WAR CHINA THREATENS TO INVADE TAIWAN

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment

jward

passin' thru

O imagine you'd be (very pleasantly!?!!) surprised by all the things that slip outta my mouth, not to mention the language(s) employed
..& in fact, I can not only "say" tripwire, I recall posting a few analysis on it's changing roles and history of use in America's deterrence efforts on the WoW thread ; )~

Hummm....can you say "trip wire"?....
 

jward

passin' thru

Taiwan tycoon to train three million 'civilian warriors'​


AFP



Synopsis

Taiwan lives under constant threat of invasion by China, which claims the self-ruled island as part of its territory to be seized one day -- by force if necessary. For a week after Pelosi's visit, China sent warships, missiles and fighter jets into the waters and skies around Taiwan, its largest and most aggressive exercises since the mid-1990s.​


AgenciesTaiwan remains massively outgunned, with 88,000 ground forces compared to China's one million troops, according to Pentagon estimates.
A colourful Taiwanese tycoon unveiled plans Thursday to train more than three million "civilian warriors" to help defend the democratic island in the event of a Chinese invasion, donating TW$1 billion ($33 million) of his own money.
Robert Tsao, 75, is one of Taiwan's most successful businessmen and founded major microchip maker United Microelectronics Corp (UMC).

He has been increasingly outspoken against Beijing, and his donation comes after China's forces put on a huge show of force to protest US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taipei last month.
Taiwan lives under constant threat of invasion by China, which claims the self-ruled island as part of its territory to be seized one day -- by force if necessary.
For a week after Pelosi's visit, China sent warships, missiles and fighter jets into the waters and skies around Taiwan, its largest and most aggressive exercises since the mid-1990s.
Tsao warned it would be "an intentional slaughter and vicious war crime and crime against humanity" if China were to use force against Taiwan.
The tycoon said he would put TW$600 million towards training three million "black bear warriors" in the next three years who could work alongside the military.

Another TW$400 million will be used to train 300,000 "marksmen" with shooting skills.
Tsao, who no longer holds any position or title with UMC, portrayed the risk posed by China as existential.
"The Chinese Communist Party's threat to Taiwan is growing and the fight against (it) stands for freedom against slavery, democracy against authoritarianism and civilised against barbaric," he said.
"If we can successfully resist China's ambitions, we not only will be able to safeguard our homeland but make a big contribution to the world situation and the development of civilisation".
Taiwan has spent decades living alongside China's threats, but the sabre rattling has become more pronounced under President Xi Jinping.

China's most authoritarian leader in a generation, Xi is on the cusp of securing an unprecedented third term later this year and has made gaining Taiwan a key part of his "national rejuvenation" goals.
Taiwan remains massively outgunned, with 88,000 ground forces compared to China's one million troops, according to Pentagon estimates.

Mandatory military service for Taiwanese men is currently just four months.
American and Taiwanese strategists have increasingly pushed Taipei to adopt a "porcupine" strategy of asymmetric warfare, which would include training civilians to fight.
Russia's stalled invasion of Ukraine has also focused attention in Taiwan on both the threats posed by a giant authoritarian neighbour and how huge armies can be resisted by a much smaller but determined defender.
 

jward

passin' thru

China seeks 'naval outpost' in Nicaragua to threaten US, Taiwan warns​


by Joel Gehrke, Foreign Affairs Reporter |
September 04, 2022 07:00 AM


TAIPEI, TaiwanChina aspires to open a “naval outpost” in Nicaragua as part of a plan to dominate the Indo-Pacific, Taiwan has warned.


“The Chinese are talking with them about also potentially setting up a naval outpost,” Taiwanese Vice Foreign Minister Alexander Yui told reporters this week. “So they have a very large plan.”

Nicaragua severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan last year in favor of new ties with Chinese General Secretary Xi Jinping’s regime, which claims sovereignty over the island democracy despite never having ruled in Taipei. Xi has deployed a mix of pressure and inducements to convince Taiwan's dwindling number of allies to establish a connection with Beijing, an initiative that China has used both to isolate Taipei and gain advantages in relation to the United States.

“It’s part of their expansionist agenda — take over Taiwan, and break from the first island chain into the rest of the Pacific, take over the Pacific,” Yui said. “They are expanding. They want to become the predominant power in the world and also export their way of thought, their way of living, to the rest of the world.”

SEVENTY-YEAR LIE: CHINA HAS NEVER HAD A SERIOUS CLAIM TO TAIWAN

China’s vaunted overseas infrastructure investment program, the Belt and Road Initiative, has been denounced by U.S. officials for years as a “predatory” lending scheme designed to allow Beijing to buy an empire. Nicaragua’s authoritarian leader, Daniel Ortega, seized the Taiwanese Embassy in Managua and transferred it to China in December, then signed a memorandum of understanding to join the BRI in January.

“The Chinese could do it and call it the beginning of the Nicaragua Canal if we ticked them off enough about Taiwan,” U.S. Army War College research professor Evan Ellis, who worked as a member of the State Department’s policy planning staff during then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s tenure, told the Washington Examiner. “It would symbolically be a big deal, because the Chinese know they could get military access if they asked, and the Russians could operate out of it, too.”

Nicaragua’s switch was a strategic setback for the government in Taipei, which regards international recognition as an important bulwark against China’s desire to bring Taiwan under Beijing’s control. And by cutting ties with Taiwan, the Ortega government cleared an important obstacle from Beijing’s long-standing pursuit of port access in the region — although it remains unclear how those talks are progressing.

“China has very clear ambitions to become a major maritime power,” said Marcin Jerzewski, who leads the Taiwan office of the European Values Center for Security Policy in Taipei. “So it makes perfect strategic sense and is very consistent with Chinese strategic thinking, especially its maritime dimension.”

Ortega severed relations with Taiwan just weeks after the U.S. imposed sanctions on several members of his regime for “orchestrat[ing] a pantomime election” and arresting top opposition candidates and civil society activists. The idea of a Chinese port in Nicaragua offers both regimes an opportunity to pressure the U.S., although it “would be a big money loser” given Nicaragua’s corruption and the lack of an economic market to reward the project, as Ellis put it.

“I think there’s reasons why it could happen if the Chinese wanted to do a provocation that was big, but they could still [claim it was] a commercial port,” Ellis said. “Militarily, it would be more defensible than trying to operate out of Puerto Cabello, Venezuela, for example.”

For now, Nicaragua and China appear to be making only slow progress toward converting their newfound political affinity into major infrastructure developments, the analysts agreed, likely due to disagreements about to divide the cost of a port project.

If they can resolve such impediments, the development would be a symbol of the Chinese rivalry with the U.S. and a message to the global audience watching the competition unfold. “It would allow for more efficient power projection,” Jerzewski said. “Even if those bases are not used for kinetic conflict, their sheer presence would send a signal that China is indeed providing an alternative model for countries within the Indo-Pacific to follow.”

China has demonstrated in other parts of the world that success in convincing a country to cut ties with Taiwan can lead to other strategic benefits for Beijing, as well. The Solomon Islands, having severed relations with Taipei in 2019, struck a security agreement with Beijing in March, to the alarm of U.S. and Australian officials. Last week, the Solomon Islands refused to allow a U.S. Coast Guard vessel to make a port call during a patrol against illegal fishing.

“It’s the changing of the attitudes of the Solomon Islands after their connection to the PRC,” said Yui, the Taiwanese vice foreign minister.

 

jward

passin' thru

colonel holman

Veteran Member
Apex
@Apex_WW
3h

The Philippines would let U.S. forces use the Southeast Asian nation's military bases in the event of a #Taiwan conflict only "if it is important for us, for our own security," the Philippine ambassador to the U.S. says.
View: https://twitter.com/Apex_WW/status/1566472778546614279?s=20&t=5ZEsO_IbAfNPamo7H3DJ5Q
Philippines planning on a bidding war between US and China over who gets these bases. They could make out pretty good… short term… even though China will screw them over long term
 

northern watch

TB Fanatic

Military reserves, civil defense worry Taiwan as China looms​

Chris Chen, a former captain in Taiwan’s military, spent a lot of time waiting during his weeklong training for reservists in June
By HUIZHONG WU Associated Press
September 4, 2022, 9:40 PM

People shoot air soft guns at a private civilian training organization named Polar Light Training in New Taipei City, Taiwan on June 21, 2022. While an invasion doesn’t appear imminent, China's recent large-scale military exercises in response to a v

People shoot air soft guns at a private civilian training organization named Polar Light Training in New Taipei City, Taiwan on June 21, 2022. While an invasion doesn’t appear imminent, China's recent large-scale military exercises in response to a visit by U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan have made the government in Taipei more aware than ever of the hard power behind Beijing’s rhetoric about bringing the self-ruled island under its control. Experts said that civilian defense and reserve forces have an important deterrent effect, showing a potential aggressor that the risks of invasion are high. (AP Photo/Wu Taijing)

TAIPEI, Taiwan -- Chris Chen, a former captain in Taiwan's military, spent a lot of time waiting during his weeklong training for reservists in June. Waiting for assembly, waiting for lunch, waiting for training, he said.

The course, part of Taiwan's efforts to deter a Chinese invasion, was jam-packed with 200 reservists to one instructor.

“It just became all listening, there was very little time to actually carry out the instructions,” Chen said.

Russia's invasion of Ukraine has underscored the importance of mobilizing civilians when under attack, as Ukraine's reserve forces helped fend off the invaders. Nearly halfway around the world, it has highlighted Taiwan's weaknesses on that front, chiefly in two areas: its reserves and civilian defense force.

While an invasion doesn’t appear imminent, China's recent large-scale military exercises in response to a visit by U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan have made the government in Taipei more aware than ever of the hard power behind Beijing’s rhetoric about bringing the self-ruled island under its control.

Experts said that civilian defense and reserve forces have an important deterrent effect, showing a potential aggressor that the risks of invasion are high. Even before the invasion of Ukraine in March, Taiwan was working on reforming both. The question is whether it will be enough.

Taiwan’s reserves are meant to back up its 188,000-person military, which is 90% volunteers and 10% men doing their four months of compulsory military service. On paper, the 2.3 million reservists enable Taiwan to match China's 2 million-strong military.

Yet, the reserve system has long been criticized. Many, like Chen, felt the seven days of training for the mostly former soldiers was a waste of time that did not prepare them well enough.

The number of combat-ready reservists — those who could immediately join front-line battles — is only about 300,000, said Wang Ting-yu, a lawmaker from the governing Democratic Progressive Party who serves on the defense committee in the legislature.

“In Ukraine, if in the first three days of the war it had fallen apart, no matter how strong your military is, you wouldn’t have been able to fight the war,” Wang said. “A resilient society can meet this challenge. So that when you are met with disasters and war, you will not fall apart.”

Taiwan reorganized its reserve system in January, now coordinated by a new body called the All Out Defense Mobilization Agency, which will also take over the civil defense system in an emergency.

One major change was the pilot launch of a more intensive, two-week training instead of the standard one week, which will eventually be expanded to the 300,000 combat-ready reservists. The remaining reservists can play a more defensive role, such as defending bridges, Wang said.

Dennis Shi joined the revamped training for two weeks in May at an abandoned building site on Taiwan’s northern coast. Half the time it was raining, he said. The rest, it was baking hot. The training coincided with the peak of a COVID-19 outbreak. Wearing raincoats and face masks, the reservists dug trenches and practiced firing mortars and marching.

“Your whole body was covered in mud, and even in your boots there was mud,” Shi said.

Still, he said he got more firing time than during his mandatory four months of service three years ago and felt motivated because senior officers carried out the drills with them.

“The main thing is when it’s time to serve your country, then you have to do it,” he said.

There are plans to reform the civil defense force too, said Wang, though much of the discussion has not been widely publicized yet.

The Civil Defense Force, which falls under the National Police Agency, is a leftover from an era of authoritarian rule before Taiwan transitioned to democracy in the 1980s and 1990s. Its members are mostly people who are too old to qualify as reservists but still want to serve.

“It hasn’t followed the passage of the times and hasn’t kept pace with our fighting ability,” Wang said.

Planned changes include a requirement to include security guards employed by some of Taiwan’s largest companies in the force, and the incorporation of women, who are not required to serve in the military.

About 73% of Taiwanese say they would be willing to fight for Taiwan if China were to invade, according to surveys by Kuan-chen Lee at the Defense Ministry-affiliated Institute for National Defense and Security Research, a number that has remained consistent.

