WAR 09-12-2020-to-09-18-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
(434) 08-22-2020-to-08-28-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****
WAR - 08-22-2020-to-08-28-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****


(435) 08-29-2020-to-09-04-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****



WAR - 08-29-2020-to-09-04-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****
Sorry for the delay....HC (432) 08-08-2020-to-08-14-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR**** WAR - 08-08-2020-to-08-14-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR**** (429)...

www.timebomb2000.com
www.timebomb2000.com


(436) 09-05-2020-to-09-11-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

---------------------------------------------------

Hummmm..........

Posted for fair use.......

Afghan peace talks with Taliban begin in Doha with rocky path ahead
Nineteen years after 9/11, securing a ceasefire and safeguarding rights of women and minorities are key challenges

Reuters
Sat 12 Sep 2020 02.56 EDT First published on Fri 11 Sep 2020 21.41 EDT

Talks between the Afghan government and Taliban insurgents started in Qatar’s capital of Doha on Saturday with the goal of bringing an end to a conflict that has laid waste to the country and killed tens of thousands of combatants and civilians.


The head of Afghanistan’s peace council, Abdullah Abdullah, said that if the Afghan government and Taliban insurgents came together, they could finally strike a peace deal to end decades of conflict.

“I believe that if we give hands to each other and honestly work for peace, the current ongoing misery in the country will end,” he told the opening ceremony of the talks at a hotel in Doha.

The talks are aimed at ending 19 years of war in Afghanistan. It is the US’s longest overseas military action, vexing three successive US presidents.


The US secretary of state, Mike Pompeo, said the starting of the talks was a momentous occasion and that an enduring peace was possible. But the talks would require enormous hard work and sacrifice to succeed, he said.


Pompeo told both parties that the choice of Afghanistan’s political system was theirs to make.


Earlier, officials, diplomats and analysts said that although getting both sides to the negotiating table was an achievement in itself, it did not mean the path to peace would be easy.

“The negotiations will have to tackle a range of profound questions about the kind of country Afghans want,” Deborah Lyons, the UN special representative for Afghanistan, told the UN security council this month.


The inauguration ceremony on Saturday was taking place a day after the 19th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks on the US that triggered its military involvement in Afghanistan.


US forces intervened in Afghanistan on the orders of president George W Bush a month after the attacks to hunt down their mastermind, Osama bin Laden, a Saudi who had been given sanctuary by the country’s radical Islamist Taliban rulers. They initially offered mainly air support to the Taliban’s local enemies.

The Taliban regime was quickly toppled, but they regrouped and have since waged an insurgency that has sucked in Afghanistan’s neighbours and troops from dozens of countries, including Nato forces.

Negotiations to broker a comprehensive peace deal were envisaged in a troop withdrawal pact signed between the US and the Taliban in February in an attempt to find a political settlement to end the war.


After months of delay, a dispute over the Taliban’s demand for the release of 5,000 prisoners was resolved this week.


Ahead of the US presidential election in November, president Donald Trump is also looking to show progress in his pledge to end the US involvement and pull out most of the foreign forces stationed in Afghanistan.


The US has reduced its troop levels and by November is expected to have less than 5,000 soldiers in Afghanistan, down from about 13,000 when the US-Taliban deal was signed. More than 2,300 US troops have been killed in Afghanistan since 2001, and about 450 British soldiers.


A European diplomat in Kabul said that a ceasefire – which the Taliban have so far rejected – should top the talk’s agenda.

“The Taliban leaders will have to stop fighters from attacking Afghan forces and civilians, violence continues to degrade the atmosphere and potentially derail negotiations,” the diplomat said.


How to include the Taliban, who reject the legitimacy of the Western-backed Afghan government, in any governing arrangement and how to safeguard the rights of women and minorities who suffered under Taliban rule are big challenges, experts said.


But many diplomats, victims of violence and members of civil society say negotiations are the only realistic way to bring an end to a conflict that has killed more than 100,000 civilians and hampered Afghanistan’s development, leaving millions in poverty.


“Solutions will not be found on the battlefield, we know this,” Lyons said.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Hummm.......

Posted for fair use.....

Endgame in Afghanistan: Division, Hope and Challenges

Published 2 hours ago on September 12, 2020
By Saddam Hussein

The efforts for kick-starting intra-Afghan negotiations (IAN) faced another roadblock, as Afghan President Ghani’s appointed 46-member High Council for National Reconciliation, is rejected by some influential Afghan leaders. The council is criticized for not being inclusiveness in nature. It is being regarded as ‘one man show’ and fingers are obviously being pointed at Ghani. Some term the council as “Ghani’s favorites”.


The council has 10 members in leadership positions, nine women members, nine high-ranking government officials, and 19 who are an assortment of political figures and former mujahideen leaders. The council is separate from a 21-member negotiating team, which Ghani appointed in March and is expected to travel to Doha, where the Taliban maintain a political office, for the intra-Afghan talks. However, the council will have the final say and will ultimately decide on the points that the negotiating team takes up with the Taliban.


The problem is that the names were not finalized through across the board consultative process, including the representatives from almost all walks of life. Also, those in the list were not contacted for their consent; their names were announced without them knowing.


Likewise, Afghan people opine that there are many former mujahideen and jihadi leaders. This portrays the picture of one group of militia talking to another group of militia with few government representatives. Women are given a customary role without any impactful decision-making power, while youth have been ignored all together. Does this mean that diverse array of Afghan representation is being excluded and only those are included who possess de facto power in their respective areas?


In contrast, former Afghan president Hamid Karzai in a statement said he will continue his efforts for peace, but rejected his membership in the council, saying he would serve in no government institution. While, Hizb-e-Islami, led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, called the membership of mujahideen and political leaders in the council symbolic and ineffective.


On the other hand, Abdullah Abdullah, the chairman of the High Council for National Reconciliation, in a statement opposing President Ghani’s decree, officially listing members of the council, stated that according to the political agreement it is the authority of the head of the council to appoint its members.


As of now, Karzai and Abdullah both agree that selecting the members of the High Council for National Reconciliation should be after consultations with religious leaders, political leaders, elders, civil society organizations and broad-spectrum Afghan representation including women and youth.


Furthermore, some influential leaders may also be eyeing on the positions of power in the post intra-Afghan negotiations set-up. This may also cause problems in the finalization of high reconciliation council as these leaders may be positioning themselves where they can optimize their self-interests.Having said that, Afghan leaders are capable of resolving these issues and it is hoped this issue will soon witness a closure with a logical conclusion. This ought to happen to negotiate with equivalent bargaining power with Taliban, otherwise the council will be at a losing end in talks, commencing in Doha in couple of days.


IAN – a bumpy road ahead?


Afghanistan has been badly devastated by war for decades of war and terrorism. The ongoing conflict has affected the physical resources and the social fabric of the country, as well. Now, as a decent opening has been shaped to bring the war to an end and establish sustainable peace, so, it needs to be utilized so that the obliterations being caused by war can come to an end and peace and security can be cherished in the country.


After four decades, a window of opportunity is offering a closure to the war in Afghanistan. After a long time, all parties regarding Afghanistan are on one page. Regional and international consensus about peace has happened and all international groups and bodies believe that if there is any solution to Afghan imbroglio, it is political one – through table-talks.


The aim of intra-Afghan talks is to end the war and bloodshed is the country. Thus, first and foremost objective of the both sides should be trust building and reduction in violence, which will eventually lead to a lasting ceasefire.


All necessary issues such as reforms, protection and empowerment of national establishments, amendment of the constitution, limits to freedom of the people and others should be categorized and prioritized and ought to be deliberated with sheer tolerance and with an open mind. Negotiations over all issues may take several months. Nevertheless, extendedponderingsmust not lead to apathy and discontinuity of talks. Intra-Afghan dialogue should continue until a comprehensive agreement is prepared and signed between both sides.


Regardless of local national, regional and international consensus over peace, there still are elements that consider peace against their interests, hence, create obstacles for it. Such groups and bodies will definitely keep attempting to find ways in order to sabotage the intra-Afghan dialogue.


Transformation of peace efforts into national, regional and international competition can be perceived as another great challenge for intra-Afghan dialogue. As conflicts of interest exist on all levels; many would prefer interests over peace. So, supporters of the peace process and the negotiating team should be sensitive and pragmatic while making decisions.


Evidence shows, power is still something that many Afghan leaders and officials are keen to hold on to. This thirst for power is a direct challenge for the intra-Afghan talks. Considering the lobbying attempts by the officials and politicians, it can be perceived that power is prioritizing over peace. Recently, some Afghan leaders allege that, some very high-ranking officials close to Ghani have established a cell, which also includes vice president and deputy of NDS, for crushing the political opposition and criticism. They term it as a violation of article 34 of Afghanistan’s constitution, which states “Freedom of expression shall be inviolable”. These Afghan leaders also link the mentioned cell to death threats and recent mysterious assassinations of peace activists and political critics. They communicated all these grievances to President Ghani via a letter; though the letter is silent on the subject if the cell hasa nod from the Ghani himself or otherwise. If true, how can Afghan government legitimize itself within the framework of Intra-Afghan dialogue? How it will take the cover behind the expression of “constitution is supreme’, while the government itself doesn’t respect it.


Another key problem is of ethnic inclusion. If the intra-Afghan dialogue does not address the apprehensions of non-Pashtun ethnic groups, the latter will also become skeptical with the peace process. It will be too much to expect the Taliban to make non-Pashtun groups feel comfortable, as indeed it is to expect entrenched non-Pashtun warlords to cede their power. Still, there needs to be comfortable arrangement for non-Pashtoon ethnic groups too in the future set-up of Afghanistan’s governance. In addition to that, how the interests of various groups, particularly women, religious minorities, and the media, will be accommodated in the future political dispensation, in which the Taliban would have significant representation, is unclear. Women’s groups increasingly fear that the rights and freedom they have come to enjoy would be taken away by the Taliban if they become part of any power sharing equation. They are skeptical as Taliban has made no meaningful concessions on this front.


Lastly, both sides need to show flexibility and humility to not lose this opportunity of peaceful Afghanistan. If this chance is lost then there will be unrest, chaos and perhaps another civil war. It is pertinent to that, for sustainable peace, Taliban have to be part of the power equation in the post-peace Afghanistan for quite some time, else they may resort to violence again if they feel losing control too soon.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Posted for fair use.....

Morocco Warns of Growing Islamic State in African Sahel-Sahara Region
By Kizzi Asala
with AFP
Last updated: 1 hour ago

Morocco

A cell of dangerous terrorists with allegiance to the Islamic State (IS) found with explosive belts, kilos of ammonium nitrate — the same substance behind the devastating explosion in Beirut, bladed weapons and electronic equipment, was dismantled Thursday at sites in Tangier and the Rabat region of Morocco.

This came after the five Islamist extremists — aged between 29 and 43, put up fierce resistance.

Abdelhak Khiame, head of the Central Bureau of Judicial Investigation (BCIJ), recounted events in an interview Friday at the offices in Sale, near Morocco's capital Rabat, "It was a dangerous cell primed to go into action at any moment."

He added that the dismantled cell had apparently had no direct contact with the jihadists of IS, "Even if the Daesh (Islamic State) was defeated in the Levant, in the region of Syria and Iraq, it is an ideology that is conveyed and does not need a territory, it can develop where it finds sympathisers easily."

Moroccan authorities have warned of the growing presence of Islamist extremism in the Sahel-Sahara region of Africa spanning the western and northern-central areas of the continent — especially in countries such as Mali and Libya who do not yet have their security under control, "Terrorist cells and terrorism are growing in the region but also organised crime networks, drug trafficking, weapons and human beings," said the BCIJ chief. "All of this... makes the Sahel region, in my opinion, a time bomb."

Khiame also stated that the Islamic State-affiliated group had planned suicide attacks targeting "public personalities, military figures and the headquarters of security services" in Morocco.

He reminded that it was the first such large-scale bust since the 2003 Islamist suicide attacks in Casablanca, Morocco's economic capital, that left 33 dead.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Posted for fair use.....

What is behind rebel attacks in Mozambique's gas-rich region?

A debt crisis, gas price slump and armed uprising are slowing Mozambique's rise. Plus, why the dollar is sinking.

12 Sep 2020 07:28 GMT Mozambique, Fossil Fuels, Business & Economy, Conflict, Science & Technology

In time, Mozambique will become the world's fourth-biggest exporter of gas but right now it is fast becoming the most unequal society in sub-Saharan Africa.

The promise of gas riches could not come quickly enough for a nation mired in a debt scandal, pandemic and an armed uprising in the far north, where the country has its most valuable offshore gas deposits.

Plus, is the world heading towards a currency war as the United States allows the dollar to sink, and will other nations weaken their currencies?

And, the maker of the popular Fortnite game takes on tech giant Apple in the courts.

Source: Al Jazeera
 

jward

passin' thru
The Gulf War 30 Years Later: Successes, Failures, and Blind Spots
Richard A. Lacquement, Jr.

September 9, 202


original (6)


Was the Gulf War (1990 to 1991) a success for the United States? To many, the answer is unequivocally “yes.” After all, the United States rallied the international community to punish aggression and liberate a small country (Kuwait) that had been invaded by its larger, authoritarian neighbor (Iraq). The country marshaled its formidable instruments of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic power to garner international support and achieved its objectives quickly at a relatively limited cost; adeptly executed joint and multinational military operations; and displayed astonishing military capabilities heralded as the beginning of a “revolution in military affairs.” These elements of the U.S. campaign should be celebrated and, where possible, emulated in the future.


But the United States should be careful not to mythologize its performance in the Gulf War. For example, war termination was handled haphazardly in a manner that hurt policy goals for regional stability. Following the war, great-power and non-state competitors sought to identify and exploit U.S. vulnerabilities with asymmetric responses while excessive military deference from allies often placed a greater burden on the United States. Lastly, U.S. military prowess in the war led to hubris, and reinforced a neglect for diplomacy, irregular warfare, stability operations, and governance. The country should continue to study the record of the Gulf War to identify and attend to demonstrated deficiencies, and to analyze subsequent responses of adversaries and allies.

Background
On Aug. 2, 1990, Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein ordered his armed forces to seize control of Kuwait. The Iraqi military secured the entirety of Kuwait and had troops poised on the border with Saudi Arabia by the following day. Saddam’s gambit to restore what Iraq claimed to be its 19th province rapidly assumed global dimensions.
Iraqi forces were poised to conquer the oil-rich northeastern portion of Saudi Arabia. Conceivably, along with its own considerable stockpiles, Iraq could then control half of global oil reserves. In the minds of American policymakers, this was a direct threat to U.S. vital interests.

Events evolved rapidly. With strong U.S. leadership, the United Nations condemned Iraq’s aggression, demanded its immediate withdrawal from Kuwait, and then levied an economic embargo when Baghdad failed to comply. Following an invitation from Saudi Arabia’s King Fahd, U.S. forces, primarily from the XVIII Airborne Corps, deployed to defend Saudi Arabia on Aug. 8 (this would mark the official start of Operation Desert Shield). In November, the United States began deploying an additional corps (the U.S. VII Corps from Germany) to build an offensive military option to evict Iraqi forces from Kuwait if Iraq did not accede to U.N. resolutions. At the end of the month, the United Nations authorized all necessary means to achieve its demands if Iraq did not comply by Jan. 15, 1991. American and Soviet diplomats, among others, could not convince Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. However, diplomacy did succeed in gaining the release of hostages whom Iraq had seized. After receiving congressional support, the U.S.-led military coalition launched combat operations, consisting primarily of airstrikes, on Jan. 17, 1991 (the beginning of Operation Desert Storm). In late February, the coalition launched a ground offensive that forcibly evicted Iraqi forces from Kuwait. On March 3, the Iraqi and coalition leaders agreed to an armistice at the southern Iraqi town of Safwan. In short, a broad military coalition, led by the United States under a U.N. mandate, removed Iraqi forces from Kuwait and restored Kuwaiti sovereignty.

America’s Successful Response to Iraqi Aggression
There are several important successes from the Gulf War that are relevant to the present. First, the U.S. prewar policy and strategy were well matched to isolate Iraq and build a broad coalition to conduct military operations to enforce U.N. resolutions. The limited policy aims — essentially status quo antebellum — were supported by a commensurate military force. American officials focused on the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait and the restoration of its sovereignty. The White House determined that overthrowing the Iraqi government was not particularly desirable (although many, including President George H.W. Bush, hoped for Saddam’s removal by some internal means) so as to preserve Iraq as a check against Iran. Moreover, regime change was not an aim supported by other nations that were crucial to diplomatic and military support for the war (primarily through the United Nations).

Increased cooperation among the different U.S. military services was another very positive lesson from the Gulf War. This was the first significant multi-service test after the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reform Act, which was designed to strengthen joint performance. Key elements included strengthening the authority of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs over the individual service chiefs (hence Gen. Colin Powell’s central role at the strategic level); giving the combatant commanders clearer authority over service components in a theater (Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf was commander of U.S. Central Command in this case); as well as seeking greater joint acculturation through assignment and educational prerequisites for officers filling critical joint positions and for any who would compete for general or flag officer promotion. Though growing pains demonstrated room for improvement, interservice rivalry and divided responsibilities were significantly abated in planning and executing joint operations during the Gulf War. Well-integrated joint operations tied platforms, units, and actions together to create multiple dilemmas for the Iraqi military.

Perhaps most importantly, the United States demonstrated restraint and avoided the temptations of fighting past the culminating point of victory. Given the relative ease with which Iraqi forces were defeated and ousted from Kuwait, some U.S. decision-makers were tempted to press their advantage deeper into Iraq itself. In a deft way, America’s military intervention in the Gulf War also restored the status quo without disrupting U.S. endeavors to manage what proved to be the final stages of the Cold War, particularly through careful diplomacy with the Soviet Union.
The U.S. armed forces displayed a well-integrated approach to the use of precision munitions and long-range strikes that cut across services and domains — land, sea, air, and space. Many saw it as a revolution in military affairs. The U.S. ability to move vast forces into Saudi Arabia from around the globe was a testament not just to combat power but to the incredible mobility afforded by air and maritime assets. American capabilities in space also played a crucial role for long-range communications and a satellite-based global positioning system that made it possible to navigate easily in trackless desert.

American Deficiencies in the Gulf War: Making the Results Durable
America’s intervention in the Gulf War was not a complete success. The United States failed to construct a durable regional security order after the war. What appeared to be an exceptionally daunting undertaking to simply defeat Iraqi forces in the theater of operations led to an overcautious approach to warfighting. The cautious approach included several weeks of airstrikes before launching the ground attack; insufficient recognition of Iraqi shortcomings (especially after the major Iraqi attack at Khafji in late January); a relatively slow-moving, deliberate main attack that was difficult to accelerate; and a mismatched approach to war termination that came up short on key military objectives both geographically (failure to close off the Iraqi retreat route) and operationally (in not destroying the Republican Guard).

According to National Security Directive 54, dated Jan. 15, 1991, there were four major war aims: complete Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, restore Kuwait’s government, protect American lives (in particular, free hostages), and “promote the security and the stability of the Persian Gulf.” The United States accomplished the first three objectives but not the last. Iraq freed American hostages seized in the conquest of Kuwait before the conflict and then released U.S. prisoners of war whom it had captured soon after combat operations. Combat operations were effective in evicting Iraqi forces from Kuwait and restoring Kuwaiti sovereignty. But regional stability in the Persian Gulf? What would sufficiently represent achievement of that objective? Before combat operations, key supporting goals included elimination of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and destruction of the Republican Guard Forces Command. The execution of a cautious operational plan allowed a large proportion of the Republican Guard in Kuwait to escape, and aerial bombing of suspected weapons of mass destruction sites was a highly uncertain remedy for eliminating Iraq’s possible stockpiles. Combat alone was not enough to attain key policy aims.

The survival of Saddam’s regime, still well-armed, was in part secured through effective use of force against a Shiite uprising in southern Iraq. The intervention of the U.S. and other allied forces in Operation Provide Comfort and Operation Northern Watch thwarted a more bellicose Iraqi effort to subdue rebellious Kurds.
The problem was not so much with combat operations at the tactical and operational level but with the lack of foresight about what might be required to attain durable policy outcomes even with the continued existence of Saddam’s Baathist regime. Eventually, the United States declared northern and southern no-fly zones and stationed U.S. forces in the region to help support military operations to deter and contain Iraq. The United States also worked through the United Nations to establish an intrusive inspection regime to ferret out and monitor weapons of mass destruction programs and to promulgate the continuation of economic sanctions on Iraq to force compliance with U.N. resolutions.
 

jward

passin' thru
continued

Blowback and Blind Spots After the Gulf War
There were important second-order effects to military operations that continue to play out. The U.S. armed forces demonstrated an array of abilities, subsumed under the rubric of a revolution in military affairs, that showed how the United States was far more advanced militarily than its rivals and most of its allies. The conventional armed forces built primarily to fight numerically superior Soviet forces proved extremely effective against Iraq.
For Americans, the realization that U.S. capabilities appeared to be even more advanced than hoped help to build a confidence that arguably led to hubris or “victory disease.” In the Cold War, there was a sense of the U.S. armed forces as underdogs who would be hard-pressed to defend against a Soviet onslaught without having to resort to nuclear weapons. After the Gulf War, many Americans reveled in the military’s apparently unmatched superiority.

Other states and their armed forces quickly distilled their own lessons from the Gulf War. Several developed asymmetric conventional strategies to counter the United States. High among these efforts are Russian concepts of hybrid warfare and Chinese concepts of unrestricted warfare that include major components of competition and conflict below the threshold of war as well as heightened emphasis on new technologies (e.g., information warfare, cyber attacks, economic disruptions, artificial intelligence, and other non-military endeavors). This is the area that poses the greatest contemporary challenge for the United States. Russia and China have had time to close the gap with the United States in major areas of modern warfare. In particular, they have developed long-range precision strike systems such as anti-ship missiles, anti-aircraft systems, and other capabilities to thwart U.S. global deployment options.

Another lesson some learned from the Gulf War was to “never fight the U.S. without nuclear weapons.” This insight reflects an implicit acceptance among America’s adversaries that they might be unable to match the United States (or other rivals) in conventional terms for the foreseeable future. As a result, developing nuclear weapons could offset this disadvantage. India, Pakistan, and North Korea all joined the nuclear weapons club after the Gulf War, while Iran accelerated its nuclear activities.
America’s military intervention in the Middle East had long-term repercussions. Osama bin Laden and his followers cited the U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia as one reason for their war against the United States. Bin Laden was motivated by grievances to include, “occupying the lands of Islam in the holiest of places, the Arabian Peninsula” and continuing to punish the Iraqi people. During his experience in Afghanistan in the 1980s, bin Laden saw how Soviet forces had ultimately succumbed to much less technically sophisticated opponents. Might such techniques of irregular warfare used against one superpower be fruitfully applied against the other?

Military success in a war of limited aims left open the question of whether America’s military prowess in precision airpower, naval supremacy, and large-scale ground combat operations in open terrain would translate to other locations. Though not a failure, the Gulf War did not demonstrate U.S. military capabilities for irregular warfare, stability operations, or the stewardship of social and political affairs for a defeated and/or occupied population — all elements of counter-insurgency and state-building operations that had proved so difficult in Vietnam. The vulnerabilities of U.S. armed forces to such challenges were evident in subsequent operations in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq (after 2003).

The demonstration of military prowess in the Gulf War included a problematic second-order effect for the relationship between the United States and some of its military allies. Even the most developed nations were (and are) extremely hard-pressed to match the complex and often exquisite U.S. military capabilities. Few bothered to try. Instead, U.S. allies opted for armed forces that relied even more heavily on the United States for critical capabilities and enablers, such as high-tech air, space, and maritime platforms. Furthermore, the absence of such capabilities also obviated the need for allies to develop the organizations to create and orchestrate the use of such exquisite capabilities. American success in the Gulf War created, in part, a new expectation that the U.S. military could easily intervene around the globe in ways that most allied military forces could not.

