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Will Russia Further Lower Its Nuclear Weapons Use Threshold?

In August 2020, noted Russian journalist Pavel Felgenhauer warned, “The Kremlin is constantly playing the deterrence game by trying to scare the West. But this situation has two dangerous ramifi

www.realcleardefense.com

Will Russia Further Lower Its Nuclear Weapons Use Threshold?

By Mark B. Schneider
September 19, 2020

(Russian Defense Ministry Press Service via AP)

In August 2020, noted Russian journalist Pavel Felgenhauer warned, “The Kremlin is constantly playing the deterrence game by trying to scare the West. But this situation has two dangerous ramifications. First, the nuclear threshold is becoming lower: in any serious skirmish, the Russian Navy would either need to go nuclear or risk being sunk. And second, while the Russian leadership believes it has surpassed the West militarily thanks to its dazzling superweapons, Moscow's threshold for employing military force in conflict situations may also drop further.” Indeed, Putin’s new superweapons are all nuclear-armed or nuclear-capable. For over twenty years, Felgenhauer, who has warned about the risk posed by Russian, first use of low-yield nuclear weapons, continues to believe that Russia might use nuclear weapons in very limited conflicts.https://www.realcleardefense.com/ar...clear_weapons_use_threshold_577995.html#_edn1

It is noteworthy that Putin’s 2017 decree on the Russian Navy directed that concerning non-strategic naval nuclear forces, “Indicators of the effectiveness of measures undertaken to execute the State Policy on Naval Operations are:….b) the capability of the Navy to damage an enemy’s fleet at a level not lower than critical with the use of non-strategic nuclear weapons.” Since NATO navies do not have naval tactical nuclear weapons, this directive relates to nuclear warfighting and to the advantage that tactical nuclear weapons give Russia, rather than deterrence. Russia has a wide variety of naval non-strategic nuclear weapons.[ii] In 2015, the Russian Ambassador to Denmark stated, “if Denmark joins the American-led missile defense shield. If they do, then Danish warships will be targets for Russian nuclear missiles.”

We are now seeing a large increase in Russian military exercises and training. In late June 2020, Russia’s Defense Minister General of the Army Sergei Shoigu said, “During it [the summer training period], over 15,500 various combat training measures are planned. Special attention will be paid to the preparations for the Kavkaz-2020 strategic command and staff exercise.” In December 2019, General Shoigu said that in 2019 Russia had “over 18,500 drills and exercises.” This is significantly higher than what General Shoigu indicated in December 2018 when he said that in 2019 there would be, “Over 4,000 various types of drills and nearly 8,500 practical combat training events…” As noted British analyst Roger McDermott pointed out in September 2020, “Despite the global COVID-19 pandemic, the Russian Armed Forces have vigorously pursued the summer combat training schedule throughout the country’s five military districts (MDs).”

Two weeks before Felgenhauer’s article appeared, Russia announced a “snap drill” ordered by President Putin -- a no notice large-scale military exercise, which is particularly threatening to NATO because it demonstrates that Russian mobilization capabilities are much faster than NATO’s 30-30-30 plan (mobilizing 30 battalions, 30 fighter squadrons and 30 warships), which is not yet functional. The Russian Defense Ministry said:

In accordance with the decision of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, a surprise inspection of the troops of the Southern and Western military districts, separate formations of the central subordination, airborne troops and marines of the Northern and Pacific fleets is being conducted . . . During the inspection, 56 tactical-level exercises are planned to be conducted with the troops. Thirty-five grounds and training fields are being used, as well as 17 sea ranges of the Black and Caspian seas. In total, 149,755 military personnel, 26,820 weapons and military equipment, 414 aircraft, 106 ships and support vessels were involved in the sudden check.

The day before the snap drill was announced, the Russian Defense Ministry indicated there would be a drill involving the Iskander-M nuclear-capable missile system in the Southern Military District, which is one of the areas for the snap drill. In August 2020, Russia announced a “special tactical exercise," which involved simulated Iskander missile launches and the inspection of the “special hardware of the missile formation.” “Special” is a word used in Russia to describe nuclear weapons.


In late July 2020, the Russian nuclear-armed ICBM force (the RVSN) staged a major exercise involving operations in a nuclear war, including radiological decontamination of the ICBM launchers, which were on “combat patrol routes.” They were clearly fighting a mock nuclear war. In late June, July and August 2020, there were also threatening flights by Russian nuclear-capable bombers and other aircraft near the U.S., NATO allies, Ukraine and Finland. In August 2020, on the same day as the Iskander exercise involving “special weapons,” General Shoigu participated in an exercise of the mobile ICBM force.[iii]


The Caucasus 2020 (Kavkaz 2020) exercise, the largest planned exercise for 2020, will be, according to the Russian Defense Ministry and its Chief of the General Staff General of the Army Valery Gerasimov, a “special exercise.” The Russian Defense Ministry announced that the exercise will involve 80,000 troops, but Russia will not honor the Vienna document’s mandatory inspection provisions because of a contrived interpretation of this agreement. The probability of Russian simulated nuclear weapons use in such an exercise is very high. Kavkaz-2016 reportedly simulated the Russian launch of cruise missiles carrying non-strategic nuclear weapons.


In August 2020, Russia conducted a major naval exercise near Alaska, involving 50 ships and 40 aircraft, which involved cruise missile launches.


This pattern of preparation for war will likely continue and involve nuclear-capable forces.


In June 2020, Russia released a decree by President Putin on Russian nuclear deterrence policy, the first of its kind made public, which indicated a much lower threshold for nuclear weapons first use than was evident in the unclassified military doctrine publications released in 2010 and 2014. While much of the substance of Putin’s nuclear decree apparently goes back a long time, it clearly has new elements in it. Secretary of the Security Council of Russia Nikolay Patrushev has characterized it as a “new Doctrine.” As Dr. Stephen Blank observed over 20 years ago, in Russian military doctrine, “Essentially there is no clear firebreak between conventional and nuclear scenarios in the open sources.” The 2020 decree presents a major but incomplete victory for the most hardline elements in the Russian military. The most fanatic of Russia’s generals want an open declaration of nuclear preemption as Russian strategy. In November 2018, the Russian Federation Council voted to urge the Kremlin to adopt a pre-emptive nuclear strike strategy against NATO and authorized it. (It already was secret Russian policy).


Putin’s decree indicates that Russian state-run RT (formerly Russia Today) and the independent Interfax[iv] news agency were accurate when they both reported Russian nuclear doctrine allows for nuclear weapons first use “…if the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation are under threat.” [v] (Emphasis in the original). Paragraph 4 of Putin’s 2020 decree states, “The state nuclear deterrence policy is of a defensive nature and is directed at supporting the capabilities of nuclear forces at a level sufficient to ensure nuclear deterrence and to guarantee the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state and to deter a potential adversary from aggression against the Russian Federation and (or) its allies in the event of the emergence of an armed conflict by preventing the escalation of military activities and ending them on conditions acceptable to the Russian Federation and (or) its allies.”[vi]


In reviewing Putin’s decree, Russian expatriate Dr. Nikolai Sokov has pointed out, “Today, it is also easy to imagine a situation when the “existence” of Russia would not be threatened, but its ‘territorial integrity’ would—for example, an attempt to use force to return Crimea to Ukraine. The change of language may be explainable, but the presence of two very different definitions of nuclear threshold is not.” It actually is. The decree is not the entire Russia nuclear weapons use policy, which has always been included in classified documents.


Continued.....

 

[Housecarl]

Continued.....

In 2014-2015, there were a number of high level Russian nuclear threats relating to Ukraine, which were inconsistent with the announced Russian nuclear doctrine. Dmitry Adamsky of the Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy and Strategy noted regarding Ukraine that Russia was “…engaged in nuclear signaling aimed to distance Western support out of fear of escalation, possibly also to soften further sanctions.” In 2015, President Putin said that during the Crimea crisis, he would have put Russian nuclear forces on alert if it were necessary. In July 2014, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov made a nuclear threat relating to Crimea by referencing their nuclear doctrine. In September 2014, then-Ukrainian Minister of Defense Colonel General Valeriy Heletey wrote, "The Russian side has threatened on several occasions across unofficial channels that, in the case of continued resistance, they are ready to use a tactical nuclear weapon against us.”


The importance of these nuclear threats is that they were made to support blatant Russian aggression. Putin’s justification for the possible use of nuclear weapons in the Crimea crisis was that Crimea “is our historical territory. Russian people live there. They were in danger. We cannot abandon them.” As Dr. Stephen Blank has pointed out, protection of ethnic Russians was the rationale for Russian military intervention in Georgia, Crimea, Donbas, and Moldova. In 2015, Putin linked the protection of ethnic Russians to nuclear weapons use. Thus, the territorial integrity of Russia was changed to include the just conquered territory. In June 2017, Putin declared Russia would defend Crimea “with all means available to us.”[vii] The reason these statements appear to go beyond published Russian nuclear doctrine at that time is that that the published version was never complete. It still isn't complete, but it is apparently closer to it than ever before.


Russian linkage of nuclear weapons first use to “sovereignty” is very disturbing because of the ambiguous nature of this concept and its potential permissiveness. In 2008, General of the Army Yuriy Baluyevskiy, then-Chief of the General Staff, declared that to “defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Russia and its allies, military forces will be used, including preventively, including with the use of nuclear weapons.” In 2007 Putin declared, “The nuclear weapons remain the most important guarantee of Russia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and play a key role in maintaining the regional balance and stability.” Putin has said some amazing things about the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Russia, making these criteria potentially very permissive. President Putin has characterized cyber espionage (not cyber-attack) as “a direct violation of the state’s sovereignty…” In August 2020, President Putin stated that the Union State Treaty with Belarus obliges the parties to “to help each other protect their sovereignty, external borders and “stability. This is exactly what it says.”


Paragraph 19 of Putin’s decree listed four specific conditions for nuclear weapons first use:


The conditions which determine the possibility for the use by the Russian Federation of nuclear weapons are:


a) the receiving of creditable information concerning the launch of ballistic missiles attacking the territories of the Russian Federation and (or) its allies;


b) the use by an enemy of a nuclear weapon or other types of weapons of mass destruction against the territories of the Russian Federation and (or) its allies;


c) enemy actions against critically important state or military facilities of the Russian Federation, the disablement of which will lead to a disruption of retaliatory operations of the nuclear forces;


d) aggression against the Russian Federation involving the use of conventional weaponry, which threatens the existence of the state itself.[viii]


All four of Putin’s announced conditions allow for nuclear weapons first use in non-nuclear warfare. Paragraph 19(A), (B) and (C) all contain conditions for first use that are somewhat lower than even what appeared in the most alarming of the open source reports concerning Russian willingness to use nuclear weapons first. The supposed limitation of nuclear weapons first use in conventional war in previous editions of Russian military doctrine to situations in which there was an existential threat to Russia turned out to be a deception since all four of the conditions allow for first use of nuclear weapons in non-nuclear war.


The condition allowing for a nuclear response to the use of “other types of weapons of mass destruction…” (paragraph 19[C]) is broader than the three previous formulations in the military doctrine documents which spoke specifically about chemical and biological attack. This is clearly a change in declaratory policy. Michael Kofman from the Center for Naval Analysis has pointed out it is “…unclear how weapons of mass destruction are defined, some Russian military writing posits conventional capabilities as having strategic effects similar to nuclear weapons.” There are other possibilities, such as a very damaging cyber-attack.


The condition on the use of nuclear weapons in response to non-nuclear attacks on “nuclear forces” rather than “strategic nuclear forces” in paragraph 19(C) opens up the possibility of a nuclear response to a non-nuclear attack on a vast number of Russian military facilities, airbases, naval ships and Army bases and units. This is because dual capability (conventional and nuclear capability) is almost universal in Russia.[ix] The Russians are trying to use the threat of nuclear escalation to negate effectively our conventional and cyber capabilities. If they impose this targeting constraint upon us, we lose the war. Kofman’s suggestion that this is limited to cyber-attacks on nuclear command and control facilities contradicts the plain meaning of the provision. It clearly includes nuclear delivery vehicles and weapons. The provision can also be read to include cyber-attacks, but it certainly is not limited to cyber-attacks on nuclear command and control, which are not even mentioned. State documents on nuclear weapons use issues that do not contain "sloppy language." Russian doctrinal writing in 1999 indicated that a nuclear strike might be used in response to conventional attacks on targets that are not even military.


