WAR 09-10-2022-to-09-16-2022__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
(266) 08-20-2022-to-08-26-2022__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

(267) 08-27-2022-to-09-02-2022__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****


(268) 09-03-2022-to-09-09-2022__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****


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European powers express 'doubts' over Iran's commitment to nuclear deal​

Issued on: 10/09/2022 - 16:20

France, Britain and Germany on Saturday vented their frustration at Iran's demand in talks to revive its 2015 nuclear deal that the U.N. nuclear watchdog close a probe into uranium particles found at three sites, adding that it was jeopardising the talks.

Iran earlier this month sent its latest response to the European Union's proposed text to revive the agreement under which Tehran had restrained its nuclear programme in exchange for relief from U.S., EU and U.N. economic sanctions.

Diplomats have said Iran's response to the EU coordinator was a step backwards, with it seeking to link a revival of the deal with the closure of investigations by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) into the uranium traces.

"This latest demand raises serious doubts as to Iran's intentions and commitment to a successful outcome on the JCPoA," the three countries, known as the E3, said in a statement, referring to the deal's full name, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

"Iran's position contradicts its legally binding obligations and jeopardises prospects of restoring the JCPoA." Then-U.S. President Donald Trump abandoned the deal in 2018 and re-imposed U.S. sanctions, prompting Iran to start breaching the deal's nuclear curbs and reviving U.S., Arab and Israeli fears it may be seeking an atomic bomb. Iran denies having nuclear ambitions.

The IAEA's Board of Governors meet on Monday, three months after already adopting a resolution urging Iran to give credible answers to the watchdog.

The IAEA said on Wednesday Iran's stock of uranium enriched to up to 60%, close to weapons-grade, had grown to enough, if enriched further, for a nuclear bomb and that Tehran had still failed to explain the origin of the uranium particles.

"Given Iran’s failure to conclude the deal on the table, we will consult, alongside international partners, on how best to address Iran’s continued nuclear escalation and lack of cooperation with the IAEA regarding its NPT (non-proliferation.
(Reuters)
 

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2 utility workers killed after warring drug cartels cut electricity to villages as "reprisals," Mexico's president says​

SEPTEMBER 9, 2022 / 6:15 AM / CBS/AP

The killing of two utility workers in northern Mexico may be related to the scorched-earth tactics of warring drug cartels, Mexico's president said Thursday.

Drug cartels in Mexico have increasingly targeted civilian communities in their turf battles, isolating towns that don't support them by cutting off roads and electricity, or forcing residents to leave.

On Tuesday, assailants opened fire on two trucks carrying workers from the state-owned electrical power company on a highway. Two workers escaped and two were killed.

On Thursday, President Andrés Manuel López Obrador said the area in the northern border state of Sonora was the scene of fighting between gangs, who had cut electricity to two villages as "reprisals."

"There is fighting between groups there," López Obrador said of the area around the village of Onavas, where the attack occurred.

While he said the attackers might have mistaken the utility trucks for those of a rival gang, López Obrador noted "there is another hypothesis that suggests they were performing their duties by going to reconnect electricity to two villages that had been cut off by one of the groups as reprisals."

In the western state of Michoacan, warring drug cartels have periodically cut off villages that appear to support a rival gang, by downing power lines or digging trenches across roadways.

But the attack Tuesday was unusual, because up to now cartels have largely avoided going after public workers trying to reconnect roads or power lines. Moreover, resuscitating the debt-strapped state-owned utility, the Federal Electricity Commission, has been one of López Obrador's main policy initiatives.

Drug cartels - including the La Linea gang based in Ciudad Juarez and factions of the Sinaloa cartel - have been fighting over the lucrative drug-producing and shipping zones of Sonora state for years.

The cartel conflict may have played a role in the 2019 ambush slayings of nine U.S.-Mexican dual citizens in a rural area relatively near Onavas.

The three women and six children from the extended Langford, LeBaron and Miller families were ambushed and slain by suspected drug gang assassins on Nov. 4, 2019.

Initial investigations suggested a squad of gunmen from the La Linea gang had set up the ambush to kill members of the rival cartel. However, relatives of the victims say that at some point, the gunmen must have known who they were killing.

After his mother and two brothers were shot to death, 13-year-old Devin Langford was able to hide six other siblings in nearby bushes, covering them with branches. He then walked 14 miles for help. His 9-year-old sister, McKenzie, was grazed in the arm. She walked for four hours in the dark before finally finding rescuers.

In July, a federal judge from North Dakota ruled the cartel accused in the gruesome killings must pay $4.6 billion to the families.

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Of course the flow of drugs out and cash in isn't their problem too.....

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Mexico calls on U.S. for help in stopping delivery of guns to cartels​

by: Julian Resendiz
Posted: Sep 9, 2022 / 06:15 PM EDT
Updated: Sep 9, 2022 / 06:15 PM EDT

JUAREZ, Mexico (Border Report) – A top Mexican official is urging the United States to step up the fight against weapons smuggling into Mexico.

Those guns, including AR-15s, AK-47s, 9mm guns and even .50-caliber sniper rifles, often end up in the hands of drug cartels blamed for a dramatic rise in homicides in Mexico in the last three years.

Mexico sending agents to U.S. to probe gun smuggling, foreign minister says
“Mexico in its territory is seizing five times more weapons that the United States is seizing weapons headed to Mexico on its side,” Foreign Minister Marcelo Ebrard said during a visit to Juarez this week. “You have no reason on (your) territory to let someone with weapons cross into Mexico when you know it is illegal to have those weapons in our country. [….] We are asking, at the very least, for a similar effort.”

Mexico claims that half a million guns a year are pouring across the U.S. border and that American gun makers know this and refuse to do something about it. Mexico is suing a dozen U.S. gun manufacturers for negligence in U.S. federal court and presented initial arguments this month, Ebrard said. Lawyers for the gunmakers also are presenting their side of the story to the court.

“We are saying ‘you are producing weapons that you know will be sold to (drug trafficking organizations). The weapons targeted at that market are bringing about homicides, femicides, violence into Mexico,” Ebrard said. “That’s why I accuse those businesses of negligence and (want them) to stop making those weapons.”

US-Canada launch task force to dismantle gun-smuggling operations at northern border
The gunmakers have denied the chargers.

