WAR 09-26-2020-to-10-02-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
(436) 09-05-2020-to-09-11-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

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(433) 08-15-2020-to-08-21-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR**** WAR - 08-15-2020-to-08-21-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR**** (430) 07-25-2020-to-07-31-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR**** WAR - 07-25-2020-to-07-31-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR**** (427)...


www.timebomb2000.com

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(437) 09-12-2020-to-09-18-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****



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(438) 09-19-2020-to-09-25-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

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Something a little different to start this week out.....the guy's coming from a perspective that isn't usually seen in the MSM sources....HC

Wars of the 2020s and 30s.
RT 25:52
View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WXUiVLBifpk



Why is the World Crazy Now?
RT 40:45
View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iTWOXRCyOY4
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Posted for fair use.....

Three Army brigades will deploy to Europe, South Korea and Afghanistan

By CAITLIN M. KENNEY | STARS AND STRIPES
Published: September 25, 2020

WASHINGTON — Despite the coronavirus pandemic, the Army announced it will deploy a brigade to Europe, another to South Korea and a third to Afghanistan.


The fall deployments are part of regular rotations to the three locations, according the Army’s announcement Thursday.


About 700 soldiers from the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division from Fort Drum, N.Y., will replace the division’s 1st Brigade Combat Team in Afghanistan, Maj. Harold Huff, a 10th Mountain Division spokesman, wrote Friday in an email. The soldiers will be stationed in a number of locations across the country for a nine-month deployment supporting Operation Freedom Sentinel to conduct “command and control, force protection, and logistical support functions,” he said.

The United States is drawing down forces in Afghanistan following a Feb. 29 peace agreement with the Taliban. Troop levels in the country are expected to be reduced to between 4,000 to 5,000 service members by the end of November, and Defense Secretary Mark Esper has not issued an order to reduce that number any further, said David Helvey, who is performing the duties of assistant secretary of defense for Indo-Pacific security affairs at the Defense Department.

A full withdrawal of U.S. and allied troops is planned by May 2021 as part of the peace agreement, but it would be dependent on the Taliban meeting its obligations and commitments of the agreement. Helvey said Tuesday during a congressional hearing that the Taliban is still not fully compliant.


The 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division from Fort Hood, Texas, will deploy to Europe for nine months with about 3,700 soldiers, who will participate in Atlantic Resolve exercises, including the multinational exercise Combined Resolve, said Lt. Col. Chris Brautigam, a 1st Cavalry Division spokesman. The exercises are “in support of the United States’ commitment to NATO allies and partners,” according to the Army announcement.


The brigade will be replacing 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division from Fort Stewart, Ga.


About 3,600 soldiers from the 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, 3rd Infantry Division from Fort Stewart, Ga., will deploy to South Korea for a rotation, said Lt. Col. Lindsey Elder, a 3rd Infantry Division spokeswoman, replacing 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division from Fort Riley, Kan.


The nine-month rotation is to “support the United States’ commitment to southeast Asia partners and allies,” the announcement states.


kenney.caitlin@stripes.com
Twitter: @caitlinmkenney
 

Housecarl

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Hummmm........

Posted for fair use.....

Indian Army Has Deployed Additional 100,000 Troops Near The LAC – Top Chinese General


Published 1 hour ago on September 26, 2020
By Smriti Chaudhary

Despite the sixth round of Corps Commander level meeting between India and China which failed to provide any significant breakthrough, a Chinese lieutenant general has warned that Beijing should stay alert for a surprise attack from the Indian side.

According to a report in SCMP, Retired Chinese lieutenant general Wang Hongguang, in an article published on a defence-related social media account, has claimed that India has doubled its troops along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the disputed Himalayan region.

“India only needs 50,000 soldiers to maintain the Line of Actual Control, but now, instead of withdrawing troops before the winter comes, India has added 100,000 more soldiers in Ladakh,” Wang said.

“India has doubled or tripled its troops near the Line of Actual Control; they are mostly stationed within 50km (31 miles) of Chinese territory, and they could easily cross into China in a few hours.”

Wang didn’t mention the source of these numbers. He was a deputy commander of the Nanjing Military Region which is now a part of People Liberation Army’s (PLA’s) Eastern Theatre Command.

He added that the danger of conflict had risen and “incidents” in the Taiwan Strait and the coming US presidential election might give India an opportunity to “do something big,” said the media report. He warned the PLA that it cannot let its guard down until mid-November.

Reportedly, Beijing has deployed 50,000 troops along with 150 fighter jets and surface-to-air missiles (SAM) along the LAC. Both the sides have been mirroring the buildup in the region. Indian experts have said that India is thoroughly prepared to deal with any confrontation as the security forces are reinforcing their forward positions in the region.

Several rounds of commander level talks have taken place but full disengagement is still far fetched. In the last meeting, the sixth round of senior commander meeting between Lt. Gen. Harinder Singh, 14 Corps Commander and Maj. Gen. Lin Liu, South Xinjiang military commander, both the sides agreed to “stop sending more troops to the frontline” and “refrain from unilaterally changing the situation on the ground”.

The joint statement added that the two leaders agreed to strengthen communication on the ground, avoid misunderstanding and misjudgements and avoid taking any action that may complicate the situation further.

Song Zhongping, Hong Kong-based military commentator told SCMP that China had to tread carefully in reference to the additional troops deployed by India.

He further said that India doesn’t accept the LAC and so “it’s possible that they will initiate attacks to take back the region that Indians see as belonging to them.”

India and China have been at loggerheads after the Galwan valley clash in June that killed 20 Indian troops. There have at least two violent incidents following the clash.

During one such incident, shots were fired in the air, the first time in the last four decades. Both the sides have accused each other of firing, which was in breach of the long-standing agreement signed between the two countries.
 

jward

passin' thru
US Is Preparing Military Response To Wave Of Iranian-Backed Attacks On Its Forces In Iraq

by Tyler Durden
Sat, 09/26/2020 - 13:50



Submitted by SouthFront,
Over the past months, attacks on convoys of the US-led coalition moving military equipment and supplies have become an ordinary development in Iraq. Local Iranian-backed resistance groups demanding a US military withdrawal from the country have conducted over two dozen attacks so far. The most recent ones took place on September 22 and 23.

The September 22 attack erupted in the district of al-Dujayl, around 60 km to the north of Baghdad. According to Iraq’s Security Media Cell, the convoy was targeted with an improvised explosive device. No casualties were reported. On the afternoon of September 23, a second supply convoy of the U.S.-led coalition was targeted in the district of Awja, more than 160 km north of Baghdad.

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq (also known as Ashab al-Kahf) claimed responsibility for the September 23 incident saying that several military vehicles belonging to British forces were damaged. Meanwhile, another group, the Breaker of Titans Company (Saryat Qasim al-Jabbarin), said that it had attacked coalition convoys near the town of Hillah in Babylon province and in the district of Abu Ghraib west of Baghdad. In an official statement, the group claimed that it will continue attacks until U.S. forces are expelled from Iraq.

While regular attacks on supply convoys of the Coalition cause apparent media jitters, they have not caused any notable damage to the coalition forces themselves. Logistical and supply convoys are often operated by private military contractors and local forces affiliated with or just hired by the coalition.
The US military still has a strong presence at its fortified positions and remaining bases in central and northern Iraq. This year the Pentagon even reinforced the security of its forces by deploying Patriot surface-to-air missile and C-RAM (counter rocket, artillery, and mortar) systems. The C-RAM is now regularly employed to protect the US embassy area in Baghdad’s Green Zone from rocket strikes.

The US military has been also conducting active reconnaissance and electronic warfare operations to detect and suppress infrastructure of Iranian-backed forces working against its interests in the region. On September 24, a U.S. EC-130H Compass Call “electronic attack” aircraft was spotted over the southern and eastern regions of Iraq. The aircraft took off on September 24 from the Al Dhafra Air Base in the UAE’s capital, Abu Dhabi. After crossing the Persian Gulf, the aircraft entered Iraq’s airspace and flew between the southern province of Basrah and the eastern city of Kut in a line parallel to the Iraqi-Iranian border.
The Compass Call is a heavily modified version of the C-130 Hercules developed to disrupt enemy command and control communications, perform offensive counter-information operations and carry out other kinds of electronic attacks. The U.S. Air Force’s EC-130Hs carry out missions over the Persian Gulf on a regular basis. Nevertheless, previously they rarely flew over Iraq.

Pro-Iranian sources claim that the increased US military and intelligence activity near Iranian borders are an indication of the US-Israeli preparations for aggressive actions in Iran. Despite this, in the current conditions, an open Iranian-US conflict in the Persian Gulf region in the near future remains an unlikely scenario. At the same time, the proxy conflict between Iranian-led forces and the US-Israeli-led bloc have been escalating.

posted for fair use
 

Housecarl

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WAR Armenia has downed Azerbaijan - 2 helicopters, 3 UAVs and destroyed 3 tanks



------

REGIONAL CONFLICT BREWING IN THE Mediterranean
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Hummm..........

Posted for fair use.....


News
Mexico orders arrest of soldiers in 2014 missing students case
Mexico has issued arrest warrants for police and military personnel suspected of involvement in the 2014 disappearance of 43 students. The unresolved kidnapping case sent shockwaves across the country.
Date 27.09.2020

Mexico has issued arrest warrants for police and military personnel suspected in the 2014 disappearance of 43 Mexican college students.

President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador announced the warrants on Saturday while presenting a report on the probe into the unresolved case that drew international criticism.

"Orders have been issued for the arrest of the military personnel," Lopez Obrador said at an event with family members of the missing students.

"Zero impunity — those proven to have participated will be judged," he added.

Omar Gomez, head of the special prosecutor's office for the case, told the media that the warrants had been issued for the "material and intellectual authors" of the crime, including the federal and municipal police.

The warrants come on the sixth anniversary of the disappearance that sent shockwaves across Mexico.

The students from the Ayotzinapa Rural Teachers' College disappeared on September 26, 2014, in the state of Guerrero, as they traveled to a protest in five buses. They were said to have been stopped by corrupt police in Iguala and handed over to a drug cartel.

Prosecutors had initially said the cartel mistook the men for members of a rival gang. They were killed and their bodies were incinerated at a garbage dump before being tossed in a river.

The remains of only two of the students have been positively identified so far.

Family members of the victims have long accused Mexican authorities, including the military, of involvement in the students' disappearance.

dvv/sri (AFP, Reuters)
 

Housecarl

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Narco-Terrorist Cartel Now Operational in Mexican Border States

by Ildefonso Ortiz and Brandon Darby
25 Sep 2020
73 Comments


The narco-terrorist criminal organization known as Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generacion (CJNG) is now operating in the border states of Tamaulipas and Nuevo Leon. To keep a low profile, CJNG delved into business fronts and money laundering while keeping their paramilitary forces in other parts of the country.

New information released this week by Mexico’s Financial Intelligence Unit led by Santiago Nieto revealed that 19 criminal organizations including CJNG and Sinaloa Cartel, Los Zetas, Gulf Cartel, and others had a strong presence nationwide. According to Nieto, CJNG has a presence in 27 states, while the Sinaloa Cartel (Cartel del Pacifico) is in 21 states. The report also lists other lesser-known criminal organizations like La Union de Tepito and Fuerza Antiunion.

According to Nieto, there was no outside funding from foreign terrorist organizations, even though some cartels like Jalisco, the Cartel Del Noreste faction of Los Zetas, and factions of the Gulf Cartel have carried out acts of narco-terrorism.

CJNG was linked to car bombs and other explosive attacks in addition to gruesome murders. Those actions and others among peers have led some U.S. politicians to call for designating them as foreign terrorist organizations.

Breitbart Texas consulted top law enforcement officials in Nuevo Leon and Tamaulipas who revealed the presence of CJNG in those border states. Despite social media rumors, law enforcement officials have not found or arrested CJNG gunmen in Tamaulipas or Nuevo Leon. While very active on the financial side, the organization does not appear to have taken part in the many local shootouts.

Ildefonso Ortiz is an award-winning journalist with Breitbart Texas. He co-founded Breitbart Texas’ Cartel Chronicles project with Brandon Darby and senior Breitbart management. You can follow him on Twitter and on Facebook. He can be contacted at Iortiz@breitbart.com.

Brandon Darby is the managing director and editor-in-chief of Breitbart Texas. He co-founded Breitbart Texas’ Cartel Chronicles project with Ildefonso Ortiz and senior Breitbart management. Follow him on
Twitter and Facebook. He can be contacted at bdarby@breitbart.com.

Tony Aranda from Breitbart Texas’ Cartel Chronicles project contributed to this report
 

Housecarl

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Posted for fair use.....

Mexico's drug war leaves 39,000 unidentified bodies in its morgues
Investigation by Quinto Elemento Labs finds alarming number of people buried in common graves

David Agren in Mexico City
@el_reportero
Tue 22 Sep 2020 16.05 EDT Last modified on Tue 22 Sep 2020 16.45 EDT



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Mexican soldiers stand guard in Coatzacoalcos
Soldiers stand guard in Coatzacoalcos. Mexico’s militarised war on drugs has claimed nearly 300,000 lives over the past 14 years. Photograph: Rebecca Blackwell/AP

Mexico’s militarised crackdown on organised crime has left nearly 39,000 unidentified bodies in the country’s morgues, which are often unable to handle the volume of corpses brought in for autopsies.

A new investigation by the investigative NGO Quinto Elemento Labs found that an alarming number of people were simply buried in common graves without proper postmortems. Some were left in funeral homes and more than 2,500 bodies were given to medical schools.

“It’s possible that [medical] students are learning with bodies of persons being searched for by their families,” said an article accompanying the report, published on Tuesday. “The forensic crisis has transformed the Mexican state into a burying machine: 27,271 unidentified bodies went from the morgue to common graves – 70% of the total.”

Mexico’s militarised war on drugs has claimed nearly 300,000 lives over the past 14 years. Another 73,000 persons have gone missing – with their families often left to search for their loved ones unassisted by the authorities.
Quick guide Mexico's evolving war on drugs

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The investigation found that the number of unidentified corpses in Mexican morgues was 178 in 2006 – the year president Felipe Calderón first deployed the country’s armed forces against drug cartels.


That figure soared by 1,032% over the next 13 years to 38,891 , as the murder rate mushroomed.

Mexican morgues have routinely run out of space to store unidentified bodies, prompting some local authorities to seek makeshift solutions such as storing bodies in refrigerated trailers. In 2018, a scandal erupted in Guadalajara when the stench of decomposition led to the discovery of a trailer containing 273 corpses which had been parked in a suburban neighbourhood.

Stories have also surfaced of workers and neighbours protesting against horrible stenches coming from overcrowded morgues in cities such as Tijuana on the US border and Chilpancingo in the heroin-producing heartland of Guerrero state.

The number of unidentified bodies in Mexican morgues has continued to accelerate, even as the current government of Andrés Manuel López Obrador has promised to take action. An additional 4,905 were brought to Mexican morgues in 2019, according to the report.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Posted for fair use.....

Military Tech
Published 3 days ago
From bomb-affixed drones to narco tanks and ventilated tunnels: How well-equipped are the Mexican cartels?
Arsenals are expanding and advancing as profits increase, experts warn

By Hollie McKay | Fox News

Mexico’s increasingly militarized crackdown of powerful drug cartels has left nearly 39,000 unidentified bodies languishing in the country’s morgues – a grotesque symbol of the ever-burgeoning war on drugs and rampant violence.

Investigative NGO Quinto Elemento Labs, in a recent report, found that an alarming number of people have been simply buried in common graves without proper postmortems, while others were left in funeral homes.

The so-called war of drugs has claimed the lives of nearly 300,000 people over the last 14 years, while another 73,000 have gone missing.

TONS OF COCAINE BOUND FOR NEW YORK CITY INTERCEPTED OFF MEXICO

All the while, these cartels have yet to be designated formal terrorist organizations despite boasting well-documented arsenals of sophisticated weaponry to rival most fear-inducing militias on battlefields abroad.

Just last month, reports surfaced that Mexico’s Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG) now possess bomb-toting drones – which The Drive’s Warzone depicts as “small quadcopter-type drones carrying small explosive devices to attack its enemies.”

"The Mexican cartels operate like a sophisticated terror group and use advanced weapons to kill and intimidate. They use military-grade weapons and are a serious national security threat to the U.S.," Derek Maltz, a former Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) head of the Special Operations Division, told Fox News. "As the Mexican cartels expand their operations around the world and grow their revenue, they utilize the latest and greatest technology and buy the top of the line weapons."

Two dozen of the explosive-charged quadcopters were reportedly recovered from a cartel car in Michoacan state in late July, the container-like bombs stuffed with C4 charges and ball bearings to function as shrapnel and adhered to the drones.

While the cartels were previously known to utilize aerial capabilities to disseminate drugs over border barriers and conduct surveillance, the recent findings have raised deeper questions over their battle-ready tactics.

"Between 2012 and 2017, Mexican cartels operated 850 incursions into the United States through drones," observed Lee Oughton, co-founder and COO of the Mexico-based Fortress Risk Management, citing government data and intelligence collection. "Mainly, the cartels of Sinaloa, Los Zetas and Jalisco Nueva Generación have surpassed the Mexican and U.S. authorities with their drone fleets."

Since 2014, a report by Robotics Business Review affirmed, Mexican cartels learned to build and use drones for their criminal activities -- explaining that a drone has the capacity to carry more than 220 pounds of cocaine. So the use of drones reduces the risk and costs for drug trafficking.

In addition to an advancing air arsenal, the stockpile of the land-based armory is expanding and improving.

WHITE HOUSE LABELS VENEZUELA'S MADURO COCAINE' KINGPIN' OVER ALLEGED DRUG TRAFFICKING TIES

In a calamitous and hourslong showdown last October between Mexican police and the notorious Sinaloa cartel over the arrest of Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman's son, cartel operatives battled back with Barrett .50-caliber anti-materiel rifles, staggering .50-caliber M2 machine guns hoisted to gun trucks, and at least one vehicle with an "improvised armored turret-like structure in the back," deemed "narco tanks" in scenes that mirrored the urban fighting jungles of Mosul rather than Mexico.

Such "narco tanques" – as they are referred to in Spanish – are brought to life by modifying commercial pickup trucks and substituting rear beds with high-walled, open-topped frames.

Earlier this month, Mexican authorities also tweeted images of a homemade tank they unearthed while patrolling the rural plains of San Jose de Chila, slightly west of Mexico City.

"#GuardiaNacional personnel located a van with handmade armor, allegedly used by a criminal group in the area," Mexico's National Guard wrote.


The photos illustrate a self-enterprising assemblage of scrap metal and glass to function as a bulletproof vehicle, reportedly belonging to the Los Viagras cartel currently embroiled in territorial conflict with other regional players.

The do-it-yourself armored carriers are colloquially referenced as the "Rhinoceros, "Batmobile," "Monster" or even the "Popemobile," the Mexico Daily News reported. Some are additionally furnished with inch-thick steel panels and retain the capability of traveling close to 70 miles per hour while heaving out nails and oil slicks to offset pursuers from the rear.

