do), but the central fear is a sustained air campaign that paralyzes the Russian military and inflicts unacceptable damage on the country’s critical infrastructure. In recent years, the fear of a large aerospace attack has also been paired with concerns that it could be preceded by political warfare to destabilize the country. Degrading such an attack — mitigating its effects — is possible, but denying it is not. In Moscow’s reading, long-range precision-guided weapons are strategic capabilities because of the damage they can inflict on a country’s critical economic and military infrastructure. There is always a lingering fear of strategic surprise, and the belief that if escalation is likely, then Russia should take the lead rather than attempt a costly defense.

This is not just a question of conventional inferiority; the United States might not do any better against a massed cruise missile attack. The Russian goal has been to find deterrence answers to problems that do not have good warfighting solutions, to manage escalation, and to address the escalation dilemmas resulting from a force structure too inflexible to deter a strategic-level conventional attack or a regional conventional conflict against a militarily stronger adversary. Nuclear weapons remain an important intra-war deterrence tool to manage escalation and compensate for disadvantages in a conflict where aerospace power and precision-strike capabilities could prove decisive.

Key Assumptions

In Russian military thought, warfighting is discussed as distinct from deterrence. So important is this difference that in the Russian military the forces are functionally divided into categories of “general purpose” and “strategic deterrence.” The latter are further divided into offensive and defensive strategic forces. A simple example is the general-purpose role of a missile brigade, supporting an army in the field with precision strikes, versus its strategic deterrence role in firing long-range cruise missiles against critically important economic or military objects far beyond operational depths. Strategic offensive capabilities include long-range conventional weapons, nuclear weapons, directed-energy or cyber weapons, whereas defensive forces consist of missile defense, integrated air defense, and early warning radar systems.

Important assumptions guide Russian thinking in this realm. The first is that while general-purpose forces contribute to conventional deterrence and can win in a small armed conflict or local war, they are insufficient to deter a power like the United States together with a coalition of allies. Today, Russia’s military is much more capable than in the late 1990s or mid-2000s, but only strategic deterrence forces, armed with strategic conventional capabilities (offensive strike and aerospace defense), nonstrategic nuclear weapons, and strategic nuclear weapons, are effective deterrents in regional and large-scale wars. The deterrence stratagems in question are premised on raising the expected costs above that of anticipated gains. They include both preemptive and retaliatory use of force. In general, Russian military analysts assume that defense, while necessary, is cost-prohibitive in a regional or large-scale war. The notion that new anti-access and area-defense capabilities have led to newfound confidence in a deterrence-by-denial approach in Russian thinking is incorrect. More accurately, the Russian military seeks to deny the U.S. a quick or easy victory in the initial period of war, thereby changing the cost calculus relative to interests at stake.

Russian strategy, integrating nonnuclear and nuclear deterrence, is intended to solve a straightforward escalation dilemma stemming from a lack of force flexibility and capability in the 1990s: The United States could inflict unacceptable damage on Russia with conventional capabilities and attain victory with precision-guided weapons in the initial period of war while making minimal contact with Russian forces. Moscow’s answer would necessitate large-scale use of nonstrategic nuclear weapons in theater. This was an untenable situation, which led to the Russian military’s quest for both the ways and means to build a “deterrence ladder” with multiple rungs, and flexibility in conventional and nuclear options, to manage escalation. Conventional force modernization has not altered Russian thinking on the importance of nuclear weapons at higher thresholds of conflict, for intra-war deterrence, and ultimately for warfighting.

The Russian military sees an independent conventional war as possible, but believes conflict is unlikely to remain conventional as it escalates. This is not a departure from late-Soviet military thought. The military expects a great-power war between nuclear peers to eventually involve nuclear weapons, and is comfortable with this reality, unlike U.S. strategists. However, in contrast with Soviet thinking, the Russian military does not believe that limited nuclear use necessarily leads to uncontrolled escalation. The Russian military believes that calibrated use of conventional and nuclear capability is not only possible but may have decisive deterrent effects. This is not an enthusiastically embraced strategy, but an establishment’s answers to wicked problems, in the context of a great-power conflict, which have no easy or ideal solutions.

Strategic Deterrence

Russian approaches to contain, deter, and inflict different levels of damage on potential adversaries can be grouped under the umbrella term of “strategic deterrence” (strategicheskoe sderzhivanie), which has been evolving since the 2000s. In a 2017 speech in Sochi, Putin asserted that Russian defense policy is aimed at “providing guaranteed strategic deterrence, and, in the case of a potential external threat — its effective neutralization.” Strategic deterrence, in the sense used by the Russian president, is a holistic concept that envisions the integration of nonmilitary and military measures to shape adversary decision-making. Russia’s 2015 National Security Strategy defined strategic deterrence as a series of interrelated political, military, military-technical, diplomatic, economic, and informational measures to prevent the use of force against Russia, defend sovereignty, and preserve territorial integrity.

Russia uses strategic deterrence measures continuously — in peacetime not just to deter the use of force or threats against Russia, but to contain adversaries, and in wartime to manage escalation. Nonmilitary measures (considered nonforceful) include “political, diplomatic, legal, economic, ideological, and technical-scientific.” However, deterrence in Russian thinking is founded first and foremost on the coercive power of military measures (forceful in character). Military measures consist of demonstrations of military presence and military power, raising readiness to wartime levels, deploying forces, demonstrating readiness within the forces and means designated to deliver strikes (including with nuclear weapons), and conducting or threatening to conduct single or grouped strikes (which again include nuclear weapons). Such measures are employed in peacetime to deter direct aggression or the use of military pressure against Russian interests. In wartime they are designed to manage escalation and to de-escalate or cease hostilities on terms acceptable to Russia.

Escalation Management and War Termination

Russian stratagems can be divided up into phases of demonstrative actions operating under the principle of deterrence by fear-inducement (устрашение), and progressive infliction of damage, which is deterrence through limited use of force (силовое сдерживание). Deterrence by fear-inducement operates through demonstrative acts, which, during peacetime or a period of perceived military threat, communicate that Russian forces have the means and resolve to inflict damage against an opponent’s vitally important targets. These objects — for example, nuclear and hydroelectric power plants, chemical and petroleum industry facilities, and others — are those that might lead to significant economic losses or loss of life, or impact the target nation’s way of life.

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Housecarl · Sep 22, 2022

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Conversely, deterrence through limited use of force is based on destroying or disabling critically important objects relevant to the economy or the military, but choosing those targets that would not lead to loss of civilian life or risk unintended escalation. The strategy involves signaling the ability and willingness to use force, prior to actual escalation. Either as a preemptive measure, when there is an imminent threat of attack, or at the outset of the conflict, Russian military analysts envision inflicting progressive levels of damage beginning with single and grouped strikes using conventional weapons, and issuing nuclear threats. This constitutes a demonstrative use of force, and could subsequently include nuclear use for demonstration purposes. Both deterrence by fear-inducement and deterrence through limited use of force are iterative processes, not singular attempts to manage escalation via a specific operational ploy. Hence much depends on the opponent’s reaction. Furthermore, applying force does not necessitate use of precision-guided weapons, but can include offensive cyber operations and directed energy weapons, or what the Russian armed forces term “weapons based on new physical principles.”

If escalation cannot be managed, then capabilities are employed en masse for warfighting and retaliation. Generally, the Russian military sees escalation management as possible up to larger-scale employment of nuclear weapons. Subsequent use of force falls primarily into the retaliation category.

As a regional or large-scale conflict escalates, the Russian military could follow the employment of nonnuclear capabilities with single and grouped nuclear strikes using nonstrategic nuclear weapons, either for the purposes of demonstration; against a target in a third country; or against deployed adversary forces. As prospects for managing escalation decline, use of force intensifies with extensive use of precision-guided conventional weapons in a regional war. In a large-scale war, the Russian military expects that its forces will use nonstrategic nuclear weapons in warfighting, together with limited use of strategic nuclear weapons.

The purpose of limited strikes is to shock or otherwise stun opponents, making them realize the economic, political, and military costs they will pay for further aggression, but also to offer them off-ramps. The approaches described above are not mechanistic. Military science may give the impression that these actions are preprogrammed, but much depends on the context and what Russian political leadership authorizes (and the manner in which that authority is given). The figure below offers one representation of the potential courses of action.

(Source: Michael Kofman, Anya Fink, Jeffrey Edmonds, “Russian Strategy for Escalation Management: Evolution of Key Concepts,” CNA paper, April 2020. Data from A.V. Skrypnik, “On a possible approach to determining the role and place of directed energy weapons in the mechanism of strategic deterrence through the use of force,” Armaments and Economics, no. 3 (2012); A.V. Muntyanu and Yu.A. Pechatnov, “Challenging methodological issues on the development of strategic deterrence through the use of military force,” Strategic Stability, no. 3 (2010).)

Damage Levels

Russian military thinking on damage levels has evolved from calculations pegged to unacceptable damage — an absolute amount of destruction visited upon the adversary’s population and economic potential — to subjective or tailored forms of damage. Unacceptable damage is still the byword for Russian strategic nuclear forces. The exact percentage of damage to population and industry is unknown, but some writings base it on ensuring that 100 strategic nuclear warheads reach the U.S. homeland. However, the Russian military believes the actual level of damage required to manage escalation or deter adversaries is much lower, considering unacceptable damage excessive or overkill outside of strategic nuclear retaliation. The concept relevant for escalation management discourse is “deterrent damage,” which is a subjective level of damage that varies from country to country, and the operations envisioned apply this form of damage via “dosing.” For warfighting, the commonplace term is “assigned damage,” presumably set by the general staff in operational planning.

Deterrent damage has two basic components: the material damage inflicted, and the psychological effect based on the opponent’s reaction to the strike and its influence on other coalition members. The idea behind this approach is that damage will have cascading psychological effects on the target, and on the coalition of adversary states, depending on that country’s role. Russian military thinkers have yet to settle on a clear scope for deterrent damage and are struggling with how to quantify it, but it can be best framed as damage greater than the benefits the target expects to gain from using force, and an amount of pain ranging from reversible effects on one end of the spectrum all the way to “unacceptable damage” on the other.

Nuclear versus Nonnuclear Capabilities

In the 1990s, the Russian military debated the role of nonstrategic nuclear weapons in deterring regional war (a regional system of deterrence), and strategic nuclear forces as part of a global system of deterrence for large-scale war. These approaches remain today, but since then a system of nonnuclear deterrence has been established based on strategic conventional capabilities. Russian military strategists see conventional weapons as usable and coercive early on in a conflict or crisis, and naturally they carry far fewer escalatory risks. They have taken over deterrence tasks in the initial period of a regional war from nonstrategic nuclear weapons, and lesser conflicts like local wars.

However, Russia has no intention of replacing nuclear weapons with conventional capabilities across the board. No number of precision-guided weapons will lead the Russian military to forgo nonstrategic nuclear weapons and the threat of nuclear employment in an escalating conflict. The Russian military sees conventional and nuclear capabilities as complementary within its deterrence concepts, not as substitutions for one another.

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has largely disarmed of tactical nuclear weapons save the B-61 variants of gravity bombs, while Russia reduced its nonstrategic nuclear arsenal by about 75 percent. However, the Russian military has been modernizing and expanding nonstrategic nuclear weapons alongside strategic conventional ones. This suggests a different philosophy at work in terms of the balance between conventional and nuclear capabilities in Russian military strategy. Russia sees nuclear weapons as essential because their psychological impact, and deterrent effect, cannot be supplanted by conventional capabilities. They are an asymmetric investment to neutralize U.S. conventional advantages, representing a competitive strategy. Simply put, conventional weapons cannot match the deterrence bang for the ruble spent on nuclear weapons.

No less important is the theory that binds Russian conventional, nonstrategic, and strategic nuclear weapons. Limited use of conventional weapons has added coercive effect if nuclear use is expected to follow, and it lends credibility to follow-on nuclear threats, which by themselves might prove unconvincing in early phases of escalation. A large strategic nuclear arsenal is not just important as a survivable nuclear deterrent. It raises the fear of uncontrolled nuclear escalation once nuclear weapons are used. This nuclear dread generates psychological pressure on the elites and population of a targeted state to avoid escalation once nuclear weapons are used.

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Housecarl · Sep 22, 2022

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Targeting

The Russian military thinking behind targeting, particularly with strategic conventional weapons for escalation management purposes, is to select objects or nodes whose destruction has the potential to create cascading effects on the system as a whole. Targets may, and likely will, include those that have both a deterrent effect and practical military value should the conflict continue; that is, there are targets that may be considered dual purpose. Some military thinkers proposetargeting strategies dividing the approach between strikes aimed at the leadership, and those that seek to affect the population.

Although Russian military analysts propose different lists, they overlap considerably. Political, economic, and military-related targets often include nonnuclear power plants, administrative centers (political), civilian airports, roads and rail bridges, ports, key economic objects, important components of the defense-industrial complex, and sources of mass media and information. Military targets tend to include command and control centers; space-based assets; key communication nodes; systems for reconnaissance, targeting, navigation, and information processing; and locations where means of delivery for ballistic or cruise missiles are based. In general, Russian thinking on targeting seeks to avoid infrastructure whose destruction could result in unintended collateral damage, like dams or nuclear power plants, and lead to unintended counter-escalation from the opponent.

Strikes to inflict limited forms of damage, or large-scale use of the aforementioned capabilities, are executed via strategic operations, discussed in numerous writings, including Strategic Operation for the Destruction of Critically Important Targets and Strategic Nuclear Forces Operation. These joint operations allow the Russian general staff to leverage the force to achieve strategic effects on the adversary’s ability or will to fight.

The Question of Escalate to De-escalate

Whether Russia has a lowered nuclear threshold is a matter of perspective. Moscow sees nuclear weapons as essential for deterrence and useful for nuclear warfighting in regional or large-scale war. That is hardly a recent development, though it may be new to decision-makers in the United States. There is an erroneous perception in American policy circles that at some point Washington and Moscow were on the same page and shared a similar threshold for nuclear use in conflict. It is not clear that this imagined time period ever existed, but perhaps both countries viewed nuclear escalation as uncontrollable, or at least publicly described it as such during the late-Cold War period. In principle, Russian leadership does view nuclear use as defensive, forced by exigent circumstances, and in the context of regional or large-scale conflicts.

Compared to Russian military considerations of the late 1990s and early 2000s, the criteria for use of nuclear forces remains unchanged, and if anything the thinking has been refined over the last two decades, as has declaratory policy. The role of nonstrategic nuclear weapons has been pushed further into regional or large-scale war, with Russia preferring conventional options in a crisis and the initial period of conflict. What has changed in the last two decades is not so much the threshold, but more so the timing when nuclear weapons might come into play. There is strong doubt in Russian military circles that political leadership will authorize early, preemptive use of nuclear weapons. In general, despite some marginal voices who consistently call for early nuclear use, the consensus is that attempts to coerce with nuclear weapons early on will not be credible. This is precisely why the Russian military invested in complementary means of nonnuclear deterrence. However, Russia’s strategy of deterrence by fear-inducement when under military threat makes heavy use of nuclear signaling, which serves to create the impression that the country is far looser with its thinking on nuclear use than is actually the case.

Important differences exist between Russian military thinking on escalation management and what some have characterized as Russia’s early war-termination strategy, nicknamed “escalate to de-escalate,” where Moscow acts aggressively and seeks to terminate the war with preemptive nuclear use. De-escalation as envisioned by the Russian military means escalation management, which includes containing conflict to a specified threshold — for example, keeping a limited war from becoming a regional war — or deterring other states from becoming involved; containing the war geographically; attaining a cessation of hostilities on acceptable but not necessarily victorious terms; or simply generating an operational pause. It includes more than simply war termination. Successful escalation management results in escalation control, because escalation control is not something you do, but something you get as the result.

Single or grouped strikes may or may not result in follow-on nuclear escalation, but widespread use of nuclear weapons is not about escalation management. It is for general warfighting as a last-ditch effort in cases where the military is losing a war and the state is under threat. Can Russia find itself fighting a war that it perceives to be defensive in nature, and then resort to nuclear first use as the conflict escalates? Absolutely, but this proposition assumes a host of military and nonmilitary actions taken on both sides prior to nuclear escalation, rather than an attempt at preemptive nuclear coercion. There is no gimmicky “escalate to win” strategy, in which military strategists believe they can start and quickly end a conflict on their terms thanks to the wonders of nuclear weapons. The U.S. defense strategy community needs to put away this boogeyman and stop telling this scary tale like some kind of nuclear ghost story. The Russian military has a visibly different comfort level with nuclear weapons than the United States, and arguably always will, but it does not write of nuclear escalation in recklessly optimistic terms, incognizant of the associated risks.

Implications for American Strategy

One of the misperceptions about Russian nuclear strategy is that it takes advantage of lower-yield nuclear weapons that the United States does not have. This appears nowhere in Russian military writings or deliberations. There has never been a theory suggesting that asymmetry in yields presents a special escalation dilemma for the United States. The escalation dilemma would be that the United States would be forced to respond to a lower-yield weapon with a high-yield strategic weapon, thereby escalating the nuclear exchange. The “yield gap,” as Dr. Strangelove’s Gen. Buck Turgidson might have declared it had he written the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, is a matter of U.S. defense planners worrying about being self-deterred. It has little to do with Russian nuclear strategy, and it will have precious little effect on Russian thinking. Lower-yield weapons make Russia’s escalation management strategy more viable in practice, especially when considering that in a theater wide conflict they might be used in Eastern Europe or near Russia’s borders.

For the United States, attaining greater force flexibility and developing the ability to respond in kind with a limited number of low-yield nuclear weapons makes sense, but it also reduces Russia’s risk of uncontrolled nuclear escalation. This results in a schizophrenic nuclear posture: Declaratory policy proclaims that nuclear use is dangerous and uncontrollable, while American programmatic strategy contradicts those statements, suggesting that the United States plans to engage in limited nuclear counter-escalation and has bought the tools to do so. One of our findings is that Russian strategy has not been based on the premise that the United States is hamstrung by an asymmetry of yields. The U.S. escalation dilemma stems from its having much lower interests at stake, and its extending deterrence to distant allies, which cannot be resolved by strapping a low-yield warhead onto a submarine-launched ballistic missile.