According to the U.S. Customs and Border Protection website, 92 guns or ammunition were seized all along the Southwest border in July, and 941 have been seized during fiscal year 2022, which began on Oct. 1. CBP reported 1,134 seizures in fiscal year 2021.

Visit BorderReport.com for the latest exclusive stories and breaking news about issues along the U.S.-Mexico border

In March, the Mexican National Guard seized 128 semi-automatic rifles, 19 machine guns, one submachine gun, and six .50-caliber sniper rifles in a single bust, the Associated Press reported. The raid took place on a stash house in a town in Sonora 200 miles south of the Arizona border.
 

Housecarl

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Saudi naval modernization pushes ahead, with eye always on Iran

The first of five new corvettes recently arrived at King Faisal Naval Base in Jeddah, upgrading the Saudi fleet's capabilities in the Red Sea.​

By AGNES HELOU
on September 09, 2022 at 6:25 AM

BEIRUT — Against the backdrop of regional tensions and the potential return of the Iran nuclear deal, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is pushing ahead with an ambitious, multi-billion dollar naval fleet modernization effort that includes a quintet of new Avante 2200 corvettes.

On August 25, the first Avante 2200-class, dubbed the Al Jubail, arrived at King Faisal Naval Base in Jeddah. Saudi Arabia took possession of that first corvette in March, with a second taken into possession at the end of July. The Al-Sarawat Program, as the corvette addition is known, comes for the first time with a Saudi- made combat management system known as Hazem. The production is a joint venture between Saudi Military Industries Company (SAMI) and Spanish shipbuilder Navantia.

The corvettes, which were purchased under a 2018 agreement, are capable of multi-tasking and come equipped with air defense systems, anti-submarine warfare and Surface Warfare capabilities, Bahraini strategic expert and political researcher Abdullah Al Junaid told Breaking Defense.


All five vessels — 104 meters in length and capable of transporting around 100 people — are underway with construction, with the fifth corvette having been put into the water in Dec. 2021. Delivery of that final ship is scheduled for February 2024.

“As part of its multi-year Saudi Naval Expansion Program (SNEP-II), Saudi Arabia is reinforcing its fleets through small naval assets, such as corvettes, speedboats, OPVs. These naval assets boost Saudi Arabia’s capacity to monitor and patrol its seas and coasts from potential asymmetric attacks launched by Iranian proxies, or potentially Iran itself, against the Kingdom,” Corrado Cok, a defense expert at Gulf State Analytics think tank told breaking Defense.

He added that the newly-arrived corvette is a case in point. “This warship is designed for surveillance and control operations with the capacity to host a helicopter of up to ten tons. On top of that, Navantia tailored it to the Royal Saudi Navy by installing additional combat systems, enhancing their survivability at sea and making them resilient to extreme temperatures.”

The corvettes are scheduled to join Saudi’s Western fleet, meaning the ships will not be deployed in the Arab or Persian Gulf next to Iran but instead to protect the roughly 1,800 kilometers of Saudi’s Red Sea coastline and safeguard the navigation of the Gulf of Aden, located directly beside Yemen, where Iranian proxy Houthi forces are based.



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“It will play a major role in combating terrorism and piracy and securing navigation in Saudi and international waters in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden,” Al Junaid said.

Countering Threats In The Gulf

Attacks in the Red Sea and the Arabian Gulf threatening navigation and naval assets are ongoing.

On August 30, an Iranian ship attempted to seize an American unmanned surface vessel operating in the Arabian Gulf, but US fifth fleet intervened and thwarted the attempt. That same day, a US Coast Guard fast response cutter interdicted a fishing vessel smuggling illegal drugs worth an estimated $20 million while patrolling the Gulf of Oman. Then just days later, an Iranian boat grabbed two more US unmanned systems and brought them aboard a ship before eventually dumping them overboard.

RELATED: NAVCENT head on why a new Red Sea task force was needed

The Saudis are looking to address both direct attacks carried out by the Houthis on commercial and civilian relief ships, as well as Somali organizations active in piracy, human trafficking and arms and drugs smuggling. Those Somali ships have also cooperated with the Houthis in transporting African fighters to fight with them in Yemen.

“The Royal Saudi Navy already faces a number of asymmetrical threats from air and sea. The Houthi rebel group has launched repeated attacks through explosive-laden boats in the southern Red Sea, including a relevant strike against an oil tanker in the port of Jeddah in December 2020,” Cok said.

“On top of that, Iranian proxies in Iraq and Yemen have hit the Kingdom with drones and ballistic missiles on multiple occasions. If the confrontation with Iran escalated, Tehran and its local allies could launch missiles and drones also across the Gulf. Arms smuggling into Yemen is yet another threat to Saudi security and part of it follows maritime routes across the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, a reason that raised the attention of Saudi Arabia and the UAE in the Horn of Africa since 2015,” he commented on the threats.

Against this background, Cok stressed that the Avante 2200 provides suitable solutions to counter both aerial threats and a wide range of maritime targets, being equipped with torpedoes, ESSM surface-to-air and anti-ship Harpoon missiles and Leonardo’s super rapid 76mm main gun system. Torpedoes are also instrumental to match Iran’s submarine assets.

Indigenous Capabilities

But the corvette deal isn’t just about securing Saudi’s territorial waters. As with all defense deals, the Kingdom has an eye on technology transfer that can lead to the Saudi Vision 2030 effort, an ambitious set of economic targets set out by crown prince Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud.

Part of that technology transfer from the Sami Navantia joint venture has led to the creation of the first Saudi Arabian Naval combat system, known as “Hazem,” which has now been integrated onto the first Al Jubail Avante 2200. Hazem includes a combat management system, integrated communication system, combat system integration, integrated platform management system, fire control system and a training system — the brains of a modern-day ship.

Al Junaid believes the local production could help make the integration and training of the system easier for the Saudi fleet. But it has other benefits, as Cok noted — developing the Saudi manufacturing sector and creating employment for Saudi citizens, which are two pivotal goals of Vision 2030.

Of course, the corvette program is only one part of the modernization effort. In 2018, a contract was signed with US firm Lockheed Martin for four Multi-Mission Surface Combatant (MMSC), based on the US Navy’s Freedom-class Littoral Combat Ship; the first cut of steel of MMSC 1 took place on October 24th, 2019 while that of MMSC 2 happened January 28th, 2021. Those are expected to serve in the Saudi Eastern fleet.