The Ukraine war, at least initially, shook some people's confidence in the willingness of America to come to Taiwan's assistance in the event of an attack. Whereas 57% said last September they believed the U.S. would “definitely or probably” send troops if China invaded, that dropped to 40% in March.

The U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity leaves it murky as to whether the U.S. would intervene militarily. Pelosi said during her visit that she wants to help the island defend itself.

Outside of government efforts, some civilians have been inspired to do more on their own.

Last week, the founder of Taiwanese chipmaker United Microelectronics, Robert Tsao, announced he would donate 1 billion New Taiwan Dollars ($32.8 million) to fund the training of a 3 million-person defense force made up of civilians.

More than 1,000 people have attended lectures on civil defense with Open Knowledge Taiwan, according to T.H. Schee, a tech entrepreneur who gives lectures and organizes civil defense courses with the volunteer group, which aims to make specialized knowledge accessible to the public.

Others have signed up for first aid training, and some for firearms courses, though with air guns as Taiwan’s laws do not allow widespread gun ownership.

These efforts need government coordination, said Martin Yang, a spokesperson for the Taiwan Military and Police Tactical Research and Development Association, a group of former police officers and soldiers interested in Taiwan’s defense.

“The civil sector has this idea and they’re using their energy, but I think the government needs to come out and coordinate this, so the energy doesn’t get wasted,” he said.

Yang is critical of the government's civil defense drills, citing annual exercises in which civilians practice taking shelter.

“When you do this exercise, you want to consider that people will hide in the subway, they need water and food, and may have medical needs. You will possibly have hundreds or thousands of people hiding there,” Yang said. “But were does the water and food come from?”

In July, the New Taipei city government organized a large-scale drill with its disaster services and the Defense Ministry. Included for the first time was urban warfare, such as how first responders would react to an attack on a train station or a port.

The drills had the feeling of a carnival rather than serious preparation for an invasion. An MC excitedly welcomed guests as Korean pop music blared. Recruiters for the military, the coast guard and the military police set up booths to entice visitors, offering tchotchkes such as toy grenade keychains.

Chang Chia-rong guided VIP guests to their seats. The 20-year-old expressed a willingness to defend Taiwan, though she hadn’t felt very worried about a Chinese invasion.

“If there’s a volunteer squad, I hope that I can join and defend my country,” she said. “If there’s a need, I would be very willing to join.”

 

raven

TB Fanatic

Military reserves, civil defense worry Taiwan as China looms​

Chris Chen, a former captain in Taiwan’s military, spent a lot of time waiting during his weeklong training for reservists in June
By HUIZHONG WU Associated Press
September 4, 2022, 9:40 PM

People shoot air soft guns at a private civilian training organization named Polar Light Training in New Taipei City, Taiwan on June 21, 2022. While an invasion doesn’t appear imminent, China's recent large-scale military exercises in response to a v's recent large-scale military exercises in response to a v

People shoot air soft guns at a private civilian training organization named Polar Light Training in New Taipei City, Taiwan on June 21, 2022. While an invasion doesn’t appear imminent, China's recent large-scale military exercises in response to a visit by U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan have made the government in Taipei more aware than ever of the hard power behind Beijing’s rhetoric about bringing the self-ruled island under its control. Experts said that civilian defense and reserve forces have an important deterrent effect, showing a potential aggressor that the risks of invasion are high. (AP Photo/Wu Taijing)

TAIPEI, Taiwan -- Chris Chen, a former captain in Taiwan's military, spent a lot of time waiting during his weeklong training for reservists in June. Waiting for assembly, waiting for lunch, waiting for training, he said.

The course, part of Taiwan's efforts to deter a Chinese invasion, was jam-packed with 200 reservists to one instructor.

“It just became all listening, there was very little time to actually carry out the instructions,” Chen said.

Russia's invasion of Ukraine has underscored the importance of mobilizing civilians when under attack, as Ukraine's reserve forces helped fend off the invaders. Nearly halfway around the world, it has highlighted Taiwan's weaknesses on that front, chiefly in two areas: its reserves and civilian defense force.

While an invasion doesn’t appear imminent, China's recent large-scale military exercises in response to a visit by U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan have made the government in Taipei more aware than ever of the hard power behind Beijing’s rhetoric about bringing the self-ruled island under its control.

Experts said that civilian defense and reserve forces have an important deterrent effect, showing a potential aggressor that the risks of invasion are high. Even before the invasion of Ukraine in March, Taiwan was working on reforming both. The question is whether it will be enough.

Taiwan’s reserves are meant to back up its 188,000-person military, which is 90% volunteers and 10% men doing their four months of compulsory military service. On paper, the 2.3 million reservists enable Taiwan to match China's 2 million-strong military.

Yet, the reserve system has long been criticized. Many, like Chen, felt the seven days of training for the mostly former soldiers was a waste of time that did not prepare them well enough.

The number of combat-ready reservists — those who could immediately join front-line battles — is only about 300,000, said Wang Ting-yu, a lawmaker from the governing Democratic Progressive Party who serves on the defense committee in the legislature.

“In Ukraine, if in the first three days of the war it had fallen apart, no matter how strong your military is, you wouldn’t have been able to fight the war,” Wang said. “A resilient society can meet this challenge. So that when you are met with disasters and war, you will not fall apart.”

Taiwan reorganized its reserve system in January, now coordinated by a new body called the All Out Defense Mobilization Agency, which will also take over the civil defense system in an emergency.

One major change was the pilot launch of a more intensive, two-week training instead of the standard one week, which will eventually be expanded to the 300,000 combat-ready reservists. The remaining reservists can play a more defensive role, such as defending bridges, Wang said.

Dennis Shi joined the revamped training for two weeks in May at an abandoned building site on Taiwan’s northern coast. Half the time it was raining, he said. The rest, it was baking hot. The training coincided with the peak of a COVID-19 outbreak. Wearing raincoats and face masks, the reservists dug trenches and practiced firing mortars and marching.

“Your whole body was covered in mud, and even in your boots there was mud,” Shi said.

Still, he said he got more firing time than during his mandatory four months of service three years ago and felt motivated because senior officers carried out the drills with them.

“The main thing is when it’s time to serve your country, then you have to do it,” he said.

There are plans to reform the civil defense force too, said Wang, though much of the discussion has not been widely publicized yet.

The Civil Defense Force, which falls under the National Police Agency, is a leftover from an era of authoritarian rule before Taiwan transitioned to democracy in the 1980s and 1990s. Its members are mostly people who are too old to qualify as reservists but still want to serve.

“It hasn’t followed the passage of the times and hasn’t kept pace with our fighting ability,” Wang said.

Planned changes include a requirement to include security guards employed by some of Taiwan’s largest companies in the force, and the incorporation of women, who are not required to serve in the military.

About 73% of Taiwanese say they would be willing to fight for Taiwan if China were to invade, according to surveys by Kuan-chen Lee at the Defense Ministry-affiliated Institute for National Defense and Security Research, a number that has remained consistent.

The Ukraine war, at least initially, shook some people's confidence in the willingness of America to come to Taiwan's assistance in the event of an attack. Whereas 57% said last September they believed the U.S. would “definitely or probably” send troops if China invaded, that dropped to 40% in March.

The U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity leaves it murky as to whether the U.S. would intervene militarily. Pelosi said during her visit that she wants to help the island defend itself.

Outside of government efforts, some civilians have been inspired to do more on their own.

Last week, the founder of Taiwanese chipmaker United Microelectronics, Robert Tsao, announced he would donate 1 billion New Taiwan Dollars ($32.8 million) to fund the training of a 3 million-person defense force made up of civilians.

More than 1,000 people have attended lectures on civil defense with Open Knowledge Taiwan, according to T.H. Schee, a tech entrepreneur who gives lectures and organizes civil defense courses with the volunteer group, which aims to make specialized knowledge accessible to the public.

Others have signed up for first aid training, and some for firearms courses, though with air guns as Taiwan’s laws do not allow widespread gun ownership.

These efforts need government coordination, said Martin Yang, a spokesperson for the Taiwan Military and Police Tactical Research and Development Association, a group of former police officers and soldiers interested in Taiwan’s defense.

“The civil sector has this idea and they’re using their energy, but I think the government needs to come out and coordinate this, so the energy doesn’t get wasted,” he said.

Yang is critical of the government's civil defense drills, citing annual exercises in which civilians practice taking shelter.

“When you do this exercise, you want to consider that people will hide in the subway, they need water and food, and may have medical needs. You will possibly have hundreds or thousands of people hiding there,” Yang said. “But were does the water and food come from?”

In July, the New Taipei city government organized a large-scale drill with its disaster services and the Defense Ministry. Included for the first time was urban warfare, such as how first responders would react to an attack on a train station or a port.

The drills had the feeling of a carnival rather than serious preparation for an invasion. An MC excitedly welcomed guests as Korean pop music blared. Recruiters for the military, the coast guard and the military police set up booths to entice visitors, offering tchotchkes such as toy grenade keychains.

Chang Chia-rong guided VIP guests to their seats. The 20-year-old expressed a willingness to defend Taiwan, though she hadn’t felt very worried about a Chinese invasion.

“If there’s a volunteer squad, I hope that I can join and defend my country,” she said. “If there’s a need, I would be very willing to join.”

I wonder if someone should tell them that China is not going to be using Airsoft missiles?
Asking for a friend.
 

jward

passin' thru

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
I wonder if someone should tell them that China is not going to be using Airsoft missiles?
Asking for a friend.

If they're shooting at silhouette targets, just the act of firing anything at a human "shape" is going to go a long way to giving them an edge if it were ever to go real.

The marksmanship side can be done with "air soft" if the target distances aren't stretching the "aim-ability" of the weapon. Recall that the US military was using Daisy BB guns on "Hogan's Alley" reactive ranges during Vietnam and the OSS was using wax bullets and reduced charges in similar set ups in WW2 for operatives.

Tuning it up further can be done with laser/receiver systems and is also used by military and law enforcement. Heck a civilian can by these systems on line.
 

jward

passin' thru
Apex
@Apex_WW
1m

The United States will continue to provide defensive weapons to #Taiwan despite protests by Beijing over the recent approval by Washington of the sale of weapons systems to Taipei: U.S. gov’t spokesman
 

jward

passin' thru

Defiant Congress to Make Largest Taiwan Visit in Years Amid China Fallout​


John Feng


A group of Democrats and Republicans from the House of Representatives will arrive in Taiwan late local time on Wednesday in what will be the largest visit by Congressional members in recent years, according to reports out of Taipei.
Democratic Representative Stephanie Murphy of Florida was expected to lead a delegation of seven other U.S. lawmakers to the island beginning September 7, local news site Mnews reported on Monday. Reuters said the congressional delegation would stay in the Taiwanese capital until Friday.
Murphy, who is vice chair of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations, will be accompanied by Representatives Kaiali'i Kahele, a Hawaii Democrat; Scott Franklin, a Florida Republican; Joe Wilson, a South Carolina Republican; Andy Barr, a Kentucky Republican; Darrell Issa, a California Republican; Claudia Tenney, a New York Republican and Kat Cammack, a Florida Republican, both reports said.
Reached by Newsweek on Wednesday, Taiwan's foreign ministry said it welcomed all guests from the U.S. in principle, but didn't comment on any imminent visits.
The expected arrival of the eight-member Congressional delegation will be seen in Taipei as another sign of the strong, bipartisan support the island enjoys in Congress.
It is the third visit from the U.S. legislative branch since tensions flared across the Taiwan Strait on the back of Democratic House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's trip on August 2 and 3, when Pelosi became the most senior American official to set foot in Taiwan in 25 years.

Democratic Representative Stephanie Murphy of Florida delivers remarks during the seventh hearing by the House Select Committee to Investigate the January 6 attack on the U.S. Capitol, in the Cannon House Office Building on July 12, 2022, in Washington, D.C. Murphy is leading a congressional delegation to Taiwan between September 7 and 9, according to reports. Kevin Dietsch/Getty Images
China claims Taiwan as its own, contrary to the wishes of the Taiwanese public and its democratically elected government. Beijing has accused Washington of reneging on past commitments not to elevate U.S.-Taiwan political ties, while the White House says it has no authority over members of Congress, and that similar visits to Taipei are consistent with America's longstanding "one China" policy.