Although our research explores national-level concepts, it focuses on military strategy and military thought, not political strategy or political intent. These military and national security concepts represent inputs into Russian political decision-making. Military strategy helps establish the potential courses of action, and offers insight into what political leadership might choose to do, but it cannot predict what political leadership will do, or how much confidence it will have in the military plans that are developed.

That said, Russia’s political leadership shows a strong interest and involvement in nuclear strategy, regularly attends military exercises that simulate nuclear use, and is conversant on the questions of nuclear policy. It would be wrong to dismiss Russian military thinking on this subject as general staff or military scientist machinations holding debates in the proverbial wilderness. Russian force structure, exercises, and signaling helps further substantiate the thinking found in Russian military writing. Furthermore, we are skeptical that there is a multiplicity of actors outside of the military, national security leadership, and defense research institutions involved in shaping Russian nuclear strategy.

The challenge posed by Russian nuclear strategy is not just a capability gap, but a cognitive gap. The Russian military establishment has spent decades thinking and arguing about escalation management, the role of conventional and nuclear weapons, targeting, damage, etc. In the United States, precious little attention has been paid to the question of escalation management, which is overshadowed by planning for warfighting. Thinking on escalation management and limited nuclear war should take priority, because the political leadership of any state entering a crisis with a nuclear peer will inevitably wish to be assured that a plausible strategy for escalation management and war termination exists. Otherwise, leaders may back down because the risks may simply outweigh U.S. interests at stake, and the defense establishment’s ideas for managing that potential escalation prove unconvincing.

Simply adding flexibility to the force structure — buying missiles or warheads — will not make for a credible strategy, nor will boisterous policy language deter U.S. adversaries. Seeking to dissuade Russian planners by telling them their strategy won’t work will only reinforce their belief that the United States is deeply concerned about Russian limited nuclear employment, and validate the thinking behind it. There is a general sense in U.S. military circles that it is dangerous for Russia to believe that nuclear escalation can be controlled. Yet by imagining that the United States can have conventional-only wars with nuclear powers, where the stakes for them are likely to become existential, there is an implicit assumption in U.S. defense strategy that Washington can somehow control escalation and dissuade nuclear use on the part of others, without any discernible plan for accomplishing this feat.

Any conflict with Russia will always be implicitly nuclear in nature. If it is not managed, then the logic of such a war is to escalate to nuclear use. The United States needs to develop its own strategy for escalation management, and a stronger comfort level with the realities of nuclear war.

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Michael Kofman serves as director and senior research scientist at CNA Corporation and a fellow at the Wilson Center’s Kennan Institute. Previously he served as program manager at the National Defense University and a nonresident fellow at Modern War Institute at West Point. The views expressed here are his own.

Anya Loukianova Fink is a research analyst at CNA and a research associate at the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland. Previously, she was a fellow in the U.S. Senate and at the RAND Corporation. She holds a PhD in international security and economic policy from the University of Maryland, College Park. The views expressed here are her own.

Housecarl · Sep 22, 2022

The adults had better show up soon.....As it is the DC press may well be waking up to the 'new reality" brought on by their recent collusion

Posted for fair use.....

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/09/22/putin-ukraine-threats-biden-cuban-missile-crisis/

Opinion

To confront Putin, Biden should study the Cuban missile crisis

By David Ignatius
Columnist | Follow
September 22, 2022 at 2:00 p.m. EDT

As Russian President Vladimir Putin tries to salvage his failing invasion of Ukraine, there is a small but growing chance that he will use nuclear weapons. Historians will wonder how this war could have veered toward such insanity, but it’s now inescapably part of the landscape.

“In the event of a threat to the territorial integrity of our country … we will certainly make use of all weapons systems available to us. This is not a bluff,” Putin said in a speech broadcast Wednesday morning. His nuclear umbrella appears to include Ukrainian territory that Russia has seized or plans to annex.

How should President Biden and other world leaders respond to this outrageous blackmail? The answer cannot be to capitulate. That would scar the global future as horribly as this war has already damaged Ukraine. As Biden said Wednesday: “Russia has shamelessly violated the core tenets of the United Nations Charter.”

Leaders must think now with the same combination of toughness and creativity that President John F. Kennedy showed during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. Because that’s the only parallel within most of our lifetimes. That means drawing a firm line — Kennedy never wavered on his demand that Soviet missiles be removed from Cuba — but it also means looking for ways to de-escalate.

Let’s start with the need for firmness from the West. The outcome in Ukraine will set the rules for the 21st century. If Putin’s extortion succeeds, China will surely see it as a precedent for Taiwan. If Chinese leaders see that the United States and its allies can be cowed by a nuclear threat, they will act with greater boldness. That’s the hidden danger of this “little” war in Ukraine: It could set the stage for a big war with China down the road.

The Pentagon has undoubtedly presented Biden with a menu of options for how to respond if Putin, say, uses a tactical nuclear weapon to block further Ukrainian advances toward Crimea and the Donbas region. Biden in an interview broadcast Sunday warned Putin against using nuclear weapons, saying: “Don’t. Don’t. Don’t. It would change the face of war unlike anything since World War II.”

Biden’s comment was more plea than threat. And it was in line with his repeated signals that he wants to avoid any direct U.S.-Russian conflict. That’s admirable restraint, but it’s also part of why Putin keeps raising the ante. Now that Putin has directly threatened use of nuclear weapons, Biden must signal more clearly that the cost would be devastating for Russian forces occupying Ukraine and for Russia itself.
Let’s think now about how Biden can emulate JFK’s clarity and diplomatic finesse. A good start, always, is by understanding your adversary.

Putin is a bully, but what makes him truly dangerous is that he has woven a narrative of Russia’s victimization that causes him to view the Ukraine conflict almost as a holy war. He claimed Wednesday that the West’s goal in Ukraine “is to weaken, divide and ultimately destroy our country.” That might sound mad, but Putin clearly believes it. So, one message Biden needs to send, to Putin and the Russian people, is that the West doesn’t seek dominion. Sketching a path toward mutual postwar stability if Russia halts its aggression would be a start.

Kennedy’s genius in the Cuban missile crisis was to respond to a message from Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev that offered a path to de-escalation, rather than to more belligerent messages.

Is there a similar off-ramp with Ukraine? I doubt it. But I was struck that Putin in his Wednesday speech repeated the same claim he made at a news conference last week in Uzbekistan — that Russia had been prepared for a “peaceful settlement” in the negotiations brokered by Turkey in Istanbul in late March, but that Ukraine and the West had balked. Okay, that’s the letter to answer.

Biden and Putin are a study in contrasts. One is an aging elected politician; the other is a famously vigorous, unelected dictator; one has near-consensus support at home for his Ukraine policy; the other is increasingly attacked in Moscow by right-wing hawks and left-wing doves; one has a unified presidential administration; the other faces growing Kremlin bickering and finger-pointing; one has solid allies across Europe; the other has increasingly wary support from China and India. Clearly, whatever the differences in age and aggressiveness, Biden’s is the stronger hand.

Ukraine, for now, shows no interest in the sort of diplomatic process that Biden has said is necessary to end the war. The Ukrainians want to press their advantage against the retreating Russians, regaining as much territory as possible before winter. There’s a kind of catch-22 at work here: When the Ukrainians were losing ground last summer, they didn’t want to negotiate from weakness. Now that they’re advancing, they see no reason to compromise from a position of strength. Kyiv needs a reality check about its longer-term battlefield prospects.

Kennedy succeeded in the Cuban missile crisis for two reasons. First, he showed that he was prepared to risk nuclear war to stop a reckless move by Moscow. Second, through a secret back channel, he found a face-saving way to avoid the ultimate catastrophe. Biden should study both lessons.

201 Comments

jward · Oct 4, 2022

Some of the geopolitical threads from the last few weeks.
Those noted in the OP are also still relevant and well worth a look, too.

ENER - Nordstream 1 and Nordstream 2 had sudden pressure drop - Likely Sabotage

ALERT - Putin speech from the Kremlin on annexation live

GOV/MIL - US Military Has a Mass Monitoring Tool that can Spy on 93% of ALL Internet Traffic, Including Email, Browser Data

INTL - Africa: Politics, Economics, Military- October 2022

INTL - Europe: Politics, Economics, Military- October 2922

INTL - Latin America and the Islamic: Politics, Economics, Military- October 2022

INTL - Something unusual is indeed going on in China: Rumours all over the place, including suggestions it's a coup.

jward · Oct 4, 2022

Despite economic woes, UK leaders tout massive defense-spending hike
Andrew Chuter

LONDON — Britain may be in economic turmoil right now but that hasn’t stopped Defense Secretary Ben Wallace emphasizing the new government’s pledge to effectively double spending on the military by 2030.

In his first interview since the Conservative government, led by new Prime Minister Liz Truss, took office earlier this month Wallace said defense spending by the end of the decade would see a massive increase, doubling annually to £100 billion ($107 billion) compared with £48 billion ($51 billion) now.

The interview has raised questions among some analysts who wonder whether the plan is affordable and are skeptical over exactly how the British are going to digest such a massive budgetary increase in such a short time.

Wallace told the Sunday Telegraph Sept. 26 that Truss had been adamant about defense being a priority, pledging to increase spending to “2.5 percent [of GDP] by 2026 and 3 percent by 2030.”

The defense secretary, one of the few senior ministers to stay in post when the Truss government was formed, declined to give any details of when, where and even how the money might be spent.

Heavy artillery, reversing planned cuts to the British Army, and increased investments in intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance (ISTAR) capabilities all got a mention as potential beneficiaries, though.

“It’s highly likely we will grow the Army, but it might not be in the places the armchair generals want you to, because what we desperately need is to, for example, invest in our intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capability,” Wallace said.

Much depends on the lessons learned from the Russian invasion of the Ukraine.

During a trip to New York to attend the United Nations General Assembly last week Truss confirmed that a new look at the government’s integrated defense and security review, published in 2021, was underway as a result of the attack.

The pledge of what would be a huge rise in defense spending comes as the Ministry of Defence and the country in general brace for tough economic times. Rising inflation, a slump in the value of the Pound against the dollar and sky high fuel costs are battering defense department finances.

With the Pound approaching parity with the dollar it’s not just a problem for the government.

Industry will suffer, too, said John Louth, an independent analyst here. “A lot of companies haven’t sufficiently hedged the exchange costs in their supply chains; it is going to be an absolute nightmare,” he said.

The economic difficulties have driven some analysts here to question whether a £100 billion-a-year defense budget is affordable let alone whether the MoD could rapidly digest such huge spending increases.

Malcolm Chalmers, the deputy director general of the Royal United Services Institute think tank in London, made clear the scale of the effort required to spend such a huge budget increase.

A 3% rise would be equivalent to about £157 billion ($168 billion) in additional spending over the next eight years compared with current plans, he wrote in a paper published recently.

According to Louth, spending so much additional money sensibly would be a struggle.

“They are grappling with how do they effectively double spending in six years,” he said. “I don’t think they understand what their priorities are yet, or how they can programmatize such an effort.”

Louth added: “We are in an era of ‘Alice in Wonderland’ economics in the U.K., so answers to those kind of questions likely won’t matter anyway.”

Howard Wheelden, a consultant at Wheeldon Strategic Advisory in London reckons there is little chance the budget numbers touted by Wallace and Truss will actually be met

With little more than two years before the next general election, Wheeldon said rebuilding the economy in that time will be little short of a miracle. “Bringing voters on-side to believe that doubling spending on defense by 2030 … is hard to comprehend,” he said.

Andrew Chuter is the United Kingdom correspondent for Defense News.

Despite economic woes, UK leaders tout massive defense-spending hike

Analysts question whether the Ministry of Defence could even spend the amount of extra money envisioned by the Truss government.

www.defensenews.com

jward · Oct 4, 2022

French 2023 defense budget adds $3 billion to fund ‘war economy’
Vivienne Machi

STUTTGART, Germany — Propelled by an edict to make deep investments in its defense industrial base, France’s Ministry of Defense has unveiled a 2023 budget worth billions more than the previous year to launch a new “war economy.”

The proposed €43.9 billion ($42.8 billion) for the French military represents a 36% increase over the 2017 budget and a 7.4% increase over 2022 funds. The €3 billion add for 2023 amounts to nearly twice the year-over-year increases seen in the past couple of years, officials noted during a Tuesday press briefing. Between 2019 and 2022′s budgets, the yearly increase stood at around €1.7 billion, which was the target to reach according to the military’s 2019-2025 military program law.

The increase was forecast by Defense Minister Sebastian Lecornu when he met with French lawmakers this summer.

The ‘war economy’

Equipment orders take up the largest amount in the budget, standing at €38 billion, or $37 billion. The orders, officials said, reflected French President Emanuel Macron’s declaration in July of a “war economy.”

The new funding will launch the “transformation of our industry’s production model towards a ‘war economy,’ and guarantee our sovereignty by renewing our [munition] stocks,” Lecornu said in a statement accompanying the budget documents.

The goal is to boost orders of equipment to keep the production lines moving for France’s defense and industrial base, to keep ammunition supplies high and to prevent any capability attrition in the case of an “engagement,” per ministry documents.

In 2023, the French army plans to order:

420 Serval light armored vehicles,
8,000 HK416 assault rifles,
46 satellite communication ground stations for the Syracuse IV constellation,
one lot of medium-range missiles,
22 next-generation multirole helicopters,
22 heavy armored vehicles for special forces.

The navy plans to order:

3 naval counter-UAS devices,
19 naval SATCOM stations for Syracuse IV,
one lot of MBDA-built Exocet anti-ship missiles,
one lot of MBDA Aster-30 missiles for use on the FREMM multirole frigates,
an “exploratory capacity” for the deep sea beds.

In the air and space domains, the orders include:

42 Rafale fighter aircraft,
One lot of 320 BK 1 NT Aster missiles,
Various equipment kits for France’s Eurocopter EC 725 Caracal helicopters, along with the CN235 and A400M transport aircraft.

Among major developments, the ministry expects to perform the first firing of the next-generation MICA air-to-air missiles built by MBDA, which will equip France’s fighter jets. Munition replenishment in all services takes up €2 billion worth of orders in 2023.

Over €5 billion ($4.8 billion) in the total budget is earmarked for maintenance, a 12% funding increase over last year, which includes investments in digital tools and additive manufacturing capabilities, as well as optimizing supply chain fluxes, per the ministry.

(Relatively) new focus areas

The French Ministry of Defense highlighted “new” areas of funding in the budget, to include €702 million dedicated to the space domain, while €288 million is earmarked for the cyber domain. The ministry plans to recruit about 1,900 “cyber combatants” by 2025. The amount of €467 million is highlighted for information warfare systems.

The most notable “new” funding category is dedicated to seabed warfare, which would receive €3.5 million in 2023. Those funds would cover the protection of sovereign assets deep underwater such as natural resources and deep-sea cables, and invest in tech that could recover “sensitive objects,” per the ministry.

A total of €8 billion is dedicated to research-and-development efforts, including €6 billion for new development programs, while €1 billion is earmarked for “innovation,” the same amount of funding as last year. For R&D, six key priority areas are noted: cyberdefense, counter-UAS technologies, seabed dominance, hypervelocity, and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense.

Notable exceptions: FCAS and MGCS

Two French-involved programs stand out in the budget thanks to their omission: the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) effort to build a Franco-German-Spanish next-generation fighter aircraft and associated new systems, and the Main Ground Combat System tank in development by Paris and Berlin. The two programs are nowhere to be seen in the budget documents provided by the ministry.

Both efforts have slowed to just about a complete stop at the moment. French ministry officials on Tuesday asserted there was funding in the budget for both efforts to proceed to their next phases of development, but they declined to provide the numbers.

A request for funding numbers to the Ministry of Defense by Defense News was not returned by late Wednesday. Last year, the minister had budgeted €282.7 million for the FCAS program to fund ongoing studies and preparations for the demonstrator phase, while the MGCS program was slated to receive €58 million for ongoing studies.

Meanwhile, the budget documents laud European-wide defense measures undertaken in 2022, noting that increased tensions in the Indo-Pacific region and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have led to a “collective awareness to strengthen European defense.” Nearly €8 billion, or $7.8 billion, will contribute to European-wide initiatives, and France is involved in 47 of the 61 projects selected for the inaugural European Defence Fund cycle announced in July.

Vivienne Machi is a reporter based in Stuttgart, Germany, contributing to Defense News' European coverage. She previously reported for National Defense Magazine, Defense Daily, Via Satellite, Foreign Policy and the Dayton Daily News. She was named the Defence Media Awards' best young defense journalist in 2020.

French 2023 defense budget adds $3 billion to fund ‘war economy’

The increase was forecast by Defense Minister Sebastian Lecornu when he met with French lawmakers this summer.

www.defensenews.com

jward · Oct 4, 2022

Lithuania boosts defense budget to buy HIMARS, trucks, drones
Jaroslaw Adamowski

WARSAW, Poland — The Lithuanian government has decided to allocate additional funds for the country’s Defence Ministry this year, paving the way for the purchase of High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems, or HIMARS, Oshkosh joint light tactical vehicles (JLTVs) and Switchblade drones from the United States.

In response to Russia’s invasion of its neighbor Ukraine, Lithuania has decided to expand its military budget by some €148 million (US$144.5 million) this year. In total, the government plans to earmark 2.52 percent of the country’s 2022 gross domestic product for defense.

“In the context of the war started by Russia, we are increasing funding for defense, consistently implementing the agreement of the parliamentary parties,” Finance Minister Gintarė Skaistė said in a press release.