Conclusion
From a U.S. perspective, the Gulf War appeared to be a resounding success. Personally, as an artillery captain with the U.S. 1st Armored “Old Ironsides” Division, I deployed from Germany to the Gulf in December 1990, participated in the VII Corps main attack during the ground war, and was back in Germany by the end of April 1991. I was satisfied that our unit had performed brilliantly and that we had helped successfully accomplish our mission. After the Gulf War, I rose in rank (retiring in 2013 as colonel) and spent much of my military life as a strategist (back in Iraq a couple of times, as well as tours in Korea, Afghanistan, and the Pentagon) and as a faculty member (at the U.S. Naval War College and U.S. Army War College). During that time, I’ve regularly revisited the impact of the Gulf War.

The United States has much to be proud of in its performance in the Gulf War. American officials aligned policy and strategy well in the run-up to the war; successfully integrated diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of power; and triumphantly conducted joint military operations that exhibited mastery of new and even revolutionary military-technical capabilities. This record becomes all the more impressive in light of the country’s tumultuous experience in the Iraq War and in Afghanistan.

In the immediate aftermath of the conflict, President George H.W. Bush enthused “by God, we’ve kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all.” To an extent, Bush was right. Indeed, the U.S. military proved that it could project power with success thousands of miles from American shores. At the same time, that’s not the whole story. The Gulf War demonstrated shortcomings in war termination that helped thwart the creation of a durable security architecture in the Persian Gulf; provided an inflection point affecting the subsequent development of difficult policies and strategies by both adversaries and allies; and left open questions of American readiness for counter-insurgency and governance operations that were not tested during the Gulf War.
As successful as the U.S. performance in the Gulf War may have been, 30 years on it remains a source of justifiable pride and an instructive case for continued study.

posted for fair use
 

jward

passin' thru
Rivers: Gunmen Storm Funeral, Shoot Top Politicians, Kidnap Guests
ac149024c6fcc4cd8fdf02f9d6d6eae7

Published
on
13.09.2020
By
Enioluwa Adeniyi
gunmen

Suspected gunmen on Saturday stormed a funeral at Banigo Isile-Ogono community in Bonny Local Government Area of Rivers State, and abducted several people.
Information gathered revealed that some of the victims kidnapped at the event are identified as Sunny Hart, Thomas Allison and Theophilus Ibiama, among several others.
Chairman of Bonny Local Government Council, David Irimagha and lawmaker representing Bonny Constituency in the Rivers State House of Assembly, Abinye Blessing Pepple, escaped being killed in the attack.

The incident happened on Saturday during a funeral at Finiapiri-Ama, Banigo Isile-Ogono community in Bonny Local Government Area of the State.
While the LGA Chairman and the State lawmaker escaped, the leader of the Bonny Local Government Legislative Assembly, Miriam Hart who was among the guests was abducted in the process.
Further information revealed that Miriam Hart was hit by bullets and now battling for her life at an undisclosed hospital after sustaining gunshot injuries.

An eyewitness who spoke with Daily Post stated that, “Pepple, Irimagha, and Hart were among guests who were in the community to attend the funeral of late Kenneth Kalada Banigo when the gunmen who were masked struck.”
“The lawmaker, local government chairman, together with other guests tried to get to the waterfront to board their boats and escape.
“The gunmen later abducted a number of persons and took them away into the nearby creeks. The matter has been reported to security agencies.”



Kingsley Jumbo, Special Assistant on Media and Publicity to Pepple in a statement said, “The Rivers State lawmaker representing Bonny Constituency, Hon Abinye Blessing Pepple and the Executive Chairman of Bonny Local Government ,Hon David Rogers Irimagha earlier today escaped being abducted by masked gunmen.”
“The unfortunate incident happened at Finapiri Ama (Amauda) village in Banigo Ishilegono where they attended the burial ceremony of an elder statesman in Bonny Kingdom, Late Amaopusenibo Kenneth Miebaradima Kalada Banigo when masked gunmen arrived and began shooting sporadically from the jetty.”


posted for fair use
 

jward

passin' thru
CSIS
@CSIS

1h
In a collaborative report with , CSIS experts have identified seven geopolitical shifts that indicate a more nuclear-capable landscape in the future. To watch the full video: http://cs.is/3lLnhVk To read the report: http://cs.is/31NuWe2
View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CCMi9_Vgmww



Toward a More Proliferated World?

The Geopolitical Forces that Will Shape the Spread of Nuclear Weapons
September 2, 2020

Download the Report





The United States has been remarkably successful at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, but there are new reasons to question whether this track record will last into the future.


Working with partners, the United States has steadily built a framework of disincentives and barriers to prevent proliferation. These include: (1) international treaties and agreements that have erected legal, political, and normative barriers to the bomb; (2) U.S. security commitments to allies that dampen their own need for nuclear weapons; and (3) a set of tough penalties (e.g., sanctions) for those who get caught trying to build the bomb. In other words, the barriers to entry to the nuclear club are high, and those countries that want the ultimate weapon need to be willing to accept significant risks. This helps explain why, although many countries have explored or pursued nuclear weapons, only nine states have them today.


But several trends are eroding the foundation on which this formidable set of barriers rests. These trends are rooted in, and being shaped by, changes to the nature and structure of the international system: namely, the decline of U.S. influence and its gradual withdrawal from the international order that it helped create and lead for more than 70 years, and the concurrent rise of a more competitive security environment, particularly among great powers. These trends (detailed in the report) will have three broad implications for proliferation and U.S. policy. First, they stand to increase pressures on countries to seek nuclear weapons or related capabilities as a hedge. Second, they will almost certainly challenge the United States’ ability to effectively wield the traditional “carrots and sticks” of nonproliferation and counterproliferation policy and dilute the effectiveness of those tools. Finally, they could increasingly pit U.S. nonproliferation goals against other policy objectives, forcing harder tradeoffs.

U.S. policy must adapt unless the United States wants to be faced with a more nuclear-capable landscape in the future.


This research was made possible with the support of the MacArthur Foundation.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Hummm.......

Posted for fair use.....

Mon, Sep 14, 2020 page6

  • ‘Asian NATO’ presents opportunity
    • By Yao Chung-yuan 姚中原

    • During the US-India Strategic Partnership Forum’s third leadership summit on Aug. 31, US Deputy Secretary of State Stephen Biegun said that the US wants to partner with the other members of the Quadrilaterial Security Dialogue — Australia, India and Japan — to establish an organization similar to NATO, to “respond to ... any potential challenge from China.”
      He said that the US’ purpose is to work with these nations and other countries in the Indo-Pacific region to “create a critical mass around the shared values and interest of those parties,” and possibly attract more countries to establish an alliance comparable to NATO.
      China has over the past decade heavily invested in its national defense. In addition to creating opportunities for the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to learn about modern military concepts, including joint operations and cyberwarfare, it has also provided it with more modernized weapons and equipment, to the extent that some of its advancements, such as the Chengdu J-20 fighter jet, have been completely integrated and entered service.
      China has also been continually developing its nuclear weapons, space technology, aircraft carriers and information warfare capabilities.
      It is thus on its way to becoming a world-class military power, while also posing a serious threat to US interests in the Asia-Pacific region.

      The US Department of Defense on Sept. 1 published its 2020 Military Power Report, which says that China has deployed about 200 nuclear warheads that could be launched from land, sea and air, and that it plans to further expand and modernize its nuclear weapons, at least doubling the number of its nuclear warheads within the next 10 years.
      China’s military strength has already caught up with the US or even surpassed it in a number of key areas.
      US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for China Chad Sbragia has said that the PLA’s recent military exercises in the South China Sea show that it might be preparing to further harass neighboring countries.
      Sbragia said that the US Department of Defense would demonstrate the US’ commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific region by continuing to closely monitor China’s military drills.
      For Biegun, as deputy secretary of state, to raise the strategic concept of an “Asian NATO” in an international public forum shows that the US has become alert to the fact that China’s nonstop military development in the past few years poses a serious threat to Taiwan and the stability and security of the entire Asia-Pacific region.
      However, Biegun said that the Indo-Pacific region lacks strong multilateral security structures.
      In other words, the existing multilateral mechanisms in the region lack the fortitude of NATO or the EU, and are not inclusive enough.
      The US’ desire to establish an “Asian NATO” with its partners in the region presents Taiwan with a strategic opportunity that must be grasped.
      To put it simply: In addition to continuing to develop its asymmetric warfare capabilities, Taiwan should work out the smartest and most appropriate way to take part in this possibly US-led Asian regional security mechanism. This task will be a challenging test for the wisdom of Taiwan’s national security team.
      Yao Chung-yuan is an adjunct professor at a university and former deputy director of the Ministry of National Defense’s Strategic Planning Department.
      Translated by Julian Clegg
 

jward

passin' thru
Officials: Iran weighs plot to kill U.S. ambassador to South Africa
The Islamic Republic is still looking to avenge the death of Qassem Soleimani, officials said.
Qassem Soleimani


Office of the Iranian Supreme Leader via AP
By NAHAL TOOSI and NATASHA BERTRAND
09/13/2020 08:07 PM EDT


The Iranian government is considering assassinating the American ambassador to South Africa, U.S. intelligence reports say, according to a U.S. government official familiar with the issue and another official who has seen the intelligence.
News of the plot comes as Iran continues to seek ways to retaliate for President Donald Trump’s decision to kill a powerful Iranian general earlier this year, the officials said. If carried out, it could dramatically ratchet up already serious tensions between the U.S. and Iran and create enormous pressure on Trump to strike back — possibly in the middle of a tense election season.

U.S. officials have been aware of a general threat against the ambassador, Lana Marks, since the spring, the officials said. But the intelligence about the threat to the ambassador has become more specific in recent weeks. The Iranian embassy in Pretoria is involved in the plot, the U.S. government official said.

Still, attacking Marks is one of several options U.S. officials believe Iran’s regime is considering for retaliation since the general, Qassem Soleimani, was assassinated by a U.S. drone strike in January. At the time, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said the U.S. killed Soleimani to re-establish deterrence against Iran.
An intelligence community directive known as “Duty to Warn” requires U.S. spy agencies to notify a potential victim if intelligence indicates their life could be in danger; in the case of U.S. government officials, credible threats would be included in briefings and security planning. Marks has been made aware of the threat, the U.S. government official said. The intelligence also has been included in the CIA World Intelligence Review, known as the WIRe, a classified product that is accessible to senior policy and security officials across the U.S. government, as well as certain lawmakers and their staff.

Marks, 66, was sworn in as the U.S. ambassador last October. She’s known Trump for more than two decades and has been a member of his Mar-a-Lago club in Florida. Critics of Trump have derided her as a “handbag designer,” but her supporters retort that she is a successful businesswoman — her eponymous handbags run as much as $40,000 — with numerous international connections. A personal friend of the late Princess Diana, she also was born in South Africa and speaks some of the country’s key languages, including Afrikaans and Xhosa.

The intelligence community isn’t exactly sure why Iranians would target Marks, who has few, if any, known links to Iran. It’s possible the Iranians took her long friendship with Trump into consideration, the U.S. government official said.
The Iranian government also operates clandestine networks in South Africa, the officials noted, and has had a foothold there for decades. In 2015, Al Jazeera and The Guardian reported on leaked intelligence documents that detailed an extensive secret network of Iranian operatives in South Africa. Marks may also be an easier target than U.S. diplomats in other parts of the world, such as Western Europe, where the U.S. has stronger relationships with local law enforcement and intelligence services.

Iran’s Islamist leaders have a history of carrying out assassinations beyond their country’s borders, as well as taking hostages, since seizing power following a popular uprising in the late 1970s. In recent decades, Iran has generally avoided directly targeting U.S. diplomats, although Iranian-backed militias have long attacked U.S. diplomatic facilities and personnel in Iraq.
Trump alleged after Soleimani’s killing that the Iranian general had been plotting attacks on American diplomatic missions, although U.S. officials later cast doubt on his claims. “They were looking to blow up our embassy,” Trump said in January, referring to the massive, heavily fortified U.S. diplomatic compound in Iraq. Later, in a Fox News interview, he said, “I can reveal I believe it probably would’ve been four embassies.”

Days after Soleimani’s death, Iran launched a ballistic missile salvo at a military base in Iraq that housed U.S. forces, causing traumatic brain injuries among dozens of American troops. Trump declined to retaliate and said, “Iran appears to be standing down, which is a good thing for all parties concerned and a very good thing for the world” — though he announced fresh sanctions on the Iranian regime and warned it against further retaliatory moves.
Some analysts, however, said at the time that Iran likely would seek other ways to avenge Soleimani’s death. Gen. Kenneth McKenzie, the head of U.S. Central Command, was at the top of Iran’s hit list earlier this year, according to media reports. McKenzie said last month that he expected a new “response” from Iran to America’s ongoing presence in Iraq.

“I do not know what the nature of that response will be, but we will certainly be ready for it, should it occur,” he said. On Wednesday, McKenzie confirmed plans to cut the U.S. troop presence in Iraq from 5,200 to 3,000 by the end of September.
During an online forum in August, McKenzie said Iran was “our central problem” in the region, and acknowledged that the danger from Iranian proxies in Iraq had complicated U.S. efforts against ISIS, the radical Sunni terrorist organization and movement. “The threat against our forces from Shia militant groups has caused us to put resources that we would otherwise use against ISIS to provide for our own defense and that has lowered our ability to work effectively against them,” he said.

The White House-based National Security Council did not immediately respond to requests for comment. Neither did an Iranian official with Iran’s mission at the United Nations, nor a South African embassy official in Washington. Spokespeople for the State Department, the CIA and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence declined to comment.
The U.S. and Iran have been bitter foes for decades, openly confronting each other at times — and gingerly engaging in diplomacy at others — but more often waging a shadowy battle for power and influence across the broader Middle East. Under Trump, the two countries have veered toward outright military conflict on more than one occasion.
Last summer, the U.S. blamed Iran and its proxies for a series of explosions aimed at oil tankers. Iran took down a U.S. drone, and the U.S. later managed to take down an Iranian drone.

Trump acknowledged that, after Iran took down the U.S. drone, he nearly authorized a direct attack on Iranian soil, but he held off after being told 150 people could die — a toll he said was disproportionate.
The countries’ dispute deepened in the months afterward, especially in Iraq, where America and the U.S. have long engaged in proxy warfare. In December, an American contractor was killed in Iraq after an attack by an Iranian-allied militia. The U.S. reacted by bombing sites held by the group, killing around two dozen of its fighters. Soon afterward, protesters believed linked to the militia breached parts of the U.S. Embassy compound in Baghdad.

Then, in early January, the United States staged an airstrike that killed Soleimani as he was visiting Baghdad. It was a major escalation given Soleimani’s importance in Iran, although U.S. officials described it as a defensive measure.
Soleimani led the Quds Force, a unit of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps that oversees much of the country’s military activities outside its borders. Americans blame him for the death of numerous U.S. troops in the region.

Iran vowed to retaliate. Its first major move was the Jan. 8 missile attack on the al-Asad military base in Iraq. But around the same time, an Iranian missile took down a civilian airliner, killing 176 people and leading to fury inside Iran at the regime’s incompetence and shifting explanations for the incident, along with condemnation abroad.

Iran and South Africa have cooperated on a number of fronts in recent decades, including at the United Nations, where South Africa has at times advocated for Iran. South Africa’s uranium deposits are believed to have been a major interest for Iran as it was ramping up its nuclear program, which Tehran has always insisted was meant for peaceful energy purposes, not a bomb. The pair also have a military relationship, having signed some basic defense pacts.
Strange Iran-connected plots have been uncovered before.

Almost a decade ago, the U.S. arrested and eventually sentenced to prison an Iranian-American man who was alleged to have tried to hire Mexican drug cartel assassins to kill Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to the United States as he dined in Cafe Milano, a swanky Washington restaurant frequented by the city’s wealthy and powerful. The U.S. accused Soleimani of overseeing the plot.

posted for fair use
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Officials: Iran weighs plot to kill U.S. ambassador to South Africa
The Islamic Republic is still looking to avenge the death of Qassem Soleimani, officials said.
Qassem Soleimani


Office of the Iranian Supreme Leader via AP
By NAHAL TOOSI and NATASHA BERTRAND
09/13/2020 08:07 PM EDT


The Iranian government is considering assassinating the American ambassador to South Africa, U.S. intelligence reports say, according to a U.S. government official familiar with the issue and another official who has seen the intelligence.
News of the plot comes as Iran continues to seek ways to retaliate for President Donald Trump’s decision to kill a powerful Iranian general earlier this year, the officials said. If carried out, it could dramatically ratchet up already serious tensions between the U.S. and Iran and create enormous pressure on Trump to strike back — possibly in the middle of a tense election season.

U.S. officials have been aware of a general threat against the ambassador, Lana Marks, since the spring, the officials said. But the intelligence about the threat to the ambassador has become more specific in recent weeks. The Iranian embassy in Pretoria is involved in the plot, the U.S. government official said.

Still, attacking Marks is one of several options U.S. officials believe Iran’s regime is considering for retaliation since the general, Qassem Soleimani, was assassinated by a U.S. drone strike in January. At the time, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said the U.S. killed Soleimani to re-establish deterrence against Iran.
An intelligence community directive known as “Duty to Warn” requires U.S. spy agencies to notify a potential victim if intelligence indicates their life could be in danger; in the case of U.S. government officials, credible threats would be included in briefings and security planning. Marks has been made aware of the threat, the U.S. government official said. The intelligence also has been included in the CIA World Intelligence Review, known as the WIRe, a classified product that is accessible to senior policy and security officials across the U.S. government, as well as certain lawmakers and their staff.

Marks, 66, was sworn in as the U.S. ambassador last October. She’s known Trump for more than two decades and has been a member of his Mar-a-Lago club in Florida. Critics of Trump have derided her as a “handbag designer,” but her supporters retort that she is a successful businesswoman — her eponymous handbags run as much as $40,000 — with numerous international connections. A personal friend of the late Princess Diana, she also was born in South Africa and speaks some of the country’s key languages, including Afrikaans and Xhosa.

The intelligence community isn’t exactly sure why Iranians would target Marks, who has few, if any, known links to Iran. It’s possible the Iranians took her long friendship with Trump into consideration, the U.S. government official said.
The Iranian government also operates clandestine networks in South Africa, the officials noted, and has had a foothold there for decades. In 2015, Al Jazeera and The Guardian reported on leaked intelligence documents that detailed an extensive secret network of Iranian operatives in South Africa. Marks may also be an easier target than U.S. diplomats in other parts of the world, such as Western Europe, where the U.S. has stronger relationships with local law enforcement and intelligence services.

Iran’s Islamist leaders have a history of carrying out assassinations beyond their country’s borders, as well as taking hostages, since seizing power following a popular uprising in the late 1970s. In recent decades, Iran has generally avoided directly targeting U.S. diplomats, although Iranian-backed militias have long attacked U.S. diplomatic facilities and personnel in Iraq.
Trump alleged after Soleimani’s killing that the Iranian general had been plotting attacks on American diplomatic missions, although U.S. officials later cast doubt on his claims. “They were looking to blow up our embassy,” Trump said in January, referring to the massive, heavily fortified U.S. diplomatic compound in Iraq. Later, in a Fox News interview, he said, “I can reveal I believe it probably would’ve been four embassies.”

Days after Soleimani’s death, Iran launched a ballistic missile salvo at a military base in Iraq that housed U.S. forces, causing traumatic brain injuries among dozens of American troops. Trump declined to retaliate and said, “Iran appears to be standing down, which is a good thing for all parties concerned and a very good thing for the world” — though he announced fresh sanctions on the Iranian regime and warned it against further retaliatory moves.
Some analysts, however, said at the time that Iran likely would seek other ways to avenge Soleimani’s death. Gen. Kenneth McKenzie, the head of U.S. Central Command, was at the top of Iran’s hit list earlier this year, according to media reports. McKenzie said last month that he expected a new “response” from Iran to America’s ongoing presence in Iraq.

“I do not know what the nature of that response will be, but we will certainly be ready for it, should it occur,” he said. On Wednesday, McKenzie confirmed plans to cut the U.S. troop presence in Iraq from 5,200 to 3,000 by the end of September.
During an online forum in August, McKenzie said Iran was “our central problem” in the region, and acknowledged that the danger from Iranian proxies in Iraq had complicated U.S. efforts against ISIS, the radical Sunni terrorist organization and movement. “The threat against our forces from Shia militant groups has caused us to put resources that we would otherwise use against ISIS to provide for our own defense and that has lowered our ability to work effectively against them,” he said.

The White House-based National Security Council did not immediately respond to requests for comment. Neither did an Iranian official with Iran’s mission at the United Nations, nor a South African embassy official in Washington. Spokespeople for the State Department, the CIA and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence declined to comment.
The U.S. and Iran have been bitter foes for decades, openly confronting each other at times — and gingerly engaging in diplomacy at others — but more often waging a shadowy battle for power and influence across the broader Middle East. Under Trump, the two countries have veered toward outright military conflict on more than one occasion.
Last summer, the U.S. blamed Iran and its proxies for a series of explosions aimed at oil tankers. Iran took down a U.S. drone, and the U.S. later managed to take down an Iranian drone.

Trump acknowledged that, after Iran took down the U.S. drone, he nearly authorized a direct attack on Iranian soil, but he held off after being told 150 people could die — a toll he said was disproportionate.
The countries’ dispute deepened in the months afterward, especially in Iraq, where America and the U.S. have long engaged in proxy warfare. In December, an American contractor was killed in Iraq after an attack by an Iranian-allied militia. The U.S. reacted by bombing sites held by the group, killing around two dozen of its fighters. Soon afterward, protesters believed linked to the militia breached parts of the U.S. Embassy compound in Baghdad.

Then, in early January, the United States staged an airstrike that killed Soleimani as he was visiting Baghdad. It was a major escalation given Soleimani’s importance in Iran, although U.S. officials described it as a defensive measure.
Soleimani led the Quds Force, a unit of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps that oversees much of the country’s military activities outside its borders. Americans blame him for the death of numerous U.S. troops in the region.

Iran vowed to retaliate. Its first major move was the Jan. 8 missile attack on the al-Asad military base in Iraq. But around the same time, an Iranian missile took down a civilian airliner, killing 176 people and leading to fury inside Iran at the regime’s incompetence and shifting explanations for the incident, along with condemnation abroad.

Iran and South Africa have cooperated on a number of fronts in recent decades, including at the United Nations, where South Africa has at times advocated for Iran. South Africa’s uranium deposits are believed to have been a major interest for Iran as it was ramping up its nuclear program, which Tehran has always insisted was meant for peaceful energy purposes, not a bomb. The pair also have a military relationship, having signed some basic defense pacts.
Strange Iran-connected plots have been uncovered before.

Almost a decade ago, the U.S. arrested and eventually sentenced to prison an Iranian-American man who was alleged to have tried to hire Mexican drug cartel assassins to kill Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to the United States as he dined in Cafe Milano, a swanky Washington restaurant frequented by the city’s wealthy and powerful. The U.S. accused Soleimani of overseeing the plot.

posted for fair use

They really want their boy to climb out of that well don't they......An illegal enemy combatant is a heck of a lot different than an accredited ambassador in another country on another continent.....
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Hummm......

Posted for fair use.....

afghanistan-kabul-1.jpg

South Asia
Iran’s balanced role in Afghanistan

Published 2 hours ago on September 14, 2020
By Inayat Ur Rehman Saqeb



U.S. and Taliban Peace deal signing in Doha on February 8 has brought with it some uncertainty. Since the agreement many countries in the region have been working to maximize the benefits of possible US withdrawal, as well as power sharing deal between the Afghan government and the Taliban. In this context, Iran a key neighbor of Afghanistan is likely to play a key role in determining stability and security in Afghanistan and the region in the near future. Iran will be able to reap the full benefits of a stable and secure Afghanistan, both commercially and culturally. However, Iran is also at a critical juncture where the outcome or progress of the peace process could change Iran’s strategy to its best interests. It is likely that Iran will continue its current strategy of openly supporting the Afghan government, as well as maintaining its ties with the Taliban so that all doors are open in case of a US withdrawal. It is likely that Iran will continue its current strategy of openly supporting the Afghan government as well as maintaining own ties with the Taliban so that all the door is open for a US withdrawal. Tehran’s goal is to prioritize maintaining Afghanistan as a republic, as well as limiting the influence of other countries, including Iran’s regional rivals Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. It could also create a more conducive environment for the protection of Iran’s interests in the country.

