WAR US to leave troops in Afghanistan beyond May, 9/11 new goal

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jward

passin' thru
J.p. Lawrence
@JpLawrence3

8h

Updates on the withdrawal of US partner countries from Afghanistan.
Norway, Romania, Netherlands left last week.
A UK Puma helicopter returned home.
Also, someone left classified documents about Afghanistan plans from the UK Ministry of Defense at a bus stop.
Links below:
View: https://twitter.com/JpLawrence3/status/1409396937737093124?s=20


"Romania brought back its last military detachment from Afghanistan on Saturday night, June 26. Between February and June 2021, Romania had 600 troops stationed in Afghanistan for the last rotation of the allied forces."
View: https://twitter.com/JpLawrence3/status/1409396940874391554?s=20


"Dutch troops conduct end of mission ceremony in the Netherlands today."
View: https://twitter.com/JpLawrence3/status/1409396943240011776?s=20


"The three Puma helicopters and around 50 personnel from 33 Squadron and 230 Squadron ... that have been serving in Kabul have now returned to the UK. The aircraft were flown from Kabul to RAF Brize Norton on an Antonov AN-225."
View: https://twitter.com/JpLawrence3/status/1409396948742836224?s=20


Story on the soggy documents left at a bus stop with classified plans for the "UK's military footprint in Afghanistan, following the end of Operation Resolute Support." The documents note that any remaining troops would be highly vulnerable.
View: https://twitter.com/JpLawrence3/status/1409396959547379713?s=20
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
I'm glad I kept reading because it looks like for all their faults someone in the Biden Administration has a clue and is looking for places to evacuate former US employees and other US-allied folks and their families to a third country for processing. Even doing that, there will still be a bloodbath after the US finally leaves but if the US does not appear to be doing anything, it will be at least a generation before locals anywhere cooperate with the US in similar situations. That was the case for some time after Vietnam and it will happen again, this time with the internet and social media to keep up the drumbeat of the "The USA will use you and then leave you to die," meme.

That said, my heart goes out to the Afghan people especially anyone unlucky enough to be female in that country and of any age, but it is painfully obvious that no matter what eventually the Taliban is going to take over most of that country for a time.

All we can hope for is that they have learned something in the last 20 years, and also have a better idea of just what the outside world will and will not tolerate after the fall of the official Jihadi/ISIS kingdom.

Things like: open slave markets on youtube are not a good idea, nor is bragging about women's punishment squads even when imposed by other women; these don't play well in the West and are certain to get a lot of unwanted attention (message if you do this, do it quietly - the same is true for buying and selling of young boys).

It will be interesting to see if they try to shut all the girl's schools again and murder women who leave the home with no male family member (even if there isn't one) for any reason? My hunch is that in places where the world can watch they may allow a few very strict girls-only schools that are underfunded and don't teach much and for the elites move to a Saudi-like system of approved "drivers" for women at least of prominent citizens.

Life has never been great for women in most of the country, though it used to be much better for urban women than it has been for the last 25 to 30 years or so. But even rural women used to wear colorful clothing (with headdresses that were lovely), have stalled in the marketplace, and work beside their husbands without fear of abduction and rape.

Those things are unlikely to return under the Taliban, instead, life is going to be very grim and probably for a number of years. But this time if they destroy the women's hospital, there probably won't be any women OBGYN's for them to drag out of their houses and demand they start "saving" their sons when it suddenly dawns on them that no care in pregnancy or while giving birth leads to extremely tragic results and often no paternal legacy for "Dad."

Anyone with any training at all, especially anyone female is likely to flee the country before this Fall if they haven't already and I don't blame them.

But saying all this (and I could write ten more pages) the US simply can't stay there forever in a place even Alexander the Great finally just married into a local clan and let his father-in-law pretend to govern. The Taliban will either end up reorganize to a point that their people can kind of manage to live with it even if they hate it (like Iran) or they will be conquered at least unofficially by a more local power like Turkey or Pakistan. If they are not officially absorbed by a nearby nation, they will effectively become an Economic Dependent of one.

They simply don't do "empire" submission well and they have proved that all the modern technology in the world can't totally control or conquer a place whose geography and culture have made it: "The Graveyard of Empires."

There are reasons the real governmental system there is clan-based and not really well centralized, and that hasn't changed much in the last 3,000 plus years.

It hasn't helped that Bush started this thing as a "manage the threat" scheme followed by Obama and which included turning effectively a blind eye to Pakistani/ISI backing of the Taliban and allowing sanctuaries in Pakistan while ineffectual trying to keep CCP influence in Pakistan in check and failing miserably at it.

The argument that the West couldn't "kill their way" to victory IMHO is a fallacy which the jihadis have proven time again when they apply it. Going in and using the ROE used was a guarantee of this end result, particularly when added to the pursued foreign policy. That being said I'm not advocating a Genghis Khan approach, his track record speaks for itself.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Posted for fair use....

"My Future Is Now." An Afghan Woman from a Threatened Minority Wrestles with What Happens When the U.S. Withdraws

BY KNOX THAMES

JUNE 28, 2021 3:53 PM EDT

Knox Thames served as the State Department Special Advisor for Religious Minorities during both the Obama and Trump administrations. He is writing a book on twenty-first century strategies to combat religious persecution. You can follow him on Twitter.

“I am afraid of the future,” wrote Farkhondeh Akbari, a Hazara university student from Afghanistan.
She has reason to be apprehensive. In the face of steady gains by Taliban forces, a new U.S. intelligence assessment estimates the Afghan government may only last six months after the American military withdrawal. A return to Taliban rule would be disastrous for human rights, impacting hard won gains for women and girls. But it would also place millions of Hazara in jeopardy, an often overlooked and forgotten religious and ethnic minority.

Hazaras have long faced discrimination and persecution in Afghanistan, and a renewed fear grips Farkhondeh’s increasingly victimized and beleaguered community. Hazaras constitute the country’s third-largest ethnic group and largest religious minority community due to their Shia Muslim faith in this Sunni majority country. Their different beliefs and Asiatic features have made them easy targets. The Taliban was their persecutor during their rule. Now the local Islamic State franchise, known as ISIL-Khorasan (ISIL-K), murders.

In early June, for example, terrorists struck a demining charity, but their assault carried a gruesome twist: they methodically killed Hazara Shia. Halo Trust CEO James Cowan told the BBC that ISIS “sought out members of the Hazara community, and then murdered them.” The attack comes just weeks after the May 8th bombing of a Hazara girls school in Kabul, where more than 85 Hazara children died and 150 wounded.

I met many Hazara in Afghanistan and Pakistan while serving as an American diplomat focused on religious minorities. I’ve listened to grown men cry as they described picking up pieces of their friends after a bombing. ISIL-K wants these Shia “heretics” dead. Perhaps surprisingly, Taliban attacks on civilians generally avoid Hazaras, but they are not their protectors. A Taliban spokesman explained their plans to Islamicize the country in their image, while Taliban military gains led a commander to boast, “When we arrive in Kabul, we will arrive as conquerors.”

These are ominous signs for all minorities and human rights advocates in Afghanistan. But for the Hazara and their youth, the stakes surrounding the U.S. withdrawal are existential. The school bombing killing the next generation of educated Hazara leaders will not be the last.

Farkhondeh’s fear for tomorrow is based on memories of the past and the realities of today.
I met Farkhondeh in 2018 when visiting Kabul in the former special envoy role I held during the Obama and Trump administrations. I wanted to hear from Hazara students about the challenges facing their community. Many hailed from the Hazara neighborhood of west Kabul called Dasht-e-Barchi. The enclave had repeatedly experienced ISIS attacks on soft targets such as maternity hospitals, schools, sports centers, and gyms. Despite the violence and government impotence in finding the perpetrators, Hazara have exhibited remarkable restraint. No reprisal attacks. Few join militias. No calls for “jihad” against western military forces.

Why? Hazara remain committed to the idea of a multicultural, democratic Afghanistan at peace with itself. The community, so long repressed, understands education as a form of empowerment and democracy as a pathway to equality. Literacy levels are high, and almost all girls are educated. Election turnout is always amongst the highest in Hazara regions. Hazara can be found in parliament and government.

Since the Taliban’s overthrow, Farkhondeh and other Hazara youth have poured themselves into this vision of a new Afghanistan. She is a success story, earning a spot as a Ph.D. candidate at the Australian National University. But while her future is bright, she does not believe the same for her community.

Farkhondeh and I exchanged emails recently. She had just written her close friend in Kabul who lost all her female family members in the school attack. Farkhondeh characterized the U.S. military withdrawal as “irresponsible and unconditional.” Her overall view is frank and blunt. “America is leaving Afghanistan in chaos, in bloodshed, amid the operation of some twenty terrorist organizations and an emboldened Taliban that are not compromising an inch for power-sharing, for human rights and for the international call to reduce violence.”

She and all Hazaras watch the peace process warily. “The warring parties are not ripe for resolution nor ready for meaningful negotiation to settle the conflict politically.” Her lack of sanguinity is understandable. She shares the community’s deep concern that attacks on Hazaras will continue after any settlement with the Taliban. “There is a perception that Hazaras have stepped out of their historical roles as subordinates and inferior groups, and hence they should be pushed back.”

And her expectation once the U.S. military withdraws? “Even more brutal war.”

What to do? Some will argue no good options exist to help the Hazara. Every idea has a negative side. While active in Afghan politics, the Hazara are not a power block, so they garner little attention. Arming would provide them cache (politically and militarily), but creates new militias and warlords. Fortifying their towns could also create ghettos. Should they decide to flee, the international community cannot absorb 3-5 million more refugees.

The recent G7 communiqué speaks to the future of Afghanistan, with the heads of state declaring their determination to “help the people of Afghanistan, including women, young people and minority groups, as they seek to preserve hard-won rights and freedoms.” For this to be more than mere words, however, policymakers must give greater attention to the plight of the Hazara.

The U.S. and its partners can respond with meaningful steps. Start by recognizing how ISIL attacks the Hazara community because of their religious and ethnic identity. And help the Hazara secure their rights through a specific emphasis at the negotiating table with the Taliban.

Much discussion has rightly focused on allowing Afghani translators who assisted U.S. service members and diplomats to immigrate to America. They helped us, and we should help them. Similarly, the Hazara ardently supported U.S. efforts to create a new Afghanistan, to unwrite Taliban misrule. They invested in Afghanistan thanks to the American security blanket.

Farkhondeh and the Hazara will be a bellwether for what happens next in Afghanistan. As she said, “My future is now. My generation has been investing and preparing to serve in Afghanistan and change the country’s fate for good.”

Yet she fears “each day that ‘future’ is being taken away further from us by violence by actors of the past.” Helping the Hazara secure the future they want—a democratic, rights respecting, multiethnic country—will help Afghanistan achieve the future it so desperately needs.
 

jward

passin' thru
Chargé d’Affaires Ross Wilson
@USAmbKabul

Jun 27

Seeing shocking reports from Andkhoy District of #Faryab. The Taliban’s burning of shops & govt buildings, detaining of people, & destruction of infrastructure & communication networks demonstrates their extremism & their disregard for the human rights of the Afghan people.- IM



Replying to
@USAmbKabul

Still waiting 2 evaluate your agreement w/your, new friends? IF, again IF you really wanted peace, will take you less than 24 hours. Close the terrorist camps in Pakistan, sanction Pakistan, add them 2 the blacklist, End of the story, or else don't shed crocodile tears, please!.

8:20 AM · Jun 27, 2021·Twitter Web App
 

jward

passin' thru
An inside look at the US troop withdrawal from Afghanistan: ABC News exclusive
Luis Martinez, Martha Raddatz

9-11 minutes


ABC News' Martha Raddatz interviews the top general directing the withdrawal.
The top U.S. general directing the full withdrawal of all 2,500 American troops from Afghanistan acknowledged in an exclusive interview with ABC News chief Global Affairs correspondent Martha Raddatz that the security situation in the country is "not good" and that the Taliban's push to seize parts of the country is "concerning."
Gen. Austin Scott Miller said he stands by his belief that there cannot be a military victor in Afghanistan, but he told Raddatz that as the Taliban continues with its military operations across the country, while also engaging in peace talks, "you're starting to create conditions here that doesn't -- won't look good for Afghanistan in the future if there is a push for a military takeover" that could result in a civil war.