RELATED: A Middle East NATO? A missile defense network with Israel? Major shifts brewing in region

And in 2019, Saudi Arabia signed an agreement with France’s Naval Group to build warships and frigates in the Kingdom, through a joint venture in which SAMI holds 51% stake while Naval Group holds the remaining 49%. However, there has been little news about progress since.

In addition, Al Junaid noted Saudi is currently operating three Al Riyadh (F3000S) Class multipurpose anti-air warfare frigates, built by DCN of France for the Royal Saudi Naval Forces and commissioned in 2002. Though older, those frigates are able to operate in blue waters and played a key role during the 2015 anti-Houthi effort known as Operation Decisive Storm.

One interesting wrinkle to watch, as Saudi Arabia continues to modernize: could it look towards Beijing? Chinese President Xi Jingping expected to visit KSA in the near future, one month after the US president’s visit to the Gulf country, and Xi would certainly love to tighten ties with Riyadh.

“China’s arms sales to the Middle East have been in narrow areas, and they have not been in the maritime space. While I wouldn’t be surprised to see Saudi Arabia acquire some niche capabilities from China, I’d be very surprised to see Saudi Arabia turn away from a fundamental reliance on Western systems for training, maintenance and logistics,” Jon Alterman, director of the Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, told Breaking Defense.

Cok, however, is more open to the idea. “Yes, the visit of Xi could open to new arms sales to Saudi Arabia, including naval assets like China did with Pakistan. This is yet unlikely to shift Saudi interest in Western, and particularly US, naval technology. When it comes to interoperability, the recent drills around Taiwan have shown that Beijing is enhancing its capability to coordinate its land, naval and air forces, but still it has to close a large gap with the US and its Western allies,” he said.
 

Housecarl

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HOW MUCH MULTIPOLARITY DOES A STRONGMAN NEED?: WHY ERDOGAN HAS BENEFITED FROM RUSSIA’S FAILURE IN UKRAINE​

NICHOLAS DANFORTH
SEPTEMBER 9, 2022
COMMENTARY

This week, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan repeatedly threatened to invade Greece, then, without missing a beat, condemned the West’s provocative approach to Russia. And yet, since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Ankara has been eager to tout its unique success in balancing between both sides of the conflict to the benefit of Turkey, NATO, and the world. This approach reflects Erdogan’s emphasis on pursuing an independent foreign policy in which Turkey will supposedly use its military strength and cultural influence, along with its unique geographic position, to chart a course between the great powers.

The success of this policy can be debated. Turkish drones and diplomacy have certainly proved more influential than many of us anticipated and less influential than many of Erdogan’s propagandists continue to insist. But to the extent Turkey’s independent foreign policy has proven effective in this conflict, it reveals a deeper irony about the premises behind it. Turkish policymakers have consistently presented their newfound independence as a structural response to the West’s growing weakness and the emergence of an ever-more multipolar world. Over the last six months though, it has instead been Russia’s unexpected weakness that facilitated Turkey’s balancing act.

If, as many analysts expected, Russia had overrun Kyiv in a matter of weeks, few people would now be praising Turkey’s Bayraktars or mediation efforts. Instead, Erdogan would be facing a more formidable strategic environment from the Black Sea through the Caucasus to Syria, and even greater frustration in the United States and Europe. This outcome might have brought Ankara other benefits instead, but it would be left balancing on a far more wobbly wire.

Besides counting their blessings, U.S. policymakers can take this as a reminder to stop worrying about how to win Turkey back. The invasion of Ukraine has been put forward as a reason why the West should be more solicitous of Erdogan in seeking to repair ties with Turkey. But Ankara’s response suggests the opposite. Ankara has demonstrated that it will respond to shifting geopolitical circumstances with an eye toward securing the immediate benefits they offer. For example, Turkey has profited directly from selling drones to Kyiv and from its role in facilitating the export of Ukrainian grain. To the extent these moves advance U.S. interests, Ankara will pursue them without any need for encouragement or incentives from Washington. To the extent other moves undermine U.S. interests, such as threatening to block Nordic NATO membership or start a war with Greece, Washington can target its pressure or blandishments where they are needed.

The invasion of Ukraine has led Ankara to double down on its independent foreign policy, while calling into question one of the core assumptions behind it. Recognizing this can help Washington be clear-eyed about Turkey’s course and craft its response accordingly.

Making the Most of Multipolarity

As Ankara has pursued a more assertive foreign policy in recent years that is increasingly at odds with U.S. interests, observers have offered a range of overlapping explanations. Some have stressed Erdogan’s domestic concerns or ideological hostility toward the United States. Others have emphasized Ankara’s threat perception, justified or imagined, and its perceived need to push back against the activities of U.S. allies in the region. Others, however, particularly defenders of Ankara’s policies, have stressed that they are a logical or predictable reaction to multipolarity, Washington’s withdrawal from the Middle East, and the growing strength of actors like Russia. In the case of Syria, where Ankara needed Russian compliance to pursue its fight with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party and maintain its presence in Idlib, this explanation certainly makes sense. In other cases, such as Turkey’s intensified confrontation with Greece, the logic seems far less plausible.

Most likely, Turkish policymakers, like their counterparts in other countries, were predisposed to interpret geopolitical trends in accordance with their ideological orientation and policy preferences. They disliked the United States and resented its policies, and so were happy to believe its power was in abeyance. And while they had little reason to love Putin, and indeed clashed with Russia in a number of specific regional conflicts, they nonetheless saw Russian power as something that could push back against Washington and give them more room to maneuver. By backing forces opposing Russia’s partners in conflicts like the Libyan civil war and Nagorno-Karabakh, Ankara sought to build leverage with Moscow that it could ultimately use to negotiate outcomes that benefited both countries. The result would be to not only strengthen Turkey’s position but also minimize Western influence and, ideally, exclude Western actors from regional conflicts altogether.

Before Russia’s invasion, Ankara had also developed a strong relationship with Ukraine. Erdogan consistently criticized the annexation of Crimea, specifically with reference to the Crimean Tatar community. Ankara had also agreed to establish a co-production program for Turkish drones with Kyiv and begun building ships for the Ukrainian navy. These measures won Turkey points in Washington and also helped contribute to the balancing act with Russia. Through 2021, Ukraine represented a case where Turkey’s independent foreign policy was playing out well. As tensions mounted, Erdogan appeared to see this as something that could further enhance Turkey’s role. But, like many others, he discounted the possibility of an actual Russian invasion.