Tehran’s balanced role in Afghanistan
Relations with the Afghan government have so far been Iran’s top priority, and it has maintained ties with both Afghan President Ashraf Ghani and his political rival, Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah. Recently, in a short span of less than a month, high-level delegations have been exchanged between Iran and Afghanistan, Under the Deputy and Acting Foreign Ministers of the two countries visited each other’s country respectively.. Following the visit of Afghan Acting Foreign Minister Hanif Atmar to Tehran and a joint statement was issued by the two countries on June 3, in which the two countries announced the resumption of the role of Chabahar Port for trade and transit cooperation in the region. The two countries discussed improving border security and deploying staff to vacant Afghan checkpoints on the border. During Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Seyed Abbas Araghchi visit to Afghanistan on July 6, he said the two countries had worked on a comprehensive document for comprehensive strategic cooperation between Iran and Afghanistan, including the main contents of non-interference, and non-aggression. Iran has also played a role in persuading Afghan political factions to set up a joint committee for inter-Afghan dialogue, which is in line with a broader strategy of engagement with all actors on the Afghan political arena. Iran’s Special envoy to Afghanistan Mohammad Ibrahim Teheran, has met with many Afghan political leaders, including Salahuddin Rabbani, leader of the Jamiat-e-Islami, and Dawat-e-Islami Afghanistan leader Abdul Rab Rasul Sayaf. This will not only give Iran more opportunities, but will also send a message to the Afghan government that Tehran is not relying solely on Kabul’s goodwill. Following Afghanistan’s recent disputed presidential election, Tehran questioned the outcome of the election and called for a comprehensive government. The Ghani government was clearly unhappy with Iran’s stance and accused Iran of providing military support to the Taliban and other terrorist groups.However, Ghani and Abdullah have been cautious about developing ties with Tehran. In January, a US drone strike in Iraq killed Qasim Solimani, head of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC-QF), and both leaders expressed sorrow and condemnation, as well as key Praise the role of the United States as a partner. In addition, Afghanistan does not want to be a battleground for proxy war between the United States and Iran, as Iran is already accused of providing weapons to certain Taliban factions to fight the United States in Afghanistan If a new civil war and instability breaks out in Afghanistan, there is a risk of a proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Iran, meanwhile, could lead and / or deploy large numbers of Afghan Shia fighters returning from Syria to Afghanistan, with the help of which it created the powerful Fatimion militia of 3,000 to 5,000 troops. Iran’s growing influence in the Afghan government, such a move is unlikely at this time, but if it becomes a battleground for future proxy wars in Afghanistan, Iran’s involvement in the Shia Hazara community and Influence the majority Sunni Pashtuns, This can lead to sectarian violence.

Iran has ties to senior and junior leadership of the Taliban, and has reportedly provided limited military support to key Taliban factions and smaller rival factions that oppose the peace process. Given Iran’s tense history and ideological differences with the Taliban, its current relationship with the Taliban is a fitting and rare opportunity, as well as a means of maintaining pressure. In addition to the common interest in withdrawing US troops from the region, Iran and the Taliban have also cooperated in the fight against the Islamic State in Khurasan province (ISKP), which has prevented them from setting foot on the border with Iran in western Afghanistan. The ISKP is a Wahhabi extremist terrorist group and Iran Shia Islamic power because of that it’s their logical enemy. ISKP also opposes the Taliban for ideological and political reasons, and finally, Iran like in the 1980s, was insecure in Afghanistan with regard to the purely Saudi and Pakistani-backed Taliban. The main reason for Iran’s concern is the threats posed by the Taliban to Sunni extremists who are more pro-Saudi. Given these concerns, Iran would not want a complete Taliban victory in Afghanistan, but it acknowledges its capabilities as a key player in Afghanistan.

Iran: Game spoiler or helper?
One of Iran’s main interests in Afghanistan is to maintain access to Afghan markets (especially now that it is subject to US sanctions), as well as concerns about drug trafficking in Iran due to the easy access to Iranian-Afghan border. Due to the improved security situation in the area. Iran is a key trading partner of Afghanistan, and Kabul could benefit from greater ties with Iran and increased trade. In this context, US sanctions on Iran could also play a negative role in Afghanistan. Access to Iran’s ports, trains and roads could benefit the Afghan economy and reduce its dependence on Central Asia and Pakistan (with which Kabul has strained relations) due to its landlocked nature Iran also offers many opportunities to meet Afghanistan’s energy needs. For these reasons, Iran would prefer a stable government in Kabul, and the Afghan government would like to strengthen its ties with Iran. According to recent reports, China and Iran are close to signing a trade and military agreement. The agreement would increase Chinese investment in ties and other projects in Iran, which could lead to a Chinese military presence in the region following the withdrawal of US troops. This situation could enhance Iran’s role in Afghanistan through connectivity projects, trade and improved border management, as well as access to Afghanistan through the use of Pakistani and Iranian ports, as a source of such Pak-Iran-China alliance. The center of which is Afghanistan. Given the current state of US-China relations and US-Iran relations, such a situation is not entirely out of the question in the event of a US withdrawal. The United States and Saudi Arabia (and possibly India) will be concerned about the growing existence of the Sino-Iranian alliance and will certainly face growing opposition from these countries. In the coming days, Iran is likely to wait for the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan without further straining relations with the United States. At the moment, Iran is deeply affected by the crisis caused by COVID-19, and is unlikely to take any steps that would call for retaliation by the United States In the event of further deterioration in Iran-US relations, Iran has the potential to attack US forces through pro-Iranian Taliban factions in Afghanistan or through its proxy militias. Soleimani predecessor, Esmail Qaani has extensive experience and expertise in operations in Afghanistan through the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. This is possible due to the geographical proximity and easy borders with Afghanistan, and in this regard Iran could possibly get the help of Russia.

Tehran will try to influence Afghanistan’s outcome in order to position itself as stronger than its rivals in the United States and the Gulf. As long as Afghanistan continues to exist as an Islamic republic, Iran’s thinking in this regard will be balanced and beneficial. However, if (from Tehran’s point of view) an aggressive situation arises in Kabul, then could launch a balance campaign so that its rivals remain engaged on the eastern borders. With regard to the various roles on the Afghan landscape, Iran’s role ultimately depends on the nature of its needs and threats. Therefore, Iran’s post-US withdrawal is not the only strategy for Afghanistan, but a multi-faceted strategy in which to maintain the status quo and relations with the parties concerned, as well as the failure of peace talks and the Taliban, It also includes the preparation to seize power by force. Whatever the outcome of the Afghan peace process, Iran appears poised to protect its interests in Afghanistan.
 

jward

passin' thru
I assumed it was just boys' running their mouths, not something they'd actually try. . . but if this new "middle east peace" that's breaking out "accidentally" puts the end to Iran's proxy influence in the ME and upsets them n China/Russia. . . and the globalists perceive themselves as playing for all the marbles this time. . . I reckon there is no end to what devilment many might be willing to conjure up. A few assassinations may well be the least of it :: grabs covers n prepares to hide ::

They really want their boy to climb out of that well don't they......An illegal enemy combatant is a heck of a lot different than an accredited ambassador in another country on another continent.....
 

jward

passin' thru
Can India Transcend Its Two-Front Challenge?
Sushant Singh

September 14, 2020


W020190814589822511914


For more than five decades, the Indian military has feared one thing above all else — a two-front war with China and Pakistan. By leveraging its size, military strength, and eventually its nuclear arsenal, New Delhi believed it could deter or manage a conflict with either one of its nuclear-armed neighbors individually. But a collaborative threat from both adversaries would overstretch India’s resources and pose a formidable challenge.

Unfortunately for Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his government, India is close to realizing this nightmare scenario. Ties with Pakistan remain tense more than a year after a Pakistan-based terrorist group killed 40 Indian soldiers in a suicide bombing. The two countries exchanged airstrikes in the weeks that followed. In August 2019, New Delhi changed the legal status of Kashmir (which Pakistan also claims) by abrogating Article 370 of the Indian constitution, sending the relationship into a nosedive. India’s border dispute with China turned deadly this summer for the first time in decades. Hostilities with both countries have no end in sight. A pincer move by either of them would be made worse by the opening of another internal half-front in the Kashmir Valley, where anti-India sentiment is at an all-time high after the Indian federal government instituted harsh security measures against the restive population last year. Ironically, New Delhi’s moves in Kashmir — a longstanding objective of Modi’s political party designed, in part, to stabilize or quell India’s security challenges with Pakistan — and its strident rhetoric on border disputes with China contributed to the country’s current predicament.


Over the last decade, India’s military leadership has invoked the two-front threat to demand a greater share of national resources for the modernization of its armed forces. That covenant was based on an unstated understanding that if there was a war-like situation between India and Pakistan, China was unlikely to intervene directly. The planning, and the limited resource accretion, was aimed at India fighting a short, aggressive 10-day war against Pakistan while holding its defenses against China. The limited stocking of ammunition and stores has placed the Indian military at a disadvantage as New Delhi confronts a real two-and-a-half-front challenge, with China as the primary aggressor at its borders. The result would be bad for India and its partners — New Delhi’s political attention, military posture, and diplomatic efforts would be bogged down at its borders. India’s efforts to project power outside South Asia and assume a more prominent global role would be put on hold.
India will have to boldly rework its strategy to deal with this challenge and accommodate either of the adversaries. It won’t be easy due to India’s domestic politics and geopolitical considerations, but there are no other viable alternatives. Recent diplomatic efforts with China are a good start.

A “Hot” Line of Control
While the world’s attention has been focused on the Sino-Indian border recently, tensions between India and Pakistan have been overlooked. The number of ceasefire violations on the de facto border between the two countries in Jammu and Kashmir, called the Line of Control, has increased significantly. According to Pakistani news reports, there have been 2,158 ceasefire violations by India this year as of Sept. 6, which have left 17 civilians dead and 168 seriously injured. Data provided by Indian Army officials show that there have been 3,104 ceasefire violations as of Sept. 1, compared to 1,924 during the same period in 2019 and 994 in 2018. Notwithstanding the disparity in exact numbers — much depends on how either country defines a ceasefire violation — it clearly points to the fact that the Line of Control has been “hot” this summer.

The Indian military should have been prepared for increased activity along the Line of Control. In an interview this April, I asked Lt. Gen. B. S. Raju, the commander of the Srinagar-based Chinar Corps, if he expected the situation on the Line of Control to improve in the wake of the pandemic. Lt. Gen. Raju — the top military officer responsible for the Line of Control in Kashmir — told me that “Pakistan’s persistence in infiltrating terrorists, proliferating false propaganda are intended to disturb peace and its actions are unlikely to change anytime soon.”
It is not merely the data on yearly ceasefire violations that is so striking. The monthly breakdown of ceasefire violation data from the Indian Army officials demonstrates that the number of violations has significantly escalated since August 2019. On Aug. 5, Modi’s government altered India’s relationship with Jammu and Kashmir. New Delhi removed the special status Kashmir had long enjoyed, split it into two federally controlled territories, imprisoned all pro-India Kashmiri politicians, and imposed a very harsh physical and internet lockdown in the region.

At the time, these moves were seen by his supporters as a political masterstroke. Asserting de jure control over Kashmir had long been a central tenet of his party (the Bharatiya Janata Party) and Modi — months after re-election — had delivered. In the eyes of domestic and international critics, however, New Delhi’s new Kashmir policy was, at best, a short-sighted mistake and, at worst, a gross miscarriage of justice unbecoming of a secular democracy. Relations between India and Pakistan had already plummeted after the two countries were involved in a limited military skirmish following the Indian airstrikes in Balakot to avenge the Pulwama suicide bombing incident in February 2019. However, the decision on Kashmir in August opened up a new set of challenges for India with Pakistan and, more surprisingly, with China.

China’s Anger
As soon as India bifurcated the erstwhile state into two federally controlled territories of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh, the latter bordering Tibet, China clearly signaled its disapproval. China’s foreign ministry said, “We urge India to exercise prudence in its words and deeds concerning the boundary question, strictly abide by relevant agreements concluded between the two sides and avoid taking move that further complicate the boundary question.”
The strident Chinese statement took Indian officials by surprise. On Aug. 5, Modi’s right-hand man and India’s Home Minister Amit Shah had thundered in parliament about taking back Aksai Chin — another territory claimed by New Delhi and Beijing — at any cost. However, the prime minister had to suddenly rush his foreign minister, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, to Beijing to placate the Chinese government. The ploy didn’t work. Wang Xianfeng, press officer at the Chinese mission in Islamabad, tweeted an article — which he later deleted — that stated that Foreign Minister Wang Yi had conveyed to Jaishankar that “India’s moves challenged China’s sovereign rights and interests and violated the agreement on maintaining peace and tranquility in the border areas between the two countries.”

A couple of days later, the Chinese permanent representative to the United Nations argued in a closed-door informal session of the U.N. Security Council that India’s decision to abrogate Article 370 challenged China’s sovereign interests and violated bilateral agreements on maintaining peace and stability in the border area.
Despite China’s protestations, senior Indian military leaders were supremely confident that China would do nothing. Gen. Bipin Rawat, who was then the army chief, and was promoted by Modi’s government to be India’s first ever chief of Defence Staff, assessed in September 2019:
The Chinese have got a vision and a plan. I don’t think they are going to come in and do anything at this moment. These pricks (making Ladakh a separate union territory) will not make them waver from their plan. They know when they have to do something. These small skirmishes will happen.
The strident and sustained Chinese response surprised the Indian leadership, which had banked on the strength of Modi’s personal relationship with Chinese President Xi Jinping. The two leaders had held an informal summit in Wuhan in April 2018, which was seen to have brought in a new era of trust and cooperation in bilateral ties. In May 2019, the Chinese government released its longstanding hold at the U.N. Security Council to allow the Indian demand to sanction Pakistan-based terrorist Maulana Masood Azhar. After the 73-day standoff at Doklam in 2017, there had been no major crisis on the border between the two armies, which lulled the military leadership into thinking that China was not an immediate threat.
 

jward

passin' thru
continued. . .

Pakistan’s Gambit
Since the 1980s, China’s policy on Kashmir had evolved from a strong pro-Pakistani stance to a more balanced one between Pakistan and India. Beijing’s diplomatic support for internationalizing the Kashmir issue in the United Nations had also diminished over time, including during the 1999 Kargil War between India and Pakistan. But by upsetting the status quo and embracing confrontational rhetoric in August 2019, Modi’s government compelled China to take a more forceful official posture on territorial disputes. As a result, India’s nightmare scenario — a two-front conflict with China and Pakistan simultaneously — has become a reality. What’s more, it is in fact facing a two-and-a-half front challenge against China in the north, Pakistan in the west, and an insurgency in Kashmir.

Pakistan, of course, views Modi’s predicament with delight. For over half a century, the Pakistani military has sought to weaken New Delhi’s grip on Kashmir, dilute its influence in South Asia, and convince the international community that India — not Pakistan — was an aggressive, revisionist power. With its actions last August, the Indian government played right into Pakistan’s hands. Unsurprisingly, Pakistan has leapt at the opportunity to hurt India while it is under pressure from China. Former army chief, Gen. (ret.) N. C. Vij, predicted in 2018:
If there was to be a war between China and India, Pakistan would almost definitely activate the Western borders with a view to try and seize Kashmir, as Indian troops would be reduced to less than half the normal deployment opposite Pakistan. There will be very little possibility of switching troops and resources from one front to another in case of a war on two fronts.
While India is facing a two-front war, and an additional half-front open internally in Kashmir, its military leadership appears confident. Gen. Rawat noted last week that India has “taken adequate precautions to ensure that any such misadventure by Pakistan is thwarted, and they are not able to succeed in their mission. In fact, they may suffer heavy losses should they attempt any misadventure.” Despite the strong official posturing, can India live up to its top military officer’s words?

The Challenges of a Two-Front War
In their public declamations over the past decade, top Indian military commanders have spoken of preparing for a two-front military threat. But what does this tasking mean in practice? Gen. Vij wrote that the defense minister’s operational directive of 2009 requires that Indian armed forces, “should be prepared to fight on both fronts simultaneously a war at 30 days (intense) and 60 days (normal) rates.” The intense and normal rates refer to rate of expenditure of ammunition when engaged in warfighting (calculated on the basis of estimates, previous war data of expenditure, and technical specifications), with intense rates consuming three times the quantity of normal rates.

By all accounts, India appears completely unprepared for a two-front conflict, let alone a two-and-a-half front war. Reports by India’s constitutionally mandated auditor have highlighted that stocks of 55 percent types of ammunition were below the “minimum acceptable risk level” meant to last 20 days of warfighting. More alarmingly, stocks of 40 percent types of ammunition were not sufficient for even 10 days of intense warfighting. A retired major general explained that this led then-Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar to arrive at a decision in 2016 to stock only 10 days of ammunition for the entire army from the “earlier much inflated figures” of 40 days — slashed to the “minimum acceptable risk level” of 20 days in 1999.

Gen. Rawat was then the vice chief of the army. He later explained that his focus in 2016 “was to build more reserves.” Notwithstanding the operational directive of preparing for a two-front war, he decided to focus on building up stocks for only 10 days of intense war with Pakistan, arguing that “If we can’t win a war with Pakistan in 10 days, there is no point of a war.”

Unlike with Pakistan, Rawat said that a possible future war with China would be drawn out. “And hence it is felt that we should prepare for 30 I (30 days of intense war) … Also, in case of any issue, we can always move arms, ammunition, and men from one location to another.” In other words, even in late 2019, the Indian Army had only stocked ammunition for a 10-day war with Pakistan and was still in the process of building the stocks up for a military conflict with China.
There is little chance that these reserves would have been built up this year before the tensions escalated on the disputed Ladakh border with China in May. As a result, the government in June gave enhanced financial powers to the army to undertake emergency procurement. Nearly all of these emergency procurements have been for ammunition from foreign suppliers. Gen. Vij’s warning about ammunition shortages might come to haunt the Indian Army if the current tensions with China on the Line of Actual Control escalate into a full-on military conflict — especially if Pakistan joins in a pincer move on Kashmir.

It is not just ammunition that is in short supply. The Indian Air Force’s shrinking fleet of fighter jets is equally worrisome, as was brought home during the Balakot strike. The air force fielded a Soviet-era MiG-21, which was easily shot down by the Pakistan Air Force’s F-16 and the pilot taken captive. India’s newest fighter aircraft is the 4.5-generation French Rafale. The air force recently accepted five Rafale and will have a total of 36 by 2022. The Indian Air Force will face China’s indigenous fifth generation fighter, the J-20. An old fleet also brings problems of serviceability and operational availability, an issue flagged by the air force and government auditors.

However, the most pressing problem facing the Indian air force is not just the age of its fleet, but its size. The then-Air Force Chief B. S. Dhanoa said in 2017 that 42 squadrons “is the minimum strength necessary to “dominate” a two-front conflict.” However, the Indian Air Force currently has only 30 squadrons of fighter jets. His words that “reduced numbers place a severe handicap, akin to a cricket team playing with seven players instead of 11” sound ominous in the current scenario.

Fighting a Two-Front War
Senior Indian military commanders plan to execute a two-front war by prioritizing only one front for active operations, keeping the other one dormant through defensive measures, and handing over counterinsurgency duties in Kashmir to central police forces. Even though they acknowledge Kashmir as a half-front, they only talk in strict military terms of a two-front war against external adversaries, assuming that the military would not be dealing with the internal challenge of Kashmir in such a scenario.
How would India execute such a war? Gen. Vij explains, “Strategically, India may consider adopting a posture of deterrence against Pakistan and dissuasion against China … This will result in optimization and application of forces as best-suited for such an operational scenario with available resources.”
Simply interpreted, Gen. Vij means that India would have to coercively preclude an attack from Pakistan by threatening an effective military reprisal causing unacceptable losses. This was also stated by Gen. Rawat earlier this month when he said that Pakistan would “suffer heavy losses.” Against China, a posture of dissuasion means that New Delhi would be urging Beijing not to become a real military rival or fight a war. This was stated by both the foreign ministers in their joint statement in Moscow, when they said that both sides shall “avoid any action that could escalate matters.” Dissuasion would not be achieved by crude threats of war and destruction from India but through the logic of strategic influence in a wider context.
Current Army Chief Gen. M. M. Naravane explained the modus operandi at a seminar this May:
To assume that in all cases both fronts would be 100 per cent active, I think that would be an incorrect assumption to make. In dealing with the two front scenarios, there will always be a priority front and a secondary front. That is how we look at dealing with this two-front threat.
He said the priority front would be addressed in a different manner, while the secondary front would be kept as dormant as possible in order to conserve resources to focus on the priority front.
Gen. Rawat reiterated that plan this month when the two-front threat seemed more real, stating that the military strategy to deal with a twin challenge would be based on identifying a primary and a secondary front for conducting operations. But it goes contrary to Gen. Vij’s warning that “It will not be possible for India to deal with both the fronts piecemeal; they will have to be handled simultaneously.”
All these theories sound fine but, as every military commander knows, no plan survives first contact with the enemy. The reality is that a vast geographical separation between the two theaters rules out the rapid movement of a large quantum of troops from one sector to another, which would result in separation of forces. This would impose a major limitation on India, which would be made worse by an intractable Kashmir insurgency. Even if these limitations can somehow be overcome by imaginative military leadership and deft political guidance, it is hard to overcome the disadvantage imposed on an army when 68 percent of its equipment is vintage, its ammunition holdings are far below the operationally desirable level of stocks, and high-end specialist military platforms are in short supply.
That such a crisis is arising at a time when India’s economy is going through its worst crisis since its independence, its GDP having shrunk 23.9 percent in the last quarter — the worst performance globally among major economies — only makes the challenge bigger for India. Modi’s government is also confronting the challenge of combating a raging pandemic. The majoritarian politics of the government has polarized a diverse Indian society and a hyper-partisan nationalist media has not helped matters either.
To put it bluntly, a two-front war is a daunting challenge at the best of times, but a two-and-a-half front military challenge at this time would be a nightmare for India. This is not to argue that the Indian armed forces would not give a good fight, but even if they fought to the very best of their capabilities and optimized their potential in every possible way, the odds would be stacked against them.
 

jward

passin' thru
continued


The Way Out
The border dispute in Ladakh with China is now a full-blown crisis and only a major initiative from the top political leadership has a chance, however limited, of achieving a breakthrough. Modi, however, has tried to avoid taking ownership of the crisis, pushing the military to the forefront. Senior military commanders have led talks that would have usually been fronted by senior diplomats and political leaders. Things are on a knife’s edge on the Line of Actual Control, and the onus is now upon Modi to take that chance with Xi, who he has met 18 times since taking office. Modi has taken great pride in his personalized diplomacy and he needs to deliver for his government and the country.
If India can avoid a two-front external war now, it will still need to find answers to this conundrum in the long run. The easiest way is to increase the defense budget, but India’s diminishing economic growth precludes that possibility. Nearly a third of the total capital expenditure incurred by India’s federal government goes towards defense procurement, and any further increase in the defense budget will impinge on India’s equally pressing developmental needs. A major chunk of the existing defense budget goes towards servicing pensions and salaries but with a nationalist government under Modi in place, there is no chance of implementing any plans that slash benefits for personnel.
In addition, India cannot grow its way out of this crisis. Back of the envelope calculations show that the economy would have to sustain an 18 percent growth rate over a decade to provide adequate resources to build the military without cutting down on any other important government expenditure. This, of course, is not possible. Hoping for such a high growth rate over a sustained period cannot be a strategy.
It can be argued that such alarming developments in the conventional domain will increase the possibility of nuclear escalation between the three countries, with one of the weaker powers in the triad lowering its nuclear threshold. In a limited war scenario envisaged between these countries, it is hard to imagine that such an option would be even rhetorically exercised. The need for strategic global alliances and a weak economy would preclude any such move by India, more so when the two-front threat from China and Pakistan is established to be collusive. Any threatening move against the weaker adversary would then be construed as threatening the stronger adversary, placing India’s decision-makers in the unenviable position of choosing between equally unfavorable options.
The only pragmatic way ahead is to ensure that one of the two fronts no longer remains a front. This requires India’s political leadership to have the boldness and the imagination to strike a deal with one of the adversaries for the greater good.
A rational choice for New Delhi would be to find a modus vivendi with China. Doing so, of course, would be extremely difficult. The bilateral relationship has turned toxic after the deadly brawl in Ladakh on June 15, and India’s growing defense ties with the United States cause alarm in Beijing. However, India has overcome mistrust with China before. This would be the model followed by Indian political leadership since the 1990s, when New Delhi and Beijing signed agreements and found ways to manage the relationship. The Indian establishment was, however, always aware that China provides a bigger strategic challenge than Pakistan in the long run. With the world in flux, New Delhi is being confronted with the realities of dealing with a new China.
Evidently, India is in no position to bargain and get a good deal from China. Beijing is a much bigger power with global ambitions, and New Delhi will neither accept a subservient role nor will it be able trust China for the foreseeable future. That leaves the option of engagement and peace with Pakistan, India’s historical adversary. However, this was ruled out by Gen. Rawat last week as Pakistan, he says, “has been launching proxy war, and sponsoring, training, arming and equipping terrorists on their soil, which they keep infiltrating into Jammu and Kashmir.”
Moreover, there is a political reason for India being unable to seek a deal with Pakistan. Modi’s political campaigning has always invoked Pakistan as an adversary, and his party’s majoritarian political narrative works by surreptitiously identifying Indian Muslims with an enemy country like Pakistan. A U-turn on what has consistently been his most successful electoral and political strategy will not be acceptable either to Modi or to his party, his political supporters, and his ideological mentors.