The implicit meaning of the condition in paragraph 19(A) is that the launch of a single ballistic missile at Russia would be a justification for a Russian nuclear strike even before it was known what type of warhead the missile carried. This was made explicit in August 2020 when two senior officers of the Russian General Staff, Major General Andrei Sterlin and Colonel Alexander Khryapin, writing in the official newspaper of the Defense Ministry Red Star, noted that “. . . there will be no way to determine if an incoming ballistic missile is fitted with a nuclear or a conventional warhead, and so the military will see it as a nuclear attack.” They added, “Any attacking missile will be perceived as carrying a nuclear warhead” and, “The information about the missile launch will be automatically relayed to the Russian military-political leadership, which will determine the scope of retaliatory action by nuclear forces depending on the evolving situation.”


This is irresponsible in light of the potential consequences to Russia, but it is classic Putin. Indeed, in 2015, Putin declared that "Fifty years ago, the streets of Leningrad taught me one thing: If a fight’s inevitable, you must strike first.” Applying street fighting tactics to nuclear war is not the smartest thing to do if a nation wants to survive. Yet, In March 2018, Alexander Velez-Green of the Harvard Belfer Center wrote, “Military Thought has published at least 18 articles in support of preemption against NATO from 2007 to 2017.” Military Thought is the journal of the Russian General Staff. In 2014, Dr. Sokov wrote that “nuclear exercises have been conducted with targets in Europe, the Pacific, Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean, and even the continental United States,” further adding that, “…all large-scale military exercises that Russia conducted beginning in 2000 featured simulations of limited nuclear strikes.” In January 2016, the annual report by the Secretary General of NATO indicated Russia in its Zapad (West) exercises not only simulated nuclear attacks against NATO but that in 2013 Russia simulated nuclear attacks against Sweden, which is not a NATO nation. This is inconsistent with Russia’s declaratory policy concerning so-called negative assurances. Negative assurances pledge no nuclear weapons use against non-nuclear nations that are not allied with a nuclear power.


This emphasis on pre-emption is particularly dangerous because Russia plans to use nuclear weapons, including nuclear armed ICBMs, as part of its “escalate to de-escalate” or “escalate to win” strategy.[x] Part of it is the concept of “escalation dominance.” According to Dr. Blank, “arguably [escalation dominance] is merely a part of a much broader nuclear strategy that relies heavily upon the psychological and intimidating component of nuclear weapons.” In 2009, Lieutenant General Andrey Shvaychenko, then-Commander of the Strategic Missile Force (RVSN), outlined the role of the nuclear ICBM force in conventional war. He said, “In a conventional war, [the nuclear ICBMs] ensure that the opponent is forced to cease hostilities, on advantageous conditions for Russia, by means of single or multiple preventive strikes against the aggressors’ most important facilities.”[xi] The most amazing thing about this statement is the implication that the introduction of strategic nuclear weapons in conventional war would not start a nuclear war.


In 2017, then-Defense Intelligence Agency Director Lieutenant General Vincent Stewart affirmed that Russia is “the only country that I know of that has this concept of escalate to terminate or escalate to deescalate but they do have that built into their operational concept, we’ve seen them exercise that idea and it’s really kind of a dangerous idea…”[xii] He also said that he had seen no evidence that this policy was changing.[xiii]


Despite what Russia says about its possible response to the launch of even a single Western ballistic missile, Russia will clearly be launching nuclear-capable Kinzhal ballistic missiles against NATO in the event of a war. Paragraph 19(A) and (C) may be intended to deter conventional attacks on Russian territory in the event of a Russian invasion of NATO Europe. Paragraph 19(C) can justify a nuclear response to a conventional attack on almost any Russian military facility because virtually all Russian forces are nuclear-capable. Indeed, in 2018, President Putin stated Russia is developing nuclear weapons for “all types of forces.”


Putin’s decree contained implicit nuclear attack threats directed against NATO. In August 2020, the government-owned Russian newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta made these threats explicit:


We will not analyse what kind of warheads they have, nuclear or not, and in any case, at the time of launch, decision will be made on a retaliatory strike to deliver a missile strike on the territory of the state from which the launch was carried out in our direction,” said military analyst Alexander Perendzhiev, member of the Officers of Russia expert council. Moreover, according to him, we are talking not only about countries where such missiles are produced but also about the countries that have allowed to host such missiles.[xiv]


Putin’s June 2020 nuclear decree clearly is not the entirety of Russia’s nuclear first use strategy. It did not supersede Putin’s 2017 decree on the Russian Navy. There are classified elements, including provisions for pre-emptive nuclear strikes. (Russian announced in 2009 that is was classifying its nuclear doctrine. Putin’s 2020 decree appears to be a partial reversal of this policy.) [xv] In September 2014, General of the Army (ret.) Yuriy Baluyevskiy, who developed the 2010 revision of Russia’s nuclear doctrine when he was Deputy Secretary of the Russian National Security Council, stated that the “…conditions for pre-emptive nuclear strikes…is contained in classified policy documents.”[xvi] In 2003, then-Russian Minister of Defense Colonel General Sergei Ivanov explained why these plans were kept secret. He told a reporter:


What we say is one thing. That sounds cynical, but everything that we plan does not necessarily have to be made public. We believe that from the foreign policy viewpoint, it is better to say that. But what we actually do is an entirely different matter.


Continued.....

 

[Housecarl]

Continued.....

There are certainly other secret aspects of Russian nuclear weapons use doctrine. According to state-run RT, “It follows from the document that nuclear deterrence is aimed at ensuring that the potential adversary understands the inevitability of retaliation in the event of aggression against Russia and its allies.” This is more permissive than Paragraph 19. In March 2020, state-run Sputnik News said that Russian nuclear doctrine provided for nuclear first use “…in response to large-scale conventional aggression.” This could allow a nuclear response to a conventional attack that would not be a threat to Russia's existence. Moreover, what Russia is really talking about is not a response to aggression against Russia but a counterattack against Russian aggression, as was indicated in their nuclear threats related to Ukraine.


A hardline but very well-connected Russian journalist, Colonel (ret.) Nikolai Litovkin talked about what it would take for Russia to “push the button.” (Emphasis in the original). He wrote that while Russian strategy was defensive:


At the same time, a number of scenarios have been identified in which Russia could deploy nuclear weapons.


First, this pertains to the “build-up of general forces, including nuclear weapons delivery vehicles, in territories adjacent to the Russian Federation and its allies, and in adjacent offshore areas.”


Second, the “deployment of anti-ballistic missile defense systems and facilities, medium- and shorter-range cruise and ballistic missiles, precision non-nuclear and hypersonic weapons, strike drones, and directed-energy weapons by states that consider the Russian Federation to be a potential adversary.”


Third, the “creation and deployment in space of anti-ballistic missile defense facilities and strike systems.”


Fourth, the “possession by countries of nuclear weapons and (or) other types of weapons of mass destruction able to be used against the Russian Federation and (or) its allies, as well as the means to deliver them.”


Fifth, the “uncontrolled proliferation of nuclear weapons, their means of delivery, and technologies and equipment for their manufacture.”


And sixth, the “deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles in non-nuclear states.”


Moscow also sets forth additional situations in which it is ready to take “extreme measures.” Among them is the “receipt of reliable information about the launch of ballistic missiles attacking the territory of Russia and (or) its allies,” as well as the “enemy deployment of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction against Russia and (or) its allies.”


Furthermore, the command to deploy nuclear weapons will be given in the event of an “enemy attack on critical state and military facilities of the Russian Federation which, if incapacitated, would disrupt a nuclear response,” as well as “aggression using conventional weapons that threatens the existence of the Russian state.”


According to Marek Menkiszak, head of the Russian Department at Poland’s Centre for Eastern Studies in Warsaw, “…the list of moves which could fall under the Russian definition of ‘threatening’ is impressive, and contains both offensive and defensive actions by a potential adversary.” The Litovkin version of Russian nuclear first-use policy indicates that these “concerns” are really conditions for “pressing the button.” He is apparently saying that in addition to Paragraph 19 criteria in the Putin decree, just about any serious threat to Russia justifies first use of nuclear weapons. Moreover, it appeared in Russian state media without any disclaimer concerning whether or not this is state policy. Litovkin’s conditions for nuclear weapons' first use are actually similar to Russia’s nuclear missile targeting threats, which have involved missile defense facilities, troop deployments and non-existent U.S. INF missile deployments in Europe. Russia, including President Putin, has even threatened nuclear decapitation attacks against the U.S. with hypersonic missiles. Under Putin’s information warfare policy, nuclear threats are used “to achieve immediate strategic advantage.”


An August 2020 Red Star article, attributed to the General Staff, characterized the four conditions in the Putin decree as “redlines.” It also indicated that the political leadership would determine the scale of the nuclear response before they knew if the ballistic missile attack against Russia was nuclear. The response to a single missile launch against Russia, even without knowing the kind of warhead it carried, “will no doubt be crushing.”[xvii] Again, this is monumental stupidity because the consequences to Russia are ignored. This is irresponsibility turned into an art form.


The strong emphasis on escalation control in the original public discussion of nuclear first use in 1999 may be eroding, although there is still a considerable difference on initial nuclear first use. Keep in mind that the description of Russian targeting by General Shvaychenko cited above involves nuclear ICBM attacks “against the aggressors’ most important facilities.” This sounds more Soviet-like than the description of escalation in the doctrinal literature of 1999, which said Russia would “not to provoke the aggressor into escalating the use of nuclear weapons without a justified reason,” according to a First Deputy Defense Minister.


The new Russian nuclear doctrine in the context of massive modernization of Russian nuclear forces and constant nuclear first use exercises is very disturbing. It makes it critically necessary to modernize the U.S. nuclear deterrent capability.



Dr. Mark B. Schneider is a Senior Analyst with the National Institute for Public Policy. Before his retirement from the Department of Defense Senior Executive Service, Dr. Schneider served in a number of senior positions within the Office of Secretary of Defense for Policy including Principal Director for Forces Policy, Principal Director for Strategic Defense, Space and Verification Policy, Director for Strategic Arms Control Policy and Representative of the Secretary of Defense to the Nuclear Arms Control Implementation Commissions. He also served in the senior Foreign Service as a Member of the State Department Policy Planning Staff.


Notes:

https://www.realcleardefense.com/ar...ar_weapons_use_threshold_577995.html#_ednref1 “Are Russian Military Deliveries to Armenia during Fighting in Tovuz Accidental?,” Turan News Agency, August 13, 2020, available at Sign in to ProQuest 2433241217/ fulltext/1735CF59B993DB8DD7A/2?accountid=155509&site=professionalnewsstand&t:ac=1735CF59B993DB8DD7A/1&t:cp=maintain/resultcitationblocksbrief&t:zoneid=transactionalZone_173f7746b79


[ii] “In a Broad Context,” Krasnaya Zvezda Online, April 30, 2011. Translated by World News Connection. World News Connection is no longer available on the internet


[iii] “Russian defence chief visits nuclear missile unit - TV report,” BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union, August 11, 2020, available at Sign in to ProQuest 5CFAB5F96948C9F9/3?accountid=155509&site=professionalnewsstand&t:ac=1735CFAB5F96948C9F9/1&t:cp=maintain/resultcitationblocksbrief&t:zoneid=transactionalZone_173f785a34a


[iv] “Updated Russian military doctrine has no preemptive nuclear strike provision – source,” Interfax, December 10, 2014, available at http://www.interfax.com/newsinf.asp?pg=6&id=558118


[v] “Preemptive nuclear strike omitted from Russia’s new military doctrine – reports,” RT, December 10, 2014, available at Preemptive nuclear strike omitted from Russia’s new military doctrine - reports


[vi] “Putin approves state policy on nuclear deterrence – text,” BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union, June 4, 2020, available at Sign in to ProQuestfulltext/ 171E6F03B7B7D7382ED/2?accountid=155509&site=professionalnewsstand&t:ac=171E6F03B7B7D7382ED/1&t:cp=maintain/resultcitationblocksbrief&t:zoneid=transactionalZone_1728171393a


[vii] “Russia will defend Crimea with all possible means: Putin,” United News of India, June 15, 2017, available at Sign in to ProQuest


[viii] “Putin approves state policy on nuclear deterrence – text,” op. cit.