Oughton highlighted that armored vans used mostly by the CJNG include everything from Ford F150 and 250, to Dodge Ram 1500, to Jeep Wranglers, Hummers and Chevrolet Colorados. He also underscored that, based on extensive intelligence gathering, the major cartels are in possession of multiple frag rag grenades, Molotov pumps.

Then there are the Russian-made RPG-7 rocket launchers, M2 .50-caliber machine guns, M1919 .30-caliber machine guns, M60 machine guns, RPD light machine guns and M-249 machine guns.

"The most common way of entering weapons into the country is through ant trafficking where hundreds of people separately acquire one or more weapons which they deliver to groups that are in charge of sending them to Mexico," he continued, adding that the infamous "narco tunnels" as a means of trafficking drugs north have also "over time (increased) in with lighting installations, ventilation systems, and an electric train system."

MEXICO CARTEL BEHIND BRAZEN ATTACKS EMERGES AS ‘MOST URGENT THREAT’ TO COUNTRY’S NATIONAL SECURITY

At least half of the firearms obtained by the cartels, experts contend, are trafficked in from the United States. A 2020 report released by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) shows that weapons are illicitly transported over in small quantities, with cartels securing the arms batches through "straw purchases," which involve recruiting people with "clean" records to buy weapons and then illegally pass them on.

Grillo pointed out that much of the cartels' skills in recent times has stemmed from their ability to customize and enhance everything from drones to vehicles to imported guns -- such as taking a basic semiautomatic rifle and converting it into an automatic, or augmenting a simple drone with an explosive.

Not to be outdone by air and land wherewithal, the sea space is also a fast-emerging arena for cartel capabilities.

Late last year, the first-ever narco submarine used for smuggling purposes was seized off the European coast by Spanish authorities -- prompting head scratching as to how the vessels ventured thousands of miles undetected. While this particular craft, not yet fully submersible, was linked to cartels in Colombia, intelligence reports indicate that Mexico's outfits have similar capabilities when it comes to self-propelled semi-submersibles (SPSS) or low-profile vessels (LPV).

"This model for trafficking drugs has been used since 1993, and the cartels began using it with semi-submersible submarines so that most of the cabin and exhaust pipes are visible above the water," Oughton explained. "However, there are already new completely submersible models designed not to be detected by infrared ray systems, radar or sonars, and even when they are capable of transporting large amounts of drugs, their construction is complicated, and if they are discovered, the losses are considerable."

Moreover, Johan Obdola, president of the Canada-based Global Organization for Intelligence (IOSI) and a former counter-narcotics chief in Venezuela, said it is difficult to put a number of narco subs used for drug trafficking in Mexico.

"Now, we know that the use of narco subs and narco torpedos as tactical weapons are being tested in Mexico by the Sinaloa and the Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generacion," he said. "And the Cartel del Golf mainly, with the support of Colombian cartels and terrorist groups including Hezbollah, and operatives from Al Qaeda and the Islamic State."

And while there are dozens of cartels spanning Mexico with a varying weapons depositories, analysts are pointing more and more to the CJNG as the one not only responsible for the shifting of approximately one-third of all drugs from Mexico into the United States – as per U.S. government officials – but also as using that revenue to develop a cache of weapons, equipment and vehicles to pose the greatest threat to Mexico's military.

"The Jalisco Nueva Generacion CJNG is becoming the most powerful drug cartel in Mexico territory," Obdola cautioned.

And the cartel itself is certainly not hiding its prowess. Over the summer, the CJNG released a video of one of its convoys decked out in camouflage-painted trucks, pickups, and SUVs, replete with mounted weapons and armor, further brandished with well-armed personnel decked out in tactical gear.

"The Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generacion or CJNG is just one example of a cartel that reorganized its gunmen into fully kitted paramilitaries with their own armored vehicles, commercial pickup trucks covered in steel armor plate," noted Miguel Miranda, a global expert analyst in military technology. "The largest cartels always maintained significant stocks of small arms for their gunmen. But three distinct weapons have made cartels better armed than any local police forces they may encounter. These are the RPG-7 – the ubiquitous rocket launcher that originated in the Soviet Union – the Barrett .50-caliber anti-material rifle made in the United States, and the Browning .50-caliber heavy machine gun."

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And from the lens of the likes of Oughton, it is a growing cause for concern.

"It is recognized that organized crime groups have a greater number of weapons, and their technology is superior compared to that of the Mexican armed forces," he added.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Hummm.....

Posted for fair use.....

Afghanistan- NATO warns Taliban there is no going back to past



Date
9/27/2020 2:18:00 PM

(MENAFN - Afghanistan Times) AT News

KABUL: The NATO warns Taliban insurgents that there was no way back to two decades ago when the militants ruled Afghanistan, calling on them to join the government of Afghanistan.

Stefano Pontecorvo, the NATO's senior civil representative in Afghanistan, on Sunday emphasized that the achievements gained by Afghans in the past 19 years, saying the international donors assess a possible peace agreement between Afghanistan and Taliban and would continue their support to the war-torn country if the peace deal was favorable.

'The peace in which achievements of the past two decades are maintained will be valuable. Women's rights, minorities' rights and generally the human rights and freedom of media are the only way to lead us to a lasting peace,' Pontecorvo said.

He urged that the NATO is supportive to freedom of speech and freedom of media in Afghanistan, threatening that they would not support a government that restricts freedom of media by any means.

He called the Afghan peace talks going on in Qatar as 'real', but admitted that violence in Afghanistan was in high level and is not acceptable.

The NATO representative called on the Taliban to built trust and decrease violence if they are truly concerned over the people of Afghanistan.

'The peace will be a hard process but it would much harder if there is not trust.'

Potencorvo said that the United States and NATO came together to Afghanistan and would leave together. 'This is wrong to say that the US leaves here (Afghanistan) and NATO remains.'

He also vowed to help Taliban fighters' integration to the government of Afghanistan.

MENAFN2709202001690000ID1100865218
 

Housecarl

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Posted for fair use.....

Talking peace while waging war in Afghanistan

Afghanistan peace talks in Doha are constrained by various sticking points while bullets continue to fly on the battlefield


by Fazelminallah Qazizai September 27, 2020

KABULAs the Afghan government and rebel Taliban engage in peace talks in Doha, Qatar, hopes for a breakthrough are still constrained by myriad sticking points as civil war violence continues apace.

While Afghanistan President Ashraf Ghani’s government negotiation team has insisted on a battlefield ceasefire before entering substantive talks, the Taliban has stood firm on discussing and agreeing on the causes of the war before quieting their guns.

The negotiations aim to end 19 years of fighting and establish a plan for post-war society, including a potential power-sharing arrangement. Talks to date have focused on setting agendas and how negotiations will be held.

The Taliban are demanding that the conflict be formally acknowledged as a “jihad”, that negotiations are conducted under the so-called Hanafi school of thought, and that the US-Taliban agreement signed in February serves as a basis for the two sides’ dialogue.

The US deal paves the way for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Afghanistan by May 2021. Differences over a prisoner exchange agreed to in the US-Taliban deal delayed the start of the talks.

The intra-Afghan talks began on September 12 and were marked by an historical opening ceremony in Doha, with speeches by top diplomats and international community representatives carried virtually due to Covid-19 restrictions.

The two Afghan teams have been meeting daily since, in meetings that have so far highlighted sticking points rather than common ground. Meanwhile, clashes continue on the battlefield as recriminations fly in the media.

The Taliban have deployed their heavy guns to the talks in hard-core leader and Islamic scholar Sheikh Abdul Hakim Haqqani.

Sheikh Haqqani, who is serving as the Taliban’s chief negotiator, is known to be a key figure in the Taliban movement and is the author of several high-level Islamic books on the judiciary and Islamic Hadiths.

He also leads a madrassa in Ishaqabad in Quetta, Pakistan known for graduating many hard-line Taliban military commanders.

Mullah Mohammad Yaqoob, son of deceased former Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar and current chief of the military commission, is among his former students, says an ex-student of the madrassa who wished to remain anonymous for security reasons.

Sheikh Haqqani was also known to be a close religious and political aide to movement Mullah Mohammad Omar, the Taliban’s founder in 1994, and was reportedly among the first to receive news of his death from tuberculosis in 2013.

According to a well-informed source, it was Haqqani’s idea to keep the news a secret until it was officially announced in 2015, when he appointed Mullah Akhter Mohammad Mansour as the new Taliban leader in 2015.

His key role in the Taliban’s political and military strategy are a testament to the continuity of the struggle which in its early years started in defense of Islamic ideology.

He has also been instrumental in the Taliban’s transformation from an indigenous to a global actor in this Islamic commitment. Sheikh Haqqani is also known to be highly regarded as a religious mentor by local commanders and neighboring Islamist groups alike.

“He calls all the Muslims of the region as brothers,” adds the former student of the Sheikh. “For him, Afghans, Pakistanis, Iranian Sunni, and others are all the same.”

It’s all significant considering many of the issues in dispute in Doha are scholarly and political at their root.

One concerns full adherence to the Hanafi school of thought, which is one of the four principal Sunni schools of Islamic jurisprudence, largely followed in the Indian subcontinent, Central Asia and Turkey.

The controversy centers on whether to maintain the Shiite Ja’fari school as a source of law in the Afghan legal system.

The Ja’fari school differs from Sunni jurisprudence on matters of inheritance, religious taxes, commerce, personal status, and the allowing of temporary marriage or mutʿa. It was introduced in Afghanistan only during the post-2001 reconstruction reforms.

Both teams confirm that talks are ongoing, but the issue increasingly seems to be used as a stalling mechanism to delay broad and meaningful talks.

Mujiburahman Lemar, a member of the Afghan government’s technical team in Doha says, “Progress has been made and Taliban are now discussing with their leadership about the alternatives we proposed. We are waiting. Soon they will get back to us.”

However, critics believe no substantive agreement can be reached by the current Afghan government team, which is widely perceived to lack strong politicians or influential figures with the authority to be effective.

“The republic team is formed of several different sides, it lacks unity of thought, action and views with tiny authority and zero power,” comments Nasratullah Haqpal, a Kabul-based political analyst.

Other observers view the Taliban’s hard-line views and strategy as a threat to the country’s young and fragile democracy, including progress made in the past decades regarding women’s and civil rights.

Meanwhile, Afghanistan’s battlefields continue to be a bloodbath. More than 11 civilians were killed by an airstrike carried out by the Afghan forces in Kunduz province on September 19.

The Taliban claims that the airstrike killed 23 people, including women and children, and injured 17 others.

The highways that connect Afghanistan’s provinces and districts, already on the edge of danger for common travelers, are now filled with Taliban checkpoints looking for members of Afghan security forces to exact revenge.

News reports said the Taliban later launched a wave of attacks on security checkpoints in southern Afghanistan, killing a total of 28 Afghan policemen.

Zelgai Ebadi, a spokesman for the Uruzgan governor, said Taliban fighters offered 28 local and national police officials a chance to go home if they surrendered on September 22, “but after taking their guns, the Taliban killed them all.”

Negotiators are not allowing the violence to scupper the talks, at least not yet.

“Expecting to end 20 years of war in two days is neither practical nor logical,” says Naeem Wardak, a Taliban political spokesperson. “There is a need of time, talks, and discussions. What matters though is determination and willing to start discussion. We have them both.”

Other influential actors are so far staying on the sidelines. Among them are former president Hamid Karzai and ex-mujahideen leader and founder of the powerful Hezb-e-Islami party Gulbdeen Hekmatyar.

Both have refused to join the High Council for National Reconciliation and have kept their distance from the team announced in a decree by President Ghani.

Karzai announced in a statement that he will continue his personal efforts for peace but will not serve any government institution.

Hekmatayr, who returned to the Afghan political scene after the peace deal between Hezb-e-Islami and the government signed in 2016 called the mujahideen’s membership and political leaders in the council “symbolic and ineffective.”

Whether there is any progress towards peace will depend on the willingness of all actors to compromise and find common ground. While Ghani’s government and the Taliban are now engaged in talks, the clouds have not yet begun to clear over Afghanistan’s future.
 

jward

passin' thru
Yemen's warring parties agree to their largest prisoner swap as U.N. seeks ceasefire

By Stephanie Nebehay
4 Min Read

GLION, Switzerland (Reuters) - The U.N. Special Envoy for Yemen wants to build on Sunday’s announcement of the largest prisoner exchange agreement in the five-year conflict to pave the way for a national ceasefire and a political solution to end the war, he said.

Yemen’s warring parties agreed to exchange 1,081 prisoners, including 15 Saudis, as part of trust-building steps aimed at reviving a stalled peace process, the United Nations said.
“I was told that it’s very rare to have prisoner releases of this scale during the conflict, that they mostly happen after a conflict,” U.N. envoy Martin Griffiths told Reuters in the Swiss village of Glion where the deal was announced.
The timing, sequence and logistics of the exchange were still being finalised by the International Committee of the Red Cross, which will organise the transfers, he said.

Griffiths is trying to restart political negotiations to end the war, which has killed tens of thousands of people and caused what the United Nations describes as the world’s largest humanitarian crisis with millions on the brink of famine.
The Yemeni government, backed by a Saudi-led military coalition, and the Iran-aligned Houthi movement they have been battling for over five years signed a deal in late 2018 to swap some 15,000 detainees split between both sides but the pact has been slowly and only partially implemented.
“Our overall aim at the moment is to bring an agreement on what we call a joint declaration which is a national ceasefire to end the war in Yemen,” Griffiths said, adding it would be accompanied by measures to open up ports, airports and roads.

video and photos at source
posted for fair use
 

Housecarl

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Derek H. Burney: 'Watershed moment': U.S. facing dual nuclear threats from China and Russia
For its part, Canada should urgently consider the negotiation of a partnership in the U.S. anti-ballistic missile system

Author of the article:
National Post & Derek H. Burney
Publishing date:
Sep 28, 2020 • • 5 minute read

U.S.-China relations are reaching new levels of acrimony and concern. On the campaign circuit, President Donald Trump blames China exclusively and persistently for the dire economic fallout from what he calls the “China virus.” China’s U.N. ambassador fired back on the latest salvos, saying “Enough is enough. You have created enough troubles for the world already.” The rancorous public exchanges between the two governments are troubling and reveal deep strains in the relationship that extend well beyond the pandemic. In fact, the most deep-seated threat today is on the military front.

China is rapidly expanding the scope and scale of its land, maritime and air power. Artificial islands being constructed illegally in the South China Sea are intended to ensure China’s air and surface dominance and to undermine America’s role as a regional security partner.

Even more ominous is China’s increasing nuclear weapons capability. Admiral Charles Richard, Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command and responsible for the U.S.’s nuclear arsenal, reported to Congress earlier this month that, while China’s nuclear capability is modest with a little more than 200 nuclear warheads, it is expected to double this decade. He added pointedly that “China now has the capability to directly threaten our homeland from a ballistic missile submarine. That’s a pretty watershed moment.”

China’s nuclear capability … is expected to double this decade
The direst warning from Admiral Richard was that “China is on a trajectory to be a strategic peer to us by the end of the decade. So, for the first time ever the U.S. is going to face two, peer capable nuclear competitors (Russia and China) who are different, who you have to deter differently. We have never faced that before.” He emphasized that there was no margin of error for the U.S. to modernize its massive nuclear arsenal (3,800+ warheads) to respond to China’s moves.

China’s next generation of nuclear missile submarines, the Type 096, and an advanced new missile they are expected to carry would be able to target the U.S. from China’s shores, thereby reducing the risk that they might be spotted in advance.

A recent Pentagon report indicated that China has built silos south of Mongolia that may be intended for the development of new, solid-fuelled intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and may also be constructing new silos in Henan province for its liquid-fuelled missiles.

During the Cold War, the U.S. faced a sole nuclear challenge from the Soviet Union — a threat that was managed strategically by a combination of arms-control agreements and diplomatic tactics of detente until president Ronald Reagan forced the issue with a massive military expansion and direct challenges to the lack of liberty and freedom in the U.S.S.R. The sclerotic leadership in Moscow and the stagnating Soviet economy ultimately collapsed. Even with an economy less than that of Canada — US$1.66 trillion GDP versus US$1.71 trillion in 2018 — Russia under Vladimir Putin still poses a real nuclear threat, especially if it could strike a modus vivendi with China.

U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has signalled that the U.S. is pursuing a new arms-control approach trying to establish a broad “framework” agreement with Russia while endeavouring to bring China on board later. (Pompeo had been similarly optimistic about negotiations with North Korea, but that bizarre initiative now seems sidetracked.)

China has shown no inclination to negotiate. Unlike Russia (or the Soviet Union), China’s economy is expanding. While its leaders are as authoritarian as those in Moscow, they are determined and confident that their economy will soon surpass that of the United States. They have the wind at their back.

China has shown no inclination to negotiate
Some analysts suggest that the failure of arms control — the Russians cancelled the IRNF (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces) treaty, long before Trump was elected — necessitates an incremental step of “arms racing.” One option would be to put nuclear warheads on hypersonic missiles. The U.S. is already trying to counter a Russian force that has retained, modernized and produced so many low-yield nuclear weapons that they reportedly outnumber the U.S. by a margin of eight to one. Russia has repeatedly rejected any attempt to negotiate arms controls for low-yield nuclear weapons. China is almost certain to follow a similar path.

Shifting ground and maritime hypersonic missiles to a dual-use design could arguably give the U.S. leverage and flexibility for future arms-control efforts. As Alan Cummings noted in the Texas National Security Review, “Statecraft remains the preferred solution but the U.S. should back its diplomats with the right military tools so that they can navigate today’s competitive environment and shape the future of European and Pacific deterrence.”

Arms-control negotiations may, of course, succeed. Some contend that the huge interdependence of economic links between the U.S. and China is a compelling reason to avoid nuclear confrontation. But, faced with what is an unprecedented and growing dual threat, the U.S. should intensify relations and counterweights, nurturing in select cases a nuclear capability with regional allies like Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore and possibly India, which is already a nuclear power. Each of them is vulnerable to the expanding nuclear threat from China and Russia. Given Trump’s instinctive allergy to alliance leadership or cohesion, this option may be more appealing to Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden.

Alternatively, the U.S. could try to drive a wedge between China and Russia on the theory that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” — a tactic used effectively by president Richard Nixon when he opened high-level contact with Beijing. However, when dealing with authoritarian dictatorships, this option has more inherent risk than advantage. A necessary degree of trust could prove elusive.

Because our military is bloated and top-heavy with personnel and grossly mismanaged on equipment purchases, Canada does not factor into any serious calibration of global security threats. Besides, our relations with both China and Russia are in the deep freeze, lacking avenues for any constructive dialogue. We are obliged to nestle under the U.S. nuclear umbrella whether we like it or not and whether or not it ultimately proves tenable. One initiative Canada should consider urgently is the negotiation of a partnership in the U.S. anti-ballistic missile system. That would at least give us a say on our own defence.

The resurgence of great power rivalry is a geopolitical reality although some dimensions are not clear cut. It is already a mindset Russia and China have embraced, one that is guiding their approach to nuclear modernization. For Russia, it is a craving for lost respect. For China, it is a matter of destiny. They share a mutual desire to unseat the U.S. from its position as the world’s sole superpower.