Conclusion
China’s growing power and assertiveness has unraveled India’s strategy of managing the relationship with Beijing while focusing on a troublesome Pakistan. As India’s economy has plummeted, New Delhi is unable to modernize its military to tackle the collusive two-front threat. India’s new security posture under Modi has opened another half-front internally in Kashmir, further compounding the problem for India’s strategic planners.
Trapped between its domestic majoritarian politics, its crumbling economy, and its proud military, India’s strategy for tackling a two-front military challenge needs a fundamental shift. If the cost of pursuing such a radical course seems very high, the price for chasing easy alternatives is far worse.

posted for fair use
 

jward

passin' thru
UAE ties with Israel show how region is changing, former US envoy says

Former US peace negotiator expects more Arab states to follow the UAE’s lead



Dennis Ross, a former US peace negotiator, is the William Davidson Distinguished Fellow at The Washington Institute. Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Dennis Ross, a former US peace negotiator, is the William Davidson Distinguished Fellow at The Washington Institute. Washington Institute for Near East Policy

The Abraham Accord to normalise ties between the UAE and Israel is a natural progression of regional shifts and puts governance ahead of past grievances, former US peace negotiator Dennis Ross said.

Mr Ross, who worked on US peace negotiations between Arabs and Israelis during four previous Democratic and Republican administrations, said challenges relating to security, water, cybersecurity issues, health and technology could no longer be put on hold.

The UAE highlighted the benefits of greater co-operation from the accord, with Bahrain also announcing that it would normalise relations with Israel a few weeks later.

“The accords are significant in telling us how the region is changing," said Mr Ross, now a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

"We are seeing how Arab states are sending a message that they are looking after their national interest.


"It doesn’t mean they are forgetting about the Palestinians but they are sending a message of realities in the region and needs that they have.

“The Emirates imposed linkage, they didn’t walk away from the Palestinian issue."

Mr Ross was referring to Israel suspending its planned annexation of occupied Palestinian land under the agreement.

He said this prevented the worst outcome for the Palestinians, which would have permanently derailed a two-state solution.

“If the annexation had gone ahead, you wouldn’t have seen UAE do this, and if UAE hadn’t done it, Bahrain wouldn’t do it," Mr Ross said.



The accords differed from previous peace agreements with Israel by Egypt and Jordan in emphasising people-to-people relations and not involving territory, said Mr Ross, who worked on the Camp David talks, the Oslo agreements, Jordan’s peace treaty with Israel and the Hebron agreement.

“Both those countries were in a state of war with Israel. Bahrain and UAE have no common border with Israel, no territorial conflict.”

Read More
Emirati and Israeli officials tread on grounds shaped by Middle East history of bloodshed and peace

Omar Ghobash: UAE deal with Israel removes a huge taboo in Arab world

Full text: Joint statement of US, Israel and UAE

Mr Ross expected other countries to follow suit in normalising ties with Israel, starting with Sudan and Oman.

“I would put Morocco after that,” he said.

In five years, most Arab Gulf countries with the exception of Kuwait and Qatar could have peace agreements with Israel, he said.

But in the case of Saudi Arabia, it might be gradual.

“Saudis are not going to take this kind of a step [soon], but it doesn’t mean they won’t take partial steps," Mr Ross said.

“The two that would hold out are Qatar and Kuwait. The others [in the Gulf] in five years from now are very likely.”

He said Doha’s ties to the Muslim Brotherhood and Turkey would delay such action.

Mr Ross urged the Palestinian Authority to come to the table and reduce its association with “forces of rejection”, namely Turkey, Iran and the Muslim Brotherhood.

The former envoy said the PA would be making a mistake in assuming that a Joe Biden administration, if the Democratic nominee won the November presidential election, would bring a transformative approach to the conflict.

“A Biden administration is not going to come in and present its own peace plan because they realise the divide [between Israelis and Palestinians] is too great to bridge," Mr Ross said.

"What they will do is try to build on what is happening right now in brokering Arab-Israeli agreements."

If President Donald Trump wins a second term, Mr Ross expects the PA to make its way back to the negotiating table.

But mostly, he said, the normalisation agreements are an end result of convergence of views between the parties on regional threats, a realisation that the US is less reliable and that Israel is part of the region.

Updated: September 15, 2020 07:07 AM

posted for fair use
 

night driver

ESFP adrift in INTJ sea
They really want their boy to climb out of that well don't they......An illegal enemy combatant is a heck of a lot different than an accredited ambassador in another country on another continent.....
We can thank Hillary and Barry 1 for this, to some extent.
The death of Chris Stevens, our ambassador in Benghazi in 2012, without ANY perceivable retribution, or rather nowhere NEAR the International Norm of retribution for the death of an Ambassador will embolden Iran for this adventure.

If Nation A kills the Ambassador from Nation B in Nation C, Nation A manifestly DESERVES a short, sharp war of punishment. In the rememberable past, this is how wars have begun... Even LARGE wars.
Often, this was the only required Casus Bella.
Thanks, Mrs. Clinton, THIS is "What difference does it make"
 

jward

passin' thru
Russia releases video of its fighter jets intercepting a US B-1B bomber over the Bering Sea



David Cenciotti,
The Aviationist

5 minutes ago






B-1B Lancer

US Air Force
  • Russian MiG-31s and Su-35S escorted a US B-1B bomber in international airspace over the Northern Pacific Ocean as it "approached" Russia's airspace.
  • US Air Force bombers have been busy in the air over Eastern Europe and around Alaska in recent months, amid heightened tensions between Russia and its neighbors in NATO.
  • Visit Business Insider's homepage for more stories.
On September 15, 2020, the Russian MoD released the news and video about the intercept of a B-1B Lancer bomber flying in the airspace over the waters of the Bering and Okhotsk seas.
The US strategic bomber was detected as an "air target approaching the state border of the Russian Federation" and was intercepted "to identify it and prevent violations of the state border."
Two MiG-31 Foxhound interceptors from the Pacific fleet were scrambled to intercept, identify and escort the "Bone" (as the B-1 is normally dubbed in the pilot community) that was later also escorted by at least one Su-35S of the Eastern Military District.

Noteworthy, the footage released by the Russian MoD shows that the B-1 flying the quite unusual sortie over the Bering Sea (another similar mission was flown in the same area in April this year), is one of the Lancers assigned to the 345th Bomb Squadron at Dyess Air Force Base in Abilene, Texas, and not one of the four B-1s from the 34th Expeditionary Bomb Squadron, 28th Bomb Wing, Ellsworth AFB, South Dakota, deployed to Guam since September 11, 2020.
Dyess's B-1s show of force over Arctic's East Siberian Sea
US Air Force Reserve B-1 Lancer bombers from Dyess AFB have operated in the same region in recent days.
On September 11, three B-1s of the 345th BS landed at Eielson Air Force Base near Fairbanks, Alaska, after a 14-hour mission that saw them fly from Texas to the international airspace over the East Siberian Sea, into the easternmost section of the USEUCOM area of responsibility. This was a US European Command (USEUCOM) planned and led Bomber Task Force (BTF) mission flown in preparation for another long-scheduled deployment to Europe.

"The three Lancers, assigned to the 345th Bomb Squadron at Dyess Air Force Base in Abilene, Texas, demonstrated how US strategic bombers are able to support any mission, anywhere around the globe at a moment's notice. The mission, which complemented the deployment of six B-52s to RAF Fairford in England, showcased how US-based assets can be employed to achieve an operational objective on USEUCOM's eastern and western flanks," said the official USEUCOM press release.
"This continuous 14-hour, 4,300 nautical-mile mission also marked the first time a European BTF mission was supported by a US Air Force Reserve B-1 Lancer unit, thereby advancing total force integration efforts."

While the video of the MiG-31 intercept on the Dyess AFB B-1 was released on September 15, it's not clear when the "close encounter" took place. Moreover, the news mentions only one B-1 (and not three, as in the 14-hour mission).
Therefore, while we can't rule out the clip was filmed on September 10-11, it's also possible that one of three bombers (the one in the video) carried out another mission across the Bering Sea later, on September 14 and 15.
Anyway, the news of latest B-1 missions in the Pacific region come as the four B-52s deployed to Europe continued to carry out a third mission to another hotspot: the Black Sea. After flying sorties over Ukraine and near Crimea on August 28 and September 4, the BUFFs flew again in the region on September 14, 2020.
Read the original article on The Aviationist. Copyright 2020. Follow The Aviationist on Twitter.
 

jward

passin' thru
We can thank Hillary and Barry 1 for this, to some extent.
The death of Chris Stevens, our ambassador in Benghazi in 2012, without ANY perceivable retribution, or rather nowhere NEAR the International Norm of retribution for the death of an Ambassador will embolden Iran for this adventure.

If Nation A kills the Ambassador from Nation B in Nation C, Nation A manifestly DESERVES a short, sharp war of punishment. In the rememberable past, this is how wars have begun... Even LARGE wars.
Often, this was the only required Casus Bella.
Thanks, Mrs. Clinton, THIS is "What difference does it make"
I'll never forget Cat reporting the truth of the situation only to be over ridden in real time by that "the video is to blame" BS. The first time I ever went white hot over geopolitical machinations. Still, I firmly believe Iran knows that DJT is no Zero, and that they'd be ground to glass should they try that chit today. Unless they know they'd only be one of a million cuts... : (
 

jward

passin' thru
The Abraham Accords and a changing Middle East
It's the end. The Middle East has lived with myths and legends. But pan-Arabism, tribal and sectarian tensions, corruption, violence and Islamism are now over in a large part of the world.
fiamma-nirenstein-90x90.jpg
By Fiamma Nirenstein

Published on 09-15-2020 18:51
Last modified: 09-15-2020 18:51


Whether we call it peace or normalization isn't very important: The agreements being signed today between Israel, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, along with US President Donald Trump's guarantee, mark a historical transition that not only reflects the great changes underway within Arab societies, but also upends old dynamics and can change the world.
It's very difficult to recognize the deal for what it is, because Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu don't enjoy the support of the international press. Moreover, the Palestinians received what was for them a totally surprising refusal from the Arab League to their request to condemn it.
Europe, meanwhile, keeps repeating its old stupid mantras of "illegally occupied territories," and "two states for two peoples." It can't fathom calling the current agreements "peace."


What, after all, is peace without Palestinians?
Follow Israel Hayom on Facebook and Twitter

Paradoxically, many American Jews and Israelis have joined this very same festival of self-humiliation.
Nevertheless, history is in the making in Washington today, and not only for the Middle East. What we are witnessing is the construction of a bridge between the three monotheistic religions.
Like it or not, Israel, the Jewish state, is finally integrated into the positive narrative of the region. With actual smiles and handshakes, it has become a recognized Middle Eastern state – part of the landscape of its deserts, mountains, cities and Mediterranean coasts.

Airplanes will be able to fly freely between Tel Aviv, Abu Dhabi and Manama. Citizens of these countries will travel back and forth. Water will flow. Innovation in medicine, high-tech and agriculture will be shared. It's a Rosh Hashanah miracle. The Messiah seems to be coming, after all.
"Hope and change" – the empty campaign slogan used by former US President Barack Obama – doesn't do justice to what is happening before our very eyes. That Saudi Arabia is allowing its airspace to be used for flights between Israel and the Arab world is but one example.

Oman, too, has welcomed the normalization of ties between Israel and the UAE and Bahrain, as has Egypt. Kuwait is looking on with caution. Even Qatar, a friend and ally of Iran and Hamas, is trying to hedge its bets – as the current agreements have shuffled all the cards.
Other Arab countries expected to normalize relations with Israel in the near future include Saudi Arabia, Oman, Morocco, as well as Sudan, Chad and even Kosovo, a Muslim country, which wants to open an embassy in Jerusalem.
All official statements welcoming the agreements express the hope that the Palestinians will eventually become part of the game again. Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, decided on the Abraham Accord after Jerusalem and Washington agreed to suspend, at least temporarily, the application of Israeli sovereignty over the Jordan Valley and parts of the West Bank as envisaged in Trump's "Peace to Prosperity" plan.

While the Crown Prince may expect some gratitude from Palestinian Authority leader Mahmoud Abbas, the latter is not complying, preferring, instead, to talk about Arab "betrayal" and "abandonment" – in concert with Iran, Hezbollah, Turkey and any other proverbial pyromaniac who loves fanning the flames of war.
Hamas chief Ismail Haniyeh traveled to Lebanon earlier this month to meet with Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and discuss a multi-front terror war against Israel. While there, he announced Hamas's plan to build on-site smart ballistic missiles. Lebanese newspapers denounced his remarks as an attempt to "destroy Lebanon" by making it the base of a war that its citizens don't want.

Many say that it's "not too late for the Palestinians" to reverse their rejectionism. Some believe that it is not in their DNA to extricate themselves from their disastrous comfort zone – one that not only has turned them into veto-masters in the nationalist and then Islamist Middle East, but also rendered them the protagonists of both, which are now waning.
It's the end. The Middle East has lived with myths and legends. But pan-Arabism, tribal and sectarian tensions, corruption, violence and Islamism (that was used as a substitute weapon for defeated pan-Arabism) are now over in a large part of the world.

The entire fortress has been struck by a resounding wave of enthusiasm for a normal future with – and increased knowledge about – this "Martian" from the planet "Evil," which Israel had become in the collective Muslim-Arab imagination.
Now, on the one hand, there's normalization, which has been recognized by new Asian and African leaders (even among the Palestinians, according to expert Khaled Abu Toameh, courageous voices are emerging that despise corruption and terrorist incitement); on the other hand, there is the Tehran-Ankara axis and its friends, soldiers and proxies ready for war. Their aspirations have nothing to do with fighting on behalf of the Palestinians. They are locked in an old ideological terrorist spiral.
The Europeans should have learned from history how to distinguish peace from war. Choosing the former clearly is the better path, unless death and destruction have a strange attraction that magnetizes more than peace and prosperity.

This article was translated from Italian by Amy Rosenthal.

posted for fair use
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Posted for fair use.....

ASC NEWS: U.S. Military Re-Emphasizing Large Warfighting Exercises (UPDATED)

9/14/2020
By Connie Lee

The U.S. military is shifting its training focus to conducting more large-scale warfighting exercises, Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness Matthew Donovan said Sept. 14.

The services have grown accustomed to working in smaller units for counterinsurgency operations, he noted during the Air Force Association’s Air, Space and Cyber Conference, which was held online due to COVID-19 safety considerations.

Now, the Defense Department is looking to implement more wide-ranging exercises similar to those conducted during the Cold War.

“We’re restarting those efforts,” Donovan said. “These types of exercises reassured our allies and demonstrated this capability to our adversaries. … It provided significant return value.”


However, the ongoing pandemic has created challenges, he acknowledged. For instance, the exercise Defender Europe 2020 was originally supposed to deploy the biggest force from the United States to Europe in over 20 years, but the event was modified to limit troop movement due to COVID-19

Larger exercises will help the military develop new skills as it seeks to implement the National Defense Strategy, which emphasizes great power competition with Russia and China, he said. Both nations possess large forces and are capable of fighting in multiple domains.


“We've grown used to a rotational mindset — really since the end of Desert Storm — where we rotate small units in on mature infrastructure with a focus on [countering] violent extremist organizations. It’s something that we have to shift,” Donovan said.

The defense industry will need to be more agile to adjust for these changes as well, he noted. The services are at a critical point in time for their modernization efforts. The military hopes to modernize its force structure without incurring a lot of risk, he said.

“We need to ensure we have an industrial base — specifically a defense industrial base — that’s able to support a force structure and can respond quickly in an emergency,” Donovan said.

Additionally, the military will need to continue with digital modernization efforts. Adversaries are improving their technology quickly, and the United States must keep up, he said.

“The linchpin to this is digital modernization to seamlessly connect all our data in real time,” Donovan said. “Because [of] some of our foundational analog practices, we are at risk of falling behind our competitors.”

COVID-19 has been a “wake up call to DoD” on the importance of digital modernization, he noted. The pandemic has compelled the department to figure out ways to better transmit information faster. The crisis has “forced us out of our comfort zone and pushed us into the digital era," he added.


Correction: A previous version of this article mistakenly identified Matthew Donovan as the undersecretary of the Air Force.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Posted for fair use.....

The UK and Long-Range Strike

by Dr James Bosbotinis
September 10, 2020

As the UK enters the third decade of the 21st century, it is confronted by a strategic system in flux. This is particularly highlighted by the resurgence of great power rivalry, the renewed Russian threat to regional and international security, the shifting global balance of power from the Euro-Atlantic to the Indo-Pacific, the rise of China as a global power, regional instability in the Middle East, and wider geopolitical shifts. This is compounded by the Trump Administration’s approach to foreign policy, particularly it’s attitude towards arms control and reported interest in resuming nuclear testing, and the potential impact of the Covid-19 pandemic.

It is likely that defence budgets will come under intense pressure due to the economic impact of the pandemic, however, given the deteriorating geopolitical environment, significant defence cuts may only serve to embolden potential adversaries seeking to change local or, indeed, the international status quo. Moreover, the UK itself is at a critical strategic juncture with the opportunities inherent in its withdrawal from the European Union. Ahead of the forthcoming Integrated Security, Defence and Foreign Policy Review, discussion of the UK’s strategic priorities and balance of capabilities is warranted. In this regard, this article considers whether the UK should invest in a more substantial long-range strike capability, namely some form of bomber.

The evolving strategic environment and its implications
The development of a long-range bomber capability would constitute a significant investment and a marked shift in the composition of British airpower. The UK retired its last dedicated long-range bomber, the Vulcan, in 1984, but has retained an interest in a long-range strike capability since. This has included the use of the Tornado for long-range strike operations including with the Storm Shadow stand-off cruise missile, as part of the abortive Future Offensive Air System programme to replace the Tornado, and the potential integration of the Storm Shadow with the cancelled Nimrod MRA4. Andrew Brookes, writing in RUSI’s World Defence Systems in August 2003 stated with regard to the latter: ‘With its range of over 6,000nm, the datalink equipped Nimrod MRA4 positioned at six facilities could provide almost global strike coverage when armed with five Storm Shadows and supported by in-flight refuelling’. Whilst in June 2020, Air Marshal (ret’d) Greg Bagwell, writing in Air Forces Monthly, stated:

So, do I think the UK or countries like it should invest in their own 21st-century bombers? Well, I can certainly see value in having the ability to launch larger numbers of smart weapons from larger platforms, but I do not see the need for an expensive, niche platform able to penetrate sophisticated enemy defences.
Air Marsal (Retd) Greg Bagwell
In considering whether the UK should invest in a long-range bomber, three particular factors warrant discussion: the evolving strategic system and its implications; recent operational experience and the prospective operating environment; and the direction of British national policy in the coming decades.

The strategic environment is characterised by uncertainty, including a core principle underpinning British strategic thinking since the end of the Second World War: the reliability of the US as the ‘guarantor’ of international security. The actions of the Trump administration, for example, with regard to military threats against Iran, including the June 2019 crisis following Iran’s downing of a Global Hawk unmanned air vehicle (UAV), and the January 2020 crisis following the US assassination of General Soleimani, strategic arms control (highlighted by the US approach toward renewing the New START treaty with Russia), and wider questions concerning President Trump’s approach to foreign policy, raise questions over the reliability of the US in the event of a crisis. Moreover, the rise of China, and with it, the re-emergence of a bipolar international system, and US efforts to China’s growing power and influence may also pose a dilemma for the UK. This is particularly with regard to the potential for US pressure on Russia and China serving as a stimulus for enhanced strategic cooperation between Moscow and Beijing.

Russia poses the greatest threat to the UK, and international security more broadly, as it seeks to challenge the post-Cold War international order and reassert its position as a great power. Although the weakness of the Russian economy and industrial base has prevented Moscow from achieving the full extent of its military ambitions, it is nonetheless making significant progress in the modernisation of its armed forces. This is particularly evident in the progress Moscow is making in the development of a robust long-range precision strike capability, which will enable Russia to prosecute targets on land and at sea across the Euro-Atlantic, including from deep within Russian territory. The Russian challenge is not restricted to Europe; Moscow has a military presence in Syria, is looking to develop military bases in Venezuela and or Cuba, and is developing a presence in Africa, namely in Libya and potentially Mozambique.

In the Middle East, Iran and its proxies pose a significant threat to regional security and British interests, most recently highlighted by Iran’s seizure in July 2019 of a British-flagged tanker, the Stena Impero. The possibility that Iran or a proxy, such as Hezbollah, would target British interests or forces in the region directly cannot be dismissed, and given the Iranian ballistic and cruise missile threat and the capabilities of its proxies, British military operations in the region, including from RAF Akrotiri, could be significantly disrupted. In addition, terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda and Islamic State continue to operate in the Middle East and North Africa. More broadly, the UK is committed to contributing to the security of the global rules-based order, including in the Asia-Pacific where the UK has significant interests.

In contrast to recent operations, that is, since the end of the Cold War, a future crisis with Russia or a regional power such as Iran, would see contested access to the theatre of operations from the start. In Russia’s case, this would include the threat of direct attack on the UK itself. The issue of access, basing and overflight (ABO) can be problematic. For example, attempts to secure basing rights in Italy for operations over Bosnia in the early 1990s were problematic (a planned US deployment of F-117 strike aircraft was refused); and the deployment of HMS Invincible for Operation Bolton in the Persian Gulf in November 1997 was the result of a failure to secure overflight rights in the Middle East which prevented RAF Tornados from deploying to the region.