Tellingly, when the invasion happened, Erdogan criticized NATO for having failed to successfully deter it, while at the same time many pro-government media outlets accused NATO of provoking it. Viewed in these terms, the invasion fit nicely into the dual narrative of Western weakness and perfidy. Erdogan announced that it was not possible for Turkey to abandon either Russia or Ukraine, emphasizing he would continue to support Kyiv while simultaneously distancing himself from the broader Western response. The invasion, in short, was an opportunity for more balancing. And yet, initially at least, it threatened to undermine key components of Turkey’s preferred foreign policy.

Continued.....
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Continued.....

Consequences of a Russian Victory

Had Russia carried out its invasion as planned, toppling the Ukrainian government and consolidating control over much of the country, Turkey would have lost the relationship it had cultivated with Kyiv and many elements of its current engagement would have been rendered moot.

A quick Russian victory, or even a more successful initial Russian air campaign, would have preempted the possibility of Turkish drones playing their high-profile role in the initial weeks of the war. If Russia had set up a puppet government in Kyiv, Moscow would have had little need for Turkey to serve as an intermediary in negotiating with it. Even in a different scenario, where Russia was seeking to impose a victor’s peace on a defeated but still independent Ukrainian government, any Turkish role in the process would have looked decidedly unpalatable to the country’s NATO’s allies.

More broadly, if slightly more speculatively, a decisive Russian victory would have generated much greater alarm throughout the NATO alliance, leading to considerably greater anger at Turkish fence-sitting. Publicly at least, Washington was initially willing to put a positive spin on Turkey’s approach to the conflict. For example, U.S. officials thanked Turkey for closing the Bosporus to Russian warships in keeping with the Montreux convention, while officially overlooking the fact that, in an effort to be scrupulously balanced, it had also closed the straights to NATO ships as well. In a far more strained and perilous situation, however, there may well have been less tolerance. Ankara’s refusal to impose sanctions on Russia or its bargaining over the admission of Sweden and Finland to NATO could well have generated a more punitive response if the stakes were higher. It is possible that, feeling even more threatened, NATO members might have proven more hesitant to antagonize Turkey, or more desperate for any support they could secure from Ankara. But in Washington at least, the impulse to take a withusoragainstus approach would have been strongly felt.

In security terms, Russia’s seizure of the entire northern Black Sea coast would have also posed a significant long-term risk for Turkey that would have been difficult to counter without intensified NATO cooperation. Of course, this too would have driven a greater desire for cooperation on Washington’s part. But, with Bulgaria and Romania in NATO and new transportation options through the Greek port of Alexandropoulos, Washington now has more flexibility in the Black Sea than during the Cold War. This presumably would have shifted the perceived necessity of cooperation more firmly toward Ankara. And, if not immediately, Turkey would have been left confronting an emboldened Russia in multiple contact zones throughout the region.

Instead, as Russia remains bogged down in Eastern Ukraine, Turkey has benefitted from its weakness in other theaters. The initial ceasefire agreement following the 2021 war between Armenia and Azerbaijan gave Russian peacekeepers a prominent role, seeming to consolidate Russian influence in Nagorno-Karabakh. However in the past month, Turkish-allied Azeri forces have made further advances, pressing their advantage against Armenia with minimal diplomatic or military response from Moscow.

In Syria, the invasion has also lessened the threat of any new offensive against Idlib, where Turkey has currently stationed at least 10,000 troops following the last regime advances in March 2020. Despite recent speculation, it is still far too soon to envision any successful rapprochement between Erdogan and Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad. But if this were to happen on terms amenable to Ankara, namely those that allow a continued Turkish presence in the country over Assad’s objections, it could only be as a result of diminished Russian support for the regime.

Conclusion

Rather than being vindicated by the rise of a multipolar world, Turkey has benefited from keeping its distance from the pole that held. The West has shown greater unity than many expected — although this too would look much less impressive if Russia was winning on the ground — leaving Turkey freer to pursue its own interests. Advocates of a more independent foreign policy have often argued that previous Turkish governments were too deferential to the United States and NATO out of some kind of ideological subservience enforced through Western-backed coups. But the reality is that many of these governments, both military and civilian, also wanted to pursue a more independent foreign policy, but were prevented by their own strategic concerns about the Soviet Union. In other words, they were constrained by the distinctly bipolar Cold War order.

At the outset of the invasion, many observers predicted that Turkey would seek to avoid taking sides, but also that it would eventually be forced to. So far, however, Turkey has not. While this may be delivering diminishing returns or further alienating Turkey’s Western allies, it has also delivered real benefits. Following months of free advertising, new orders for Bayraktar drones are coming in. An influx of Russian money has brought no more than warnings from Washington while providing relief to Turkey’s collapsing economy. Crucially, it was the success of Ukraine’s military resistance, bolstered by Western support, that made this possible.

Recognizing this reality leaves Washington freer to pursue its own interests without having to fret about bringing Turkey on board with further concessions. Turkey’s military support for Ukraine and ability to serve as an intermediary between the warring parties have both been put forward as reasons why the West should cultivate Erdogan and embrace his independent turn. But these Turkish policies suggest an alternate reading. During his first year in office, Biden took a hands-off approach to Turkey. He kept his interactions with Erdogan to a minimum and had the State Department issue regular expressions of concern when Erdogan committed new human rights abuses. He offered no concessions on sanctions over Turkey’s S-400 purchase, and — despite a brief flurry of interest in Turkey running the Kabul airport after America’s withdrawal — did not go out of his way to solicit Turkish cooperation on other issues.

Whatever policies Turkey has carried out with regard to Ukraine, it has carried out against this backdrop. To the extent Ankara’s advocates believe the West should be pleased with these policies, that suggests a more solicitous approach to Erdogan was not necessary. To the extent Washington is still frustrated with Turkey’s behavior, it can at least take comfort in the fact it is a consequence of Russia’s failure.



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Nicholas Danforth is a Senior Visiting Fellow at the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP). He is the author of The Remaking of Republican Turkey: Memory and Modernity since the Fall of the Ottoman Empire.
 