Given the ebb and flow of economic and military strengths evolving among the major global powers, the prospect for global stability is fraught with complexity. (Nuisance, mini-nuclear states like North Korea and Iran present additional question marks.) Maintaining a sensible equilibrium in these precarious circumstances will be the top challenge confronting whoever wins the U.S presidency in November.

Derek H. Burney is the co-author of “Braver Canada: Shaping Our Destiny in a Precarious World,” published by McGill-Queen’s in 2020.

More On This Topic
A police officer stands in front of the U.S. Consulate in Chengdu, China, on July 26, 2020. The closure of the consulate is the latest escalation in tensions between the world’s two biggest economies, a move announced after the Trump administration ordered the shuttering of the Chinese consulate in Houston, Texas. Derek H. Burney: This clash of the titans shows no signs of easing
The United Nations Security Council in New York. Derek H. Burney: Rethinking our place in the world
 

jward

passin' thru
Trump administration orders assessment on bolstering nuclear warheads as talks with Russia stall
U.S. diplomats are trying to play hardball with Russia in negotiations over whether to extend New START.
Marshall Billingslea



U.S. arms control envoy Marshall Billingslea speaks at a press conference. | Thomas Kronsteiner/Getty Images
By DANIEL LIPPMAN, BRYAN BENDER and LARA SELIGMAN
09/28/2020 06:03 PM EDT



The Trump administration has asked the military to assess how quickly it could pull nuclear weapons out of storage and load them onto bombers and submarines if an arms control treaty with Russia is allowed to expire in February, according to three people familiar with the discussions.

The request to U.S. Strategic Command in Nebraska is part of a strategy to pressure Moscow into renegotiating the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty before the U.S. presidential election, the people said.
In making the request, the Trump administration wants to underscore that it is serious about letting the treaty lapse if Russia fails to meet U.S. demands. The negotiating team is leery that Russia is dragging out the talks in the hope that Joe Biden — who has pledged to extend New START under what Moscow believes will be more favorable terms than what this White House is offering — wins the election.

“It’s a clear signal that the costs for not negotiating before the election are going to go up,” said one of the people, who requested anonymity to relay sensitive discussions. The Trump administration is “trying to create an incentive, and it’s a real incentive, for the Russians to sit down and actually negotiate.”
The request for the assessment came in the last two weeks from a group of officials at the National Security Council and State, Defense and Energy departments that’s supporting Ambassador Marshall Billingslea in negotiations with Moscow to try to replace New START before it runs out in February.
The assessment will determine how long it would take to load nuclear weapons now in reserve onto long-range bombers, ballistic missile submarines and land-based silos to beef up the U.S. nuclear force in the event Russia increases its arsenal.
It comes as Billingslea has publicly raised the possibility of putting more weapons on bombers and submarines if New START lapses and has sharpened his rhetoric in recent days to try to secure more concessions from the Russians.
“It would certainly be a question that you would want to ask STRATCOM,” said retired Air Force Lt. Gen. Frank Klotz, who oversaw nuclear forces before serving as head of the DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration. “You would want to fully understand all the possible implications of your negotiating approach, both if it should succeed or, alternatively, if it should fail."
But former senior arms control and military officials also consider the move a risky gambit. It could send a message that the Trump administration, which has already pulled out of two other nuclear-related treaties with Russia, is no longer interested in any limits on the world’s largest arsenals. And it could goad the Russians into taking similar steps.


“I call that megaphone diplomacy,” said Rose Gottemoeller, who served as deputy secretary general of NATO until last year and negotiated New START when she was at the State Department. “Do we want to end up in a less stable place? Because we would be nuclear arms racing.”
“It’s very stupid,” added a former GOP arms control official who declined to be identified because he still advises the government. “It makes absolutely no sense to threaten to upload. It becomes a valid leveraging point only if the other side can’t do it. The Russians can do it, too.”

“But more importantly,” this person added, “the systems we have deployed today are the ones we believe are necessary to provide an adequate deterrent. There is no obvious reason and every reason not to in the absence of a change in the threat. It’s not going to scare the Russians. The likelihood of success with the Russians is about nil."
A State Department spokesperson declined to comment on Billingslea's behalf.
Capt. Bill Clinton, a spokesperson for Strategic Command, declined to address the military’s role in the deliberations. “We don’t talk about future operations, and really can’t speculate on arms control talks (as that is not [our] responsibility),” he wrote in an email.

An NSC spokesperson declined to comment.
New START, signed in 2010, mandated both sides draw down to 1,550 deployed strategic weapons and includes provisions to verify compliance, including reciprocal on-site inspections of nuclear bases.
The pact is set to expire on Feb. 5 unless both sides agree to an extension for up to five years.
Russia in December offered to extend the treaty without preconditions. The position of the Trump administration, which withdrew from both the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces and the Open Skies treaties, has been that New START is too narrow and a replacement is needed that covers more classes of weapons, such as “tactical” or battlefield nuclear weapons.

At the outset of negotiations in June, the U.S. also insisted that China be party to any new agreement, but dropped that demand after Beijing balked.
The U.S. negotiating team has insisted on a number of Russian concessions: a commitment to follow-on talks about a new arms deal that includes all U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons; a pledge to eventually bring in China, which is projected to double its relatively small nuclear arsenal in the next decade; and strong compliance measures.
Billingslea’s current public negotiating position is that the U.S. and Russia must agree on at least the outlines of a new framework that both Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin can sign in order for Washington to consider extending New START.

Asked in an interview published last week by a Russian newspaper if the Trump administration would scrap the treaty if the two sides can’t agree on such a “presidential agreement,” Billingslea responded, “absolutely.”
“In such a situation, we will not extend the treaty,” he told Kommersant, according to an English translation of the interview. “Given all the deficiencies of New START, we consider it disadvantageous to the United States. It imposes constraints on the United States that it does not impose on Russia.”

In the same interview, Billingslea also indicated that the United States would take steps to increase the number of its deployed nuclear warheads if the pact is not extended.
“If that doesn’t happen, we will simply reconvert our weapons as soon as the treaty expires in February,” he told the newspaper.
Billingslea also said that the longer the Russians delay, the less attractive it would be for Moscow.
“I suspect that after President Trump wins reelection, if Russia has not taken up our offer, that the price of admission, as we would say in the U.S., goes up,” he said.
Billinglea has previously also threatened that the U.S. could spend Russia, as well as China, “into oblivion” in a nuclear arms race.
Already, the U.S. and Russia have a much larger number of weapons in storage that could be placed on alert if they decided to take that course.

According to the Federation of American Scientists’ Nuclear Security Project, which tracks global inventories of atomic arms, the U.S. has 3,800 warheads stockpiled, while Russia has 4,310.
Some in reserve could be made ready to deploy more quickly than others, according to Hans Kristensen, director of FAS’ Nuclear Security Project.
Of the three legs of the nuclear triad — bombers, submarines and missile silos — the quickest would be the bombers.
“Those weapons are just a few hundred yards from the aircraft,” Kristensen said. “They could be loaded in days. Others would have to be transported to the bases. Maybe a week or so.”
Next would be the fleet of Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines, beginning with those already in port and the rest when they return from deployment

Finally, there are the intercontinental ballistic missiles deployed in underground silos at bases in North Dakota, Wyoming and Montana.
“The slowest leg would be the ICBMs,” Kristensen said. “They only have so much capacity to do that. That’s a very slow process. That would take a long time for 400 silos. Many months.”
Both the ICBMs and the subs currently carry only one nuclear warhead on each missile, but they are designed to carry more.

If the U.S. decides to upload all of its reserve force, “it would more than double the deployed force,” Kristensen added. “The question of course is why.”
To the Trump administration, the STRATCOM assessment is necessary to be prepared for the treaty to expire, but also to strengthen its hand with the Russians.
“I think there’s an element of, ‘the Russians might not make a deal, we need to be ready,’" said a former White House official who is one of the three people familiar with negotiations. “The administration is planning on what to do the day after. They want to be ready, but being ready doesn’t actually mean that they will."

“We don’t just want to rubber stamp New START, so we need to start doing some prudent planning to see what other options there are,” the first person familiar with the discussions added. “They’re getting ready with options to raise the price.”
But at what cost, asked a number of veterans of nuclear negotiations who said they were alarmed at the administration’s strategy.
Gottemoeller, who is now a research fellow at the conservative Hoover Institution at Stanford University, expressed concern the approach could merely increase the chances of a new arms race if New START expires.
“We can upload,” she said, referring to the U.S. reserve nuclear stockpile. “But the Russians can upload, too. I would argue they could get a jump on us.”

Klotz, who also served as defense attaché in Moscow during previous arms control negotiations and is now an analyst at the government-funded Rand Corporation, agreed.
“It's my personal view that the United States might initially be at a disadvantage,” he said. “The Russian nuclear modernization program is already well underway, while the U.S. program is still in its very early stages. Moreover, the systems the Russians have developed generally have the ability to carry more warheads than analogous U.S. systems.”
The Trump administration, he added, “rather glibly says, ‘we'll spend you into oblivion’ in any potential nuclear arms race. But wouldn’t it be far better to avoid getting into that situation in the first place, especially when there are so many other capabilities our military needs?”
Kristensen, of the Federation of American Scientists, said the prospect of setting off a new competition to increase the two sides’ arsenals “only underscores the need to keep New START to keep those numbers in check.”
“Without it you don’t really know where you are going.”

posted for fair use
 

northern watch

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  1. Full Comment
Derek H. Burney: 'Watershed moment': U.S. facing dual nuclear threats from China and Russia
For its part, Canada should urgently consider the negotiation of a partnership in the U.S. anti-ballistic missile system

Author of the article:
National Post & Derek H. Burney
Publishing date:
Sep 28, 2020 • • 5 minute read

U.S.-China relations are reaching new levels of acrimony and concern. On the campaign circuit, President Donald Trump blames China exclusively and persistently for the dire economic fallout from what he calls the “China virus.” China’s U.N. ambassador fired back on the latest salvos, saying “Enough is enough. You have created enough troubles for the world already.” The rancorous public exchanges between the two governments are troubling and reveal deep strains in the relationship that extend well beyond the pandemic. In fact, the most deep-seated threat today is on the military front.

China is rapidly expanding the scope and scale of its land, maritime and air power. Artificial islands being constructed illegally in the South China Sea are intended to ensure China’s air and surface dominance and to undermine America’s role as a regional security partner.

Even more ominous is China’s increasing nuclear weapons capability. Admiral Charles Richard, Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command and responsible for the U.S.’s nuclear arsenal, reported to Congress earlier this month that, while China’s nuclear capability is modest with a little more than 200 nuclear warheads, it is expected to double this decade. He added pointedly that “China now has the capability to directly threaten our homeland from a ballistic missile submarine. That’s a pretty watershed moment.”


The direst warning from Admiral Richard was that “China is on a trajectory to be a strategic peer to us by the end of the decade. So, for the first time ever the U.S. is going to face two, peer capable nuclear competitors (Russia and China) who are different, who you have to deter differently. We have never faced that before.” He emphasized that there was no margin of error for the U.S. to modernize its massive nuclear arsenal (3,800+ warheads) to respond to China’s moves.

China’s next generation of nuclear missile submarines, the Type 096, and an advanced new missile they are expected to carry would be able to target the U.S. from China’s shores, thereby reducing the risk that they might be spotted in advance.

A recent Pentagon report indicated that China has built silos south of Mongolia that may be intended for the development of new, solid-fuelled intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and may also be constructing new silos in Henan province for its liquid-fuelled missiles.

During the Cold War, the U.S. faced a sole nuclear challenge from the Soviet Union — a threat that was managed strategically by a combination of arms-control agreements and diplomatic tactics of detente until president Ronald Reagan forced the issue with a massive military expansion and direct challenges to the lack of liberty and freedom in the U.S.S.R. The sclerotic leadership in Moscow and the stagnating Soviet economy ultimately collapsed. Even with an economy less than that of Canada — US$1.66 trillion GDP versus US$1.71 trillion in 2018 — Russia under Vladimir Putin still poses a real nuclear threat, especially if it could strike a modus vivendi with China.

U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has signalled that the U.S. is pursuing a new arms-control approach trying to establish a broad “framework” agreement with Russia while endeavouring to bring China on board later. (Pompeo had been similarly optimistic about negotiations with North Korea, but that bizarre initiative now seems sidetracked.)

China has shown no inclination to negotiate. Unlike Russia (or the Soviet Union), China’s economy is expanding. While its leaders are as authoritarian as those in Moscow, they are determined and confident that their economy will soon surpass that of the United States. They have the wind at their back.


Some analysts suggest that the failure of arms control — the Russians cancelled the IRNF (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces) treaty, long before Trump was elected — necessitates an incremental step of “arms racing.” One option would be to put nuclear warheads on hypersonic missiles. The U.S. is already trying to counter a Russian force that has retained, modernized and produced so many low-yield nuclear weapons that they reportedly outnumber the U.S. by a margin of eight to one. Russia has repeatedly rejected any attempt to negotiate arms controls for low-yield nuclear weapons. China is almost certain to follow a similar path.

Shifting ground and maritime hypersonic missiles to a dual-use design could arguably give the U.S. leverage and flexibility for future arms-control efforts. As Alan Cummings noted in the Texas National Security Review, “Statecraft remains the preferred solution but the U.S. should back its diplomats with the right military tools so that they can navigate today’s competitive environment and shape the future of European and Pacific deterrence.”

Arms-control negotiations may, of course, succeed. Some contend that the huge interdependence of economic links between the U.S. and China is a compelling reason to avoid nuclear confrontation. But, faced with what is an unprecedented and growing dual threat, the U.S. should intensify relations and counterweights, nurturing in select cases a nuclear capability with regional allies like Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore and possibly India, which is already a nuclear power. Each of them is vulnerable to the expanding nuclear threat from China and Russia. Given Trump’s instinctive allergy to alliance leadership or cohesion, this option may be more appealing to Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden.

Alternatively, the U.S. could try to drive a wedge between China and Russia on the theory that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” — a tactic used effectively by president Richard Nixon when he opened high-level contact with Beijing. However, when dealing with authoritarian dictatorships, this option has more inherent risk than advantage. A necessary degree of trust could prove elusive.

Because our military is bloated and top-heavy with personnel and grossly mismanaged on equipment purchases, Canada does not factor into any serious calibration of global security threats. Besides, our relations with both China and Russia are in the deep freeze, lacking avenues for any constructive dialogue. We are obliged to nestle under the U.S. nuclear umbrella whether we like it or not and whether or not it ultimately proves tenable. One initiative Canada should consider urgently is the negotiation of a partnership in the U.S. anti-ballistic missile system. That would at least give us a say on our own defence.

The resurgence of great power rivalry is a geopolitical reality although some dimensions are not clear cut. It is already a mindset Russia and China have embraced, one that is guiding their approach to nuclear modernization. For Russia, it is a craving for lost respect. For China, it is a matter of destiny. They share a mutual desire to unseat the U.S. from its position as the world’s sole superpower.

Given the ebb and flow of economic and military strengths evolving among the major global powers, the prospect for global stability is fraught with complexity. (Nuisance, mini-nuclear states like North Korea and Iran present additional question marks.) Maintaining a sensible equilibrium in these precarious circumstances will be the top challenge confronting whoever wins the U.S presidency in November.

Derek H. Burney is the co-author of “Braver Canada: Shaping Our Destiny in a Precarious World,” published by McGill-Queen’s in 2020.

More On This Topic
A police officer stands in front of the U.S. Consulate in Chengdu, China, on July 26, 2020. The closure of the consulate is the latest escalation in tensions between the world’s two biggest economies, a move announced after the Trump administration ordered the shuttering of the Chinese consulate in Houston, Texas. Derek H. Burney: This clash of the titans shows no signs of easing
The United Nations Security Council in New York. Derek H. Burney: Rethinking our place in the world

With Trudeau in power, there is no way Canada will be involved in any anti-ballistic missile system
 

jward

passin' thru
Chinese National Sentenced for Laundering Millions for Mexican Drug Cartels
September 29, 2020

ALEXANDRIA, Va. – A Chinese national was sentenced today to five years in prison and ordered to forfeit more than $4.2 million for laundering drug proceeds generated by large-scale cocaine trafficking in the United States.
According to court documents, Xueyong Wu, 40, cultivated relationships with Latin American drug trafficking organizations to transport and launder their United States-based drug proceeds. Much of this money was repatriated to Mexico through a complex series of international financial transactions. Wu received a percentage of the money involved in these transactions as compensation for organizing these laundering activities. Much of this money was generated through movement of cocaine or payment for cocaine that took place within the Eastern District of Virginia.

G. Zachary Terwilliger, U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia; Wendy C. Woolcock, Special Agent in Charge for the Drug Enforcement Administration’s (DEA) Special Operations Division; Jeffrey T. Scott, Special Agent in Charge of DEA’s Louisville, Kentucky Field Division; Jason Crosby, Chief of the Criminal Investigations Division of the U.S. Department of State’s Diplomatic Security Service (DSS); and James Gibbons, Special Agent in Charge of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) Chicago, Illinois made the announcement after sentencing by U.S. District Judge Leonie M. Brinkema.

Assistant U.S. Attorneys Michael P. Ben’Ary and David A. Peters, along with Trial Attorneys Steve Sola and Kerry Blackburn of the Justice Department Criminal Division’s Money Laundering and Asset Recovery Section prosecuted the case.
A copy of this press release is located on the website of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Virginia. Related court documents and information are located on the website of the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia or on PACER by searching for Case No. 1:20-cr-15.

posted for fair use
 

jward

passin' thru
Caucasus crisis puts Iran on high alert


Azerbaijan-Armenia clashes have potential grave implications for neighboring Iran if they escalate into a big power proxy war

by Kaveh Afrasiabi September 29, 2020

Iran-Border-Guards.jpg

Iranian security forces on the border with Azerbaijan, September 27, 2020. Image: Twitter



After years of an inconclusive cease-fire punctured with occasional flare-ups, the Azerbaijan-Armenia stand-off over the disputed Nagorno Karabakh territory and its adjacent areas has in recent days turned into an inter-state military conflict with potentially destabilizing implications.
Gone are the previous optimistic predictions that pragmatism and outside mediation, particularly the so-called Minsk Process led by Russia, the United States and France, could yield a peaceful resolution to a vexing ethnic and territorial dispute rooted in history.
The recent flare-up has put Iran, a regional power that shares a land border with both warring parties, on high alert. Turkey also shares a border with both Azerbaijan and Armenia.
Seeking to finally reverse the early 1990s military defeat that wrested away some 20% of Azerbaijan’s UN-recognized territory, Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliyev has characterized his country’s military offensive as a campaign that “will end the occupation that has lasted for nearly 30 years.”
But given the difficult mountainous terrain and the Armenians’ military resources backed by Russia, chances are that Baku will fall short of that military objective and instead may have to settle for incremental advances to be utilized as leverage for a next round of negotiations.