Initial operations over Afghanistan in 2001 had to be conducted from aircraft carriers and by long-range bombers due to an absence of regional basing for tactical aircraft; securing ABO from Turkey for Operation Telic was difficult; and despite being a close ally, Oman did not permit combat aircraft to be based on its territory for operations over Afghanistan. In 2011, friction between the British and Italian authorities nearly resulted in the withdrawal of basing rights at Gioia del Colle – the main base for RAF Typhoon and Tornado operations over Libya. Moreover, Operation Allied Force over Yugoslavia in 1999 and Ellamy against Libya in 2011 required extended-range sorties: the former, 3,500 nautical mile round-trips by Tornados from Germany, and the latter, ‘3,000-mile (4,800km) round trips from the UK’, again by Tornados. In this regard, it warrants noting that Olenogorsk airbase on the Kola peninsula, and home to Russian Aerospace Forces’ Tupolev Tu-22M3 Backfire bombers, is over 2,000 km from RAF Lossiemouth. Whilst there are allied airbases in Norway and in Sweden and Finland (access would be contingent on whether Sweden and Finland remained neutral in the event of conflict, the operational availability of those bases could not be guaranteed, especially in the opening phase of a war with Russia.

The UK again faces the challenge of having to balance the requirements of countering the Russian threat in the Euro-Atlantic against those of protecting wider global interests. In both cases, the UK requires broad-based capabilities and globally deployable, credible forces. Given the UK’s global interests and the national policy intent to maintain the ability to project power and influence globally, the issue of commitments versus resources will become even more pressing. It is likely that the forthcoming Integrated Security, Defence and Foreign Policy Review will continue the UK’s national policy of maintaining a limited ability to project power globally and contribute to the security of the international rules-based order. The issue of commitments versus resources will become even more pressing, especially in light of the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic. Conversely, the UK may follow Australia’s lead and opt to enhance its defence posture in response to the deteriorating strategic environment.

Developing a bomber capability
The deteriorating strategic environment, proliferation of precision strike systems and wider anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities, and recent operational experience where ABO was problematic and extended-range sorties required, points to the potential need for the UK to possess a means of conducting long-range strike operations. Although, as demonstrated in Operations Allied Force and Ellamy, the UK can undertake long-range strike sorties, those were dependent on extensive air-to-air refuelling (AAR) support. In the event of conflict with Iran or especially Russia, AAR support may be limited. In this regard, Russia is developing and deploying long-range surface-to-air (such as the S-400 and S-500) and air-to-air missiles to target force enablers, such as AAR and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft. Moreover, the payload of tactical aircraft such as the Royal Air Force’s (RAF) Typhoon and the RAF/Royal Navy F-35B is limited, in particular for long-range strike: as with the Tornado, a Typhoon would typically carry two Storm Shadow cruise missiles. Aside from the Royal Navy’s submarine-launched Tomahawk cruise missiles, the UK has a very limited means of conducting strikes beyond 1,000 miles from a host air base or the Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers, without significant AAR support.

At present, the US would be expected to provide any large-scale strategic strike capability required for an operation. In this context, operational analysis following the 1998 Strategic Defence Review in support of decision making regarding the variant of F-35 to be acquired, indicated that the F-35B could reach 70 per cent of all targets that the UK would wish to hold at risk, the remaining 30 per cent could either be reached using Tomahawk or air-launched cruise missiles (such as Storm Shadow) or by the US (from authors’ interview with retired senior Royal Air Force officer, 17 June 2014). Although the UK would, in the event of, for example, conflict with Russia, be engaged in coalition operations, it would be unwise to base British strategy on the assumption that operations will only take place with allies and capability gaps can be tolerated. Moreover, given the evolving character of the strategic environment, it cannot be assumed that UK and US interests will always coincide, or circumstances allow for the US to necessarily provide in a timely manner an otherwise expected military contribution. What if the US was engaged in a war with North Korea and a crisis with Russia erupted in Europe?

The principal threat to the UK is posed by Russia, with threats to regional security in the Middle East and Asia-Pacific also warranting concern, given Britain’s interests in both those regions. North Africa is also an area of interest due to the presence of terrorist groups and Russian activity in Libya. Based on this geographic distribution, together with operational experience in Allied Force, Afghanistan, and Ellamy, an ability to prosecute targets at ranges of around 3,000 km would be valuable. From bases in the UK, this would cover a wide expanse of western Russia, whilst from RAF Akrotiri, it would cover the entire Middle East, southern Russia, the western half of Afghanistan, and a significant part of North Africa. AAR support would be required for operations from Diego Garcia. The use of stand-off weapons would further extend the reach of a UK long-range bomber.

Screenshot-2020-07-18-at-11.51.46.png

A long-range bomber would, like the Queen Elizabeth-class, contribute alongside the carriers to the UK’s conventional strategic deterrent, through undertaking such roles as stand-off precision strike, maritime strike and naval mine laying, and if operating in permissive airspace, close air support. Other potential roles could include targeting deeply buried and hardened facilities, ISR and electronic warfare. Notably, Russia and the US are looking at incorporating an air-to-air missile capability in their respective developmental strategic bombers (the PAK DA and B-21 Raider). Central to the development of a long-range bomber would be balancing cost, capability and flexibility. There has been debate in Australia regarding the feasibility of joining the US B-21 Raider programme; should the UK also consider the B-21? The B-21 is intended to provide the US Air Force’s next-generation strategic stealth strike capability, and whilst providing a highly potent asset capable of penetrating otherwise denied airspace, it will also be highly expensive. The current B-2 Spirit stealth bomber has an availability rate of around 50 per cent and mission capable rate of 35 per cent, and whilst it is likely the B-21 will considerably improve on this, there is arguably a penalty incurred in terms of flexibility versus low observability. For example, the US Air Force’s new air-launched hypersonic missile, the AGM-183A, will be integrated with the B-52.

For the UK, there are four broad options for a long-range strike capability: a stand-off missile carrier; a penetrating bomber; an unmanned combat air vehicle; or an off-the-shelf acquisition. A stand-off missile carrier would provide perhaps the most affordable approach to the acquisition of a bomber capability and could either utilise an existing airframe or a purpose-built design. The following discussion focuses on developing a conventional long-range strike capability. The central role and importance of nuclear weapons in Russian strategy emphasises the continued importance of maintaining the UK’s nuclear deterrent. The question of whether the UK requires a second nuclear-capable system, such as an air-launched missile, to complement Trident, in particular to counter limited nuclear threats or use warrants examination but is beyond the scope of this article.

The Stand-off Missile Carrier
The feasibility of using the A-400M, C-130 and C-17 as cruise missile-equipped large, non-penetrating aircraft (LNPA) as part of the FOAS force mix was considered. In 1977, Boeing proposed, following the cancellation of the B-1A bomber programme in the US, the Cruise Missile Carrier Aircraft (CMCA), a converted Boeing 747 freighter equipped with nine eight-round rotary launchers, as used in the B-52. This would enable a single CMCA to launch 72 air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM) from stand-off range. A CMCA could also form the basis for an ‘arsenal plane’, capable of delivering large quantities of precision-guided munitions. An additional advantage of utilising a Boeing 747-based platform would be the ability to utilise the aircraft’s external hardpoint on the port wing, originally designed to carry a spare engine. A Boeing 747-based airborne launch system, similar to that used by Virgin Orbit, could be utilised to launch a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) such as the US AGM-183A.

Continued.....
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Continued.....

A stand-off missile carrier or arsenal aircraft could utilise either an existing design or be developed afresh, but that would reduce the affordability of the option. Such an aircraft would rely on stand-off weapons, although it could also provide a ‘bomb truck’ capability in permissive operating environments or following the degrading of an adversary’s air defence capabilities. A variant of the P-8 Poseidon could potentially be developed as a stand-off missile carrier/bomb truck. The P-8 has 11 hard points (five in its bomb bay, four under the wings and two under the fuselage) and is capable of carrying a payload of 10 tons: its unrefuelled range exceeds 4,000 nautical miles.

The Penetrating Bomber
There are two principal approaches to the acquisition of a penetrating long-range bomber capability open to the UK: the development of a strike derivative of the Tempest sixth-generation combat aircraft, or the development of a purpose-built long-range bomber. A Tempest strike derivative could follow the approach the US considered for a regional bomber capability in the 2000s. The US examined the development of a regional bomber derivative of the F-22 Raptor, the FB-22. Utilising a larger wing, and potentially a fuselage plug allowing for a two-seat cockpit and additional fuel, the FB-22 would have had a combat radius of 1,800 miles in contrast to the 800-mile combat radius of the F-22A. The FB-22’s payload capacity would also be significantly increased; its internal bay would be capable of holding up to two 5,000 lb bunker-buster weapons, whilst four hardpoints on the wings would carry weapons pods designed to hold two 2,000 lb bombs each whilst maintaining the aircraft’s low observability. A single FB-22 would be capable of carrying ten 2,000 lb weapons in the external pods and weapons bay; for missions where stealth was not required, the aircraft could deliver a payload of up to 30,000 lbs. A Tempest strike derivative would provide a high-end stealth strike capability and could also be utilised as a long-range interceptor, in particular to counter Russia’s air-launched cruise missile threat. Although a strike derivative of the Tempest would be costly, it would also likely attract interest from a number of countries including Australia and Japan.

The second option would be to develop a purpose-built long-range bomber. The Vulcan provides a useful benchmark for comparison: the Vulcan B Mk. 2 had a range of 4,600 miles, a maximum weight of 113 tons, and was powered by four Olympus engines each developing 20,000 lbs of thrust. In comparison, the Pratt and Whitney F-135 engine that powers the F-35 delivers more than 40,000 lbs of thrust. The aircraft had a payload of up to 21,000 lbs. The proposed Vulcan B Mk. 3 was intended to be armed with six Skybolt air-launched ballistic missiles, that is, a total payload of around 30 tons. A prospective long-range bomber with a combat radius of around 2,000 miles, payload of up to around 20 tons (enabling carriage of large weapons similar to the US GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator to counter deeply buried and hardened targets), and utilising technologies under development as part of Team Tempest, could be feasible. The Russian Tupolev Tu-22M3 Backfire provides a valuable comparison: it has a maximum take-off weight of 126 tons, can carry a payload of up to 24 tons, and has a maximum range of around 4,350 miles. A payload of 24 tons would be equivalent to 16 Storm Shadow cruise missiles.

In contrast to the US B-21, Russian PAK DA, and Chinese H-20, which are intended to be large stealth bombers with ranges in excess of 6,000 miles, a British long-range bomber would be somewhat smaller. Notably, China is believed to be developing a regional bomber, which will reportedly be a relatively large, stealthy, twin-engine aircraft, possibly around 100 feet long with a maximum take-off weight of 60 to 100 tons, with a combat radius potentially around 1,500 miles (estimates vary between 1,000 and 2,000 miles). It will reportedly possess a long-range air-to-air missile capability. A notional British bomber would also, in the interest of affordability and flexibility (namely, the carriage of outsized external stores such as potential hypersonic missiles), not be a stealth aircraft. Rather, the aircraft could utilise electronic warfare and directed energy systems for self-defence (the Chinese H-20 will also reportedly feature this capability); MBDA is developing as part of Team Tempest, a Hard Kill Defensive Aid System, capable of ‘tracking, targeting and intercepting incoming missiles in high threat environments’. Together with stand-off weapons, and Loyal Wingman unmanned aircraft (Boeing’s Airpower Teaming System Loyal Wingman will have a range in excess of 2,000 miles), it may be possible to operate in high-threat environments.

In July 2019, Air Vice Marshal Simon Rochelle, then Chief of Staff Capability, announced at the Royal Air Force Chief of the Air Staff’s Air and Space Power Conference, that the UK sought to deploy a hypersonic weapon by 2023. For the UK, hypersonic weapons would provide a means of responding, namely, to Russian A2/AD capabilities, naval forces, regional threats such as that posed by Iran, and in certain cases, non-state actors. In terms of mission, counterforce, maritime strike, and defeating high-value targets in support of theatre access, or the defence of the Euro-Atlantic, would be priorities. Hypersonic cruise missiles will be compatible with tactical aircraft such as the Typhoon and F-35 (albeit requiring external carriage), but their size will likely limit the number of weapons carried and divert those aircraft from other missions to which they are better suited.

Perhaps most importantly, the advanced manufacturing technologies and approach being developed in support of Team Tempest would be critical to ensuring the affordability of what would nonetheless require significant investment. It is likely that the development of a bomber would be comparable to, or surpass, for example, the cost of the Typhoon programme, or around £18 billion. By means of comparison, the unit cost of a B-1B is $317 million, or around £254 million; 60 aircraft at £255 million each would cost a total of £15.3 billion. In light of Australia’s interest in expanding its long-range strike capabilities, a joint UK-Australia programme could also perhaps be viable.

An Uninhabited Combat Air Vehicle
Building on the Taranis UCAV demonstrator, and other uninhabited air system research, the development of a UCAV with the required range, persistence and payload to operate in the long-range strike role, could be a viable option. Boeing proposed a strategic strike version of its X-45, the X-45D, in the 2000s to the US Air Force. An enlarged design, similar to the Northrop Grumman X-47B, would likely be capable of a mission radius in the 2,000-2,500 mile range, and carrying four 2,000 lb weapons internally or significantly more smaller weapons. To illustrate this, an F-35B can carry two 1,000 lb bombs or eight 285 lb small diameter bombs. A UCAV would be the stealthiest option and provide the capability to operate for extended periods within adversary airspace, but would it offer the same degree of flexibility as a crewed platform? It would likely require a high degree of autonomy to operate effectively; in this regard, artificial intelligence could be a critical enabler. A strategic UCAV could provide an ideal complement to a stand-off missile carrier or a bomber to form human-machine team.

An Off-the-Shelf Bomber
The UK could seek to join the US B-21 bomber programme, although this would be an extremely expensive option and would be unlikely to offer British industry the opportunities that a domestic programme would provide, even if the US allowed the aircraft to be exported. This would also be the case were the UK to look to acquire US B-1 or B-52 bombers; the US is looking to retire 17 B-1Bs in order to free up funds for the B-21. Moreover, those B-1Bs have been subject to considerable operational use causing airframe issues. If there were available B-52 airframes, the UK could join the US programme to buy new engines for the aircraft, thus extending its service life beyond the 2050s and significantly enhancing its performance. This would provide a potent stand-off missile carrier capability and bomb truck for operations in permissive airspace but would be dependent on the availability of surplus B-52s.

Conclusion
Of the above options, a stand-off missile carrier would be the most affordable (an off-the-shelf acquisition from the US could be quite competitive in cost terms too), whilst a Tempest strike derivative or purpose-built long-range bomber would be the most capable, but costly options. A Tempest strike derivative could provide a highly stealthy, deep strike capability, including a potential ability to prosecute hardened targets beyond what the UK can currently hold at risk, and an extended-range air-to-air capability, which would be particularly valuable vis-à-vis Russian stand-off missile-armed bombers. A purpose-built long-range bomber would provide greater range and payload, including an ability to carry large bunker-buster munitions and potential air-launched HGVs offering extended-range stand-off capabilities. A notional air-launched HGV could offer a means of prosecuting high-value and well-defended targets at ranges of 2,500 to 3,000 km, but would require a large aircraft as a launch platform. In this context, a mix of stand-off missile carriers and a Tempest strike derivative could provide a highly capable force mix with the former providing volume of fire and the latter an ability to operate in heavily defended airspace.

Screenshot-2020-07-18-at-12.03.19.png

Although a strategic UCAV was discussed as a stand-alone option, it would provide a significant contribution to any proposed force mix, in particular, if also operating in the ISR role. This would provide a means of conducting counter-force operations against an adversary’s own long-range strike assets, a capability which would be especially valuable with respect to countering Russia’s burgeoning long-range strike forces. This also highlights the inherently multi and cross-domain contribution a long-range bomber capability could provide: for example, counter-force operations contribute to the air and missile defence of the UK or deployed forces and allies; whilst maritime strike aids in establishing sea control or denial. Moreover, an ability to launch large payloads, such as an HGV, could also be utilised as a means of launching small satellites, building on collaboration with Virgin Orbit as part of Team Artemis. Most significantly, a long-range bomber capability would provide synergy with the UK’s carrier airpower, constituting a potent conventional strategic deterrent and means of gaining theatre entry. Consider the impact on Russian thinking of a UK ability to deploy a carrier strike group into the Norwegian Sea, in conjunction with a force of UK-based long-range bombers capable of launching hundreds of stand-off weapons in a single salvo.

The development of a long-range bomber capability would require significant investment, which in the context of a markedly deteriorating economic situation due to the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic, may seem foolish. However, as Australia recognises in its 2020 Defence Strategic Update, the global strategic environment is becoming more contested and thus requires, in response, increased investment in defence, including long-range strike capabilities. In this respect, investing in developing an indigenous long-range bomber capability could be undertaken as part of a wider national economic strategy, including an industry 4.0 digital manufacturing drive. Further, the development of ground-launched long-range strike systems and expanded ship and submarine-launched long-range strike capability, should be considered as the UK looks to shape its armed forces for the coming decades. An ability to prosecute sustained, long-range strike operations against even peer adversaries would constitute a potent deterrent and credibly position the UK within coalitions, whether long-standing (NATO) or ad-hoc.

Ultimately, the UK requires versatile, flexible and adaptive forces, that provide the broadest range of credible options for responding to a highly dynamic strategic environment and contingencies across the spectrum from sub-threshold, ‘grey zone’ threats through to, in extremis, operations against Russia. Within this, an ability to project credible power to deter and if necessary, defeat even high-end threats is key. The UK depends on the effective operation of the global trading system for its prosperity, as the Covid-19 pandemic has shown, this system is vulnerable to disruption. Although the cost of investment in enhancing defence capabilities may be high, the costs of a failure of deterrence and the outbreak of major conflict in a region of British interest, let alone that of war with Russia, would be exponentially higher. Nor can the UK afford to base its strategic planning assumptions and capability decisions on relying on others, namely the US (a point made by Hugh White with regard to the defence of Australia). The development of a long-range bomber capability would provide the UK with an enhanced means of protecting and projecting its interests in an increasingly uncertain and dangerous strategic environment.

-----

Dr James Bosbotinis is a UK-based specialist in defence and international affairs, and Co-CEO of JB Associates, a geopolitical risk advisory. He has particular expertise in the study of contemporary maritime strategy, assessing naval and air force developments, geopolitical analysis, and generating understanding of the connections between maritime strategy and national policy. Dr Bosbotinis has written widely on British defence issues, Russian strategy and military modernisation, China’s evolving strategy, and regional security in Europe, the Former Soviet Union and Asia-Pacific.
 

jward

passin' thru
Navy Sharpening Anti-Submarine Warfare Skills in Black Widow Exercise
By: Mallory Shelbourne
September 16, 2020 8:18 PM



An MH-60R Seahawk Helicopter, attached to Helicopter Marine Strike Squadron (HSM) 46, prepares to lower a dipping sonar transducer during anti-submarine warfare (ASW) training with the amphibious assault ship USS Wasp (LHD-1) on Sept. 12, 2020. US Navy Photo

The Navy is expanding how it coordinates anti-submarine warfare missions in an exercise the service began in the Atlantic last week, as Russia continues to have a more active presence in waters off the U.S. coast.
Now that the Navy’s recently reactivated U.S. 2nd Fleet is fully operational, the service is using the command structure that organization allows to sharpen its anti-submarine warfare skillset this week in Exercise Black Widow 2020 in the North Atlantic.
The exercise, which began last week, will concentrate on undersea warfare drills to practice potential combat scenarios and work on communications, the Navy said.
While Navy officials declined to comment on whether they’ve encountered any Russian presence during the exercise so far, during a call with reporters today they stressed the need to pay attention to the undersea threat in the nearby waters in the North Atlantic and off the East Coast.

“It’s pretty well-known now that our homeland is no longer a sanctuary. And so we have to be prepared here to conduct high-end combat operations in local waters, just like we do abroad now, because of the threats and just through these nuclear-powered ships that can travel great distances on the water, nothing’s a sanctuary any longer. So that’s part of why we have to be so ready,” said Vice Adm. Daryl Caudle, the service’s commander of Submarine Forces Atlantic.
Navy officials said that the exercise will allow 2nd Fleet to experiment with and better understand its command and control structure.
“Because I have 2nd Fleet now here stood up and a true fleet commander, with a theater undersea warfighting commander working for him, now this is truly – it really is a rehearsal,” Caudle said. “So the submarines and surface ships that are involved in this exercise are in a command and control structure that would be identical that if they were deployed to 6th Fleet.”

Joint Force Command Norfolk, 2nd Fleet, and Submarine Group 2 will steer Black Widow, U.S. 2nd Fleet Commander Vice Adm. Andrew Lewis told reporters.
Submarine Group 2, led by Commander Rear Adm. Jim Waters, was also recently reactivated as the U.S. recalculated its strategy due to the Russian undersea threat.
“This is where the fight is – where the competition is – that we’ve got to maintain our positional advantage over the adversary, specifically in the Atlantic the undersea capability of the Russians,” Lewis said.
While the exercise includes systems testing, Cardle pointed out that Black Widow also allows the Navy to do command and control testing now that Waters has platforms under his purview that would typically fall under a carrier strike group.

“Part of Black Widow and what makes it different . . . is we are not only testing new capabilities — which means the actual gadgets, devices, sensors, those types of things — along with tactics, techniques and procedures that undersea warfare development center is trying to test,” Caudle said. “But we’re also testing that command and control structure and making sure that Jim Waters can actually bring those forces to bear on the scenario under the command of Admiral Lewis.”
The exercise features one Los Angeles-class submarine, one Virginia-class submarine, destroyers USS McFaul (DDG-74) and USS Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) and amphibious assault ship USS Wasp (LHD-1), according to the service.

Helicopters from the “Grandmasters” Helicopter Maritime Strike Squadron (HSM) 46, the “Proud Warriors” of HSM 72 and aircraft assigned to Patrol and Reconnaissance Wing (CPRW) 11 are also participating.
Lewis declined to say whether they are employing unmanned systems for the Black Widow exercise, but said undersea warfare will include both manned and unmanned platforms in future operations.
“The future of undersea warfare, as well as a lot of other warfare, is in the combination of unmanned and manned and the integration of those,” Lewis said.



Article Keywords: Joint Force Command Norfolk, North Atlantic, Russia, U.S. 2nd Fleet, Vice Adm. Andrew Lewis, Vice Adm. Daryl Caudle

Categories: Aviation, News & Analysis, Submarine Forces, Surface Forces, U.S. Navy


posted for fair use
 

jward

passin' thru
US to declare UN sanctions on Iran are back, setting up showdown with the world
Move forcefully opposed by most countries, except for Israel and Gulf, and expected to be ignored by rest of Security Council, which could undermine credibility of world body
By AP Today, 9:09 am


US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo is flanked by US Ambassador to the United Nations Kelly Craft as he speaks to reporters following a meeting with members of the UN Security Council about Iran's alleged non-compliance with a nuclear deal and calling for the restoration of sanctions against Iran at United Nations headquarters in New York, August 20, 2020. (MIKE SEGAR / POOL / AFP)
US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo is flanked by US Ambassador to the United Nations Kelly Craft as he speaks to reporters following a meeting with members of the UN Security Council about Iran's alleged non-compliance with a nuclear deal and calling for the restoration of sanctions against Iran at United Nations headquarters in New York, August 20, 2020. (MIKE SEGAR / POOL / AFP)



WASHINGTON — In defiance of overwhelming opposition, the United States is preparing to declare that all international sanctions against Iran have been restored. Few countries believe the move is legal, and such action could provoke a credibility crisis at the United Nations.
Virtually alone in the world on the matter save for Israel, the Trump administration will announce on Saturday that UN sanctions on Iran eased under the 2015 nuclear deal are back in force, after invoking a “snapback” clause despite having pulled out of the landmark pact.
The other members of the UN Security Council, including US allies, say the US lost the right to trigger a return to sanctions and have vowed to ignore the step. That sets the stage for ugly confrontations as the world body prepares to celebrate its 75th anniversary at a coronavirus-restricted General Assembly session next week.