[ix] Alexander Mladenov, “Best in the Breed,” Air Forces Monthly, May 2017, p. 51


[x] “Senate Committee on Armed Services Hearing on U.S. Strategic Command Programs,” Political Transcript Wire, April 4, 2017, available at Sign in to ProQuest professional/professionalnewsstand/docview/ 1902238886/fulltext/167BE8951294B52C4B4/1?accountid=155509&site=professionalnewsstand&t:ac=1 67BE8951294B52C4B4/1&t:cp=maintain/Resultitationblocksbrief&t:zo neid=transactionalZone_16859081e63


[xi] “Russia may face large-scale military attack, says Strategic Missile Troops chief,” BBC Monitoring Former Soviet


Union, December 16, 2009, available at Sign in to ProQuestdocview/ 460433852/fulltext/173438170CB2F81FF58/1?accountid=155509&site=professionalnewsstand&t:ac=173438170CB2F81FF58/1&t:cp=maintain/resultcitationblocksbrief&t:zoneid=transactionalZone_173de004188


[xii] “S Armed Services Hearing on Worldwide Threats,” Political Transcript Wire, May 23, 2017, available at https: //dialog.proquest.com/professional/professionalnewsstand/docview/1902238886/fulltext/1738266AFAE364AFE88/1?accountid=155509&site=professionalnewsstand&t:ac=1738266AFAE364AFE88/1&t:cp=maintain/resultcitationblocksbrief&t:zoneid=transactionalZone_1741ce58604


[xiii] Ibid.


[xiv] “Russian pundits discuss new rules for use of nuclear weapons,” BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union, August 19, 2020, available at https://dialog.proquest.com/professional/professionalnewsstand/docview/24351 60686/ fulltext/1738C5577584F127A6B/1?accountid=155509&site=professionalnewsstand&t:ac=1738C5577584F127A6B/1&t:cp=maintain/resultcitationblocksbrief&t:zoneid=transactionalZone_17426d445a8


[xv] “Army; Closed Part of New Military Doctrine to Define Legal Aspects Of Forces’ Employment, Nuclear


Weapons―Gen. Staff,” Interfax, August 14, 2009, available https://dialog.proquest.com/professional/professional newsstand/ docview/443749342/fulltext/173D4BAD9862D0C73B8/1?accountid=155509&site=professionalnewss tand&t:ac=173D4BAD9862D0C73B8/1&t:cp=maintain/resultcitationblocksbrief&t:zoneid=transactionalZone_1746f39a927


[xvi] “Russia classifies information on pre-emptive nuclear strikes – military,” BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union, September 5, 2014, available at Interfax-AVN military news agency, Moscow, in Russian 0728,0752,0826Sep


14/BBC, available at Sign in to ProQuest 17344A2E7A6775A1A7F/1?accountid=155509&site=professionalnewsstand&t:ac=17344A2E7A6775A1A7F/1&t:cp=maintain/resultcitationblocksbrief&t:zoneid=transactionalZone_173df21b673


[xvii] “Russian pundits discuss new rules for use of nuclear weapons,” op. cit.

 

[Housecarl]

Hummm........

Posted for fair use.....

The Air Force Needs a New Non-Stealthy Bomber

There are important things the B-1 and B-52 do that the B-21 won’t.

www.defenseone.com

A B-1 Lancer and a B-52 Stratofortress fly over Barksdale Air Force Base, La., in 2015. U.S. Air Force / Tech. Sgt. Ted Daigle


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The Air Force Needs a New Non-Stealthy Bomber
There are important things the B-1 and B-52 do that the B-21 won’t.
Maj. Shane Praiswater
|
September 18, 2020

In 1957, the U.S. military began to worry that the Soviet Union might have more strategic bombers than the United States. That fear of a “bomber gap” turned out to be baseless, but today, a dangerous gap is emerging between the long-range strike capacity America needs and what will be available once today’s bombers retire. If not addressed, this new bomber gap might leave the United States and its allies more vulnerable to aggression much sooner than people realize.

While China and Russia aggressively pursue anti-access/area-denial strategies, the ability of bombers to employ standoff weapons will remain a linchpin of any U.S. strategy. In a near-peer conflict, how well the United States can employ massive waves of bombers might very well be the difference between victory and defeat. Non-stealth bombers such as the B-1 and B-52 have an important role to play in A2/AD scenarios because they can carry so many standoff weapons.

They also play an important role in deterrence and counterinsurgency operations. Non-stealth bombers send a visible signal to U.S. adversaries and can participate in any sort of allied exercise without betraying valuable intelligence. In a long-term conflict where the United States has air supremacy, such as in Afghanistan, bombers provide diverse and efficient options due to their weapons capacities and long loiter times. With the B-52 and B-1 headed for retirement, these capabilities are at risk.

Leaders should start the acquisition process for an affordable, modular, and non-stealth bomber to augment the B-21 Raider, the only bomber the U.S. plans to produce between now and 2050. The B-21 will be an exquisite but expensive aircraft and will not replace specific B-52 and B-1 capabilities. Starting this process now would prevent a bomber gap from disrupting the Air Force’s ability to counter China or Russia and would provide leaders valuable strategic off-ramps should acquisition plans change before 2050 (a year after China plans to become a dominant world power).

As it stands, the Air Force has done an admirable job of managing its aging bomber fleet. Still, when the B-52 retires in 2050, there will be only 100 B-21s in service, well short of the 225 bombers theoretically needed in the era of great power competition, a figure that reflects the findings of classified studies. Yet in 2019, Air Force Gen. Timothy Ray highlighted that the current game plan does not allow for a realistic path beyond 175 bombers.

The acquisition of 100 stealth B-21s, combined with the 75 existing B-52s, will result in a 175-bomber force before 2040 following the retirement of the B-2 and B-1. This compares favorably with the current fleet of about 140 bombers (75 B-52s, 20 B-2s, and 45 B-1s after the divestment of 17 aircraft).

However, questions remain. First, extending the B-52 to 2050 will mean replacing its engines and making other various upgrades, such as a new radar, to make it structurally viable and cost-efficient. Even if everything goes perfectly, there is no guarantee that the B-52 will last until 2050, when the jets will be nearly 90 years old. Structurally, the jet appears sound, but as the Air Force found out with the B-1, that assumption can change in an instant. Second, even if the B-52 does last until 2050, is it to be replaced? Or does the Air Force plan to have only one type of bomber in its inventory?

These issues are even more pressing considering the current state of the Air Force’s bomber fleet. Though the B-1 is younger than the B-52, the Rockwell-built bomber faces multiple structural issues after nearly two decades of continuous operations in Iraq and Syria. The Air Force saved the platform by temporarily standing it down in 2019, and the divestment of 17 aircraft will allow B-1 maintainers to focus on the best remaining jets. Like the B-52, there is no guarantee the B-1 will last until its planned retirement dates or will not need massive investments to do so. This is a problem, because analysts tend to assume that the United States will always have the long-range strike capacity it requires.

For example, in two War on the Rocks articles, authors debated whether the United States is prepared to counter China’s artificial islands. Gregory Poling argued that China’s man-made installations pose a significant problem for the United States. However, in a rebuttal, Olli Pekka Suorsa detailed how current and robust capabilities give the United States multiple options to deal with China’s outposts. What is disturbing about these debates, however, is how both authors take the current U.S. bomber fleet for granted. As Suorsa states, “Airpower would be at the forefront of an American approach to seriously degrade China’s ability to mount a substantial defense.” U.S. leaders seem to agree: as a CSIS analysis of the most recent budget request shows, leaders are giving the Air Force some priority in terms of resources. There is no mention, however, of any new bomber aside from the B-21.

Any major conflict with China is bound to be rife with difficulties, but even in Suorsa’s more optimistic assessment, the role of cruise missiles and bombers is critical. Stealth bombers such as the B-21 can penetrate A2/AD systems for targets requiring direct attack weapons, but non-stealth bombers can also provide hundreds of standoff weapons at the outset of hostilities. The same is true for Russia: even though the United States has bases and allies in the region, the sheer number of standoff weapons necessary to, for example, defeat the integrated air defenses of Kaliningrad, would require significant bomber participation.

Fighters also provide critical capabilities, but their ability to strike targets is limited due to their small payloads and short ranges. Fighters depend on bases and tankers relatively close to the front line, and in a major conflict involving waves of ballistic missiles, the security of these bases is a severe concern. Weapons capacity and the ability to deploy from long distances makes bombers indispensable, and as it stands, the United States is already lacking.

The Air Force has acknowledged this weapons-capacity issue by entertaining some novel ideas. The bomb truck concept, spearheaded by the Air Force’s assistant secretary of acquisitions, Dr. Will Roper, envisions modifying a civilian passenger or cargo jet to employ standoff weapons. Palletized munitions would allow cargo planes, such as a C-17, to convert their storage space into bomb bays capable of dropping ordinance.

Both the bomb truck and palletized munition options are appealing because of their low costs, but they are not long-term strategic answers. The truck would provide a short-term solution and would likely only carry a small number of standoff weapons. Palletized munitions might be a fantasy given the already limited supply and high demand for airlift assets.

Therefore, if 225 bombers are required, why not just buy 225 B-21s? The obvious answer is price: the Air Force might be lucky to only get 100 B-21s. Additionally, relying on a stealth-only bomber force would also rob the United States of important capabilities.

Of course, if a major conflict erupts and only 100 B-21s are available, other assets might pick up critical targets. The Army and Navy are working on hypersonic missiles, and the Space Force recently released its first capstone doctrine, which mentions “offensive weapons to deter adversaries from hostile actions.” The Army has ATACMS and is pursuing long-range precision fires, even if they would be inherently susceptible to ballistic missile reprisals. These emerging weapons might be enough to cover the bomber gap in a major conflict with Russia or China.

However, they would also be impractical and expensive for a sustained campaign against extremists in broken states. It is probably wishful thinking to hope that the United States will not get sucked into another conflict that would require what the B-52 and B-1 provided for decades in the Middle East: persistent and flexible weapons availability. The B-21, if it is an advanced version of the B-2, will not be appropriate for CAS (or many other low-risk missions) because of its payload, sensors, and the need to protect its signature profile. The same is true for the deterrence operations EUCOM and PACOM employ, where the B-1 and B-52 prove their ability to employ from long-distances with a whole host of allies. The B-21 will also not have the external carriage capabilities of the B-52, meaning that it will have less flexibility to carry any newly acquired weapon.

This argument mirrors that of the F-35 versus the F-15EX, where stealth capabilities come at the price of more flexible—and perhaps more realistically necessary—employment.

Great power competition demands the ability to efficiently counter China and Russia, conduct Afghanistan-style operations, and be fiscally responsible. Even if it were fiscally possible to acquire 225 B-21s, the price tag would presumably be astronomical, and Air Force’s bomber fleet would suddenly only be appropriate for selective missions.

The right choice
A proper acquisition strategy, therefore, should emphasize flexibility and redundant options. It is difficult to anticipate, in a conflict with Russia or China, what the tactical situation will be, how effective enemy A2/AD efforts become, or even if the United States can protect its homeland bases from conventional threats such as hypersonics. If the United States wishes to deter Russia and China in the future, it must continually expand its weapons delivery options. On many fronts, military leaders are doing just that. But ignoring the bomber fleet or reducing it to only 100 B-21s forfeits the opportunity to pursue flexible strategies at a relatively low cost.

Starting the acquisition process for a next-generation B-52, or the Next-Generation Strategic Bomber (this is the author’s term, not an official Air Force phrase) is the solution. It may seem early to start considering a replacement when the B-52 should fly until 2050, but acquisition programs can take decades. More importantly, starting now would allow leaders to accelerate the program and cover any bomber gaps should the B-52 fail before 2050, or if Congress declines to buy the planned number of B-21s (as happened with the B-2 or F-22).

The NGSB, to be affordable and flexible, would be a non-stealth, modular aircraft designed to accept defensive and offensive upgrades rapidly. Unlike the B-52, it should be able to land at any large airfield easily. To be nuclear-certified, the NGSB should be manned but require only two aircrew members, like a B-2 or an F-15E. Given its dynamic nature, the “pilot and weapons system officer” model might be most appropriate.
The crew compartment, like a B-52, could have room for up to 10 people, to allow for extra pilots, maintenance, security, and intelligence personnel. These airmen would make the NGSB expeditionary and able to operate in unpredictable environments. Such an aircraft would be able to conduct bomber task forces or combat operations from any global region.

In theory, the NGSB could reduce risks and improve performance by being unmanned, but unless a paradigm shift in U.S. thinking occurred, such a bomber would not be allowed to carry nuclear weapons. If the point of having nuclear weapons is to—if necessary—win a nuclear war, it seems irresponsible to self-eliminate the portion of the bomber force capable of carrying standoff nuclear weapons and being a highly visible symbol of deterrence (just as the B-52 is today). Considering the costs and vulnerabilities associated with unmanned operations and support systems, it might not be worth the loss of nuclear capability.

The NGSB should have the ability to carry weapons both externally and internally, in at least two bomb bays. The radar cross-section, which is how easily an aircraft is visible on an enemy’s radar, should be like that of a B-1. This cross-section would not be an expensive stealth capability, but it would, for technical reasons, make several defensive options viable.

In 2050—or earlier, if necessary—the combination of 100 to 200 B-21s and a cheap NGSB option would make the existence of over 225 bombers feasible. Worst case, an NGSB would give leaders options should financial realities intervene.