The fallout, which included a week of intense Chinese military drills that began with the firing of ballistic missiles over Taiwan, hasn't deterred U.S. lawmakers from traveling in their own shows of support.
Since Pelosi's visit, Senators Ed Markey, a Massachusetts Democrat and Marsha Blackburn, a Tennessee Republican have made separate trips to Taipei, as have Indiana Governor Eric Holcomb and Arizona Governor Doug Ducey. Most, if not all, of the recent visits had been arranged weeks and months in advance, well before Pelosi decided to take her six-member Congressional delegation to Taiwan as part of their wider trip across Asia.
President Tsai Ing-wen of Taiwan has already welcomed a string of congressional visits this year, including by Senators Rick Scott, a Florida Republican and Tammy Duckworth, an Illinois Democrat respectively, as well as a bipartisan, cross-chamber Congressional delegation led by South Carolina Republican Senator Lindsey Graham—each drawing a response from Beijing.

Earlier on Wednesday, a cross-party group of French lawmakers led by Senator Cyril Pellevat arrived in Taipei for their own visit, the fourth such trip in the last 12 months. Taiwan's foreign ministry said they were expected to stay until September 12 for a trip that would include meetings with Tsai and Taiwan's Vice President William Lai.

 

jward

passin' thru

Latest U.S. lawmaker delegation arrives in Taiwan​


September 7, 202210:09 AM CDTLast Updated 3 hours ago

3 minutes



Chiu Tai-san, vice chairman of Taiwan's policy-making Mainland Affairs Council, speaks at a news conference to give Taiwan's official reaction to China's draft anti-secession law in Taipei on March 8, 2005. . REUTERS/Richard Chung

TAIPEI, Sept 7 (Reuters) - A delegation of U.S. lawmakers arrived in Taiwan on Wednesday on a previously unannounced trip, the latest group of senior officials from the country to visit the island and defy Beijing, which has reacted with anger to such exchanges.
The de facto U.S. embassy in Taiwan said the eight lawmakers, led by Stephanie Murphy, a Democrat from Florida who sits on the House Armed Services Committee, would be staying until Friday as part of a larger visit to the Indo-Pacific region.
"The delegation will meet with senior Taiwan leaders to discuss U.S.-Taiwan relations, regional security, trade and investment, global supply chains, and other significant issues of mutual interest," it added.

Taiwan's foreign ministry said they would meet President Tsai Ing-wen while there.
China views democratically-governed Taiwan as its own territory, dismissing the strong objections of the government in Taipei.
China carried out war games last month near Taiwan following a trip to Taipei by U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, and has continued its military activities around the island since then.
Other U.S. lawmakers have come since Pelosi's trip, as well as the governor of the U.S. state of Arizona.
Taiwan's top representative in Washington Hsiao Bi-khim has said Beijing's aggression in the wake of Pelosi's visit had spurred interest from parliaments around the world to send visitors to the island. read more
Separately on Wednesday, Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council minister Chiu Tai-san told a Washington forum that Beijing could not use cross-Strait peace and regional stability as bargaining chips.
"We count on all countries to unite more strongly in urging China to show rational restraint and adjust its practices," Chiu said in a video address to the Center for a New American Security think tank. "We also need to prevent improper and illegal coercion from being normalized as a result of our neglect or compromise."

Reporting by Ben Blanchard in Taipei, and Michael Martina and David Brunnstrom in Washington; Editing by Alex Richardson and Bill Berkrot
 

Doc1

Has No Life - Lives on TB
That would not only be stupid for China to "try", it would be suicide. The US has five times the number of nukes that China has. They would become a glassed over parking lot in a matter of an hour or two.

I'm not sure that our having "five times the number of nukes that China has" means very much. At one point during the Cold War, Winston Churchill addressed a question regarding the number of nukes the NATO countries possessed. He said, "We have enough to make the rubble jump several times."

Do you expect them - or ourselves - to kill any particular target and then make them dead(er)?

Best
Doc
 

jward

passin' thru

China Invading Taiwan Is ‘Distinct Threat,’ Biden Aide Jake Sullivan Says​

Jennifer Jacobs



China Invading Taiwan a 'Distinct Threat': Jake Sullivan
September 7, 2022 at 1:09 PM CDT

US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said a Chinese invasion of Taiwan remains a “distinct threat,” while insisting that the Biden administration hasn’t changed its position over the island’s status, despite Chinese claims to the contrary.
“I think it remains a distinct threat that there could be a military contingency around Taiwan,” Sullivan said in an interview for “The David Rubenstein Show: Peer-to-Peer Conversations” on Bloomberg Television. Although Sullivan offered no prediction of when such an attack might occur, he said, “The People’s Republic of China has actually stated as official policy that it is not taking the invasion of Taiwan off the table.”
 

northern watch

TB Fanatic

Japan Building Military Ports Closer To Taiwan In Preparation For Cross-Strait Crisis​

BY TYLER DURDEN
ZERO HEDGE
THURSDAY, SEP 08, 2022 - 04:40 PM

Japan is upping the ante in its longstanding simmering tensions with China, given Tokyo leaders have over the past year much more overtly sided with Taiwan amid the crisis which has seen a series of US delegations visit Taipei, most especially Nancy Pelosi's August 2nd visit.

"Japan will expand fuel and ammunition storage facilities on the Nansei Islands in the East China Sea, Defense Minister Yasukazu Hamada told Nikkei on Tuesday, as Tokyo seeks to better prepare for a Taiwan Strait crisis," Nikkei reports.


Japan defense ministry image

This is significant given that most of Japan's ammunition is stored on faraway Hokkaido, in the complete opposite direction in the north. Thus this latest announcement marks a major strategic refocusing on placing ammo depots and military accessible ports much closer to Taiwan.

"To protect Japan, it's important for us to have not only hardware such as aircraft and ships, but also enough ammunition for them," Defense Minister Hamada said. "We will radically strengthen the defense capabilities we need, including our capacity for sustained and flexible deployment."

And yet, given that "neutral" Japan since WWII has essentially barely even had a military to speak of until recent times, the ammunition that it does have would likely last a very short time by the standards of modern warfare.

Nansei island chain line of defense, where Japan plans to concentrate more military storage...


nansei.jpg


"Japan's Self-Defense Forces have stockpiled enough ammunition for two months at most. Less than 10% is stored in southwestern Japan's Kyushu and Okinawa, and the SDF lacks the shipping capacity to send enough to the area during a conflict," the Nikkei report continues.

The defense ministry announcement this week also previewed an expansion of military logistics infrastructure, to include new port facilities and fuel depots in Okinawa, Kyushu and other islands.

Interestingly, Nikkei's analysis concludes with the following admission regarding the role of US forces in any future potential conflict with China: "Tokyo's postwar defense strategy has generally assumed that Japanese forces would need to hold out for a few weeks until the U.S. military arrived to handle the threat. But Russia's invasion of Ukraine, now stretching into its seventh month, is spurring a rethink."

 
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NOT SO FAST: INSIGHTS FROM A 1944 WAR PLAN HELP EXPLAIN WHY INVADING TAIWAN IS A COSTLY GAMBLE​

BENJAMIN JENSEN
SEPTEMBER 8, 2022
COMMENTARY

If you click on enough articles, watch television, or read testimony by military leaders, you might think an invasion of Taiwan is imminent. Think tank panels spring up daily discussing how Beijing is learning from Russia’s war in Ukraine. Speculation abounds with worst-case scenarios imagining Xi Jinping using the West’s distraction in Ukraine to invade Taiwan.

While wargames and focusing attention on Taiwan’s real security challenges are important, the accompanying noise can be misleading and misses the hard reality of planning amphibious operations in the era of precision strike capabilities and information warfare. Here, historical cases illuminate some of the enduring challenges associated with invading Taiwan. While analogies are never perfect, recognizing patterns by cataloguing similarities and differences across cases helps identify key planning challenges.

In 1944 U.S. military planners drafted a plan to invade Taiwan: Operation Causeway. The plan was ultimately rejected by senior leaders due to the high costs and risks relative to alternatives for advancing against Tokyo. Analyzing Causeway provides a historical baseline against which to assess the enduring challenges of joint forcible entry operations, particularly those executed from the sea. Put simply, crossing a contested sea only to fight on complex, canalizing terrain against a deliberate defense-in-depth makes amphibious assault in Taiwan a more complex operation than even the famed 1944 Operation Overlord — the D-Day landings. A mix of Taiwanese defense planning and the reality of modern battle network competition compound these challenges, making an invasion likely harder in 2022 than in 1944.

Amphibious Assault

Amphibious assaults are a subset of joint forcible entry operations. These operations “seize and hold lodgments against armed opposition.” While there are a range of other amphibious operations, joint forcible entry is strictly concerned with assault. In joint doctrine, there are five notional stages to entry operations: 1) preparation and deployment; 2) assault; 3) stabilization of the lodgment; 4) introduction of follow-on forces; and 5) termination/transition criteria. Chinese military planning condenses these activities into three phases: 1) advance; 2) assault and penetration; and 3) exploitation and consolidation. The People’s Liberation Army divides its amphibious landing capability between its army and marine corps, with the heavy amphibious warfare associated with a Taiwan scenario in the army while its marine corps serves as a flexible expeditionary response force. Furthermore, where U.S. planning differentiates between ship-to-shore and ship-to-objective maneuver, the Chinese military divides amphibious operations between coast-to-coast and vessel-to-coast, showing the centrality of the Taiwan scenario to their doctrine and planning.

Given the complexity and risk associated with conducting landing operations in a hostile, uncertain, and non-permissive environment, amphibious assaults are usually seen as unavoidable components of larger campaigns. In the spring of 1944, the Joint Chiefs of Staff debated two courses of action designed to continue their advance to Japan. General MacArthur advocated advancing in the Philippines and seizing Luzon, which formed the base of Operation Musketeer. Admiral Chester Nimitz, alongside the Joint Staff including Admiral Ernest King, General George C. Marshall, and Army Air Force Chief of Staff Henry H. Arnold, favored bypassing Luzon and seizing Taiwan, contending that it gave them closer airbases and ports to support their advance against Japan. Where MacArthur focused on the Philippines, the Joint Staff preferred Operation Causeway, which was more oriented on theater objectives. According to the plan, turning Taiwan into an advanced base would allow the United States and its partners to “(1) Bomb Japan. (2) Support further advance into China. (3) Sever Japanese sea and air communications.”

Today, Chinese leaders would likely see an amphibious operation as a desperate last resort rather than an intermediate military objective. The end state is reunification, not establishing a staging area to further pressure Japan. Instead of taking a more indirect approach involving gray-zone pressure, a blockade, and coercive pressure designed to create a war atmosphere and pressure Taipei consistent with Chinese doctrinal writing on strategic deterrence as a continuum, Xi would only gamble and attempt to seize and exploit a lodgment as prelude to occupying the entire island. Based on historic studies of counterinsurgency — which highlight the need for 25 counterinsurgents per 1,000 citizens — this occupation force would need to be almost 600,000 strong (60 percent of the current active force) after defeating the Taiwanese armed forces, whose cohesion remains untested. China could mobilize enough forces to carry out occupation duties. The challenge would likely be the military operation that sets the conditions for a prolonged occupation. A closer look at the planning considerations in Operation Causeway illustrates that the harder challenge for Beijing would be establishing and exploiting a lodgment without suffering combat loses that dwarf Russian attrition in Ukraine.

To Establish a Lodgment, You Need to Isolate the Objective

The first challenge in invading Taiwan would be shaping or “advance” operations designed to change the correlation of forces and set conditions for landing. Causeway envisioned three phases: 1) a preliminary campaign to isolate Japanese forces on the island, which included reducing Tokyo’s ability to reinforce its garrison and counterattack in the air and sea domain; 2) an amphibious assault to seize a port and establish a lodgment; and 3) follow-on operations to destroy Japanese forces and build up airfields and ports on the island for future operations. Of note, this phasing construct is consistent with current Chinese military doctrine referenced above.

During the initial phase of Operation Causeway, which planners assumed would last 27 days, assault forces would move from across the Pacific and into staging areas while over 800 aircraft operating in an area up to 600 miles away from Taiwan attacked surface combatants, airfields, and other high-value targets. These operations would pave the way for Fast Carrier Task Forces to act as a covering force supporting the amphibious assault with close air support 96 hours prior to the attack. Of note, heavy bombers and other army aircraft planned to shift to targets on Taiwan 10 days prior to the anticipated attack to reduce Japanese indications and warnings and the ability to move forces to bolster their garrison on the island. Today, these missions could leverage rocket forces and aircraft in mainland China, potentially reducing the timeline. What would not change is the requirement to isolate the objective. China would need to be prepared to target any combatant supporting Taiwan in East China Sea, Philippine Sea, and the Luzon Strait.