"I think what you're seeing -- just if you look at the security situation -- it's not good," Miller told Raddatz. "The Afghans have recognized it's not good. The Taliban are on the move."
Miller explained that while the Taliban are participating in peace talks in Qatar with the government of Afghanistan and expressing sentiments favoring a political settlement "you have an offensive operation going on across the country by the Taliban."
He has previously said neither side can win militarily in Afghanistan.

"I still stand by those words," Miller said. "You're starting to create conditions here that doesn't won't look good for Afghanistan in the future if there is a push for a military takeover.
Miller said "we should be concerned" by reports of increasing Taliban violence as Taliban fighters have seized dozens of Afghan government district centers throughout Afghanistan.
"The loss of terrain and the rapidity of that loss of terrain has to be a concerning one," Miller said, noting that it can lower morale among military forces and civilians. "So as you watch the Taliban moving across the country, what you don't want to have happen is that the people lose hope and they believe they now have a foregone conclusion presented to them."

Miller said Afghanistan's new Defense Minister Bismillah Mohammadi "understands the gravity of the situation" and is moving to strategically consolidate Afghan security forces to maintain the fight against the Taliban and not necessarily defend every district center.
"They're going to need to do that" Miller said, and "they're going to have to choose where they want to fight the Taliban as they continue to move forward."
Miller also said he understood concerns by residents in Kabul that the Taliban would like to attack Afghanistan's capital in the future.

"If you go back to what the Taliban's objectives are, they want to take over and so at some point that implies that at some point they are in Kabul," he said. "And certainly some of them remember what it was like the last time under with the Taliban regime."

Departing Bagram
ABC News accompanied Miller to the sprawling Bagram Air Base located 40 miles east of Kabul that is the main transportation hub for the hundreds of cargo flights that have taken out U.S. military equipment and personnel over the past two months.

"Where we're standing right now is this equipment that's waiting to get on aircraft and that will redeploy from Afghanistan as part of our order in retrograde," Miller told Raddatz, using the military's official term for the full withdrawal.
"What's happening here is also happening at other airfields around the country, particularly in the north," said Miller, who stressed that the objective is for a safe and orderly withdrawal that will protect American and coalition forces as they depart the country.

Ultimately Miller said that the base would be turned over to Afghan security forces, much as is happening with other U.S. inventory in the country.
"The idea is that there is equipment that stays here that supports them, certainly in a strategic airfield," said Miller. "But again, we're looking to make sure that they have the ability to absorb it and secure it as we go forward.
More than half of the U.S. military equipment in Afghanistan has already been shipped out of the country as the U.S. forces quickly move towards pulling out all U.S. troops from Afghanistan by Sept. 11, as ordered by President Joe Biden.

But it appears that the withdrawal could be completed much sooner than that with one U.S. official telling ABC News that it could be completed as soon as July.
The pace of the operations at Bagram has been eye-opening for the experienced logistics officers in charge of the operation.
"It's a little surreal to see things very bare and empty," said Col. Erin Miller, a logistics officer overseeing the withdrawal. "And as we continue to move forward with the retrograde, seeing the equipment leave out, it truly is surreal."

Maintaining security
With all the billions of dollars the United States has invested in training and equipping Afghanistan's security forces, it will be up to them to maintain security.
"What we've said is this is Afghanistan, this is their country," said Miller. "The Afghan security forces have to hold."
The U.S. military will continue to provide Afghan forces with financial support and continued assistance for Afghan air force maintenance crews, but as the U.S. completes its withdrawal, there will not be a physical U.S. military presence in Afghanistan aside from the hundreds of personnel who will be stationed at the U.S. embassy in Kabul.

Americans will also continue to fly "over-the-horizon" reconnaissance missions and counterterrorism missions from countries in the Persian Gulf area focused on al-Qaida and the Islamic State group, not the Taliban.
While the U.S. is continuing to provide defensive airstrikes in support of Afghan ground troops during the withdrawal, U.S. Central Command's Gen. Frank McKenzie has indicated that airstrikes later will only be directed against the two terror groups if they are planning to attack the American homeland or allies.

Miller praised the effectiveness of Afghanistan's Air Force but indicated that the possibility of U.S. defensive airstrikes in the future will continue "to be discussed as we move forward."
"I think we need to see how that how that lands," he told Raddatz.
The withdrawal in Afghanistan after an almost 20-year presence has drawn comparisons to the 2011 U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, which created a security vacuum that led to the rise of ISIS and the eventual return of U.S. forces in 2014.

"Do you think about Iraq when we're leaving here and what happened in Iraq when we left?” Raddatz asked Miller.
“Absolutely, I mean that's on everybody's mind," said Miller. "These are judgments that we have to make balanced against our national interests."

Friends in need
Miller first served in Afghanistan in December, 2001 as a special operations commander and has deployed at least eight other times to Afghanistan, Iraq and other locations.
As he prepares to leave Afghanistan for the final time Miller described mixed feelings both professionally and personally.
"On the professional side, what you're seeing is a -- what I would call -- a historic retrograde being done under at least the threat of conflict," said Miller. "So far, it has not been contested, at least to date. So you see that and you know the goodness that's taking place there, watching our service members as well as our allies doing this as professionally as possible."

He said that after 20 years he has developed friends in Afghanistan, but "I don't like leaving friends in need and I know my friends are in need."
"As we continue to move down the retrograde and withdraw forces, there's less and less I can directly offer them in terms of assistance," he said. "So that's hard."
For example, he said Afghan Defense Minister Mohammadi has asked him occasionally for some type of assistance -- provided in years past -- and "there's points where I have to tell him I won't be able to do that."
"It's a tough, tough business, it is tough," said Miller.

"We knew we were going to have to leave at some point," he continued. " I don't know that you could find a right time, but so know what you are trying to do is, as you depart, ensure that the security assistance that can continue does continue; that you keep those lines open. So even as we discuss -- we call it ‘departure’ -- it doesn't mean a full break of the relationship."
Gen. Haibatullah Alizai, the commander of the Afghan Army's Special Operations Command acknowledged that there will be challenges ahead for Afghanistan's military, but he expressed confidence that his forces and Afghanistan will be able to endure after all U.S. troops have left Afghanistan.

"Absolutely, we will survive," said Alizai. "Afghanistan will survive."
"We have learned a lot from our friends and partners in the last two decades," he said. "Based on those lessons we are going to expand and extend and make our army great to make Afghanistan keep the situation in Afghanistan the same or better than today. "
"I'm really optimistic about this and we are really committed to this fight against terrorism and to keep Afghanistan safe for the future," said Alizai.

Posted for fair use
 

jward

passin' thru
It Was the Best of COIN, It Was the Worst of COIN: A Tale of Two Surges

Mike Nelson | 06.24.21



It Was the Best of COIN, It Was the Worst of COIN: A Tale of Two Surges
As twenty years of counterinsurgent wars come to a close with the impending withdrawal from Afghanistan, the United States is still trying to make sense of why American efforts failed to reduce violence and stabilize the country. This failure is in part due to deliberate decisions made during the surge in Afghanistan, many of which were based on poorly drawn conclusions about what had occurred in Iraq a few years earlier. Scholars and practitioners alike are familiar with the axiom that one should avoid fighting the last war. It should go without saying, then, that one should also avoid trying to fight two distinct, concurrent wars as though they are the same conflict. While there are guiding principles for counterinsurgency, there is simply no one-size-fits-all template for success.

However, heavily relying on methods from a different conflict is roughly what the United States tried to do in Afghanistan in 2009 with the attempt to replicate the apparent successes of the surge in Iraq. The fatal flaw in this plan was predicated on a misunderstanding of the circumstances and the environment that had created the conditions for reduced violence in Iraq. Perhaps most disappointingly, these plans for Afghanistan were made and implemented by some of the same leaders who earned praise for having turned the Iraq War around when it was at its most bleak.

Understanding Iraq
In early 2007, with domestic calls for withdrawal from a deteriorating Iraq steadily growing, the United States instead decided to increase its commitment in hopes of pressuring the insurgency and bringing growing sectarian violence to an end. While these additional forces undoubtedly added capability and provided greater flexibility to commanders in Iraq, the successful reduction in violence and stabilization in Iraq circa 2008–09 caused many to attribute a direct, causal link between these increased forces and subsequent successful counterinsurgency. The truth was that the successes were not a direct result of the additional troops, but rather of second-order effects from their deployment.

This post hoc ergo propter hoc formulation in the minds of many military and political leaders misrepresented the underlying dynamics of the Iraq insurgency and set the stage for future flawed decision making in Afghanistan. This is probably most evident in the fact that the efforts of 2007–08 are most often referred to as “The Surge” (with the focus and attribution of success being on the increased US troop levels) as opposed to the more appropriate name—the Sahwa (Arabic for “awakening”).

The Sunni insurgency in Iraq was, like most insurgencies, a blanket term that encompassed loosely aligned parties with varied motivations and grievances. Some of the earliest elements were committed “former regime elements” hoping to force a US withdrawal and return of Ba’athist control, while others were jihadist extremists—both Iraqi and foreign—who took the opportunity to fight both Americans and Shias as part of a broader global effort. But many, especially after the bombing of Samarra’s al-Askari Mosque in 2006 and subsequent Shia retribution, were Sunnis who felt no choice but to align with insurgent, and even extremist, elements. For these factions, resistance seemed the only way to protect themselves from the Shia-controlled government—a government many Sunnis feared would maltreat and oppress them upon what seemed like the imminent US withdrawal.

The increased US deployments, therefore, had an additional, and far more impactful, effect than just increased combat power. It showed a renewed and undeterred US commitment to the conflict in Iraq. It demonstrated to a large portion of the Sunni population that the United States would not leave them to their fate in an Iraq torn apart by civil war and that, with the United States acting as the honest broker, cooperation with the government of Iraq seemed like a more guaranteed way to provide protection for their families and communities than continued alliance with extremist organizations such as al-Qaeda in Iraq. Coming at a time of discontent with Sunni extremists, which had been growing in Anbar since 2005, many Sunnis saw the increased US commitment as a key opportunity to rethink their calculus. This confluence of factors was the genesis of the Sahwa or “Anbar Awakening.”

The benefit of the Sahwa was not merely removing irregular combatant forces from the insurgency, but having them switch sides entirely. The coalition reached out to these irregular forces and brought them into the fold as semi-legitimate, government-sanctioned entities (under various names from the vague and innocuous “Concerned Local Citizens” to the more patriotic and inspiring “Sons of Iraq”). These organizations were particularly effective in establishing local control, primarily because they already had local control. The coalition did not create new formations to provide security in neighborhoods, villages, and along major roadways; they merely recognized the unofficial, but very real, systems of control that already existed there. Instead of fighting the power dynamics that had formed organically, which local citizens accepted as legitimate, the coalition and government of Iraq absorbed and recognized them. This sudden shift—from local control aligned with the insurgency to local control aligned with the coalition—was a major reason for the successes of 2007–08.

Trying to Re-create a Surge in Afghanistan
By late 2009, violence in the Iraq War, which had been the primary US effort since 2003, had dropped significantly and the Obama administration was turning its focus toward Afghanistan. To helm this effort President Obama appointed General Stanley McChrystal, who had achieved notoriety in Iraq as commander of a special operations task force through the years of hunting al-Qaeda in Iraq. McChrystal recommended a shift in strategy, focused primarily on providing protection to civilians and denying the Taliban control of major population centers. While these were admirable goals and in line with traditional counterinsurgent principles, the mechanism by which McChrystal sought to achieve these prevented the kind of progress that had been achieved a few years earlier in Iraq. In contrast with the Iraq example, which relied on local forces for success, McChrystal sought additional US forces to be the primary action arm in Afghanistan.