001_8QV9GK_JPEG.jpg

Iran’s Azeri minority

Significantly, Tehran has offered to mediate between Baku and Yerevan. Although Iran has good neighborly ties with both Armenia and Azerbaijan, it has been accused by Azerbaijan of taking Armenia’s side in the past, partly because of Baku’s pro-NATO stance and its cozy relations with Israel, which has equipped Armenia with drones and other hardware.
An Azerbaijan victory in the current war may in fact result in the enlargement of the Iran-Azerbaijan border by approximately 130 kilometers.
But given Iran’s still fresh memory of the Azeri-led irredentist pressure of the 1990s, advanced through the discourse of a “widening Azerbaijan” encompassing parts of Iran, it is not in Iran’s national security interests to deal with an empowered and potentially menacing neighbor to its north in cohort with its arch-nemesis Israel.
That’s all the more true now that Israel has inserted itself in the Persian Gulf security calculus through its recent successful normalization of ties with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain.
Given its sizable Iranian-Azeri minority, comprising a quarter of the population, Iran is careful not to damage sensitive relations with neighboring Azerbaijan, which unlike Armenia has refused to join the Russian-dominated Eurasia Economic Union (EEU). Iran has signed a free trade agreement with the EEU.

Both Russia and Iran are concerned that Azerbaijan “can become a NATO outpost in the Caspian in the future, especially if it can defeat and dominate its neighbor Armenia,” according to a Tehran political science professor who wishes to remain anonymous.
For now, Iran’s main worry is a spill-over of the conflict into its territory, new waves of refugees and other unwanted consequences of a brewing war that bodes ill for regional stability. The Tehran professor predicts a “spirited effort” by Iran in coordination with Russia, Europe and the UN to bring peace quickly to South Caucasus.
Yet so far Iran’s call for an immediate cease-fire has fallen on deaf ears.
000_8QW4QY.jpg

An image grab from a video on the official website of the Azerbaijani Defence Ministry on September 28, 2020, allegedly shows Azeri artillery firing towards the positions of Armenian separatists in the breakaway region of Nagorno-Karabakh.
Pipelines in play

The timing of the new conflict, coinciding with the impending operationalization of much-anticipated energy pipelines running from gas-rich Azerbaijan to Europe through Georgia, gives it an international dimension wrought with geo-economic and geopolitical ramifications.
The pipelines, which bypass Russia and Iran, are meant to reduce Europe’s energy dependence on Moscow in sight of US sanctions on Russia over the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline to Germany.

Speculation is rife that Putin, already unhappy with perceived US and European meddling in Belarus, has struck back through Armenia.
The country can easily shell the critical infrastructure in the narrow Tovus land strip where more than 80% of Azeri energy travels through the pipelines of the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyahn oil pipeline, the South Caucasus Natural Gas pipeline, as well as the Baku-Tblisi-Kars railway.
At the same time, Moscow has ordered a massive military exercise in the Caspian and Black Sea regions with the participation of the Chinese and Iranian navies, thus sending a clear signal to the West that it still considers the Caucasus as its natural sphere of influence.
Inevitably, this will introduce new thorns in Russia’s already prickly relations with Turkey, which solidly backs Baku in its current bid to regain the Armenian-controlled territory.
Stalemated negotiation

So far there is insufficient international will to douse the flames engulfing the South Caucasus, notwithstanding the distractions caused by the pandemic and the divergent paths of the US and France over how to handle Iran and Lebanon.

There is also Russia’s determination to make the US pay for its opposition to Nord Stream 2, and Iran’s growing concerns about Israel’s perceived security encroachment. From Tehran’s perspective, Israel is no longer an “out of area” adversary irrelevant to Iran’s national security calculus.
The only viable path for peace in South Caucasus is at the negotiation table, in line with the four UN resolutions on Nagorno-Karabakh and the Minsk Group’s peace proposal. Those have called for the restoration of Baku’s sovereignty over Nagorno Karabakh, respect for the rights of Armenians inhabiting the disputed territory, the return of mass refugees and the creation of a land corridor to Armenia.
Hypothetically speaking, Nagorno Karabakh can become another autonomous enclave similar to Nakhchivan, located between Armenia and northwestern Iran. Nakhchivan was a part of Iran until the Treaty of Turkmanchay in 1828 that awarded it to Russia after Iran’s military defeat.
It’s unclear if local Karabakh Armenians, who look more to the Kosovo model in the Balkans in their current aspiration for complete independence from Azerbaijan, will consent to the re-imposition of Baku’s authoritarian control.
So far, no one in the international community including Iran has recognized the Kosovo-like efforts of Armenians in Nagorno Karabakh, leading but to one conclusion: the unstable status quo must change sooner or later, and it can come about only through concerted international efforts such as the dispatch of a peacekeeping force, which is so far missing.

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Housecarl

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Hummm.....Recall SEATO anyone?

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China's military might, aggressive policies spur talks of creating 'Asian NATO'

By Guy Taylor - The Washington Times - Sunday, September 27, 2020

China’s growing military prowess and increasingly aggressive foreign policy have revived talk among U.S. and European officials of creating an “Asian NATO” of regional powers to contain communist Beijing’s expansionist ambitions.

Past efforts for an East Asian security alliance, such as the post-World War II Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) to guard against Cold War-era communism, failed to gain lasting traction.

But that was before China’s emergence as a rising superpower — a reality NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg has said is “fundamentally shifting the global balance of power” in ways should motivate NATO itself to “become more global.”

Quietly, Trump administration officials have gone further. Deputy Secretary of State Stephen E. Biegun recently suggested that the informal defense alignment between the U.S., Japan, Australia and India already known as the Quad could be the beginning of a NATO-style alliance in Asia.

“It’s something that I think in the second term of the Trump administration or, were the president not to win, the first term of the next president, it could be something that would be very much worthwhile to be explored,” Mr. Biegun said at a U.S.-India strategic dialogue on Aug. 31.

Senior officials from the four powers — all of which had tense recent relations with China — held another virtual meeting on Friday, Indian newspapers reported. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs said the four countries called for a “free, open, prosperous and inclusive” Indo-Pacific region based on shared valued and respect for international law.

Mr. Biegun said last month that the Asian NATO would be about more than simply countering China, and could focus on broadly coordinating militaries and economies of the region’s smaller nations around a rules-based value system.

“It is a reality that the Indo-Pacific region is actually lacking in strong multilateral structures. They don’t have anything of the fortitude of NATO or the European Union. The strongest institutions in Asia oftentimes are not inclusive enough,” Mr. Biegun said. “There is certainly an invitation there at some point to formalize a structure like this.”


The comments quickly spurred debate among proposed alliance members. Some argue the Quad — a strategic forum first initiated back in 2007 by then-Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and later embraced by the Trump administration as part of its 2017 Indo-Pacific strategy — is ripe for expansion given China’s recent troubling behavior.



The catch is that the Quad, while stepping up joint military exercises in recent years, has struggled since its inception by the hesitation of some members that a more formal Asian NATO would anger China and result in a punitive economic backlash from Beijing. But as China’s military and economic muscle expand, that fear may be fading.


“One country or another at one time or another has been worried about antagonizing China,” said Michael Kugelman, deputy director of the Asia program at the Wilson Center.


“But things are different now,” he added. “The Quad really has legs at this point and I think that’s because there’s a growing consensus among the Quad countries, as well as other nations in the region, that China’s activities there are not only aggressive, but increasingly threatening to global stability.”


Apart from the construction of military bases on artificial islands in disputed areas of the South China Sea, Beijing’s use of so-called “Wolf Warrior” diplomacy in recent years has angered and unnerved its neighbors, Mr. Kugelman argued. The practice, which got its name from the Rambo-style Chinese-action movie “Wolf Warrior,” often sees Chinese officials in Australia, India and Japan sharply denouncing officials and institutions in those nations who criticize China.


Dramatic departure


It’s been a dramatic departure from the past when Beijing kept a low diplomatic profile sought to avoid confrontation internationally.



“This use of ‘Wolf Warrior’ diplomacy has been a trigger for new momentum behind the Quad,” said Mr. Kugelman, although he cautioned that Washington is still likely to encounter challenges trying to build a full-fledged NATO collective security alliance. That’s true even though India, a key target of the alliance idea, came close to a shooting war with China in a border clash earlier this year that has still not been resolved.


New Delhi traditionally has resisted participating in such formal alliances, even with powerful and like-minded democracies such as the United States. “The U.S. and India have a strong security partnership, but the Indians continue to want to play this role of the strategic independent actor,” said Mr. Kugelman.


Daniel S. Markey, a former State Department official now at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, said in an interview that while India may be “eager to work to push back against China,” it seeks to do so “only on its own terms.”


“U.S. policymakers are now well-aware that the ‘ally’ language doesn’t get a good reception in New Delhi, so turning the Quad into a new NATO-like institution is, at least for the near future, a nonstarter,” said Mr. Markey, although he acknowledged that recent Chinese actions internationally could create an opening for Washington.


The clash in the Himalayas, China’s expansive sovereignty claims in the South China Sea, and the crackdown on pro-democracy protesters in Hong Kong “may be shifting attitudes in India” in a manner that “makes the American job of convincing Indians that China is a threat easier.”


The Indian Embassy in Washington, D.C., did not respond to a request for comment. However, one Indo-Pacific source familiar with India’s position told The Washington Times on condition of anonymity that China’s Himalayan aggression — as well as U.S. offers to help India respond to it — have given New Delhi renewed incentive to coordinate with the Quad.


But the source stressed that India remains staunchly against formal participation in any security alliance that’s focused on countering China militarily. “To talk about an Asian NATO is definitely jumping the gun,” the source said, “because it puts out a narrative of a military grouping, which Delhi is against.”



India in 2017 even agreed to join the Shanghai Cooperations Organization (SCO), a loose confederation that China has pushed as an alternative security alliance to coordinate military and anti-terrorism policies in Asia.


China itself has sent conflicting signals about the fear that the U.S. and its main Asian allies are moving toward a more formal alliance to contain Beijing’s rise, according to a survey by Joel Wuthnow, a senior research fellow in the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs at National Defense University in the journal Strategic Forum.


Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in March 2018 compared reports that the Quad was attempting to “contain” China to “sea foam in the Pacific or Indian oceans” that would soon wash away because “stoking a new Cold War is out of sync with the times and inciting bloc confrontation will find no market.”


But other Chinese strategists take it as a matter of course that U.S. “Indo-Pacific” policy is aimed first and foremost at preventing China from challenging the U.S. as a global superpower.


“Chinese interpretations of U.S. strategy in Asia as a containment plot are deeply rooted and have persisted across recent U.S. strategic adjustments, including the rebalance to Asia,” Mr. Wuthnow wrote.


‘America First’


Some remain skeptical that the Trump administration is serious about promoting the sort of multilateralism that an expanded Quad effort may entail, noting Mr. Trump’s own touchy relations with the original NATO and his complaints the European allies have failed to pay their fair share of the collective defense costs.


As part of its “America First” foreign policy, the administration has put particular pressure on South Korea, a potential player in an expanded Quad, as well as Japan, two nations that collectively house more than 80,000 U.S. troops.



“I see the Trump brand of ‘America First’ as toxic to advancing serious cooperation,” said Patrick Cronin, the Asia-Pacific security chair at the Hudson Institute in Washington, who says a more modest approach might be best.


“Bulking up” the Quad by “adding coalition partners for specific tasks, such as maritime situational awareness or cybersecurity, seems like a logical next step to advance cooperation without expecting the impossible,” Mr. Cronin said. “This is also something that could be sustained in a Biden administration.”


David Maxwell, a retired U.S. Special Forces Colonel and East Asia expert with the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, said China’s “aggressive behavior” may be fueling talk of an Asian NATO but U.S. policy under Mr. Trump is undercutting the momentum.


“The U.S. is behind the eight ball so to speak and I fear we will squander an opportunity,” said Mr. Maxwell. Despite Mr. Biegun’s recent comments, the Trump administration’s “shift from an interest-, values- and strategy-based alliance philosophy to a transactional foundation undermines U.S. credibility.”


“The time is ripe,” Mr. Maxwell said, “[but] we may have missed the opportunity because of the current alliance and economic world views of the administration.”


Short of an Asia NATO, some have talked of a so-called “Quad Plus” grouping of nations, anchored around non-military initiatives such as infrastructure financing support from the U.S., Japan, Australia and others with the goal of countering China’s vastly ambitious “Belt and Road “overseas investment program under President Xi Jinping.


Mr. Maxwell pointed to the establishment of the so-called “Blue Dot Network,” which the U.S., Japan and Australia announced last year, aimed at assessing and certifying infrastructure development projects in Indo-Pacific and beyond. The newly created Economic Prosperity Network, which the Trump administration has pushed in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic to reduce global supply chain reliance on China, may also be a foundation for expanding the Quad along non-military lines.



“Paradoxically,” Mr. Maxwell said, the pursuit of a Quad Plus paradigm through such initiatives “might provide a foundation for a Biden foreign policy structure in Asia should he be elected.”


“If Trump is reelected, I hope his national security team can convince him to drop his transactional alliance philosophy, because there is a great opportunity to invest in security and economic prosperity in Asia given Chinese actions,” he said.


Mr. Kugelman said that “the big question is: How do you put more meat on the bones of the Quad” in a way that can draw in smaller nations, particularly in Southeast Asia?


“Southeast Asian countries are in a tough spot right now because, despite their fears of Chinese dominance, they still want to be able to look to Beijing for economic support, particularly with regard to infrastructure, while at the same time depending on the security umbrella of the United States,” Mr. Kugelman said.


“If the U.S. gets its act together and is able to step things up as a big player in the infrastructure game, nations in the region might be more willing to enter into something like an expanded Quad.”

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Housecarl

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Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons: The Kremlin’s Wild Card
Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 17 Issue: 135
By: Pavel Luzin


September 29, 2020 05:11 PM Age: 1 day

A recent interview in Kommersant with Marshall Billingslea, the special presidential envoy for arms control who represents the United States in negotiations with Russia on the extension of the New START strategic nuclear weapons treaty (Kommersant, September 21; see EDM, September 24), highlighted a key omission in the current round of bilateral arms control talks—the issue of non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW). No international agreement covers NSNW; and for many years, Russia has adhered to the principle that it would not discuss “tactical” warheads so long as US B-61 nuclear gravity bombs remained deployed in Europe. Two primary political considerations underly Moscow’s approach: 1) the asymmetry between total and operational numbers of Russian NSNW and 2) Russia’s efforts to reassign forces responsible for NSNW strikes to instead take on strategic nuclear deterrence and/or conventional power-projection missions.

Russia’s recently adopted “Foundations of Russian Federation State Policy on Nuclear Deterrence” pointedly does not differentiate between strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons (Kremlin.ru, June 2; see EDM, June 4). Yet NSNW is mentioned explicitly in article 37 of the less-known 2017 “Foundations of Russian Federation State Policy on Naval Affairs Until 2030” (Kremlin.ru, July 20, 2017). The latter document clarifies that, in case of conflict escalation, a demonstrative readiness to resort to military force using non-strategic nuclear weapons would be an effective deterrence measure. Put more simply, Moscow is prepared to engage in first use of NSNW in a conventional conflict. Even though such a demonstrative, first-use nuclear strike would be unlikely to cause significant or decisive damage, the explosion would aim to demoralize the adversary.

The most common expert estimates of the size of Russia’s current arsenal of NSNW vary widely: from 860–1,040 (Rusi.org, November 7, 2012) to nearly 2,000 warheads (Carnegie.ru, March 4, 2011; Tandfonline.com, March 9, 2020). However, NSNW is useless without working delivery systems, and here the perceived importance of the Russian stockpile begins to change completely. Over the past three decades, the number of such delivery systems has decreased. Many were retired, including some types of guided-missile nuclear submarines, while others suffered from degrading technical reliability when assigned NSNW roles, such as Su-24 tactical bombers. At the same time, while Russia has been determinedly pressing forward with its efforts to develop conventional precision-strike weapons (see EDM, June 20, 2017, October 2, 2018, September 4, 2019), the numbers of newly developed dual-capable delivery systems in its inventory are significantly lower than in Soviet times.

Further exacerbating the situation is the fact that the infrastructure maintained by the 12th Main Directorate of the Ministry of Defense, which is responsible for controlling Russia’s strategic and non-strategic nuclear warheads, bombs and related assets, is limited. This infrastructure consists of 12 central storage bases and a number of special logistic and security units subordinated to these bases and deployed close to assigned nuclear weapons combat units. So even when a particular naval, ground or aerospace forces base operates dual-capable delivery systems, if it has no special 12th Main Directorate unit close by, that base is officially not assigned to handle nuclear (including NSNW) weapons at all. Therefore, taking all these above factors together, the actual number of Russia’s operational NSNW assets arguably does not exceed 520 (Riddle, May 1, 2018) and is projected to decline further this decade.

In the absence of sufficient available delivery systems, trained personnel and necessary logistical/operational infrastructure, whatever stockpiles of NSNW warheads may exist can only be used in theory, thus undermining their true battlefield significance. Consequently, Moscow is constrained in its ability to convert these weapons into tradable diplomatic capital. Their main value, thus, comes from exacerbating the West’s threat perceptions of Russia’s tactical nuclear arsenal in order to pressure the United States and Europe to reconsider one of the pillars of Transatlantic unity—the deployment of US nuclear weapons in Europe.

The second consideration for the Kremlin regarding NSNW relates to ongoing Russian efforts to reassign other roles to their delivery systems. These priorities are demonstrated by Russia’s rearmament programs for 2011–2020 and 2018–2027. For instance, the modernization of 30 Tu-22M3 bombers, heretofore partially assigned to NSNW missions, will permit the same planes to carry out long-range bombing runs thanks to a new aerial refueling capability as well as the installation of engines, electronics and possibly weapons already standard in Tu-160 long-range strategic bombers (Interfax, May 26). Here the nominal threshold between Russia’s strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons erodes. At the same time, Russia is retrofitting its long-range nuclear bombers to be able to carry out conventional operations: it used them in this way for the first time in Syria in 2015 (see EDM, November 20, 2015). In a similar vein, it is worth highlighting the ongoing modernization of the strategic missile-defense system around Moscow, which involves denuclearizing the associated interceptor missiles (AINonline, June 26, 2019). Taken together, these efforts are further limiting the numbers of dedicated NSNW delivery systems within the Russian Aerospace Forces.

The same phenomenon can be observed in the Military-Maritime Fleet (Voyenno-Мorskoi Flot—VMF). Russia is presently undergoing the challenging modernization of its 949A- (Oscar-II) and 971- (Akula) class guided-missile nuclear submarines. The aim is to make these vessels capable of conventional land-attack missions utilizing Kalibr and Oniks cruise missiles (Izvestia, April 28, 2017; TASS, August 25, 2020). Moscow wants to make its submarine forces more useful and flexible for conventional power-projection tasks in overseas operations as well as to decrease the role of NSNW in Russia’s naval planning. These weapons will thus be downgraded from tactical uses to a small number of exceptional purposes such as the nuclear de-escalation of conflicts (see above).