The country’s Ministry of National Defence said in a statement that “Lithuanian and U.S. officials are planning to sign contracts on acquisitions that are important to Lithuania this year” including deals to buy “HIMARS missile systems, Switchblade combat drones, and JLTV armored combat support all-terrain vehicles.”

Since the war’s outbreak, Lithuania has transferred some 50 M113 armored personnel carriers to Ukraine, and the JLTV acquisition is designed to backfill this capacity.

With Ukraine using U.S.-supplied systems to combat Russia’s aggression, Lithuania is one of the region’s countries who plan to buy Lockheed Martin’s weapon to boost their rocket artillery capabilities. Last July, neighboring Latvia sent a letter of request to buy an undisclosed number of M142 HIMARS launchers, two months after Poland filed a letter of request to order about 500 such weapons.

Jaroslaw Adamowski is the Poland correspondent for Defense News.

Lithuania boosts defense budget to buy HIMARS, trucks, drones

In total, the government plans to earmark 2.52 percent of the country’s 2022 gross domestic product for defense.

www.defensenews.com

jward · Oct 4, 2022

Pointed at China, US spreads THAAD all around Guam
Richard S Ehrlich

The Pentagon wants to scatter its surface-to-air Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile launchers and radar onto diverse tiny islands around Guam, instead of currently concentrating everything at one site there, to survive possible US-China warfare in the West Pacific.

Guam’s strategic air and naval facilities, including Andersen Air Force Base, Naval Base Guam, Marine Corps Camp Blaz, and the Joint Region Marianas Headquarters, are perceived main targets for China if warfare erupts against the US in the Pacific over Taiwan island’s government, or territorial disputes in the South China Sea.

Guam island is the nearest American base on US territory to mainland China. China’s largest commercial city Shanghai is 1,800 miles (2,897 kilometers) northwest from Guam. Andersen AFB would be a vital forward position for launching, re-arming, and repairing US strike aircraft.

“Naval Base Guam is strategically located to support all submarines deployed to 7th Fleet,” the Navy said on its Commander Submarine Force website.

The 7th Fleet, based in Yokosuka, Japan, includes nuclear submarines. The US Army is already testing the diversification of THAAD’s missile launchers and telecommunications on remote islands.

The US Navy is meanwhile preparing West Pacific sites for installations of THAAD’s radar and other equipment, plus possible personnel. Some of THAAD’s mobile assets may be kept on ships. THAAD has been on Guam island since 2013.

THAAD’s missiles currently provide only a sliver of protection and are not strong enough to fully protect Guam, according to Guam-based Joint Region Marianas Commander, Navy Rear Admiral Benjamin Nicholson.

THAAD “gives us protection from ballistic missiles, and some of the other missiles as well, but it is somewhat limited in scope,” Nicholson said in June, according to Air Force magazine.
A THAAD, interceptor missile launcher, operated by the U.S. Army’s 3rd Air Defense Artillery Regiment, in place at Andersen Air Force Base’s Northwest Field in Yigo on November 17, 2021. Photo: Facebook

“The new system will provide a more comprehensive ability to defend the island [Guam] from all threat axes, and a larger group of missiles.

“That’s in the works. There’s still a lot of work to be done, on where those parts and pieces will go,” Nicholson said.

The new Guam Defense System would ideally include 360-degree radar and missile defenses against advanced ballistic, hypersonic, and cruise missiles, plus sophisticated drones and space weaponry.

Britain’s “BAE Systems has received a contract from Lockheed Martin to design and manufacture next-generation infrared Seeker technology for the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) interceptor missile,” BAE Systems announced on August 16.

“Guided by BAE Systems’ infrared technology, THAAD interceptors engage ballistic missiles and destroy warheads with kinetic force in or out of the atmosphere,” it said.

Guam, a sunny L-shaped island only 30 miles (48 kilometers) long and eight miles at its widest, is home to 170,000 Americans on its 225 square miles (362 kilometers).

“In a war with China, the American territory of Guam would likely become the 21st Century Pearl Harbor,” reported Task & Purpose, a news site focused on active duty military.

Opponents denounce the THAAD diversification strategy as hype and alarmism for a lucrative, oceanic arms race against China.

“Guam is home to Andersen Air Force Base, from which F-22 Raptors and strategic bomber rotations project US power from the skies, and to the deep-water port Apra Harbor, which plays a critical role in US Navy missions aimed at keeping trade routes open,” the Hudson Institute said in July.

“Guam’s strategic importance is difficult to overstate,” Navy Admiral John Aquilino, head of US Indo-Pacific Command, told the House Appropriations Committee-Defense in May.

“The [Defense] Department has committed more than $11 billion for military construction projects on Guam in FY22-FY27.”

Guam’s new, expanded missile defense “will include Navy SM-3 and SM-6 missiles, the Patriot air-and-missile defense system and the Army’s Terminal High Altitude Area Defense System,” Defense News reported in March.

“Think of it as a distributed system,” said Missile Defense Agency Director, Vice Admiral Jon Hill.

Previous plans for Guam considered Israel’s Iron Dome Missile Defense system, by Rafael, and an Aegis Ashore missile site.

“In 2021, the Army tested the Iron Dome missile defense system on Guam, but its high humidity proved a challenge,” Air Force Magazine reported on June 21.
An Israeli Iron Dome anti-rocket system and an American Patriot missile defense system are shown during a joint US-Israel military exercise on March 8, 2018. Photo: AFP/Getty/Jack Guez

“Now the Missile Defense Agency is proposing a multi-layer defense system, seeking $539 million in fiscal 2023 to begin building a multi-layer defense system for Guam that could be fielded by 2026.”

To test a remote launch’s ability to hit an incoming ballistic missile, a Lockheed Martin manufactured THAAD unit was deployed in March to Rota island, also a US territory, 40 miles (64 kilometers) northeast of Guam.

Rota is expected to be among the “dispersed” tiny West Pacific islands and “austere locations” handling pieces of THAAD’s integrated functions, the report said.

Sites presumably also could include uninhabited and sparsely inhabited rocky isles and outcroppings. The US Army said it was thrilled with THAAD’s test results on Rota island.

“THAAD’s newest piece of equipment, the Remote Launch Kit, proved its worth.

“In a first-ever operation, the air defenders of the E-3 Air Defense Battery used the newly developed Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD, remote launch capability to expand their ability to defend the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI),” the Army reported on its website in March.

“The exercise was to demonstrate a new capability we received January — the Remote Launch Kit,” said Army E-3 Air Defense Battery’s 1st Lieutenant Peter Gonsalves.

“On Rota, [we] brought a launcher and wanted to send a message that we can defend the entirety of CNMI,” Gonsalves said according to the Army’s website.

“There is a misconception that we only protect Andersen Air Force Base. By bringing a launcher out here, we can show all the people here on Rota that we are not just an organization that is defending military assets, but are here to protect their safety as well,” he said.

Navy Admiral Phil Davidson, head of INDOPACOM, told members of Congress in 2021: “China’s own Air Force has put out a propaganda video showing their H-6 bomber force attacking Andersen Air Force Base at Guam, and distributed that quite publicly.”
Part of America – Tumon Bay in Guam. Photo: AFP / Mar-Vic Cagurangen

The Hudson Institute said US “policymakers should educate the American public on the integral role the US territory of Guam plays in the security of the United States and in the American way of life.

“A lack of support domestically to fight from, and for, Guam could convey a lack of political will on the part of US government officials.

“It is wise to make efforts publicly, in rhetoric – for example, Admiral Davidson’s effort to describe Guam’s defense as ‘Homeland Defense System Guam.'”

Richard S Ehrlich is a Bangkok-based American foreign correspondent reporting from Asia since 1978. Excerpts from his two new nonfiction books, “Rituals. Killers. Wars. & Sex. — Tibet, India, Nepal, Laos, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka & New York” and “Apocalyptic Tribes, Smugglers & Freaks” are available here.

Pointed at China, US spreads THAAD all around Guam

The Pentagon wants to scatter its surface-to-air Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile launchers and radar onto diverse tiny islands around Guam, instead of currently concentrating ev…

asiatimes.com

jward · Oct 4, 2022

US Has Lost Conventional Overmatch, Needs Investment to Maintain Deterrence - Air & Space Forces Magazine
Sept. 21, 2022 | By John A. Tirpak

China has advanced so far and so fast in its air and space power that the Air Force’s ability to deter through conventional forces is at risk, Air Combat Command chief Gen. Mark Kelley said Sept. 21. He said the combat air forces are short 12 squadrons of multirole aircraft.

“By any measure, we have departed the era of conventional overmatch,” Kelly said in a speech at AFA’s Air, Space & Cyber Conference.

“When you have conventional overmatch, strategic risk is low. But that’s not where we’ve arrived in terms of conventional deterrence.”

The combat air forces are less than half the size they were when the U.S. prevailed quickly and with relatively few casualties in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, and the size of the combat air forces is well below where various unclassified studies have said they need to be, Kelly said. The exact numbers are highly classified, he said.

Kelly said the Air Force needs 60 fighter squadrons to meet all the responsibilities it’s carrying with regard to homeland defense, overseas contingencies, overseas presence, and crisis response, but only has 48 squadrons of what he termed “multirole” fighters. He has an additional nine squadrons of A-10s, which he called “attack” aircraft, but they lack the multirole capability that allows them to be plugged into the global force management scheme. Combatant commanders want multirole aircraft to be able to fulfill a variety of missions, which the A-10 cannot do. He lauded the A-10 community as brave and willing to go wherever they’re sent, but lacking in the capabilities needed to meet COCOM needs and prevail in air-to-air combat.

The shortages are felt mostly in Pacific Air Forces, which needs 13 squadrons but fields only 11, and in crisis response forces, which are five squadrons short of requirements, Kelly said.

There’s also an insufficient number of squadrons transitioning to new aircraft. Kelly said eight squadrons should be in that process but only three are.

“If there is an insufficient number in conversion, that either means your fighter force is getting smaller, getting older, becoming less capable, or all three,” he said.

The age of the fighter fleet was 9.7 years in 1991, but is 28.8 years now, he noted.

Readiness is also taking a dive, Kelly said, with fighter pilot flying hours hovering around 9.7 hours a month, versus 22.3 just before Desert Storm.

“Some folks may surmise that I’m trying to make a case for 134-fighter squadrons or 10-year-old aircraft where pilots get over 20 hours a month,” Kelly said, and while that would be a good thing, “it completely misses the point,” which is that declining readiness of the fighter force raises the risk that an adversary will see an advantage, resulting in a failure of conventional deterrence.

Kelly ticked off a series of combat air force achievements of China’s People’s Liberation Army Air Force, which has gone from a rudimentary force to one that has nearly caught up to USAF through the rapid, “iterative” deployment of better aircraft and greater capabilities.

He also warned that there are “fourth-generation aircraft with fifth-generation capabilities,” and that it’s become too simplistic to pigeonhole aircraft into various categories. Older aircraft are carrying increasingly sophisticated sensors and weapons, he said.

Kelly also argued that there must not be a tradeoff between capacity and quality in the Air Force. He noted that Germany in World War II fielded rocket planes, jet fighters, jet bombers and rudimentary ICBMs—a truly advanced capability—yet got “completely destroyed,” because it failed to have enough air force assets.

“What I’m arguing for,” he said, is a force that will discourage any potential opponent from even contemplating a war with the U.S.

“Who wants to pick a fight with a nation that has 134 fighter squadrons” that are modernized, well-equippped and well trained, he asked. “No nation in their right mind,” he answered.

Kelly said the nation must stay on a rhythm of fielding at least 72 new fighters a year, and keep allies and partners at a comparable level of capability, because the U.S. will depend on them to provide mass.

He said the Air Force is still planning a “4+1” fighter force comprised of F-22s—which must be kept credible until the Next-Generation Air Dominance Fighter arrives, he said—the F-15E/EX family for “large munitions and payloads,” the F-35 for taking down enemy air defense systems, and the F-16 as the “capacity” airplane, with the A-10s as an attack aircraft force that will phase out circa 2030.

In a later press conference, Kelly told reporters it is too soon to think about the effect on the structure of the force that uncrewed collaborative combat aircraft will have; they will need to be put in the hands of “the captains” who will figure out the best use of such aircraft. It’s also too soon to calculate how many CCAs could be substitute for a fighter squadron, if indeed such a metric is ever applied.

US Has Lost Conventional Overmatch, Needs Investment to Maintain Deterrence - Air & Space Forces Magazine

U.S. Air Force lacks the fighter squadrons and readiness to deter Chinese aggression, Air Combat Command leader says.

www.airandspaceforces.com

jward · Oct 5, 2022

USAF Drones to Receive AI Gun Detection Solution
Rojoef Manuel
3 minutes

US Air Force AFWERX has awarded ZeroEyes a contract to deliver its AI gun detection solution for the service’s unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) at the Dover Air Force Base, Delaware.

The $1.25 million Direct-to-Phase II SBIR (Small Business Innovation Research) grant is the third contract the air force has awarded to the firm this year.

ZeroEyes’ technology will enable UAVs to detect handheld weapons for base protection.

The detection system is programmed with machine learning software with internet protocol security cameras that “identify the gun before the first shot is fired.”

After identification, the system shares screenshots of threats. An operator at a control facility confirms the weapon and triggers the drones to activate its response and interference components.

The entire process of AI-based gun detection takes three to five seconds, according to the firm.

“A quarter of active shootings take place on government property, and we will take every step possible to protect our Airmen,” Dover Air Force Base Chief innovation Officer Capt. Nicholas Martini said.

“ZeroEyes’ technology not only provides another layer of security; it will also enable us to reduce our investment in security personnel and use our manpower for more mission-critical tasks.”
ZeroEyes’ Gun Detection in USAF

USAF’s 325th Security Forces Squadron tested the ZeroEyes’ AI detection solution at Tyndall Air Force Base in March.

“The AI software can identify weapons such as shotguns, rifles and other weapon models,” said 325th Security Forces Squadron Tech and Innovation Officer-in-Charge Staff Sgt. Nicholas Murphy said.

“This innovation in technology is ‘early warning’ in nature and can help security forces Airmen save seconds that will save lives.”

“It is fully mission capable and due to that presence, it is a deterrence to stop or mitigate damage. The AI meets our mission intent because these technologies are used to strengthen our multi-layered base defense capability and augment our manpower.”
Other Contracts from AFWERX

In June, the firm received a $750,000 SBIR contract from AFWERX for the research, development, and deployment of the detection software at Ellsworth Air Force Base in South Dakota.

One month later, Zero Eyes secured another $1.2 million contract to integrate the technology at Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota.

USAF Drones to Receive AI Gun Detection Solution

The US Air Force has awarded ZeroEyes a contract to deliver its AI gun detection solution for the service’s drones at the Dover Air Force Base, Delaware.

www.thedefensepost.com

jward · Oct 5, 2022

Taiwan Will Treat China Flights Into Airspace as ‘First Strike’
Sarah Zheng, Cindy Wang

Taipei warns against incursions into 12-nautical-mile zone Latest attempt to deter Beijing’s military pressure campaign
Biden Says US Forces Would Defend Taiwan From China Attack

October 5, 2022 at 2:01 AM CDT

Taiwan warned it would treat any Chinese incursion into the island’s airspace as a “first strike,” as Taipei seeks to deter Beijing from ratcheting up military pressure around the island.

Defense Minister Chiu Kuo-cheng told lawmakers in Taipei that the ministry was taking such incursions more seriously after a recent spate of closer flights by Chinese warplanes and drones. Pressed on whether any warplane’s violation of Taiwan’s airspace would be viewed as a first strike, Chiu said, “Yes,” without elaborating what the response would be.

Taiwan Will Treat China Flights Into Airspace as ‘First Strike’

Taiwan warned it would treat any Chinese incursion into the island’s airspace as a “first strike,” as Taipei seeks to deter Beijing from ratcheting up military pressure around the island.

www.bloomberg.com

jward · Oct 5, 2022

US Nuclear Posture Unchanged Despite 'Concerning' Russian Threats, Officials Say - Air & Space Forces Magazine

Oct. 3, 2022 | By Chris Gordon

The U.S. has not seen anything that indicates it should adjust its nuclear posture, a senior U.S. military official told reporters Oct. 3. The official’s remarks came as the Biden administration has sought to calm tensions following Russian President Vladimir Putin’s hints that the country might consider the use of nuclear weapons.

After announcing the illegal annexation of four Ukrainian regions, Putin said he would use “all available means” to defend the territories, which Russia does not fully control. In comments that caused anxiety in the West, the Russian leader also said the U.S. had created a “precedent” for the use of nuclear weapons in warfare during World War II.
The senior military official declined to say whether the U.S. has detected any movement of Russia’s nuclear forces, citing the need to protect American intelligence. But the official’s overall assessment reinforced recent comments by Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III.
“To be clear, the guy who makes that decision, I mean, it’s one man,” Austin said in an interview with CNN that aired Oct.

2. “There are no checks on Mr. Putin. Just as he made the irresponsible decision to invade Ukraine, you know, he could make another decision. But I don’t see anything right now that would lead me to believe that he has made such a decision.”
Putin is reportedly in an increasingly precarious situation in Ukraine, with his forces in disarray as a result of Ukraine’s counteroffensive in the east and south of the country. In response, Russia announced a partial mobilization of around 300,000 troops, leading to some displays of unrest across the country.
Some of Putin’s most prominent and vocal supporters have blasted the country’s military leadership and have demanded tougher action, including the potential use of nuclear weapons.
Russia has around 2,000 short-range tactical nuclear weapons that analysts worry it could use on a battlefield or as a show of force.

Though the two sides are not currently engaged in arms control talks, Russia has adhered to the New START treaty, which limits the U.S. and Russian long-range nuclear arsenals, U.S. officials say. The treaty has been extended until 2026.
Another senior Defense Department official criticized Russia’s loose talk of nuclear weapons.

“Russia is a major nuclear power,” Celeste Wallander, assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, said at an event Oct. 3 hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “It sets the tone for the global community along with other major nuclear powers in responsible stewardship of a nuclear capability. And that does not include saber-rattling and threatening small, weaker, non-nuclear countries on his border, specifically Ukraine.”
“This facile reliance on nuclear threats is really concerning,” she added.