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In Operation Causeway, naval forces supported isolating the objective. Six task groups — each with three carriers, four battleships or cruisers, and 12 destroyers — would sortie to interdict Japanese ships and aircraft. The equivalent in today’s military would be six carrier strike groups each with a supporting surface action group. Even if China opted for land-based aviation and its rocket force to reduce this covering force requirement, it would still require large concentrations of aircraft and mobile rocket launchers to isolate Taiwan and prevent other countries from intervening. Challenges with aerial refueling, airborne command and control, and even the massive logistics required to move jet fuel and munitions to support sustained sortie generation and fires missions could limit the Chinese military’s ability to provide a large enough covering force. Furthermore, Beijing’s naval forces would be held at risk by Taiwan’s land-based anti-ship cruise missiles operating alongside its surface combatants. China can isolate Taiwan by air and sea, but the costs and risks are uncertain.

Despite China’s overwhelming advantages in long-range missiles and aircraft operating from secure mainland bases, there would still likely be air and naval battles in the littorals associated with a joint forcible entry operation. Even if Beijing wins that battle, the attrition it suffers could complicate its decision on whether to proceed with the amphibious attack, an operation that would involve incurring additional loses. For a comparison, the Battle of Okinawa, the alternative to Operation Causeway, saw 368 allied ships damaged or destroyed, including 120 amphibious landing craft. Losses to amphibious landing craft would be particularly problematic for China if Taiwan sabotaged key ports. More recently, it took little more than the sinking of a small number of Russian ships to deny the Black Sea as littoral maneuver space necessary for conducting amphibious operations.

As seen in the Causeway timeline, Beijing will confront key temporal tradeoffs between surprise and unity of effort as it moves from the advance to assault phase. Moving the air and naval resources into position required for setting conditions for a landing would produce indicators and warnings. As China shifted from destroying Taiwan’s navy and air force to supporting the landing force, it would risk revealing the location of the amphibious assault. While Chinese military doctrine calls for joint firepower strikes as well as combined information and firepower assaults — or blitz — the timing and sequencing of these operations would still have to be integrated with amphibious assault objectives and the extent to which sustained fires might give the enemy time to reposition. In other words, you can concentrate fires on the objective and reveal your intentions or risk leaving the beach landing at risk.

China has the overwhelming preponderance of force, but Taiwan’s hardened facilities, mobile radars, and asset mix would make it difficult for Chinese planners to be confident they had degraded Taiwan enough to proceed to the assault phase. More critically, China would have to make a critical decision early in the war: whether or not to strike U.S. and Japanese bases and assets in its advance phase. Keeping the United States and Japan out of a war with Taiwan would significantly alter the balance of forces but risk counterattacks and/or counter-landing operations.

To Occupy an Island, You Need a Port

In the second phase, Operation Causeway called for simultaneously overrunning modern Kinmen Island to secure lines of communication while seizing a lodgment in the southern port of Kaoshing with a force of 402,000 soldiers and marines, compared to 98,000 Japanese defenders — a 4:1 ratio. This relative combat power ratio didn’t take into account the overwhelming allied superiority in ships and aircraft or terrain which, consistent with modern approaches, would push the ratio closer to 10:1. For a modern comparison, Taiwan has 170,000 active duty personnel and over 1 million trained reservists, coupled with advanced air defense and coastal defense capabilities and decades of building hardened fighting positions and obstacles that would complicate an amphibious assault. Even if Beijing accurately assesses relative military power, hard under any circumstance, they would still confront difficulty in assessing the population’s will to fight, a key feature of the war in Ukraine.

In analyzing Taiwan in 1944, planners concluded that the geography made it necessary to establish a lodgment on the southern tip of the island and use it as a base of operations to build up enough combat power to clear the coastal plan on the west of the island — where the majority of the population lives — from south to north. Terrain and logistics drove the selection of the landing objective. The port in Kaoshing was seen as the best candidate, given that it was near an airfield and there were northern and eastern rivers outside the city which the amphibious force could use as an initial defensive perimeter.

According to the plan, “the strength of total forces to be employed … is limited by the capacity” of the port. The plan envisioned sending in teams to repair and develop airfields, ports, and identifying intermediate staging areas to reconstitute forces. The staff estimated it would take over 90 days just to build up enough combat power to shift from the assault phase to what modern PLA doctrine calls exploitation and consolidation. In other words, without a working port, China would likely struggle — in the same way imagined in 1944 — to introduce enough forces to defeat the Taiwanese military in less than 90 days.

The requirement to use a port to build up combat power on the island created a critical vulnerability. According to the 1944 plan, “it is estimated that enemy action to block and damage the harbors and bridges and our offensive operations will greatly curtail the harbor and road capacities in the early stages.” While China has shorter lines of communication to project power to Taiwan than the Causeway plan envisioned, it likely still needs a port and would struggle to expand the lodgment against a determined defender. Operation Causeway planners estimated that the assault phase would result in 37,000 causalities (roughly 10 percent of the force) in less than 60 days. These casualty counts exceed even the largest estimates from Ukraine. There is also the open question of whether China’s authoritarian state and censors can hide mass casualties for an extended period of time from a digitally savvy public. China has enough combat power to overwhelm Taiwan, but the losses and operational difficulties could make it a pyrrhic victory at best.

Conclusion: The Unlikely Invasion

Ultimately, war is a continuation of politics by other means. Politicians can gamble even when confronted with difficult military plans just as military leaders can skew estimates to gain political favor. What ultimately pushed the U.S. Joint Chiefs to decide against invading Taiwan was a mix of the logistical nightmares inherent in the operation alongside General MacArthur’s efforts, which included direct outreach to political figures, to push for invading Luzon. By late summer 1944, planners decided to postpone a decision on whether or not to execute Operation Causeway based on progress in the Southern Philippines. By September 1944, they set aside the plan altogether and focused on Operation Iceberg, the invasion of Okinawa.

The sheer size, scale, and complexity involved with invading Taiwan likely checks even the most self-serving and impetuous instincts inside the Chinese Community Party. Court sycophants and hawks have viable alternatives to invading Taiwan that they can recommend as they seek to win favor and shape the future of modern China. The enduring challenges associated with terrain, logistics, and force-ratios on display in Operation Causeway have only compounded over time. Even if the plan is not a guide used by the Chinese military, it offers a reminder of the complexity of joint forcible entry operations.

Military planners are tasked with balancing the most likely and most dangerous enemy courses of action as they develop viable options for political leaders. The more democracies — and not just the United States — can help Taiwan deny littoral access and beachheads, the less likely Chinese leaders will be to pursue an amphibious landing. Furthermore, the more this assistance supports alternative coercive scenarios like countering a blockade and large-scale air incursions, the better it helps Taiwan deter by denial and buy time for new political and economic forces to walk back more aggressive tendencies in Beijing. For example, helping Taiwan build resiliency into its battle networks supporting the tracking (and targeting) of Chinese forces will help Taipei offset Beijing’s power preponderance. If the reality of integrated deterrence and JADC2 come to fruition, these local partner networks could also provide options for the United States and partner nations to plug into Taiwan’s battle network, further complicating Beijing’s calculus.



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Benjamin Jensen, Ph.D., is a professor of strategic studies at the School of Advanced Warfighting and a senior fellow for future war, gaming, and strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

The views expressed are his own and do not reflect the views or positions of the U.S. Marine Corps, the Department of Defense, or any part of the U.S. government.
 

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The Weakness of Xi Jinping​

How Hubris and Paranoia Threaten China’s Future​

By Cai Xia

September/October 2022

Not long ago, Chinese President Xi Jinping was riding high. He had consolidated power within the Chinese Communist Party. He had elevated himself to the same official status as the CCP’s iconic leader, Mao Zedong, and done away with presidential term limits, freeing him to lead China for the rest of his life. At home, he boasted of having made huge strides in reducing poverty; abroad, he claimed to be raising his country’s international prestige to new heights. For many Chinese, Xi’s strongman tactics were the acceptable price of national revival.

点击此链接阅读中文版 (Read in Chinese).

Outwardly, Xi still projects confidence. In a speech in January 2021, he declared China “invincible.” But behind the scenes, his power is being questioned as never before. By discarding China’s long tradition of collective rule and creating a cult of personality reminiscent of the one that surrounded Mao, Xi has rankled party insiders. A series of policy missteps, meanwhile, have disappointed even supporters. Xi’s reversal of economic reforms and his inept response to the COVID-19 pandemic have shattered his image as a hero of everyday people. In the shadows, resentment among CCP elites is rising.

I have long had a front-row seat to the CCP’s court intrigue. For 15 years, I was a professor in the Central Party School, where I helped train thousands of high-ranking CCP cadres who staff China’s bureaucracy. During my tenure at the school, I advised the CCP’s top leadership on building the party, and I continued to do so after retiring in 2012. In 2020, after I criticized Xi, I was expelled from the party, stripped of my retirement benefits, and warned that my safety was in danger. I now live in exile in the United States, but I stay in touch with many of my contacts in China.

At the CCP’s 20th National Party Congress this fall, Xi expects that he will be given a third five-year term. And even if the growing irritation among some party elites means that his bid will not go entirely uncontested, he will probably succeed. But that success will bring more turbulence down the road. Emboldened by the unprecedented additional term, Xi will likely tighten his grip even further domestically and raise his ambitions internationally. As Xi’s rule becomes more extreme, the infighting and resentment he has already triggered will only grow stronger. The competition between various factions within the party will get more intense, complicated, and brutal than ever before.

At that point, China may experience a vicious cycle in which Xi reacts to the perceived sense of threat by taking ever bolder actions that generate even more pushback. Trapped in an echo chamber and desperately seeking redemption, he may even do something catastrophically ill advised, such as attack Taiwan. Xi may well ruin something China has earned over the course of four decades: a reputation for steady, competent leadership. In fact, he already has.

THE CHINESE MAFIA​

In many respects, the CCP has changed little since the party took power in 1949. Now, as then, the party exercises absolute control over China, ruling over its military, its administration, and its rubber-stamp legislature. The party hierarchy, in turn, answers to the Politburo Standing Committee, the top decision-making body in China. Composed of anywhere from five to nine members of the broader Politburo, the Standing Committee is headed by the party’s general secretary, China’s paramount leader. Since 2012, that has been Xi.

The details of how the Standing Committee operates are a closely guarded secret, but it is widely known that many decisions are made through the circulation of documents dealing with major policy questions, in the margins of which the committee’s members add comments. The papers are written by top leaders in ministries and other party organs, as well as experts from the best universities and think tanks, and to have one’s memo circulated among the Standing Committee members is considered a credit to the writer’s home institution. When I was a professor, the Central Party School set a quota for the production of such memos of about one a month. Authors whose memos were read by the Standing Committee were rewarded with the equivalent of roughly $1,500—more than a professor’s monthly salary.

Another feature of the party system has remained constant: the importance of personal connections. When it comes to one’s rise within the party hierarchy, individual relationships, including one’s family reputation and Communist pedigree, matter as much as competence and ideology.



The CCP is more of a mafia organization than a political party.
That was certainly the case with Xi’s career. Contrary to Chinese propaganda and the assessment of many Western analysts that he rose through his talent, the opposite is true. Xi benefited immensely from the connections of his father, Xi Zhongxun, a CCP leader with impeccable revolutionary credentials who served briefly as propaganda minister under Mao. When Xi Jinping was a county party chief in the northern province of Hebei in the early 1980s, his mother wrote a note to the province’s party chief asking him to take an interest in Xi’s advancement. But that official, Gao Yang, ended up disclosing the note’s content at a meeting of the province’s Politburo Standing Committee. The revelation was a great embarrassment to the family since it violated the CCP’s new campaign against seeking favors. (Xi would never forget the incident: in 2009, when Gao died, he pointedly declined to attend his funeral, a breach of custom given that both had served as president of the Central Party School.) Such a scandal would have ruined the average rising cadre’s career, but Xi’s connections came to the rescue: the father of Fujian’s party chief had been a close confidant of Xi’s father, and the families arranged a rare reassignment to that province.