To that end, he submitted a report and request for additional forces to President Obama which, as Peter Feaver summarizes, “basically call(ed) for an Iraq-type surge gambit, asking President Obama to do more or less what President Bush did in 2007: (i) change the strategy, (ii) adequately resource the new strategy, and (iii) overcome the strong domestic political opposition to doing (i) and (ii).”

President Obama agreed to a troop increase (albeit at a smaller level than that requested by McChrystal) and announced the beginning of an Afghanistan surge in a speech in December 2009. The speech itself made a direct connection to the perceived relationship between relative troop strengths and the success, or lack thereof, of the two counterinsurgent campaigns the United States had been fighting. “When I took office, we had just over 32,000 Americans serving in Afghanistan, compared to 160,000 in Iraq at the peak of the war. . . . And that’s why, shortly after taking office, I approved a longstanding request for more troops,” he explained. In the same speech, President Obama announced these increased troop levels would end within eighteen months, beginning what was intended to be a complete withdrawal from Afghanistan shortly thereafter.

Therefore, a strategy meant to imitate recent successes in Iraq was almost certainly doomed to failure from its inception, largely because of two critical miscalculations—one political and one operational. The political error was in immediately announcing a timeline for withdrawal, thus demonstrating the opposite of the renewed commitment shown during the Iraq War. The operational error was in planning for US soldiers and Marines to be the primary means by which security would be achieved instead of attempting to work by, with, and through local sources of power, security, and legitimacy. The overly simplified conclusion—more US troops would bring counterinsurgent victory—had glossed over the sequential steps and environmental factors that created a link between committing more troops and achieving success, and instead created a plan in which one was designed to directly achieve the other, and within a limited timeline.

Even the closest attempt at anything Sahwa-like during the surge in Afghanistan, the Village Stability Operations/Afghan Local Police program, was started too late, ended too early, and too burdened by cumbersome Afghan Ministry of the Interior bureaucracy. These forces, while taken from and serving in the local villages, were still reformed into something new. They were not standing militias like, for example, the 1920s Brigade was in Iraq. They never replicated the natural power—and often lacked the tribal history, leadership, and structure—of the Sons of Iraq.
The mistaken conclusions from the Iraq War during the Afghan surge were not limited to strategic-level decision makers. Brigade and battalion commanders, many of whom had cut their teeth in Iraq, tried to use the same tools to achieve success that had worked in previous experiences. The Commander’s Emergency Response Program, which allowed commanders to quickly undertake civil and infrastructure projects, had been a vastly effective game changer in Iraq.

However, these projects in Iraq were often designed to rebuild infrastructure that had been damaged or disrupted during the invasion or subsequent fighting. In other words, these projects helped return a relatively modern and expected standard of living and reduce grievances that fueled the insurgency. Meanwhile, in Afghanistan, these projects often were used to create new infrastructure, much of which was of marginal utility to a populace who had never had it and therefore did not miss it, and usually did not think the new projects were worth the Taliban retribution they often attracted. These projects had vastly diminished returns in Afghanistan and were another example of Americans falling back on what they felt were tried and true tools in their proverbial kit bags, not in the context of what the Afghan environment required.

The Enduring Legacy from Flawed Decisions
In hindsight, the Afghan surge did not achieve its stated goals, and the war in Afghanistan continues to this day as the United States prepares for withdrawal later this year. For most of the Afghan surge, the United States focused on conducting counterinsurgency directly by US troops or through corrupt, inefficient, and burdensome Afghan government structures that had developed over the previous decade. For much of the war, the focus was distracted from addressing underlying grievances that allowed the insurgency to flourish. Instead, many leaders focused on direct kinetic effects against insurgents, or on measures of performance in nation-building projects, without regard to those projects’ measures of effectiveness.

Likewise, there was a sad epilogue in Iraq, in large part because of a failure to understand the causes of one-time successes there. The fear of US abandonment to Shia retribution, which had fueled the insurgency prior to 2007, came to fruition after the Iraqi election of 2010. Despite receiving a minority of the parliamentary seats, a somewhat paranoid Nouri al-Maliki formed a governing coalition with the more extreme and Iranian-backed wings of Iraqi politics, with the backing and endorsement of the US government. After US withdrawal from Iraq in 2011, Maliki and his allies used the levers of state power to punish and oppress his Sunni rivals, which proved to be a key factor in the rise of ISIS. The US experience in Iraq is further evidence that, while militaries can achieve tactical or operational successes in a counterinsurgency campaign, the ultimate success or failure hinges on an acceptable political settlement.

All warfare is political, and all warfare shifts on human decisions made in complex circumstances. But this is doubly true of counterinsurgent warfare. It is a complicated endeavor that requires deft understanding of the motivations and goals of multiple actors. America’s mistake, in two theaters, was in trying to reduce one of the more complex forms of conflict into something simple, uniform, and replicable without regard to the environment. While the United States should not shy away from studying, determining principles of, developing doctrine for, and preparing to conduct counterinsurgency, we must remember that these guidelines are only as good as the means by which they are adapted to the fight at hand.

Lieutenant Colonel Michael D. Nelson is an Army Special Forces officer and veteran of Operations Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom, and Inherent Resolve, including as an ODA commander in Iraq during the Sahwa and as part of a special operations task force during the Afghan surge. He is a visiting fellow at the National Security Institute at George Mason University’s Antonin Scalia Law School.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.


Image credit: Senior Airman Eric Harris, US Air Force
 

jward

passin' thru
continued, comments below:

Mark McDaniel on 06.25.21 at 7:44 am

So many “Mis-learnings” from the Iraq Surge Era. This article sets many of them straight. Unfortunate that the centrality of the Sahwa to the Iraq turnaround hasn’t penetrated institutional knowledge more deeply than it has.


B.C. on 06.25.21 at 12:43 pm

Whether we are talking about the U.S./the West's efforts, of late, to alter the way of life, the way of governance, the values, etc., of states and societies in the U.S./the West itself — and/or those of states and societies elsewhere throughout the world, for example, in Iraq and Afghanistan today —

Whether we are talking about either or both of these such U.S./the West's efforts, what we must come to understand is that – in all such instances — the "transformative"/"modernizing" actions being undertaken by the U.S./the West today, these constitute:
a. Not so much "counterinsurgency" but, rather,
b. "Revolutionary warfare."
This understanding allowing that we might likewise come to understand that the "countering" actions being undertaken by our opponents today — those both here at home in the U.S./the West and/or there abroad in places such as Iraq and Afghanistan — these such "countering" actions constitute:

a. Not so much "insurgency" but, rather,
b. "Resistance warfare."
From Kilcullen's "Counterinsurgency Redux:"
"Similarly, in classical theory, the insurgent initiates. Thus, Galula asserts that ‘whereas in conventional war, either side can initiate the conflict, only one – the insurgent – can initiate a revolutionary war, for counter-insurgency is only an effect of insurgency’. Classical theorists therefore emphasise the problem of recognising insurgency early. Thompson observes that ‘at the first signs of an incipient insurgency … no one likes to admit that anything is going wrong. This automatically leads to a situation where government countermeasures are too little and too late.’ But, in several modern campaigns – Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Chechnya, for example – the government or invading coalition forces initiated the campaign, whereas insurgents are strategically reactive (as in ‘resistance warfare’). Such patterns are readily recognisable in historical examples of resistance warfare, but less so in classical counter-insurgency theory.

Politically, in many cases today, the counter-insurgent represents revolutionary change, while the insurgent fights to preserve the status quo of ungoverned spaces, or to repel an occupier – a political relationship opposite to that envisaged in classical counter-insurgency. Pakistan's campaign in Waziristan since 2003 exemplifies this. The enemy includes al-Qaeda-linked extremists and Taliban, but also local tribesmen fighting to preserve their traditional culture against twenty-first-century encroachment. The problem of weaning these fighters away from extremist sponsors, while simultaneously supporting modernisation, does somewhat resemble pacification in traditional counter-insurgency. But it also echoes colonial campaigns, and includes entirely new elements arising from the effects of globalisation.

Bottom Line Thought — Based on the Above:
If we were to look at this sentence from last paragraph of my quoted item above:
"The enemy includes al-Qaeda-linked extremists and Taliban, but also local tribesmen fighting to preserve their traditional culture against twenty-first-century encroachment."

And if we were to change this sentence to reflect U.S./Western difficulties here at home today:
"The enemy includes Right-Wing extremists but also other local population groups fighting to preserve their traditional culture against twenty-first-century encroachments,"
Then would this help us to both understand — and to agree with — Kilcullen's "revolutionary warfare" and "resistance warfare" thesis above?

TrustbutVerify on 06.28.21 at 8:49 am
Your problem would be, first, identifying American citizens in a Constitutional Republic requesting redress of grievances as "the enemy" and the second would be calling them "Right Wing Extremists". Perhaps, rather, the "extremists" are those who have an avowed aim of "fundamentally transforming" the Constitutional Republic into a different, socialist entity? You know, those "initiating revolution" or "resistance" (which you might recognize) who are the "insurgents". So I think your own ideology has led you to misidentify and mischaracterize the players in our own political sphere.

As to the Middle East, as shown in Iraq it is always the "strongest horse" that gets support. We are also working against the meme of the last 40 years that we will cut and run if you just make it painful enough. To paraphrase Grant on Lee, "It is time to stop worrying about what pain they are going to cause and let them worry about what we are going to do". Per our lesson, seize the initiative rather than ceding it to the enemy. As pointed out in the article, Obama was working at cross purposes from the beginning so no wonder the strategy was weak and muddled.
One thing that is elided here, though, is the power of money. We BOUGHT many of those Sunni tribes in Anbar. By taking over as their source of income, we became their "allies" because they saw 1) a way to get more and 2) a way to get us to leave (which is what we were trying to get them to realize – "you settle down and we have no reason to stay and then you can do what you want as long as you don't attack anyone").

In Afghanistan, their chief source of income is the heroin from growing poppies – not just bakshish or Diya – so that is the income source we were trying to replace with the tribes and the base of their "loyalty" and survival. We tried to interdict this trade and shift the economy away from illicit drugs – so it wasn't only the Taliban or ISI or anybody we were fighting politically or ideologically, it was the criminals in EACH of them (along with Russia, China and everywhere else) that were in the heroin business and pumping funds into the enemy to KEEP Afghanistan as open and lawless as possible so they could operate their drug trade. That this made things difficult for us was just a side benefit to the criminals, but the Russians and Chinese (working with elements of the Pakistan ISI) WANTED to keep us there to bleed resources and keep our eye OFF the ball elsewhere (some mischief and some real strategy).

So let's not act like either of these were simple or, as covered, provide any OTHER lesson than, perhaps, we need to prove to people (again, as they learned in WWII) that the price upfront for messing with us is too high to bring down on you and your group/country and that, if you do, the pain will not only be high but enduring as we will see the fight through to the end. They have to believe this, not us…and that requires lessons, too.


B.C. on 06.28.21 at 1:03 pm


Indeed, Kilcullen, in his "Counterinsurgency Redux" above, seems to take great pains; this, to tell us that he does, indeed, believe that:
a. It is governments today who are the actual insurgents; this, given that it is governments today who he sees as the ones engaged in "revolutionary" activities, for example, activities designed to advance the political, economic, social and/value "changes" necessary for (a) globalization and thus necessary for (b) national security. And that, accordingly,
b. It is the more-conservative/the more-traditional, the more-no-change (and/or reverse unwanted change) elements within various states and societies today who — because they oppose these such government "change" initiatives — are now considered to be (a) the actual "counter-insurgents" and, thus in this such context, (b) "the enemy."

Below are some examples of the rationale that governments use today (in this case, the rationale of the element of the United States government known as the U.S. Supreme Court); this, for governments making arguments that (a) the political, economic, social and/or value changes they believe they must support and undertake make, these are (b) necessary for national security.