US Nuclear Posture Unchanged Despite 'Concerning' Russian Threats, Officials Say - Air & Space Forces Magazine

The U.S. has not seen anything that indicates it should adjust its nuclear posture, a senior U.S. military official told reporters Oct. 3.

www.airandspaceforces.com

jward · Oct 5, 2022

US may establish new command in Germany to arm Ukraine: report

Rachel Nostrant

A Ukrainian soldier helps a wounded fellow soldier on the road in the freed territory in the Kharkiv region, Ukraine, Monday, Sept. 12, 2022. (AP Photo/Kostiantyn Liberov)
A new mission is being established at U.S. European Command’s headquarters in Germany to oversee how the U.S. trains and equips Ukrainian troops, according to a report by the New York Times.
The plan for a formal structure in Wiesbaden, Germany, for the U.S. efforts to aid Ukraine following the Russian invasion in February was presented by EUCOM commander Gen. Christopher Cavoli to Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin in late September, according to the Times.

Citing an unnamed source within the U.S. military and Biden administration, the Times reported that the new command would include approximately 300 personnel, and would likely report to Cavoli. While the command’s headquarters would be situated in Wiesbaden, training would likely take place at other U.S. bases in Germany, such as Grafenwoehr or Hohenfels, where the Army has large ranges.
A final decision on the command is expected within the next few weeks.
“In close coordination with our Allies and partners, we continue to take steps to align our support to the Ukrainian Armed Forces in a more unified manner in order to aid the Ukrainians with their most urgent needs on the battlefield against the Russian invading force,” EUCOM spokesman Lt. Cmdr. Daniel Day told Military Times in a statement. “At this time, any additional changes or moves to improve our ability to support the Ukrainians are pre-decisional, but as previously stated, we continue to take steps to better align our support.”

Signs of a potential re-structuring have been seen in recent weeks, as a multi-national logistics cell — the International Donor Coordination Center — moved from Stuttgart to Wiesbaden earlier this summer.
“The co-location with the U.S. Army Europe and Africa headquarters, as well as XVIII Airborne Corps increases the ability of the organization to rapidly support Ukraine operations,” EUCOM said in a statement regarding the Aug. 6 move.
The U.S. military began its mission to train Ukrainian troops well before Russia launched its full-scale war earlier this year. The initial efforts began in 2015, following the separation of Crimea from Ukraine.

U.S. troops, in addition to forces from Canada, Lithuania, Denmark, Poland, Sweden and the United Kingdom, have been training Ukrainian forces through the Joint Multinational Training Group-Ukraine. Initially stationed at the Combat Training Center-Yavoriv near Lviv, in western Ukraine, the troops were removed just before the invasion began.
“United States military units support the training to strengthen relationships and affirm the United States’ commitment to European partners,” a press release from the Army stated. “Army National Guard brigade combat teams provide the main support to the Joint Multinational Training Group-Ukraine mission in nine-month rotations as part of the Army’s rotational model.”

The U.S. military also still has thousands of troops positioned across Europe in response to the invasion, including in Poland, Romania, Germany, Latvia and Lithuania. To date, the U.S. has committed more than $16 billion to Ukraine.
Rachel is a Marine Corps veteran and a master's candidate at New York University's Business & Economic Reporting program.

US may establish new command in Germany to arm Ukraine: report

A final decision on the command is expected within the next few weeks.

www.defensenews.com

jward · Oct 6, 2022

Attackers kill a mayor, state lawmaker separately in Mexico

Mexican authorities say attackers have gunned down a mayor in the southern state of Guerrero, while unconfirmed local media reports say others were killed in the attack

MEXICO CITY (AP) — Attackers gunned down a mayor in the southern Mexico state of Guerrero on Wednesday, authorities reported, while unconfirmed local media reports said eight others also were killed.
Later in the neighboring state of Morelos, a state lawmaker was shot to death in the city of Cuernavaca south of Mexico City.

While attacks on public officials are not uncommon in Mexico, these come at a time when the security strategy of President Andrés Manuel López Obrador is being sharply debated. The president has placed tremendous responsibility on the armed forces rather than civilian police for reining in Mexico’s persistently high levels of violence.

Guerrero’s security coordination group confirmed the killing of Conrado Mendoza, mayor of San Miguel Totolapan, in a statement. The remote township is in Tierra Caliente, one of Mexico’s most conflictive areas, disputed by multiple drug trafficking gangs.
In 2016, Totolapan locals fed up with abductions by the local gang “Los Tequileros,” kidnapped the gang leader’s mother to leverage the release of others.
Late Wednesday, local media outlets said at least eight people were killed in the attack. There was no confirmation from authorities.

In Cuernavaca, Morelos State Attorney General Uriel Carmona said two armed men traveling on a motorcycle fatally shot state Deputy Gabriela Marín as she exited a vehicle.
Local outlets said Marín, a member of the Morelos Progress party, was killed at a pharmacy in Cuernavaca. A person with Marín was reportedly wounded in the attack.
Morelos Gov. Cuauhtémoc Blanco condemned the attack and said via Twitter that security forces were deployed in search of the attackers.
The deaths of Mendoza and Marín brought the number of mayors killed during López Obrador’s administration to 18 and the number of state lawmakers to eight, according to data from Etellekt Consultores.
Mexico’s Congress this week is debating the president’s proposal to extend the military’s policing duties to 2028. Last month, lawmakers approved López Obrador’s push to transfer the ostensibly civilian National Guard to military control.

Copyright 2022 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed without permission.

Attackers kill a mayor, state lawmaker separately in Mexico

Mexican authorities say attackers have gunned down a mayor in the southern state of Guerrero, while unconfirmed local media reports say others were killed in the attack. Later Wednesday, in

www.elpasoinc.com

jward · Oct 6, 2022

How We Would Know When China Is Preparing to Invade Taiwan
John Culver

As tensions between China, Taiwan, and the United States have increased over the past year, numerous articles and pundits have posited that war could come sooner rather than later. These speculations were prompted by comments from senior U.S. military officers that Chinese President Xi Jinping has directed the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to be prepared to invade the island by 2027, although the basis for this claim is not given. A new report claims some in the U.S. intelligence community now assess that China could attack as soon as 2024 (presumably around Taiwan’s January 2024 elections).

But if war is Beijing’s plan, there ought to be reliable indications that it is coming. So it seems like an appropriate time to consider precisely what Chinese full mobilization for major conflict might entail. Although China last fought a major war against Vietnam in 1979, it is possible to frame how Beijing might prepare for an invasion and what specific indicators we could expect to see. Such a military conflict would reflect four assumptions underpinning Chinese leaders’ decisionmaking.
John Culver

John Culver retired from CIA in 2020 after thirty-five years as an analyst and manager of East Asian security, economic, and foreign policy issues. He has written extensively on China, Taiwan, and regional issues and serves as a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.

First, reports indicate that Xi and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) understand that an outright invasion of Taiwan would be a daunting strategic task and would end any putative return to the status quo ante. Such a war could last years to a decade, and China would be subjected to American and possibly multilateral sanctions and perhaps even a U.S. blockade. The basis for the CCP’s domestic legitimacy would shift from the emphasis on generating economic growth that has prevailed since 1978 to a near-exclusive focus on nationalism in the cause of Taiwan’s “reunification” with China.

Second, China’s political goal since U.S.-China diplomatic normalization in 1979 has been to preserve the possibility of political unification with Taiwan at some undefined point in the future. Beijing has been pursuing that goal by promoting rapid economic integration with Taiwan, and until the coronavirus pandemic, it enabled greatly expanded travel across the strait, with millions of Chinese tourists visiting Taiwan annually and millions of Taiwanese working in China. But since 2020, travel bans and quarantines in China and Taiwan have drastically curtailed travel. And China’s 2019 crackdown on democracy advocates in Hong Kong further tarnished Beijing’s “one country, two systems” model for eventual political settlement and negatively influenced perceptions among many Taiwanese of Beijing’s motives, intentions, and goals. These trends have undermined Beijing’s apparent hope that people-to-people contacts and economic interchange would promote unity across the Taiwan Strait. This rapid erosion of ties has made a peaceful unification even more doubtful.

Third, China’s political strategy for unification has always had a military component, as well as economic, informational, legal, and diplomatic components. Most U.S. analysis frames China’s options as a binary of peace or war and ignores these other elements. At the same time, many in Washington believe that if Beijing resorts to the use of force, the only military option it would consider is invasion. This is a dangerous oversimplification. China has many options to increase pressure on Taiwan, including military options short of invasion—limited campaigns to seize Taiwan-held islands just off China’s coast, blockades of Taiwan’s ports, and economic quarantines to choke off the island’s trade. Lesser options probably could not compel Taiwan’s capitulation but could further isolate it economically and politically in an effort to raise pressure on the government in Taipei and induce it to enter into political negotiations on terms amenable to Beijing.

Finally, many of the understandings, military factors, and ambiguous positions that enabled decades of peace, prosperity, and democracy on Taiwan are now eroding due to China’s burgeoning economic and military power, Taiwan’s consolidating democracy led by the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party, and burgeoning U.S. determination to play the “Taiwan card” in its strategic rivalry with China.

If China has actually decided to go to war with Taiwan—and, per President Joe Biden’s recent gaffes, with the United States—in eighteen or twenty-four months, how would we know? For one, it almost certainly would not be subtle, at least to the U.S. intelligence community and probably not to Taiwan and other Western observers. Modern war between great powers (and even not-so-great powers) consumes huge stocks of key munitions, especially precision-guided ones for high-intensity naval, air, and amphibious warfare. So China would have already started surging production of ballistic and cruise missiles; anti-air, air-to-air, and large rockets for long-range beach bombardment; and numerous other items, at least a year before D-Day. Commercial imagery used by nongovernment analysts has identified new military facilities and weapons in China, including what appears to be new silo fields for its expanding nuclear-armed force of intercontinental ballistic missiles. Major production by China of key munitions would be noticed by international government and nongovernment observers alike.

China also would take visible steps to insulate its economy, military, and key industries from disruptions and sanctions. This would go beyond its current industrial policies and dual circulation strategy, which collectively aim to achieve technological and material self-sufficiency, or even its limited measures against increasing U.S. use of export controls, sanctions, and economic and financial pressure. As CSIS Senior Fellow Gerard DiPippo recently noted, near-term indicators of approaching conflict would include financial elements such as imposition of stronger cross-border capital controls, a freeze on foreign financial assets within China, and rapid liquidation and repatriation of Chinese assets held abroad. It would also include a surge in stockpiling emergency supplies, such as medicine or key technology inputs; a suspension of key exports, such as critical minerals, refined petroleum products, or food; measures to reduce demand or ration key goods, especially imports such as oil and gas; and prioritization or redirection of key inputs for military production. Chinese elites and high-priority workers would also face international travel restrictions.

And China’s leaders probably would be preparing their people psychologically for the costs of war: austerity, tens of thousands of combat deaths, and civilian deaths from U.S.- and Taiwan-launched strikes. For a conflict that would begin in 2024, as some observers in the United States have predicted, such measures likely would be happening now—and they are not, despite recent heightened tensions and U.S. choices and actions that Beijing views as provocations.

It seems plausible, therefore, that if the American intelligence community saw some of that happening, they would right now be releasing that information publicly, just as they did almost four months before Russia invaded Ukraine. They would not just be leaking it to one news outlet.

Preparations within the PLA would also alert U.S. intelligence that preparations for war were underway. Six or twelve months before a prospective invasion, China probably would implement a PLA-wide stop loss, halting demobilizations of enlisted personnel and officers, just as it did in 2007 when it ratcheted up pressure as Taiwan prepared to hold elections. (Chinese officials would have already announced these moves if they truly planned to use force as soon as early 2024.) Three to six months out, the PLA would also halt most regular training and perform maintenance on virtually all major equipment. It would expand the capacity of the Navy and Air Force to rearm, resupply, and repair ships, submarines, and aircraft away from military facilities that the United States or Taiwan would likely bomb, including naval bases and military airfields near the Taiwan Strait. The PLA Navy would replace electric batteries on its non-nuclear submarines and intensify training in loading missiles, torpedoes, and ammunition on all vessels.

In its Eastern and Southern Theater Commands opposite Taiwan, the PLA would take preparation steps rarely seen in mere exercises. Field hospitals would be established close to embarkation points and airfields. There likely would be public blood drives. Mobile command posts would depart garrisons and move to hidden locations. Units responsible for managing petroleum, oil, and lubricants would deploy with field pipeline convoys to support vehicle preparation at civilian ports being used to load transport ships embarking on an invasion.

The PLA would place forces, including those far from the Taiwan Strait, on alert. Beijing has long feared chain-reaction warfare, either by the United States or encouraged by it, on China's other borders. Across the PLA, leave would be canceled and service members would be recalled to duty and restricted to their garrisons or ships. Hundreds of military air and chartered flights would carry key material and senior officers to inspect preparations in the Eastern Theater Command. Normal passenger and cargo flights would be disrupted. This would be noted even by amateur airline flight tracking enthusiasts, who weighed in last month to debunk claims that flights in and out of Beijing had been halted amid unsubstantiated rumors of a coup.

And the CCP would order national mobilization at least three or four months in advance of planned combat—a very public step that has not been taken since 1979. Provincial military-civilization mobilization committees would commandeer commercial ships, roll-on/roll-off vehicle transport ships, large car ferries, aircraft, trains, trucks—everything relevant to a war effort, for preparation prior to conflict, and then throughout. They'd mobilize an enormous number of people, including reservists to guard key civilian infrastructure, be prepared to repair U.S. bomb damage, and prevent riots and sabotage. Western manufacturers operating in China would experience supply chain disruptions as key transportation and some component manufacturers shifted to war preparation. These would all be public actions, reported in Chinese national and provincial media and quickly detected by Western government and private analysts.

Recently, a recording and transcript of an April war mobilization exercise in the southern province of Guangdong leaked to Western sources. It is unclear how often such drills are conducted, but they are probably an annual event to ensure preparedness for natural disasters and potential military conflict. The transcript provides a wealth of details on the massive joint military-civilian mobilization effort of one province: hundreds of thousands of people; almost 1,000 ships; twenty airports; six shipyards and ship repair yards; and medical, food storage, and energy facilities. Although Guangdong is wealthy, populous, industrialized, and strategically located for a Taiwan conflict, similar actions likely would be undertaken in every province, especially coastal ones.

If China decides to fight a war of choice over Taiwan, strategic surprise would be a casualty of the sheer scale of the undertaking. Even if Xi were tempted to launch a quick campaign and hope that Taiwan’s will to fight would quickly collapse, Russia’s disastrous invasion of Ukraine probably has induced more caution in Beijing. Such a roll of the dice on China’s part would be far riskier than Russia’s land invasion, not only because the PLA would have to conduct the largest and farthest amphibious invasion in modern history, but also because—unlike in Ukraine—cautious PLA war planners would have to assume that the United States and some of its regional allies would quickly commit combat forces to the island’s defense. Any invasion of Taiwan will not be secret for months prior to Beijing’s initiation of hostilities. It would be a national, all-of-regime undertaking for a war potentially lasting years.

How We Would Know When China Is Preparing to Invade Taiwan

If war is Beijing’s plan, there would be reliable indications that it is coming.

carnegieendowment.org

jward · Oct 6, 2022

US Air Force Will Deploy MQ-9 Reapers to Japan for the First Time
By Kosuke Takahashi for The Diplomat

Asia Defense | Security | East Asia

Starting in late October, the USAF will station the UAVs on Kyushu, a move designed to strengthen Japan’s maritime surveillance.

US Air Force Will Deploy MQ-9 Reapers to Japan for the First Time

An MQ-9 Reaper flies a training mission over the Nevada Test and Training Range, July 15, 2019.
Credit: U.S. Air Force photo by Airman 1st Class William Rio Rosado

The U.S. Air Force (USAF) will temporarily deploy eight MQ-9 Reaper unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF)’s Kanoya Air Base in Kagoshima Prefecture on Kyushu, or the southernmost of Japan’s main islands, from late October, the Ministry of Defense (MoD) in Tokyo has announced.

The move will mark the first time that the Reaper is deployed to Japan, demonstrating the U.S. commitment to Japan’s defense. The MoD hopes the UAVs will be beneficial to Japan’s security by strengthening maritime surveillance around the nation, given the increasingly active maritime activities by surrounding countries such as China and Russia.

The Reapers are expected to be deployed at the base for one year. About 150-200 U.S. service personnel will stay at hotels in Kanoya City to operate the medium-altitude, long-endurance (MALE) surveillance aircraft, an official of the Kanoya City Hall in charge of the deployment told The Diplomat on October 6.

Some are expecting that the deployment will bring about positive economic effects on the city, while others are questioning whether the deployment will really end after one year, the city official admitted to The Diplomat.

The MoD said in documents that the temporary deployment of the UAVs is aimed at conducting intelligence-gathering activities in waters near Japan with a central focus on the East China Sea ‒ an implicit reference to China’s increasing assertiveness in the region, especially around the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, which are controlled by Tokyo but also claimed by Beijing, as well as Taiwan.

Japan’s Defense Minister Hamada Yasukazu and U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said in a statement after their first in-person talks in Washington on September 14 that they “welcomed the progress towards the temporary deployment of USAF MQ-9s to JMSDF Kanoya Air Base.” They agreed that the two nations would “jointly analyze information acquired by Japanese and the US assets including MQ-9s.”

In particular, Hamada said that the temporary deployment of MQ-9s contributes to the deepening of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) activities by unmanned aerial vehicles of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF).

As Beijing expands its activities in the East China Sea, Tokyo is striving to enhance the defense capabilities on Japan’s southwestern Nansei island chain, which spans about 1,200 km from Kagoshima to Okinawa, stretching southwest toward Taiwan.