Xi would continue to fail upward. In 1988, after losing his bid for deputy mayor in a local election, he was promoted to district party chief. Once there, however, Xi languished on account of his middling performance. In the CCP, moving from the district level to the provincial level is a major hurdle, and for years, he could not overcome it. But once again, family connections intervened. In 1992, after Xi’s mother wrote a plea to the new party leader in Fujian, Jia Qinglin, Xi was transferred to the provincial capital. At that point, his career took off.

As all lower-level cadres know, to climb the CCP ladder, one must find a higher-level boss. In Xi’s case, this proved easy enough, since many party leaders held his father in high esteem. His first and most important mentor was Geng Biao, a top diplomatic and military official who had once worked for Xi’s father. In 1979, he took on the younger Xi as a secretary. The need for such patrons early on has knock-on effects decades down the line. High-level officials each have their own “lineages,” as insiders call these groups of protégés, which amount to de facto factions within the CCP. Indeed, disputes that are framed as ideological and policy debates within the CCP are often something much less sophisticated: power struggles among various lineages. Such a system can also lead to tangled webs of personal loyalty. If one’s mentor falls out of favor, the effect is the professional equivalent of being orphaned.

Outsiders may find it helpful to think of the CCP as more of a mafia organization than a political party. The head of the party is the don, and below him sit the underbosses, or the Standing Committee. These men traditionally parcel out power, with each responsible for certain areas—foreign policy, the economy, personnel, anticorruption, and so on. They are also supposed to serve as the big boss’s consiglieres, advising him on their areas of responsibility. Outside the Standing Committee are the other 18 members of the Politburo, who are next in the line of succession for the Standing Committee. They can be thought of as the mafia’s capos, carrying out Xi’s orders to eliminate perceived threats in the hope of staying in the good graces of the don. As a perk of their position, they are allowed to enrich themselves as they see fit, seizing property and businesses without penalty. And like the mafia, the party uses blunt tools to get what it wants: bribery, extortion, even violence.

SHARING IS CARING​

Although the power of personal connections and the flexibility of formal rules have remained constant since Communist China’s founding, one thing has shifted over time: the degree to which power is concentrated in a single man. From the mid-1960s onward, Mao had absolute control and the final say on all matters, even if he exercised his power episodically and was officially merely first among equals. But when Deng Xiaoping became China’s de facto leader in 1978, he chipped away at Mao’s one-man, lifelong dictatorship.

Deng restricted China’s presidency to two five-year terms and established a form of collective leadership, allowing other officials—first Hu Yaobang and then Zhao Ziyang—to serve as head of the party, even if he remained the power behind the throne. In 1987, the CCP decided to reform the process for selecting members of the Central Committee, the party’s nominal overseer and the body from which Politburo members are chosen. For the first time, the party proposed more candidates than there were seats—hardly a democratic election, but a step in the right direction. Even the endorsement of Deng could not guarantee success: for example, Deng Liqun, a Maoist ideologue whom Deng Xiaoping had promised to promote to the Politburo, failed to earn enough votes and was forced to retire from political life. (It is worth noting that when the Central Committee held an election in 1997, Xi barely squeaked by. He had the fewest votes of all those selected to join, reflecting a general distaste within the party for “princelings,” descendants of top CCP leaders who rose thanks to nepotism rather than merit.)

Seeking to avoid a repeat of the disastrous Cultural Revolution, when Maoist propaganda reached its apogee, Deng also sought to prevent any leader from forming a cult of personality. As early as 1978, a student from the Central Party School who was a close family friend noticed on a school trip to a pig farm in the Beijing suburbs that items that Hua Guofeng had used on an inspection visit—a hot water bottle, a teacup—were displayed in a glass cabinet, as if it were a religious shrine. My friend wrote to Hua criticizing the personal worship, and Hua had the display removed. In 1982, China’s leaders went so far as to write into the party constitution a ban on cults of personality, which they viewed as uniquely dangerous.



Family reputation and pedigree matter as much as competence and ideology to the Communist Party.
Deng was willing to go only so far in sharing power, and he forced out Hu and Zhao successively when each proved too politically liberal. But Deng’s successor, Jiang Zemin, deepened the political reforms. Jiang institutionalized his group of advisers to operate more as an executive office. He sought advice from all members of the Standing Committee, which now made decisions by majority vote, and he circulated draft speeches widely. Jiang also made the elections to the Central Committee slightly more competitive by increasing the ratio of candidates to seats. Even princelings, including one of Deng’s sons, lost their elections.

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When Hu Jintao took over from Jiang in 2002, China moved even further toward collective leadership. Hu ruled with the consent of the nine members of the Standing Committee, a clique known as the “nine dragons controlling the water.” There were downsides to this egalitarian approach. A single member of the Standing Committee could veto any decision, driving the perception of Hu as a weak leader unable to overcome gridlock. For nearly a decade, the economic reforms that began under Deng stalled. But there were upsides, too, since the need for consensus prevented careless decisions. When SARS broke out in China during his first year in office, for instance, Hu acted prudently, firing China’s health minister for covering up the extent of the outbreak, and encouraging cadres to report infections truthfully.

Hu also sought to expand the use of term limits. Although he ran into resistance when he tried to institute term limits for members of the Politburo and its Standing Committee, he did manage to introduce them at the level of provincial ministers and below. More successfully, Hu established an unprecedented process by which the composition of the Politburo was first selected by a vote of senior party members.

Ironically, it was through this quasi-democratic system that Xi rose to the heights of power. In 2007, at an expanded meeting of the Central Committee, the CCP’s top 400 or so leaders gathered in Beijing to cast votes recommending which ministerial-level officials from a list of 200 should join the 25-member Politburo. Xi received the most. The deciding factor, I suspect, was not his record as party chief of Zhejiang or Shanghai but the respect voters held for his father, along with the endorsement of (and pressure from) some key party elders. In a similar advisory election five years later, Xi got the most votes and, by the consensus of the outgoing leaders, ascended to the top of the pyramid. He swiftly got to work undoing decades of progress on collective leadership.

PARTY OF ONE?​

When Xi took the reins, many in the West hailed him as a Chinese Mikhail Gorbachev. Some imagined that, like the Soviet Union’s final leader, Xi would embrace radical reforms, releasing the state’s grip on the economy and democratizing the political system. That, of course, turned out to be a fantasy. Instead, Xi, a devoted student of Mao and just as eager to leave his mark on history, has worked to establish his absolute power. And because previous reforms failed to place real checks and balances on the party leader, he has succeeded. Now, as under Mao, China is a one-man show.

One part of Xi’s plot to consolidate power was to solve what he characterized as an ideological crisis. The Internet, he said, was an existential threat to the CCP, having caused the party to lose control of people’s minds. So Xi cracked down on bloggers and online activists, censored dissent, and strengthened China’s “great firewall” to restrict access to foreign websites. The effect was to strangle a nascent civil society and eliminate public opinion as a check on Xi.

Another step he took was to launch an anticorruption campaign, framing it as a mission to save the party from self-destruction. Since corruption was endemic in China, with nearly every official a potential target, Xi was able to use the campaign as a political purge. Official data show that from December 2012 to June 2021, the CCP investigated 393 leading cadres above the provincial ministerial level, officials who are often being groomed for top positions, as well as 631,000 section-level cadres, foot soldiers who implement the CCP’s policies at the grassroots level. The purge has ensnared some of the most powerful officials whom Xi deemed threatening, including Zhou Yongkang, a former Standing Committee member and the head of China’s security apparatus, and Sun Zhengcai, a Politburo member whom many saw as a rival and potential successor to Xi.

Tellingly, those who helped Xi rise have been left untouched. Jia Qinglin, Fujian’s party chief in the 1990s and eventually a member of the Standing Committee, was instrumental in helping Xi climb the ranks of power. Although there is reason to believe that he and his family are exceedingly corrupt—the Panama Papers, the trove of leaked documents from a law firm, revealed that his granddaughter and son-in-law own several secret offshore companies—they have not been caught up in Xi’s anticorruption campaign.

Xi’s tactics are not subtle. As I learned from one party insider whom I cannot name for fear of getting him in trouble, around 2014, Xi’s men went to a high-ranking official who had openly criticized Xi and threatened him with a corruption investigation if he didn’t stop. (He shut up.) In pursuing their targets, Xi’s subordinates often pressure officials’ family members and assistants. Wang Min, the party chief of Liaoning Province, whom I knew well from our days as students at the Central Party School, was arrested in 2016 on the basis of statements from his chauffeur, who said that while in the car, Wang had complained to a fellow passenger about being passed over for promotion. Wang was sentenced to life in prison, with one of the charges being resistance to Xi’s leadership.

After ejecting his rivals from key positions, Xi installed his own people. Xi’s lineage within the party is known as the “New Zhijiang Army.” The group consists of his former subordinates during his time as governor of Fujian and Zhejiang Provinces and even university classmates and old friends going back to middle school. Since assuming power, Xi has quickly promoted his acolytes, often beyond their level of competence. His roommate from his days at Tsinghua University, Chen Xi, was named head of the CCP’s Organization Department, a position that comes with a seat on the Politburo and the power to decide who can move up the hierarchy. Yet Chen has no relevant qualifications: his five immediate predecessors had experience with local party affairs, whereas he spent nearly all his career at Tsinghua University.



Xi and his deputies have demanded a degree of loyalty not seen since Mao.
Xi undid another major reform: “the separation of party and state,” an effort to reduce the degree to which ideologically driven party cadres interfered with technical and managerial decisions in government agencies. In an attempt to professionalize the bureaucracy, Deng and his successors tried, with varying degrees of success, to insulate the administration from CCP interference. Xi has backtracked, introducing some 40 ad hoc party commissions that end up directing governmental agencies. Unlike his predecessors, for example, he has his own team to handle issues regarding the South China Sea, bypassing the Foreign Ministry and the State Oceanic Administration.

The effect of these commissions has been to take significant power away from the head of China’s government, Premier Li Keqiang, and turn what was once a position of co-captain into a sidekick. The change can be seen in the way Li comports himself in public appearances. Whereas Li’s two immediate predecessors, Zhu Rongji and Wen Jiabao, stood side by side with Jiang and Hu, respectively, Li knows to keep his distance from Xi, as if to emphasize the power differential. Moreover, in the past, official communications and state media referred to the “Jiang-Zhu system” and the “Hu-Wen system,” but almost no one today speaks of a “Xi-Li system.” There has long been a push and pull between the party and the government in China—what insiders call the struggle between the “South Courtyard” and the “North Courtyard” of Zhongnanhai, the imperial compound that hosts the headquarters of both institutions. But by insisting that everyone look up to him as the highest authority, Xi has exacerbated tensions.

Xi has also changed the dynamic within the Standing Committee. For the first time in CCP history, all Politburo members, even those on the Standing Committee, must report directly to the head of the party by submitting periodic reports to Xi, who personally reviews their performance. Gone is the camaraderie and near equality among Standing Committee members that once prevailed. As one former official in Beijing told me, one of the committee’s seven members—Wang Qishan, China’s vice president and a longtime ally of Xi—has grumbled to friends that the dynamic between Xi and the lesser members is that of an emperor and his ministers.



Xi is positioning himself not as merely a great party leader but as a modern-day emperor.
The most brazen change Xi has ushered in is to remove China’s presidential term limit. Like every paramount leader from Jiang onward, Xi holds three positions concurrently: president of China, leader of the party, and head of the military. Although the limit of two five-year terms applied only to the first of those three positions, beginning with Hu, there was an understanding that it must also apply to the other two to make it possible for the same person to hold all three posts.

But in 2018, at Xi’s behest, China’s legislature amended the constitution to do away with the presidential term limit. The justification was laughable. The professed goal was to make the presidency consistent with the party and military positions, even though the obvious reform would have been the reverse: to add term limits to those positions.

Then there is the cult of personality. Even though the ban on such cults remains in the party constitution, Xi and his deputies have demanded a degree of loyalty and admiration for the leader not seen since Mao. Ever since 2016, when Xi was declared the party’s “core leader” (a term never given to his predecessor, Hu), Xi has positioned himself in front of members of the Standing Committee in official portraits. His own portraits are hung everywhere, Mao style, in government offices, schools, religious sites, and homes. According to Radio France Internationale, Xi’s subordinates have proposed renaming Tsinghua University, his alma mater and China’s top school, Xi Jinping University. They have even argued for hanging his picture alongside Mao’s in Tiananmen Square. Although neither idea went anywhere, Xi did manage to get Xi Jinping Thought enshrined in the party’s constitution in 2017—joining Mao as the only other leader whose own ideology was added to the document while in office—and in the state constitution the next year. In one lengthy article published in Xinhua, the state media organ, in 2017, a propagandist crowned Xi with seven new North Korean–style titles that would have made his post-Mao predecessors blush: “groundbreaking leader,” “diligent worker for the people’s happiness,” “chief architect of modernization in the new era,” and so on.