Russia’s deployment of dual-capable 9M729 (the land version of the Kalibr) ground-based long-range cruise missiles together with Iskander short-range ballistic missiles led to the collapse of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 2019. When equipped with conventional warheads, these missiles give Moscow offensive battlefield capabilities. However, the same missiles can be armed with low-yield, non-strategic nuclear warheads; and at that point, they become an important strategic deterrence tool against Russia’s regional neighbors in Europe and East Asia—at a cost that is significantly lower than intercontinental or submarine-launched ballistic missiles (ICBM, SLBM). So even though the number of operationally usable Russian NSNW warheads has been dropping, ongoing modernization of the Armed Forces has effectively been transforming these “tactical” weapons into an essential part of Russia’s nuclear deterrence strategy—a factor worth keeping in mind during New START negotiations with Moscow.
 

Housecarl

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Making the U.S. Military’s Counter-Terrorism Mission Sustainable

Stephen Tankel

September 28, 2020

Commentary

One of the many hallmarks of the Trump administration has been its capricious approach to troops deployments, especially ones related to counter-terrorism. President Donald Trump has zigged and zagged on whether to maintain troops in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, sometimes sending Pentagon planners scrambling to keep up. Over the weekend, his administration threatened to pull out U.S. forces from Iraq as a way to pressure the government there to rein in Iran-backed militia groups. Meanwhile, in the background, Defense Secretary Mark Esper has been conducting a review of each combatant command to ensure they have the right mix of personnel and resources to meet the 2018 National Defense Strategy’s priorities. The review has not been entirely devoid of drama. It advocates reducing the U.S. military footprint in Africa, a move that has engendered pushback from Congress and U.S. allies. One should not equate Trump’s manic demands, which appear driven almost entirely by electoral calculations, with Esper’s more sober review, but both highlight the challenges of reducing the military’s counter-terrorism mission.

The 2018 National Defense Strategy made a stark declaration, “Inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S. national security.” The military’s counter-terrorism mission is not going away, however, and likely will require attention, resources, and manpower for the foreseeable future. In addition to exerting ongoing pressure on terrorist organizations, American forces enable intelligence collection — especially in hostile environments — and provide the means to conduct swift action against individuals and networks involved in plotting, directing, or attempting to inspire attacks against the United States. A military counter-terrorism presence can facilitate activities conducted by civilian departments and agencies as well as make U.S. partners more effective. This is not an argument for maintaining the status quo, which appears unsustainable and disproportionately large relative to the current terrorist threat, but rather an affirmation that the military still has an important role to play in counter-terrorism. The issue at hand is, or should be, how to adjust this role relative to the terrorist threat and other U.S. priorities.

Two years after the publication of the National Defense Strategy, the Department of Defense is still working on how to rebalance its counter-terrorism mission in line with this new prioritization. One of the reasons it is struggling is that it lacks a rubric for doing so. Almost two decades after 9/11, the Pentagon still has not developed a comprehensive framework for balancing risks and resources when it comes to counter-terrorism. As I argued in a recent paper for the Center for a New American Security’s Next Defense Strategy project, the absence of such a framework makes it more likely that the Defense Department either remains overly committed to counter-terrorism because it lacks a mechanism for driving sustainable reform, or overcorrects in a way that takes on unnecessary risk of a terrorism-related contingency that threatens the United States and disrupts its shift toward other priorities.

The Need for a Sustainable Counter-Terrorism Mission

In a speech earlier this month, Esper blamed the focus on counter-terrorism for leaving the military less prepared for a high-end fight against near-peer adversaries. This is a convenient excuse that covers over a range of failures to modernize the force as Paul Scharre, my colleague at the Center for a New American Security, has pointed out. The Pentagon was steadily investing billions to deter and fight big wars against nation-state adversaries while U.S. troops were fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan. It just wasn’t investing in the right weapons systems, according to Scharre, or properly rethinking how the military needs to fight future wars. Yet while the focus on counter-terrorism might not be the primary reason for the military’s failure to modernize effectively, it continues to strain U.S. readiness.

When it comes to resourcing America’s counter-terrorism operations, it is important to distinguish financial resources from the people and platforms that money pays for. There is no line item for this mission, which makes estimating potential budget savings difficult. Expeditionary warfare is expensive. The training and personnel pipeline for special operations forces, who bear the brunt of counter-terrorism missions, is also more expensive than for conventional forces. The operating costs of the conventional assets still used for counter-terrorism, especially air platforms, can also add up. Even so, potential cost savings from cutting counter-terrorism expenditures is likely to be small relative to the overall defense budget. The Pentagon should still seek ways to reduce financial resources, but this over-spending is less problematic than the readiness issues that it is facing.

The days of massive counter-insurgency campaigns are long gone, but the United States still has thousands of troops deployed for this mission. There are approximately 8,500 in Afghanistan (although that number is set to decline to 5,000 by November), 3,000 in Iraq, and smaller numbers in Syria, Somalia, Yemen, the Sahel, and elsewhere. These forces are mainly working by, with, and through local partners — who do the heavy lifting — and conducting direct action strikes to supplement these indigenous efforts. These missions, many of which are intended to suppress terrorist threats and maintain a modicum of political stability in conflict zones, have the impression of sustainability because they require comparatively smaller numbers of forces than large-scale counter-insurgency efforts and rely heavily on local forces. Yet for many local partners to be effective, they need the U.S. military — typically special operations or conventional military forces, but also CIA paramilitary forces or even private military contractors — to provide intensive operational support. This, in turn, necessitates the use of enabling platforms like intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; close air support; airlift; and medevac. These platforms are required for unilateral raids conducted by U.S. special operations forces as well.

Even airstrikes conducted by drones typically require forces on the ground. The level of investment in terms of troops and platforms necessary to maintain the current scope and tempo of “light-footprint” operations may be unsustainable in terms of available forces and platforms given the Defense Department’s prioritization of strategic competition with nation-states.

Special operations forces, who carry a disproportionately large share of the burden when it comes to counter-terrorism deployments, are “fatigued, worn and frayed around the edges,” according to a comprehensive review conducted at the direction of the commander of U.S. Special Operations Command. Even if this were not the case, special operations forces cannot maintain this operational tempo while simultaneously contributing to strategic competition as envisioned by the National Defense Strategy, preparing for a potential conflict with a near-peer competitor, and meeting their goal of a 1:2 deployment-to-dwell ratio. The problem is not simply the overuse of special operations forces, but also the misuse of different special operations elements. The “all hands on deck” approach that defined the last two decades combined with the absence of a framework for adjudicating missions and resources has created an environment in which various special operations forces are used for the wrong purposes. For example, units assigned global response missions against imminent threats, such as the Army’s Delta Force and some Navy SEAL teams, have been used for training missions, while Army special forces teams that should be focused on training and advising have been called upon to conduct direct action missions.

Moreover, special operations forces don’t travel alone. The Pentagon continues to dedicate enabling platforms — such as manned and unmanned aerial platforms used for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and armed overwatch, as well as manned platforms for electronic warfare, airlift, and medevac — to support counter-terrorism. These platforms also require people to use and maintain them. Special operations forces need additional logistical support as noted above. As a result, conventional forces continue to deploy in support of counter-terrorism missions despite the services increasing focus on high-intensity conflict. Of greater concern, the overuse of some of these platforms for counter-terrorism has created readiness issues, most notably for the Air Force because its bombers and fighter jets have been used for direct action. In other words, the Pentagon not only failed to invest in the right types of assets needed for a high-intensity conflict, it also wore down some of the assets it did invest in by over-using them for counter-terrorism.

Spinning its Wheels

Optimizing the U.S. military for strategic competition and a potential conflict with a near-peer competitor will necessitate more than just reigning in the counter-terrorism mission. This does not obviate the need for reform. The issue is not whether the Defense Department is devoting too much or too little to counter-terrorism in absolute terms, but rather how forces, platforms, and resources are allocated relative to the terrorism threat and other priorities. Risk aversion regarding the potential of a future terrorist attack is part of the problem, but it is also the case that some of the global combatant commands use counter-terrorism as a rationale when writing requirements for special operations forces and enabling platforms. The Trump administration’s escalatory approach towards Iran — and the ways in which this has become intertwined with the U.S. counter-terrorism mission — compounds the problem.

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Housecarl

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Continued.....

The most obvious danger of failing to develop and implement a framework for conducting a more sustainable counter-terrorism mission is that this mission remains unsustainable. There are other dangers, however, one of which is a department-wide overcorrection that increases the risks of a terrorist attack against the United States or its interests overseas. Another is a disjointed transition away from counter-terrorism, which already appears to be occurring according to members of the special operations community with whom I have spoken. The Army is pulling away many of its intelligence specialists and technical capabilities from the counter-terrorism mission. This has not been coordinated with a commensurate drawdown in Army special forces counter-terrorism operations, however, making these operations more difficult and riskier. The Air Force has also pulled back support for counter-terrorism operations, creating pressure to fill looming gaps in the various types of enabling support that U.S. and partner forces have come to rely on.

It’s tempting just to call for a “zero-based” review of the entire counter-terrorism mission. The principle of such a review is that all counter-terrorism deployments would need to be justified against a goal of zero operational forces deployed. The problem is that such a review would be based on a static assessment of threats at the time the review is being conducted, whereas the threat environment is dynamic. Realizing the type of systemic change needed will require putting in place a framework for aligning threats, missions, resources, and risk acceptance, and a program for conducting net assessment of the counter-terrorism mission. Because of the potential of unforeseen events, any effort to scale back the counter-terrorism mission should also include contingency planning. Absent clear direction and backing from the secretary to make all this happen, there’s a real risk that the Defense Department will keep spinning its wheels.

A Comprehensive Framework

A comprehensive framework for assigning counter-terrorism missions is critical for avoiding the extremes of path dependency on the one hand and overcorrection or a disjointed transition on the other hand. It would also provide a mechanism for recalibrating counter-terrorism-related force structure and posture requirements as terrorist threats and Defense Department priorities evolve. Finally, such a framework could also help the Pentagon evaluate the counter-terrorism-related infrastructure that it has developed since 9/11: authorities and execute orders, policy shops, and military task forces, including the role of the theater special operations commands under the geographic combatant commands.

The framework below provides one model. It would need to be pressure tested to determine whether these are the right factors to include and how the Defense Department should weigh them. The Pentagon could use planning scenarios to flesh out and standardize its approach to prioritization and threat assessment, the assignment of missions, and the identification of resources required to accomplish a mission.

The first step the Defense Department needs to take is to create a standardized, universal list of terrorist groups and assign groups to a fixed number of prioritized tiers based on the level and nature of threat. This may seem like a no-brainer, but almost 20 years after 9/11 the Pentagon still lacks a single list that includes all the terrorist groups it is combating. Creating a standardized list will do more than just identify the universe of potential terrorist groups to combat. The Defense Department has had a tendency to prioritize terrorist threats without always doing threat assessments first. Creating a universal list will enable the Defense Department to identify its counter-terrorism priorities based on the same set of factors, in terms of the groups themselves and the types of threats these groups pose to the United States. This list will need to be a living document, evolving in line with the changing nature of the terrorist landscape. For example, in the future, near-peer competitors may increase their use of nonstate proxies or support for terrorism to advance their interests below the threshold of conflict. Of course, if a similar document exists elsewhere in the government and is sufficient for the Defense Department’s purposes, it could adopt that one.

Once the Pentagon has identified the terrorist groups it is concerned about and tiered them based on the threats they pose, it can assign a specific mission to each group. The chart below suggests six missions — from most to least intensive — based on the priority accorded to a group: defeat, dismantle, degrade, disrupt, monitor, and identify and understand. Each mission should include criteria for defining and achieving success, which in turn should enable defense planners to identify what actions are necessary. This is important not only for ensuring that the Defense Department achieves its counter-terrorism objectives, but also may help reduce the potential for counter-terrorism to be used as a rationale for employing troops and platforms for purposes that are not terrorism related.

Figure 1: Framework for Assigning and Resourcing Counter-Terrorism Missions

st3.png


Next, the Defense Department should assign resources to each mission (Column 1 lists the possible missions described above that the Pentagon might assign) based on the factors outlined in the chart. Columns 2–4 include factors for consideration that could enable or encumber pursuit of the mission, as well as possibly increase risk to U.S. forces. When considering the threat environment, the Defense Department should assess not only the risks from the terrorist targets, but also those posed by other actors (e.g., near-peer competitors and nation-state adversaries) that are physically present or able and intent on projecting power into the country or region in question. Regarding the contributions that other U.S. government agencies (e.g., CIA, State Department, U.S. Agency for International Development), allies, and partners could make to a counter-terrorism mission, it will also be important to consider whether and how their efforts might rely on U.S. forces or platforms. Depending on the circumstance, the intelligence community or State Department may develop or expand cooperation with and support for partners’ law enforcement, border authorities, and intelligence communities. Column 5 factors in the potential value of a counter-terrorism mission to advancing strategic competition objectives. There are costs and benefits to including this in the decision calculus. It could enable the Pentagon to maximize the utility of its forces and resources in certain places, but also might be used to justify counter-terrorism activities that the Pentagon otherwise would not conduct or sap resources that could be used to advance strategic competition objectives more effectively elsewhere. Column 6 determines the resources required to accomplish the assigned mission, factoring in the elements identified in Columns 2–5. Column 7 identifies potential known risks to U.S. interests, the mission, and U.S. forces if the resources required are provided.

Finally, on an ongoing basis, defense planners ought to assess the cumulative resources dedicated to the entire counter-terrorism mission relative to the overall terrorism risks that the president and the secretary of defense are prepared to accept, and then re-adjust individual missions and resources accordingly. If the Pentagon remains over-resourced toward counter-terrorism relative to requirements for other priorities, the approach outlined here would enable the secretary to make an informed decision about whether to accept more risk from terrorism, and, if so, where to accept that risk.

Pursuing missions in accordance with this framework should help adjust direct action missions and train, advise, and assist missions that involve aggressive operational support in line with current terrorism threats and other priorities. This would likely free up special operations and conventional forces and resources for other National Defense Strategy priorities. It also would inform decisions about where the Defense Department engages in more routine training and provides other security assistance for counter-terrorism capacity building, as well as how much and what type of assistance. Even a scaled-back counter-terrorism mission will still require considerable intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, as well as some logistical support and armed overwatch. Demands for airlift, quick reaction forces, and medevac might decline, although it is possible that a smaller footprint leads to less force protection on the ground, which in turn could affect demand for these capabilities. Relying mainly on unmanned platforms for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; close-air support; and precision strike, in the types of austere and permissive environments where the United States is likely to conduct counter-terrorism missions could further reduce the strains on readiness.

While the framework above allows for recalibration, conducting a net assessment would significantly enhance the Defense Department’s ability to prioritize, adapt its lines of effort, and ensure the effective allocation of resources relative to terrorism-related risks. The Defense Department currently lacks this type of net assessment process, which should include several elements. First, the Pentagon needs to explicitly identify its criteria for measuring effectiveness for the overarching counter-terrorism mission, as well as the individual missions that make up its component parts. Second, it should develop metrics based on the actions required for success and the way the military defines success for each mission. These metrics should factor in assumptions made regarding interagency efforts and cooperation from allies and partners. Third, the Defense Department should use these metrics to drive the collection of data about U.S. counter-terrorism efforts and those of its partners, the behavior of terrorist adversaries, and the effects on the civilian population in the country or region where these efforts occur and terrorists operate. Fourth, although metrics should be tailored to actions and therefore need not be universal, the Pentagon should develop a common methodological toolbox for assessing effectiveness.

Because there may be instances in which contingencies arise (e.g., terrorists seize strategic territory, or develop or reconstitute external operations capabilities that pose new threats to the United States) the Pentagon should also ensure it has adequate contingency planning in place. It will be critical to ensure ongoing intelligence collection — unilaterally by Defense Department elements or other members of the U.S. intelligence community, or provided via intelligence liaison with reliable allies and partners — for the purposes of indications and warnings. The Pentagon, in coordination with other U.S. government agencies, should also develop a plan for emplacing additional intelligence collection assets quickly if necessary. Planners also will need to ensure the global force readiness required to move military assets into various locations where the United States scales back its efforts. These assets could be required for a range of operations, including increased operational support to allies or partners, limited counter-terrorism strikes, and even a troop surge of several thousand U.S. forces. Pentagon planners will need to identify the level of persistent forward engagement necessary to enable access and placement to support this range of operations.

Contingency planning should factor in potential contributions from and the effect on allies and partners as well. In areas where the U.S. military pulls back considerably, partners will need to assume more of the burden and more risk. Preparing them for this eventuality will be critical. This means working with the partner forces to identify and address priority gaps in capabilities, equipment, and relationships with other security forces, among other things. There may be instances where allies and high-end regional partners have sufficient capabilities and vested interests in counter-terrorism and in their relationship with the United States to make joint contingency planning worthwhile. Where this is not the case, the Pentagon at the very least should identify close allies and high-end regional partners who might be able to assist in the event of a contingency, and lay the groundwork for coordinating with them.

Conclusion

The over-militarization of U.S. counter-terrorism efforts has had pernicious consequences both for these efforts and the U.S. military. Focusing on interstate strategic competition requires investing the mental energy necessary to develop a more sustainable approach to counter-terrorism. In the absence of such an effort, the military risks remaining overly committed to counter-terrorism because of inertia, or overcorrecting in a way that makes it more likely the United States will face a terrorism-related contingency that could disrupt its shift toward interstate strategic competition. Failing to do this intellectual homework also risks leaving the Pentagon unprepared to respond effectively in the event near-peer competitors increase their use of proxy warfare or support for terrorism to distract the United States and sap its resources, or as part of a larger conflict. It is understandable for Defense Department leadership to want to turn the page on counter-terrorism, but equally critical that they realize the page won’t turn itself and that there are risks to closing the book too quickly.

Stephen Tankel is an associate professor at American University, an adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, and a senior editor at War on the Rocks. He has served on the House Foreign Affairs Committee and in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Tankel is the author most recently of With Us and Against Us: How America’s Partners Help and Hinder the War on Terror.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
In light of some of the drone use in combat reported from the Caucuses and Russian exercises....

Posted for fair use.....

Army Robots Hunt Tanks In Project Convergence
The pair of unmanned scout vehicles had enough AI smarts aboard to navigate cross-country, identify “enemy” forces, and open fire – but a human still decides whether to shoot.
By Sydney J. Freedberg Jr. on September 28, 2020 at 2:37 PM
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Army photo

An experimental Army robot, nicknamed Origin, at the Project Convergence exercise at Yuma Proving Ground, Ariz. The large green tube on top is a CROWS-J Javelin missile launcher.

WASHINGTON: A pair of unprepossessing robots, looking more like militarized golf carts than Terminators, trundled across the Yuma Desert, part of the Army’s Project Convergence exercise on future warfare.

Like human troops, the machines took turns covering each other as they advanced. One robot would find a safe spot, stop, and launch the tethered mini-drone it carried to look over the next ridgeline while the other bot moved forward; then they’d switch off.
Army photo

Hoverfly mini-drone carried on the Origin robot.
Their objective: a group of buildings on the Army’s Yuma Proving Ground, a simulated town for urban combat training. As one robot held back to relay communications to its distant human overseers, the other moved into the town – and spotted “enemy” forces. With human approval, the robot opened fire.