Addressing the bomber gap will allow the United States to deter Russia and China while simultaneously handling smaller conflicts more efficiently in the future. Not doing so, and depending solely on exquisite and expensive new technologies, leaves the nation vulnerable.

Maj. Shane Praiswater is a visiting military analyst at the Center on Military and Political Power at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). Views expressed or implied in this commentary are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Air Force, the Defense Department, or any other government agency.

 

[coalcracker]

I respect the viewpoint from Major Shane Praiswater above. He makes good points. Still....

We must always be careful not to bring past war tactics and technologies into future wars. 2050 is a long way off. The technological developments over these next 30 years will probably be amazing.

We don't want to bring a sword to a gun fight.

Will bombers and aircraft carriers have a role in 2050? I'm thinking advanced missiles and satellites will probably rule the battlefield and may effectively render much of today's military hardware obsolete. Star Wars, circa 2050.

 

[Housecarl]

I respect the viewpoint from Major Shane Praiswater above. He makes good points. Still....

We must always be careful not to bring past war tactics and technologies into future wars. 2050 is a long way off. The technological developments over these next 30 years will probably be amazing.

We don't want to bring a sword to a gun fight.

Will bombers and aircraft carriers have a role in 2050? I'm thinking advanced missiles and satellites will probably rule the battlefield and may effectively render much of today's military hardware obsolete. Star Wars, circa 2050.

All good points.

That being said, we need to remember that we need to think of not just the peer vs peer conflict needs but the whole spectrum of conflict. For that you need more in the tool box than one wrench.

As to a lower tier "munitions truck" that can fill an important role in a peer vs peer conflict or its deterrence, we need to look at not just the vehicle itself, but the logistical support of it throughout its service live. As such it should be as long lived as the B-52 if such an aircraft is considered for that role. (Anyone else envisioning the pictures of all of those BUFFs sitting in the desert sun at the "Bone Yard" of Davis–Monthan Air Force Base awaiting to be cut up per SALTs I, II and START?)

The engineering studies were done on this regarding the use of either the B-747 or the C-17 in that role over 20 years ago with the B-747 winning out in terms of cruising range/loiter time vs payload and operational cost (I've posted some of that material in the past. ETA: the CMCA version of the B-747 going back to 1979). That being said, a look at it again with current technology, needs and costs is more than warranted.

ETA:

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wywbWHly9Ow

https://i.kinja-img.com/gawker-media/image/upload/c_scale,f_auto,fl_progressive,pg_1,q_80,w_800/rlabfdndjnelosjgyuw5.jpg

https://laststandonzombieisland.files.wordpress.com/2016/01/mc747.jpg?w=584

https://aviationhumor.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/MC-747.jpg

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use.....

Islamic State claims killing French aid workers, clashes with al Qaeda in the Sahel | FDD's Long War Journal

In this week's edition of the Islamic State's weekly Al-Naba newsletter, the jihadist group claims a series of wide-ranging operations across the Sahel. This includes last month's massacre of French aid workers in Niger, as well as a spate of battles with al Qaeda's men.

www.longwarjournal.org

Islamic State claims killing French aid workers, clashes with al Qaeda in the Sahel

By Caleb Weiss | September 19, 2020 | weiss.caleb2@gmail.com | @Weissenberg7

Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) fighters seen clashing with al Qaeda’s Group for Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) near Talataye in northern Mali on Aug. 11.
In a new issue of the Islamic State’s weekly Al-Naba newsletter, the jihadist group said its men were responsible for the Aug. 9 massacre of six French aid workers and two Nigeriens. Additionally, it reported a series of new clashes with al Qaeda across the Sahel.


On Aug 9, eight French and Niger nationals were attacked by armed gunmen outside of Koure, Niger, just around 40 miles southeast of Niger’s capital Niamey. The workers were captured and later summarily executed by gunshot, while one woman was found with her throat slit.


Initially reported as French tourists, local aid organizations, ACTED and IMPACT, later confirmed the death of their staff in the ambush.


For over a month the murders went unclaimed by any armed group in the region, though suspicion quickly fell on the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), the Islamic State’s local branch.


Other groups, such as al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, even denied responsibility. The Islamic State previously mentioned the event in an earlier issue of Al-Naba, but did not actually claim the incident.


But in this week’s issue of the newsletter, it finally owned up to the massacre. It is unclear why the jihadist group decided to wait over a month to official claim the operation. However, it is possible it delayed a statement to gauge the reaction of both international media and the French government.


Perpetrated by ISGS and claimed under its West African Province moniker, the Islamic State justified the killings as part of its war against France. The group said its men “conducted a swift attack with automatic gunfire upon a number of French Crusader subjects in the Koure region southeast of Niamey.”


Speaking to the significance of the ambush, it adds “the apostates and crusaders have acknowledged the strike and have shown their fear that this will impact their military campaign. This operation created a media sensation due to the nationalities of those killed.”


Little other information was provided regarding the raid. Though a photo of some of the victims, apparently from a video of the executions, was provided in the newsletter.


In addition to the ambush on the aid workers, the Islamic State also reported a number of other smaller operations across the Sahel. For instance, it continued to advertise its war against the various armed groups in northern Mali.


The newsletter stated that on Aug. 3, Islamic State gunmen assassinated a commander within the Movement for the Salvation of Azawad (MSA) south of Menaka.


While in a claim dated for Sept. 6, the newsletter reported that the jihadists captured a commander within the Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA) also in Menaka. The commander was later executed after being accused of acting as a spy for both France and Algeria against ISGS.


ISGS has long been at war with MSA, as well as its ally the Imghad Tuareg Self-Defense Group and Allies (GATIA), in Mali’s northern Menaka region. MSA and GATIA conducted a series of campaigns against ISGS in the region in 2018.


However, this week’s Al-Naba marks the first time that the Islamic State’s central media apparatus has advertised attacks against MAA in Mali.


Renewed Clashes with Al Qaeda


The Islamic State’s newsletter also dedicated a significant amount of space to discuss a renewed series of clashes with al Qaeda’s Group for Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) across the Sahel.


Beginning on July 25, the Islamic State claims its men killed 50 JNIM fighters east of Menaka. A day later, it reported a clash near N’Daki close to the Burkinabe borders. While on July 31, it said another clash took place in Kerboule in Burkina’s Soum Province.


On Aug. 2 and 4, two additional battles reportedly occurred in the Mali-Burkina Faso borderlands. Three days later on Aug. 7, a skirmish was reported near In-Tillit in Mali’s Gao Region. And on Aug. 9, the Islamic State alleges 60 JNIM members were killed near Deou in Burkina Faso’s Oudalan Province.


Then on Aug. 11, the Islamic State says its men killed at least 52 JNIM members in a battle near Talataye in Mali’s Gao Region. While details were scarce on this event in the newsletter, the Islamic State released a video yesterday of this skirmish through its Amaq News Agency.


The short clip also marks the first time either side has released a video from the infighting.


The brief video details ISGS fighters using mobilized infantry tactics with motorcycles, including motorcycles mounted with heavy machine guns. The jihadists are then seen pursuing al Qaeda’s men across the nearby shrubland before several corpses are shown.


More photos were then released through the Islamic State’s central media apparatus that also detailed several dead al Qaeda fighters, though a significantly lesser amount than what the Islamic State has claimed.


Additionally, Al-Naba reports three final clashes with al Qaeda’s men in the Mali-Burkina Faso borderlands between Aug. 20 and Aug. 22.


The Islamic State’s chronology of recent events paints the group as having dealt a heavy blow to al Qaeda’s ranks. According to the Islamic State, these clashes have killed 500 members of JNIM since earlier this year.


While this number may be an exaggeration, it is clear that hundreds of jihadists on both sides have been killed in the infighting. As a result, Al-Naba alleges that this has caused JNIM to begin “compulsory conscription” of men living under its control or influence.


The newsletter further argues that JNIM has had to field new fighting groups in the areas near the borders between Burkina Faso and Ivory Coast, the Mali and Burkina Faso border area, and in central Mali. Though the Islamic State says, “this has not changed the equation on the ground.”


Much of this version of events, however, has been disputed by al Qaeda’s men online. While official al Qaeda propaganda outlets have been silent regarding the clashes, more unofficial al Qaeda social media channels have often chimed in on the events.


Earlier this week, al Qaeda’s Thabat News Agency, which operates similar to Islamic State’s Amaq News, released a statement alleging that over the last month JNIM drove ISGS fighters from a series of villages in Mali’s Gao region.


According to Thabat, JNIM kicked ISGS out of 13 villages along the Niger River from Bourem in northern Gao to Ouattagouna near the borders with Niger.


Though specific details in these claims remain unclear, JNIM has indeed been able to push ISGS out of other areas of northern Mali. And clashes between the two in the Gao Region have been reported in the past.


Stemming from a series of local and international factors, the two jihadist heavyweights, formerly cooperative in the Sahel, have been clashing in the region since last summer.


This conflict expanded rapidly earlier this year after both sides began a propaganda battle and internal disagreements spilled over into intense clashes. While JNIM is believed to have the upper hand, ISGS has been able to deal significant casualties within JNIM’s ranks.


Screenshots from the Islamic State’s video of the Aug. 11 clash with JNIM near Talataye, Mali:

Caleb Weiss is a contributor to FDD's Long War Journal.

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use.....

Analysis: A ‘Tired’ Taliban talking point | FDD's Long War Journal

American politicians, military leaders, and reporters have been claiming that the Taliban is "tired," "desperate," "war weary" and other such statements for the past decade and a half. Yet the Taliban keeps fighting.

www.longwarjournal.org

Analysis: A ‘Tired’ Taliban talking point

By Bill Roggio | September 19, 2020 | admin@longwarjournal.org | @billroggio


For the past decade and a half, American politicians, military leaders, and reporters have claimed that the Taliban is “tired,” “desperate,” “war weary” – despite the fact the Taliban has sparked “near-record violence” in Afghanistan, according to the United Nations.
That did not stop President Donald Trump from adding to the tired narrative when he repeated the “tired” canard on Sept. 18.

“We’re dealing very well with the Taliban,” Trump said, according to Reuters. “They’re very tough, they’re very smart, they’re very sharp, but you know it’s been 19 years and even they are tired of fighting, in all fairness.”

The “even” in the last sentence is telling as it is an admission that the U.S. has exhausted itself in Afghanistan. Trump has been so desperate to leave Afghanistan that he signed a withdrawal deal with the Taliban that legitimized the group and delegitimized the Afghan government – and absolved the Taliban for its role in sheltering Al Qaeda both before and after 9/11.

Trump’s statement that the Taliban is “tired” is nothing new. He said the same thing in early Feb. 2019, and again in late Feb. 2020.

However, Trump is merely following the time-honored tradition of declaring the Taliban to be exhausted of the fight.

Reports of a “tired” Taliban can be traced back to 2004, when the Christian Science Monitor quoted Al-Hajj Mullah Abdul Samad Khaksar, the group’s former interior minister. “Most of the local ordinary Taliban are tired of fighting, they are eager to come back to the country and live here in peace,” Khaksar told CSM. Within a year, the Taliban reinvigorated its insurgency and began to take over large areas of southern and eastern Afghanistan.

At the height of the “surge” in 2011, when the U.S. sent more than 100,000 troops to battle the Taliban, which controlled large swaths of Afghanistan, The Guardian reported that “both the west and the Taliban are tired now and keen to move toward a resolution.”

In June 2011, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said that “we have broken the Taliban’s momentum.”

President Barack Obama repeated Clinton’s words in his 2012 State of the Union address. “The Taliban’s momentum has been broken,” Obama said.

In Sept. 2012, U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta claimed that the green-on-blue attacks, in which Afghan security personnel are killing Coalition forces, were evidence of the “last gasp” of the Taliban. FDD’s Long War Journal took the unusual step of commissioning a cartoon to highlight the absurdity of Panetta’s statement.

In 2013, Russia Today was telling us that the Taliban was “war weary” and was prepared to form a political party (the Taliban has explicitly stated elections and a western form of government are forbidden in Islam). Purported Afghanistan expert Rashid Waziri said that “the Taliban are tired of war and it will be a step in the right direction if they launch a political movement.”


General John Campbell, who then led US and NATO forces in Afghanistan, talked about a sapped Taliban in May 2015, which was ready for peace. From Sputnik News:

Campbell explained that the resource drain combined with lack of leadership, supplies and funding have contributed to the Taliban weakening and fracturing on the battlefield…
The Taliban are tired from fighting for 14 years and want to get on with their lives, Campbell argued, so they might be ready and willing to engage in peace talks with the Afghan government.