It is possible that the UAVs will also be used to keep tabs on North Korean activities, including Pyongyang’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs.

According to Janes Defence Weekly, the Reaper has a maximum take-off weight of 4,760 kg; a payload of 1,701 kg; a cruise speed of 200 knots (370 km/h); a range of 1,000 nautical miles (1,852 km); a service ceiling of 50,000 ft; and an endurance of 27 hours. It carries an electro-optical/infrared sensor turret for ISR duties.

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US Air Force Will Deploy MQ-9 Reapers to Japan for the First Time

Starting in late October, the USAF will station the UAVs on Kyushu, a move designed to strengthen Japan’s maritime surveillance.

thediplomat.com

jward · Oct 6, 2022

The Downside of Imperial Collapse

By Robert D. Kaplan October 4, 2022

Wars are historical hinges. And misbegotten wars, when serving as culmination points of more general national decline, can be fatal. This is particularly true for empires. The Habsburg empire, which ruled over central Europe for hundreds of years, might have lingered despite decades of decay were it not for its defeat in World War I. The same is true of the Ottoman Empire, which since the mid-nineteenth century was referred to as “the sick man of Europe.” As it happened, the Ottoman Empire, like the Habsburg one, might have struggled on for decades, and even re-formed, were it not for also being on the losing side in World War I.

But the aftershocks of such imperial comeuppance should never be underestimated or celebrated. Empires form out of chaos, and imperial collapse often leaves chaos in its wake. The more monoethnic states that arose from the ashes of the multiethnic Habsburg and Ottoman empires often proved to be radical and unstable. This is because ethnic and sectarian groups and their particular grievances, which had been assuaged under common imperial umbrellas, were suddenly on their own and pitted against one another. Nazism, and fascism in general, influenced murderous states and factions in the post-Habsburg and post-Ottoman Balkans, as well as Arab intellectuals studying in Europe who brought these ideas back to their newly independent postcolonial homelands, where they helped shape the disastrous ideology of Baathism. Winston Churchill speculated at the end of World War II that had the imperial monarchies in Germany, Austria, and elsewhere not been swept away at the peace table in Versailles, “there would have been no Hitler.”

The twentieth century was largely shaped by the collapse of dynastic empires in the early decades and by consequent war and geopolitical upheaval in the later decades. Empire is much disparaged by intellectuals, yet imperial decline can bring on even greater problems. The Middle East, for example, has still not found an adequate solution to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, as evidenced by its bloody vicissitudes over the past hundred years.

All this should be kept in mind when considering the vulnerability of China, Russia, and the United States today. These great powers may be even more fragile than they seem. The anxious foresight required for avoiding policy catastrophes—that is, the ability to think tragically in order to avoid tragedy—has either been insufficiently developed or nowhere in evidence in Beijing, Moscow, and Washington. So far, both Russia and the United States have initiated self-destructive wars: Russia in Ukraine and the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq. As for China, its obsession with the conquest of Taiwan could lead to self-destruction. All three great powers have in recent years and decades clearly demonstrated bouts of uncommonly bad judgment when it comes to their long-term survival.

Were any or all of today’s great powers to dramatically weaken, confusion and disorder would increase inside their borders and around the world. A weakened or embattled United States would be less able to support its allies in Europe and Asia. Were the Kremlin’s regime to wobble because of factors stemming from the Ukraine war, Russia, which is institutionally weaker than China, could become a low-calorie version of the former Yugoslavia, unable to control its historic territories in the Caucasus, Siberia, and East Asia. Economic or political turmoil in China could unleash regional unrest within the country and also embolden India and North Korea, whose policies are inherently constrained by Beijing.

SHAKY GROUND

Today’s great powers are not empires. But Russia and China bear the traces of their imperial heritage. The Kremlin’s war in Ukraine is rooted in impulses that existed in both the Russian and the Soviet empires, and China’s aggressive intentions toward Taiwan echo the Qing dynasty’s quest for hegemony in Asia. The United States has never formally identified as an empire. But westward expansion in North America and occasional overseas territorial conquests gave the United States an imperial flavor in the nineteenth century, and in the postwar era it has enjoyed a level of global dominance previously known only to empires.

Today, all three of these great powers face uncertain futures, in which collapse or some degree of disintegration cannot be ruled out. The suite of problems is different for each, but the challenges confronting each country are fundamental to that power’s very existence. Russia faces the most immediate risk. Even if it somehow prevails in the war in Ukraine, Russia will have to confront the economic disaster of being decoupled from the EU and the G-7 economies unless there is a genuine peace, which now appears unlikely. Russia may already be the sick man of Eurasia, as the Ottoman Empire was of Europe.

As for China, its annual economic growth has been slowing from double digits down to single digits, and it may soon reach low single digits. Capital has fled the country, with foreign investors selling many billions of dollars in Chinese bonds and billions more in Chinese stocks. At the same time that China’s economy has matured and investment from abroad has diminished, its population has aged and its workforce has shrunk. All this does not augur well for future internal stability. Kevin Rudd, the president of the Asia Society and former Australian prime minister, has noted that Chinese President Xi Jinping, through his statist and strict communist policies, “has begun strangling the goose that, for 35 years, has laid the golden egg.” These stark economic realities, by undermining the standard of living for the average Chinese citizen, can threaten the social peace and implicit support for the communist system. Authoritarian regimes, while they present the aura of serenity, may always be rotting from within.

Empires form out of chaos, and imperial collapse often leaves chaos in its wake.

The United States is a democracy, so its problems are more transparent. But that does not necessarily make them less acute. The fact is that as the federal deficit climbs upward toward insupportable levels, the very process of globalization has split Americans into warring halves: those swept up into the values of a new, worldwide cosmopolitan civilization and those rejecting it for the sake of a more traditional and religious nationalism. Half of the United States has escaped from its continental geography while the other half is anchored to it. Oceans are increasingly less of a factor in walling off the United States from the rest of the world, which for over 200 years helped provide for the country’s communal cohesion. The United States was a well-functioning mass democracy in the print-and-typewriter age but is much less of a success in the digital era, whose innovations fed the populist rage that led to the rise of Donald Trump.

Owing to these shifts, a new global power configuration is likely taking shape. In one scenario, Russia declines precipitously because of its misbegotten war, China finds it too difficult to achieve sustained economic and technological power under a Chinese Communist Party (CCP) that increasingly reverts to orthodox Leninism, and the United States overcomes its domestic turmoil and eventually reemerges, as it did immediately after the Cold War, as a unipolar power. Another possibility is a truly bipolar world in which China maintains its economic dynamism even as it becomes more authoritarian. A third possibility is the gradual decline of all three powers, leading to a greater degree of anarchy in the international system, with middle-level powers, particularly in the Middle East and South Asia, even less restrained than they already are, and European states unable to agree on much in the absence of strong American leadership, even as the continent is threatened by a chaotic post-Putin Russia on its frontier.

Which scenario emerges will depend to a great deal on the outcome of military contests. The world is witnessing what a major land war in eastern Europe is doing to Russia’s prospects and reputation as a great power. Ukraine has exposed Russia’s war machine as distinctly belonging to the developing world: prone to indiscipline, desertions, and poor to nonexistent logistics, with an exceedingly weak corps of noncommissioned officers. Like the war in Ukraine, a sophisticated naval, cyber, and missile conflict in Taiwan or in the South China Sea or the East China Sea would be easier to start than to end. For example, what would be the strategic aim of the United States once such military hostilities started in earnest: the end of CCP rule in China? If so, how would Washington respond to the resulting chaos? The United States has barely begun to think through these questions. War, as Washington learned in Afghanistan and Iraq, is a Pandora’s box.

SURVIVAL STRATEGY

No great power lasts forever. But perhaps the most impressive example of endurance is the Byzantine Empire, which lasted from AD 330 to the conquest of Constantinople during the Fourth Crusade in 1204, only to recover and survive until a final Ottoman victory in 1453. This is doubly impressive when one considers that Byzantium had a more difficult geography and stronger enemies, and consequently greater vulnerabilities, than Rome did in the West. The historian Edward Luttwak has argued that Byzantium “relied less on military strength and more on all forms of persuasion—to recruit allies, dissuade enemies, and induce potential enemies to attack one another.” Moreover, when they did fight, Luttwak notes, “the Byzantines were less inclined to destroy enemies than to contain them, both to conserve their strength and because they knew that today’s enemy could be tomorrow’s ally.”

In other words, it is not just a matter of avoiding major war whenever possible but also a matter of not being overtly ideological, so as to be able to consider today’s enemy tomorrow’s friend, even if it has a political system different from one’s own. That has not been easy for the United States to do, given that it sees itself as a missionary power committed to spreading democracy. The Byzantines wrote an amoral flexibility into their system, despite its putative religiosity—a realistic approach that has become more difficult to accomplish in the United States, partly owing to the power of a sanctimonious media establishment. Influential figures in the American media incessantly call on Washington to promote and sometimes even enforce democracy and human rights worldwide, even when doing so harms U.S. geopolitical interests.

In addition to the media, there is the foreign policy establishment itself, which, as the 2011 U.S. military intervention in Libya pointedly demonstrated, did not fully learn the lessons of the collapse of Iraq and what was even back then the ongoing intractability of Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the Biden administration’s relatively measured response in Ukraine—inserting no U.S. troops and informally advising the Ukrainians not to expand their war into Russian territory—may mark a turning point. Indeed, the less missionary the United States is in its approach the more likely it is to avoid disastrous wars. Of course, the United States does not have to go quite as far as authoritarian China, which delivers no moral lectures to other governments and societies, gladly dealing with regimes whose values differ from Beijing’s when doing so gives China an economic and geopolitical advantage.

War, as Washington learned in Afghanistan and Iraq, is a Pandora’s box.

A more restrained U.S. foreign policy might be the recipe for the long-term survival of American power. “Offshore balancing” would at first glance serve as Washington’s guiding strategy: “Instead of policing the world, the United States would encourage other countries to take the lead in checking rising powers, intervening itself only when necessary,” as the political scientists John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt put it in Foreign Affairs in 2016. The problem with that approach, however, is that the world is so fluid and interconnected, with crises in one part of the globe migrating to other parts, that restraint may simply not be practical. Offshore balancing might be simply too restrictive and mechanical. Isolationism thrived in an age when ships were the only way to cross the Atlantic Ocean, and took days to do so.

Presently, an avowed policy of restraint might only telegraph weakness and uncertainty.
Alas, the United States is destined to be embroiled in foreign crises, some of which will have a military component. That is the very nature of this increasingly populous and interlocked, claustrophobic world. Again, the key concept is to always think tragically: that is, to contemplate worst-case scenarios for every crisis, while still not allowing oneself to be immobilized into general inaction. It is more an art and a brilliant intuition than a science. Yet that is how great powers have always survived.

Empires can end abruptly, and when they do, chaos and instability ensues. It’s probably too late for Russia to avoid this fate. China might pull it off, but it will be difficult. The United States is still the best positioned of the three, but the longer it waits to adopt a more tragic and realistic shift in its approach, the worse the odds will get. A grand strategy of limits is crucial. Let’s hope it begins now, with the Biden administration’s war policy in Ukraine.

The Downside of Imperial Collapse

When empires or great powers fall, chaos and war rise.

www.foreignaffairs.com

jward · Oct 7, 2022

US hypersonic program back on a fast track

Gabriel Honrada

The US has just successfully tested a Tactical High-speed Offensive Ramjet for Extended Range (THOR-ER) hypersonic vehicle, providing a significant boost to its weapons program that until now has been perceived as lagging behind China and Russia’s.
In a press release this month, the US Department of Defense (DOD) said that the US and Norway successfully tested the THOR-ER, with the vehicle firing several times, on August 17. The test showed the viability of solid-fuel ramjet propulsion (SFRJ) technology and demonstrated a significant increase in range, it said.

Aviation website SKYbrary notes that a ramjet, an air-breathing engine with no moving parts such as a rotary compressor that uses forward motion to compress incoming air, is the simplest method of achieving supersonic flight.
Because they have no moving parts, ramjets cannot be used at zero airspeeds. Instead, they can be started at 185 kilometers per hour but do not produce significant thrust until Mach 0.3 and reach peak efficiency at Mach 3.
Ramjets are also limited to a maximum speed of Mach 6 due to shockwave-induced pressure loss that occurs when slowing the intake air to subsonic speed.

The DOD claims that the first flight test, reportedly conducted on August 17 at Andoya in Norway, demonstrated unguided SFRJ operation across a wide range of speeds and altitudes.
The second test, conducted the following day, reportedly focused on a high thrust flight profile. Both test flights successfully demonstrated high flight speeds before ramjet burnout and splashdown.
“The SFRJ flight vehicle was accelerated to above Mach 2 with the help of a solid rocket booster and transitioned to ramjet mode. The flight phase was a resounding success with stable flight, robust ramjet operation, and a high thrust-to-drag ratio,” claimed Stein Erik Nodeland, executive vice president of Aerospace Propulsion at the Nordic Ammunition Company (NAMMO).

The DOD statement says that the tests achieved the THOR-ER Phase 1 objective of demonstrating jointly-developed technologies in flight, such as new high-energy fuels, advanced air injection and throttling methodologies critical for future mission-flexible SFRJ systems.
This success is a quick follow-up to the third test of its Hypersonic Air-breathing Weapon Concept (HAWC) this July, which also used a scramjet engine.

DARPA noted that after release from the test aircraft, HAWC’s first-stage boosters pushed it to the expected scramjet ignition envelope. From there, its scramjet engine fired and propelled it to Mach 5 for more than 555 kilometers at an altitude of 18,288 meters.
HAWC’s second flight test in September 2021 demonstrated the capabilities to make hypersonic cruise missiles an effective tool for US warfighters, noted Andrew Knoedler, HAWC program manager in DARPA’s Tactical Technology Office.

As with the first test, an aircraft released the missile seconds before its scramjet engine kicked on, compressing incoming air with its hydrocarbon fuel and propelling it to Mach 5.
DARPA noted that all test mission primary objectives were accomplished, such as safe separation from the launch aircraft, booster ignition and boost, booster separation and engine ignition and cruise.
While hypersonic weapons are barely past the prototype stage, the technology behind them, such as scramjet engines, are rapidly maturing, gradually lowering costs.
In addition, scramjets are much less reliant on exotic materials than other hypersonic systems, which significantly reduces costs as traditional metals are more accessible to source and can be purchased in large quantities, notes Wes Kremer, president of the missiles and defense unit at Raytheon.
This simplification of hypersonic weapon design may eliminate one cause of failure that has so far dogged US hypersonic weapons development.

Asia Times has noted that the overly complex design of US hypersonic weapons may have caused previous failures, with the two-stage design used by some US prototypes requiring complex integration of subsystems and multiple tests.
Using SFRJ technology such as THOR-ER eliminates difficulties in liquid-fuel systems, negating the need for difficult and dangerous-to-store fuels, pre-flight fueling and complicated pumps within hypersonic missiles.
However, SFRJ technology presents its own technological challenges. In solid-fuel systems, once combustion has started, it cannot be stopped and can only be controlled with great difficulty.

Moreover, the use of scramjets will reduce supply chain vulnerabilities in America’s hypersonic weapons program, eliminating the possibility that China exploits its near-monopoly on rare-earth metals to hobble it.
Asia Times has reported on this vulnerability, noting that the discovery of Made in China magnets in the US premier F-35 fighter this August forced the US to temporarily stop jet deliveries, with significant implications for its airpower capabilities and those of its allies.
Chinese parts were recently discovered in US’ premier F-35 fighter jets. Image: US Air Force
The US may now look at hypersonic weapons designs that do not rely on China’s rare-earth metals. This March, Breaking Defense reported on Australia’s 3D printed scramjet engine, which reduces reliance on rare-earth metals and has been presented to US officials.

The report notes that Australia’s engine is made of Inconel, a tough and heat-resistant alloy. The specific alloy may be Inconel-617, a nickel-chromium-cobalt-molybdenum-aluminum blend designed for increased strength and stability at high temperatures, and is widely used in gas turbine hot gas paths, combustion cans, ducting, and liners. None of Inconel-617’s ingredients are rare-earth metals, on which China has a potential supply chokehold.
Although China, Russia, and the US are locked in a hypersonic weapons race, the US does not seem to have a clear doctrine or strategy for its hypersonic weapons, as opposed to China and Russia, which plan to incorporate such weapons into their strategic nuclear arsenals.

Despite that, Dan Gouré, in a 2021 article for Real Clear Defense, notes that the US sees its investments in hypersonic weapons as a means to compensate for the loss of its deep strike capabilities due to the proliferation of China and Russia’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities, meaning they will likely be deployed for conventional rather than nuclear purposes.

US hypersonic program back on a fast track

jward · Oct 9, 2022

UK, Poland to pool missile development for their land, naval forces

Andrew Chuter, Jaroslaw Adamowski

MBDA is offering its Common Anti-air Modular Missile, which has a range in excess of 25 kilometers, as the basis for the designed Narew system and other applications for the Polish armed forces. (MBDA UK)

LONDON and WARSAW, Poland — Britain and Poland are investigating possible cooperation in the development of a surface-launched, long-range missile in the latest step towards strengthening their ties in the defense sector.
The two nations announced their intention to take a look at forming a partnership at the end of a visit Oct. 5 to Poland by British Defence Secretary Ben Wallace for talks with his Polish counterpart, Mariusz Błaszczak.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has accelerated plans by Poland to develop the nation’s short-range air defense capacities. In April 2022, Błaszczak signed a contract to procure a short-range air defense system, dubbed Narew, using MBDA’s Common Anti-air Modular Missile, or CAMM, for the country’s military this year.