Then the robot’s onboard Aided Target Recognition (ATR) algorithms identified another enemy, a T-72 tank. But this target was too far away for the robot’s built-in weapons to reach. So the bot uploaded the targeting data to the tactical network and – again, with human approval – called in artillery support.

“That’s a huge step, Sydney,” said Brig. Gen. Richard Ross Coffman, the Project Convergence exercise director. “That computer vision… is nascent, but it is working.”
Algorithmic target recognition and computer vision are critical advances over most current military robots, which aren’t truly autonomous but merely remote-controlled: The machine can’t think for itself, it just relays camera feeds back to a human operator, who tells it exactly where to go and what to do.


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That approach, called teleoperation, does let you keep the human out of harm’s way, making it good for bomb squads and small-scale scouting. But it’s too slow and labor-intensive to employ on a large scale. If you want to use lots of robots without tying down a lot of people micromanaging them, you need the robots to make some decisions for themselves – although the Army emphasizes that the decision to use of lethal force will always be made by a human.
Sydney J. Freedberg Jr.

Brig. Gen. Richard Ross Coffman



So Coffman, who oversees the Robotic Combat Vehicle and Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle programs, turned to the Army’s Artificial Intelligence Task Force at Carnegie Mellon University. “Eight months ago,” he told me, “I gave them the challenge: I want you to go out and sense targets with a robot — and you have to move without using LIDAR.”

LIDAR, which uses low-powered laser beams to detect obstacles, is a common sensor on experimental self-driving cars. But, Coffman noted, because it’s actively emitting laser energy, enemies can easily detect it.
Army graphic
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By Sydney J. Freedberg Jr.

So the robots in the Project Convergence experiment, called “Origin,” relied on passive sensors: cameras. That meant their machine vision algorithms had to be good enough to interpret the visual imagery and deduce the relative locations of potential obstacles, without being able to rely on LIDAR or radar to measure distance and direction precisely. That may seem simple enough to humans, whose eyes and brain benefit from a few hundred million years of evolution, but it’s a radical feat for robots, which still struggle to distinguish, say, a shallow puddle from a dangerously deep pit.

“Just with machine vision, they were able to move from Point A to Point B,” Coffman said. But the Army doesn’t just want robots that can find their way around: It wants them to scout for threats and targets – without a human having to constantly stare at the sensor feed.

That’s where Aided Target Recognition comes in. (ATR also stands for Automated Target Recognition, but the Army doesn’t like the implication that the software would replace human judgment, so it consistently uses Aided instead).
Army photo

Data from the Origin robot and drone updates handheld tactical maps.
Recognizing targets is another big challenge. Sure, artificial intelligence has gotten scarily good at identifying individual faces in photos posted on social media. But the private sector hasn’t invested nearly as much in, say, telling the difference between an American M1 Abrams tank and a Russian-made T-72, or between an innocent Toyota pickup and the same truck upgunned as a guerrilla “technical” with a heavy machinegun in the back. And the Army needs to be able to tell enemy from friendly from civilian in messy real-world combat zones – and not only from clear overhead surveillance shots, but from the ground, against troops trained to use camouflage and cover to break up easily recognizable silhouettes.

“Training algorithms to identify vehicles by type, it’s a huge undertaking,” Coffman told me. “We’ve collected and labeled over 3.5 million images” so far to use for training machine-learning algorithms, he said – and that labeling requires trained human analysts to look at each picture and tell the computer what it was: “That’s someone sitting there and going, ‘that’s a T-72; that’s a BMP,’” etcetera ad nauseam, he said.
But each individual robot or drone doesn’t need to carry those millions of images in its own onboard memory: It just needs the “classifier” algorithms that resulting from running through images through machine-learning systems. Because those algorithms themselves don’t take up a ton of memory, it’s possible to run them on a computer that fits easily on the individual bot.

“We’ve proven we can do that with a tethered or untethered UAV. We’ve proven we can do that with a robot. We’ve proven we can do that on a vehicle,” Coffman said. “We can identify the enemy by type and location.”

“That’s all happening on the edge,” he emphasized. “This isn’t having to go back to some mainframe [to] get processed.”
Robot-from-above-200825-A-WL997-231-1024x559.jpg

The Army’s experimental “Origin” robot during Project Convergence
In other words, the individual robot doesn’t have to constantly transmit real-time, high-res video of everything it sees to some distant human analyst or AI master brain. Sending that much data back and forth is too big a strain on low-bandwidth tactical networks, which are often disrupted by terrain, technical glitches, and enemy jamming. Instead, the robot can identify the potential target itself, with its onboard AI, and just transmit the essential bits – things like the type of vehicles spotted, their numbers and location, and what they’re doing.

“You want to reduce the amount of information that you pass on the network to a tweet, as small as possible, so you’re not clogging the pipes,” Coffman told me.

But before the decision is made to open fire, he emphasized, a human being has to look at the sensor feed long enough to confirm the target and give the order to engage.

“There’s always a human that is looking at the sensor image,” Coffman said. “Then the human decides, ‘yes, I want to prosecute that target.’”

“Could that be done automatically, without a human in the loop?” he said. “Yeah, I think it’s technologically feasible to do that. But the United States Army [is] an ethics-based organization. There will be a human in the loop.”
 

night driver

ESFP adrift in INTJ sea
1) SEATO. If they made the error of putting it to bed they need the alarm to ring and wake it up fairly soon.
MAJOR differences now would be that the USA ain't carrying the whole load.

2 Ref Mexico. Hope DJT has War Plan Green somewhere on top of his desk.

Hey doz, we got a creative and dynamic Light Colonel or Bird Colonel who could assemble and run a War Plan Green expeditionary Force???

Thinking Kurilla, last seen as CO at 85th Ranger Regiment. (85th might not be right)
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
1) SEATO. If they made the error of putting it to bed they need the alarm to ring and wake it up fairly soon.
MAJOR differences now would be that the USA ain't carrying the whole load.

2 Ref Mexico. Hope DJT has War Plan Green somewhere on top of his desk.

Hey doz, we got a creative and dynamic Light Colonel or Bird Colonel who could assemble and run a War Plan Green expeditionary Force???

Thinking Kurilla, last seen as CO at 85th Ranger Regiment. (85th might not be right)

Heck, the impact the Mexican Cartels are having within CONUS, never mind MS-13, is so far beyond Via's raid on Columbus New Mexico as to make it a side note....
 

jward

passin' thru
Analysis
30th September 2020
Russia's Military Modernisation: An Assessment
An introduction to Russia's military modernisation
The IISS Strategic Dossier Russia’s Military Modernisation examines the nature and scope of the development of Moscow’s armed forces and military capabilities.
russia-dossier-2020_packshot_thumbnail-866x486_no-background-(1).png


In the Western popular imagination at least, the United States and its allies emerged victorious in the Cold War against the communist Soviet Union. Russia did experience severe economic and political turbulence in the immediate post-Soviet era, but Moscow did not necessarily see itself as having been defeated. Rather, the Russian political elite’s view is increasingly that the country was betrayed by those in the West who had assured that Russia would benefit from free-market economics, but instead expanded the reach of an alliance (NATO) that had been established with the single purpose of containing Moscow, while the new economy concentrated wealth in the hands of a few. Analysis of the misunderstandings and the missed opportunities of the late 1980s and early 1990s falls outside the scope of this study, but Moscow’s view of these events continues to influence and shape its security policies and its armed forces, the capabilities of which were degraded severely by the turmoil of the 1990s.

This IISS Strategic Dossier examines how Russia’s armed forces have fared in the three decades since the end of the Soviet Union. There is particular focus on the most recent defence reforms and military-modernisation ambitions. However, what becomes clear is that modernisation, in this case, does not just mean introducing new capabilities. Many of Moscow’s plans to improve its armed forces have depended on upgrading existing equipment and, in some cases, simply introducing into service capabilities that were planned decades earlier. But they are improving. As such, the conclusions of this publication are also valuable when considering the nature and extent of any challenge that Moscow’s more capable armed forces pose to European security.

Soviet no more
The Soviet Union’s armed forces entered the 1980s with ambitious research and development and acquisition goals, but by the end of the decade the fall of the Berlin Wall presaged the collapse of the USSR only two years later, in 1991. Instead of introducing a range of advanced weapons across the armed services during the 1990s, the rump of the Soviet Union’s armed forces was instead faced with a fight to sustain even a modest capability. Structured force reductions introduced by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in 1988, intended to cut 500,000 personnel as part of his wider effort to begin to shift emphasis from a military-focused to a civil economy, were overtaken by events in the USSR’s final chaotic two years. For the armed forces, however, this heralded worse to come. In the 1990s, only Russia’s strategic missile forces received enough funding to remain credible, as the conventional elements of the armed forces struggled to manage the impact of the collapse of the USSR and the end of the Warsaw Pact, Moscow’s 36-year-old military alliance designed to counter NATO.

NATO expansion and US ballistic-missile-defence goals were fault lines along which the US–Russia relationship fractured. What for NATO member states was clearly the sovereign right of a nation to seek Alliance membership was viewed from Moscow as a betrayal of assurances it felt were given during the discussions over German reunification in 1990. More recently, this has been compounded by Russia’s demand for a sphere of influence in the post-Soviet space, part of which contains now Alliance members.
From Washington’s perspective, ballistic-missile defence was aimed at the defeat of a handful of intercontinental ballistic missiles from a rogue state. However, Moscow saw it as the beginning of a threat to its deterrent forces, a view reinforced by the United States’ 2001 decision to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and its pursuit of ballistic-missile defence in Europe, however limited these capabilities are in reality.
Russia’s view of NATO expansion, merited or not, was made clear by then-president Boris Yeltsin in 1998, who said it was a ‘serious mistake’ with ‘serious consequences’. However, from a European perspective, Moscow had ample opportunity to avoid confrontation.

Having extracted the Soviet Union from a protracted war in Afghanistan, Gorbachev said, idealistically, in 1989 that the ‘use of force ... has become historically obsolete’. Three decades later, Russia had annexed foreign territory, fought wars with former parts of the USSR and embarked on a successful expeditionary operation to support the Syrian regime in a civil war.
Far from being ‘historically obsolete’, by 2018 President Vladimir Putin was lauding the armed forces and telling the Federal Assembly that Russia possesses a ‘modern high-technology army’. He chided those international ‘partners’ who considered it ‘impossible in the foreseeable historical perspective for our country to revive its economy, industry, defence industry and Armed Forces to levels supporting the necessary strategic potential’.
Examining the extent to which Putin’s boast of ‘a modern high-technology army’ is justified is a founding question of this dossier. Nevertheless, without Putin and his political associates, it is at the very least debatable whether Russia’s armed forces would have recovered to the extent they have from the vicissitudes of the 1990s.

Reform efforts
Reform of the armed forces had been on the agenda during the 1980s, even before Gorbachev’s proposed cuts. Chapter One charts the thinking within the senior Soviet ranks in the 1980s over potential approaches to restructuring the armed forces, through the thwarted reform efforts of the 1990s, up to and including the 2008 New Look modernisation programme. The groundwork for the New Look had been completed under defence minister Sergei Ivanov (incumbent 2001–07). In 2006, Ivanov outlined planned cuts in conscript numbers, the thinning of the senior ranks and moving to a larger percentage of professional soldiers. All of these were to be implemented as part of the 2008 New Look programme, though by Anatoly Serdyukov, who replaced Ivanov as defence minister in February 2007. Irrespective of previous reform efforts, the conflict with Georgia had shown that Russia still lacked the capacity to rapidly deploy enough combat-ready units even for a small war. However, unlike previous reform efforts, New Look benefited from adequate funding for many of its goals, and from the backing of Russia’s political leaders.

Strategic forces
Throughout the 1990s, only Russia’s nuclear forces received anything resembling the required funding to sustain a modicum of credibility. Chapter Two examines the development of Russia’s nuclear deterrent since the end of the USSR. Irrespective of the end of the Cold War, there was little question that Russia would remain a major nuclear power, even if several of the weapon systems planned or in development during the 1980s fell into abeyance. If anything, during the 1990s, as its conventional armed forces were hollowed out through a lack of investment and associated cuts in personnel and inventory, Moscow’s nuclear systems took on even greater importance. The perceived vulnerability to conventional warfare was reflected in the Soviet Union’s declared position of ‘no first use’ of nuclear weapons being dropped in 1993.

Land-based systems have continued to remain the largest part of Moscow’s nuclear triad, with the shift from silo-based to mobile systems ongoing. Nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs) provide the second element of the deterrent, despite the difficulties Russia has had in introducing a new submarine-launched ballistic missile into the inventory. The air-launched element of Russia’s strategic forces today remains arguably the weakest, in that it is dependent on a small number of modern bomber aircraft, supported by a turbo-prop-powered bomber that has its origin in the 1950s.
Along with investing in ‘traditional’ nuclear delivery systems, Moscow is also pursuing several ‘novel’ systems, including nuclear-powered cruise missiles and ‘torpedoes’, and is in the early stages of introducing a hypersonic boost-glide system into its nuclear inventory.

Ground Forces
Russia’s Ground Forces are today smaller and more capable than they were in the mid-1990s. Elements of these forces are held at a high state of readiness and have had recent combat experience. The Airborne Forces and reorganised Special Forces are also seen as a key component of Russia’s high-readiness capability. Chapter Three assesses the organisational changes that have reshaped these forces since the end of the Soviet Union. Tracing the origins of the reforms in late-Soviet military thinking, it also evaluates the lessons that Russia’s military leaders derived from reform efforts, including the post-2008 New Look, and how these were reshaped by experimentation and, as time went on, lessons from operations.

The decision in 2008 to wholly change formations by transitioning to a brigade structure was designed to generate units capable of more independent self-sustaining missions of the sort that were anticipated on Russia’s periphery. However, lessons arising from trials, from increased tensions with the West and with Ukraine (and the fighting there) contributed to Moscow’s decision to reintroduce divisions. These forces’ equipment has also changed, though perhaps not in so far-reaching a manner as anticipated in the middle of the last decade, when new designs like the T-14 main battle tank were first observed. The inventory of the Ground Forces, certainly the manouevre formations, will in the immediate future consist of some wholly new equipment types, as well as a large number of modernised platforms, such as the T-72B3. But there has been particular progress in improving artillery and missile capabilities, with the replacement of the Tochka-U (SS-21B Scarab) short-range ballistic-missile system with the Iskander-M(SS-26 Stone) system and modernisation of self-propelled artillery systems. These hold the potential, when combined with new command-and-control systems and uninhabited aerial vehicles, to improve the ability of Russia’s forces to find, fix and strike adversary formations at greater range than before. In common with the other services, these have also been tested on operations.
(continued___)
 

jward

passin' thru
(continued..._)
Naval forces
The US intelligence community assessed that by the mid-1990s the Soviet Navy would field 60–70 SSBNs, fewer but larger principal surface combatants and five or more aircraft carriers as part of a balanced fleet increasingly capable of addressing all maritime roles. As of 2020, the navy has a single aircraft carrier, now in refit, with no replacement as yet funded, 11 SSBNs and a surface-ship-building programme focused on platforms more suited to the littoral than the blue-water environment. Chapter Four considers developments in the Russian Navy, and the gulf, often apparent, between the ambition and the reality of the service’s goals and actual capabilities. Nevertheless, the navy retains considerable capabilities, even beside its SSBNs. The introduction, for example, of the 3M14 Kalibr (SS-N-30A Sagaris) land-attack cruise missile provides the navy with a notable power-projection weapon.

The navy retains vestiges of a blue-water role, relying predominantly on its larger, ageing Soviet-era surface platforms and more modern submarines. However, more recent additions to its surface fleet are better suited to defending the Russian littoral and its near waters, as well as supporting and protecting the submarine-based deterrent. While the navy was allocated the second-largest funding element after Russia’s nuclear forces in the 2020 State Armament Programme (SAP), covering 2011–20, it has not fared as well in the follow-on 2027 SAP, covering 2018–27.

Aerospace Forces
Like the navy, several of the Aerospace Forces’ goals in the 2020 SAP went unmet. Unlike for the navy, however, Russia’s defence industry was better placed to provide interim solutions that have improved considerably the combat-air elements of the service. Chapter Five examines what is a smaller by far air force than that fielded by the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War, but one which has benefited considerably from recent investments. Less successful, however, were some of the structural changes introduced by the 2008 New Look programme, several of which have been re-cast in the intervening years.

For the Soviet Air Force, the 1990s was to be a decade of recapitalisation, with new combat-aircraft types and major upgrades of existing designs to be introduced. Instead, the embryonic Russian Air Force struggled to maintain even a semblance of capability. Its performance in the first and second wars in Chechnya and in the short Georgia campaign exposed shortcomings in equipment and training. By the launch of the Syrian intervention in 2015, however, the service was benefiting from sustained investment from SAP 2020 and those positive elements of New Look. A new multi-role fighter, the Su-57 Felon, remains in development (albeit years behind the original schedule), while a modernised variant of the original Su-27 Flanker design, the Su-35S Flanker M, now provides the air force with its most capable fighter/ground-attack aircraft. In Long Range Aviation terms, as well as upgrading in-service types, the air force is returning the Tu-160 Blackjack to production. Meanwhile, the programme to develop a new long-range bomber to meet the service’s PAK-DA requirement was part of SAP 2020, and continues to be funded in SAP 2027 alongside the new-build of an upgraded Tu-160. However, whether Russia can afford to run two expensive bomber projects in parallel and has the industrial capacity to do so is debatable.

Military decision-making and joint operations
The US was not alone in the early 1980s in considering the implications of the digital revolution for military operations. Similar thinking was being led by the Soviet Union’s Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov. While the US went on to field an increasing array of digitally enabled weapons throughout the 1990s, any hope of Ogarkov’s vision of a Russian revolution in military affairs was thwarted by the Soviet Union’s collapse. Chapter Six assesses the impact of the 2008 New Look reforms on the Russian armed forces’ decision-making structures, Russia’s approach to joint operations and its increasing adoption of digital systems across the spectrum of military equipment. Nearly four decades after Ogarkov envisaged a ‘reconnaissance strike complex’, Russia’s armed forces are putting in place a decision-making architecture and network-enabled capabilities and weapons to finally deliver such a capability. The 2008 reforms set in train an overhaul of the Russian military decision-making process, moving from what was mainly a paper-based process to a digital architecture. The development and adoption of command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnais-sance (C4ISR) systems was emphasised as part of the modernisation programme.

A revised framework for military decision-making has emerged over the past decade as Moscow carried out a widespread structural reorganisation of the armed forces and its command-and-control systems. This is designed to improve efficiency and speed in command and control, as well as positioning the armed forces to conduct operations in an information-driven environment. A test-and-adjust approach has been adopted, including with systems trialled during joint-operations exercises. As with many large-scale computer-based developments, progress has not always been smooth.

Defence economics and industry
Defence expenditure is predicated upon, though not directly pegged to, wider economic performance. The travails of the Russian economy throughout the 1990s were reflected in the near collapse of defence expenditure. Even when sums were allocated, sometimes only a fraction of the amount would be forthcoming. Chapter Seven considers the arc of Russian defence expenditure since the end of the Soviet Union and examines how the country’s domestic defence industry has had to navigate turbulent times.