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passin' thru

Army, Marines declare Joint Air-to-Ground Missile ready for production​


Jen Judson

4-5 minutes



JU5PCP636JGIXOEAKT2NULJJWI.jpg
Marine Corps Cpl. Gabriel Halcomb, front, assigned to Marine Operational Test & Evaluation Squadron One (VMX-1) conducts an operational check on the M299 hellfire missile launcher attached to an AH-1Z Viper, Nov. 4, 2021. Marine Corps aviation ordnance personnel, Cpl. David Walker-Hyde, left, and Lance Cpl. Christian Castaneda, back, ensure the aircraft remains ready during the operational test and evaluation of the joint air-to-ground missile (JAGM). (Maj. Jay Hernandez/Marine Corps)

WASHINGTON — The U.S. Army and Marine Corps have declared the Joint Air-to-Ground Missile ready for full-rate production, manufacturer Lockheed Martin said in a statement on Sept. 8.
The decision, dated Aug. 30, was delayed after the weapon previously failed to achieve desired lethal effects on a maritime target, resulting in the Army and Marine Corps delaying the missile’s fielding by over a year.
“The milestone also marks the successful completion of operational testing of JAGM on the US Army’s AH-64E Apache and the Marine Corps’ AH-1Z Viper helicopters,” Lockheed said in its statement.
JAGM replaces the legacy Lockheed Martin-made Hellfire missile used across the services. However, the new weapon encountered problems during testing when it was fired from the Army’s AH-64E Apache and the Marine Corps’ AH-1Z Viper helicopters.

The new munition features a dual-mode seeker and guidance system mated to a Hellfire missile.
Prior to 2018, the Army experienced several failures during live-fire testing from an AH-64E Apache, including seeing the missile miss two targets. And during a major test event, one of the four launches with a live warhead failed to detonate. The Apache’s targeting site and fire control radar also passed “erroneous target velocities” to the missile, according to test reports.
The Army was able to resolve those problems in subsequent testing and evaluation.
But the Marine Corps struggled with JAGM on Viper during an initial operational test and evaluation at Fort Hood, Texas, and Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, in mid-2019.
The Marines fired two shots, both of which did not hit boat targets at the center of the vessel, but rather striking more toward the back.

The plan was to make a full-rate production decision about a year ago, but the Marine Corps needed more time to complete the platform integration with the missile. During that time, the Army has made no modifications to the missile since it completed its integration with the Apache.
The delay has not affected the program overall, then-Program Executive Officer for Missiles and Space Maj. Gen. Robert Rasch, said last fall. He has since pinned on his third star and now serves as the director of the Army’s Rapid Capabilities and Critical Technologies Office.

The Army is still producing JAGMs at the minimum sustainment rate, he said.
Lockheed rolled its 1,000th JAGM off the production line in February.
The plan is to ultimately integrate JAGM onto helicopters and unmanned aircraft, like Gray Eagle, as well as on air defense systems like the Mobile Short-Range Air Defense System, or M-SHORAD, that the Army rapidly fielded to its formations in European last year, Lockheed noted in its statement.
Lockheed is now working on extending JAGM’s range to 16 kilometers through the pursuit of a medium-range variant. This would double the missile’s current range without changing its length or diameter, the company said.

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Housecarl

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General: Supply chain problems are hurting nuclear modernization​

By Joe Gould
Sep 15, 12:51 PM

WASHINGTON ― The nominee to lead the U.S. nuclear arsenal said Thursday that supply chain snags that are pummeling the defense industrial base are also hurting Washington’s plans to modernize its aging nuclear arsenal.

“I would venture to say that it’s probably being seen across the Department of Defense, but in particular for the nuclear portfolio,” Air Force Gen. Anthony Cotton, nominated to lead U.S. Strategic Command, told the Senate Armed Services Committee, at his confirmation hearing.

Without offering specifics, Cotton credited vendors with “Herculean efforts” to keep programs on track, but said “the realities of supply chain limitations and supply chain shortfalls” have taken hold. It’s taking some nuclear programs up to 90 days to source certain U.S.-made components that would have typically taken 10 days, he said.

“If you look at what we need to do in regard to maintaining a flow and schedule to get our new, modernized systems online, if you introduce that into the flow, those delays right there are going to cause me concern,” Cotton said. “I think it’s going to take everyone to understand how to close the gap on supply chain management, to get the supplies to industry partners who are trying to modernize this force.”

Asked by Sen. Jeanne Shaheen, D-N.H., Cotton said he was no longer comfortable that needed U.S.-manufactured components and materials would be available. “I did,” he said, “until we started to see that kind of eke into the schedule with problems in the supply chain.”

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RVPH2GP6RZDG5JYK3V6Q7EG3QE.jpg

US nuclear commander warns of deterrence ‘crisis’ against Russia and China

The head of U.S. Strategic Command, which oversees the nuclear arsenal, warned Congress Wednesday Washington faces a deterrence crisis amid Russia’s war in Ukraine and China’s rapid nuclear modernization efforts.​

By Bryant Harris
Operating and modernizing the nuclear force will cost $634 billion in the 2021-2030 period, the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office said last year. Along with the expense of the Energy Department managing nuclear stockpiles, the Defense Department is modernizing the sea, air and land-based legs of the nuclear triad.

At a wide-ranging hearing, Cotton punted on the sensitive question of whether he agrees with the Biden administration’s plans to cancel the sea-launched nuclear cruise missile, which deemed the SLCM-N as costly, redundant and destabilizing. Cotton said he was “not familiar” with the system and wants to make his own assessment of whether it fills a capability gap.

“When it comes to SLCM-N, I must admit that I would like to be able to do like my predecessors before, to make an assessment on that,” Cotton said. “If it is able to meet that capability gap that is there, I’d like to be able to see that and assess that so I can make my best military assessment on the specific weapon system itself.”

A list of four-star officers have come out against the administration’s plans, including Strategic Command’s current chief, Adm. Charles Richard, Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Mark Milley and Vice Chairman Adm. Christopher Grady. Amid those assessments, lawmakers are poised to add funding through the annual defense policy bill and upend the administration’s plans to cancel the missile.

Last week, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Colin Kahl offered a glimpse into the Biden administration’s rationale against the SLCM-N, when asked in a public forum about Russian President Vladimir Putin’s arsenal of low-yield nuclear weapons. Kahl said he dismissed “the notion that SLCM-N is somehow a silver bullet to the challenge we find from Putin in 2022, for a capability that doesn’t pay off until the mid-2030s and comes with an enormous price tag.”

“Yes, nuclear weapons will remain the ultimate backstop, but we have to have the resources to invest in space, to invest in cyber, to invest in advanced conventional systems and emerging technologies,” Kahl said.