Under the envisioned partnership with the U.K,, the CAMM “family of missiles” will find its way into several new applications in the Polish armed forces, according to a British Ministry of Defence statement. The two ministers agreed to form a new working group examining relevant use cases for land and maritime environments.
During an Oct. 4 signing ceremony, Błaszczak announced the first of the ordered systems, which the ministry calls “small” Narew, had been delivered to the Polish Armed Forces. A second system is to be supplied in the first half of 2023, the Ministry of National Defence said in a statement.
“The ‘small’ Narew system comprises Polish radars, Polish trucks, and British launchers and missiles. We could say it is based on the Sky Sabre anti-aircraft and anti-missile system which was also deployed to our country owing to the decision of Defence Secretary Ben Wallace,” Błaszczak said.

CAMM is already in service with British forces, and the land version, known as Sky Sabre, is among the weapons the British Army have deployed in Poland.
The Polish government’s interest lays in the development of a missile that could be used by the Wisla mid-range air defense system and the three Miecznik frigates slated to be built locally using Britain’s Babcock Arrowhead-140 design.
Collaboration on the procurement and operation of a Arrowhead variant for the Polish Navy was among several areas of cooperation proposed by the British and Polish ministers.
As part of their bilateral plans, Wallace and Blaszczak touted a memorandum of understanding on air defense capabilities, enabling both countries two sides to team on the development and manufacture of current and future complex weapons.

The two sides also signed a framework agreement for cooperation on the Polish Pilica+ very short range air defense system.
To that end, the Polish minister signed a contract for the delivery of 21 upgraded PSR-A Pilica+ anti-aircraft missile systems with a consortium led by the country’s state-run defense giant PGZ. The weapon’s modernized version will be equipped with CAMMs.
Chris Allam, the managing director of MBDA UK, said the new British-Polish pacts pave the way for further steps in weapon development.

“Today’s agreements launch the next step in Polish-UK missile cooperation and underpins the PGZ-MBDA technology transfer proposal on Narew, while also supporting Pilica+, Miecznik, a tank destroyer, and other vital projects,” he said.
Andrew Chuter is the United Kingdom correspondent for Defense News.
Jaroslaw Adamowski is the Poland correspondent for Defense News.

UK, Poland to pool missile development for their land, naval forces

Various applications for MBDA's CAMM missile are expected to be front and center in the team-up.

www.defensenews.com

jward · Oct 9, 2022

Hellfire Missile With Roughly Three Times More Range Tested By MQ-9

Emma Helfrich, Tyler Rogoway

The Air National Guard Air Force Reserve Command Test Center, or AATC, has revealed that it had tested a new version of the AGM-114 Hellfire missile modified to achieve much longer ranges. The missile was launched from an MQ-9 Reaper, which could signal a significant increase in the drone’s stand-off range when employing the updated Hellfire missiles.
AATC led the test of what is being designated as the new AGM-114R-4 long-range Hellfire missile during this year’s biennial Valiant Shield exercise held in June. The test was reportedly also meant to evaluate the system’s associated ‘weaponeering’ software. The AATC is claiming that AGM-114R-4 can fly roughly three times as far as earlier variants of the missile, which made it so the recent test ostensibly resulted in the longest Hellfire shot taken to date.

Airman 1st Class Steven (left) and Airman 1st Class Taylor prepare an MQ-9 Reaper for flight during exercise Combat Hammer, May 15, 2014, AGM-114 Hellfire munitions can be seen under the wings. Credit: U.S. Air Force photo/Staff Sgt. Nadine Barclay
“The AATC MQ-9 Test Detachment was supported by the 174th Attack Wing with Block 5 MQ-9 aircraft,” read the press release. “The 556th Test and Evaluation squadron supported with a block 30 Ground Control Station, while test flights were flown out of Creech AFB using Air Combat Command (ACC), Air National Guard (ANG), and Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) aircrew.”

Interestingly, the AATC even claimed that the test was also beneficial in demonstrating the AGM-114R-4’s potential to “double the MQ-9’s standoff range,” which would provide the drone with the “ability to engage threats while maintaining a safe distance out of the threats ability to counter-strike, which is crucial to survivability in a contested environment.” This is especially notable considering how the Air Force has been talking about scaling back Reaper operations because of the drone’s perceived vulnerability in higher-end conflicts.
Overall, however, details about this evaluation remain limited. The War Zone has reached out to the AATC for additional clarification on both the origins and the future of this capability, especially as it relates to the MQ-9, but has yet to hear back.
Senior Airmen Gale Passe (left) and Jason Atwell prepare to load an AGM-114 Hellfire II air-to-ground missile onto an MQ-9 Reaper during weapons load training on April 22 at Creech Air Force Base, Nev. Credit: U.S. Air Force photo/Senior Airman Larry E. Reid Jr.
In an effort to gain some perspective on the significance of this recent test, it is important to have a basic understanding of the AGM-114 series’ and the MQ-9’s current performance specifications. To start, AGM-114 Hellfire is a family of primarily short-range air-to-ground, and now sometimes anti-air, laser-guided (apart from the AGM-114L Longbow Hellfire which uses radar homing), missiles designed by Lockheed Martin. Hellfire is used by dozens of countries on many platforms and was initially designed to serve an anti-armor role, but has since evolved to take on many other types of targets. Above all else, it became a staple weapon of the Global War On Terror.

The missile is powered by a solid propellant rocket motor that allows it to reach its operational range of anywhere between four to just under seven miles (seven to 11 kilometers). This means that, if the AATC is accurate in its announcement, the modified long-range AGM-114R-4 could reach up to around 21 miles under optimal conditions. Even if half this number is realized, it is a major capability leap that offers a big boost in flexibility for platforms employing it.

Assuming that this new long-range Hellfire underwent modifications to its rocket motor to increase its range, current advancements in rocket propellants could mean that the new variant wouldn’t necessarily end up being that much longer than its standard 64 to 69-inch length, although we don't know exactly what the new configuration looks like at this time. Major upgrades to the missile's software and autopilot that can allow for tailored flight profiles depending on the target situation can also extend range.
Hellfire II missile exposed through a transparent casing, showing laser homing guidance system in front, copper cone-shaped charge explosive in the middle, propulsion in the rear. Credit: Wikimedia Commons
At sea, some Littoral Combat Ships are also being equipped with them, as well. Finally, Stryker-based M-SHORAD short-range air defense systems also use Hellfires for countering low and slow-flying threats. Missiles belonging to the AGM-114 family are armed with a variety of warheads ranging from the blast fragmentation type to high-explosive anti-tank, thermobaric, and even more ‘exotic’ types, but more on that in a minute.

However, in September 2020, a new software update for the drone that was facilitated under an Air Force initiative dubbed "Operational Flight Program 2409" allowed the service to arm the MQ-9’s pylons otherwise used primarily for bombs with four additional AGM-114s. The software update brought the total number of Hellfire missiles an MQ-9 can carry to eight.
An MQ-9A Reaper assigned to the 556th Test and Evaluation Squadron armed with eight Hellfire missiles for the first time. (U.S. Air Force-SrA Haley Stevens).
There is also the question of how this recent test could influence the development of Joint Air-to-Ground Missiles (JAGM), Hellfire’s intended (at least partial) replacement. Considering that the initial version of JAGM is evolved from the AGM-114R, a modded long-range ‘R’ variant could translate to an increased range for JAGM, too, which uses a multi-mode seeker (radar and laser) as opposed to the standard AGM-114R’s semi-active laser homing.

Essentially, whichever new features the AATC recently demoed could be combined with other capabilities in the future, including the JAGM seeker, which would make better use of the extra range due to the limitations of the MQ-9’s laser designator’s range. The JAGM seeker can also hit moving targets in any weather conditions.
A graphic showing how the JAGM's configuration leverages AGM-114R's design. Credit: Department of Defense
For now, though, there are unfortunately more questions than answers. To better understand what exactly this AGM-114R-4 will offer both the Hellfire family and the MQ-9, many facets of the system need to be better understood. This includes how exactly the missile’s guidance system has been modified to make use of the extra range and whether or not it will require a separate asset to ‘paint’ the target downrange for the launching MQ-9 if it retains its single-mode laser seeker.

Staff Sgt. Bobby Domanski double checks a guided bomb unit-12 Paveway II laser-guided bomb onto the munitions rack during weapons load training April 22 at Creech Air Force Base, Nev. Credit: U.S. Air Force photo/Senior Airman Nadine Y. Barclay
This wouldn’t be the first time that the U.S. military has been particularly shadowy about a new Hellfire variant, either. For the past few years, The War Zone has been reporting on the development and employment of the AGM-114R9X missile, which has six pop-out, sword-like blades as opposed to a traditional explosive warhead. While there remains very little official information about the missile, various sightings of it have turned it into a relatively open secret.

Giving the MQ-9 more standoff range will enhance its survivability under some threat conditions, especially when operating on the outer fringes of an enemy's integrated air defense system. But just the MQ-9 loitering overhead can be a tell to potential targets in far less threatening airspace, so giving it the ability to standoff farther could improve its abilities by decreasing its chances of detection when it comes to hunting and striking high-value targets, too.
Beyond the air-launched advantages, this missile would be hugely beneficial for sea-launched applications, such as the LCS. Beyond that, it could be extremely beneficial in servicing Hellfire’s growing surface-to-air role, as well.
We will report back once we get more details about this intriguing Hellfire evolution from AATC.

Hellfire Missile With Roughly Three Times More Range Tested By MQ-9

The new AGM-114R-4 could give the MQ-9 much needed additional standoff capabilities and could also greatly benefit a host of other platforms.

www.thedrive.com

jward · Oct 10, 2022

New US nuclear sub made for China, Russia war

Gabriel Honrada

The US is designing its SSN(X) next-generation nuclear attack submarine in a significant shift from procuring Virginia class SSNs to a new class by the 2030s. The program addresses maintenance woes in its current nuclear attack submarine fleet and reorients US undersea warfare capabilities to great power competition from China and Russia.
The designation “SSN(X)” means that the exact design of the nuclear attack submarine class has not yet been determined, according to an August 2022 US Congressional Research Service (CRS) report.

Although the Virginia class is built with incremental improvements called “blocks,” a new design that solves maintenance problems and includes game-changing technologies may represent the development of a new class altogether.
The CRS report states that the US Navy estimates the SSN(X)’s price tag at US$5.8 billion per boat, significantly higher than the $3.6 billion for a VPM-equipped Virginia class boat.
At the Society of Naval Engineers’ annual Fleet Maintenance and Modernization Symposium held this month, Rear Admiral Jonathan Rucker stated that the US currently has 50 SSNs, but 18 are under maintenance and unavailable to operational commanders, as reported in Defense News.

Rucker said that the current number of SSNs in maintenance is too high and that sub maintenance is facing challenges in planning availabilities, work execution and keeping enough spares and materials for repairs on hand.
At the same conference, Rear Admiral Scott Brown said that the US Navy did not make sufficient investments in repair and maintenance capabilities when designing and acquiring the Virginia class SSN, resulting in the cannibalization of other boats to maintain operational numbers and delays waiting for parts and components that are often unavailable.
Rucker emphasized that such shortfalls should not happen with the SSN(X). He stated that from over a million parts in the Virginia SSN, only 0.1%, or 32 parts, were found not to perform as intended from a life expectancy perspective. He also mentioned that those 32 parts were redesigned, or had their maintenance cycle changed, insinuating those improved parts could possibly be used in the SSN(X).

He stated that the SSN(X) design emphasizes four top requirements: speed, stealth, payloads and operational availability. Rucker and Brown’s statements echo the August 2022 CRS report highlighting the industrial base and maintenance woes plaguing the US Virginia class SSN fleet.
America’s shipyards are being asked to produce more Virginia-class submarines per year. Credit: US Navy photo.
The report notes concern about the US’ limited industrial base to construct two Virginia class SSNs with the multi-mission Virginia Payload Module (VPM) and one Columbia class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) annually from the mid-2020s to mid-2030s.

Despite those limitations, there may be plans to increase US submarine production to three Virginia class boats and one Columbia class boat per year, which has been dubbed the “3+1 program.”
In December 2021, US President Joe Biden signed three determinations of the Defense Production Act (DPA) to strengthen the US submarine industrial base to increase the production of Virginia class subs.
However, the CRS report asks several difficult questions – most without answers – about the US’ submarine construction industrial base. First, it asks whether the US Navy, submarine shipyards and submarine supplier firms have agreed on the US industrial base capacity to handle building the Virginia and Columbia class subs.
Second, it asks whether those organizations have taken steps to increase the industrial base capacity to match desired submarine procurement rates. Third, the report asks about the specific effects of the three presidential DPA determinations on US submarine-building capacity.

The CRS report also points to other issues within the Virginia class fleet such as cannibalization between boats, noting that some components have worn out earlier than their 33-year designed lifespan, with flaws in contractor quality and out-of-spec parts contributing to accelerated wear.
The report notes that most cannibalized parts were electrical components, among other classified parts. It also says that cannibalization brings a slew of disadvantages, such as increased workload and risks of parts being damaged during the process.
Other issues raised in the CRS report included substandard steel, problems with hull coating and defective parts.
With all these problems, US Navy SSNs have had delayed deployments due to capacity-related backlogs at US Naval shipyards, notes a separate July 22 CRS report. That report asks critical questions about the US Navy’s required number of SSNs given its 355-ship goal in 2016 while pointing to the operational implications of the US’ shrinking SSN fleet, which is projected to decline to 46 boats by 2028 and stay below 60 until 2045.
The US built the Virginia class SSN in the 2000s as a less-expensive alternative to the Seawolf class, which was built between 1989 and 2005, with the latter class being the most expensive US attack sub ever built at $5 billion per boat in 2018 dollar values.

The Seawolf class was designed as the successor to the 1970s Los Angeles class, which is currently still in service. The US built the subs to operate in deep-water environments to hunt then-Soviet nuclear-powered subs such as the Typhoon-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile subs (SSBN) and Akula-class SSNs.
However, the US built only three out of 29 planned boats due to the end of the Cold War.
A Los Angeles-class fast-attack submarine moors to the pier at Naval Base Guam. Photo: U.S. Navy / Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Kelsey J. Hockenberger
In contrast, the VPM-equipped Virginia class costs $3.6 billion per boat while featuring technologies found in the Seawolf class.
While the Virginia class can perform the same missions as the Seawolf class, it is optimized for a post-Cold War threat environment characterized by covert insertion and delivery of special operations forces (SOF), covert cruise missile strikes on land targets and covert offensive and defensive mine warfare.

However, renewed great power competition between the US, China and Russia may have prompted a shift in US submarine design philosophy, with a new emphasis on anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare.
Notably, China’s rapidly advancing anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities and improving nuclear and conventional subs pose a significant challenge to US undersea dominance in the Pacific. Russia’s nuclear subs are also a serious challenge to US dominance in the Pacific and Arctic. When operating close to US shores, Chinese and Russian subs pose a significant threat to the US homeland.
Apart from simplifying logistics and maintaining fleet numbers as a rationale for the SSN(X), the US Navy may have reached its stealth capability limit with a purely mechanical system, a limitation that may be driving the SSN(X)’s development.

In a 2016 article for The National Interest, Dave Majumdar notes that a next-generation sub would have to dispense with moving parts to improve stealth drastically, as rotating machinery and propulsors moving through water excite the stern and other parts, generating noise.

In addition, Majumdar notes that a permanent magnet motor for the upcoming Columbia class may also be installed in the SSN(X), presenting a big technological leap from the Virginia class.
Critically, the increasing stealth of Chinese and Russian subs may be the driving factor to improve the stealth of the Virginia class. However, current mechanical propulsion technologies may already have reached their limit.
In a September 2020 article for The National Interest, Caleb Larson mentions that China’s Shang class SSNs may already be as quiet as their US counterparts. He notes improvements in reactor design and anti-echoic tiles may have reduced the Shang class’s noise level to that of upgraded Los Angeles SSNs.

Similarly, Russia has been steadily improving the capability of its subs, despite the relative deterioration of its military in other areas. In technology terms, the Yasen SSGNs represent a significant development in acoustic signature reduction and weapons integration, which are on par with some Western counterparts, notes Arnaud Sobrero in a February 2021 article for The Diplomat.
Sobrero also mentions that Russia’s Borei SSBNs are more modern than the aging US Ohio class SSBNs. Russia commissioned its Belgorod special mission submarine this July.
Asia Times has reported on this development, noting that the Belgorod is the designated carrier of the Poseidon nuclear-armed underwater drone and the highly-classified Losharik saboteur sub.
Russia’s Belgorod submarine is designed to fight in a nuclear conflict. Image: Creative Commons

Asia Times has also reported on Russia’s planned successor to the Borei class, the Arcturus, which is optimized for Arctic operations and features stealth improvements such as a shaftless power plant and pump jet propulsion.
Given these threats, the US Navy envisions the SSN(X) will be an “apex predator” combining the high speed and payload of the Seawolf class, stealth and sensors of the Virginia class and availability and service life of the Columbia class.
The CRS report says the SSN(X) will be designed to counter the growing threat posed by near-peer adversary competition for undersea supremacy, noting it aims to outclass competitors in terms of speed, payload, stealth and operational availability.

The SSN(X) will also be capable of full-spectrum undersea warfare and coordinate with a larger contingent of off-hull vehicles, sensors and friendly forces while improving multi-mission capability and sustained combat presence in denied waters.

New US nuclear sub made for China, Russia war

The US is designing its SSN(X) next-generation nuclear attack submarine in a significant shift from procuring Virginia class SSNs to a new class by the 2030s. The program addresses maintenance woes…

asiatimes.com

jward · Oct 10, 2022

On Trolls and Nuclear Signaling: Strategic Stability in the Age of Memes - Modern War Institute

Steve Speece

A key feature of the war in Ukraine salient to most Western observers is the memes being generated and spread at the expense of Russia’s failing so-called special operation. In August an image of a Ukrainian self-propelled howitzer adorned with anthropomorphic Shiba Inus of the North Atlantic Fellas Organization (NAFO) emerged online. Spelled across the tube in block letters was “SUPERBONKER 9000.” The absurdist humor employed by NAFO rings appropriate to ridicule Putin’s absurd and cruel war. Russia, known to formally employ internet trolls of its own, cannot directly engage NAFO ridicule without elevating the notoriety of the NAFO project.