Defence spending fell steeply in the early 1990s, a situation exacerbated by the 1998 financial crisis. It recovered somewhat during the early 2000s, with a notable further improvement for most of the 2010s. The government’s goal now is to secure a steady state of funding that will support the reform and modernisation progress made in the previous decade.
However, measuring Russian defence expenditure is not straightforward, as Moscow has unsurprisingly not adopted a NATO-standard approach to accounting for military-related expenditure. Nearly all military spending is included in the Federal Budget, though not all of it is included in the document’s chapter on defence expenditure. Military housing infrastructure and pension costs, for example, are to be found elsewhere in the Federal Budget’s 14 volumes.
After a difficult two decades, the defence industry has benefited from the sustained investment supported by SAP 2020. However, even before the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, it was evident that the levels of procurement investment of the 2010s were not going to be replicated in the 2020s.

In addition, the sector is not homogeneous, and nor is the performance of its various elements. Maritime and land systems have fared less well than defence aerospace, though even here the accomplishments are far from uniform. While smaller by far than in the Soviet era, the defence industry is still significant, an important employer and a sector upon which some cities remain dependent.

Scope of the dossier
The intent of this dossier is to assess the impact of Russia’s military-modernisation project using open-source material, to consider the extent to which Moscow’s explicitly stated goals have been or are being met across all the military domains, and the capacity this confers on the Russian government to suggest, threaten the use of or wield military power in all its guises to meet its policy aims.

In the past decade, Russia has used many of the military tools it now has at its disposal, from ‘below-the-threshold’ information operations to traditional kinetic activity in Syria and eastern Ukraine. However, this dossier is not intended as an exhaustive study of all of Moscow’s military and paramilitary organisations.

Instead, the dossier examines the impact of the 2008 New Look modernisation programme, which remains the most important of all post-Soviet military reforms, and weighs the successes and failures of this project just over a decade after it was launched. In concert, the current and recent SAPs are reviewed across all the military domains to measure their effectiveness. Particular attention is paid to the 2020 SAP, which was intended to implement ‘modernisation’ across all of Russia’s armed services, to consider whether and the extent to which the programme’s targets have been met and the implications for each of the armed services.

 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Posted for fair use.....

Russian military strength at a post-Cold War high, report says

By JOHN VANDIVER | STARS AND STRIPES Published: October 1, 2020


STUTTGART, Germany — The Russian military is more capable than at any time since the end of the Cold War, the result of an effort to produce a more agile force, a new study found.

“Though significantly smaller than their Soviet predecessors, these forces are better equipped, with professional personnel increasingly prevalent,” the International Institute for Strategic Studies said in its latest assessment of the Russian military.

The report, released Wednesday, described a military that has rebounded from the neglect of the 1990s, when Russia was in disarray after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Moscow also has benefited from lessons learned during its brief war with Georgia in 2008, which exposed command and control and logistical shortcomings, the IISS report said.

While the Russians easily defeated the much smaller Georgian force, Moscow’s “New Look” reform program was launched to make improvements “in the wake of the armed forces’ poor performance,” the report said.

Those reforms laid the foundations for the current Russian military, which is being used to extend Moscow’s influence beyond its borders.

“Russia’s annexation of Crimea, its involvement in the war in eastern Ukraine and its decisive intervention in the Syrian civil war exemplify growing military confidence and capability,” the report said.

Russia’s ground forces have modernized by fielding the Iskander short-range ballistic-missile system and new self-propelled artillery. Combined with new command-and-control networks and drones, Russia’s forces can “find, fix and strike adversary formations at greater range than before,” the report said.

Russia has also upgraded its Navy, including with more modern submarines, the report said.

While smaller than during the Soviet era, the air force has advanced since the first and second wars in Chechnya and in the short Georgia campaign, which exposed gaps in equipment and training. In 2015, air power improvements were on display in Syria with modernized fighters, the report said.

However, it’s unclear if Russia’s armed forces can maintain their progress, given budget constraints.

“Nonetheless, when combined with Moscow’s more assertive foreign policy, Russia’s armed forces in 2020 constitute a capability that should not be ignored,” the IISS report said.

vandiver.john@stripes.com
Twitter: @john_vandiver
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Hummm.....

Posted for fair use.....

Trying to compel China into arms talks risky, says Russian analyst
The United States is seeking update global security frameworks for the 21st century. China’s reluctance to join discussions on limiting nuclear weapons, however, could be increasing the chances of a new arms race.
Oct 1, 2020

It’s no secret that United States arms negotiators want China to be part of any new pact to limit nuclear weapons. But Moscow is refusing to work with Washington to cajole China into participating in talks. A leading Russian arms control expert, writing recently in the journal Russia in Global Affairs, a periodical that often reflects Kremlin viewpoints, claimed that trying to compel China to agree to limitations on its nuclear arsenal could do more harm than good.


Alexander Savelyev, chief research fellow at the Primakov Institute in Moscow, argued that if China were to accede to Washington’s wishes and join Russia and the United States in a new strategic arms limitation framework, Beijing would need to alter its nuclear doctrine from a “no-first-use” policy to a “launch on warning” stance. Such a shift could have a destabilizing impact on global security, he contended.


“China, if it agrees to the drafting and signing of a nuclear arms control treaty, will certainly have to depart from the principle of no-first-use of nuclear weapons,” Savelyev wrote. “This may also trigger an enhanced arms race and induce China to adopt more aggressive nuclear arms concepts.”


China’s chief hang-up about accepting limits on nuclear arms is connected to the concept of transparency. In terms of numbers, China currently lags behind the United States and Russia when it comes to nuclear warheads and delivery systems. Thus, secrecy and subterfuge are essential elements of Beijing’s nuclear doctrine: To retain a retaliatory nuclear capacity, China is extremely tight-lipped on precisely how many nukes it possesses, and where they are deployed.


U.S. negotiators have made it clear that any future arms control agreement would require a strong verification component to ensure compliance and build mutual trust. Accordingly, to fulfill the terms of a potential pact, Chinese leaders would have to submit to verification procedures that undermine their existing “hide-and-seek” approach to maintaining a nuclear deterrent. Savelyev portrayed the verification issue as an insurmountable obstacle for China.


“Even if such a [hypothetical] agreement did not impose any obligations on China requiring reduction of its nuclear potential, Beijing would be expected to provide exhaustive information about its nuclear weapons and deployment sites,” Savelyev writes. In order to retain a retaliatory strike potential in a situation where the information about the deployment sites of China’s nuclear forces has been disclosed […] China would have to exert major efforts to ensure the invulnerability of at least some of them.”


Although writing as independent expert, Savelyev’s analysis adheres to Russia’s official position on Chinese participation. Russian leaders have stated that while Moscow would welcome Chinese participation, Russia will not exert any pressure on Beijing to join the process. Despite a great disparity in their bilateral balance of trade, Russia in recent years has come to consider China as a strategic partner in efforts to counter U.S. global influence.


U.S. negotiators aren’t holding their breath while waiting for their Chinese counterparts to come to the table. They have put on hold the idea of China joining talks to extend an existing treaty, known as New START, which caps the number of warheads and delivery systems that each signatory can possess. Instead, U.S. officials are focusing attention on prolonging this bilateral deal with Russia. Even with the China stumbling block removed, talks are stalled and the clock is running out: If the United States and Russia can’t settle their differences over an extension, New START will expire in early February. The expiration of the pact could open the way for a new, highly destabilizing arms race, some experts worry.


The official Chinese position is that Beijing will start negotiating only after the United States and Russia have reduced their own nuclear arsenals to a level commensurate with China’s. Such a stance is dismissed out of hand by U.S. experts as unrealistic and is widely viewed as an indication that China is not interested in engaging the United States.


Given Beijing’s secrecy, there’s no way to be sure precisely how many nuclear warheads China possesses. A recent Pentagon report highlighted a discrepancy in China’s words and actions in the area of arms control. China is engaged in a robust strategic arms build-up aimed at improving its ability to project power abroad, the report asserted, adding that its rapid modernization efforts include the development of nuclear-armed strategic bombers and submarines. Within a decade, China is expected to at least double its stockpile of nuclear weapons, exceeding the “minimal deterrent” level that is specified in China’s existing nuclear doctrine.


While the United States may be willing to extend New START without Chinese participation, officials in Washington remain insistent that China needs to join the arms control process in the not-too-distant future. The wrangling over China’s inclusion in arms-control frameworks comes at a time when Beijing is becoming much more militarily assertive in bordering areas, including Central Asia and the South China Sea.


Beijing’s strategic footprint in Central Asia has expanded significantly in the past few years, prompted ostensibly by sporadic incidents of resistance among minority Muslims to Han Chinese rule in western China. China has established a vast re-education camp system for members Muslims in western China, citing a need to contain what it characterizes as terrorism.


A prominent symbol of China’s emerging forward defense strategy to contain Islamic militant activity is a small military base in Tajikistan, situated not far from the point where the Tajik, Afghan and Chinese frontiers converge. The recent Pentagon report indicated that Chinese officials are interested in expanding the country’s military presence in Tajikistan.
 

jward

passin' thru
On Iran, the Next Administration Must Break With the Past
Neither Pressure Nor a Narrow Nuclear Deal Can Succeed on Its Own

By Elisa Catalano Ewers, Ilan Goldenberg, and Kaleigh Thomas
October 1, 2020

RTS3E5OO.JPG

An Iranian missile in the northern Indian Ocean, June 2020
West Asia News Agency / Reuters


Only nine months ago, the United States and Iran nearly went to war. Even with simultaneous public health and economic crises dominating today’s agenda, that sobering fact should make Iran an early priority for a new U.S. administration in 2021.
In order to relieve tensions, the next U.S. administration will need to engage Iran in renewed diplomacy. But successful diplomacy with Iran will not come easily. The United States will have to navigate its own and Iranian domestic politics. Israel and some of the Gulf states will greet such engagement with anxiety or outright opposition. Moreover, a legacy of deep distrust divides Washington and Tehran. Nonetheless, the U.S. political transition could present an opportunity, as Iran may either test the possibilities with a President Joe Biden or relent and negotiate with a reelected President Donald Trump rather than face four more years of harsh sanctions.
The United States should start by negotiating a de-escalatory agreement that contains Iran’s nuclear program and lowers regional tensions. But it should then work both to negotiate a follow-on to the 2015 Iran nuclear deal and to tackle more fundamental regional disagreements. By putting diplomacy in the lead, the United States can address its discord with Iran and calibrate a smart and clear-eyed policy for the Middle East.
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LESSONS OF THE PAST
The context in which a new administration will assume power in 2021 will be quite different from the one in which the administration of President Barack Obama negotiated the Iran nuclear deal. But the next U.S. administration can take valuable lessons from the Obama administration’s experience in negotiating that agreement, as well as from the agreement’s collapse upon the Trump administration’s withdrawal from it.
The deal demonstrated that the United States and Iran can, in fact, reach an arms control agreement, and its particulars furnish a blueprint for future diplomacy, making technical negotiations much easier for both sides. But the trajectory of the 2015 agreement also shows that any accord that does not address Iran’s destabilizing policies in the Middle East is likely to fail, because Israel, the Gulf states, nearly all Republicans, and some Democrats will oppose it.

The next U.S. administration will need to engage Iran in renewed diplomacy.
Recognizing this reality does not entail making a nuclear agreement contingent on Iran’s surrendering all of its interests in the Middle East, as it effectively would have to do to meet the 12 demands U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo set forth as a condition for sanctions relief in 2018. Pursuing a “grand bargain” that comprehensively addresses all nuclear and regional concerns in a singular deal or demands capitulation is a recipe for failure. But doing nothing to address regional concerns is also not sustainable. A more successful diplomatic approach would address both nuclear and non-nuclear concerns from the start, methodically pursuing them separately but in parallel and seeking incremental progress in a number of areas instead of one all-encompassing agreement.
The Trump administration’s course with Iran has manifested the extent of U.S. economic power. Washington is far better off working with allies, but it also has the capability unilaterally to relieve and expand significant economic pressure. This demonstrated power gives the United States great leverage, as well as the flexibility to make concessions, knowing they are reversible.
FIRST, DE-ESCALATE
Hard-liners are expected to win Iran’s June 2021 presidential election, but Hassan Rouhani, the pragmatic president whose team negotiated the 2015 nuclear deal, will remain in office for the first six months of 2021. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is Iran’s ultimate decision-maker; even so, the Rouhani administration’s continued presence may offer a narrow window of opportunity for an early de-escalation, given its experience negotiating the original deal and the relationships it has with American negotiators. If the Iranian regime is looking to reengage Washington, Rouhani’s team might be best positioned to deliver on that intent. And if Khamenei is on the fence, Rouhani’s team may be able to convince him to reengage.
Neither Biden nor Trump will conclude a historic agreement during the short time Rouhani remains in office, but to fail to cement any progress would be to lose a possible opportunity. The United States should spend those six months forging an initial arrangement that de-escalates regional tensions and arrests Iran’s nuclear progress. It should consult extensively with its partners in doing so.
To set the conditions for such an arrangement, Washington will need to undertake modest, unilateral confidence measures right away. At a minimum, it should abolish the travel ban from Iran and ensure—even expand—exceptions to U.S. sanctions that allow Iran to address the humanitarian needs arising from the COVID-19 crisis.

The Trump administration’s course with Iran has manifested the extent of U.S. economic power.
The United States and Iran should attempt then to reset the cycle of escalation with an informal “calm for calm” agreement. Iran would put a stop to the proxy attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle East, as well as mine and missile attacks on oil tankers and critical infrastructure. The United States would cease the bellicose rhetoric and do what is in its power to restrain provocations such as some of the mysterious explosions inside Iran in recent months.
The U.S. government must then decide how to pursue the nuclear component of this early arrangement. A Biden administration may try to get the United States and Iran to reenter the 2015 agreement. Such an approach may be the simplest to negotiate. It would also most meaningfully roll back Iran’s nuclear program, and it could help the United States repair transatlantic relations. However, returning to the deal could permanently alienate the agreement’s opponents, which include Israel, Saudi Arabia, and congressional Republicans. That fallout could in turn complicate future diplomacy with Iran. Iran’s internal politics may also foreclose the possibility of a simple reentry so close to elections, as hard-liners would not want Rouhani’s faction to have such a victory.

Washington will need to undertake modest, unilateral confidence measures right away.
A new U.S. administration—in this case more likely Trump’s than Biden’s— could instead pursue a different short-term agreement: one that would lack the scope of the original nuclear deal but that would require Iran to freeze its nuclear program or partially roll it back in exchange for limited sanctions relief. This arrangement would be similar to the deal French President Emmanuel Macron tried to forge in 2019 between Iran and the United States, or to the 2013 Joint Plan of Action, which preceded the final agreement. Opponents to the 2015 agreement may find this option more acceptable, because it would leave more sanctions in place at the start. And because the deal would be straightforward, with relatively few steps to implementation, it might help Iran and the United States avoid getting bogged down in detailed negotiations. On the other hand, it would not roll back Iran’s nuclear program as far, and it would require opening an entirely new negotiation, which would likely necessitate a 30-day congressional review period.
Whether the United States returns to the 2015 Iran nuclear deal or negotiates a more limited alternative will depend ultimately on the Iranian position. And either a Biden or a Trump administration should be open to testing all possibilities.
PARALLEL TRACKS
An initial de-escalation deal would forestall any crisis from unfolding before the Iranian election. In so doing, it would buy time for the United States to develop a comprehensive strategy in consultation with its partners and Congress. The parties could then begin engaging on parallel tracks: one focused on further de-escalating regional tensions and the other on hammering out a follow-on nuclear arrangement. The tracks will be separate, but not entirely independent.
Iran, the United States, other regional actors, and members of the P5+1 need a framework in which to engage one another, and the United States should offer its support for and participation in a facilitated, active, multilateral dialogue on issues of import to the region. For regional partners, American efforts to participate in such a dialogue would signal an important U.S. commitment. For Iran, the inclusion of multiple international players would signal that the United States is not simply out to impose its views.
The overall objective should be to sustain a process that might produce durable solutions. But initial goals should be modest and can start with practical, narrow dealmaking. A highly structured forum with lengthy agendas and formal interventions is less likely to succeed than a more flexible one with multilateral meetings and smaller contact groups. The key is for the United States, in concert with the P5+1, to invest serious diplomacy in such a dialogue.

The United States would cease the bellicose rhetoric and do what is in its power to restrain provocations.
The dialogue would lay the foundation for constructive engagement even while contributing to the Middle East’s long-term stability. Through it, the region’s states could seek an agreement to not interfere in one another’s internal affairs. At the same time, they could adopt cooperative measures to address COVID-19, other health issues, natural disasters, and climate change. The dialogue could pursue naval de-escalation in the Gulf through multilateral mechanisms. And it could address arms control by limiting conventional offensive arms, including missiles, curtailing nuclear enrichment for civilian purposes, and devising common inspection regimes. Some difficult issues are unlikely to yield early progress, but they should be part of the program nonetheless. These include ending the civil wars in Syria and Yemen and reducing tensions between the United States and Iran in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Simultaneously, the United States and the P5+1 should engage Iran in follow-on negotiations regarding its nuclear program. The first priority in this regard should be for Iran to extend the expiring sunset provisions in the 2015 nuclear deal, in exchange for greater sanctions relief from the United States. Such relief could include allowing for “U-turn” transactions, in which Iranian funds held in foreign banks can pass through the U.S. financial system, or relaxing some limited aspects of the direct U.S. embargo.
If negotiations on regional issues make progress, the United States should show flexibility on sanctions relief. Likewise, a stalemate in regional diplomacy should affect the nuclear discussions. But neither track should be allowed to hold the other hostage. Some discussions, such as those regarding Iran’s missile program or regional agreements on civilian nuclear use, may overlap them both.
OTHER PLAYERS
For this strategy to work, the United States will have to convince Israel, the Gulf states (especially Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates), and the U.S. Congress to play constructive roles. The United States should assure its partners in the Middle East that while Iran’s nuclear program remains a priority, Washington will put greater emphasis on the regional issues than it did in the past. It should signal from the start that it is aiming not naively to transform Iran or the region but to construct practical deals, supported by U.S. diplomacy, that de-escalate tensions.
Congress may pose the greatest difficulty to a Biden administration that seeks to reengage. A Trump administration can rely on Republicans to fall into line if it reengages with Iran and on Democrats to welcome de-escalation. Biden, however, would need to persuade Congress that his administration’s approach will address concerns about nuclear deal sunsets, ballistic missiles, and regional issues and to emphasize that it can and will reimpose sanctions if necessary. A Biden administration could consider creative ways to maximize Republican buy-in: say, by developing a bipartisan “gang” of members who are leaders on national security, from whom the administration would solicit views on Iran and who might even observe some of the negotiations. If bipartisan support for engaging Iran proves elusive, Biden will have to take steps to harden any agreement against reversal.
Putting U.S. policy toward Iran on a firmer footing is an extraordinarily complex task that will require delicately aligning numerous players. The U.S. political transition in 2021 could offer either a President Biden or a President Trump a critical opportunity to do just that—but each would have to break with the past. Biden would need to move Democrats away from a nuclear-only strategy and put greater focus on the region. Trump would have to revise his pressure-only approach and engage in serious negotiations. Both would have to put diplomacy in the lead.
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  • ELISA CATALANO EWERS is an Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, on the adjunct faculty at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, and a former U.S. government official serving in the Obama and George W. Bush administrations.
  • ILAN GOLDENBERG is Director of the Middle East Security Program at the Center for a New American Security.
  • KALEIGH THOMAS is a Research Associate and recipient of the 1LT Andrew J. Bacevich Jr., USA Award at the Center for a New American Security.

posted for fair use
 

jward

passin' thru
Paratroopers fire 20 TOW missiles in return to large-scale ground combat training

Todd South

12 minutes ago

Paratroopers from 1st, 2nd and 3rd brigades of the 82nd Airborne Division got the rather rare opportunity to fire 20 tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided, or TOW, anti-tank missiles Sept. 27 on Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

Soldiers with the 82nd Airborne Division recently conducted a large-scale missile fire, one that some soldiers don’t get to see for an entire enlistment, if ever.