((These quoted matters were taken from the Catholic University of America paper: "Moral Communities or a Market State," by Antonio F. Perez and Robert J. Delahunty.)
"In taking this course, the Court has increasingly aligned itself with the prescriptive views of American business and political elites, for whom globalization is understood 'not merely [as] a diagnostic tool but also [as] an action program.' From this perspective, globalization 'represents a great virtue: the transcendence of the traditional restrictions on worldwide economic activity.., inherent' in the era of Nation States. Proponents of this vision of a globalized economy characterize the United States as 'a giant corporation locked in a fierce competitive struggle with other nations for economic survival,' so that 'the central task of the federal government' is 'to increase the international competitiveness of the American economy'."

(As to this first quoted item, see Page 643 of the referenced Catholic University of America paper above; therein, see the paragraph which starts with "We agree with Bobbitt that a global transition from Nation States to Market States is now well underway.")
“Major American businesses have made clear that the skills needed in today’s increasingly global marketplace can only be developed through exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints. What is more, high-ranking retired officers and civilian leaders of the United States military assert that ‘[based on their] decades of experience,’ a ‘highly qualified, racially diverse officer corps … is essential to the military’s ability to fulfill its principle mission to provide national security.’ …”

“In short, the Court based its constitutional reasoning on the contention of a group of the Nation’s key corporate, political, and military leaders that the Nation’s prospects of success in the face of international strategic threats, as well as continued stability and perceived legitimacy in its domestic political institutions, required racial preferences in elite formation through our major educational institutions.”
(As to this second quoted item above, see the bottom of Page 698 and and the top of Page 699 of the referenced paper.)

Bottom Line Thought — Based on the Above:
We should not be surprised by the fact that — throughout latter history — (a) those who oppose government-sponsored political, economic, social and/or value "change" initiatives; these can be (b) seen as "the enemy;"
This, given that the demands of capitalism — are various times like today — places the more-traditional, the more-conservative, the more-no-change (and/or reverse unwanted change) elements of states and societies IN THIS EXACT SUCH POSITION?:

“Capitalism is the most successful wealth-creating economic system that the world has ever known; no other system, as the distinguished economist Joseph Schumpeter pointed out, has benefited ‘the common people’ as much. Capitalism, he observed, creates wealth through advancing continuously to every higher levels of productivity and technological sophistication; this process requires that the ‘old’ be destroyed before the ‘new’ can take over. … This process of ‘creative destruction,’ to use Schumpeter’s term, produces many winners but also many losers, at least in the short term, and poses a serious threat to traditional social values, beliefs, and institutions.”
(From the book “The Challenge of the Global Capitalism: The World Economy in the 21st Century,” by Robert Gilpin, see the Introduction.)


B.C. on 06.25.21 at 12:52 pm

Addendum to my comment above:
The following quoted items, taken from the first two paragraphs of Sir Adam Roberts 2006 “Transformative Military Occupations: Applying the Laws of War and Human Rights;” these also may support Kilcullen's "revolutionary warfare" and "resistance" warfare thesis above:

“Within the existing framework of international law, is it legitimate for an occupying power, in the name of creating the conditions for a more democratic and peaceful state, to introduce fundamental changes in the constitutional, social, economic, and legal order within an occupied territory?" …
These questions have arisen in various conflicts and occupations since 1945 — including the tragic situation in Iraq since the United States–led invasion of March–April 2003." …

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jward

passin' thru
..yeah, occasionally more than one a day iirc : (
I started to say "it's a shame" but it's far more than that-
"some people need killin'" probably comes closer to the
truth, at least, the truth of how I "feel". :shk:

Daughter, who was there in 16-17, said now that almost a province a day is falling to the Taliban.
 

jward

passin' thru
Security in Afghanistan Is Decaying, U.S. General Says as Forces Leave
“Civil war is certainly a path that can be visualized,” said Gen. Austin S. Miller, commander of the U.S.-led forces. “That should be a concern for the world.”




Afghan forces flying over Helmand Province in May in Afghanistan.

Afghan forces flying over Helmand Province in May in Afghanistan.Credit...Jim Huylebroek for The New York Times
Thomas Gibbons-Neff Eric Schmitt
By Thomas Gibbons-Neff and Eric Schmitt
June 29, 2021Updated 5:17 p.m. ET

KABUL, Afghanistan — The commander of the U.S.-led mission in Afghanistan warned on Tuesday that the country could be on a path to chaotic civil war as American and other international troops prepare to leave in the coming weeks.
His assessment, in a rare news conference at the headquarters of U.S. and NATO command in Kabul, will likely be one of the last publicly delivered by an American four-star general in Afghanistan, where recent events have included a Taliban offensive that has seized around 100 district centers, left dozens of civilians wounded and killed, and displaced thousands more.

“Civil war is certainly a path that can be visualized if it continues on the trajectory it’s on,” the commander, Gen. Austin S. Miller, told reporters during the news conference. “That should be a concern for the world.”
With some intelligence estimates saying that the Afghan government could fall in six months to two years after a final American withdrawal, General Miller’s comments were a window into recent tension between the White House and the Pentagon.

For months, Pentagon leaders argued for some sort of lasting American military presence in Afghanistan, citing counterterrorism concerns and the need to provide a check on the Taliban’s advance. President Biden’s response, in April, was final: All American forces except for an embassy garrison will be gone by Sept. 11.
Speaking from a garden adjacent to the circle of flagpoles that once displayed the flags of the 36 countries that contributed to the U.S.-led NATO mission — now reduced to Turkey, Britain and the United States — General Miller said the troop withdrawal was reaching a point where he would soon end his command, which began in September 2018, and in turn, say goodbye to Afghanistan.

“From a military standpoint it’s going very well,” General Miller said of the U.S. withdrawal. He did not offer a timeline for when the withdrawal will be complete. The Taliban, for the most part, have not attacked U.S. or international forces as they have departed, instead focusing the brunt of the violence on the Afghanistan security forces and the civilians caught in the crossfire.
What U.S. forces remain are spread between Kabul and Bagram Air Base, the sprawling base that was once home to thousands of troops and contractors. Bagram is now the final gateway for moving out what troops and equipment remain in the country.

Image
“Civil war is certainly a path that can be visualized,” Gen. Austin S. Miller, commander of the U.S.-led mission in Afghanistan, told reporters on Tuesday. Credit...Ahmad Seir/Associated Press
The NATO headquarters, soon to become part of the U.S. Embassy compound, was quiet Tuesday. The Georgian guards who had manned its perimeter were gone, replaced by U.S. Embassy security. The interior, a web of protective cement barriers, barracks and offices, felt much like an empty home.
Roughly 650 U.S. troops are expected to remain in the country to provide security for diplomats, American officials said last week.

The U.S. military inches closer to the exit, but it is still providing what support it can to the Afghan security forces — flying jets from the aircraft carrier Eisenhower, recently replaced by the Reagan, over Afghanistan to drop airstrikes on Taliban fighters as Afghan security have found themselves under siege.
But with much of the high-tech American communications equipment gone, in at least one instance those jets were unable to communicate properly to carry out an airstrike on Taliban positions and had to pass the attack off to an armed drone, said one military official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive matters. Currently much of the air support over Afghanistan has already been moved out of the country.
But what the Americans are doing in Afghanistan becomes less relevant by the day as their presence in the country shrinks, and with it their capacity to affect what happens on the battlefield.

The United States has spent billions of dollars propping up Afghan security forces, but it remains unresolved whether it will continue to provide those forces with air support after Sept. 11, when American troops are withdrawn.
The United States currently has “the ability to support Afghan security forces when attacked,” General Miller said. “That exists today, and I don’t want to speculate what that looks like in the future.”
U.S. airstrikes, targeting groups of Taliban fighters following their recent offensive in the country’s north, have drawn outrage from the Taliban but little else as their fighters continue to take territory daily. The insurgent group has taken dozens of districts in past weeks — sometimes through military means and at others by exploiting local divisions along with mediation with local officials.
Afghan forces have managed to retake several districts, but nothing on the scale of their insurgent foes.

Taliban fighters in an area controlled by the group in the Laghman province last year.Credit...Jim Huylebroek for The New York Times
“What we’re seeing is the rapid loss of district centers,” General Miller said, adding that he had passed his advice — to pull security forces back to defend key areas such as big cities — on to Afghan leaders.
This domino effect of falling districts has only served to demoralize the Afghan security forces, who have watched some of their comrades surrender, forfeiting their vehicles and equipment to an increasingly triumphant Taliban. In recent days, the fighting had reached roughly 60 miles away from Kabul, the country’s capital.

To bolster the depleted government forces, militias — some long on the government’s payroll — have gained new prominence, a distinct echo of the civil war in the 1990s when warlords and their fiefs of armed men harassed and taxed residents to the point where the Taliban’s rise was welcome in broad areas of the country. Both President Ashraf Ghani and his newly appointed defense minister have made comments that seemed to welcome the resurgence of such groups.
The militias’ efficacy on the battlefield is questionable, but the government will continue to back their rise because “it will bleed the Taliban by a thousand cuts,” said Ibraheem Bahiss, a consultant with International Crisis Group and independent research analyst.

Abdullah Abdullah, the top Afghan official leading continuing peace talks in Qatar, has been oblique about whether he supported the militias, saying in a recent interview only that they need to be in direct coordination with the security services to avoid any fracturing.
The Biden administration has pledged to provide Mr. Ghani with financial support. That includes $266 million in humanitarian aid and $3.3 billion in security assistance, as well as three million doses of the Johnson & Johnson coronavirus vaccine and oxygen supplies.

Security forces on a road in Kabul earlier this year. The United States has spent billions of dollars propping up the Afghan security forces.Credit...Jim Huylebroek for The New York Times
Still, Mr. Biden’s message in his meetings with the Afghan leaders was clear: The U.S. military was leaving.
NATO and the U.S. military will also continue to assist the Afghan security forces with training and logistics from outside the country.
“Afghans are going to have to decide their future, what they want,” Mr. Biden said at the White House. “The senseless violence has to stop.”

But the violence is unlikely to come to a halt anytime soon. Peace talks in Doha between the Afghan government and the Taliban that began in September have all but stalled, and with the insurgents’ gains on the battlefield, the Taliban is increasingly likely to only settle for an outright military victory.
Speaking to reporters in Washington hours after General Miller’s remarks, the Pentagon spokesman, John F. Kirby, deflected questions on the precise timing of the final withdrawal of American forces — officials have previously said early to mid-July — and on how the Pentagon and Biden administration would mark that occasion.

No senior Pentagon officials are expected to visit Afghanistan as the last troops leave. And it is unclear what kind of official homecoming ceremonies — if any — the last returning troops and their commanders, including General Miller, will receive.
“We’re all mindful, all of us here, of the fact that this war is now two decades on, and is coming to a close, and of our responsibility to communicate the closure of that to you and to the American people and we will do that,” Mr. Kirby said.
“We will find a way to mark it officially,” he added, “and to state it unequivocally for the American people at the right time and in an appropriate way.”

Eric Schmitt reported from Washington.
 

jward

passin' thru
Turkey and US nearing deal on Kabul airport mission
By Ragip Soylu , Levent Kemal in Ankara

6-7 minutes


Turkish and US officials are getting close to a technical agreement over securing Kabul airport after Nato's withdrawal. But a small disagreement on Turkey's possible role in providing security outside the facility is remaining, two people familiar with the issue told Middle East Eye.
A US technical delegation visited Ankara last week and held consultations with officials from the foreign ministry, defence ministry and intelligence to draft a framework for the Turkish presence in Kabul airport, whose accessibility is crucial for the foreign missions, aid groups and the Afghan government.

Afghanistan: Why Turkey wants to partner with Hungary to protect Kabul airport

Read More »
Presidents Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Joe Biden reached a verbal agreement earlier this month that would see Turkey take over the airport's security after the vast majority of Nato forces pull out of Afghanistan, which is expected to be completed in mid-July. Erdogan asked for financial and logistical aid, as well as assistance from partner countries.