The question is how the Trump administration will respond to being ignored. It already has slapped extensive sanctions on Iran, but could impose penalties on countries that don’t enforce the UN sanctions it claims to have reimposed. A wholesale rejection of the US position could push the administration, which has already withdrawn from multiple UN agencies, organizations and treaties, further away from the international community.
In the midst of a heated campaign for reelection, US President Donald Trump plans to address Iran in a speech to the General Assembly on Tuesday. Officials say he will also touch on his brokering of agreements for Israel and the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain to normalize relations in part to solidify a regional bulwark against Iran.
AP19176499709699-640x400.jpg

In this April 9, 2018 file photo, released by an official website of the office of the Iranian Presidency, President Hassan Rouhani listens to explanations on new nuclear achievements at a ceremony to mark ‘National Nuclear Day,’ in Tehran, Iran. (Iranian Presidency Office via AP, File)

And, as he seeks to demonstrate statesmanlike credentials ahead of the election, Trump has injected another element of uncertainty into the mix by threatening to retaliate “1,000 times” harder against Iran if it attacks US personnel overseas.
His tweeted warning came earlier this week in response to a report that Iran is plotting to assassinate the US ambassador to South Africa in retaliation for the US killing of a top Iranian general at the beginning of the year. Neither Trump nor any other senior US official has confirmed such a plot exists, although they have said Iran has a long history of political assassinations.
Amid uncertainty over that, the other 14 members of the Security Council and all but about five of the UN’s 195 member states say the US lost its legal standing to act on sanctions when Trump withdrew from the nuclear accord more than two years ago. The US argues it retains the right to enact the snapback of sanctions because the council resolution that endorsed the deal refers to it as a participant.
063_1272635840-400x250.jpg

US President Donald Trump speaks at the signing ceremony of the Abraham Accords on the South Lawn of the White House September 15, 2020 in Washington, DC. (Alex Wong/Getty Images/AFP)

“These will be valid UN Security Council (actions) and the United States will do what it always does, it will do its share as part of its responsibilities to enable peace,” Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said on Wednesday. “We’ll do all the things we need to do to ensure that those sanctions are enforced.”
Pompeo traveled to the United Nations on August 20 to formally notify the Security Council that the US was triggering snapback because Iran is not complying with the nuclear deal. He dismissed suggestions that the administration was engaged in anything legally questionable or even controversial.

He said the snapback mechanism was the “one thing that the previous administration got right” in the nuclear deal that Trump has denounced as the worst deal ever negotiated. The agreement was a signature foreign policy achievement of President Barack Obama and gave Iran billions of dollars in sanctions relief in exchange for curbs on it nuclear program.
Yet, aside from Israel and the Gulf Arab states, almost no country in the world agrees with the US. Russia and China, along with American allies Britain, France and Germany, who often disagree but remain parties to the 2015 agreement, are united in declaring the US action “illegal.”

Untitled-17-1-400x250.jpg

In this photo released by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, spokesman of the organization Behrouz Kamalvandi, center, briefs the media while visiting Fordo nuclear site near Qom, south of Tehran, Iran, Nov. 9, 2019. (Atomic Energy Organization of Iran via AP)

Nonetheless, the US special envoy for Iran, Elliott Abrams, told reporters Wednesday that all UN sanctions would “snap back” at 8 p.m. EDT on Saturday.
”We expect all UN member states to implement their member state responsibilities and respect their obligations to uphold these sanctions,” Abrams told reporters.
“If other nations do not follow it,” he said, “I think they should be asked … whether they do not think they are weakening the structure of UN sanctions.”
Iran has responded angrily to the US bid.

“The reality is simple. The US is not a member of the nuclear deal to use the so-called snapback mechanism against Iran; even if the US were a member of the nuclear deal, it could not do the snapback without implementing its nuclear deal undertakings with a good will,” Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister Mohsen Baharvand said on Wednesday, according to the semi-official Fars News Agency.

Iranian lawmakers have openly said the Islamic Republic will resume its nuclear activities if the sanctions are imposed.
“If the US succeeds in automatically returning the sanctions, then there will be left nothing called the nuclear deal and certainly, the Islamic Republic of Iran will discard the undertakings it was implementing under the nuclear deal,” said MP Zohreh Elahian, a member of Iranian parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, according to Fars.
“The parliament is determined to give up the Islamic Republic of Iran’s undertakings under the nuclear deal in case the sanctions are reinstated on Saturday and our country’s peaceful nuclear industry will again continue its activities without limitations of the nuclear deal.”

AP20232135751018-400x250.jpg

In this July 20, 2015, file photo, members of the Security Council vote at United Nations headquarters on the landmark nuclear deal between Iran and six world powers. (AP/Seth Wenig, File)

UN diplomats said the three European countries remaining in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA, who are all currently Security Council members, will likely respond by issuing a statement reiterating their position that the United States cannot trigger snapback.
Trump administration officials been attacking the 2015 nuclear deal for years. They say it is fatally flawed because certain restrictions on Iran’s nuclear activity gradually expire and will allow the country to eventually develop atomic weapons.
The UN sanctions the US is seeking to reimpose include a ban on uranium enrichment, all missile activity, and the indefinite extension of an arms embargo that would otherwise expire on Oct. 18. The Security Council rejected a US effort to extend the embargo in a lopsided vote that got support from only one country, the Dominican Republic.

Pompeo reiterated Wednesday that Iran “remains the world’s largest state sponsor of terrorism and we don’t believe that them being able to trade in weapons of war with impunity is remotely acceptable.” He called the US decision to reimpose sanctions “good for the peoples of all nations.”
But opposition to the US move is widespread and strong, including from 13 of the other 14 Security Council members.
“Under intl law you can’t withdraw from an agreement and then claim you can still benefit from its provisions. Under ‘rules-based intl order where the rules are defined by the US this seems to be OK provided it serves US interests,” Russia’s deputy UN ambassador Dmitry Polyansky tweeted.
European Union High Representative Josep Borrell, in softer terms, delivered the same message in August saying the United States “cannot be considered to be a JCPOA participant state for the purposes of possible sanctions snapback foreseen by the resolution.”
Times of Israel staff contributed to this report.

posted for fair use
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
So how many of the "refugees" fleeing to Europe via North Africa could be recruited and used against this threat?......

Posted for fair use.....


Flashpoints
AFRICOM: Al-Shabab growing more emboldened in targeting US troops

Diana Stancy Correll

1 day ago

Al-Shabab, an al-Qaida offshoot based in Somalia, is growing more emboldened in targeting U.S. troops, according to U.S. Africa Command’s director of intelligence Navy Rear Adm. Heidi Berg.

“We do assess that there is a definitive shift in focus on conducting attacks against the U.S.” Berg told reporters Friday. “We’ve watched that take place over the course of a couple of months.”

Violent extremist groups including ISIS-Somalia, Boko Haram and al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb exist in Africa. But Berg claimed that al-Shabab is particularly worrisome, and noted that the organization’s propaganda and public announcements are “reminiscent” of al-Qaida’s prior to the 9/11 attacks.

“We currently assess that al-Shabab is the most capable terrorist group on the African continent in terms of the ability to potentially threaten Western interests regionally,” Berg said.

The comments come days after a U.S. service member was injured in an al-Shabab attack on Sept. 7 where militants used a vehicle as an improvised explosive device and mortar fire.

AFRICOM reported last week the service member, who was among U.S. and Somali troops conducting an advise, assist and accompany mission at the time of the attack, was in stable condition and receiving treatment for non-life-threatening injuries.

But other al-Shabab attacks have been deadly for Americans. In January, U.S. and Kenyan forces were attacked at Manda Bay Airfield in Kenya and the ambush resulted in the deaths of Army Spc. Henry Mayfield Jr., 23, and two U.S. Department of Defense contractors, Dustin Harrison, 47, and Bruce Triplett, 64.

AFRICOM officials previously told reporters that they believed al-Shabab militants came from Somalia and received assistance from facilitators in Kenya to pull off the attack.

Africa spec ops commander warns of al-Qaida’s growing influence
At a time when a troop withdrawal is up in the air, U.S. Africa Command's top special operator is sounding an alarm.
Meghann Myers

According to a Department of Defense Inspector General report released in August, AFRICOM reported that al-Shabab did not significantly modify its tactics in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. In fact, the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project tracked more than 600 violent incidents in Somalia between April 1 and June 30, 2020, per the report.



A total of 568 violent incidents were logged in the previous quarter. AFRICOM said al-Shabab’s attacks involved ambushes, hit-and-run attacks, and IEDs, the report said.

“When you consider Al-Shabab, it’s a very real and dangerous threat,” AFRICOM spokesman Air Force Col. Chris Karns told reporters Friday. “They’re an affiliate of al-Qaida. Al Qaida is in Africa — I think sometimes this may be lost on some Americans.”

“Al Qaida’s roots are in Africa, they’re seeking sanctuary in Africa,” Karns said. “But their ambitions are much broader. We have to keep that in mind...they do seek to export their violence more widely."

Failure to exert pressure on these violent extremist organizations or allowing the African continent to become a “safe haven” for such groups means the U.S. runs the “risk of repeating the past” in the future, he said.



Karns told Military Times earlier this month that al-Shabab does not currently have the capability to attack the U.S. homeland, which he credited to the pressure AFRICOM has placed on the group.

The U.S. has conducted more than 45 airstrikes in Somalia this year against violent extremist organizations, and conducted more than 60 in 2019.

According to AFRICOM, there are approximately 5,000 to 7,000 al-Shabab militants in Somalia and the U.S. military has between 650 to 800 U.S. troops in the country at any given time.



About Diana Stancy Correll
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Huimmm.....

Posted for fair use.....


September 17, 2020 Topic: Security Region: Americas Blog Brand: The Skeptics Tags: Nuclear WarWorld War IIIAmericaRussiaChinaNuclear EntanglementDual Use Systems
Why the Next Shooting War Could Go Nuclear

Too many dual-use systems could confuse an enemy in wartime who might think a nuclear (not conventional) attack was underway.


by Zack Brown



Nuclear expert James Acton believes that we are entering into an era of what he calls “nuclear entanglement,” one that promises to be different from anything we’ve seen before. It’s main characteristic: an increasingly blurry line between nuclear and conventional weapons.

“During the Cold War, the nuclear and non-nuclear domains were largely distinct,” said Acton in an interview for the podcast, Press The Button. “Most delivery systems were nuclear or they were conventional, but they couldn’t accommodate both types of weapons.” The same goes for the threats facing nuclear weapons themselves. The majority of these, he explained, “came from other nuclear weapons.”

Not that the divide was ever airtight, cautioned Acton, co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. There have always been some dual-use systems that could accommodate both nuclear and non-nuclear munitions. And certain conventional platforms could indeed threaten nuclear weapons, chief among them the American attack submarines that prowled the Arctic for their nuclear-armed Soviet counterparts. “But,” he warned, “the degree of entanglement we’re seeing today is growing dramatically.”

The evidence is easy to spot. China and Russia are deploying greater numbers of “ambiguous,” dual-use ground-launched ballistic missiles. At the same time, the United States’ pursuit of conventional hypersonic missiles of very high speed and accuracy might enable even these non-nuclear weapons to hold nuclear arsenals at risk.

Neither trend is good for crisis stability. In the case of warhead ambiguity, the lack of clear distinctions between nuclear and non-nuclear systems greatly complicates any attempt at escalation management. “Imagine that the U.S. and China are in a shooting match, and China deploys conventional DF-26 missiles with non-nuclear warheads,” Acton explained. “But imagine U.S. intelligence gets that wrong and thinks they are nuclear versions of the DF-26.”

“From a U.S. perspective, that represents a big escalation of the crisis: China has just deployed nuclear weapons. But that kind of escalation is inadvertent because China hasn’t, in fact, deployed nuclear weapons. We just misidentified it.”

“The other way around is a problem, too,” he continued. “Imagine that China does deploy nuclear-armed DF-26s, and we think they are conventional and try and hunt down and attack these missiles. If we’re successful, we’ve inadvertently destroyed nuclear weapons, which from a Chinese perspective is extremely escalatory.”

On the other side of the ledger, the eventual deployment of American hypersonic weapons—whose conventional payload might conceivably lower the bar for their use—is likely to exacerbate Chinese and Russian fears about a preemptive strike on their nuclear forces, creating a dangerous “use-it-or-lose-it” mentality. “Even if that concern is wrong,” said Acton, “that could be for Russia or China an incentive to use nuclear weapons first.”

Nor is the entanglement problem limited to just weapons. Command and control systems are increasingly vulnerable, even those orbiting high above the planet. As a case in point, Acton pointed to Washington’s fleet of early warning satellites. These provide notice of an incoming nuclear attack against the United States, he explained, but can also detect non-nuclear launches against regional targets, allowing time for U.S. forces to prepare more localized missile defenses.

“In a conflict, Russia might start attacking these early warning satellites so that Russian non-nuclear missiles can penetrate missile defenses in Europe,” said Acton. “But from our perspective, it looks like Russia is preparing for nuclear war.”

Mitigating the new risks of entanglement won’t be easy, but there are some steps the United States can take on its own. “The most fundamental thing that we need to do is factor escalation risks into our war planning and crisis management,” Acton said. “Somebody needs to say, ‘there are military advantages to doing this, but there are also big risks,’ so that the key decision makers in these processes can be informed.”

But there is only so much that the United States can do alone. To truly succeed, it needs buy-in from the other major players, too. “The U.S. can’t dictate how other countries perceive these risks,” said Acton. “Russia and China are clearly very worried about the survivability of their nuclear forces.”

A trilateral forum—or, better, two bilateral ones—between the three nuclear powers could jump start the conversation around concrete risk reduction. Agreements could be reached limiting anti-satellite weapons testing, for example, or prohibiting dual-use missiles in the intercontinental range—a tactic Acton preferred because it doesn’t change present policy.

“What I like about that idea is it’s not rolling back a capability that’s already existing, it’s preventing new problems from arising. And that’s an easier thing to do.”
The entire interview with James Acton is available here on Press The Button.

Zack Brown is a policy associate at Ploughshares Fund, a global security foundation.
Image: Reuters.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Posted for fair use.....

Vice Chairman Discusses Weapons of Mass Destruction at Symposium
Sept. 17, 2020 | BY Jim Garamone , DOD News

The new Joint Warfighting Concept will be enabled by deterrence — a concept in vogue during the Cold War, but becoming relevant again, the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said today.


Air Force Gen. John Hyten spoke as part of the virtual National Defense University's Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction 2020 Symposium.

Video

Hyten gave a bit more detail on the Joint Warfighting Concept. He said the overall concept is enabled by four underlying concepts: joint contested logistics, all-domain command and control, joint fires and information advantage.


Speed of action, speed of development and speed of acting will be critical to the future capabilities of the U.S. military. "It's important that we start training our people and educating our people to understand that whatever concept we have … (it) is underpinned by a deterrent model that has to be ready each and every minute of each and every day."


Nuclear weapons are the backbone of that deterrent, and while everyone hopes they will not be used, they must be ready and must be in the minds of any adversary or competitor.





HAZMAT-suited technician searches outdoor stadium.





"The primary role of our nuclear weapons is to deter our adversaries and make sure that nuclear weapons aren't used against the United States," he said. "They're also there to provide a deterrent backdrop for everything else we do, and understanding that is important."


The general also talked about the lessons from the COVID-19 pandemic. The coronavirus is a naturally occurring disease that first manifested itself in Wuhan, China. It was not created in a lab or released on purpose, he said.


"But our adversaries, as they look at the response of our nation and the impact of COVID-19 on our nation, understand how biological capabilities can impact the nation," Hyten said.


The United States military had a plan for responding to a pandemic. "Like most plans, it was not really accurate," he said. "It did not survive first contact with the adversary — COVID-19.





A missile takes off at night.





But the planning was still useful because the military had the capabilities and people needed and aligned to respond effectively. "It's still a huge impact on our nation," he said.


Another example he used was the alleged poisoning of Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny. News reports indicate Navalny was poisoned with Novichok — a nerve agent the Soviet Union developed in the 1970s and 1980s. While Hyten did not comment on intelligence matters he did say if the news reports are true and if an adversary applied that weapon more broadly, the results could be catastrophic.


Hyten also spoke about cyber saying that it deserves to be discussed in the symposium. "A catastrophic attack from cyber could be looked at as a weapon of mass destruction. We have to figure out how to defend against that."
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Posted for fair use.....
Ray Wants ARRW ‘Soonest’ For B-52, B-1
Ray Wants ARRW ‘Soonest’ For B-52, B-1
Combatant Commanders for European Command and Indo-Pacific Command see bombers with hypersonic capabilities as "incredibly, incredibly valuable," says Gen. Timothy Ray.
By Theresa Hitchens on September 16, 2020 at 5:41 PM


Air-Launched-Rapid-Response-Weapon-1024x576.jpg
WASHINGTON: The head of Air Force Global Strike Command, Gen. Timothy Ray, wants to integrate the first hypersonic missiles onto the B-52 and B-1 bomber fleets “in the next couple of years.”

“We’re working some plans on that, and I am very pleased with the progress that we’re making,” Ray told reporters in a roundtable this afternoon on the margins of the annual Air Force Association conference (AFA 2020). “And so I’m going to continue to press on that capability,” he added.

Ray said the command needs to deploy the AGM-183A Air-launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW) “soonest” — in part to beef up the capacity to undertake “dynamic force employment’ over far-flung theaters such as the Indo-Pacific.

Ray asserted that hypersonic capability would further demonstrate the importance of the Bomber Task Force to Dynamic Force Employment — one of Defense Secretary Mark Esper’s top 10 goals for 2020 in implementing the 2018 National Defense Strategy.

In response to my question during today’s presser, he suggested this gives the Air Force a leg up as the Pentagon and Joint Chiefs of Staff hash out future service roles and missions regarding long-range strike as they settle on a new Joint Warfighting Concept. (As Breaking D readers know, Esper has ordered the new concept to be readied by the end of the year.)

“I’ll steer you to the comments this morning from the Secretary of Defense. He said there’s no better example of Dynamic Force Employment than the Bomber Task Forces. He talked about our ability to get anywhere on the planet, where I don’t have the same limitations for access facing an overflight. So we’ve proven, even in a pandemic, that we can do that in an incredible fashion. Just connect hypersonic capability to that.”

He added that from discussions with Combatant Commanders for European Command and Indo-Pacific Command they also see bombers with hypersonic capabilities as “incredibly, incredibly valuable.”




Networks / Cyber,
Sponsored
How Remote Government Employees Can Access Multiple Classified Networks
Learn how Forcepoint Trusted Thin Client: Remote enables secure, multi-domain access for the remote worker.

From George Kamis, CTO, Global Governments and Critical Infrastructure, Forcepoint
Lockheed Martin is developing the ARRW under a $480 million contract for concept development awarded in 2018. In December 2019, it nabbed another contract, worth $998 million, to bring its concept to critical design review (CDR) — which the missile passed in February. The Air Force has budgeted $382 million for ARRW in 2021.

Whereas ARRW is a boost-glide missile, the Air Force is also eyeing hypersonic missiles that use scramjets — and Ray said he is interested in that capability as well.

“This is not an either or. I think we should do both,” he said.

However, Ray stressed that his focus is on moving ARRW as fast as possible because “scramjet, cruise missile” capability is not yet as mature. Indeed, DoD’s cutting-edge research arm, DARPA, is leading development of this type of hypersonic missile because the technology remains extremely challenging.
Lockheed Martin graphic
Recommended
Lockheed Aims For Laser On Fighter By 2025

How do you keep a laser focused on a target moving at hundreds of miles per hour? The answer is crucial to Lockheed lasers being fitted on Army trucks and Air Force fighters over the next few years.
By Sydney J. Freedberg Jr.

DARPA is working on two concepts — the Hypersonic Air-breathing Weapons Concept (HAWC) and Hypersonic Strike Weapon-air breathing (HSW-ab) — with a goal of handing them over to the Air Force when they mature.

Ray also stressed that the mission capable rates of the bomber fleet has improved and that he is, overall, pleased with progress on that front — despite the continued struggles of the B-52 with its aging TF-33 engine.

In particular, he noted, the B-1 has turned around and is “meeting its fleet numbers” some six or seven months ahead of what AFGSC thought was possible. “The recovery is incredibly successful.” At one point, half-a-dozen B-1s were ready to fly.

“On any given day, I probably can fly well over 20 of the B-1s. And I can fly, probably, in the mid- to high-30s for the B-52 on any given day. And I can fly almost every B-2 that’s at home, notwithstanding the numbers in depot,” Ray said.

21 comments
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Hummm.....

Posted for fair use.....

High Speed, Low-Yield: A U.S. Dual-Use Hypersonic Weapon

Alan Cummings

September 17, 2020

Commentary

Should the United States put nuclear warheads on hypersonic missiles? For 20 years, Washington has answered “no” by excluding nuclear weapons from its prompt strike and hypersonic weapons programs. In order to close gaps in U.S. theater deterrence and assurance capabilities, it is time to consider a change of course. Theater capabilities currently depend too much on aircraft and low-observable technology, the advantages of which are being eroded by advancements in adversary air defenses. Meanwhile, low-yield Trident missiles invite escalation and put strategic deterrence assets at risk.

One U.S. hypersonic program — the Common Hypersonic Glide Body — relies on neither aircraft nor low-observability. It ought to be a prime candidate for becoming a dual-use weapon with conventional and low-yield nuclear variants. There are counterarguments, which I will address and welcome others to raise, but even once they are fairly considered, the case for nuclear-tipped hypersonic missiles is persuasive. It would serve U.S. interests — namely, by improving U.S. theater deterrence, diversifying its assurance capabilities, and gaining leverage for future arms control agreements.

The Hypersonic Connection

Concerns about using hypersonic weapons for nuclear delivery often focus on the strategic level of war, where fears of large-scale instability and national vulnerability reside. However, the numerous intercontinental delivery systems already possessed by China, Russia, and the United States mean strategic hypersonic missiles produce only a marginal change in each other’s strategic vulnerability. While the Kremlin cites U.S. missile defenses as motive for its Avangard missile and other programs, the performance and cost realities of U.S. missile defenses make effective interdiction unrealistic for any large-scale nuclear strike, whether delivered by hypersonic or ballistic warheads. China is less transparent but has similar motivations, with added concerns rooted in its smaller arsenal and perceptions of U.S. ambiguity on mutual vulnerability — a condition that Beijing may try to impose with an Avangard-like system, as mentioned by Gen. Terrence O’Shaughnessy. Against the fear of a first strike, each of the three nations cultivates second-strike capabilities that may be more vulnerable to widespread cyber attack than a finite number of long-range hypersonic weapons. Even if one concedes a stabilizing role for strategic hypersonic weapons in China and Russia, adding them to an already robust U.S. modernization plan seems unnecessary given limited resources.

There is a more compelling case for the significance of hypersonic weapons at the theater level, where the logic of speed and defeating air and missile defenses applies to everyone. History has shown the enduring value of rapid effects delivered from multiple firing positions and in conjunction with other forces. This is certainly true for conventional munitions, as well as theater nuclear delivery and therefore deterrence. It is reflected in Russia’s avowedly dual-capable Kinzhal and, potentially, its Tsirkon, as well as perhaps China’s DF-17. In contrast, the United States has ruled out nuclear hypersonic capabilities for a variety of reasons, including presumptions of U.S. conventional dominance and theater nuclear sufficiency as well as programmatic momentum. This conventional-only approach was the right decision in the early 2000s, but that restraint may no longer be in the best interests of the United States and its allies.