Shortly thereafter a Twitter user and alleged NAFO affiliate shared a Shiba Inu version of Ukrainian Minister of Defence Oleksii Reznikov holding a shield and a HIMARS vehicle. Reznikov’s official Twitter account replied with “Thank You!” and later tweeted a photo of him in a NAFO shirt and cap to express appreciation for NAFO financial support and countering Russian propaganda. Russian state-controlled media outlet RT later accused NAFO of harassing and silencing pro-Russian voices online. For an online community like NAFO, hostile mention from an official propaganda outlet of its target is evidence its ridicule is achieving the desired effect.

In July 2022, prior to a series of senior US lawmaker visits to Taipei, Hu Xijin, a Chinese columnist with the state media outlet the Global Times released a statement on his personal Twitter account. “If US fighter jets escort [US Speaker of the House Nancy] Pelosi’s plane into Taiwan, it is invasion,” he tweeted, before claiming that the Chinese military has the right to fire warning shots at or shoot down the aircraft if necessary. This statement echoed similar sentiment in Mandarin-language social media when the speaker’s trip became public knowledge and then postponed earlier in 2022.

Days later, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian held a press conference stating that the Chinese military would not “sit idly by” while US leaders visit Taiwan. When asked by a reporter what military measures would be taken against the US Speaker of the House if she visits Taiwan the spokesperson replied, “If she dares to go, let us wait and see.” The ambiguity of this statement was menacing in the context of Hu Xijin’s claim.
This emerging structure of strategic messaging resembles what Venkatesh Rao calls “The Internet of Beefs.” There now exists a hierarchy of rhetorical combatants online who compete with each other for status as influencers. Champion trolls like NAFO and Hu Xijin derive status from their highly visible antagonism directed against a powerful foe.
In the orbit of these champion “knights” as Rao calls them are mobs of interchangeable serf-like “mooks” mobilized by recreational outrage and snark to spar with ideological opponents of similar status. Mooks hope to signal their virtuous worth as rhetorical combatants to ultimately be elevated in the hierarchy to the level of knight.

This framework predicts that alongside most substantive public engagements on contentious geopolitical issues there will exist performative ones. Meme content shared in NAFO channels like its eponymous subreddit is almost exclusively English language and presumably not intended for Russian audiences. Chinese ultranationalist social media on Weibo and other platforms is likewise almost exclusively Mandarin language. These fora exist to generate content for the entertainment and status of their own members.
Yet even Western national security policy is sometimes explicitly driven by the emotions—like outrage—cultivated in online communities. The #bringbackourgirls campaign of 2014 led to military intervention against the Islamist Boko Haram insurgent group in West Africa. Incredibly, a great power adversary seeking to understand US critical national interests during a time of crisis cannot entirely discount the success of memes as a leading indicator for the direction of US foreign policy.

The stakes are raised considerably when the context is one of deterrence. Nuclear powers today may find that the Cold War–era playbook of nuclear assurance signaling like policymakers directly articulating conflict red lines synchronized with actual nuclear bomber patrols have lost relevance in public discourse. Nuclear conflict no longer ranks in the top ten fears held by most Americans. Years of incessant fearmongering and outrage baiting across the Internet of Beefs is probably in no small part the cause. However, calls for action from angry internet mobs are becoming difficult to ignore. That makes them an attractive messaging channel to exploit if possible.
Virtue-signaling online communities can make bellicose threats and maximalist demands that policymakers cannot without risking credibility. Whether through deliberate government synchronization with meme generators and social media bomb throwers or not, trolls then essentially become bad cops to the policymaker good cops. The angry online mob calls for nuclear escalation within their ideological echo chambers while prudent national leaders claim to be exercising responsible restraint.

This trend seems unlikely to reverse, and will only further muddy the waters of nuclear signaling. Conducting such signaling via online trolls will become a common feature of nuclear brinkmanship tactics. This, then, is the challenge for policymakers and intelligence analysts: de-muddy the waters. It is now an essential task to better understand the hierarchy of online antagonists and their champions to reduce the risk of misinterpreting performative virtue signals as a feature of nuclear messaging. It will not be a simple one.
Lieutenant Colonel Steve Speece is an active duty US Army strategic intelligence officer currently assigned to United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) J-2.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, USSTRATCOM, Department of the Army, Defense Intelligence Agency, or Department of Defense.

On Trolls and Nuclear Signaling: Strategic Stability in the Age of Memes - Modern War Institute

A key feature of the war in Ukraine salient to most Western observers is the memes being generated and spread at the expense of Russia’s failing so-called special operation. In […]

mwi.usma.edu

jward · Oct 10, 2022

Excerpt

Conclusions and Implications for U.S. Policy

The emergence of hypersonic weapons has led to a series of robust debates about the degree to which the United States should pursue their development and acquisition, as well as how seriously the United States should push for an arms control regime. This paper has sought to walk through the general criteria that policymakers should use when developing any new technology, and has applied this logic to the expected capabilities and advantages provided by hypersonic missiles. It has also found that short- and medium-range hypersonic weapons are most useful to states that have revisionist agendas and may employ fait accompli strategies to quickly and efficiently grab territory. However, they are less useful from a defensive posture.

When evaluated according to these criteria, U.S. policy on developing and acquiring hypersonic weapons appears to over-state the importance of introducing them into its arsenal. Far from being a necessary acquisition in a new arms race, hypersonic weapons appear to be primarily useful to the aggressive and the disadvantaged — two things that the United States is not. The costs associated with the development of conventional hypersonic weapons are high enough — both fiscally and strategically — that the United States should pause and think carefully about whether the aggressive pursuit of these weapons is indeed in the national interest.

By contrast, American investments in hypersonic missile defense, particularly at short and medium range, could reap significant dividends. Better defense against hypersonic missiles would both signal to adversaries and the international community that the United States was not interested in aggressive action, but rather just concerned about defending existing territory. It would reduce the incentives for other countries to invest in procuring additional hypersonic weapons, and it would deter them from using them in the event of a conflict with the United States. When limited to short and medium range, better hypersonic missile defense significantly reduces the first-mover advantages associated with hypersonic missiles today.

This framework suggests that U.S. efforts at arms control should be revisited as well, particularly with regard to the proliferation of hypersonic technology and missile exports. America’s existing strategic ballistic missile defense is most effective against small numbers of ballistic missiles from countries that it considers “rogue regimes,” such as North Korea. The proliferation of hypersonic glide vehicle technology to these states could significantly undermine U.S. homeland defense, making America vulnerable to a strategic attack from an unstable regime. Further, the proliferation of hypersonic technology to regional rivals could significantly exacerbate conflict and instability across the globe. The United States should therefore push aggressively to limit the spread of hypersonic missile technology in a significant way.

Overall, this paper has sought to take a step back. It first provided a framework, using existing theory, to structure debates about the acquisition of new technologies and arms control. It then evaluated how hypersonic weapons and hypersonic technology more broadly fit into these debates — highlighting areas for future research and the weapons’ potential policy implications. Hypersonic weapons undoubtedly raise important questions about the future of strategic stability and deterrence in today’s environment. All three major powers are already either employing these weapons in conflict or preparing to introduce them into their arsenal quickly, meaning that the international system will be faced with the very dilemmas and decisions outlined above in the very near future. Understanding how missile delivery, speed, and technological change impact decision-making and strategic thought at the highest level is therefore of paramount importance in an increasingly challenging international environment.

https://tnsr.org/2022/09/technology-acquisition-and-arms-control-thinking-through-the-hypersonic-weapons-debate/

jward · Oct 10, 2022

Seth Baum
@SethBaum

Executive Director @GCRInstitute
. Affiliate @CSERCambridge
. Research on catastrophic risk, security, ethics, astrobiology. Tweets my own.

jward · Oct 10, 2022

Thread by @SethBaum on Thread Reader App

@SethBaum: So lots of people are interested in the probability of nuclear war right now. I have studied the probability of nuclear war about as much as anyone (e.g., lead author on the model in the graphic...…

threadreaderapp.com

jward · Oct 12, 2022

Russia and Iran: isolated from the West and drawing closer

From Syria to Ukraine

Relations between Russia and Iran have long been characterised by a degree of mutual suspicion. This is in part because of Russia’s historical ambition to control the Caucasus region, which led to a series of wars with Tehran that ended in the nineteenth century, and in part because the countries have conflicting interests in the present-day Middle East. But the two now share an important geopolitical objective: undermining what they view as a Western-dominated international order.

Russia’s acquisition of Iranian uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs) and direct-attack munitions for use on the Ukrainian battlefield has been the most visible sign of their partnership since the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Russia and Iran have also announced joint initiatives to circumvent Western sanctions. As Western countries increase their efforts to provide Ukraine with weapons and inflict economic pain on Russia, Moscow and Tehran appear to be setting differences aside to cooperate against a common set of adversaries.

In devising a strategy to confront the West, Russia and Iran may fall back on their shared experience of mounting a joint campaign in the Syrian Civil War to rescue the regime of President Bashar al-Assad from collapse. In 2015, Russia and Iran decided to operate jointly to secure Assad's survival. Militarily, Iran and Russia cooperated well: the former applied political cover, air power, missiles, artillery and a limited number of soldiers (including mercenaries), and the latter provided UAVs and manpower, mostly Shia militiamen recruited across the region and South Asia but directed by commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. By late 2015, their combined effort began to turn the tide of the war.

Whereas Russia and Iran had good reason to cooperate in Syria to save Assad, it is unclear whether Iran has any direct interest in partnering with Russia in Ukraine. In Syria, Russia obtained a port and a military airport, securing strategically important positions in the Mediterranean. Iran managed to preserve the land bridge that allows it to funnel militants and advanced weaponry to friendly militias at Israel’s doorstep, especially Hezbollah, for use in any future conflict. By contrast, Ukraine is of no special importance to Iran. Although it may see a tactical benefit in providing Russia with weaponry or cooperating with Moscow on sanctions evasion, it has little interest in tying its fate to Russia’s agonising military campaign in Ukraine. This is one reason that Iran’s foreign ministry did not offer clear support for the outcome of Russia’s 23 September referendums on the annexation of four regions in Ukraine, instead referring to the requirement that all countries ‘fully comply with the principle of the territorial integrity’.

Emile Hokayem
Senior Fellow for Middle East Security

Russia’s deployment of Iranian weaponry in Ukraine

The United Nations lifted its arms embargo against Iran in October 2020, which has allowed Tehran to import and export conventional military equipment for the first time in more than a decade. While analysts initially predicted Tehran might recapitalise elements of its armed forces by purchasing Russian equipment, Russia’s international isolation since February 2022 has instead led Moscow to turn to Tehran for some types of weaponry.
It appears that Russia has received the Shahed-136 direct-attack munition and the Mohajer-6 UAV, although additional types of equipment may also have been secured. The Shahed-136 is a delta-wing attack munition. The system, armed with a small warhead, appears to be designated as the Geran-2 in the Russian service. The Mohajer-6 is a medium-class UAV used for combat intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance and can carry a payload of up to 150 kilograms. It likely entered service with the Iranian armed forces in 2018.

There are several possible reasons for Russia procuring Iranian direct-attack munitions and UAVs. Moscow may be running low on some of its own precision-guided weapons, while a new generation of tactical air-to-surface missiles likely has yet to enter the air force inventory in significant numbers. The Shahed-136, however, is by no means a replacement for this capability, but it does allow Russian forces to launch strikes using multiple direct-attack munitions at fixed targets. Russia also has fallen behind in the development and deployment of armed UAVs.
These sales to Moscow are notable as they appear to be the first instances of Iran supplying these types of equipment to a state, an opportunity Iran may use to advertise its products to other countries. Tehran’s willingness to provide weapons to support Russia’s invasion of Ukraine may also offer it insight into how these systems perform in a conventional, high-intensity environment. Furthermore, it is unknown whether Tehran will gain access to Russian weapons systems in return for its support to Moscow. Iran needs to recapitalise its combat-aircraft inventory, with some analysts speculating that Tehran could acquire 24 Sukhoi Su-35 Flanker M aircraft originally manufactured as part of a now-shelved Egyptian order.

The Shahed-136 and Mohajer-6 are relatively simple systems and are probably vulnerable to Ukrainian defences. But the Shahed-136, in particular, is small and comparatively difficult to detect. Furthermore, if multiple direct-attack munitions are used against a target, any air defences could risk being overwhelmed. There is evidence suggesting that Kyiv has utilised either its indigenous or Western-supplied defence systems to intercept the Shahed-136 and Mohajer-6.

Timothy Wright
Research Analyst and Programme Administrator for Defence and Military Analysis
Douglas Barrie
Senior Fellow for Military Aerospace

Cooperation and competition on sanctions evasion

The West has enacted unprecedented economic and financial sanctions against Russia. These measures aim to trigger a liquidity crisis by denying Russia access to Western capital markets, impair Russia’s production capacity by depriving it of controlled Western technology, and ultimately degrade its industrial base. Russia has been adapting to this new reality, reaching out to several sanctioned states including Iran for assistance and coordination.

Iran and Russia share the objective of undermining Western sanctions, and since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, they have announced a flurry of joint initiatives towards this end. They began trading in their national currencies in August, de-dollarising transactions to circumvent US financial sanctions. Iran and Russia may also be engaging in bartering arrangements that involve exchanging Russian metals for Iranian automobile parts and gas turbines. In addition, they held talks with Azerbaijan in September to revive the rail component of the International North–South Transport Corridor, a dormant project first announced in 2000 that the Russians have hoped would connect them to markets in Iran and India. In the energy sector, Iran is turning to Russia for help. In July, Iran’s National Iranian Oil Company and Russia’s Gazprom unveiled an ambitious plan for US$40 billion of Russian investments into Iran to sustain and develop its oil and gas fields, build liquified-natural-gas facilities and construct gas pipelines.

There are important limits to this cooperation, however. Most foreign countries will be unwilling to provide essential related technologies or financial assistance for developing the energy sectors in Iran or Russia due to sanctions and reputational risk. Although bartering arrangements and rouble–rial mechanisms may provide marginal trade and liquidity benefits, they are unlikely to constitute a major lifeline for the Russian economy in the near term. More significantly, Iran and Russia may become competitors in the clandestine market for access to Western technology. Iran has obtained controlled Western technology by working through networks of intermediaries in Western and Middle Eastern capitals, transhipping prohibited items through large ports and collaborating with Chinese state-owned companies such as Huawei. To circumvent Western export controls, Russia, whose indigenisation efforts have long fallen short of its needs, will probably soon come to rely on these same black-market channels, where supply is constrained.

Nonetheless, Russia’s decoupling from the West will probably accentuate its reliance on Iran’s well-developed sanctions-busting schemes. As Iran’s provision of UAVs and direct-attack munitions to Russia suggests, Iran may be able to fill gaps where Russia’s import-substitution policy has failed. For instance, the US has identified three Iranian cargo planes that flew to Russia carrying controlled equipment, including electronic components that Russia needs. If left unchecked, Russia and Iran may find new, more potent ways of working together to evade Western sanctions, making it less likely that the West will succeed in containing Russian aggression, Iran’s use of militias or its nuclear programme.

Maria Shagina
Diamond-Brown Research Fellow for Economic Sanctions, Standards and Strategy

Iran’s transactional but lethal support for Russia demands a Western response

Iran and Russia’s relationship is transactional and tense. Iran shares as little ideologically with Russia now as it did with the Soviet Union. Their long-term visions of the Middle East are incompatible. Even in Syria, where they collaborated to rescue Assad, Iran and Russia have since competed to shape the regime’s orientation, build influence in the security services and armed forces, and assert control over the country’s mineral resources. Russia and Iran also differ in their attitudes towards Israel.

Even if their long-term visions do not presently align, Iran and Russia may nevertheless feel they have enough grounds for aligning over Ukraine. The regimes in Tehran and Moscow now share a defining narrative of resistance to the United States (and NATO). Tactical collaboration in a military theatre has form; it worked in Syria. And they are both veterans of managing sanctions. Nevertheless, Iran’s military and economic support for Russia seems unlikely to reverse Russia’s setbacks in Ukraine at this stage.
For Iran, pursuing this strategy with Russia has risks. Firstly, it could inflame the domestic anti-Russian lobby in Iran at a time when regime coherence matters in the face of internal unrest. Secondly, it will cost Iran what support it has in Europe for a pathway out of sanctions. By carefully wording its statements on Russia, the Iranian leadership may be intending to send a nuanced signal to the West and its domestic audience.

Sanctions on Iran have generally been inadequate and have failed to deter it from fighting through proxies or advancing its missile programme. Disruption, physical or virtual, of Iran’s capabilities has been more effective, but appetites for instability in Israel and the Gulf are limited. That should not deter Western actors from reminding Iran that continuing support for Russian President Vladimir Putin, as for terrorism, will come at a cost. Applying these costs effectively, however, will be a challenge.

Russia and Iran: isolated from the West and drawing closer

Six IISS experts describe how and why Russia – faced with military setbacks on the battlefield in Ukraine and unprecedented Western sanctions – has turned to a partner that is all too familiar with international isolation: Iran.

www.iiss.org

jward · Oct 14, 2022

Indo-Pacific News - Geo-Politics & Military News
@IndoPac_Info
9h

#India

did a submarine launched ballistic missile test today The nuclear-powered SSBN submarine INS Arihant carried out the successful launch of a SLBM missile in the Bay of Bengal with very high accuracy: Defence Ministry.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1580893021859520514

View: https://twitter.com/IndoPac_Info/status/1580893021859520514?s=20&t=P1QHIaHciISzdgDjEIjp4w

jward · Oct 15, 2022

China can now deploy hypersonic nukes on its carriers

Gabriel Honrada

China’s carrier-based aircraft may soon be equipped with hypersonic weapons, thanks to the development of a new sealant that protects against storage at sea and accelerates the repair and maintenance of the game-changing armament while afloat.
The South China Morning Post reported this week that China’s carrier-based hypersonic weapons are like the Russian Kinzhal air-launched hypersonic missile, which was first used in the Ukraine war.
They can be used against air, surface and satellite targets and reach ten times the speed of sound with a range of 1,000 kilometers, as noted this month in the Chinese domestic peer-reviewed journal Aero Weaponry.
The weapon extends the strike range of China’s carrier fleet to more than 2,500 kilometers, approximately the distance east of Taiwan to Guam, which increases the threat of an ultra-fast Chinese missile attack on the strategic but increasingly vulnerable US outpost in the Pacific. Until now, hypersonic weapons have not been deployed on aircraft carriers, according to reports.
Xiao Jun, lead researcher at the China Airborne Missile Academy, and his team pointed out in the South China Morning Post article that hypersonic weapons are more difficult to repair at sea than conventional missiles.
They note that the critical areas of hypersonic weapons are shielded using high-tech material that protects against extreme flight temperatures but also allow communication signals to pass through.