The Turkish military has been guarding the airport since 2013, alongside the US, Hungary, France and other Nato allies.
The airport is a lifeline to the Afghan government, which has suffered several huge setbacks against the Taliban in major districts, prompting a US intelligence report that said the administration could totally collapse six months after Nato's withdrawal.
Two people familiar with the issue, who spoke on condition of anonymity due to the sensitivity of the subject, told MEE that Turkish and US delegations reached a mutual understanding on the following issues:
  • The US will provide military and intelligence support to Turkish forces
  • The US and Nato will undertake the financial burden for the operation
  • Turkey will be able to ask for additional military help if it is needed
  • Turkey won't take on any combat mission outside the airport
  • Turkey will be able to get any foreign partners it wants and Ankara will be permitted to deploy domestic security advisers to the Afghan government.
A Nato communique promised to maintain funding for securing the airport earlier this month, meeting a Turkish condition, but Ankara has also been seeking the deployment of drones, defensive equipment and troops from other allied countries.
The sources said, as reported last week by the Associated Press citing US officials, that Washington had agreed to leave behind a counter-rocket, artillery, mortar (C-RAM) system, which has a capability that the Turkish military lacks, to counter Taliban mortar or rocket attacks. The Pentagon would also leave a few US troops at the airport to operate the system and aircrew for helicopter support.

One area of disagreement between Turkey and the US had been guarding the diplomatic convoys shuttling between the foreign missions and the airport. The sources suggested that Turkey refused to provide security for the convoys alone, but was likely to take on the task if other countries such as the US were to share the burden.
The Associated Press reported that the US was expected to keep roughly 650 US troops in Kabul to provide security for American diplomats and the airport.

Boots on the ground
It is estimated that around 500 Turkish troops and 200 technical personnel will remain in Afghanistan, which could be enough for Ankara to take part in missions to protect the diplomatic convoys. Turkish Defence Minister Hulusi Akar last week said in televised remarks that Ankara, "for now", didn't need to send additional troops to Afghanistan.

The sources told MEE that Ankara was willing to deploy domestic security advisers to work with the Afghan government to contribute to the general peace and security of Kabul, which is marred by attacks, mostly suicide bombings, suspected to have been undertaken by the Taliban.
“The consultations have been generally positive. We will continue to hold discussions on the issue,” one Turkish official told MEE.

Even though Turkey has had a close relationship with Afghanistan since the late Ottoman Empire, the Taliban has been outspoken against an enduring Turkish presence in Kabul ever since the possibility was first raised by the US government, warning Ankara not to make a “big mistake”.
'The consultations have been generally positive. We will continue to hold discussions on the issue'
- Turkish official
The Taliban has largely avoided hitting Turkish troops since the Nato intervention began in 2001.
Turkey's government sees an opportunity in Afghanistan to repair its broken relationship with Washington, which is at odds with Ankara over the purchase of Russian-made S-400 missile systems and elements of its foreign policy.
A Washington source last week told MEE that Erdogan had been hoping for favours from the US in return for taking on the Kabul mission.

“It is true that Turkey always had a historic and friendly relationship with Afghanistan,” the source said. “Yet in return, Ankara wants solid concessions from Washington, including on the issue of S-400s.”
Erdogan said earlier this month that Turkey could guard the airport with troops from Hungary and Pakistan. For many, Pakistan sounded like a reasonable partner. Islamabad has a longstanding relationship with the Taliban, as a neighbouring country. But Hungary came as a big surprise.

Two sources familiar with the issue said Hungary itself expressed a willingness to take part in the mission, floating the idea in a meeting between Erdogan and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban on the sidelines of a Nato summit earlier this month.
The Turkish official said the US and Turkey were still working on the possible partners and there had been no final decision made on the issue.
 

jward

passin' thru
Resistance Axis Monitor

@MonitorAxis


In interview on state TV, Hesam Razavi, director of IRGC-linked Tasnim News foreign offices section, says that there's no "war between Shiite and Taliban in Afghanistan," but that US wants to set the seeds for conflict after withdrawal by arming Afghan Shiites to fight Taliban.
View: https://twitter.com/MonitorAxis/status/1410273323506966529?s=20

Razavi declared that if "sectarian warfare happens in Afghanistan between Shiite and Sunni, the first country that will certainly be at the tip of the spear would be the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Islamic Republic cannot be silent about Afghanistan."
Hardline daily Kayhan in its report on Taliban progress has stated that "the Taliban of today is different than the Taliban of before that used to chop off heads. There's no reports of horrific crimes like ISIS in their recent advances."
On other hand, editorial in hardline Raja News stated that "Shiites for Taliban are political obstacles b/c they do not accompany the Taliban," adding Tehran's insistence that "Taliban does not kill Shiites" would stoke sectarian tension and perception of deep Iran-Taliban ties.
 

jward

passin' thru
Aditya Raj Kaul
@AdityaRajKaul


#BREAKING: India issues security advisory for Indian nationals in Afghanistan. Strongly advises to avoid all types of non essential movements. Indian nationals advised to exercise utmost vigilance and caution with regard to security at work place, residence and movement to work.
1625085950990.png
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
The John Batchelor Show



1/4 Thomas Joscelyn, FDD, @ThomasJoscelyn, @LongWarJournal ; @BillRoggio @FDD @LongWarJournal

Jun 28, 7:12 PM

The John Batchelor Show



2/4 Thomas Joscelyn, FDD, @ThomasJoscelyn, @LongWarJournal ; @BillRoggio @FDD @LongWarJournal

Jun 28, 7:12 PM

Photo: Taliban control in Afghanistan. "In the six weeks since the May 1 deadline for U.S. troops to withdraw from Afghanistan, the Taliban has seized control of 32 additional districts, their reach spanning half of the country’s 34 provinces. The Afghan government has been unable to regain control in any of the 32 districts."



The John Batchelor Show



3/4 Thomas Joscelyn, FDD, @ThomasJoscelyn, @LongWarJournal ; @BillRoggio @FDD @LongWarJournal

Jun 28, 7:13 PM
The hosts Bill Roggio and Tom Joscelyn discuss the Taliban’s massive offensive in Afghanistan. The campaign demonstrates, once again, that the “peace process” is a Western delusion. They also discuss how Bill’s map of the Taliban’s gains has evolved over time.


The John Batchelor Show



4/4 Thomas Joscelyn, FDD, @ThomasJoscelyn, @LongWarJournal ; @BillRoggio @FDD @LongWarJournal

Jun 28, 7:13 PM
The first victim of a child soldier—childhood

Qassam Brigades announces military training camp for children and teenagers from Gaza. . . . The children, often referred to as ‘Qassam cubs,’ are trained in the use of firearms, educated in Hamas doctrine and learn guerrilla warfare.

 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Posted for fair use.....


Where does the withdrawal of US and allied forces leave Afghanistan?

1 Jul 2021 | Amin Saikal

As the US and allied military exit gathers pace, war-torn and Covid-19 ravaged Afghanistan faces a multifaceted transition. The country is once again positioned to embrace a political, economic and security transformation of a magnitude that could seriously impact its survival as a defendable functioning state. The US and its allies have promised to continue their non-combat support, including funding the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF). But this can’t be taken for granted. Afghanistan stands to experience more violent, murky and uncertain times ahead. The direction the country will take after 11 September 2021 will depend on whether its conflict is resolved on the battlefield or through a negotiated settlement.

Afghanistan could follow one of three directions. The first is that it stays on its current course of conflict for some time, with a chaotic and divided system of governance remaining in place in Kabul. This would be contingent on two important imperatives: that the ANDSF remains coherent and effective, and that the US fulfils its promise to meet US$3.3 billion out of the ANDSF’s US$4-plus billion in annual funding and backs with air power the ANDSF’s defensive operations whenever Kabul or another major city is at risk of falling to the Taliban. Even so, as suggested by American intelligence, the weak, divided and kleptocratic Kabul government may not last for more than six months to two years. The expectation is that this buffer would compel the Taliban and their Pakistani backers to become more serious about a political settlement.

The second option points to the possibility of the government in Kabul collapsing sooner under the weight of both the ANDSF disintegrating and the Taliban rapidly advancing towards choking the major cities to surrender. The ANDSF is composed of personnel from various Afghan micro-societies, with a sense of loyalty to their ethnic and tribal stratum. Some have already defected or surrendered to the Taliban with their weapons. Meanwhile, the Taliban have lately made rapid territorial gains, taking over district after district across the country.

If the Taliban take power in Kabul, they are expected to rename the country as the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and establish a strict theocratic order, more or less similar to what they had instituted during their previous rule (1996–2001).

However, the Taliban wouldn’t find it easy in any way to impose their writ across the country. The militia isn’t very popular, and its appeal doesn’t cut across numerous political and social cleavages in the country. Localised or regionalised deterrence forces have already started consolidating to fight it. The situation could descend into a devastating, multi-layered civil war, with Afghanistan’s neighbours and other regional actors scrambling for influence by backing different groups, as happened when the Taliban ruled.

It’s important to bear in mind that the Afghanistan conflict has been deeply entangled with many regional and extra-regional problems, including the Indo-Pakistan dispute, Pakistani–Saudi close relations, China–Pakistan strategic ties, Saudi–Iranian rivalry, Iranian–Pakistani distrust, as well as US–Russia and US–China contentions. General Austin Miller, commander of the US-led forces in Afghanistan, has said that ‘civil war is certainly a path that can be visualised … which should be a concern for the world’.

The third option is a negotiated political settlement for power-sharing governance and a transition to a general election for a popularly mandated government within a couple of years. Such a settlement can only work if it has the support of a cross-section of Afghanistan’s mosaic population and regional actors as well as the permanent members of the UN Security Council. Yet, the prevailing situation doesn’t inspire much confidence in this respect. The Doha peace process is stalled. The Taliban are enormously emboldened by their February 2020 peace agreement with the US, involving a ceasefire only with American and allied forces, and no political settlement, as well as by the total withdrawal of foreign forces by September. They have reasons not to be interested in a political settlement; they have already declared victory against the US and NATO and can see the trophy of power within their sights after two decades of fighting.

A Taliban triumph would also mean a boost for al-Qaeda, with which, according to UN reports, the militia still maintains close ties. If the key American and allied objective was to defeat the Taliban and al-Qaeda, whose 9/11 attacks triggered the US-led intervention, they can’t possibly claim to have succeeded.

At this stage, it’s hard to be optimistic about the chances of a settlement, as it may be too late. This is not to say, however, that urgent efforts shouldn’t be made by Afghan leaders within a framework of national unity and salvation, backed by the international community, to persuasively cajole the Taliban and their Pakistani sponsors to compromise in support of saving Afghanistan from more disaster. It is very disappointing to see that the leaders in Kabul are still divided, bickering over the formation of a state supreme council with the necessary executive power to make collective decisions about how to stymie the tide of the Taliban advances and give some certainty to the Afghan people about their future.

The current situation has already instilled panic and fear among citizens within the pervasive environment of violence and insecurity, causing an outflow of much-needed skilled workers and capital. Most people feel that they are caught between the self-centred and self-concerned leaders in Kabul and the very real prospects for the return of the Taliban to power. The threat posed by a Taliban return extends to fears that they will reimpose their discriminatory and brutal theocratic order, thus limiting the rights not only of women but of all citizens in general to a dignified and progressive life.

Yet, the only political settlement that might have a chance of success is one within a paradigm of interlocking national, regional and international consensus and enforceable by the UN Security Council. Failure to reach such a political resolution of the crisis should weigh heavily on Afghanistan’s leaders and the US and its allies.

Author
Amin Saikal is adjunct professor of social sciences at the University of Western Australia and author of Modern Afghanistan: a history of struggle and survival. Image: US Department of Defense.