Gaps in U.S. Theater Nuclear Deterrence

Theater deterrence is not just a microcosm of strategic deterrence. It involves U.S. interests alongside those of regional nations, which are both party and victim to potential conflicts. Escalation concerns are prominent and nuanced, incentivizing in-theater capabilities in order to forgo launching strikes from one’s homeland and risking retaliation there. This includes “low-yield” weapons. Although not formally defined, the phrase is useful in classifying weapons whose explosive power is generally tens of kilotons in TNT equivalent or less. To be clear, the bombs at Hiroshima and Nagasaki were estimated at 16 kilotons and 21 kilotons, respectively, making both “low-yield” weapons in today’s parlance. Low-yield weapons are clearly still devastating, which is why former Secretary of Defense James Mattis told Congress that there is no “such thing as a ‘tactical nuclear weapon.’ Any nuclear weapon used any time is a strategic game-changer.” While critics disagree, proponents argue that low-yield weapons facilitate deterrence by presenting adversaries with a more credible threat. This logic vis à vis Russia’s particular dedication to low-yield weapons is why they escaped complete elimination from the U.S. inventory before being reinvigorated by the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review.

The United States currently has three low-yield weapons for theater nuclear deterrence: the B61 gravity bomb, one type of air-launched cruise missile, and the low-yield W76-2 warhead on Trident submarine launched ballistic missiles. The U.S nuclear modernization plan will replace its air-launched cruise missiles from the 1970s with the Long-Range Standoff weapon and will see the return of a nuclear sea-launched cruise missile. These new delivery systems reflect a broader modernization theme: The United States does not need more nuclear weapons. It needs better ones, suitable for 21st century deterrence. However, the current approach perpetuates three vulnerabilities in U.S. theater deterrence.

The first is dependence on low observability (i.e., stealth) technology and tactics. Delivering a B61 or an air-launched cruise missile relies on the aircraft, the weapon, or both staying off an enemy’s radar. The same may be true for future sea-launched cruise missiles. Low-observable techniques are effective today and for the immediate future, but they are increasingly jeopardized by advanced air defense systems from Russia and China, along with the future systems they will inevitably deploy. The ongoing battle between signature and sensor will eventually meet an irreducible minimum, likely in favor of the sensor, at which point low observability may become moot.

The second is the escalatory problem of using U.S. strategic Trident missiles for theater purposes. Aside from the W76-2’s potential vulnerability to missile defenses, using a Trident means adversary leaders will not know if their country has been targeted with a high-yield or low-yield weapon until after impact. This action thus entails gambling, or at best an educated guess, on whether those decision-makers will wait that long before initiating their own retaliatory actions.

Third, U.S. theater deterrence and assurance are overly reliant on aircraft and easily targeted airfields. Until 2019, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty prohibited development of relevant ground-based weapons. At sea, decommissioning the nuclear Tomahawk variants removed attack submarines and surface warships from the deterrence chessboard. The W76-2 is responsive to this but with the escalatory issues mentioned above. So are future sea-launched cruise missiles, but potentially beholden to low-observable designs. With U.S. ballistic missile submarines rarely visiting foreign ports and new nuclear-armed maritime cruise missiles still up to 10 years away, in-theater manifestations of U.S. nuclear assurances are limited to U.S. aircraft in allied airfields or air space willing to permit them.

A New Role for the Common Hypersonic Glide Body

Although U.S. doctrine retains the prerogative of nuclear first use in defense of vital interests, a limited retaliatory action remains the most probable scenario. This makes it critical that low-yield delivery systems succeed when only one or a few weapons must be guaranteed to reach their objective. Among U.S. hypersonic programs, the Common Hypersonic Glide Body is the best option for a dual-use design that closes gaps in U.S. theater deterrence. This leaves the Air-launched Rapid Response Weapon to continue on track as a conventional system and likely the first U.S. weapon to become operational. It also may provide more payload capacity compared to the Hypersonic Air-breathing Weapon Concept, another air-launched missile. Furthermore, cooperative development of the Common Hypersonic Glide Body by the Army and Navy facilitates joint familiarity, logistics, and options for conventional-nuclear integration within theater contingency plans.

Target Access

Rather than stealth, hypersonic missiles defeat air defenses through a combination of speed, trajectory, and maneuverability. Even when hypersonic defense becomes feasible (at costs potentially unbearable for China and Russia), short flight times mean successful interception requires a nearly flawless detect-to-engage sequence. Against future air defenses, the Common Hypersonic Glide Body would be more credible for theater nuclear delivery than slower, low-observable cruise missiles while saving dual-capable aircraft for future missions, to include a potentially ongoing conventional fight. Additionally, the high-energy impact physics of hypersonic glide vehicles mean it would likely exceed the penetration capability of a B61 without relying on a ballistic trajectory. While its accuracy has not been disclosed, its origin in delivering precise conventional effects means it is surely accurate enough for low-yield weapons.

Scalable Presence

A dual-use approach capitalizes on the ground and maritime integration already planned for the Common Hypersonic Glide Body, diversifying U.S. theater deterrence and assurance capabilities with non-aircraft options. Virginia-class submarines and potentially Zumwalt-class destroyers offer high-mobility options for unilaterally deploying these weapons to either the European or Pacific theater. This is already planned for conventional variants as part of the Navy’s Intermediate Range Conventional Prompt Strike program. With allied coordination, port visits from these vessels could help signal U.S. commitment to extended deterrence while alleviating the political burdens allies would face in permanently hosting U.S. weapons. Should an ally see that burden become more tolerable or more necessary, ground-mobile firing units armed with this system atop the Army’s Long Range Hypersonic Weapon would provide options not constrained to airfields. Even if not immediately dispatched, simply having this family of deployable systems could help in assuring allies and cautioning adversaries, or reinforcing a secondary theater while the United States fought a major conflict elsewhere.

Continued.....
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Continued.....

Safeguarding Trident

Low-yield variants of the Common Hypersonic Glide Body aboard Virginia-class submarines should be a replacement capability for low-yield W76-2 warheads. Retiring the W76-2 would return U.S. Trident missiles to their strategic-only role aboard Ohio- and Columbia-class submarines. This would reduce escalatory risks by alleviating (though not eliminating) an adversary’s Trident discrimination problem. It would also reduce an adversary’s incentives to target U.S. strategic platforms in pursuit of its own theater objectives, helping safeguard U.S. ballistic missile submarines as the most survivable leg of the country’s strategic triad. The United States could then credibly assert that attacks on these submarines would be considered attacks on its strategic deterrent. While similar benefits could accrue from sea-launched cruise missiles, the Common Hypersonic Glide Body does not rely on low-observable designs and may be able to reach initial operational capability faster and more efficiently.

Concerns

Making a bold course change like the one suggested here warrants careful consideration of the risks for both action and inaction. The risk of inaction is straightforward: a potential deterioration in U.S. deterrence and assurance capabilities (the same sentiment that has motivated broader U.S. modernization efforts). The risks of action, however, are more specific when it comes to adopting a dual-use Common Hypersonic Glide Body.

Entanglement and Escalation

Entangling conventional and nuclear capabilities comes with risks. For one, exquisite weapons make exquisite targets in a crisis. Some fear that an agitated adversary might purposefully or inadvertently strike a nuclear-armed hypersonic missile, prompting the United States to cross the nuclear threshold first. Second, dual-use hypersonic missiles replace an adversary’s Trident discrimination problem with one of pre-launch ambiguity between nuclear and conventional warheads — a problem complicated by the compressed decision timeline of hypersonic flight. These issues lead to further concerns that hypersonic weapons will incentivize postures and reactions that heighten escalation risks. However, like dual-use cruise missiles and aircraft, the Common Hypersonic Glide Body is a theater system that is more resilient against the use-it-or-lose-it fears underpinning that argument. Strikes against it would garner a strong response, but U.S. strategic deterrence would not be jeopardized and theater deterrence would be sustained by the portfolio of theater weapons that this hypersonic capability is meant to complement. Moreover, Russia has already introduced this threat, and the United States should turn its attention to deterring Moscow from leveraging it as an asymmetric, potentially coercive, advantage. Warhead ambiguity may even be beneficial by providing political flexibility to allies hosting these systems or inducing hesitancy in an adversary considering whether to strike a potential nuclear weapon, thus enhancing deterrence. Alternatively, ambiguity can be sacrificed to mitigate these concerns by restricting nuclear capabilities to identifiable units (especially on land).

Strategic Overlap

U.S adversaries may still perceive dual-use hypersonic missiles as threatening their strategic deterrence capabilities. Similar arguments could be mounted for many theater deterrence weapons the United States has previously deployed, from cruise missiles to W76-2s. This is one among many reasons China, Russia, and the United States safeguard their second-strike capabilities. It is also a reason theater deterrence relies on a different set of weapons and targets: to keep the cataclysmic power of strategic forces in reserve, and to keep national leaders in command. Furthermore, Moscow and Beijing already seem to fear U.S. conventional hypersonic weapons, which they believe convey first-strike advantages unencumbered by the nuclear taboo. Adding a low-yield capability to the Common Hypersonic Glide Body adds little on the margin of concerns driven by its conventional attributes but adds much to the ledger for deterring conflict overall.

Costs

Making the Common Hypersonic Glide Body a dual-use system is a more efficient use of limited funds as well as common infrastructure and logistics once operational. Gen. Dave Goldfein, who will retire on Oct. 1, recently stated that this is the first time the United States is modernizing its nuclear and conventional enterprises at the same time, and that “[t]he current budget does not allow you to do both.” Adding a proposal like this runs the risk of being a fiscal non-starter. However, the Common Hypersonic Glide Body is not a new program — it already has development funding for the delivery systems and a conventional warhead. The new component would be integrating a low-yield capability. Given the expected capabilities of its naval variant, one solution may be to forgo developing a replacement for nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles and utilize those funds to cover nuclear integration. It would also be a potentially less expensive route to strengthening theater deterrence compared with increasing the U.S. bomber fleet beyond original modernization requirements.

Arms Control and Arms Racing

Shifting to a dual-use design should be acknowledged for what it is: a failure of arms control and an incremental step of arms racing prompted by U.S. adversaries. It reflects the fact that the United States is already engaged in deterring a Russian force that has retained, modernized, and produced so many low-yield weapons that they allegedly outnumber the United States’ eight to one (1,830 to 230). Russia broke faith with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty long before the Trump administration was elected, and has repeatedly rejected attempts to negotiate arms control parameters for its low-yield weapons. In the Pacific, reports that China is expanding its arsenal are pulling an ever-present nuclear subtext to the foreground and raising questions about what capabilities may yet come to underscore Beijing’s revisionist foreign policy.

U.S. low-yield weapons responsive to threats posed by Russia do risk being seen as a threat that Beijing must in turn respond to. Rather than counting on endless restraint by the United States, Chinese leaders should see this as a natural consequence of the multipolar world they themselves advocate and be willing to safeguard their regional interests through arms control. Yet Beijing has completely refused official engagement and at this point, “countless Track II dialogues with China are not a substitute.” After 20-plus years of a worthy and laudable arms control effort, the reality of this situation should be acknowledged and reflected in the U.S. force posture before progress can be made. As Lt. Gen. Robert P. Ashley Jr. noted, “the resurgence of great power competition is a geopolitical reality. It is the mindset Russia and China have embraced, the mindset that is guiding their approach to nuclear modernization and investment.”

The United States does not need to engage in an open-ended, expensive race to superiority. But in order to deter, it needs to ensure that its arsenal is fit for purpose in defeating an adversary locally. Both Russia and China would likely object to dual-use hypersonic missiles, calling their adoption a destabilizing move by the United States. This argument is hypocritical and false but expected — and to some degree desired: Washington should want Moscow and Beijing to react with some apprehension. Their reaction would acknowledge Washington’s signal of commitment to deterring their revisionist ambitions and defending U.S. allies. Their reaction would also reflect the fact that assured delivery for the United States means assured risk to their interests and security, giving both of them increased incentives to come to the negotiating table. This pressure point alone might not be decisive, but using it to complicate their decision space would be useful in pursuing trilateral arms control solutions to replace the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty or respond to the low-yield lacunae in New START — solutions that are beneficial to the stability and security of all three nations.

To Hype or Not to Hype (America’s Nuclear Arsenal)?

A dual-use Common Hypersonic Glide Body would close gaps in U.S. theater deterrence capabilities and offer scalable deployment options to assure allies. It would give the United States a tool for assured delivery of conventional and low-yield warheads that hedges against erosion of U.S. advantages in low-observable technology. Both variants could be deployed unilaterally and clandestinely at sea aboard submarines, or overtly in cooperation with allies. With its ground and maritime variants, shifting the Common Hypersonic Glide Body to a dual-use design would provide the United States with leverage and flexibility for future arms control efforts. Just as President Vladimir Putin and General Secretary Xi Jinping learned important lessons through the 1990s and early 2000s, their future successors are learning lessons now that will shape their ambitions and policy preferences for the 2030s and beyond. Statecraft remains the preferred solution, but the United States should back its diplomats with the right military tools so that they can navigate today’s competitive environment and shape the future of European and Pacific deterrence.



Alan Cummings is a recent master’s graduate from Tufts University’s Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and a 2020 member of the Center for Strategic and International Studies Nuclear Scholars Initiative. He served over 10 years on active duty with the U.S. Navy before transitioning to the Navy Reserve. The views expressed here are his own and in no way represent any institution with which he is affiliated.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Well here's a "reality check" DOT..... (who else here reading this lived/worked near a naval air station during the "Cold War" and remembers the ever present sight of out and inbound P-3s (or P-2s) in the flight pattern?).....

Posted for fair use.....

How The US Is Preparing To Hunt New Chinese, Russian Subs
"It’s pretty well-known now that our homeland is no longer a sanctuary,” Vice Adm. Daryl Caudle, Submarine Forces Atlantic says. "So we have to be prepared here to conduct high-end combat operations in local waters."
By Paul McLeary on September 17, 2020 at 6:28 PM


BlackWidow.jpg


WASHINGTON: The Navy’s newest fleet and submarine commands teamed up this week for an intensive anti-submarine drill off the East Coast, waters Navy commanders say are now open game for Russian submarines.


“This is where the fight is…where the competition is. Specifically in the Atlantic [and] the undersea capability of the Russians. We have got to maintain that advantage.” Vice Adm. Andrew Lewis, commander of the new Norfolk-based 2nd Fleet, told reporters.


“It’s pretty well-known now that our homeland is no longer a sanctuary,” Vice Adm. Daryl Caudle, Submarine Forces Atlantic told reporters Wednesday. “So we have to be prepared here to conduct high-end combat operations in local waters, just like we do abroad now because…nothing’s a sanctuary any longer.”



The exercises come as the Navy is developing new capabilities, including unmanned ships, fast-moving frigates, and a new submarine-basing agreement and expanded base with Norway, to meet the rapid modernization of Chinese and Russian undersea fleets as they operate more frequently in the Arctic and could potentially begin creeping up to the US coastline.


But it’s not clear how interested Moscow is in playing near American coasts. Their submarine fleet is primarily concerned with protecting Russian critical infrastructure and its own ballistic-missile submarines, key to Moscow’s second strike capability. There is probably little appetite in Moscow to send its subs on regular long-range, high-endurance missions near US coastlines. The fleet is small and such a far-flung deployment would leave its other assets unprotected.



What the 2nd Fleet may be most interested in close to US shores, said Michael Kofman, director of the Russia Studies Program at the Center for Naval Analysis, are the submarines of Moscow’s 10th Department, which operates several massive nuclear-powered subs which operate separately from the Russian navy.


The agency, also known as the Main Directorate of Deep-Sea Research, has converted several ballistic missile submarines to act as motherships to dock other submarines or unmanned undersea vessels on special deep-dive missions.







Air Warfare,
space, Sponsored
Advancing Space-Based Defense
Learn how Raytheon Intelligence & Space is improving our ability to detect missile attacks.
B24617213.282002605;dc_trk_aid=475902820;dc_trk_cid=137613299;ord=[timestamp];dc_lat=;dc_rdid=;tag_for_child_directed_treatment=;tfua=;gdpr=${GDPR};gdpr_consent=${GDPR_CONSENT_755}

From Raytheon Intelligence & Space
This fleet of submarines also can manipulate undersea cables and other undersea infrastructure, using retractable arms that can reach out and grab items off the ocean floor.


“A secondary concern for the United States is the activity of this second navy,” Kofman said. “Think of them as specialized submarines that have a host of capabilities — some of that surrounding fiber optic cable infrastructure on the ocean seabed — but it’s an entirely different set of operations” from the Russian navy.


The “Black Widow” exercise, which started Monday, puts several high-end assets in the water, including the amphibious assault ship Wasp, destroyers USS Arleigh Burke and McFaul, P-8 surveillance planes, helicopters, and two fast-attack submarines.


A key part of the exercise is to work out any flaws in the command and control between the new submarine command and the 2nd Fleet, as the two organizations work though how to coordinate activities. Things learned over this week will help commanders forge a closer working relationship, and iron out the kinks in coordinating and communicating, in future operations.


Recommended
Ray Wants ARRW ‘Soonest’ For B-52, B-1
Combatant Commanders for European Command and Indo-Pacific Command see bombers with hypersonic capabilities as “incredibly, incredibly valuable,” says Gen. Timothy Ray.
By Theresa Hitchens

“Because I have 2nd Fleet now stood up and a true fleet commander, with a theater undersea warfighting commander working for him, it really is a rehearsal,” Caudle said. “So the submarines and surface ships that are involved in this exercise are in a command and control structure that would be identical that if they were deployed to 6th Fleet.”


Late last month, a Russian submarine unexpectedly popped up on the surface in international waters off the coast of Alaska, catching Northern Command by surprise. The sub, part of a larger Russian military exercise, never entered US waters but its proximity was a signal that many Russian naval capabilities have improved greatly since bottoming out in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War.


The Black Widow exercise follows confirmation earlier this month that Norway had made improvements to a port above the Arctic Circle to pave the way for increased visits by US nuclear submarines, providing a major new jumping off point for watching Russia’s active Northern Fleet as it transits into the North Atlantic.


The Russian sub near Alaska appeared just days after the American fast attack submarine USS Seawolf emerged from the Arctic off the coast of Tromso, Norway to take on new crew members. The boat is one of just three Seawolf-class fast attack submarines specializing in intelligence collection, and the Washington-based submarine was likely operating under the Arctic ice before stopping off the Norwegian coast.


Twice over the past year, the US Navy has publicized its nuclear submarines docking in Norway, sending a clear signal to Russia about the American presence in the region and providing a rare glimpse into the secretive world or undersea deployments. The new work will allow American and NATO submarines to pull into the port and replenish, allowing for longer deployments to the critical Arctic region.


The Navy’s increased focus on submarine operations is a key indicator as to what the Pentagon is most concerned about in coming years the Russians and Chinese deploy new subs. “Anti-submarine warfare is a primary mission for everybody in the United States Navy, regardless of what you wear on your chest,” Lewis said.


The Navy’s Medium Unmanned Surface Vessel — still in development — is expected to play a role in hunting subs in the coming years as part of its intel collection capability, providing a risk-free alternative to expensive, crewed ships or aircraft doing circles in the ocean looking for small submarines in the vast expanses of the ocean.


A new report from the Hudson Institute points out that the current approach that uses slow-moving and easily trackable towed arrays “cannot scale to address more than a few adversary submarines at a time after they leave choke points and deploy into the open ocean,” but employing MUSVs towing active and passive arrays, networked with aerial drones, more submarines can be tracked simultaneously.


Adm. Lewis, without naming the MUSV specifically, appeared to underline that point. “The future of undersea warfare, as well as a lot of other warfare, is in the combination of unmanned and manned and the integration of those,” he said.
 

jward

passin' thru
The Future Role of the U.S. Armed Forces in Counterterrorism

September 2020, Volume 13, Issue 9
Authors:
Brian Michael Jenkins

Categories:
Share via: PDF




1600405566826.png



Abstract:

Many senior officials believe that emphasis on counterterrorism for the past two decades has compromised the ability of the U.S. armed forces to perform other critical military missions and that strategic competition, not terrorism, must now be the primary concern. This essay provides observations on the future role of the armed forces in counterterrorism and the future role of counterterrorism forces in great power competition. It notes that it will be difficult to demote counterterrorism while terrorists still remain a threat. However, there will be a further shift to counterterrorism without counterinsurgency. Dividing the military into near-peer warfare and counterterrorism camps makes little sense. Future wars will require U.S. commanders to orchestrate capabilities to counter an array of conventional and unconventional modes of conflict, including terrorism. Reduced defense spending in the post-pandemic environment will further increase pressure to cut counterterrorism—but the savings will be modest. Shifting priorities should not mean discarding competence. The hard-won skills that result from decades of counterterrorism operations are fungible, indeed valuable to future military challenges, including great power competition. Terrorism itself is constantly evolving, demanding new approaches. The ability to rapidly adapt to changing threats is applicable to strategic competition.

Posted for fair use.
Please see source for citations and PDF of report in it's entirety
 

Attachments

  • 1600405485581.png
    1600405485581.png
    344.7 KB · Views: 0

jward

passin' thru
Global defense news, analysis and opinion


Islamic State Turkey Province fighters
Fighters from Islamic State Turkey Province in the affiliate's first video released in July 2019.


Islamic State Expanding Globally Amid Setbacks: US Official
Despite being forced out of Syria and the killing of its leaders, the extremist group has some 20 affiliates worldwide.
The Islamic State (IS) group continues to expand globally with some 20 affiliates, despite being forced out of Syria and the killing of its leaders, a top US counter-terror official said Thursday.
The extremist group “has repeatedly demonstrated the ability to rebound from severe losses over the past six years by relying on a dedicated cadre of veteran mid-level commanders, extensive clandestine networks, and downturns in CT (counter-terrorism) pressure to persevere,” said Christopher Miller, director of the US National Counterterrorism Center.
Since the October 2019 killing of IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and several other prominent figures, new leader Mohammed Said Abd al-Rahman al-Mawla has been able to direct and inspire new attacks by its far-flung affiliates, Miller told a hearing of the House Homeland Security Committee.

ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi
Former Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in a video released by ISIS on April 29, 2019
On Thursday the group claimed responsibility for the killing of six French aid workers and their two local guides in Niger on August 9.

Inside Syria and Iraq, Miller said, IS has undertaken “a steady rate” of assassinations and mortar and IED bomb attacks. Those included an operation in May that killed and wounded dozens of Iraqi soldiers.
Miller said the group trumpeted this success with graphic videos that served as propaganda to demonstrate the jihadists were still organized and active, since being uprooted from their self-proclaimed Syria-Iraq “caliphate” last year.
He said that the group is now focused on freeing thousands of Islamic State members and their families from detention camps in northeastern Syria, in the absence of any coordinated international process to deal with them.
Outside Syria and Iraq, the IS global web “now encompasses approximately 20 branches and networks,” Miller said. It has had mixed results, but is strongest in Africa, as the Niger attack underscored.

Islamic State also seeks to attack Western targets, Miller says, but so far effective counter-terror work has prevented this.
IS rival Al-Qaeda, which carried out the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, was weakened by the loss of leaders and key figures but remains potent, Miller said.
The 9/11 terrorist attacks will forever be seared into our national memory. Today we honor those we lost. As we reflect almost 20 years later the @StateDept remains steadfast in its commitment to hold terrorists accountable and protect our homeland. pic.twitter.com/p8c5XmPumJ
— Secretary Pompeo (@SecPompeo) September 11, 2020

The group is still determined to carry out attacks on the United States and Europe, he said, and was tied to the radicalized Saudi air force trainee who killed three sailors at a US military base in Pensacola, Florida, December 2019.
Al-Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen and Africa retain the ability to carry out deadly attacks, Miller said, but its sub-groups in India and Pakistan have been significantly weakened.
In Afghanistan its presence has declined to “a few dozen fighters who are primarily focused on their survival,” Miller said.
Under a deal the Taliban signed with the United States in February, the insurgents agreed to stop Al-Qaeda from using Afghanistan as a safe haven to plot attacks.

However, despite the agreement, the jihadist group maintains close ties with the Afghan militants, the Pentagon said Wednesday.

posted for fair use
 

jward

passin' thru
Montenegro Is the Latest Domino to Fall Toward Russia
After parliamentary elections, a pro-West government is out. Europe and the United States should take note.