Cotton, a career missile and space officer, manages the Air Force’s nuclear weapons and bombers as commander of Air Force Global Strike Command. Nominated in June, he would replace Richard, who’s been in the job since late 2019.

Amid lawmaker questions about the state of Nuclear Command, Control and Communications, or NC3, Cotton assessed its cybersecurity as high and said he was pleased with efforts to link older and more modern systems.

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Asked by Sen. Jacky Rosen, D-Nev., about a U.S. investigation into Chinese telecom firm’s placement of equipment near U.S. missile silos, Cotton said the command is “absolutely looking into” the potential cybersecurity threat.

“We are really paying attention to what we’re seeing as the Chinese are taking advantage of some of the opportunities that they can have near some of our ICBM facilities,” he said.

When asked about the possibility of 5G communications encroaching on spectrum used for the nuclear enterprise and other national security uses, Cotton said it was “incredibly critical” that the military make federal regulators “understand the necessity to protect certain bands.”

“If confirmed, I would want to collaborate with the FCC and others,” he said, adding “maybe we need to message better” on the importance of key spectrum bands.

Looming over the hearing was Strategic Command’s scramble to reimagine nuclear deterrence theory that simultaneously faces Russia and China ― a process Cotton vowed to continue, if confirmed. Upending past assumptions, China is working more closely with Russia and it’s expanding its nuclear force faster than previously predicted.

“As recently as 2018, we would describe China as having a minimal nuclear deterrent [and] that it was probably about regional hegemony,” Cotton said. “Today they’re building ground-based ICBM silos, they have the H6-N nuclear-capable bomber that’s a strategic launch platform.”

Asked by Sen. Dan Sullivan, R-Alaska, about satellite imagery from 2021 showing three new missile field in western China with about 120 missile silos each, Cotton called it “absolutely incredible, and in such a short time.”
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Hummm.....

Posted for fair use.....

September 16, 20223:01 PM PDT
Last Updated 7 min ago

U.S. vows continued deployment of strategic assets after N.Korea nuclear law​

Reuters

WASHINGTON, Sept 16 (Reuters) - The United States and South Korea on Friday denounced North Korea's first-use nuclear doctrine announced this month as "escalatory and destabilizing" and Washington vowed to continue to deploy and exercise strategic assets to deter and respond to Pyongyang.

The countries issued a joint statement after a meeting of the Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group (EDSCG) at vice ministerial level in Washington, the first convening of the body since 2018.

The statement said the countries "expressed their serious concern over the DPRK's escalatory and destabilizing messaging related to nuclear weapons use, including its adoption of the new nuclear policy law" and "committed to continue efforts to employ all elements of both countries' national power to strengthen the Alliance deterrence posture."

"The United States committed to strengthen coordination with the ROK to continue to deploy and exercise strategic assets in the region in a timely and effective manner to deter and respond to the DPRK and enhance regional security," the statement said, referring to South Korea and North Korea by the initials of their official names.

Last week, North Korea officially enshrined the right to use preemptive nuclear strikes to protect itself in a new law that leader Kim Jong Un said makes its nuclear status "irreversible" and bars denuclearization talks.

Reporting by David Brunnstrom; Editing by Daniel Wallis
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Hummm.....

Posted for fair use.....

September 16, 20224:14 AM PDT
Last Updated 11 hours ago

China's Xi urges Russia and other countries to work at preventing 'colour revolutions'​

Reuters

BEIJING, Sept 16 (Reuters) - Chinese President Xi Jinping on Friday called on Russia and other members of a regional grouping to support each other in preventing foreign powers from instigating "colour revolutions" - popular uprisings that have shaken former Communist nations - in their countries.

Speaking in Uzbekistan at a summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), a security grouping led by China and Russia, Xi said member countries should support the efforts each other have made to safeguard their own security and development interests.


Xi did not mention Ukraine, which Russia invaded in February in what Russian President Vladimir calls a "special military operation" to protect Russian speakers from "genocide" by Ukraine's government, a claim rejected by Ukraine.

He also said that China will train 2,000 law enforcement personnel from member countries over the next five years and set up a training base focusing on anti-terrorism work.


He invited member countries to sign up to China's Global Security Initiative, a concept he proposed in April which includes the idea that no country should strengthen its own security at the expense of others.

China will provide 1.5 billion yuan ($214 million) worth of grain and other emergency aid to developing countries, Xi said, adding that the Chinese economy is resilient and "full of potential".


China's economy narrowly escaped a contraction in the April-to-June quarter, hobbled by COVID-19 lockdowns of cities, a deepening downturn in the property market and persistently soft consumer spending.

($1 = 7.0133 Chinese yuan renminbi)

Reporting by Yew Lun Tian and Ryan Woo; Editing by Hugh Lawson
 

jward

passin' thru

(earlier this month, but interesting, so...)​

The Problems With Vietnam’s ‘Bamboo Diplomacy’​


By Nguyen Quoc Tan Trung for The Diplomat​



Features | Diplomacy | Southeast Asia


Is the phrase, increasingly prominent in government communications, anything more than an update to a discredited policy of neutrality?

The Problems With Vietnam’s ‘Bamboo Diplomacy’

Vietnamese General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong, center, Chairman of the Government Office Mai Tien Dung, left, and Foreign Minister Pham Binh Minh, right, arrive at the venue for the online ASEAN Summit in Hanoi, Vietnam, November 12, 2020.
Credit: AP Photo/Hau Dinh

“It’s straightforward, and it’s fair. F**k them. What’s there to be afraid of?”
In May, during a meeting between U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken, Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh and other high-ranking officials raised national and international attention, but not for any productively diplomatic reason.

The loose-lipped Vietnamese delegation was caught on video discussing in somewhat crude and boastful terms their meeting with U.S. President Joe Biden. It appears that the negative remark referred to a warning from the U.S. President concerning Russia’s unlawful invasion of Ukraine and why Vietnam should not trust Russian President Vladimir Putin.
The video has now been removed from the U.S. State Department’s YouTube channel.
This story is far less remarkable than it has been made out to be by opponents of the Vietnamese communist regime. Many contemporary politicians employ crude language, and fewer and fewer people find it shocking or objectionable. After all, using this kind of blunt speaking helped former U.S. President Donald Trump gain the support of millions of Americans on his march to the White House in 2016.