Within the party, Xi’s lineage is carrying out a fierce campaign insisting that he be allowed to stay in power to finish what he started: namely, “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” As their efforts intensify, their message is being simplified. In April, party officials in Guangxi proposed a new slogan: “Always support the leader, defend the leader, and follow the leader.” In an echo of Mao’s “little red book,” they also issued a pocket-size collection of Xi quotations and invited citizens to memorize its contents. Xi seems to be positioning himself not as merely a great party leader but as a modern-day emperor.

THE EMPEROR HAS NO CLOTHES​

The more a political system centers on a single leader, the more the flaws and peculiarities of that leader matter. And in the case of Xi, the leader is thin-skinned, stubborn, and dictatorial.

These qualities were in evidence even before he took office. In 2008, Xi became president of the Central Party School, where I taught. At a faculty meeting the next year, the number two official at the school conveyed Xi’s threat to teachers that he would “never allow them to eat from the party’s rice bowl while attempting to smash the party’s cooking pot”—meaning taking government pay while discreetly criticizing the system. Angry about Xi’s absurd notion that it was the party, not Chinese taxpayers, that bankrolled the state, I talked back from my seat. “Whose rice bowl does the Communist Party eat from?” I asked out loud. “The Communist Party eats from the people’s rice bowl but smashes their cooking pot every day.” No one reported me; my fellow professors agreed with me.



Xi acts as “chairman of everything.”
Once in office, Xi proved unwilling to brook criticism. Xi uses Standing Committee and Politburo meetings not as an opportunity to hash out policies but as a chance to deliver hours-long monologues. According to official data, between November 2012 and February 2022, he called for 80 “collective study sessions,” in which he spoke at length on a given topic before the Politburo. He rejects any suggestions from subordinates that he thinks will make him look bad. According to an old friend of Wang Qishan, who as a Standing Committee member during Xi’s first term was part of the inner circle, Wang once proposed that Xi’s “eight-point regulation,” a list of requirements for party members, be made an official party rule. But even this rather sycophantic suggestion was considered an affront by Xi because he had not come up with it himself, and he rebuked Wang on the spot.

Xi is also a micromanager. He acts as “chairman of everything,” as many analysts have noted. In 2014, for example, he issued instructions on environmental protection 17 times—a remarkable degree of meddling, given all that is on his plate. Deng, Jiang, and Hu recognized that administering a country as vast as China requires taking local complexities into account. They emphasized that cadres at all levels should take instructions from the CCP’s Central Committee but adapt them to specific situations as needed. Such flexibility was crucial for economic development, since it gave local officials room to innovate. But Xi insists that his instructions be obeyed to the letter. I know of a county party chief who in 2014 tried to create an exception to the central government’s new rules on banquets because his county needed to host delegations of foreign investors. When Xi learned of the attempted innovation, he grew furious, accusing the official of “speaking ill of the CCP Central Committee’s policy”—a serious charge that, as a result of this incident, was subsequently codified in the party’s disciplinary regulations and is punishable by expulsion.

The CCP used to have a long tradition, dating back to Mao, in which cadres could write to the top leader with suggestions and even criticisms, but those who dared try this with Xi early in his tenure learned their lesson. Around 2017, Liu Yazhou, a general in the People’s Liberation Army and a son-in-law of a former president, wrote to Xi recommending that China reverse its policy in Xinjiang and cease rounding up members of the Uyghur minority. He was warned not to speak ill of Xi’s policies. Xi’s refusal to accept such counsel removes an important method of self-correction.

Why, unlike his predecessors, is Xi so resistant to others’ advice? Part of the reason, I suspect, is that he suffers from an inferiority complex, knowing that he is poorly educated in comparison with other top CCP leaders. Even though he studied chemical engineering at Tsinghua University, Xi attended as a “worker-peasant-soldier,” a category of students admitted in the 1970s on the basis of political reliability and class background, not their academic merits. Jiang and Hu, by contrast, earned their spots in university through highly competitive exams. In 2002, when Xi was a provincial cadre, he received a doctoral degree in Marxist theory, also at Tsinghua, but as the British journalist Michael Sheridan has documented, Xi’s dissertation was riddled with instances of suspected plagiarism. As I know from my time at the Central Party School, high-ranking officials routinely farm out their schoolwork to assistants while their professors turn a blind eye. Indeed, at the time he supposedly completed his dissertation, Xi held the busy job of governor of Fujian.

MR. WRONG​

In any political system, unchecked power is dangerous. Detached from reality and freed from the constraint of consensus, a leader can act rashly, implementing policies that are unwise, unpopular, or both. Not surprisingly, then, Xi’s know-it-all style of rule has led to a number of disastrous decisions. The common theme is an inability to grasp the practical effect of his directives.

Consider foreign policy. Breaking with Deng’s dictum that China “hide its strength and bide its time,” Xi has decided to directly challenge the United States and pursue a China-centric world order. That is why he has engaged in risky and aggressive behavior abroad, militarizing the South China Sea, threatening Taiwan, and encouraging his diplomats to engage in an abrasive style of foreign policy known as “Wolf Warrior” diplomacy. Xi has formed a de facto alliance with Russian President Vladimir Putin, further alienating China from the international community. His Belt and Road Initiative has generated growing resistance as countries tire of the associated debt and corruption.

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Xi’s economic policies are similarly counterproductive. The introduction of market reforms was one of the CCP’s signature achievements, allowing hundreds of millions of Chinese to escape poverty. But when Xi came to power, he came to see the private sector as a threat to his rule and revived the planned economy of the Maoist era. He strengthened state-owned enterprises and established party organizations in the private sector that direct the way businesses are run. Under the guise of fighting corruption and enforcing antitrust law, he has plundered assets from private companies and entrepreneurs. Over the past few years, some of China’s most dynamic companies, including the Anbang Insurance Group and the conglomerate HNA Group, have effectively been forced to hand over control of their businesses to the state. Others, such as the conglomerate Tencent and the e-commerce giant Alibaba, have been brought to heel through a combination of new regulations, investigations, and fines. In 2020, Sun Dawu, the billionaire owner of an agricultural conglomerate who had publicly criticized Xi for his crackdown on human rights lawyers, was arrested on false charges and soon sentenced to 18 years in prison. His business was sold to a hastily formed state company in a sham auction for a fraction of its true value.



Nowhere has Xi’s desire for control been more disastrous than in his reaction to COVID-19.
Predictably, China has seen its economic growth slow, and most analysts believe it will slow even more in the coming years. Although several factors are at play—including U.S. sanctions against Chinese tech companies, the war in Ukraine, and the COVID-19 pandemic—the fundamental problem is the CCP’s interference in the economy. The government constantly meddles in the private sector to achieve political goals, a proven poison for productivity. Many Chinese entrepreneurs live in fear that their businesses will be seized or that they themselves will be detained, hardly the kind of mindset inclined to innovation. In April, as China’s growth prospects worsened, Xi hosted a meeting of the Politburo to unveil his remedy for the country’s economic woes: a combination of tax rebates, fee reductions, infrastructure investment, and monetary easing. But since none of these proposals solve the underlying problem of excessive state intervention in the economy, they are doomed to fail.

Nowhere has Xi’s desire for control been more disastrous than in his reaction to COVID-19. When the disease first spread in the city of Wuhan in December 2019, Xi withheld information about it from the public in an attempt to preserve the image of a flourishing China. Local officials, meanwhile, were paralyzed. As Wuhan’s mayor, Zhou Xianwang, admitted the next month on state television, without approval from above, he had been unable to publicly disclose the outbreak. When eight brave health professionals blew the whistle about it, the government detained and silenced them. One of the eight later revealed that he had been forced to sign a false confession.

Xi’s tendency to micromanage also inhibited his response to the pandemic. Instead of leaving the details of policy to the government’s health team, Xi insisted that he himself coordinate China’s efforts. Later, Xi would boast that he “personally commanded, planned the response, oversaw the general situation, acted decisively, and pointed the way forward.” To the extent that this was true, it was not for the better. In fact, his interference led to confusion and inaction, with local health officials receiving mixed messages from Beijing and refusing to act. As I learned from a source on the State Council (China’s chief administrative authority), Premier Li Keqiang proposed activating an emergency-response protocol in early January 2020, but Xi refused to approve it for fear of spoiling the ongoing Chinese New Year celebrations.

When the Omicron variant of the virus surged in Shanghai in February 2022, Xi yet again chose a baffling way to respond. The details of the decision-making process were relayed to me by a contact who works at the State Council. In an online gathering of about 60 pandemic experts held shortly after the outbreak began, everyone agreed that if Shanghai simply followed the latest official guidelines, which relaxed the quarantine requirements, then life in the city could go on more or less as usual. Many of the city’s party and health officials were on board with this approach. But when Xi heard about it, he became furious. Refusing to listen to the experts, he insisted on enforcing his “zero COVID” policy. Shanghai’s tens of millions of residents were forbidden from going outside, even to get groceries or receive life-saving health care. Some died at the gates of hospitals; others leaped to their deaths from their apartment buildings.

Just like that, a modern, prosperous city was turned into the site of a humanitarian disaster, with people starving and babies separated from their parents. A leader more open to influence or subject to greater checks would not likely have implemented such a draconian policy, or at least would have corrected course once its costs and unpopularity became evident. But for Xi, backtracking would have been an unthinkable admission of error.

ACTION, REACTION​

The CCP’s leadership has never been a monolith. As Mao once said, “There are parties outside our party, and there are factions within our party, and this has always been the case.” The main organizing principle of these factions is personal ties, but these groups tend to array themselves on a left-to-right continuum. Put differently, although Chinese politics are largely personalistic, there are real differences over the direction of national policy, and each lineage tends to associate itself with the ideas of its progenitor.

On the left are those who remain committed to orthodox Marxism. This faction dominated the party before the Deng era, and it advocates the continuation of class struggle and violent revolution. It includes subfactions named for Mao, Chen Yun (who was the second most powerful official under Deng), Bo Xilai (a former Politburo member who was sidelined and imprisoned before Xi took power), and Xi himself. At the grassroots level, the left also includes a small, politically powerless contingent of Marxist university students, as well as workers who were laid off as a result of Deng’s reforms.

The center consists mainly of Deng’s political descendants. Because most of today’s cadres were trained under him, this is the faction that dominates the CCP bureaucracy. Centrists support full-throated economic reforms and limited political reforms, all with the goal of ensuring the party’s permanent rule. Also in the center is a group descended from two retired top officials, Jiang and Zeng Qinghong (a former vice president), as well as a group called the Youth League Faction, consisting of supporters of former party leader Hu Jintao and the current premier Li.

Last are the subfactions on the right, which in the Chinese context means liberals who advocate a market economy and a softer form of authoritarianism (or even, in some cases, constitutional democracy). This camp, which I belong to, is the least powerful of the three. It includes followers of Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, party leaders under Deng. It also arguably includes Wen Jiabao, who was China’s premier from 2003 to 2013 and still wields influence. When asked about his push for political reform in a 2010 interview, Wen responded, “I will not yield until the last day of my life.”



Within the CCP elite, many resent Xi’s disruption of the traditional power distribution.
Xi faces growing opposition from all three factions. The left, while initially supportive of his policies, now thinks he has not gone far enough in reviving Mao’s policies, with some having become disenchanted after he cracked down on the labor movement. The center resents Xi’s undoing of economic reforms. And the right has been completely silenced by Xi’s elimination of even the slightest political debate.

Glimpses of these divides can be seen in the Standing Committee. One member, Han Zheng, is widely perceived as a member of Jiang’s faction. Li in particular seems to diverge from Xi, and a row between the officials is breaking out into public view. Li has long quietly opposed Xi’s zero-COVID policy, stressing the need to reopen businesses and protect the economy. In May, after Li told 100,000 party cadres at an online conference that the economy was in worse shape than expected, Xi’s allies launched a counterattack. In Xinhua, they defended him by arguing, “China’s economic development prospects will definitely be brighter.” As a symbol of their resistance to Xi’s COVID policy, Li and his entourage refuse to wear masks. In April, during a speech in the city of Nanchang, Li’s aides could be seen asking attendees to remove their masks. So far, Li has taken Xi’s imperiousness sitting down, always acquiescing out of necessity. But he may soon reach a breaking point.