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jward

passin' thru
US hands Bagram Airfield to Afghans after nearly 20 years
By KATHY GANNON

6-7 minutes


KABUL, Afghanistan (AP) — After nearly 20 years, the U.S. military left Bagram Airfield, the epicenter of its war to oust the Taliban and hunt down the al-Qaida perpetrators of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on America, two U.S. officials said Friday.
The airfield was handed over to the Afghan National Security and Defense Force in its entirety, they said on condition they not be identified because they were not authorized to release the information to the media.
One of the officials also said the U.S. top commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Austin S. Miller, “still retains all the capabilities and authorities to protect the forces.”

Afghanistan’s district administrator for Bagram, Darwaish Raufi, said the American departure was done overnight without any coordination with local officials, and as a result early Friday dozens of local looters stormed through the unprotected gates before Afghan forces regained control.
“They were stopped and some have been arrested and the rest have been cleared from the base,” Raufi told The Associated Press, adding that the looters ransacked several buildings before being arrested and the Afghan National Security and Defense Forces (ANDSF) took control.
“Unfortunately the Americans left without any coordination with Bagram district officials or the governor’s office,” Raufi said. “Right now our Afghan security forces are in control both inside and outside of the base.”
The deputy spokesman for the defense minister, Fawad Aman, said nothing of the early morning looting. He said only the base has been handed over and the “ANDSF will protect the base and use it to combat terrorism.”
The withdrawal from Bagram Airfield is the clearest indication that the last of the 2,500-3,500 U.S. troops have left Afghanistan or are nearing a departure, months ahead of President Joe Biden’s promise that they would be gone by Sept. 11.

It was clear soon after the mid-April announcement that the U.S. was ending its “forever war,” that the departure of U.S. soldiers and their estimated 7,000 NATO allies would be nearer to July 4, when America celebrates its Independence Day.
Most NATO soldiers have already quietly exited as of this week. Announcements from several countries analyzed by The Associated Press show that a majority of European troops has now left with little ceremony — a stark contrast to the dramatic and public show of force and unity when NATO allies lined up to back the U.S. invasion in 2001.

The U.S. has refused to say when the last U.S. soldier would leave Afghanistan, citing security concerns, but also the protection of Kabul’s Hamid Karzai International Airport is still being negotiated. Turkish and U.S. soldiers currently are protecting the airport. That protection is currently covered under the Resolute Support Mission, which is the military mission being wound down.
Until a new agreement for the airport’s protection is negotiated between Turkey and the Afghan government, and possibly the United States, the Resolute Support mission would appear to have to continue in order to give international troops the legal authority.

The U.S. will also have about 650 troops in Afghanistan to protect its sprawling embassy in the capital. Their presence it is understood will be covered in a bilateral agreement with the Afghan government.
The U.S. and NATO leaving comes as Taliban insurgents make strides in several parts of the country, overrunning dozens of districts and overwhelming beleaguered Afghan security Forces.
In a worrying development, the government has resurrected militias with a history of brutal violence to assist the Afghan security forces. At what had all the hallmarks of a final press conference, Gen. Miller this week warned that continued violence risked a civil war in Afghanistan that should have the world worried.
At its peak around 2012, Bagram Airfield saw more than 100,000 U.S. troops pass through its sprawling compound barely an hour’s drive north of the Afghan capital Kabul.
The departure is rife with symbolism. Not least, it’s the second time that an invader of Afghanistan has come and gone through Bagram.

The Soviet Union built the airfield in the 1950s. When it invaded Afghanistan in 1979 to back a communist government, it turned it into its main base from which it would defend its occupation of the country. For 10 years, the Soviets fought the U.S.-backed mujahedeen, dubbed freedom fighters by President Ronald Reagan, who saw them as a front-line force in one of the last Cold War battles.
When the U.S. and NATO inherited Bagram in 2001, they found it in ruins, a collection of crumbling buildings, gouged by rockets and shells, most of its perimeter fence wrecked. It had been abandoned after being battered in the battles between the Taliban and rival mujahedeen warlords fleeing to their northern enclaves.

The enormous base has two runways. The most recent, at 12,000 feet long, was built in 2006 at a cost of $96 million. There are 110 revetments, which are basically parking spots for aircraft, protected by blast walls. GlobalSecurity, a security think tank, says Bagram includes three large hangars, a control tower and numerous support buildings. The base has a 50-bed hospital with a trauma bay, three operating theaters and a modern dental clinic. Another section houses a prison, notorious and feared among Afghans.
There was no immediate comment from Afghan officials as to the final withdrawal from Bagram Airfield by the U.S. and its NATO allies.
___
Associated Press Writer Lolita Baldor in Washington, Farid Tanha, in Bagram, Afghanistan and Rahim Faiez in Kabul, Afghanistan contributed to this report.

Jennifer Griffin
@JenGriffinFNC


A senior US official tells me all US forces have left Bagram Air Base - the main US military air base an hour north of Kabul.

8:27 PM · Jul 1, 2021·Twitter for iPhone
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
US hands Bagram Airfield to Afghans after nearly 20 years
By KATHY GANNON

6-7 minutes


KABUL, Afghanistan (AP) — After nearly 20 years, the U.S. military left Bagram Airfield, the epicenter of its war to oust the Taliban and hunt down the al-Qaida perpetrators of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on America, two U.S. officials said Friday.
The airfield was handed over to the Afghan National Security and Defense Force in its entirety, they said on condition they not be identified because they were not authorized to release the information to the media.
One of the officials also said the U.S. top commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Austin S. Miller, “still retains all the capabilities and authorities to protect the forces.”

Afghanistan’s district administrator for Bagram, Darwaish Raufi, said the American departure was done overnight without any coordination with local officials, and as a result early Friday dozens of local looters stormed through the unprotected gates before Afghan forces regained control.
“They were stopped and some have been arrested and the rest have been cleared from the base,” Raufi told The Associated Press, adding that the looters ransacked several buildings before being arrested and the Afghan National Security and Defense Forces (ANDSF) took control.
“Unfortunately the Americans left without any coordination with Bagram district officials or the governor’s office,” Raufi said. “Right now our Afghan security forces are in control both inside and outside of the base.”
The deputy spokesman for the defense minister, Fawad Aman, said nothing of the early morning looting. He said only the base has been handed over and the “ANDSF will protect the base and use it to combat terrorism.”
The withdrawal from Bagram Airfield is the clearest indication that the last of the 2,500-3,500 U.S. troops have left Afghanistan or are nearing a departure, months ahead of President Joe Biden’s promise that they would be gone by Sept. 11.

It was clear soon after the mid-April announcement that the U.S. was ending its “forever war,” that the departure of U.S. soldiers and their estimated 7,000 NATO allies would be nearer to July 4, when America celebrates its Independence Day.
Most NATO soldiers have already quietly exited as of this week. Announcements from several countries analyzed by The Associated Press show that a majority of European troops has now left with little ceremony — a stark contrast to the dramatic and public show of force and unity when NATO allies lined up to back the U.S. invasion in 2001.

The U.S. has refused to say when the last U.S. soldier would leave Afghanistan, citing security concerns, but also the protection of Kabul’s Hamid Karzai International Airport is still being negotiated. Turkish and U.S. soldiers currently are protecting the airport. That protection is currently covered under the Resolute Support Mission, which is the military mission being wound down.
Until a new agreement for the airport’s protection is negotiated between Turkey and the Afghan government, and possibly the United States, the Resolute Support mission would appear to have to continue in order to give international troops the legal authority.

The U.S. will also have about 650 troops in Afghanistan to protect its sprawling embassy in the capital. Their presence it is understood will be covered in a bilateral agreement with the Afghan government.
The U.S. and NATO leaving comes as Taliban insurgents make strides in several parts of the country, overrunning dozens of districts and overwhelming beleaguered Afghan security Forces.
In a worrying development, the government has resurrected militias with a history of brutal violence to assist the Afghan security forces. At what had all the hallmarks of a final press conference, Gen. Miller this week warned that continued violence risked a civil war in Afghanistan that should have the world worried.
At its peak around 2012, Bagram Airfield saw more than 100,000 U.S. troops pass through its sprawling compound barely an hour’s drive north of the Afghan capital Kabul.
The departure is rife with symbolism. Not least, it’s the second time that an invader of Afghanistan has come and gone through Bagram.

The Soviet Union built the airfield in the 1950s. When it invaded Afghanistan in 1979 to back a communist government, it turned it into its main base from which it would defend its occupation of the country. For 10 years, the Soviets fought the U.S.-backed mujahedeen, dubbed freedom fighters by President Ronald Reagan, who saw them as a front-line force in one of the last Cold War battles.
When the U.S. and NATO inherited Bagram in 2001, they found it in ruins, a collection of crumbling buildings, gouged by rockets and shells, most of its perimeter fence wrecked. It had been abandoned after being battered in the battles between the Taliban and rival mujahedeen warlords fleeing to their northern enclaves.

The enormous base has two runways. The most recent, at 12,000 feet long, was built in 2006 at a cost of $96 million. There are 110 revetments, which are basically parking spots for aircraft, protected by blast walls. GlobalSecurity, a security think tank, says Bagram includes three large hangars, a control tower and numerous support buildings. The base has a 50-bed hospital with a trauma bay, three operating theaters and a modern dental clinic. Another section houses a prison, notorious and feared among Afghans.
There was no immediate comment from Afghan officials as to the final withdrawal from Bagram Airfield by the U.S. and its NATO allies.
___
Associated Press Writer Lolita Baldor in Washington, Farid Tanha, in Bagram, Afghanistan and Rahim Faiez in Kabul, Afghanistan contributed to this report.

A though just popped into my mind wondering if this whole thing is somebody's idea to set up some massive hammer and anvil situation? Baldrick saying to Blackadder "I have a cunning plan" now won't leave my thoughts along with the dread of it all.....
 

jward

passin' thru
Shhh. You're just having a bad dream
..but don't wake, it will probably just get worse from here : (
A though just popped into my mind wondering if this whole thing is somebody's idea to set up some massive hammer and anvil situation? Baldrick saying to Blackadder "I have a cunning plan" now won't leave my thoughts along with the dread of it all.....
 

jward

passin' thru
U.S. Seeks Refuge for Afghan Staff as It Hands Over Key Base
Peter Martin, Nick Wadhams, Jennifer Jacobs and Eltaf Najafizada

5-7 minutes


The Biden administration asked three Central Asian nations to temporarily house thousands of Afghans who worked with American forces and could be targeted by the Taliban as U.S. and NATO troops withdraw after nearly two decades.
The U.S. has asked Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to take in about 9,000 Afghans who assisted with the American military’s invasion and occupation of the country, according to three people familiar with the request, who asked not to be identified discussing private deliberations.

That effort comes as U.S. forces handed over Bagram Air Base, their biggest facility, late Thursday night in a milestone symbolizing the effective departure of combat forces from Afghanistan after 20 years. The U.S. had said it would have most troops out by Sept. 11, keeping a contingent of about 650 in the country to protect diplomats, but that timetable was accelerated.

“All Coalition and American troops departed Bagram Air Base last night,” Fawad Aman, a deputy spokesman for Afghanistan’s defense ministry, said. “The base was handed over. ANDSF will protect the base and use it to combat terrorism,” he added, using an acronym for the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces.

But the handover raises the potential threats facing the many Afghan translators, drivers and other workers and their families who helped sustain the American presence after the U.S.-led coalition ousted the Taliban government following the Sept. 11, 2001 terror attacks. The Biden administration pledged to expedite immigration visas for Afghans who worked closely with U.S. forces, but that process is still in flux.

Turkey Gears Up for Risky Afghan Mission That No One Else Wants
“All the visa seekers are surprised by this news and we are hoping they shift us swiftly as the security is really worsening and those countries are much safer than Afghanistan,” Amin Rahimi, an Afghan employee of a U.S. government-funded project, said by phone on Friday.
Having gained strength for years despite the American and NATO presence, Taliban forces now control half of the country’s 400 districts.