Nevertheless, for a visiting delegation to speak so freely about the statesmen of the host country indicates a strong belief in their own foreign policy strategy, which Vietnamese officials are increasingly referring to as “bamboo diplomacy.”
Is this term something that the international audience needs to understand as a unique Vietnamese contribution to the study of international relations and international law? Or is it just another version of the outdated and still controversial principle of neutrality?

“Bamboo Diplomacy”: What Does It Mean in Vietnam?
As a matter of historical record, the phrase “bamboo diplomacy” was first coined by Nguyen Phu Trong, a Marxist theorist and three-term general secretary of the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP). Trong briefly mentioned the phrase during the VCP National Conference on Foreign Affairs in August 2016, but the secretary had another opportunity to explain the term at a similar conference held last year.
In that context, Trong referred to “bamboo diplomacy” as a unique and special foreign relations strategy from the Ho Chi Minh era. He described Vietnamese diplomacy as having strong roots, solid stems, and very flexible branches, like Vietnamese bamboo. The country’s approach to the world is soft and clever but still persistent and resolute; creative but consistent; resilient but valiant. The theorist contends that at the “root” of Vietnamese diplomacy is honorable conduct, humanitarianism, peace, justice, and righteousness, all of which safeguard the national interest, national unity, and the happiness of the Vietnamese people.

The “root,” Trong argued, keeps the foundations of the socialist state of Vietnam safe and prosperous, while also playing a pivotal role in guiding Vietnam’s foreign policy along the right path of independence, international accommodationism, and multilateralism.
At the same time, the stems of the bamboo tree can be adaptable and flexible but, more importantly, are plain and humble. Trong asserts that Vietnamese diplomats must be proactive in working with foreign partners while being friendly and pliable in different cases and situations. They should display a modest attitude and avoid flamboyant conduct. However, when the interests of the Vietnamese people are at stake, the “bamboo hedges” – the diplomats, the domestic political system and the Vietnamese people – will withstand any challenges and difficulties.

This well-articulated and surprisingly practical (but also intentionally vague) foreign policy principle quickly re-emerged and took the spotlight in Vietnamese’s national discourse from February of this year, when Russia invaded Ukraine, initiating a fierce war between two countries with a tradition of brotherly relations with Vietnam.
In the slightly obsequious manner of contemporary Vietnamese academia, Secretary Trong’s hour-long address from 2021 has since spawned an entire literature on “bamboo diplomacy.” Studies on the topic have appeared in academic journals, including the prestigious Communist Review; the journal of the People’s Public Security Political Academy; the newspaper of the People’s Army, and many more. These studies are full of admiration, praise, and sometimes even downright political flattery of the general secretary.
Although these articles are peculiar phenomena by the standards of Western academia, we need to understand them as a confirmation that “bamboo diplomacy” has been officially sanctioned by the Vietnamese state and will be central to Vietnamese diplomacy for years to come.

Implementation in the Ukraine Conflict: A Sugar-Coated Pill
This highly opportune theory is principally intended to provide the Vietnamese people with a scientific and patriotic justification for the government’s inactivity with regard to the war in Ukraine.
For many years, Ukraine has hosted Vietnamese expatriates and given them a vehicle for their entrepreneurial spirit. According to the Vietnamese government, the Vietnamese community in Ukraine is now 7,000-strong. This is not a very impressive number compared to the millions of Vietnamese who live in the U.S. or Canada. But if we put this number next to the Vietnamese community living and working in “big brother” Russia, which is officially estimated at around 70,000, the population concentration and the discrepancy in country size make them proportionally very similar.
Moreover, Pham Nhat Vuong, the leader of Vingroup and the richest man in Vietnam, was, in fact, an “expat” who initially operated in Ukraine and was nurtured by the Ukrainian market. For these reasons, the Russian invasion of Ukraine is more relevant to the Vietnamese people than the Russian war in Chechnya or Moscow’s intervention in Syria.

However, Russia is the nostalgic embodiment of the glorious old Soviet Union. Although Ukraine also played a vital role in the “Soviet imagination” of many Vietnamese minds, in contemporary discourse, Vietnam’s historical affinity with Russia appears unbreakable. More importantly, Vietnam’s traditional dependence on Russian arms, and the generous aid and support that the former ally granted it during difficult times, have a history of almost one hundred years.
It seems that the rhetoric of “bamboo diplomacy” has been introduced and utilized to address this paradox.
Basically, the Vietnamese leadership refuses to pick a side. They refrain from voting against Russia or calling the “special military operation” an armed aggression in violation of Article 2 (4) of the United Nations Charter. During the U.N. General Assembly (UNGA) emergency special session that was held on February 28-March 2022, the Vietnamese delegates refrained from voting against Russia, abstaining on UNGA Resolution ES-11/1, which strongly condemned the Russian action. While Vietnam did not support the resolution, it also did not vote against it like Russian allies Belarus, North Korea, and Syria.

At the same time, Ambassador Dang Hoang Giang, the head of Vietnam’s Permanent Mission to the U.N., has implicitly opposed the war by criticizing the “obsolete doctrines of power politics, the ambition of domination, and the imposition and the use of force in settling international disputes.” This was followed by the Vietnamese government’s commitment to provide $500,000 in humanitarian aid to war-torn Ukraine. In an important meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio, in which collective security in Ukraine and the South China Sea was discussed, Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh affirmed Vietnam’s respect for the principle of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state, although he avoided any mention of Russia.
All this seems to be very prudent and in accordance with the theoretical depiction of Trong’s “bamboo diplomacy.” The “root” of Vietnamese diplomacy is honorable behavior, humanitarianism, peace, and justice. If these principles are genuine, Vietnam could never lend support to an invasion like the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Offering aid and some financial support to Ukrainian citizens affected by the war is also a reflection of the core values and spirit of “bamboo diplomacy.”
 

jward

passin' thru
Commenting in the Communist Review, Dr. Phan Thi Thu Dung, a state scholar working for the Ministry of Public Security, contends that the Russia-Ukraine war can be explained as essentially either a geopolitical conflict or a clash between the Anglo-Saxon and Slavic civilizations. Each party involved in the conflict has only its own interests in mind. Consequently, Vietnam, with barely any direct connection to these grand interests, should not express an affiliation to any party. Its position will be “business as usual”: friendly relationships and normal cooperation will both sides will be maintained, and the bamboo stems will sway gently in the wind, as on any normal day. The repeated abstention votes, although criticized by many, are held to be the hallmark of Vietnam’s diplomatic success.