The Taliban merely waited out the surge, regained its momentum and overcame its supposed war weariness, dying last gasp, fracturing, and lack of leadership and resources. By 2015, the Taliban was retaking control of multiple districts throughout the country. Months after Campbell’s interview with Sputnik News, the depleted Taliban overran Kunduz City, and held it for more than two weeks before U.S. troops were forced to intervene.


One year later, a Taliban commander who admitted that he likely killed U.S. troops, told The Washington Post that the Taliban is “tired and will join if the [Afghan] government pays them, and if the government provides jobs for them,” The U.S. has attempted to pay thousands of Taliban fighters to quit the fight. The effort failed as most of them took the money and rejoined the Taliban. In late 2016, the tired Taliban again overran Kunduz City.


In 2018, Pentagon chief spokesperson Dana W. White described the Taliban as “desperate” because, she claimed without providing any evidence, that it is “losing ground.” Additionally, White said that over the last year, “things are moving in the right direction.” White doubled down on this sentiment less than two weeks later. In the two weeks between White’s triumphant assessment, the Taliban overran Farah City. Throughout 2018, the Taliban continued to slowly but surely gain ground.


Trump is not alone in repeating the fable that the Taliban is tired. As history has shown, the only tired thing is the narrative, as the Taliban has shown itself to be resilient in the face of long odds, and has shrugged off the multitude of assessments that it is exhausted.


Bill Roggio is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Editor of FDD's Long War Journal.

 

[Housecarl]

November Sierra.......

Posted for fair use......

Iran could have ‘nuclear weapon by end of 2020 as regime works with North Korea’

Tehran and North Korea have reportedly resumed work on a long-range missile project and are “transferring critical parts”. It comes as US President Donald Trump reportedly aims to introduce new sanctions

www.dailystar.co.uk

Iran could have ‘nuclear weapon by end of 2020 as regime works with North Korea’
Tehran and North Korea have reportedly resumed work on a long-range missile project and are “transferring critical parts”. It comes as US President Donald Trump reportedly aims to introduce new sanctions

By Tom TowersSenior News Reporter

• 17:50, 20 SEP 2020
• Updated 20:09, 20 SEP 2020

Iran could develop a nuclear weapon by the end of the year, and has started working on a long-range missile project with North Korea, an insider has claimed.

The leak comes amid reports the US is about to introduce further restrictions on Iran – which has been subject to sanctions by the States since 2018.

Reuters reports that two dozen people and entities involved in Iran’s nuclear, missile and conventional arms programs will see sanctions enforced against them from midnight, GMT.

It is believed the further sanctions are being introduced by U.S. President Donald Trump in an effort to dampen Iran's influence in the Middle East.

And the sanctions come a week after President Trump successfully brokered relations between the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Israel.

The new sanctions are believed to be an effort to hinder Iran's nuclear weapons building efforts.

But a source fears the country may be able to develop such weapons by the end of the year, regardless of sanctions.

The anonymous US government source told Reuters: “Iran is clearly doing everything it can to keep in existence a virtual turnkey capability to get back into the weaponization business at a moment’s notice should it choose to do so."

The insider went on to claim Iran has a desire to develop and own nuclear weapons despite a 2015 deal to prevent the country building the weapons of mass destruction.

The deal was thrown in to chaos in 2018 when President Trump withdrew the USA from the agreement – and introduced heavy sanctions that have crippled the Middle Eastern country.

While it is alleged Iran has consequently breached the agreement to stock up on low-enriched uranium – a key ingredient in nuclear bomb-making.

The official warned: "Because of Iran’s provocative nuclear escalation, it could have sufficient fissile material for a nuclear weapon by the end of this year."

They claim to have information from US intelligence and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The source added: “Iran and North Korea have resumed cooperation on a long-range missile project, including the transfer of critical parts."

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[Housecarl]

Hummm......

Posted for fair use.....

If China loses a future war, entropy could be imminent

What happens if China engages in a great power conflict and loses? Will the Chinese Communist Party’s control over the society survive a horrifying defeat?

www.defensenews.com

Commentary
If China loses a future war, entropy could be imminent

By: Jan Kallberg   4 days ago

57

China's Communist Party leaders and delegates, including President Xi Jinping, sit at the opening of the National People's Congress on May 22, 2020, in Beijing, China. (Kevin Frayer/Getty Images)



What happens if China engages in a great power conflict and loses? Will the Chinese Communist Party’s control over the society survive a horrifying defeat?

The People’s Liberation Army last fought a massive-scale war during the invasion of Vietnam in 1979, which was a failed operation to punish Vietnam for toppling the Khmer Rouge regime of Cambodia. Since 1979, the PLA has been engaged in shelling Vietnam at different occasions and involved in other border skirmishes, but not fought a full-scale war.

In the last decades, China increased its defense spending and modernized its military, including advanced air defenses and cruise missiles; fielded advanced military hardware; and built a high sea navy from scratch. But there is significant uncertainty of how the Chinese military will perform.

Modern warfare is integration, joint operations, command, control, intelligence, and the ability to understand and execute the ongoing, all-domain fight. War is a complex machinery with low margins of error and can have devastating outcomes for the ill-prepared. It does not matter if you are against or for the U.S. military operations the last three decades; the fact is that the prolonged conflict and engagement have made the U.S. experienced. The Chinese inexperience, in combination with unrealistic expansionist ambitions, can be the downfall of the regime. Dry swimmers maybe train the basics, but they are never great swimmers.

Although it may look like a creative strategy for China to harvest trade secrets and intellectual property as well as put developing countries in debt to gain influence, I would question how rational the Chinese apparatus is. The repeated visualization of the Han nationalist cult appears as a strength amid the youth rallying behind President Xi Jinping’s regime, but it is also a significant weakness. The weakness is blatantly visible in the Chinese need for surveillance and population control to maintain stability — surveillance and repression that is so encompassing in the daily life of the Chinese population that German DDR security services appear to have been amateurs.







Chinese military calls US biggest threat to world peace
China’s Defense Ministry on Sunday blasted a critical U.S. report on the country’s military ambitions, saying it is the U.S. instead that poses the biggest threat to the international order and world peace.

By: The Associated Press

All chauvinist cults will implode over time because the unrealistic assumptions add up, and so will the sum of all delusional ideological decisions. Winston Churchill knew after Nazi Germany declared war on the United States in December 1941 that the Allies would prevail and win the war. Nazi Germany did not have the gross domestic product or manpower to sustain the war on two fronts, but the Nazis did not care because they were irrational and driven by hateful ideology. Nazi Germany had just months before it invaded the massive Soviet Union to create Lebensraum and feed an urge to reestablish German-Austrian dominance in Eastern Europe. The Nazis unilaterally declared war on the United States. The rationale for the declaration of war was ideology, a worldview that demanded expansion and conflict, even if Germany was strategically inferior and eventually lost the war.

China’s belief that it can be a global authoritarian hegemony is likely on the same journey. China is today driven by its flavor or expansionist ideology that seeks conflict without being strategically able. It is worth noting that not a single major country is China’s ally.

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The Chinese supremacist propaganda works in peacetime, holding massive rallies and hailing Mao Zedong as a military genius, and some of its people sing, dance and wave red banners, but will that grip remain if the PLA loses? In case of a failed military campaign, is the Chinese population, with the one-child policy, ready for casualties, humiliation and failure? Will the authoritarian grip — with facial recognition, informers, digital surveillance and an army that primarily functions during peacetime as a force for crowd control — survive a crushing defeat?

If the regime loses its grip, the wrath of the masses may be unleashed from decades of repression. A country of the size of China — with a history of cleavages and civil wars, and that has a suppressed, diverse population and socioeconomic disparity — can be catapulted into Balkanization after a defeat. In the past, China has had long periods of internal fragmentation and weak central government.



The United States reacts differently to failure. The United States is as a country far more resilient than we might assume from watching the daily news. If the United States loses a war, the president gets the blame, but there will still be a presidential library in his/her name. There is no revolution.

There is an assumption lingering over today’s public debate that China has a strong hand, advanced artificial intelligence and the latest technology, and that it is an uber-able superpower.

I am not convinced.

During the last decade, the countries in the Indo-Pacific region that seeks to hinder the Chinese expansion of control, influence and dominance have increasingly formed stronger relationships. The strategic scale is in the democratic countries' favor. If China, still driven by ideology, pursues conflict at a large scale, it is likely the end of the communist dictatorship. In my personal view, we should pay more attention to the humanitarian risks, the ripple effects and the dangers of nukes in a civil war in case the Chinese regime implodes after a failed future war.

Jan Kallberg is a research scientist at the Army Cyber Institute at West Point and an assistant professor at the U.S. Military Academy. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Army Cyber Institute at West Point, the U.S. Military Academy, the Defense Department or the U.S. government.

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use......

Dozens killed in bloodiest Afghanistan clashes since peace talks began

At least 57 members of the Afghan security forces were killed and dozens injured in overnight clashes with Taliban fighters across Afghanistan, security officials said on Monday, in the bloodiest day of fighting since government and insurgent forces began peace talks in Doha over a week ago.

bdnews24.com

Dozens killed in bloodiest Afghanistan clashes since peace talks began

>> Reuters
Published: 22 Sep 2020 11:00 AM BdST Updated: 22 Sep 2020 11:00 AM BdST

• 
  
  A member of the Taliban insurgent and other people stand at the site during the execution of three men in Ghazni Province April 18, 2015. REUTERS/Stringer
  

At least 57 members of the Afghan security forces were killed and dozens injured in overnight clashes with Taliban fighters across Afghanistan, security officials said on Monday, in the bloodiest day of fighting since government and insurgent forces began peace talks in Doha over a week ago.

​

Negotiating teams representing the Taliban and the Afghan government have been meeting in the Qatari capital since talks started on Sept 12. But little headway has been made, particularly on a ceasefire, which many international capitals have called for but which the insurgent group has rejected.

Sunday night's bloodiest clashes were in the central province of Uruzgan, where 24 members of the Afghan security forces were killed when Taliban fighters attacked security checkpoints, Deputy Governor of the province Sayed Mohammad Sadat said.

Clashes and casualties were also reported in the provinces of Takhar, Helmand, Kapisa, Balkh, Maidan Wardak and Kunduz, provincial officials told Reuters.

In Balkh, the Taliban took hostage three members of Afghanistan's spy organisation, the National Directorate of Security, according to Monir Ahmad Farhad, spokesman for Balkh provincial governor.

The Taliban did not confirm casualties on their side, but according to a spokesman for the Pamir military corps, Abdul Hadi Jamal, 54 of the insurgents were killed in clashes in Kunduz, Takhar and Baghlan provinces on Sunday night.

​

A spokesman for the provincial government of Maidan Wardak, Muhibullah Sharifzai, said 26 Taliban fighters were killed in clashes there.

Interior ministry spokesman Tariq Arian said Taliban attacks had killed 98 civilians and injured 230 others in the last two weeks across 24 provinces.

At least 12 civilians were killed on Saturday in airstrikes on a Taliban base in the northeastern province of Kunduz. Defence ministry officials said 40 Taliban fighters were killed, but they did not confirm civilian casualties.

Despite international pressure, particularly from Washington, the Taliban continue to reject a ceasefire until the two sides reach an agreement.

The almost daily meetings in Doha have been unable to make it past debating rules and regulations of the process, and the sides remain far apart on most matters.

 

[jward]

humm... :: checkin' Amazon :: it's not a welrod, but. . .would add to my hair styling accouterments collection ; )

'Pen guns' the latest threat in Afghan capital

AFP•September 22, 2020

A stash of pen guns found by Afghan authorities on display in the capital
Police in Kabul have seized a stash of "pen guns" they say criminals and insurgents are using in a wave of targeted assassinations that has gripped the Afghan capital in recent months.
The cylindrical, single-bullet firearms look much like regular ink pens and are easy to carry undetected.
"It is like a click pen, the shooter puts the bullet in the cartridge, aims and clicks the thrust button to fire the bullet," an official at Kabul's Criminal Investigation Department (CID) told AFP on condition of anonymity.
Police last weekend unveiled a cache of 48 pen guns discovered in a larger haul of weapons including "sticky bombs" that can be slapped under vehicles and detonated remotely or on a timer.

"The terrorists wanted to use these weapons in complex-target killings in the capital," interior ministry spokesman Tariq Arian interior ministry spokesman said.
Rising unemployment and poverty have worsened Kabul's already abysmal security situation, with kidnappings, robberies and drive-by shootings commonplace.
The violence has been compounded by a string of assassinations targeting peace activists, academics and government employees.
"More than 40 people have been killed in targeted assassinations in the past six months in Kabul alone," the CID official said.
He said some of those hits were carried out using unknown weapons that authorities believe were pen guns.
Officials have blamed such killings on Taliban-linked groups.
The Taliban, who under a deal with the US in February are not supposed to be attacking urban areas, have denied involvement.
The insurgents have nonetheless stepped up attacks on security forces in rural areas, even as Afghan government and Taliban negotiators are meeting in Doha to to to find a way to end 19 years of war.