However, the research team noted that this material is susceptible to damage during transport, storage or mounting on an aircraft. In addition, the Chinese research team pointed out that when a damaged part is exposed to ocean humidity, salt, and mold, moisture absorption, expansion, deformation, blistering, debonding, or peeling can adversely affect the heat-resistant coating.
Past solutions required a clean ground-based room and an experienced crew with sophisticated equipment to ensure that there are no defects on the finished surface. To solve the problem, the research team developed a new sealing material that requires only one worker to remove the damaged part, fill in gaps with the sealing gel and smooth the finished surface with a scraper.
The China Airborne Missile Academy researchers say that during field tests in poor conditions aboard aircraft carriers, the new method reduced service time to one-tenth of the previous approach. They said that their new technology improves the storage lifespan of hypersonic weapons, which the Chinese military requires to last at least a decade.
The researchers claim that their new technology also allows for convenient field maintenance and periodic upgrades, as technicians inspect weapons and sometimes open them to enhance critical components such as infrared sensors.
The Dongfeng-17 medium-range ballistic missile that mounts the DF-ZF Hypersonic Glide Vehicle on parade. They may soon be deployed at sea. Image: Xinhua

Moreover, they noted in the South China Morning Post report that repairs and body heat sealing need to withstand the extreme conditions of hypersonic flight and adverse conditions at sea for more than ten years while allowing for ease of maintenance under rough conditions.
The sealant technology will conceivably allow China to deploy hypersonic weapons on a broader range of its surface combatants, giving them a potential edge over their competitors, namely the United States, in surface warfare operations.
This April, Asia Times reported that China had tested its YJ-12 hypersonic weapon from one of its Type 055 cruisers, making the class one of the heaviest armed warships in the world. Video footage from the test showed a cold-launched anti-ship ballistic missile armed with a hypersonic glide vehicle, with its small control surfaces suggesting it is not a surface-to-air missile.
The YJ-12 outwardly resembles China’s CM-401 high-altitude anti-ship missile, which is based on Russia’s Iskander mobile short-range ballistic missile. However, while China has successfully tested the ship-based YJ-12, an air-launched version could also be in the works.

In contrast, the US will not be ready to deploy hypersonic weapons on its surface combatants until 2025. This March, Asia Times reported that the US aims to replace the troubled Advanced Gun Systems (AGS) on its Zumwalt class destroyers with hypersonic missile tubes, converting the futuristic and stealthy shore bombardment platforms into blue-water strike ones.
As China is perceived to view its hypersonic weapons for strategic deterrence, it may also choose to arm its carrier-based strike aircraft with nuclear-tipped hypersonic weapons, taking a page from past US practice.
The idea of reintroducing ship-based nuclear weapons is under critical fire from US analysts.
In a May article for The Heritage Foundation think tank, senior policy analyst Patty-Jane Geller noted that, during the Cold War, the US deployed nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM-N) on surface ships and submarines to deter a possible Soviet attack on Europe but has since retired the capability.
Declassified US documents cited by the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) note that during the 1970s and 1980s the US deployed a quarter of its nuclear arsenal at sea, peaking in 1975 when there were 6,191 nuclear weapons deployed on US warships.

But in the 1990s, the Bush administration unilaterally offloaded all tactical nuclear weapons from US naval forces, and in 1994 the Clinton administration decided that all US surface ships would be stripped of their capability to launch nuclear weapons.
Sixteen years later, the Obama administration ended decades of nuclear weapons deployment on warships, with only ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) carrying US strategic nuclear weapons at sea.
However, Geller notes that China and Russia have continued to advance their regional nuclear forces below the threshold of strategic nuclear weapons as a backstop for conventional military operations, developing tactical nuclear weapons to such an end.
In contrast, she notes that the US maintains the same deterrent posture focused on strategic-level nuclear threats, potentially opening a deterrence gap.
The old-class ballistic-missile submarine USS Henry M Jackson. Photo: Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Amanda R. Gray / US Navy

Stressing the urgency to restore ship-based nuclear strike capability, US Strategic Command Admiral Chas Richard noted that SLCM-N would give the US “a low-yield, non-ballistic capability that does not require visible generation” to counter the tactical nuclear weapons in China and Russia’s arsenals, Defense News reported him as saying this May.
However, US Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Mike Gilday criticized the idea, stating that forcing surface ships and submarines to carry nuclear-tipped missiles would detract from more pressing missions.
Defense News notes that the current US submarine fleet consists of 50 boats, with the US Navy requiring 66 to 72 units. Furthermore, the US destroyer fleet is preoccupied with global deployments working alone or as part of carrier battlegroups. It is expected to come under more strain as the US retires its Ticonderoga class cruisers in the coming years.
Moreover, in a potential departure from the perceived US intent of using hypersonics for conventional strike purposes, Gilday pointed out that such weapons are a preferable avenue for sea-based deterrence.

China can now deploy hypersonic nukes on its carriers

jward · Oct 16, 2022

China's Vertical Nuclear Expansion is Real

David Lasseter

As the People’s Republic of China (PRC) continues to flout international norms, the world is falling behind in terms of any meaningful effort to confront their calculated aggression. Some positive, yet incremental events have occurred recently: namely, the Biden Administration issuing two new rules limiting American companies from exporting chips and chipmaking equipment to China; providing anti-ship and air-to-air missiles in the recent arms sale to Taiwan; Congressional movement on the Taiwan Policy Act; Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s perfectly acceptable summer visit to Taiwan; and reports showing a deep decline in projected Chinese GDP for 2022.

However, Chinese military growth and combativeness remains unconstrained. They treat the South and East China Seas as if they were China’s exclusive economic zones. This is a clear affront to international law and norms, as well as a show of flagrant disrespect for various countries with true and legitimate rights to use of those waters. Further, they disrespect the free and democratic Taiwan in every way possible. Most concerning is the PRC’s modern and growing nuclear arsenal. More precisely, the significant vertical expansion (an increase in the number of nuclear warheads) of this arsenal in the hands of such a destabilizing force. It needs to be confronted post-haste.

As a threshold matter, the world needs less not more nuclear weapons, including the United States. What complicates this is that for the last 75+ years, and for the foreseeable future, nuclear weapons have been the single greatest deterrent when one nation-state considers aggression against another. Also, in order to maintain nuclear superiority in relation to the malign Russian Federation, any reduction in nuclear warheads must have a correlative modernization component to ensure a meaningful deterrence and effective response.

The United States nuclear triad is old and in need of modernization, whereas an ideal arsenal would become lean, safer, and with greater durability and more lethality. This is exactly what the PRC is doing to their arsenal without regard to its impact on global stability and the proliferation interests of other nation-states. And while they are developing and building modern air, land, and sea capabilities, China’s vertical expansion should be the overriding concern rather than assessments and warnings focusing primarily on launch capability.
By public accounts, the PRC had approximately 240 nuclear warheads in 2010. Today, that number is around 350. By 2030, conservative public projections have that number around 1000. According to the most recent

Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community:
Beijing will continue the largest ever nuclear force expansion and arsenal diversification in its history. Beijing is not interested in agreements that restrict its plans and will not agree to negotiations that lock in U.S. or Russian advantages. China is building a larger and increasingly capable nuclear missile and bomber force that is more survivable, more diverse, and on higher alert than in the past, including nuclear missile systems designed to manage regional escalation and ensure an intercontinental strike capability in any scenario.
The unclassified report describes Chinese nuclear program improvements, such as: building hundreds of new intercontinental ballistic missile silos; operationally fielding the nuclear capable H-6N bomber, providing a fixed wing platform for the PRC’s nuclear triad; and, most concerning, the flight test of a hypersonic glide vehicle flight test that circled the globe before landing inside China.

A world with more nuclear weapons, especially in the hands of a brutal communist regime (cue treatment of Uighur population and pro-democracy demonstrators in Hong Kong) does not bode well for global peace and security. China continues to contravene international arms control regimes, non-proliferation agreements, and disarmament commitments as highlighted by the U.S. State Department earlier this year:
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has failed to adhere to its November 2000 commitment to the United States not to assist “in any way, any country in the development of ballistic missiles that can be used to deliver nuclear weapons. Concerns remain about the PRC’s lack of transparency regarding the nature of its testing activities and its adherence to its testing moratorium, which the PRC declared in 1996, judged against the “zero-yield” standard.
During the Trump administration, great effort was made to bring the PRC to the negotiating table along with the Russian Federation with the legitimate aim of reducing nuclear proliferation and warhead production. Officials from the Cabinet on down to the operational levels engaged with the PRC directly and indirectly to entice, pressure, and cajole Beijing to discuss nuclear proliferation. The PRC flat-out refused.

The average person might be confused by the concern of many in the national security profession regarding the PRC’s vertical nuclear expansion. After all, public reports assert that both the United States and the Russian Federation have anywhere from 10x to 20x the number of warheads as compared to the PRC. According to the Arms Control Association, the world’s other nuclear powers have between 40-300 warheads, a sufficient number for those with deterrence in mind. (This excludes North Korea who will continue to increase their numbers as Kim Jong-un redirects money from starving children to nuclear expansion with Beijing’s blessing). The concern is because China’s desire to dramatically increase their numbers is all about pride, perceived inadequacy, and reputational positioning. For the United States and the Russian Federation, the unnecessarily large numbers of nuclear warheads correlate with historic, not current, Cold War-era build-up.

Speaking of missiles, the PRC’s destabilizing activities were on full display before, during, and after Speaker Pelosi’s legitimate visit to Taiwan, when President Xi decided to lob at least four ballistic missiles over Taiwan and into their northeast and southwest waters, as well as Japan’s exclusive economic zone. In addition to these missile launches, the PRC flooded the surrounding waters with war ships and dozens of sorties using bombers, attack aircraft, and 5th generation fighters. Oh, and according to press reports, they apparently executed multiple cyber-attacks in coordination with the Russian Federation. What about this activity from an advancing nuclear power can we call normative behavior within the bounds of international order? Absolutely none.

In short, the broad expansion of their nuclear triad and significant increase in the number of nuclear warheads is a global dilemma. The PRC threatens its neighbors, is the world’s second largest economy, and has the planet’s largest active military ground force at 2M personnel. In a broad context having another nation-state arsenal growing toward Russian and American numbers, the North Korean testing and demonstration, and Iranian nuclear pursuits, genuinely threatens worldwide security and economic stability. Little by little the PRC escalates and the hostilities in Ukraine have shown the world what happens when tyrannical governments go unchecked. While we may think this broad nuclear expansion and aggression towards Taiwan is saber-rattling, the march to war is the time to attend to our values and decide what kind of future we want.

Countering Chinese nuclear vertical expansion is paramount and necessary, and the U.S. government and its allies must do more, today. While modernizing the United States nuclear arsenal is essential, so too is compelling China to discuss nuclear proliferation. It should continue to be an aim and interest to American policy makers. Whether through establishing mutually agreeable confidence building measures or, less likely, by sanctions regimes taking steps to counter the growth is warranted. There is bipartisan agreement on these issues and there is opportunity. Just last month, President Biden updated U.S. policy relating to defense of Taiwan making clear that America will defend the island against a Chinese invasion. This is something members of Congress from both political party’s support. The Administration and Congress can unite to improve American nuclear systems and contain Chinese nuclear growth.
The clock is ticking.

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2022/10/15/chinas_vertical_nuclear_expansion_is_real_859236.html

jward · Oct 17, 2022

Learning to Love the Bomb

Adam Lowther, Curtis McGiffin

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s repeated threats to use nuclear weapons should come as no surprise to anyone paying attention to Russian nuclear modernization over the past two decades. The reality of Russia is that it is a great power solely because it is a nuclear power. Russia has the largest, most advanced, and most diverse nuclear arsenal of any nation, with a particular and superior advantage in non-strategic nuclear weapons.
The challenge for the United States is its penchant for mirror imaging. American decision-makers automatically assume that authoritarian regimes around the world will always behave in a prudent and predictable fashion. After all, how could the leaders of China, Russia, or anywhere else want a war, much less a nuclear war? President after president, Republican and Democrat alike, seemingly failed to understand why other nations, especially those with authoritarian regimes, viewed the American-led international order as objectionable and the United States’ conventional military as a threat that needs countering.

Wars in Serbia (1999), Afghanistan (2001–2021), and Iraq (2003–2011) left leaders in Beijing, Moscow, Pyongyang, and Tehran confident the United States would not hesitate to remove an unfriendly regime…unless it was a nuclear-armed regime. Thus, America’s adversaries came to understand what the United States has long known; nuclear weapons deter your enemies and guarantee survival.

For Russia, a nation obsessed with controlling its near abroad, keeping pace with an advanced conventional American military was never really an affordable option. Modernizing its strategic nuclear arsenal of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), and bomber-delivered cruise missiles was the only efficient means to deter a large-scale war with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or an exchange of strategic nuclear weapons—Hollywood’s worst nightmare. But, NATO’s eastward expansion after the reunification of Germany in 1991 gave great solace to the Alliance’s new members and left Russia feeling under tremendous security pressure.
Thus, to counter encroachment into Russia’s “Near Abroad,” Vladimir Putin began developing and fielding an advanced and diverse arsenal of non-strategic nuclear weapons, immune of any treaty restriction, that employ low- and ultra-low-yield warheads on delivery systems. These non-strategic nuclear weapons include short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and other delivery systems that Putin sees as giving him the ability to use one or a small number of nuclear weapons in Europe without crossing an all but undeclared American redline for nuclear retaliation.

While the United States fields approximately two-hundred fighter-delivered B-61 nuclear gravity bombs in Europe, the operational readiness rates of the aircraft and political decision-making required to deliver these weapons is too slow to prove effective. Thus, these few bombs may no longer satisfy today’s threat environment if they are to be viewed as e more than political weapons that ostensibly make NATO a nuclear alliance. This leaves the United States with either the option to respond conventionally or escalate to strategic nuclear weapons should Russia decide to employ a small non-strategic nuclear weapon.

In support of NATO, the United States could also threaten to launch one or more of its small numbers of low-yield submarine-launched nuclear weapons, but the handful of W76-2 low-yield warheads were never meant to be a permanent solution to Russia’s 2,000–6,000 non-strategic nuclear weapons. In the mind of Vladimir Putin, this creates an opportunity for a fiat accompli where he uses one or a small number of short- to medium-range low-yield nuclear weapons in or near Ukraine, for example, with the expectation that the United States and NATO will back down and disengage their support to Ukraine rather than escalate.

For the past three decades, American conventional military superiority led multiple presidential administrations to believe nuclear weapons were no longer necessary to defend American interests. After all, by the start of the new millennium, Soviet communism was vanquished, China was in the midst of a “peaceful rise,” and democracy was triumphant. With few exceptions, the Beltway intelligentsia was wrong about Russia and China.

The world has changed since President Barack Obama’s speech in Prague on April 5, 2009. Standing before a crowd of thousands in Hradcany Square, President Obama declared, “So today, I state clearly and with conviction America’s commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.” Today, Russia’s nuclear weapon modernization and expansion program is nearly complete; with new novel weapons to threaten the west. China is fielding new nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles with greater range and accuracy; adding over 300 new ICBM silos in its deserts. Thanks to the evolving security threat environment, even the United Kingdom is increasing its overall nuclear weapon stockpile by 40%. It seems only the United States desires to do the opposite.

If not for public revelations in 2021 that China is dramatically expanding its nuclear arsenal and President Putin’s repeated nuclear threats over Ukraine, the United States may very well have added a “no first use” or “sole purpose” policy to the latest Nuclear Posture Review, which, to date, has no unclassified version for the American people to review. Despite both China and Russia growing their nuclear arsenals and, in the case of Russia, threatening to use them, America is still looking for ways to reduce the size and role of its nuclear weapons via a renewed “sole purpose” policy—despite the recent success of nuclear deterrence in Europe.

Instead, it is time to set aside long-held utopian ambitions of a world free of nuclear weapons. Should the United States find itself unprepared for a limited nuclear war in Asia or Europe, the president will not be judged by his aspirations but by his actions. Eschewing nuclear weapons and the peace nuclear deterrence provides is folly and dangerous to world peace and stability. In short, it is time to learn to love the bomb.

Dr. Adam Lowther is Vice President for Research at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and the host of ANWA DC’s Nuclecast. Col. Curtis McGiffin (U.S. Air Force, Ret.) is Vice President for Education at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and visiting professor at Missouri State University’s Department of Defense and Strategic Studies. Together, they have more than five decades of experience in uniform and DoD civil service.
The views expressed in this article are the author's own.

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2022/10/15/learning_to_love_the_bomb_859261.html

jward · Oct 17, 2022

US says 'confident' Pakistan can secure nukes after Biden uproar - Insider Paper

AFP

The United States said Monday that it had confidence in Pakistan’s ability to control its nuclear arsenal after President Joe Biden expressed alarm, leading Islamabad to summon the US ambassador.
“The United States is confident of Pakistan’s commitment and its ability to secure its nuclear assets,” State Department spokesman Vedant Patel told reporters.

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