A crucial way for the U.S. to aid key Afghan allies would be through the Special Immigrant Visa program, which allows those who have worked for American forces to claim refugee status. Officials have said there are some 18,000 Afghan SIV applicants, with 9,000 or so just starting the process.
State Department spokesman Ned Price declined to say at a briefing Thursday where the applicants might go. He said they and their families “will have the option to be relocated to a location outside of Afghanistan before we complete our military drawdown by September” to complete the immigration process.

‘Every Option’
“Importantly, these are individuals who are already in the SIV pipeline,” Price said. “We would undertake any relocation in full compliance with applicable laws and in full coordination with Congress.”
Some officials had suggested the idea of sending those Afghans to the U.S. island of Guam in the Pacific, and the island’s governor even tweeted that he was in favor of the idea. But that was never seriously considered given officials’ fear that if the visa applicants went to Guam, it would be impossible to force them to leave if their SIV applications were denied.
Secretary of State Antony Blinken met Uzbek Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Kamilov and Tajik Foreign Minister Sirojiddin Muhriddin at the State Department on Thursday. Blinken thanked Kamilov “for Uzbekistan’s continued support for a just and durable peace settlement in Afghanistan,” the department said in a statement.

Testifying before the House Foreign Affairs Committee in June, Blinken said a backlog of immigration applications is being cleared, and he asked Congress to raise a cap on special immigrant visas for Afghans by 8,000 slots. There’s now a congressionally mandated cap of 26,000 slots under the Special Immigrant Visa program.
Read More: Biden Tells Afghanistan’s Ghani U.S. Will ‘Stick With You’
The agreement being sought to temporarily base thousands of Afghans in three Central Asian nations would be part of a broader deal to establish further cooperation with those countries. As part of the visit by the Uzbek and Tajik foreign ministers in Washington this week, the U.S. is proposing an accord that would allow it to conduct intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance operations from their territory, one of the people familiar with the request said.

Bagram Handover
Afghan leaders have warned of an imminent civil war or the collapse of the government once all foreign forces withdraw, despite President Joe Biden’s promise to President Ashraf Ghani and Chairman of the Afghanistan National Reconciliation Council, Abdullah Abdullah, that he’d continue to provide military and financial assistance worth billions of dollars to Afghan forces.

“The truth is the survival, security and unity of Afghanistan is in danger,” Abdullah said in remarks broadcast on state-run television Wednesday following a high-level meeting attended by Ghani and other senior political leaders.

 

jward

passin' thru
What We Can Expect in Afghanistan from US Intelligence Once US Troops Are Gone
by Douglas London
July 1, 2021

Filed under:
Afghanistan, CIA, Intelligence activities, Reflections on Afghanistan
(Editor’s note: This article is part of a Just Security series: Reflections on Afghanistan on the Eve of Withdrawal.)
While Americans hope to breathe a sigh of relief as U.S. troops withdraw from Afghanistan, bringing an end to the longest U.S. war, the Intelligence Community (IC) is merely entering a new phase of the conflict. As politicians and pundits argue the decision, a discourse that will inevitably be played out against a backdrop of the belligerents escalating violence and abuses, the White House will be holding its breath. Will the IC still manage to detect, preempt, and destroy threats directed from Afghanistan, especially after 20 years of constant counterterrorism pressure is lifted?

Without U.S. troops on the ground, U.S. intelligence agencies will face an entirely different and more chaotic operational environment and will do so with significantly fewer resources. The U.S. military’s infrastructure and quick-reaction ground, air, and medical support will be gone, leaving American personnel stationed in the country, and their foreign agents, mostly on their own. This means incurring greater risk and being without the safety net of rescue by the U.S. military should they need it. And success will be confined to the shadows whereas failures will be public and potentially catastrophic.

History and current trends – Afghan security forces surrendering their outposts; cultural acceptance of Afghan leaders to switch sides, particularly when money is involved; and Taliban violence aimed at weakening civil society — suggest that the Taliban will ultimately secure “strategic victory.” That is, the Taliban will, in time, likely exercise sovereign control over much, but not all of Afghanistan, as it pursues military victory over its remaining opponents in contested areas. Plus, an organization determined to isolate the Afghan people from the world will not readily respond to external pressure in order to receive aid and investment nor open the country to social media that is inconsistent with its messaging, and beyond its control. But hardly homogenous, the Taliban might struggle in consolidating power and have difficulty keeping order among its own diverse ranks, some of which would profit from global interaction.

For U.S. intelligence officials, there will no longer be a vast American presence beyond Kabul, which, at its height, ranged from small forward-operating fire bases to sprawling compounds. But these were also places where intelligence collectors were shielded by high walls from which they rarely ventured. And as invaluable as these platforms were, security restrictions disconnected collectors from their Afghan neighbors. Rather than immersing themselves in the culture and operating in the shadows beyond the wire, U.S. intelligence collectors were left to learn the lay of the land vicariously through sources.

In principle, these bases and outposts around the country facilitated opportunities to gain access to sources who could report on al-Qaeda and its partner organizations. In reality, U.S. intelligence and military officials ultimately spent more time working to identify and disrupt threats generated by their own presence and the counterproductive impact of collateral civilian casualties from U.S. kinetic operations.

In truth, it was easier running operations against the ubiquitous Taliban presence than drilling the many dry holes associated with hunting down the more strategically important but elusive terrorist target which was harder to find, and more difficult still to penetrate. And it wasn’t a stretch to brand the Taliban terrorists. To this day, the group’s tactics included mass casualty suicide attacks against civilian population centers and political assassinations. But settling Afghanistan’s internal disputes, addressing human rights abuses, and supporting a nascent democracy were not strategic missions that justified the loss of American blood and treasure after 9/11.

The slippery slope of shifting priorities had the practical effect of undermining the utility of these platforms. The United States was fighting a counterterrorist intelligence war with counterinsurgency military tactics, a pairing that was never going to succeed. The United States relied on firepower, and measured success or failure by virtue of enemy casualties and the amount of Afghanistan’s population, versus territory, ostensibly under government control.

After U.S. Troops Leave

The post-withdrawal, intelligence-collection environment is fraught by the challenge of depending on middlemen. While not ideal, the IC has made this work before. It was the CIA’s relationships and its offshore collection networks that enabled it to covertly insert a team into Afghanistan within 15 days of the 9/11 attack.
It’s worth noting that the CIA and other U.S. intelligence agencies will have advantages that they lacked on 9/11. Besides a deep bench at home familiar with the country, they would have already prepared a stable of Afghan “stay behind” agents. And they would have equipped these sources to communicate via a variety of means to receive collection requirements and provide intelligence.

Some of these sources will themselves operate as “principal agents,” essentially surrogates who recruit or otherwise run their own reporters responding to U.S. collection requirements. In some cases, “sub-sources” need not even be aware that the United States is the ultimate consumer of the information. This helps secure cooperation from those less receptive to U.S. overtures, and can be useful under some circumstances for protecting their security as well as their handler’s.
Practical downsides revolve around the efficacy and expediency of communications with such agents in the field.

Only some can occasionally travel to the capital in Kabul, let alone out of the country for meetings with their American handlers. The need for timely intelligence will require those who can to communicate via secure electronic means while on the ground. But these sources will face challenges that include infrastructure limitations, particularly in the rural areas; a lack of privacy, especially for those operating within enemy camps and under circumstances in which their absence would be noted; and agents otherwise ill equipped to possess and employ spy gadgets.

Should the Afghan government collapse and Kabul fall to the Taliban, regional, tribal, and ethnic groups can again be expected to maintain territory free from Taliban control in the Panjshir and other northern areas where Afghan Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras are likely to organize and resist. U.S. intelligence operatives were regularly inserted into northern Afghanistan prior to 9/11 for meetings with the Northern Alliance before American troops arrived, and likewise into northern Iraq for meetings with Kurdish resistance groups while Saddam Hussein still ruled. A similar model could be used if this becomes the new operating environment, one taking advantage of existing relationships intelligence operatives would have nurtured over 20 years. The United States can provide money, materials, intelligence, training, and guidance as currency to tap into such resistance organizations and their own intelligence-collection networks and leverage their military capabilities. The United States would do this remotely, but with occasional trips into the country under the groups’ protection. The more reliable the local security, the more enduring and extensive the American presence and hands-on support can be.

Still, operating via surrogates and proxies is the least reliable and most dangerous means of collecting intelligence compared to having case officers directly meeting with individual agents, none of whom would know the identity of other sources the U.S. IC was running. Being far removed from the actual sources limits the means to test and evaluate their authenticity, veracity or motives. And like the children’s game “telephone,” the greater the number involved in collecting intelligence, the less reliable the reporting, and the more potential exists for someone to be caught. Benjamin Franklin said, “three may keep a secret, if two of them are dead.”

Agent networks and those handled by cutouts are more vulnerable to compromise because the exposure of one would reveal the rest. And absent the direct oversight of a trained American handler, who would prioritize security over the value of any one report, local agents and their sub-sources can overreach or fly blindly into danger. They might steal a document to which they have no natural access, ask a suspicious question, or offer the wrong person money for information. The pitfalls of agent networks and cutouts were made famous by the Nazis’ success compromising World War II resistance networks, failed Western efforts infiltrating agents behind the Iron Curtain at the outset of the Cold War, and U.S. struggles in Cuba, Iran, and Iraq.

Because of all of this, the end of the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan requires an adjustment concerning expectations for insight into terrorist planning and the United States’ ongoing capacity to thwart emerging plots. But such challenges aside, a more counterterrorism-focused, less politically skewed mission, which divorces itself from the costly whack-a-mole strategy of the preceding 20 years, will be more truly an intelligence war. And one that allows the clarity to stay focused on what’s most important to U.S. strategic interests.

In this photograph taken on April 30, 2021 people make their way along a market area in Kandahar. Photo by JAVED TANVEER/AFP via Getty Images

 

Dozdoats

On TB every waking moment
Former contractor friend who spent a lot of time there told me today we had turned Bagram over ... video at the link
==============


US vacates key Afghan base; pullout target now 'late August'
U.S. forces have vacated Bagram Airfield in Afghanistan after nearly 20 years, bringing the U.S. military closer to a final withdrawal that the Pentagon says will be completed by late August

By ROBERT BURNS and KATHY GANNON Associated Press
July 2, 2021, 10:31 PM
• 6 min read


8:12
An exclusive look at the US withdrawal from Afghanistan

ABC News' Martha Raddatz speaks with Gen. Austin Scott Miller, the commander overseeing the...Read More
The Associated Press

WASHINGTON -- Nearly 20 years after invading Afghanistan to oust the Taliban and hunt down al-Qaida, the U.S. military has vacated its biggest airfield in the country, advancing a final withdrawal that the Pentagon on Friday said will be completed by the end of August.

President Joe Biden had instructed the Pentagon to complete the military withdrawal by Sept. 11, the 20th anniversary of the terrorist attacks on the United States, but the Pentagon now says it can finish the drawdown a little earlier. In fact, the drawdown is already largely completed and officials had said it could be wrapped up this weekend. But a number of related issues need to be worked out in coming weeks, including a new U.S. military command structure in Kabul and talks with Turkey on an arrangement for maintaining security at the Kabul airport, and so an official end to the pullout will not be announced soon.

“A safe, orderly drawdown enables us to maintain an ongoing diplomatic presence, support the Afghan people and the government, and prevent Afghanistan from once again becoming a safe haven for terrorists that threatens our homeland,” Pentagon press secretary John Kirby said.

The administration is meanwhile narrowing options for ensuring the safety of thousands of Afghans whose applications for special visas to come to the United States have yet to be approved. The administration has already said it’s willing to evacuate them to third countries pending their visa approvals but has yet to determine where. Officials said Friday that one possibility is to relocate them to neighboring countries in Central Asia where they could be protected from possible retaliation by the Taliban or other groups.

The White House and State Department have declined to comment on the numbers to be relocated or where they might go, but the foreign ministers of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan were both in Washington this week and the subject of Afghan security was raised in meetings they held with Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin.