'Pen guns' the latest threat in Afghan capital

Police in Kabul have seized a stash of "pen guns" they say criminals and insurgents are using in a wave of targeted assassinations that has gripped the Afghan capital in recent months.

news.yahoo.com

 

[jward]

US Marines wants to move fast on a light amphibious warship. But what is it?

By: David B. Larter   1 day ago

Marines drive an amphibious combat vehicle ashore Dec. 18, 2019, during low-light testing at Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, Calif. (Lance Cpl. Andrew Cortez/U.S. Marine Corps)



WASHINGTON — The U.S. Marine Corps is moving as fast as it can to field a new class of light amphibious warship, but it remains unclear what it will do, where it will be based or what capabilities it will bring to the fight.

The idea behind the ship is to take a commercial design or adapt a historic design to make a vessel capable of accommodating up to 40 sailors and at least 75 Marines to transport Marine kit over a range of about 3,500 nautical miles, according to a recent industry day presentation.

While the presentation noted that the ship should have few tailored Navy requirements, that also creates a problem: If the Navy is going to pay tens of millions to develop, build, crew and operate them, should it not provide some additional value to the fleet?



In his fight to change the Corps, America’s top Marine takes friendly fire
Get an inside look at the intellectual battle for the future of the Marine Corps.

By: David Larter

Analysts, experts and sources with knowledge of internal discussions who spoke to Defense News say the answer to that question is a source of friction inside the Pentagon.

The idea of the warship arrived on the scene in 2019 with the ascension of Gen. David Berger as commandant of the Marine Corps. His planning guidance called for a smaller, more agile amphibious force that could operate inside the Chinese anti-access, area denial window in the South China Sea.

In a recent virtual meeting of the Surface Navy Association, the chief of naval operations' director of expeditionary warfare, Maj. Gen. Tracy King, emphasized that above all, the platform must be cheap and come online quickly.

“I see the efficacy of this [light amphibious warship] is really to help us in the phases and stages we’re in right now,” King said Aug. 27. “We need to start doing things differently, as an extension of the fleet, under the watchful eye of our Navy, engaging with our partners and allies and building partner capacity: We ought to be doing that right now. I think we’re late to need with building the light amphibious warship, which is why we’re trying to go so quickly.”

When asked whether the ship should contribute to a more distributed sensor architecture to align with the Navy’s desire to be more spread out over a large area during a fight, King answered in the affirmative.

"[But] I really see it benefiting from [that architecture] more,” he said. “We need to build an affordable ship that can get after the ability to do maritime campaigning in the littorals.”

The unstated implication appeared to be that if the ship is loaded up with sensors and requirements, it will slow down the process and increase the cost. Analysts who spoke to Defense News agreed with that, saying the Navy is likely trying to put more systems on the platform that will make it more complex and more expensive.



US Navy, Air Force team up on new ‘Manhattan Project’
Creating a resilient command-and-control network that joins Navy and Air Force assets over a wide area is an effort on par with the famous Manhattan Project that produced a bomb that brought World War II to an end, says the Navy's top officer.

By: David Larter

The Navy has said it wants to keep the price under $100 million per platform and begin purchasing them as early as the latter half of 2022.

“The hardest part is going to be appetite suppression, especially on the part of the Navy,” said Dakota Wood, a retired Marine officer and analyst with The Heritage Foundation. "This is what we saw in the littoral combat ship: It started out as a very light, near-shore, small and inexpensive street fighter. And then people started adding on requirements. You had ballooning costs, increasing complexity of the platform, and you get into all kinds of problems.

“The Marine Corps wants this quickly. It needs it to be inexpensive so you can have 28-30 of them over a three- to four-year period.”

There is the additional challenge of where the ships will be based, since they will probably not be built to the kinds of standards of normal Navy vessels built to last for 30-40 years in service. The minimum service life for the light amphibious warship will be about 10 years, according to the industry day presentation.

Wood said that would be a challenge for the Marines and the State Department to work out in parallel with the effort to get the hulls quickly built.

Jerry Hendrix, a retied Navy captain and analyst with the Telemus Group, agreed with that assessment, saying the Marines are eager to move forward to get something fielded, in part to make sure this transition to a lighter, more distributed force being pushed by Berger actually happens.

"The commandant can’t divest of some of the legacy platforms he’s building — these big, expensive and vulnerable platforms — until he has something that replaces it in the water. And so he’s anxious to get going with something else so he then has a reason to move away from what he has.

“The commandant is well aware he has a four-year clock and its ticking. So if he’s going to make changes, he’s got to get moving to get those changes in place and commit the Marine Corps to them to make sure it’s going to last. And right now I’m not sure there’s a lot of high confidence that they are going to last.”

Hendrix acknowledged that the Navy has good reason to want the light amphibious warship to have more capability, but added that the Corps is more interested in something simple than something costly and elaborate.

“What that does,” Hendrix said, “is drive up unit cost and drive down the numbers that can be purchased.”

posted for fair use

US Marines wants to move fast on a light amphibious warship. But what is it?

The U.S. Marine Corps is moving as fast as it can to field a new class of light amphibious warship, but it remains unclear what it will do, where it will be based or what capabilities it will bring to the fight.

www.defensenews.com

 

[Housecarl]

US Marines wants to move fast on a light amphibious warship. But what is it?

By: David B. Larter   1 day ago

Marines drive an amphibious combat vehicle ashore Dec. 18, 2019, during low-light testing at Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, Calif. (Lance Cpl. Andrew Cortez/U.S. Marine Corps)



WASHINGTON — The U.S. Marine Corps is moving as fast as it can to field a new class of light amphibious warship, but it remains unclear what it will do, where it will be based or what capabilities it will bring to the fight.

The idea behind the ship is to take a commercial design or adapt a historic design to make a vessel capable of accommodating up to 40 sailors and at least 75 Marines to transport Marine kit over a range of about 3,500 nautical miles, according to a recent industry day presentation.

While the presentation noted that the ship should have few tailored Navy requirements, that also creates a problem: If the Navy is going to pay tens of millions to develop, build, crew and operate them, should it not provide some additional value to the fleet?



In his fight to change the Corps, America’s top Marine takes friendly fire
Get an inside look at the intellectual battle for the future of the Marine Corps.

By: David Larter

Analysts, experts and sources with knowledge of internal discussions who spoke to Defense News say the answer to that question is a source of friction inside the Pentagon.

The idea of the warship arrived on the scene in 2019 with the ascension of Gen. David Berger as commandant of the Marine Corps. His planning guidance called for a smaller, more agile amphibious force that could operate inside the Chinese anti-access, area denial window in the South China Sea.

In a recent virtual meeting of the Surface Navy Association, the chief of naval operations' director of expeditionary warfare, Maj. Gen. Tracy King, emphasized that above all, the platform must be cheap and come online quickly.

“I see the efficacy of this [light amphibious warship] is really to help us in the phases and stages we’re in right now,” King said Aug. 27. “We need to start doing things differently, as an extension of the fleet, under the watchful eye of our Navy, engaging with our partners and allies and building partner capacity: We ought to be doing that right now. I think we’re late to need with building the light amphibious warship, which is why we’re trying to go so quickly.”

When asked whether the ship should contribute to a more distributed sensor architecture to align with the Navy’s desire to be more spread out over a large area during a fight, King answered in the affirmative.

"[But] I really see it benefiting from [that architecture] more,” he said. “We need to build an affordable ship that can get after the ability to do maritime campaigning in the littorals.”

The unstated implication appeared to be that if the ship is loaded up with sensors and requirements, it will slow down the process and increase the cost. Analysts who spoke to Defense News agreed with that, saying the Navy is likely trying to put more systems on the platform that will make it more complex and more expensive.



US Navy, Air Force team up on new ‘Manhattan Project’
Creating a resilient command-and-control network that joins Navy and Air Force assets over a wide area is an effort on par with the famous Manhattan Project that produced a bomb that brought World War II to an end, says the Navy's top officer.

By: David Larter

The Navy has said it wants to keep the price under $100 million per platform and begin purchasing them as early as the latter half of 2022.

“The hardest part is going to be appetite suppression, especially on the part of the Navy,” said Dakota Wood, a retired Marine officer and analyst with The Heritage Foundation. "This is what we saw in the littoral combat ship: It started out as a very light, near-shore, small and inexpensive street fighter. And then people started adding on requirements. You had ballooning costs, increasing complexity of the platform, and you get into all kinds of problems.

“The Marine Corps wants this quickly. It needs it to be inexpensive so you can have 28-30 of them over a three- to four-year period.”

There is the additional challenge of where the ships will be based, since they will probably not be built to the kinds of standards of normal Navy vessels built to last for 30-40 years in service. The minimum service life for the light amphibious warship will be about 10 years, according to the industry day presentation.

Wood said that would be a challenge for the Marines and the State Department to work out in parallel with the effort to get the hulls quickly built.

Jerry Hendrix, a retied Navy captain and analyst with the Telemus Group, agreed with that assessment, saying the Marines are eager to move forward to get something fielded, in part to make sure this transition to a lighter, more distributed force being pushed by Berger actually happens.

"The commandant can’t divest of some of the legacy platforms he’s building — these big, expensive and vulnerable platforms — until he has something that replaces it in the water. And so he’s anxious to get going with something else so he then has a reason to move away from what he has.

“The commandant is well aware he has a four-year clock and its ticking. So if he’s going to make changes, he’s got to get moving to get those changes in place and commit the Marine Corps to them to make sure it’s going to last. And right now I’m not sure there’s a lot of high confidence that they are going to last.”

Hendrix acknowledged that the Navy has good reason to want the light amphibious warship to have more capability, but added that the Corps is more interested in something simple than something costly and elaborate.

“What that does,” Hendrix said, “is drive up unit cost and drive down the numbers that can be purchased.”

posted for fair use

US Marines wants to move fast on a light amphibious warship. But what is it?

The U.S. Marine Corps is moving as fast as it can to field a new class of light amphibious warship, but it remains unclear what it will do, where it will be based or what capabilities it will bring to the fight.

www.defensenews.com

One suggestion I saw a while ago was to bring back LSTs, either in their last Cold War guise or an update of their smaller Second World War one.

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use......

A Non-Kinetic Answer to the Hypersonic Threat

Adversaries are developing new, long-range, hypersonic strike capabilities that have wide ranging security implications. America and its allies may not yet have the critical infrastructure needed to r

www.realcleardefense.com

A Non-Kinetic Answer to the Hypersonic Threat


.




By E. Grant Haver & Jeffrey Edmonds
September 22, 2020

Adversaries are developing new, long-range, hypersonic strike capabilities that have wide ranging security implications. America and its allies may not yet have the critical infrastructure needed to respond and manage such threats in a crisis scenario. China and Russia pose the most immediate risk as they lead the world in developing hypersonic and ballistic missile technologies. While many government agencies are working on designing and implementing the architectures and tools needed to mitigate the hypersonic threat, they lack the speed and resources required to keep pace with these rapidly evolving technologies. How or even if the U.S. should pursue missile defense technologies are questions yet to be answered. In the meantime, the government can take concrete, non-kinetic measures that will better ensure citizens' safety and counter new threats should the need arise.


Increasing awareness of the hypersonic threat with senior policymakers and within appropriate government institutions should be one of the first considerations. Enhancing understanding of the risks is the first step towards mitigating the threat from enemy systems. Such awareness includes the discussion of deterrence postures should tensions escalate. It also includes enhancing cyber capabilities, which will require an expanded, whole-of-government approach built upon a shared understanding of our vulnerabilities and available defense options.



Prior to any deployment of new missile defense technologies, American political and military leaders must acquire a better understanding of how U.S. adversaries plan to utilize hypersonic technologies in their efforts to dominate escalation and coerce the United States and its allies into making decisions favorable to the adversary during a time of crisis. Interagency wargames, briefings on adversary escalation strategies, and collaborative opportunities will also prepare U.S. policymakers to respond to crises before state actors consider using these new technologies.


The speed and low-profile characteristics of new strike system technologies will challenge the U.S.'s current capacity to detect and trace their flight path. The United States needs to deploy advanced space sensor capabilities integrated with targeting and management infrastructure. Linking these sensors to advanced interceptors and/or directed energy weapons will also play a key role in lessening the impact of any attack from hypersonics.