If one digs deep enough, however, one finds that there are limits to this noble-minded neutrality.
While insisting that “humanitarianism” and “humanity” are the core principles of “bamboo diplomacy,” Vietnam contradictorily abstained from Resolution ES-11/2 of March 24, concerning the humanitarian consequences of the war. This resolution focuses on demands for the protection of civilians and overall compliance with international humanitarian law by all warring parties. Vietnam then proceeded to vote against a later vote on suspending Russia’s membership of the U.N. Human Rights Council.
In another incident, a U.S. lawmaker accused the Chinese delegation of refusing to participate in a standing ovation and of walking out in protest after a powerful speech by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, in May. However, the Chinese Foreign Ministry urged CNN and the lawmaker to correct what they claimed was a mistake. It turned out that the picture taken by the U.S. lawmaker was of Vietnam’s vice prime minister and his subordinates.

Most interesting is what has happened inside Vietnam.
Vietnamese entertainment websites and key opinion leaders freely participated in an anti-Ukraine disinformation campaign and appeared to do so with the tacit approval of the authorities. These included the spreading of false information about the official view of the Ukrainian government concerning the founder of the modern Vietnamese State, Ho Chi Minh, which forced the Ukrainian Embassy in Vietnam to issue an official clarification; accusing the Ukrainian government of being a neo-Nazi institution; and mocking Ukraine’s “comedian” president; and suggesting that Ukraine deserves to be annihilated for betraying the legacy of Lenin. The campaign, which sought to depict Ukraine as the guilty party in the conflict, successfully prejudiced the perceptions of the Vietnamese public regarding the righteousness of the Ukrainian struggle against Russia.

On the other hand, some activists and groups of Ukraine’s supporters in Vietnam have complained that conferences on Ukrainian culture have been interrupted by electricity cuts at these venues. Several fundraising events held by the Ukrainian Embassy in Hanoi were also been restricted by the local authorities.
When we take into account these small, hidden, domestic details of the ways in which the Vietnamese government manages many aspects of its foreign policy, a more jaundiced view of “bamboo policy” comes into view. Just like Russian President Putin, the VCP has always feared the emergence of so-called “color revolutions” against its rule. Countless political and international relations studies produced by state scholars, such as this article in the journal of the Central Propaganda Department, have used Ukraine’s Orange Revolution (2004) and Maidan Revolution (2014) as textbook examples of “Western-led” regime change efforts aimed at destabilizing and seizing control of countries that are still outside the West’s spheres of influence.

To the Vietnamese elites, Ukraine has long been a spurious political entity that does not represent the true will of the Ukrainian people. In this sense, “bamboo diplomacy” seems to be only a convenient sugar-coating of Vietnam’s skepticism and tendency to reject the new generation of Ukrainian governments. This perspective accords completely with Russia’s rhetoric. At the meeting of the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) on February 17, just prior to the Russian invasion, Moscow’s envoy hurled accusations that the Zelenskyy government was a “puppet government” controlled by the collective West.
If my observations are true, then “bamboo diplomacy” is not as impressive as it might sound in theory. The “roots” of the belief are not founded on “international justice,” “humanitarian principles,” or “peace”, but rather on political bias and traditional regional groupings festooned with the old banner of neutrality.

“Neutral Bamboo”: An interwar trap?
Neutrality sits uncomfortably within the 21st-century environment of diplomatic theories.
It is true that the “principle of neutrality” is now a fashionable term in international relations, but this was also the case before both the First and the Second World Wars. As old as international law itself and beginning in the 16th century, a state was legally entitled to neutrality when other states were involved in an armed conflict. It was also a normal tool in the dispute settlement arsenal of the international community. In a world where war was normal, a law of neutrality theoretically allowed the localization of war and the limitation of the impact of war. The system of ensuring state security through the law of neutrality, however, had major flaws and was unable to prevent the outbreak of World War I.
There came about a system of collective security whereby states agreed to outlaw war as an instrument of national policy. Neutrality was, therefore, incompatible with the new system, as related states are required to combine their collective might (either via armed intervention or sanctions) in the attempts to expel the aggressor and protect the victim state.

Unfortunately, the League of Nations also faced serious constraints to its institutional power. After its lackluster performance during the Manchurian crisis (1932-1933), and then its total failure to prevent the Italian invasion of Ethiopia (1934-1936), a majority of states ignored their obligations under Article 16 of the League Covenant and decided to go back to the neutrality system, along with appeasement, the balance of power strategies, and regional groupings. This was a serious mistake, as it only led to more territorial demands, aggressive behavior, invasions, and finally, the outbreak of World War II.
The modern United Nations arguably restores the collective security system and augments a sense of justice through the new power of the UNSC. The UNSC has the authority to identify a specific State as an aggressor and can decide on enforcement action against the aggressor under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. The Member States must comply with the decisions of the UNSC, even at the expense of their neutrality.
But as we can see, the “right” to neutrality could only be eliminated if the UNSC actively spells out who is the perpetrator and who is the victim of a war of aggression.

UNGA resolutions have a certain normative power, but they do not possess the institutional powers the Charter provides. With Russia holding a permanent seat in the UNSC, the chances of legally identifying the aggressor and setting up enforcement measures against the Kremlin are non-existent.
In short, then, Vietnam’s “bamboo diplomacy” and its neutrality rhetoric possess some value in the current legal and political climate. But this foreign relations strategy will only make sense if the Vietnamese government also observes its obligations under the law of state responsibility, such as not recognizing the unlawful situation in Ukraine (including Russia’s occupation of Crimea, the breakaway republics in the Donbas, and the regions occupied since February 2022). It must also maintain in good faith its relationship with the lawful Ukrainian government.

If Vietnam’s so-called “bamboo diplomacy” and the language of neutrality are in reality simply a means of refraining from condemning Russia and giving tacit acquiescence to the fait accompli created by the Russian invasion, then we are not so far removed in spirit from the lavish banquet that was held at the Italian embassy in Costa Rica on November 12, 1938, at which the Costa Rican president “toasted the health of the King of Italy and Emperor of Ethiopia,” officially recognizing the Italian conquest of Ethiopia.
This type of neutrality will not be viewed favorably by those who record the history of our times.
 
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