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Indignation at the elite level is replicating itself further down the bureaucracy. Early in Xi’s tenure, as he began to shuffle power, many in the bureaucracy grew disgruntled and disillusioned. But their resistance was passive, expressed through inaction. Local cadres took sick leave en masse or came up with excuses to stall Xi’s anticorruption initiatives. At the end of 2021, the CCP’s disciplinary commission announced that in the first ten months of that year, it had found 247,000 cases of “ineffective implementation of Xi Jinping’s and the Central Committee’s important instructions.” During the Shanghai lockdown, however, resistance became more overt. On social media, local officials openly criticized the zero-COVID policy. In April, members of the residents’ committee of Sanlin Town, a neighborhood in Shanghai, collectively resigned, complaining in an open letter that they had been sealed in their offices for 24 days with no access to their families.



China’s leader is facing not only internal dissent but also an intense popular backlash.
Even more troubling for Xi, elite dissatisfaction is now spreading to the general public. In an authoritarian state, it is impossible to accurately measure public opinion, but Xi’s harsh COVID measures may well have lost him the affection of most Chinese. An early note of dissent came in February 2020, when the real estate tycoon Ren Zhiqiang called him a “clown” for bungling the response to the pandemic. (After a one-day trial, Ren was sentenced to 18 years in prison.) Chinese social media platforms are awash in videos in which ordinary people beg Xi to end his zero-COVID policy. In May, a group calling itself the “Shanghai Self-Saving Autonomous Committee” released a manifesto online titled, “Don’t be a slave—save yourself.” The document called on the city’s residents to fight the lockdown and form self-governing bodies to help one another. On social media, some Chinese have sarcastically proposed that the most effective plan for fighting the pandemic would be to convene the 20th National Congress as soon as possible to prevent Xi from staying in power.

Meanwhile, despite Xi’s claims of having vanquished poverty, most Chinese continue to struggle to make ends meet. As Li revealed in 2020, 600 million people in China—some 40 percent of its population—barely earned $140 a month. According to data obtained by the South China Morning Post, a Hong Kong newspaper, some 4.4 million small businesses closed between January and November 2021, more than three times the number of newly registered companies in the same period. Facing a financial crisis, local governments have been forced to slash government salaries—sometimes by as much as 50 percent, including pay for teachers. They will likely resort to finding new ways of plundering wealth from the private sector and ordinary citizens, in turn generating even more economic misery. After four decades of opening up, most Chinese don’t want to go back to the days of Mao. Within the CCP elite, many resent Xi’s disruption of the traditional power distribution and think his reckless policies are jeopardizing the future of the party. The result is that for the first time since the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, China’s leader is facing not only internal dissent but also an intense popular backlash and a real risk of social unrest.

FIVE MORE YEARS?​

Harboring resentment is one thing, but acting on it is another. Members of the party’s upper echelons know that they can always be charged with corruption, so they have little incentive to maneuver against Xi. High-tech surveillance is presumed to be so pervasive that party elites, including retired national leaders, do not dare communicate with one another outside official events, even about mundane matters. The public, for its part, stays silent, held back by censorship, surveillance, and the fear of arrest. That is why opponents of Xi are focused on the one legal avenue for removing him: denying him a third presidential term at the upcoming National Congress.

Perhaps sensing the growing disappointment, Xi has done everything he can to tilt the playing field in his favor. The most important constituency, of course, is his fellow Standing Committee members, who ultimately have the greatest say over whether he stays in office, in part because of their control over members of China’s legislature. Xi has likely done what he can to ensure the support of Standing Committee members, from promising that they will stay in power to pledging not to investigate their families.

Nearly as important is the military, since denying Xi a third term would likely require the support of the generals. Propagandists routinely remind Chinese that “the party commands the gun,” but China’s leaders realize that in truth the gun is always pointed at the party’s head. Although Xi has steadily replaced China’s generals with his own men over the years, military officials’ rhetoric still wavers between emphasizing personal loyalty to Xi and institutional loyalty to the Central Military Commission, the body, headed by Xi, that oversees them.

In one potential sign of lingering opposition within the ranks, I learned last December from several of my contacts in China that Liu, the military official whom Xi had rebuked for criticizing policy on the Uyghurs—had disappeared along with his younger brother, also a general. Both brothers’ houses were raided. The news sent shock waves through the military, since as the son-in-law of a former president, Liu would normally have been considered untouchable. But by detaining him and his brother, Xi had issued his strongest warning yet to princelings and the top brass of the People’s Liberation Army that they should get in line.

Xi has also ramped up his ostensible anticorruption drive. In the first half of 2022, the government has punished 21 cadres at or above the provincial ministerial level and 1,237 cadres at the district and departmental level. There has been a distinct focus on the security and intelligence agencies. In January, Chinese state television aired a confession by Sun Lijun, once a high-ranking security official, who had been charged with corruption and now faces the prospect of execution. His sin, according to the party’s top disciplinary body, was that he had “formed a cabal to take control over several key departments,” “harbored hugely inflated political ambitions,” and had “evil political qualities.” In March, Fu Zhenghua, who as deputy minister of public security had been Sun’s boss, was also charged with corruption, removed from office, and expelled from the CCP. The message was clear: obey or risk downfall.

Adding extra layers of insurance to his quest for a third term, Xi has issued a veiled threat to retired party cadres. Party elders have long wielded enormous clout in Chinese politics; it was retired elites who forced out Zhao in 1989, for example. In January, Xi took direct aim at this group, announcing that the government would “clean up systemic corruption and eliminate hidden risks” by retroactively investigating the past 20 years of cadres’ lives. And in May, the party tightened the guidelines for retired cadres, warning them “not to discuss the general policies of the party Central Committee in an open manner, not to spread politically negative remarks, not to participate in the activities of illegal social organizations, and not to use their former authority or position influence to seek benefits for themselves and others, and to resolutely oppose and resist all kinds of wrong thinking.”

Xi has also sought to guarantee the backing of the 2,300 CCP delegates invited to attend the National Congress, two-thirds of whom are high-level officials from across the country and one-third of whom are ordinary members who work at the grassroots level. The delegates have been carefully screened for their loyalty to Xi. And to prevent any surprises at the congress, a ban on “nonorganizational activities” forbids them from mingling outside of formal small-group meetings of their provincial delegations, limiting their ability to organize against a particular policy or leader.

In the months leading up to the congress, the CCP’s stealth infighting will probably intensify. Xi could order more arrests and more trials of high-ranking officials, and his critics could leak more information and spread more rumors. Contrary to the conventional wisdom among Western analysts, he may not have locked up a third term. Xi’s proliferating opponents could succeed in ushering him out of office, provided they either convince enough Standing Committee members that he has lost the support of the CCP’s rank and file or persuade party elders to intervene. And there is always a chance that an economic crisis or widespread social unrest could turn even stalwart allies against him. Despite all this, the most likely outcome this fall is that Xi, having so rigged the process and intimidated his rivals, will get his third presidential term and, with it, the right to continue as head of the party and the military for another term. And just like that, the only meaningful political reform made since Deng’s rule will go up in smoke.

XI UNBOUND​

What then? Xi will no doubt see his victory as a mandate to do whatever he wants to achieve the party’s stated goal of rejuvenating China. His ambitions will rise to new heights. In a futile attempt to invigorate the economy without empowering the private sector, Xi will double down on his statist economic policies. To maintain his grip on power, he will continue to preemptively eliminate any potential rivals and tighten social control, making China look increasingly like North Korea. Xi might even try to stay in power well beyond a third term. An emboldened Xi may well accelerate his militarization of disputed areas of the South China Sea and try to forcibly take over Taiwan. As he continues China’s quest for dominance, he will further its isolation from the rest of the world.

But none of these moves would make discontent within the party magically disappear. The feat of gaining a third term would not mollify those within the CCP who resent his accumulation of power and reject his cult of personality, nor would it solve his growing legitimacy problem among the people. In fact, the moves he would likely make in a third term would raise the odds of war, social unrest, and economic crisis, exacerbating existing grievances. Even in China, it takes more than sheer force and intimidation to stay in power; performance still matters. Mao and Deng earned their authority through accomplishments—Mao by liberating China from the Nationalists, and Deng by opening it up and unleashing an economic boom. But Xi can point to no such concrete triumphs. He has less margin for error.

The only viable way of changing course, so far as I can see, is also the scariest and deadliest: a humiliating defeat in a war. If Xi were to attack Taiwan, his likeliest target, there is a good chance that the war would not go as planned, and Taiwan, with American help, would be able to resist invasion and inflict grave damage on mainland China. In that event, the elites and the masses would abandon Xi, paving the way for not only his personal downfall but perhaps even the collapse of the CCP as we know it. For precedent, one would have to go back to the nineteenth century, when Emperor Qianlong failed in his quest to expand China’s realm to Central Asia, Burma, and Vietnam. Predictably, China suffered a mortifying loss in the First Sino-Japanese War, setting the stage for the downfall of the Qing dynasty and kicking off a long period of political upheaval. Emperors are not always forever.

Recommended Articles​

The Party That Failed​

An Insider Breaks With Beijing

Cai Xia​


The China Trap​

U.S. Foreign Policy and the Perilous Logic of Zero-Sum Competition

Jessica Chen Weiss​

 

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September 14, 2022

Senate Foreign Relations Committee Overwhelmingly Approves Taiwan Policy Act of 2022​




WASHINGTON – U.S. Senators Bob Menendez (D-N.J.), Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, today announced Committee approval of the Taiwan Policy Act of 2022, legislation he authored along with Senator Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) to reinforce United States policy towards Taiwan in order to maintain stable cross-Strait deterrence as China expands its campaign to undermine the status quo.

Among its provisions, the bipartisan proposal expands U.S. efforts to promote the security of Taiwan, ensures regional stability, and deters further People’s Republic of China (PRC) aggression against Taiwan. The legislation also imposes steep costs on the PRC for hostile action against Taiwan by setting up a broad economic sanctions regime.

“As Beijing continues to take coercive diplomatic, political, military and economic measures against Taiwan, today’s strong, bipartisan vote not only signals our unwavering support for the Taiwanese people, but our recognition of the pivotal role that the United States Congress must play in confronting these challenges.

“We need to be clear-eyed about what we are facing, just as we need to be clear in our response. Despite what some may try to argue, the primary focus of this bill has always been on deterrence and on enhancing Taiwan’s capabilities. The bill we are approving today makes clear the United States does not seek war or increased tensions with Beijing. Just the opposite. We are carefully and strategically lowering the existential threats facing Taiwan by raising the cost of taking the island by force so that it becomes too high a risk and unachievable.

“After soliciting and incorporating input from Members of the Committee to address wide-ranging views and concerns, holding multiple hearings and briefings on this issue, as well as allowing for Committee members to travel to Taiwan, we passed a comprehensive piece of legislation to lay a new and bipartisan path forward for U.S.-Taiwan policy that maintains cross-Strait stability, all while reinforcing a status quo that is under threat from Beijing and that, without reinforcement, would inevitably and invariably collapse.

“Today, I am incredibly proud to lead the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in speaking on behalf of the U.S. Congress so Beijing understands they have failed in trying to dictate what we can do and how, just like they will fail in preventing the United States from standing up for the people of Taiwan. I look forward to continue working with my colleagues to ensure this Congress does everything needed to support Taiwan.”


Last month, Chairman Menendez published an op-ed in the New York Times on the critical window of opportunity for the U.S. Congress to enact a more forward leaning policy to defend Taiwan. Citing Speaker Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, as well as the unprecedented unity among democratic nations against Putin’s own incursion into Ukraine, Chairman Menendez made the moral and strategic case for safeguarding Taiwan’s democracy through his bipartisan Taiwan Policy Act of 2022.
 

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US-China at a weaponized breaking point over Taiwan​


Jeff Pao​



Taiwanese soldiers on a armored vehicle in Taiplei during the National Day Celebration, following Chinese President Xi Jinpings vow to unify Taiwan by peaceful means. Photo: AFP / Ceng Shou Yi / NurPhoto

China’s government has reiterated its determination to realize national reunification with Taiwan after media reports said the United States was considering unveiling a sanctions package against China over its treatment of the self-governing island.