The U.S. Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and the Space Development Agency (SDA) are currently developing systems such as the Hypersonic and Ballistic Missile Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS), which will help reduce the emerging hypersonic threat. This system is designed to work cooperatively with SDA's tracking satellites to provide queuing data for ground-based interceptors. Additionally, HBTSS is currently focused on low-Earth orbit, but it will be crucial that it supports multiple orbits to ensure long-term success of the system. Inadequate funding, however, is impeding a rapid development process. Currently, HBTSS is only receiving a small fraction of the total hypersonic funding budget – leaving a severe deficit in the resources required to keep pace with the development of these emerging technologies and posing a serious national security threat.


The next step is augmented system integration, especially for command and control, which is an essential component of any hypersonic defensive capability. For example, the Army's Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command System (IBCS), which utilizes open architecture, allows for the integration of various sensors and interceptors. This, in turn, enables the best sensor to relay the targeting data to the most appropriate interceptor. The Air Force’s program of record – the Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) system – also holds tremendous promise for integrating disparate systems across operational domains and Services, if this “network of networks” is built using the right fundamentals and principles.

Ideally, HBTSS would integrate with this type of system to enhance the ability to meet the maneuverability challenges of hypersonics. Any advanced, space-based sensor, for example, must integrate with precise targeting and tracking infrastructure and link to advanced interceptors and/or directed energy weapons. The government’s ownership of open architecture command-and-control systems should, in theory, make this easier.



The geographical advantages and safety enjoyed by the continental United States begin to erode under the threat of incredibly fast, low-visibility, hypersonic weapons capable of striking targets within the United States. Also, at risk could be our forward-deployed regional assets, such as carriers in the Pacific and U.S. military bases on Guam and Kadena. Our adversaries are currently strategizing methods of utilizing these technologies to threaten and coerce the U.S. and its allies during a time of crisis.


As China and Russia continue to develop and field hypersonic capabilities, the United States must also develop the kinetic and non-kinetic systems necessary to mitigate an attack. Swift deployment of adequate resources, awareness initiatives, and enhanced integration of systems capabilities are only the first steps in meeting this rapidly evolving national security threat.



E. Grant Haver is a National Security Fellow with the Joseph Rainey Center for Public Policy and the Policy Program Coordinator for the National Security Institute where he oversees the Emerging Technologies and Cybersecurity working group. He has previously served on the Executive Committee of Phi Mu Alpha Sinfonia Fraternity of America and on the staff at the Center for American Progress. He holds both B.A. and M.A. degrees in Political Science and Government from George Mason University.


Jeffrey Edmonds is an expert on Russia and Eurasia and currently works as a Research Scientist for the Center for Naval Analyses and is a senior Advisor to the Joseph Rainey Center for Public Policy. His research focuses on the Russian military, foreign policy, Russian threat perceptions, and Russian information operations.


Most recently, Jeff served as the Director for Russia on the National Security Council and acting Senior Director for Russia during the 2017 presidential transition. While on the NSC, he advised the president and his senior staff on Russia-related national security topics.


Prior to the NSC, Jeff served as a senior military analyst with the Central Intelligence Agency, covering Eurasian militaries. He has served in the U.S. Army on both active duty and the reserves for 22 years, with tours in Iraq and Afghanistan.

 

[jward]

Pentagon Informs Congress It's Preparing To Have "Zero" US Troops In Afghanistan By Spring



by Tyler Durden

Wed, 09/23/2020 - 21:00



With the Pentagon expected to reduce troops levels in Afghanistan down to 4,500 by the November elections, and with the still negotiated US-Taliban peace deal facilitating this, on Tuesday a Pentagon official told Congress it can expect American presence there to be completely ended by May 2021.
Getty Images
Acting assistant secretary of defense for Indo-Pacific security affairs David Helvey issued the ambitious timetable during a Congressional hearing:

“I’d like to make it clear that [Secretary of Defense Mark Esper] has not issued orders to reduce military personnel below this 4,000 to 5,000 level in Afghanistan, although we are conducting prudent planning to withdraw to zero service members by May 2021 if conditions warrant, per the US-Taliban agreement.”

In August Esper vowed "We are going down to a number less than 5,000 before the end of November," in accord with President Trump's wishes, who has ahead of the election talked up "brining our troops home" in various statements and on Twitter.
Currently there are an estimated close to 9,000 US troops there, after in recent years as many as 14,000 had been deployed in America's longest running war.
Critics have said that Trump's vows and commitment to ending US "forever wars" have oscillated and have only ramped up again ahead of the election, given it's a talking point popular with his base.
Trump recently referenced the Middle East as "the bloodiest sand anywhere in the world" and reiterated that going to war there was the "single worst decision our country ever made."

"We killed hundreds of thousands of people in the Middle East.

I always say it's the bloodiest sand anywhere in the world, and it didn't have to be that way.

The single worst decision our country ever made was to go into the Middle East." -@realDonaldTrump pic.twitter.com/B8miYZ43w4
— Rep. Matt Gaetz (@RepMattGaetz) September 16, 2020

Iraq is also to slated for rapid and significant US pullout, however, neighboring Syria has just this past week seen more mechanized infantry units enter amid ongoing tensions with Russian patrols in northern Syria.

Bradley Fighting Vehicles are now patrolling northeast Deir Ezzor region with greater frequency, an escalation in US posture compared to the lighter armored convoys previously seen "protecting the oil" - as Trump has put it.

posted for fair use

Zerohedge

ZeroHedge - On a long enough timeline, the survival rate for everyone drops to zero

www.zerohedge.com

 

[jward]

IRGC Taunts US With Spy Drone Close-Ups Of Nimitz Carrier In Strait Of Hormuz



by Tyler Durden

Wed, 09/23/2020 - 23:00



Iranian state media on Wednesday published a photo set showing the US carrier group led by USS Nimitz transiting the Strait of Hormuz which Tehran says was gained after domestic-build spy drones "intercepted" the carrier.
State-run Tasnim reports: "In remarks on Wednesday, IRGC Navy Commander Rear Admiral Ali Reza Tangsiri said the homegrown drone has detected the US carrier strike group before the flotilla cruised through the Strait of Hormuz and into the waters of the Persian Gulf."
The Nimitz along with battleship escorts sailed through the area last Friday, according to separate reports.
Newly published Iranian military photos, via Tasnim News
Tunsgiri made the remarks upon the occasion of a military ceremony marking the IRGC's naval force receiving nearly 200 domestic produced drones and helicopters.
The IRGC Rear admiral described, “Monitoring and tracking all maritime movements in the Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz and the Sea of Oman will be made possible by these drones that will greatly increase our capabilities in this area.”

The US sail through appears to have occurred without incident despite the Iranian drone mission.
The drone photo set had already been circulating among Middle East analysts and think tanks in the West, which confirmed their authenticity.

Iranian media and officials are now hailing the domestic-produced drone spy mission as a success, and no doubt the reason the photo set has been released alongside English-language state media headlines is to display the IRGC's advancing capabilities in "securing" Hormuz.

Iran Releases Images of USS Nimitz-Class Aircraft Carrier & Escorting Battleships, Monitored & Chased by IRGC Drones at Entrance to Persian Gulf pic.twitter.com/dJUQs2Ct3z
— Fars News Agency (@EnglishFars) September 23, 2020

The Associated Press also confirmed the US carrier is in the Persian Gulf :

The Nimitz, and several other warships, passed last Friday through the Strait of Hormuz, the world's most important chokepoint for oil shipments, the U.S. Navy had said in what was described as a “scheduled manoeuvr.”

The US Navy's Bahrain-based 5th Fleet, however, has yet to comment on the Iranian drone monitoring mission or whether it observed the drone's flight path last week.
Should Iran continue with such provocative drone missions so near US ships in the vital gulf waterway, it's only a matter of time before there's escalation based on an incident, likely in the form of the US blasting Iran's UAVs out of the sky.

posted for fair use

Zerohedge

ZeroHedge - On a long enough timeline, the survival rate for everyone drops to zero

www.zerohedge.com

 

[Housecarl]

Hummm........

Posted for fair use......

Moscow Reluctant to Prolong New START on Washington’s Terms

Media in Russia report that United States President Donald Trump’s administration wants to secure a nuclear arms control agreement with Moscow before Election Day, November 3, to be able to publicly tout one more foreign policy success on top of the one just sealed in the Middle East—the...

jamestown.org

Moscow Reluctant to Prolong New START on Washington’s Terms
Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 17 Issue: 133
By: Pavel Felgenhauer

September 24, 2020 05:38 PM Age: 36 mins

Russian ICBM (Source: RT.com)

Media in Russia report that United States President Donald Trump’s administration wants to secure a nuclear arms control agreement with Moscow before Election Day, November 3, to be able to publicly tout one more foreign policy success on top of the one just sealed in the Middle East—the normalization/peace agreement between the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Israel. But time is running short and Russo-US backroom negotiations look to be going nowhere. In an attempt to speed up the apparently deadlocked talks, the White House’s special presidential envoy for arms control, Ambassador Marshall S. Billingslea, has resorted to public diplomacy by giving an interview to the Russian daily Kommersant, which caused commotion within the corridors of power in Moscow. Specifically, Billingslea told Kommersant that he has been discussing with his Russian counterpart, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov, the possibility of promptly producing a joint declaration or presidential memorandum by Trump and President Vladimir Putin outlining the framework of a future nuclear arms control accord. Such an agreement would not require ratification by the US Senate or the Russian parliament, but it must stipulate the political intent of both governments to work out later the precise details of a new comprehensive arms control agreement to replace the existing New START arms control treaty, set to expire in February 2021 unless extended by both sides. If Moscow agrees to sign, Washington will, in turn, agree to immediately extend (“as of tomorrow, if there is an agreement”) the New START treaty. According to Billingslea, Trump and Putin have already repeatedly discussed these proposals by phone (Kommersant, September 21).

New START allows for a onetime, five-year extension by the countries’ two presidents without a politically charged ratification procedure requiring a two-thirds’ majority vote in the US Senate. If New START expires in February, that will not be a major problem, according to Billingslea: the US will immediately begin to redeploy additional warheads on missiles and bombers. Billingslea described the US proposal as reasonable, but if Moscow does not accept it at once, the conditions could become worse “after Trump is reelected.” Billingslea believes the New START treaty limits the US more than Russia.

Washington wants New START’s verification procedures to be modified and the treaty to be extended for fewer than five years “to keep up the momentum to clinch a new treaty soon.” The Trump administration wants the proposed framework memorandum to contain a pledge to limit “all nuclear warheads,” including non-strategic or tactical, where Russia holds vast numerical superiority since the US (unlike Russia) scrapped almost all of its non-strategic warheads in the decades after the end of Cold War. The Trump administration also wants Moscow to publicly pledge support for the inclusion of limitation on China’s nuclear and missile arsenals within the next nuclear arms control treaty. According to Billingslea, Russia has been expanding its nuclear stockpile and China even more so, while the US has not; but Washington is planning a massive nuclear modernization and, “if the New START limitations expire in February, that would be easier.” The US presidential envoy believes Moscow also has a vested interest in limiting Chinese nuclear arms (Kommersant, September 21).

Moscow rebuked Billingslea’s move to publicly push through a hard bargain, calling it an unacceptable “ultimatum” (Interfax, September 21). His Russian counterpart, Ryabkov, publicly rejected the US ambassador’s proposals point by point: Moscow is not ready to begin discussing non-strategic nukes. Moscow wants to extend New START “as it is,” without any modifications or changes in the verification procedures. As Russo-US relations are in shambles and mutual trust is close to zero, the US-proposed intrusive verification process involving employing observers at nuclear-production facilities to count the number of newly manufactured and retired strategic and non-strategic warheads is unacceptable. Russia would not object to China joining nuclear arms control talks but will in no way pressure Beijing to join; and if China does come to the table, Moscow would then demand that France and the UK join, too—something Washington opposes. According to Ryabkov, Moscow may reluctantly agree to extend New START for less than five years, but not much less “or it makes little sense.” The bottom line from Ryabkov: Moscow will not be bullied into a deal (Kommersant, September 22).

It is well understood in Moscow that Trump wants a reelection foreign policy coup—to be seen to have pushed through an ambitious though legally nonbinding deal with Putin while seemingly turning Russia against China on a strategically important issue. The Kremlin could even play along to some extent, since a second Trump term is apparently considered the lesser of two evils compared to a Joseph Biden presidency. But Ryabkov’s leeway is limited. More intrusive verification involving permanent onsite missions is a no go. Limiting or seriously discussing non-strategic nuclear weapons, if that involves the disclosure of their numbers and deployments, is a no go. As a prerequisite, Moscow has demanded the unconditional withdrawal of the last deployed US tactical nuclear weapons—the bombs in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries, intended for use by allied forces—knowing such a unilateral move would seriously undermine Alliance unity and is not forthcoming. Most importantly, Moscow is not ready to undermine its cohesion with Beijing by being seen as siding with Trump on pressuring the Chinese to disclose their nuclear arsenal and enter tripartite arms control talks. None of this looks feasible in the present international situation.