By Ivana Stradner, Milan Jovanović | September 17, 2020, 1:25 PM
People wave national and European flags during a post-election rally in Podgorica, Montenegro, on Sept. 6

People wave national and European flags during a post-election rally in Podgorica, Montenegro, on Sept. 6 Savo Prelevic/AFP/Getty Images


A recent parliamentary election in Montenegro may have attracted little notice outside the country, but it will have outsized repercussions for the international order. Strongman President Milo Djukanovic has been in power for nearly 30 years at the helm of his pro-Western Democratic Party of Socialists, which lost its bid for reelection in the Aug. 30 vote, although Djukanovic will stay president until 2023. Taking the Democratic Party of Socialists’ place is a pro-Russian and pro-Serbian-led alliance, which has given Moscow an ally not just within NATO, but potentially within the European Union. It’s high time the EU wakes up and does something to stem Russian President Vladimir Putin’s creeping influence in the Balkans.

The newly formed coalition of opposition parties set to lead the small Balkan state have notionally agreed to continue Djukanovic’s pro-Western tilt, but that is unlikely to stop the festivities in the Kremlin. After all, the new coalition’s first goal, according to one of its leaders, is to lift the country’s sanctions on Russia. And although much of the Montenegrin public may be cheering the end of Djukanovic’s autocratic rule, the happiness is likely to be short-lived. Their small nation is just the latest Balkan domino to fall toward Moscow.

A longtime Moscow ally, Montenegro split from both pro-Russian Serbia and Russia in 2006, following a new pro-Western path geared toward joining NATO. Seeing NATO’s expansion eastward as a threat, Russia lobbied hard to dissuade Montenegro from joining the alliance. In 2016, the Kremlin even went so far as to back a coup attempt. Nonetheless, Montenegro joined NATO in 2017.
Such setbacks aside, Russia and its political fellow travelers in Serbia continue to enjoy enormous influence in the country.
Russia and its political fellow travelers in Serbia continue to enjoy enormous influence in the country.
Moscow remains the biggest foreign direct investor in Montenegro, and it wields the Serbian Orthodox Church as a powerful weapon. Putin worked through the churchto fight Montenegro’s independence from Serbia in 2006, and its NATO bid. The new ruling coalition in Podgorica is dominated by an alliance of Serbian nationalist parties known as For the Future of Montenegro, which is backed by the Serbian Orthodox Church.

The Moscow-leaning Serbian Orthodox Church not only is the largest religious institution in Montenegro but also hopes to position itself as one of the state’s most decisive political players. The church supported the leader of the For the Future of Montenegro party, Zdravko Krivokapic, and even before this election it united diverse communities by organizing massive religious-political gatherings.
Serbia also did its best to ensure a congenial outcome to Montenegro’s elections, and Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic crowed over the results. As well he should have—Vucic’s government financed Serbian organizations in Montenegro to the tune of almost $2 million, resulting in massive displays of Serbian nationalism in Podgorica during the election. Djukanovic accused Serbia of election meddling, which Serbia denies.

All this bodes ill for Montenegrins, who can look forward to more nationalism and deeper divisions within their society. Democratization and the development of civil society will inevitably suffer. Despite the international community’s best efforts, Montenegrin politics is regressing back toward the 1990s.
Thus, the international community should pay attention to what happens in this small Balkan country, too. As the Kremlin’s influence expands in the Balkans, the risks of conflict grow with it. Montenegro is important for Russia because of its location on the Adriatic Sea and its associated naval presence.

Nipping Moscow’s influence will require some fast work. Montenegro is in negotiations to join the European Union, but it has not yet done so. The process of the EU membership must be accelerated. And NATO itself must ensure the integrity of the Montenegrin security sector so that Russian allies don’t have access to sensitive NATO information. The best way to do that is to fashion a cybersecurity hub in Montenegro—an ideal headquarters to counter Moscow’s increasingly aggressive cyberintrusions and troll farms in the region.
Similarly, Brussels must warn Serbia—in the midst of its own negotiations to join the EU—that it can neither remain Russia’s main foothold in the Balkans nor continue its interference in Montenegrin politics. After a U.S.-brokered deal that normalized economic ties between Kosovo and Serbia earlier this month—and as a consequence angered the Kremlin—the U.S. National Security Council congratulated Vucic on his courage to confront Russia. Serbia’s relations with Montenegro will be the litmus test for whether or not Serbia is shifting its foreign-policy goals toward the West.

posted for fair use
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Posted for fair use.....

Navy Mulling Extending Service Lives of Nimitz-class Carriers

By: Mallory Shelbourne
September 17, 2020 4:33 PM

The Navy is considering an extension of the service lives of the first few aircraft carriers in the Nimitz-class, the head of the service’s carrier program said on Thursday.

The Navy is assessing whether to delay decommissioning timelines for the first few ships in the Nimitz-class, Program Executive Officer for Carriers Rear Adm. James Downey said at a symposium hosted by the American Society for Naval Engineers.

Specifically, the Navy is evaluating the timeline for USS Nimitz (CVN-68), with an eye toward coming to a conclusion about the first-in-class ship within the next one to two years, he said.

“You have 40 more years of Nimitz life, but Nimitz herself is coming up to potentially an end-of-life-cycle at the end of this [future years defense program]. But she has capability beyond that point,” Downey said. “So we’re looking at where that capability sits from a timeframe perspective. It’s — generally the math takes you to the 52 or 55 years, so we have that issue that we’re going through.”

Downey said the Navy is analyzing its upcoming refueling and complex overhauls (RCOH) and docking availabilities as it assesses whether or not to delay Nimitz’s decommissioning.

According to the Navy’s latest budget submission, USS Harry S. Truman (CVN-75), which the service last year attempted to retire at its mid-life point but ultimately rescinded the proposal due to an outcry from lawmakers, is scheduled for the next refueling and complex overhaul in 2025.

“We have the issue that there’s certain places where we do this work and there’s certain docks available to do it in. We’re going through our scheduled RCOHs and dockings and we’re looking to deconflict that at the beginning of the next FYDP as well,” Downey said. “So we have significant discussions going on on [CVN]-68 herself and we’ll see what we work out through the Navy and Department of Defense here in the coming year or two. We would potentially see some adjustments there.”

While the Navy has yet to present its legally-mandated 30-year shipbuilding outlook for FY 2021 to Congress, the FY 2020 blueprint showed the carrier inventory dropping from 11 carriers in 2024 to 10 in 2025, around the time Nimitz is slated to retire.

Still, Downey said the Navy needs to analyze a host of factors ranging from maintenance availabilities to how an extension could affect other ships in the fleet, as it weighs delaying the decommissioning date.

“These ships don’t go by themselves, so that also affects another 30-plus ships on each side of that – the ships with her, the ships with the next [carrier] strike group,” he said. “So some pretty significant considerations there. And then it also affects how many – when we pull the sailors off and how we affect that manning profile for the whole ship and certainly the nuclear plant.”

The Nimitz-class carriers are currently projected to have a 50 to 55-year service life despite the design intending the carriers to be in service for 30 years, Downey said.

“That is not at a diminished rate whatsoever. And for those of you directly involved in modernization, we’ve got significant network efforts going on — self-defense systems going on, missile systems going on — it’s interesting to look at the increased modernization including [Joint Strike Fighter] and others and see that that design has succeeded without significant hull, mechanical, electrical modifications over those 50 years, other than the overhaul,” he said.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Posted for fair use.....

The Dangerous Myths About China’s Nuclear Weapons

David Logan

September 18, 2020
Commentary

Early this summer, as American and Russian diplomats gathered in Vienna to discuss extending the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, much of the focus was on a country that was not represented at the summit: China. In the lead up to the meeting, Marshall Billingslea, the U.S. special presidential envoy for arms control, tweeted that “China just said it has no intention to participate in trilateral negotiations. It should reconsider … No more Great Wall of Secrecy on its nuclear build-up. Seat waiting for China in Vienna.” To highlight China’s absence, American negotiators placed Chinese flags in front of empty chairs, in what Beijing would later rebuke as “performance art.” Once talks began, American officials reportedly even delivered a classified briefing to their Russian counterparts outlining China’s modernization of its nuclear arsenal and the risks such forces pose.

As China’s growing nuclear forces have garnered new attention, so have some persistent myths about them. There are many legitimate concerns about China’s nuclear arsenal. China’s nuclear expansion and modernization is loosening longstanding technical constraints that have guided the country’s nuclear policies. The potential entanglement of Chinese conventional and nuclear forces raises the risks of misperception leading to nuclear first use in a crisis or conflict. And China’s opacity in the nuclear domain exacerbates dangerous misperceptions and misunderstandings between Washington and Beijing. Unfortunately, these real risks are frequently overshadowed by more dubious claims. Too many analysts have focused on the wrong problems when it comes to China’s nuclear forces, including claims that China is hiding a vast nuclear warhead stockpile, that its no-first-use policy is a sham, and that it has developed and fielded tactical nuclear weapons. The misguided focus on these claims can exacerbate distrust, heighten threat perceptions, and make it more difficult to address more genuine concerns. Three myths in particular deserve attention.

Three Persistent Myths About China’s Nukes
Since its first nuclear test in 1964, China’s approach to nuclear weapons has often diverged from that of the other nuclear-armed states, puzzling scholars and analysts alike. While nuclear-armed regional powers like France and Pakistan fielded asymmetric escalation postures consisting of high-alert tactical nuclear systems, China was slow to develop a limited arsenal of affixed, hulking liquid-fueled intercontinental ballistic missiles. While the Cold War superpowers engaged in arms racing, China committed to building a “lean and effective” force. Since obtaining a nuclear weapons capability, China has publicly claimed a categorical no-first-use policy and has asserted that “China does not engage in any nuclear arms race with any other country and keeps its nuclear capabilities at the minimum level required for national security.” Scholars have attributed China’s historically reserved nuclear strategy and policies to a range of factors, from leadership beliefs and domestic and organizational constraints to strategic culture and civil-military relations.

But whatever the sources of China’s nuclear doctrine, misperceptions about it continue to endure. These misperceptions are likely the byproduct of several factors, including confusion over the historical divergence between China’s nuclear policies and those of the United States, alarm at Beijing’s increasingly challenging behaviors in other security domains, and suspicion over the People’s Liberation Army’s troubling opacity in the nuclear realm. Together, these factors create a space for worst-case assumptions on the part of policy-makers, permitting the emergence and propagation of enduring and counterproductive myths.

The first myth is that China maintains a vast hidden arsenal of potentially thousands of nuclear warheads in the country’s underground tunnels. As the United States has called for a trilateral arms control agreement with both Russia and China, an op-ed contributor to The Wall Street Journal alleged that any reluctance on Beijing’s part only confirms the existence of this secret nuclear force. Writing in The Hill, two observers claimed that “Estimates of the size of the Chinese nuclear arsenal vary considerably, from fewer than 300 warheads to a significantly larger number” [emphasis added]. Indeed, claims of a wildly expansive Chinese nuclear arsenal are not newsimilar claims were made in major American newspapers nearly a decade ago.

There is, however, little evidence to support these claims. The most credible estimates of China’s nuclear forces from both the U.S. government and independent experts attest to Beijing’s relatively limited — though increasingly sophisticated — nuclear forces. The Pentagon’s most recent annual report on the Chinese military estimates that China has roughly 100 intercontinental ballistic missiles and puts China’s nuclear warhead stockpile “in the low 200s,” even lower than many well-respected independent estimates.

Related to the myth of a vast secret warhead stockpile are ongoing concerns that China may attempt a so-called “sprint to parity” by quickly expanding its nuclear arsenal to the size of the American one. The U.S. government predicts that China will double its nuclear warhead stockpile over the next decade (though similar past predictions about growth in China’s nuclear arsenal have not come to pass). Given the current size of that stockpile, a doubling would amount to fewer than 500 weapons compared to the 1,550 deployed warhead limit established by the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.

However, and perhaps most significantly, China lacks the fissile material necessary to build a significantly larger nuclear arsenal. The International Panel on Fissile Materials reports that China stopped production of fissile material for weapons in the 1980s and that Beijing possesses relatively limited stocks of both uranium and plutonium. Additionally, Chinese warhead designs may be comparatively conservative, requiring more nuclear fuel than those of other states.

Some skeptics have fixated on the extensive system of underground tunnels China reportedly uses to shelter and move some of its missiles, arguing that the tunnels themselves are evidence of a vast nuclear stockpile. Why would China create such an elaborate underground network if its arsenal were truly so small? The answer: to shelter this vulnerable nuclear deterrent. Not surprisingly, China sought to protect its relatively modest deterrent force by hiding it. As one expert has argued, Beijing could have enhanced the survivability of its force by expanding its size. Beijing’s reliance on concealment enhanced the force’s survivability at lower cost and with the added benefit of not introducing arms race pressures.

The second myth about China’s nuclear forces is that Beijing’s no-first-use policy is a fraud. China claims to adhere to a no-first-use policy, meaning that it would use its nuclear weapons only in response to a nuclear strike by another country. This policy has been reaffirmed repeatedly over the decades, including in last year’s defense white paper.
However, American observers have a long tradition of doubting the sincerity of that policy. The 2006 version of the Defense Department’s annual report on the Chinese military, drawing in part on faulty translations of Chinese writings, implied that China might adjust its no-first-use policy in the future. At a congressional hearing this February the head of U.S. Strategic Command, Adm. Charles Richard, said that he could “drive a truck through that no first use policy.” One writer in the editorial pages of The Hill recently dismissed China’s declared no-first-use policy as a “disinformation campaign.”

But evidence from public and classified Chinese military texts reaffirming the no-first-use policy suggests that no-first-use is still intact. China’s nuclear warheads are reportedly not mated to delivery vehicles, a practice which would confound attempts at nuclear first-use. Chinese military reporting continues to describe People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force units conducting exercises under conditions of nuclear attack, indicating that China’s nuclear missile forces plan to operate after an adversary’s nuclear strike. The Pentagon’s 2019 report on the Chinese military, while acknowledging elements of concern in China’s nuclear forces and policies, is straightforward in its conclusion: “There has been no indication that national leaders are willing to attach such nuances and caveats to China’s existing NFU [no-first-use] policy.”

The third myth is that China has developed and deployed an array of nuclear war-fighting capabilities, including tactical nuclear weapons. While there is no strict definition of tactical nuclear weapon, they are usually defined as lower-yield warheads affixed to shorter-range delivery vehicles and intended for use against military targets on the battlefield or other high-value theater targets. Over the last year, several American media outlets have published claims that China is fielding or has already fielded an array of tactical nuclear weapons. But such claims lack merit.

China certainly has the industrial and technical base to produce tactical nuclear weapons if such a decision were made. There are scattered reports that Beijing may have initiated projects to develop such weapons during the Cultural Revolution. But those projects were ultimately canceled before deployment because they conflicted with China’s nuclear strategy. China conducted successful tests of a neutron bomb in the 1980s, though it’s unclear how readily those designs might translate into a modern nuclear war-fighting capability.

Continued.....
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Continued.....

More than three decades ago, U.S. intelligence estimates were predicting that China would soon field these kinds of capabilities. But 35 years later, those predictions have yet to come true as Defense Department and independent assessments of China’s capabilities continue to make no mention of deployed tactical nuclear weapons.

Misplaced Attention: The Real Risks of Beijing’s Nukes
Although there is little evidence to support claims that China possesses a vast covert nuclear arsenal, that its no-first-use policy is a sham, or that it has developed an extensive array of tactical nuclear weapons, there are still several reasons to be concerned about China’s nuclear forces. Unlike the above myths, which often focus on China’s force modernization and potential arms racing dynamics, these legitimate concerns often relate to actual nuclear use.

First, China’s nuclear expansion and modernization, though modest in comparison to the much larger and sophisticated arsenals of the United States and Russia, ease the technical constraints that have influenced its nuclear policies, making it easier for Beijing to shift to a more alerted posture if the country’s leadership ever decides to do so. China is deploying more and increasingly sophisticated solid-fueled and road-mobile land-based missiles, fielding a fleet of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, and has reassigned a nuclear role to its air force.

The development of more accurate, mobile, and survivable missiles, and the realization of a complete nuclear triad of land-, air-, and sea-based delivery systems will expand Beijing’s nuclear policy options. More accurate missiles improve the potential value of using nuclear weapons on the battlefield against opposing military units. Calls by some within China’s military to raise the alert status of its nuclear forces raise questions about the long-term trajectory of China’s nuclear policies. China is reportedly working on a space-based early warning system which could support a move to a launch-on-warning posture, if such a decision were made in the future. Last year, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that his country would assist China in developing an early warning capability. In fact, the 2020 Department of Defense report on the Chinese military claims that “China intends to increase the peacetime readiness of its nuclear forces by moving to a launch-on-warning posture with an expanded silo-based force.” Some developments, like the deployment of a nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine fleet, may create new pressures for mating warheads in peacetime or pre-delegating launch authority in certain situations. China’s expanding fissile material production capabilities, though intended for commercial purposes, could be used to support a larger expansion of its nuclear weapons arsenal. Recent reports have suggested increased activity at China’s nuclear weapons labs and testing site.

Together, these developments either create new opportunities for China to use its nuclear forces or introduce new pressures on longstanding nuclear weapons policies and practices. They also, in part, drive American skepticism of Chinese nuclear policies. In the past, the operational and technical characteristics of China’s nuclear arsenal lent inherent credibility to Beijing’s claims of maintaining only a retaliatory capability. China may have pursued these new capabilities primarily to ensure the survivability of its nuclear deterrent. But today, thanks to those modernization efforts, China’s nuclear forces may nonetheless be capable of more than simply retaliation. This has occurred against the backdrop of growing U.S.-Chinese strategic competition and mutual suspicion, further heightening threat perceptions.
Second, experts have increasingly warned that the possible entanglement of China’s conventional and nuclear forces could introduce dangerous escalation risks in a crisis or conflict. China fields the world’s largest and most sophisticated array of conventional and nuclear ground-based ballistic missiles. All of these missiles are under the control of the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force. Some of these missiles, such as the DF-21, feature both conventional- and nuclear-armed variants. One missile system, the DF-26, appears technologically capable of switching between either a conventional or nuclear payload and Chinese military reporting describes DF-26 units rapidly transitioning from conventional strikes to nuclear ones. The mobility of these systems increases the possibility of nuclear and conventional units operating far from home garrisons and within proximity of one another. This organizational, technological, and geographic overlap may make it difficult for the United States to determine which systems are nuclear and which are conventional.

In a crisis or a conflict, U.S. strikes against China’s conventional capabilities might inadvertently degrade Beijing’s nuclear deterrent, introducing dangerous escalation pressures. U.S. efforts to locate and track Chinese conventional missiles could be misinterpreted in Beijing as preparations for a disarming first strike against its nuclear forces. Similarly, the United States might mistake the launch of a conventional Chinese missile as a nuclear attack. These risks stemming from entanglement are more pronounced given evidence that the United States misperceives the drivers of Chinese entanglement. Several American analysts have suggested that Beijing may have deliberately entangled its conventional and nuclear forces in order to increase the risks of nuclear use and deter the United States. While the logic is compelling and some Chinese strategists may have come to appreciate the potential deterrent benefits of entanglement, the evidence suggests that Chinese entanglement, to the degree it exists, developed from more parochial organizational dynamics (i.e., saving costs by using similar systems), not a desire to manipulate risk. This mismatch between what Americans and Chinese analysts perceive to be the drivers of entanglement could exacerbate escalation dynamics, with U.S. officials falsely believing that China is well prepared for the risks of entanglement and Chinese officials falsely believing that U.S. actions (inadvertently) targeting China’s nuclear weapons are part of a campaign to erode China’s nuclear deterrent. Together, this entanglement could increase pressures on China to use its nuclear weapons or for the United States to target them, raising the likelihood of a dangerous escalation spiral.

Third, China’s longstanding opacity about its nuclear forces and policies is risky, especially given the evidence of misperceptions and misunderstandings between Beijing and Washington. China and the United States appear to have dangerously different views of escalation dynamics and the ability of countries to control the scope and intensity of a conflict. For one, while American experts frequently highlight potential escalation pathways in a crisis or conflict, Chinese strategists appear overly sanguine about the escalatory potential of steps China might take with its nuclear forces to signal resolve. This mismatch in perceptions could lead each side to misjudge the actions or intentions of the other. For example, Chinese military texts describe potentially escalatory signaling practices for demonstrating resolve in a crisis, including broadcasting operations involving its strategic forces and even launching an intercontinental ballistic missile armed with a conventional warhead against an adversary’s territory. Though there is no indication that China ever deployed conventionally armed intercontinental ballistic missiles, such future actions could be easily mistaken for preparations of an actual nuclear strike. American skepticism about China’s nuclear policies, including its no-first-use pledge, exacerbates these risks.

Similarly, although skepticism about China’s no-first-use policy may be overblown, it would be dangerous to assume that it is inviolable in all possible circumstances. In a crisis or a conflict, plans can change. There are occasional reports of Chinese strategists and military officers debating the merits of the no-first-use policy, including expressing concerns about potential adversary efforts to exploit China’s no-first-use policy by mounting a conventional first strike against China’s nuclear forces. Versions of this debate have been going on for decades and there is no hard evidence that China’s no-first-use policy has changed (indeed, the existence of the debate is itself evidence that the policy is still in place). But that should not lead U.S. military planners to assume that there is no risk in non-nuclear operations intended to degrade Chinese warfighting capabilities or impose costs on China.

Addressing the Risks
These myths can exacerbate dangerous nuclear dynamics between China and the United States. The belief that China’s no-first-use policy is a sham increases the risk of Washington misidentifying a Chinese signal of resolve as preparations for a nuclear strike. Increased distrust can lead Beijing to wrongly believe that American reconnaissance of its missile forces signals an impending strike against Beijing’s nuclear deterrent. Similarly, the belief that Beijing has hidden away an arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons can increase U.S. anxieties about a possible Chinese nuclear strike.

The myths can also hobble efforts to address more legitimate risks. Many of these risks, particularly those rooted in different perceptions, could be mitigated through formal dialogue. Beijing and Washington can share and refine understandings about escalation dynamics or their aims in a crisis or conflict. But misperception and miscommunication, sometimes rooted in the very myths discussed above, can make it difficult carry out such dialogues. For example, some of these dynamics can be seen in previous Track-1.5 and Track-2 dialogues, where skeptical American participants have presented imaginative hypotheticals to their Chinese counterparts in efforts to determine the bounds of Beijing’s no-first-use policy. Chinese participants may view these hypotheticals not as illustrative thought experiments, but as potential threats, derailing attempts at more substantive discussions.

Perhaps most significantly, a misguided focus on the myths could, perversely, make those myths realities. American concerns about China’s current and future nuclear policies (both real and imagined) can drive the United States to adopt policies which hedge against an uncertain nuclear future, such as developing more robust ballistic missile defenses or fielding more sophisticated counterforce targeting capabilities. Those American actions, in turn, can raise China’s concerns about the survivability of its own nuclear deterrent, making Beijing more likely to adopt the kind of practices the United States fears: fielding a larger and more diverse arsenal, adopting a higher alert status, and adjusting its no-first-use policy

Observers have rightly criticized China’s dismissive response to U.S. arms control overtures, however insincere or misguided those overtures might be viewed in Beijing. But fixating on poorly sourced or unfounded claims makes any dialogue both less likely to occur and less effective if it does happen. There are enough real concerns about China’s nuclear modernization that need to be addressed without being distracted by myths.


David C. Logan is a Ph.D. candidate at Princeton University’s School of Public and International Affairs and an expert consultant at the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, which is part of the National Defense University’s Institute of National Strategic Studies. The views expressed are his own, not those of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.

Image: Official Twitter Account of U.S. Special Presidential Envoy for Arms Control Marshall S. Billingslea


Commentary


 
Top