According to a Reuters report citing sources familiar with the discussions, the Biden administration is now mulling a series of sanctions against China to deter it from invading Taiwan while the European Union is also being asked by Taipei to implement similarly punitive measures.
On Wednesday (September 14), Chinese Foreign Ministry’s spokesperson Mao Ning said that the Taiwan question is purely China’s internal affair and no foreign country had the right to interfere in it.
The US Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Wednesday approved the Taiwan Policy Act of 2022, which aims to bolster Taiwan’s defense capabilities with almost US$6.5 billion in new security assistance over the next four years. The legislation, if enacted, would effectively signal that Taipei is considered a non-NATO ally by Washington.
The bill needs approval from the full Senate, the House of Representatives and President Joe Biden before it can take effect.

Chinese Ambassador to the US Qin Gang reportedly told US Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman in a meeting on August 23 that China-US ties would disintegrate if the Taiwan Policy Act of 2022 became law.
Washington is already ramping up punitive measures against Beijing as bilateral relations plumb new lows. The US Department of Commerce recently unveiled a series of export bans to prevent China from obtaining high-end semiconductors and chip-making software and equipment.
US President Joe Biden wants to hinder China’s chip-making capabilities. Image: Twitter
On Monday, Biden signed an executive order that urges drug makers to reduce their reliance on foreign labs, namely in China. More specifically, White House officials told the media that the US hoped to reduce its dependence on China for biomedical research.

As many of these sanctions are longer term in nature, the Taiwanese government is calling on the US and EU to implement other measures that will have quicker effects.
Hsiao Bi-khim, Taiwan’s Representative to the US, this week hosted about 60 legislators from Europe, Asia and Africa in Washington and urged them to take action to deter China from attacking Taiwan.
On Tuesday, Hsiao hosted dozens of members of the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China (IPAC) at the Taiwan-owned Twin Oaks in Washington. She proposed they sign a pledge to push their governments to adopt “greater deterrence against military or other coercive” actions by China against Taiwan, Reuters reported.
Nazak Nikakhtar, a former official of the US Commerce Department, was quoted as saying that the possible new sanctions on China would be far more complicated than those imposed on Russia as the US and its allies are deeply integrated with China’s economy.
Mao Ning of China’s foreign ministry said on Wednesday: “The root cause of the current tensions across the Taiwan Strait is that the One China principle has been challenged and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) authorities keep pursuing the ‘Taiwan-independence’ separatist agenda.
“No country or individual should underestimate the Chinese government and people’s strong resolve and firm will to safeguard our sovereignty and territorial integrity and to realize national reunification.”
Mao said she had no knowledge of what Ambassador Qin specifically said to the State Department’s Sherman about the Taiwan Policy Act of 2022 but she believed he was stressing the importance of upholding the One China principle to maintaining bilateral relations.
Commenting on the meeting between Hsiao and foreign lawmakers, Mao said the DPP’s attempt to collude with external forces in pursuit of the “Taiwan-independence” separatist agenda would only lead to a dead end.
Chinese state media commentators are weighing in with similar warnings. Zhang Yi, a lecturer at Qingdao University, said DPP authorities tried to get support from the EU but Brussells would definitely not offer help at this time while facing serious internal and external problems related to the Russia-Ukraine war.
Tourists look on as a Chinese military helicopter flies past Pingtan island, one of mainland China’s closest points to Taiwan, in Fujian province on August 4, ahead of massive military drills off Taiwan. Photo: Twitter / JIJI
Zhang wrote: “Due to the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, European countries followed the US to sanction Russia but they then faced a serious energy crisis. They could not even guarantee the energy supply for this winter. The energy crisis has also led to a serious inflation crisis within the EU. Externally, the EU’s international status is declining as the euro has fallen sharply compared with the US dollar.”
Zhang noted the EU last year imported 472 billion euros (US$472 billion) of Chinese goods, including machinery, autos and consumer products, and exported 223 billion euros worth of goods to China.
He boldly predicted that, as China is now the EU’s third-largest export destination and biggest product supplier, the EU will not sacrifice its relations with China over Taiwan.

Chen Fei, an associate professor at the Central China Normal University, said: “As the world’s second-largest economy, China surpasses Russia in terms of its position and importance in the global economy.
“Even if the US government can reach an agreement on this issue, it is almost impossible for the 27 EU member states to compromise on any sanction package against China. This has already been vividly shown in the sanctions against Russia.”
A commentary published by the state-owned Defense Times said that although European countries are troubled by the energy crisis, it is still possible that the EU will choose to follow the US to sanction China.
The article said if the EU really does this, it should make sure its member states can pay the prices.
Read: Chinese biomed firms take ill on Biden’s decoupling order
Follow Jeff Pao on Twitter at @jeffpao3


US-China at a weaponized breaking point over Taiwan
 

jward

passin' thru

US, allies could lose 900 aircraft in conflict with China over Taiwan: CSIS​


Ryan Finnerty​


The USA can keep China out of Taiwan, but the cost of doing so will be on scale not seen since the Second World War.
That is the assessment made by analysts at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. A team there has been conducting a series of wargames meant to simulate various scenarios of a Chinese incursion across the Taiwan Strait, sometime around the year 2026.

While analysis and final conclusions are not expected until later this year, the initial findings indicate that the USA and allies have the forces and armaments to keep China from fully occupying Taiwan, but with the loss of many lives and aircraft.
“In all except the most pessimistic scenarios, the United States and Taiwan can succeed in maintaining an autonomous Taiwan and preventing the Chinese from occupying the island,” says Mark Cancian, a former US Marine Corps (USMC) colonel and leader of the CSIS team that designed the wargame.
“However, this comes at a high cost, even in the most probable scenarios, and the cost gets higher in the pessimistic scenarios,” Cancian adds.

Exactly how high a cost depends upon what is happening elsewhere in the world when a Chinese operation is launched and how US-led defenders respond.
These various scenarios, as Cancian calls them, incorporate variables like whether or not US troops are on Taiwan when the invasion begins, the presence of another crisis elsewhere in the world that requires US attention or even how quickly decision makers in Washington commit forces to Taiwan.

What the team assessed as the most-probable set of parameters, which Cancian calls the “base case”, assumes that the USA will not have significant forces on the island when a Chinese operation commences. Cancian says this was based on observations such as Beijing’s extreme reaction to US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s recent diplomatic visit to Taiwan, which suggest basing troops on the island ahead of time would not be politically tenable.

In such a scenario, China enjoys a first-mover advantage, while the Pentagon must “flow” troops and equipment into western Pacific, many from bases thousands of miles away in North America.
“In the base case, the United States loses 400 or 500 aircraft,” Cancian says.
The entire US Air Force (USAF) fleet of combat aircraft numbers just over 1,900 fighters, bombers and ground attack jets, according to the FlightGlobal 2022 World Air Forces Guide.
Cancian notes that most of those loses will be concentrated in ground-based aircraft belonging to the USAF and allied air forces. However he adds that US Navy (USN) carrier-based air wings will also be highly-vulnerable.

LOST CARRIER​

“In most iterations, both forward-deployed carriers are put out of action in the first week,” he explains. That could mean the sinking of an aircraft carrier or just damage severe enough to preclude air operations.
However the loses could be even higher in what Cancian calls a “pessimistic scenario”, one in which the situation facing US generals and admirals is particularly challenging.
Should Washington respond with indecision following the launch of a cross-strait invasion, even for a period one or two weeks, Cancian says the defenders of Taiwan will face a significantly greater challenge and correspondingly higher losses.
“In the pessimistic cases, that’s a 700-800 aircraft loss for the United States, and 900 aircraft overall for the USA, Taiwan and Japan,” he explains.
While the loss figures appear grim, there are optimistic notes in the findings thus far. In almost every scenario, China is prevented from establishing control over the disputed island.
“The Chinese always can land, there’s no way to prevent that,” Cancian reveals. However he expounds that a coalition of US, Taiwan and Japan are almost always able contain the invaders to their beachhead landing.
“In most cases, where the United States can do that, the Chinese can’t get off the beach, they can’t occupy a large part of the island and they would eventually be driven off,” he explains.

Key to any a successful defence in any of the scenarios, according to Cancian, will be the ability to inflict substantial losses on the fleet of amphibious landing ships that would be needed to ferry massive numbers of Chinese ground troops across the strait.
“Successful strategies focus on the Chinese amphibious fleet, because if that gets sunk, then they can no longer land forces on Taiwan,” he says. That should be a priority even over targeting air bases and other power projection hubs on mainland China, he adds.
With that finding in mind, Cancian says the wargame team already has two emerging insights to offer. The first insight is the importance of the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM), a stealthy air-launched cruise missile developed by Lockheed Martin.
Long-range bombers, like the Boeing B-52 and Boeing B-1, proved particularly effective in the CSIS wargame when armed with LRASM, Cancian notes.
With the caveat that final analysis is still ongoing, Cancian says that LRASM appears to be the most important US capability in defending against a Taiwan invasion scenario.

The wargame finds that the air-launched Long-Range Anti Ship Cruise Missile, centre, would be a critical tool in beating back a Chinese invasion of Taiwan

The head of Raytheon’s missile division recently warned that production of advanced precision munitions cannot be rapidly expanded when conflict breaks out and urged Western leaders to increase existing stocks.
The second insight emerging from the CSIS wargame is the need to harden forward air bases in Guam and Japan.
“Guam, Kadena Air Base in Okinawa and bases in Japan are very vulnerable to Chinese missile attack,” Cancian notes. “Although shelters are not perfect, hardening these bases and protecting aircraft is very important,” he adds.
Cancian notes that the heavy aircraft casualties his simulation predicts stem in large part from the fact that the USA will have to quickly move large amounts of aviation assets into the combat theatre, before the allies have established maritime dominance.
This constitutes a great risk, he notes, but one that is unavoidable to save Taiwan.
“If the United States hangs back, then the Chinese establish themselves on Taiwan and win the war essentially,” Cancian says. “So US forces have to go forward so they can attack the Chinese fleet, particularly the amphibious ships, but that leaves them vulnerable to Chinese missile attacks on the air bases,” he expands.

MOST AIRCRAFT LOST ON GROUND​

Notably, most of the allied air losses will actually occur while aircraft are on the ground. Cancian says in various iterations of the wargame, the USA will typically lose ten aircraft on the ground for every one it loses in the air, driving home the need for base hardening.
Some strategists have suggested using many, small airfields dispersed across the islands of the western Pacific to negate this threat. The USMC has proposed a restructuring initiative based in part around this concept of small, dispersed teams.
Cancian, a former USMC officer himself, rejects this notion.
“It’s not a substitute for the big bases,” he says of dispersion, noting that large airfields can support a far more aircraft and thus generate significantly more sorties.

“You can’t get around the need for big bases,” Cancian says emphatically.
He adds that rapidly converting civilian airfields in Japan for military use would be a more effective strategy than dispersion.
In historic terms, Cancian draws parallels between the Taiwan invasion scenario and the USA’s World War Two defence of the Philippines. That campaign, which began hours after the devastating 1941 surprise air raid on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, resulted in the near total destruction or capture of US forces in the archipelago.
Just as in that conflict, Cancian says military and political leaders will need to prepare themselves and the broader population for upsetting levels of casualties, particularly in the USAF, should war breakout in the Taiwan Strait.

“The example I use is: later arriving [USAF] reinforcements to Kadena will land on a runway that has literally hundreds of wrecked aeroplanes, bulldozed to the side,” Cancian says, of one likely scenario.
“Those reinforcements will be told: ‘Welcome to Kadena. Tomorrow, you fly over Taiwan to take on the air forces that have done this destruction.’”

 

jward

passin' thru
hmm. Weekend @ the bunker, this keeps keepin' up

Katie Bo Lillis
@KatieBoLillis

Chinese President Xi Jinping has told his military that he wants to have the capability to take control of Taiwan by force by 2027, per CIA Deputy Director David Cohen—but, he said, the IC does not currently believe that Beijing has made a decision about whether to proceed.
“He has not made the decision to do that, but he has asked his military to put him in a position where if that's what he wanted to do, he would be able to. It's still the assessment of the IC as a whole that Xi's interest in Taiwan is to get control through nonmilitary means.”
 
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