Anti-tank platoons from 1st, 2nd and 3rd brigades of the 82nd fired 20 tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided anti-tank missiles on Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Some TOW gunners might serve more than one enlistment without doing an actual live fire of the weapons system. Individual rounds can cost between $55,000 and $94,000, depending on the variant, according to industry sources.

But this type of training folds into the Army’s shift back to large-scale combat operations training. Should the 82nd be dropped into a fight with Russia or China, knocking out tanks or other armored formations will be crucial.

Soldiers with the Company B, 1st Battalion, 5th Field Artillery Regiment, 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division fired hundreds of rounds a day for two week straight testing upgrades to the M109A7 Self-Propelled 155mm Paladin Howitzer. (Army)

This Army unit tested the newest Paladin howitzer by firing hundreds of rounds a day for weeks
Cannon-cockers with the 1st Infantry Division’s “Bonecrusher” Battery fired hundreds of artillery rounds a day for two weeks straight to test the Army’s newest upgrades to the Paladin howitzer.
Todd South

“When we jump in as 82nd Airborne Division, we heavy drop those vehicles into a battle, sending our paratroopers from a C-17 or C-130, find those vehicles, pick those up, then execute a search and destroy of tanks,” said Capt. Matthew Dakota, officer-in-charge of the Sept. 27 shoot and Delta Company commander with the 2nd Battation, 2nd Brigade Combat Team.
Shoots such as these are also within larger Army plans to increase training volume and the number of units participating. In 2018 soldiers with the 1st Battalion, 5th Artillery Regiment, fired hundreds of rounds with the 155mm Paladin self-propelled howitzerat Fort Riley, Kansas, during a near continuous, two-week training cycle.

The TOW opportunity came somewhat suddenly, in the midst of Dakota’s unit readiness training. About three months of preparation got the gunners and paratroopers ready to shoot these weapons.

Lt. Col. Michael Burns, public affairs officer with the 82nd, noted that the division’s responsibility as an immediate response force means that paratroopers trained on such systems gives them the “ability to protect their units, gives us a tactical advantage as well.”
Paratroopers assigned to the 82nd Airborne Division execute a live fire range using the tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided, or TOW, weapon system. The Improved Target Acquisition System provides long-range sensor and anti-armor/precision assault fire capabilities. (Staff Sgt. Anthony Johnson/Army)
Paratroopers assigned to the 82nd Airborne Division execute a live fire range using the tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided, or TOW, weapon system. The Improved Target Acquisition System provides long-range sensor and anti-armor/precision assault fire capabilities. (Staff Sgt. Anthony Johnson/Army)
Some new soldiers might not understand the significance of the shoot, but more experienced soldiers do.

“It’s a pretty rare opportunity,” said Staff Sgt. Joseph McElroy of 1st Platoon, Delta Company.

McElroy, who helps run the basic skills trainer and has completed the heavy weapons leader course, said it was the first time he’s seen a live fire of this key weapon.

And they got to shoot the new, wirelessly controlled variant.

In rotations to the Joint Readiness Training Center in Fort Polk, Louisiana, they typically shoot a simulated attack with the systems, McElroy said.

This shoot was much more than a dry run.

Dakota said that they simulated combat conditions as best as possible to make the shoot realistic for the soldiers.

“You can spend all the time you want in simulators at the electronic range, but it really doesn’t compare to feeling the power of the weapons system as it leaves the launch tube,” Dakota said.

They worked on issued intelligence, coordination and sustainment of the formation to the shoot site. Soldiers then moved. That force included 16 vehicles in a fleet, eight equipped with TOWs using two vehicles, one in an elevated firing position.

The scenario included a squad leader, called into position to identify targets at 1,100 meters, who communicated with the vehicles to set up the fires and then destroy the targets.

That’s well within the range of the system, whose optics can spot targets out to 10km and hit targets past the 4km mark, knocking out some enemy main battle tanks with one shot.

Spc. Steven Cronin is serving at his first duty station at Fort Bragg. He’s been in uniform all of about 18 months.

The infantryman/TOW gunner with 1st Platoon, Delta Company, had never worked hands-on with the system outside of a simulator.

“It’s very exciting, I knew of only a few gunners able to shoot them,” he said.
Staff Sgt. Joseph McElroy, a platoon sergeant with 2nd Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division, conducts safety checks during a live fire range on Fort Bragg, North Carolina. (Staff Sgt. Anthony Johnson/Army)
Staff Sgt. Joseph McElroy, a platoon sergeant with 2nd Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division, conducts safety checks during a live fire range on Fort Bragg, North Carolina. (Staff Sgt. Anthony Johnson/Army)
Was he nervous about taking an expensive, perhaps once-a-tour shot and missing?

“We were definitely nervous to miss the target,” he said. “You don’t want to be the guy to miss.”

But we had a good train up, the (basic skills trainer) helps a lot," Cronin said. “I didn’t miss.”

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jward

passin' thru
‘Blue Homeland’ and the Irredentist Future of Turkish Foreign Policy
Aykan Erdemir and Philip Kowalski

September 30, 2020


02


Turkey and Greece, two NATO allies, nearly experienced a full-fledged military conflict in August. Two of their warships collided during a naval standoff over hydrocarbon exploration in the Eastern Mediterranean. This follows a similar naval incident in June between three Turkish vessels and the frigate of another NATO ally, France, prompting an inquiry that the alliance has been trying to keep under wraps to prevent further discord among its ranks. Behind these incidents lies Turkey’s embrace of an assertive naval concept, namely the “blue homeland,” that is poised to disrupt the transatlantic alliance in the years to come.

The “blue homeland” is an irredentist concept that claims vast sections of the Aegean and Mediterranean seas, including Greek and Cypriot maritime borders and hydrocarbon deposits, for Turkey. What began as a fringe idea among the anti-Western brass of the Turkish navy has morphed into a popular nationalist aspiration fronted by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. “Blue homeland” will continue to damage Ankara’s diplomatic relations, since Erdoğan will find it difficult to step away from maximalist claims he has personally cultivated.

The tendency to see the Turkish president’s belligerence merely as posturing for domestic consumption, and failure to develop a concerted transatlantic strategy, has provided Erdoğan with the time and opportunity to institutionalize his irredentist thinking. Absent pushback from the West, Turkish foreign and security policy will reflect Erdoğan’s worldview for decades to come. The United States and the European Union should, in response, work together to discourage the Turkish president from continuing to play a destabilizing role in NATO’s southeastern flank. They should also engage and support Turkey’s pro-Western dissidents and help amplify their voices in a media landscape almost entirely dominated by Erdoğan. Coordinating a Western response — while extremely difficult — is essential to mitigating the most damaging effects of current Turkish foreign policy.

Background to ‘Blue Homeland’
The “blue homeland” naval concept, first coined in 2006, does not stem from Erdoğan’s Islamist-rooted Justice and Development Party. Instead, as Ryan Gingeras lays out in detail in his War on the Rocks piece, its origins lie with two staunchly secularist naval officers who later developed links with the Maoist-rooted neo-nationalist Homeland Party. The party and its predecessor, the Workers’ Party, were once fierce opponents of Erdoğan and his political party. However, the Homeland Party has since entered into a tactical alliance with the Justice and Development Party as the Turkish president gradually turned to his former adversaries among the ultranationalists and Eurasianists (a faction that advocates Turkey joining the Russia- and China-led anti-Western geopolitical camp) in a bid to hold onto power.

Cem Gürdeniz, a retired Turkish rear admiral who is one of the architects of the “blue homeland,” presents the concept as a response to an existential threat, and offers it as guaranteeing the ability to “sleep comfortably at home.” Gürdeniz sees the Ottoman failure to control the seas as the cause of the empire’s demise and warns that naval supremacy is crucial for the survival of the Turkish Republic, which in his opinion continues to remain in the crosshairs of Western imperialism. While the “blue homeland” is most immediately linked to maximalist Turkish claims in areas where Cyprus and Greece assert jurisdiction, Gürdeniz ultimately argues that it is also key for Turkey’s expansion of its political and economic influence across the region. Since he believes that “the Mediterranean is not sufficient for an expanding Turkey,” he urges Ankara to take control of the “Persian Gulf, Sea of Oman, Arabian Sea, Red Sea, the Eastern waters of the Atlantic Ocean, [and] North Africa.” Within the Eurasianist paradigm, the “blue homeland” is part of a broader strategy of confronting the West and establishing Turkish supremacy in the region.

For Erdoğan, this concept is also a means to expand Islamist influence. More specifically, he hopes that Turkish domination of the Eastern Mediterranean will boost Turkey’s military and proxy presence in Libya, Syria, Iraq, and beyond, and thereby strengthen the footprint of the Muslim Brotherhood and its agenda.
The makeshift alliance between Eurasianists and Erdoğan is riddled with contradictions. For example, Gürdeniz spent almost four years in prison on trumped-up charges brought by a judicial system controlled by Erdoğan and the shadowy network of Erdoğan’s former ally-turned-archnemesis, Fethullah Gülen. When asked about his troubled past with Erdoğan, Gürdeniz claims that he and his fellow Eurasianists are supporting the state, not the Turkish president, although he also argues that Erdoğan has learned his lesson since then.

Turkey’s Political Opposition in a Bind
Turkey’s opposition, meanwhile, finds it difficult to oppose Erdoğan’s “blue homeland” policy and rhetoric, which taps into broader nationalist sentiment. The leader of Turkey’s pro-secular main opposition Republican People’s Party, for example, accused the European Union of a “double standard” when weighing Turkish rights in the Eastern Mediterranean versus those of Greece. Nevertheless, two other Republican People’s Party politicians managed to articulate their criticism. Lawmaker and former ambassador Ünal Çeviköz slammed the government for its “Neo-Ottomanist foreign policy” and warned Erdoğan’s intervention in Syria gives a premonition of where tensions in the Mediterranean are currently headed. Meanwhile, Gürsel Uçar, the Republican People’s Party mayor of the town of Datça on the Aegean coast, which is only 12 miles from the Greek island of Symi, posed next to a banner with the words “Peace Will Win” — honoring the close relations that many Turkish coastal towns have with neighboring Greek communities only a stone’s throw away.

Political parties to the right of the Republican People’s Party have been even more vocal in their support of Ankara’s maritime claims. Meral Akşener, leader of the center-right Good Party, tweeted that she considers the security of the “blue homeland” to be equally important to the security of the motherland. Her position echoed her archrival, far-right Nationalist Action Party leader Devlet Bahçeli, who has given his blessings for military escalation with Greece and the European Union — accusing Turkey’s opponents of “stepping on the nerve endings of the Turkish nation” and vowing that things would end “very badly” for Greece.

The most vocal opposition to the Erdoğan government’s maximalist maritime claims has come from the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party, which knows the dangers that stem from the Turkish president’s belligerent rhetoric. Peoples’ Democratic Party co-leaders Pervin Buldan and Mithat Sancar issued a statement rejecting Turkey’s “policy of tension in the Eastern Mediterranean” and urging a policy of peace instead. Meanwhile, another party lawmaker, Garo Paylan, called for a fair agreement between Turkey and its Eastern Mediterranean neighbors to share the natural gas, warning that the current path threatened disaster for Greek and Turkish people alike.
 

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Despite draconian restrictions on freedom of expression in Turkey and the purge of over 6,000 academics, Turkish intellectuals have also voiced words of caution in response to rising tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean. Ilhan Uzgel, a professor of international relations purged from Ankara University in 2017, has characterized the current crisis between Turkey and Greece as “useless” and “artificial.” Uzgel believes that the crisis will amount to little more than a “dogfight” — and one that will end up with a U.S. diplomatic intervention that brings the disagreement back to where it started — with nothing ending up resolved.

Aydın Selcen, a former Turkish diplomat who now writes for one of the few remaining critical outlets in Turkey, has warned: “Ankara appears to be in desperate need to have a mini armed conflict of sorts. It will be better for everyone in Brussels, Paris and Athens in my humble opinion not to play into Erdoğan’s hands.” Similarly, Yunus Emre Açıkgönül, another former Turkish diplomat who is now a Ph.D. student at the United Nations University for Peace in Costa Rica and an expert in maritime delimitation law, has pointed out that the International Court of Justice would not recognize any maximalist maritime claims in the Eastern Mediterranean. He notes the legal precedents set by island-maritime boundary cases such as the Saint-Pierre and Miquelon disagreement between France and Canada and the Archipelago of San Andrés dispute between Colombia and Nicaragua, which indicate the court would rule for an equitable delimitation of the maritime borders between Turkey and its neighbors, Cyprus and Greece.

Such calls for calm and reason are unlikely to elicit a positive response from the wider Turkish public. Cross-border military operations in Syria and Iraq remain popular in Turkey, gaining support beyond Erdoğan’s base — a popularity that the Turkish president has been eager to exploit to distract from Turkey’s failing economy. Furthermore, the government metes out penalties to those who dare to speak out against Erdoğan’s military campaigns. When Turkey’s peace process with the terrorist-designated Kurdistan Workers’ Party broke down in 2015, the Erdoğan government jailed and investigated activists who signed a petition urging the end of military operations and a continuation of the peace plan. Activists who spoke out against military operations in Syria in early 2018 were similarly jailed and accused of spreading “terrorist propaganda.”
Turkey’s restrictive media landscape further limits the reach of sound analysis by the likes of Uzgel and Açıkgönül. Baskın Oran, a retired professor of international relations and a leading human rights advocate, warns in his piece on the Eastern Mediterranean tensions that the current crisis is happening because “95% of newspapers and TVs, especially TRT [Turkish Radio and Television Corp.], distort the truth morning and evening.” Not only that, but opponents of the government’s decisions are subject to vicious troll attacks on social media, leading many to self-censorship.

Turkey’s suffocating intellectual climate has slowly but surely transformed public attitudes on issues that were previously unthinkable. The Erdoğan government’s irredentist figures are even questioning the Treaty of Lausanne, signed between the Turkish national movement in Ankara and the allied powers of World War I, which has long represented a resounding diplomatic victory recognizing the legitimacy of the new Turkish state and its 1923 borders. If one is to believe the government propaganda in outlets such as TRT, even this peace treaty is now up for “debate.” This is a dangerous path that leads to Turkey making revisionist claims on its neighbors’ territory. If the growing popularity of the “blue homeland” is any indication, irredentist sentiment is becoming the common reality in Erdoğan’s Turkey.

What Should the West Do?
Many policymakers and analysts in Washington and European capitals continue to believe that Erdoğan’s belligerent posturing in the Eastern Mediterranean is in part theatrics aimed at wooing the Turkish electorate and in part a bargaining ploy. So when the Turkish president agreed to resume exploratory talks over Ankara’s contested maritime claims with Athens after a four-year hiatus and withdrew its seismic research vessel, Oruç Reis, from waters claimed by Greece, the European Union was quick to walk back its threats to impose sanctions. This policy reversal came despite Nicosia’s attempts to keep them on the agenda by making them a prerequisite for greenlighting sanctions against Belarus.

One of Turkey’s leading foreign policy observers warns that Erdoğan’s move is “just a tactical pause … until the end of the upcoming E.U. summit in a bid to dodge possible EU sanctions.” Nevertheless, Berlin’s reported and Washington’s rumored pressure on the European Union against sanctioning Turkey will strengthen Erdoğan’s strategy of repeatedly escalating and de-escalating tensions to extract concessions from his European counterparts. The United States and the European Union should take the Turkish president’s belligerent rhetoric and policies seriously and develop a concerted strategy that does not shy away from holding Erdoğan accountable through targeted sanctions. More importantly, they should push back against Erdoğan’s trademark move of driving a wedge among E.U. member states as well as within the transatlantic alliance.

The key to an effective transatlantic response is developing a “containgagement” strategy (i.e., containment and engagement) that combines the right mix of sanctions (targeting Erdoğan’s inner circle and kleptocratic cronies) and other punitive measures with incentives to encourage Erdoğan to step back from his disruptive policies and rhetoric. The impunity the Turkish president has enjoyed so far for his purchase of the S-400 air defense system from Russia, his role in facilitating Iran’s sanctions evasion schemes, and hostage diplomacy involving Western nationals continue to embolden his belligerence. Given Turkey’s ongoing economic crisis, Erdoğan would be interested to sign trade deals with both the United States and the European Union and be potentially open to the idea of changing policies in exchange. If Erdoğan approaches the International Monetary Fund for a bailout package, any financial lifeline should also come with strict conditions for democratic reforms, transparency, and accountability.

It is also crucial for the United States and the European Union to engage with and support Turkey’s embattled pro-Western dissidents. The Erdoğan government’s brutal crackdown on the opposition, chokehold on the media, and restrictions on freedom of expression make it nearly impossible for critical voices to be heard. Supporting Turkey’s independent media outlets and offering Turkish dissidents platforms to articulate their alternative vision will help elevate voices for peace and democracy in the country. All Western delegations to Turkey should make it standard practice to hold formal meetings with pro-Western stakeholders, including opposition politicians, activists, and intellectuals.

Looking Ahead
In September 2019, Erdoğan posed for a photograph in front of a redrawn map of Turkey’s maritime borders in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean. The map denies any continental shelf or exclusive economic zone to Cyprus or to many of Greece’s Aegean islands. The photograph sums up Erdoğan’s approach — stoke nationalist sentiment in Turkey to advance the country’s maximalist foreign policy positions.

While the West disagrees over how to respond to Turkey’s assertive foreign policy, Erdoğan continues his efforts to popularize belligerent and irredentist territorial claims. Turkey’s opposition parties will continue to feel pressure to join Erdoğan’s saber rattling as the “blue homeland” naval concept takes hold as an expression of nationalist aspirations. Even worse, Erdoğan’s irredentism may outlive his time in office and simply become a part of mainstream Turkish political culture. Turkey’s Western allies would fare better by taking threats hurled by Erdoğan and his ultranationalist allies seriously and devise a concerted response today if they, just like the Turkish opposition, don’t want to be haunted by Erdoğanist phantoms in the decades to come.


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