Still, Russia is not breaking off arms control talks, and there is still a possibility that some compromise formula may be found (Kommersant, September 21). In a prerecorded address to the United Nations General Assembly, Putin stated, “Extending the New START treaty beyond February 5, 2021, is a priority that must be resolved without delay. Negotiations are continuing” (Kremlin.ru, September 22). Several days earlier, however, Putin announced that, for the first time in history, Russia possesses classes of nuclear weapons no one else has: “faster, more powerful and precise.” Gone are the days when Russia was catching up and unable to reply to the enemy’s challenges (Kremlin.ru, September 19). Putin believes Russia is negotiating with the US from a position of strength, and there is no need to rush to take Trump’s offer.

 

[jward]

What Are India’s Plans for Directed Energy Weapons?

DEWs are yet to be deployed by any country’s military, but are widely seen as a critical part of future warfare.

By Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan

September 24, 2020

Credit: Pixabay
India’s Defense Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) announced earlier this month that it plans to develop directed energy weapons (DEWs) using high-energy lasers and microwaves. DEWs are emerging military technologies that are yet to be deployed by any military force but are seen as critical in future warfare. According to media reports, India has developed a national plan with short, medium and long term goals to develop a series of DEW variants with up to 100 kilowatts of power. This is being planned in a collaborative mode, to eventually partner with and benefit from the domestic private sector. While India is still in the early stages of developing this technology and nowhere near possessing an operational capability, advances in such technologies will have implications for both national and regional security.

Development of DEWs is seen as particularly important in the context of India’s worsening security environment, especially its ties with China. The continuing military confrontation in eastern Ladakh is a reminder of the challenges that China poses to India. Beijing’s growing military power, including in space, cyber and electronic warfare domains, can inflict significant damage on its adversaries, including India. China is also developing DEW technologies. Indeed, India is probably developing its own DEWs as a response.

Delivering the 12th annual Air Chief Marshal L.M. Katre memorial lecture in August 2019, Dr. G. Satheesh Reddy, the head of the DRDO said, “DEWs are extremely important today. The world is moving towards them. In the country too, we are doing a lot of experiments. We have been working in this area for the past three to four years to develop 10-kW and 20-kW [weapons].” In August 2017, the DRDO is reported to have tested a 1-kilowatt laser weapon at Chitradurga in the South Indian state of Karnataka, on a target 250 meters away. Then Defense Minister Arun Jaitley is believed to have been present for the test. This is far from being a usable weapon, of course: in addition to the limited distance of the target, the laser also reportedly took 36 seconds to create a hole on the target metal sheet. The Centre for High Energy Systems and Sciences and Laser Science & Technology Centre, two DRDO laboratories, are working on the project.

In 2018, while responding to a question in the Indian Parliament on the DRDO’s major technological developments, the minister of state for defense stated that the DRDO has developed a vehicle-mounted high-power laser-directed energy system for use against drones. The anti-drone system will supposedly be eventually manufactured in large quantities through the involvement of the Indian private sector. Two models have been developed in this regard: the first can be fielded on a trailer and has a 10-kilowatt laser to target aerial targets within a 2-kilometer range, whereas the second is believed to be a compact tripod-mounted system, mounted with a 2-kilowatt laser designed to operate at a rage of 1 kilometer. Officials cited in one report claim that these have been displayed to the armed forces and other relevant agencies and note that these are capable of taking out mini-drones by jamming the command and control systems or by damaging the on-board electronic systems. This system is capable of detecting and jamming micro-drones to a distance of up to 3 kilometers and engaging a target within a range of 1-1.25 kilometers.

India is also reported to have developed a system called KALI, or “kilo ampere linear injector,” a linear electron accelerator for targeting long-range missiles. Once a missile launch is detected, KALI is supposed to “quickly emit powerful pulses of Relativistic Electrons Beams (REB)” that can damage electronic systems on-board. KALI has been developed by the DRDO and the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC). It was first proposed in 1985 by the then-BARC Director Dr. R. Chidambaram. Work on the project is reported to have begun in 1989. At a BARC Foundation Day speech in 2004, the BARC director said that a “high power pulse electron accelerator KALI-5000 has been commissioned at an energy of 650 keV and an electron beam power of 40 GW. High power microwaves having frequency in the range of 3-5 GHz and power 1-2 GW have been generated.” Despite this acknowledgement of the existence of such a system, there is very little information in the public domain. The government has not divulged any information, even in parliament. For instance, more than a decade later, in 2015, while responding to a question in parliament as to whether there are any plans to induct KALI 5000 in the Indian military, Defense Minister Manohar Parikkar simply stated, “The desired information is sensitive in nature and its disclosure is not in the interest of national security.”

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While details are sketchy, the technological roadmaps for the next decade developed by the Indian defense establishment in 2013 and 2018 articulated some of the military’s requirements. Media reports said that according to Phase I of the roadmap,the Indian Army and the Indian Air Force require a minimum of 20 “tactical high-energy laser systems” that are capable of destroying “small aerial targets” and electronic warfare systems at a range of 6-8 kilometers. In Phase II, the demand is to have laser systems that have a range of over 20 kilometers to target “soft-skinned” vehicles and forces from both land and air.


But India’s DEW technological capabilities are still in the nascent stage, and are not yet comparable to the more powerful systems of countries like the U.S., Russia and China. While the effectiveness of these weapons remains unknown because of the lack of open source information, it is quite likely that these will mature in the coming decade.

Of course, these systems bring their own advantages and disadvantages. Laser weapons, for instance, have the capability to be focused precisely, which allows for effective targeting. On the other hand, though microwaves cannot be aimed like lasers, their ability to damage electronic systems without causing casualties opens up other options. In fact, a report produced by the U.S. Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) details many illustrative scenarios as to how these weapon systems could be effectively used in contactless warfare in the future.


Indian security analysts argue that the country could be vulnerable as technology advances in India’s neighborhood. They also recommend that India consider the possibility of developing an offensive capability in this regard. Given the intensifying security dynamics in the Indo-Pacific and beyond, all the major powers including India are likely to accelerate the pursuit of these technologies.


posted for fair use

What Are India’s Plans for Directed Energy Weapons?

DEWs are yet to be deployed by any country’s military, but are widely seen as a critical part of future warfare.

thediplomat.com

 

[jward]

SAM System That Guards Washington DC Just Made Its Lowest Ever Intercept Of A Mock Cruise Missile
The National Advanced Surface to Air Missile System is critical to protecting America's capital and surrounding areas from air and missile threats.
By Joseph TrevithickSeptember 24, 2020

• The War Zone

Dutch Ministry of Defense

The U.S. military conducted the lowest ever intercept of a mock cruise missile using the National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System, or NASAMS, during a test earlier this month. Operationally, NASAMS helps protect the airspace around Washington, D.C. and the larger surrounding National Capital Region. This test follows a number of other cruise missile defense experiments in the past year or so, including a recent demonstration of the ability of a self-propelled 155mm howitzer to bring down such a weapon using a hyper velocity projectile.



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The test took place on Sept. 3, 2020 and involved a NASAMS situated on Santa Rosa Island, located off the coast of Florida in the Gulf of Mexico, engaging a very low-flying unmanned BQM-167 Skeeter target drone simulating an incoming cruise missile. The U.S. Air Force's 780th Test Squadron, based at Eglin Air Force Base in Florida and responsible for various conventional weapon testing, led the test as part of a program called Vermilion Stallion.

USAF
A low-quality image the Air Force released from the Vermilion Stallion test.

The service's 82nd Aerial Targets Squadron managed the launch and operation of the BQM-167, while personnel from the U.S. Army's 263rd Army Air and Missile Defense Command and 1st Battalion, 204th Air Defense Artillery manned the NASAMS. The 263rd is part of the South Carolina Army National Guard, while 1-204th is an element of the Mississippi Army National Guard.


The test had actually been pushed back due to Tropical Storm Marco and Hurricane Laura, which battered the region in August. More than $20 million worth of weapons and other equipment had to be relocated to safety before being sent back to Santa Rosa.
"This live-fire made history as the lowest altitude surrogate cruise missile ever impacted with the system," according to an Air Force press release. "The successful execution enabled the verification, validation, and re-characterization of the nation’s air defense system’s many upgrades."

Cruise missiles typically fly at low altitudes to avoid detection and intercept.
The release did not offer any details about these improvements to NASAMS, which is a ground-launched version of Raytheon's AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) that that company developed in cooperation with Norway's Kongsberg Defense. The two defense companies have developed an extended range version of the system using a missile that combines components of the AIM-120C-7 and the RIM-162 Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM), another Raytheon product.
In 2019, Qatar became the first country to officially buy NASAMS along with these AMRAAM-ER missiles. You can read more about NASAMS and the AMRAAM-ER in this past War Zone piece.


Upgrades to the NASAMS, especially to be able to detect, track, and engage especially low-flying threats, make good sense given how important the systems are to the critical task of protecting the airspace over and around the nation's capital. Though unknown to most Americans, NASAMS is the primary surface to air missile system in the National Capital Region. It is also supplemented by a number of AN/TWQ-1 Avenger short-range air defense systems at key locations. Air Force F-16C/D Viper fighter jets and Coast Guard MH-65 Dolphin helicopters are also on call to respond to contingencies.

This airspace is among the most heavily restricted and monitored in the world and any potential threats are taken very seriously. In November 2019, a possible intrusion triggered a lockdown at the White House and the Capitol, though that thankfully turned out to be a false alarm, as you can read about in more detail in this previous War Zone story.
This test also comes at a time when there has been a renewed focus on the potential threats posed by cruise missiles, both to American forces on the battlefield and U.S. territory, across the U.S. military. This was codified in the most recent Missile Defense Review that the Pentagon released last year. The previous review, which came out in 2010, was focused entirely on ballistic missile defense.

Protecting the National Capital Region against cruise missiles, including those fired from submarines or other ships, potentially operating clandestinely offshore, has long been a concern for the U.S. government. This was the primary driver behind the U.S. military's abortive Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System, or JLENS, an aerostat-mounted radar system. This multi-billion-dollar program began in 1996 and finally came to end more than two decades later after numerous cost increases and delays.

This new attention to the matter of cruise missile defense has translated into a number of different initiatives, including work developing and acquiring various means of detecting and intercepting such weapons. During a multi-day Air Force-led experiment earlier this month, a U.S. Army XM1299 self-propelled 155mm howitzer shot down another BQM-167 simulating a cruise missile with a Hyper Velocity Projectile (HVP), an unprecedented feat.


"That’s video games, sci-fi awesome. You’re not supposed to be able to shoot down a cruise missile with a tank," Will Roper, the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, said afterward. "But, yes, you can, if the bullet is smart enough, and the bullet we use for that system is exceptionally smart."
This experiment was primarily focused on exploring new networking capabilities able to link a wide array of weapons, sensors, and command and control nodes together. It also involved tests of HVPs fired from a 5-inch naval gun on a ground-based test stand a modified M107 self-propelled howitzer that appears to have been acting as a surrogate for the 155mm Advanced Gun Systems found on the U.S. Navy's Zumwalt class stealth destroyers.

An MQ-9 Reaper drone took down another BQM-167 with an AIM-9X Sidewinder, while an F-16C/D Viper shot down one more with a laser-guided 70mm Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System II (APKWS II) rocket during the event, as well. In both cases, the target drones were again meant to simulate incoming cruise missiles.
NASAMS was also present at White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico for this experiment. This appears to be unrelated to the Vermilion Stallion test off the coast of Florida.


The Army has also bought a small number of Iron Dome systems from Israel as an interim cruise missile defense system. The service curtailed that effort earlier this year, ostensibly over concerns about integrating it with the rest of its integrated air defense networks.

There had also been questions about just how well suited Iron Dome might be to cruise missile defense. It is primarily designed to knock down lower-tier threats such as artillery rockets and shells, mortar bombs, and small drones.
NASAMS successful interception of a mock cruise missile flying at very low altitude only underscores how important cruise missile defense is to the U.S. military at present, including when it comes to the defense of the nation's capital.
Contact the author: joe@thedrive.com

posted for fair use

SAM System That Guards Washington DC Just Made Its Lowest Ever Intercept Of A Mock Cruise Missile

The National Advanced Surface to Air Missile System is critical to protecting Washington, D.C. and surrounding areas from air and missile threats.

www.thedrive.com