Kirby said that Austin on Friday approved a new command structure in Afghanistan to transition the U.S. military mission from warfighting to two new objectives — protecting a continuing U.S. diplomatic presence in Kabul and maintaining liaison with the Afghan military.

Austin's plan calls for the top commander in Afghanistan, Army Gen. Scott Miller, to transfer his combat authorities to the Florida-based head of U.S. Central Command, Marine Gen. Frank McKenzie, before relinquishing his command this month. Also, a two-star Navy admiral will head a U.S. Embassy-based military office, dubbed U.S. Forces Afghanistan-Forward, to oversee the new mission of providing security for the embassy and its diplomats.

A satellite military office based in Qatar and headed by a U.S. one-star general will be established to administer U.S. financial support for the Afghan military and police, plus maintenance support provided for Afghan aircraft from outside Afghanistan.

Kirby said Miller, who already is the longest-serving commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan in the 20 years of warfare, will remain in command for “a couple of weeks” longer but was not more specific. He said Miller will be preparing for and completing the turnover of his duties to McKenzie and also will be traveling inside and beyond Afghanistan.

Miller met Afghan President Ashraf Ghani on Friday and, according to a Dari-language tweet by the presidential palace, the two discussed “continued U.S. assistance and cooperation with Afghanistan, particularly in supporting the defense and security forces.”

Bagram Airfield has been the epicenter of the war to oust the Taliban and hunt down the al-Qaida perpetrators of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on America. At its peak in and around 2012, Bagram Airfield saw more than 100,000 U.S. troops pass through the massive compound barely an hour’s drive north of Kabul.

Meanwhile, Afghanistan's district administrator for Bagram, Darwaish Raufi, said the American departure was done overnight without any coordination with local officials, and as a result early Friday, dozens of local looters stormed through the unprotected gates before Afghan forces regained control.

“They were stopped and some have been arrested and the rest have been cleared from the base,” Raufi told The Associated Press, adding that the looters ransacked several buildings before being arrested and the Afghan forces took control.

However, U.S. military spokesman Col. Sonny Leggett said the handover was an “extensive process” that spanned several weeks and began soon after Biden's mid-April announcement that America was withdrawing the last of its forces.

“All handovers of Resolute Support bases and facilities, to include Bagram Airfield, have been closely coordinated, both with senior leaders from the government and with our Afghan partners in the security forces, including leadership of the locally based units respective to each base,” said Col. Leggett.

The Taliban welcomed the American withdrawal from Bagram Airfield. Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid tweeted that Friday's departure was a “positive step," urging for the “withdrawal of foreign forces from all parts of the country.”

As of this week, most other NATO soldiers have already quietly exited Afghanistan. Announcements from several countries analyzed by the AP show that a majority of European troops has left with little ceremony — a stark contrast to the dramatic and public show of force and unity when NATO allies lined up to back the U.S. invasion in 2001.

The U.S. has refused to say when the last American soldier would leave Afghanistan, citing security concerns, but also future security and protection for Kabul International Airport is still being negotiated. Turkish and U.S. soldiers are currently protecting the airport, still under Resolute Support Mission, which is the military mission being wound down.

Until a new agreement for the airport is struck by Turkey and the Afghan government, and possibly the United States, it appears the Resolute Support mission would to have to continue to be in charge of the facility.

———

Gannon reported from Kabul. Associated Press writers Lolita Baldor and Matthew Lee in Washington, Farid Tanha, in Bagram, Afghanistan, and Rahim Faiez in Kabul, contributed to this report.
 

jward

passin' thru
:(

After the retreat: what now for Afghanistan?
Emma Graham-Harrison

14-18 minutes


The public flogging in Obe district, captured on video that quickly went viral this spring, was a mistake, a local Taliban judge admitted. Commanders were angry.

As the footage spread between urban Afghans, who shared it on their smartphones, it revived memories of darker times when the militants ruled the country, and an outpouring of revulsion.
Men with lashes take turns to bear down on a woman visibly bracing, even under her burqa, against the blows, and by the end screaming out in pain: “O God, I repent.” An audience of men and boys watch, or snap photos and videos.
The problem, the cleric explained, was not the punishment but the video, which circulated in April as the militants were consolidating control of the area. “She committed adultery, and I would have ordered the same thing,” he told the Observer in a telephone interview. “But the commanders said that we shouldn’t have done it in public.”
Map of Afghanistan.

Years into taking up the post in the Taliban’s shadow administration it is a sentence he still hands down regularly for “adultery”, which in Afghanistan can cover any sexual relationship outside marriage, and can sometimes even include rape. Men are flogged and then jailed, he added. “I recently ordered the flogging of a woman inside her home. Relatives and neighbours came to us and said there were witnesses to this man and woman being together. We lashed her 20 times.”

Obe sits just to the east of the silk-road city of Herat, a valley of grape and peach orchards nestled between two mountains, famous for the curative waters of a natural hot spring. In more peaceful times people used to head to the city at weekends for picnics, to escape the heat and dust of the city.

But for years the Taliban have been fighting in Obe’s fields and villages, and last month it became one of dozens of districts across Afghanistan to fall fully under the militants’ control, as foreign forces accelerated a departure they are expected to complete this month. The experiences of people there offer a glimpse of what a country, or large swaths of one, ruled by the Taliban might look like, and it is a disturbing vision.

And the details of how Obe finally fell offer a worrying insight into the militants’ growing confidence, resources and ambition, and also the problems hobbling Afghan security forces – from lack of air support to questionable strategic decisions – as they start a new era of going into battle without foreign backup.

On Friday, US troops left Bagram, the sprawling airbase north of Kabul that was the symbolic and operational heart of the American operation in Afghanistan. Fewer than 1,000 US troops are thought to be still in the country, mostly for security purposes in and around Kabul.

Britain is expected to bring the last of its regular troops home from Afghanistan over the weekend to match the US departure, and in a few days Boris Johnson is expected to make a statement to parliament marking the change and outlining the UK’s future diplomatic presence in, and military posture towards, Afghanistan.

Two women in grey burqas illuinated in a shaft of yellow sunlight through a window, shining on a wall,  in an otherwise dark place

Afghan women fear the return of the Taliban. Photograph: Reuters/Alamy
America and its allies arrived in the country in 2001, in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, to topple the Taliban and find terrorist mastermind Osama bin Laden.

The al-Qaida leader is long dead, but few politicians are willing to dwell on the reality that the international forces are leaving with the Taliban – who seemed utterly routed 20 years ago – resurgent on the ground.

Through withdrawal talks with the Americans, the militants have also gained a form of international recognition they had long craved. The group’s senior envoys have responded by burnishing the image they present to the wider world.

At peace talks in the Qatari capital Doha, and across other platforms including a New York Times opinion column by their deputy leader, the Taliban’s representatives have been presenting an image of change. They use the language of peace and reconciliation, and have promised women their rights as “granted by Islam – from the right to education to the right to work”.

Yet in Obe they have revived most of the brutal and misogynist policies that marked their rule in the 1990s, according to multiple accounts collected by the Observer.

We spoke to civilians living in Obe, others who had recently fled, the Taliban judge, engineers working on district development projects, government soldiers who fought in the bitter last stand for the district’s centre, an activist who is in regular contact with women there, and local and provincial officials. Almost all asked to remain anonymous, for fear of reprisals against them or their relatives.

“The international platform for the Taliban is truly disturbing. We live under the Taliban, we deal with them and we know they have not changed,” said Halima Salimi, a women’s rights activist based in Herat who receives regular death threats for her work.

She is still in contact with fellow activists in Obe, who say they are now confined to their homes and barred from work.

On 14 June, the last government forces in the district were helicoptered out of a besieged outpost. The militants are confident enough of their control that last week they called a meeting at the mosque in the main street to lay out their laws and plans for Obe, which include a flat 10% tax on all earnings.

The district schools have been closed for years by fighting, or boycotted by parents worried their children will be caught in crossfire. But when they reopen, girls will not be allowed to study past sixth grade, interviewees said.

Women must wear the all-enveloping burqa and cannot work or leave their home for any reason without a male “guardian”, a role that can be filled even by prepubescent sons, nephews or brothers. Shopkeepers have been ordered not to serve women out alone, and Taliban beat any unaccompanied women they catch.

01:55
Joe Biden: 'It's time for American troops to come home from Afghanistan' – video
For women without a suitable relative, the militants have a complex system, said one mother of three who fled Obe after her home was destroyed in recent fighting.

“She must let the Taliban know there is no man in the house, and they will tell her she can only go to certain places – like here, here and here – making a kind of map restricting her movement.”

Mobile phones are regularly checked by Taliban fighters, another Obe resident said, and if they find music, dancing or anything supporting the government, the owner will be beaten. If they find pictures of him or her in government uniform, they are executed.

Physical punishment including amputations and floggings are handed down as sentences by judges, including the one who spoke to the Observer, who asked not to be named because he was not authorised to speak to journalists.

“Muslims agree with this. If you don’t give sharia punishment, crimes will rise. People come to us and say they are grateful,” said the judge. “When the government was in power, no robbery was investigated. Now after we came to power, people can leave their doors open.”


In his court, which meets regularly and hears three or four cases a day, often on land and water disputes, “testimony from two women equals that from one man”, he added.

The refugee mother conceded that the group had brought an end to lawlessness, but for her it was not enough to offset all the cruelty and restrictions.

“The Taliban have already made a really big reduction in robbery – I know many people support them and are satisfied because of this, but I don’t want them [ruling the area].

“They had special people responsible for beating women, they used rope or pieces of wood to hit them,” she said. Men are beaten for not praying, and not fasting during Ramadan, and there are other petty restrictions like a ban on makeup. “It was exactly like last time they were in power [before 2001]. I was in Obe then too.”

Long shot of dozens of men looking towards the camera, head ands shoulders visible,  holding their weapons up vertically

Afghan militia fighters with regular soldiers at a gathering in Kabul last month. Photograph: Rahmat Gul/AP
One man still living in the area said: “Of course you just worry about the children’s future.” There was a bleak sense of history repeating itself, he said. “I was only educated until fifth grade, then I had to drop out for the same reason.”

The Taliban, despite their public commitment to ending “the killing and maiming”, are accused of war crimes. In the cities they have been linked to targeted assassinations; in Obe, locals say they have used families as human shields.

During the battle for the district centre, women and children were ordered not to leave at least one house the Taliban were using as a base for operations for several days, residents say. They believe the family were made to serve as insurance against airstrikes by government forces or American drones.

The comprehensive capture of the district centre, after years of the Taliban attacking and falling back, appears to have been made possible by an influx of fighters from other provinces, under a new commander. Rafi Shindandi, probably a nom de guerre, arrived in the area after Eid, which ended the fasting month of Ramadan in May. He brought around 60 or 70 fighters, from places including nearby Farah and Badghis provinces.

When they arrived, local Taliban warned a group of government-funded engineers working in Obe on development projects, including bridges and water supply, to leave. The engineers had previously built up a relationship with the insurgents to ensure that their civilian work, such as water supply projects, could go ahead without attacks or accidental targeting in battles.

“Local Taliban and elders told us when they arrived and warned they were dangerous,” he said. “We trusted the local fighters, but in war you can’t tell good and bad apart easily, and we didn’t have a relationship with the new ones.”

Sightings of reinforcement fighters were reported in other districts that fell to Taliban control, and may have been part of a tactic of preemptive strikes against areas that had been strongholds of resistance 20 years earlier.

“That the Taliban would launch widespread attacks while, or immediately after, US forces left was to be expected, but the scale and speed of the Afghan National Security Forces’ collapse was not,” said Kate Clark of the Afghanistan Analysts Network in a recent analysis of the Taliban’s takeover in much of the country’s north.

The insurgents held around a quarter of the country’s nearly 400 district centres at the end of June, the thinktank calculated from news reports and its own investigations. Clark went on to describe “the plunging morale of members of the ANSF in the field and … a new-found confidence among Taliban fighters that military victory was coming their way”.

In some provinces, almost all the areas beyond city limits have fallen; government supporters fear the Taliban is positioning for a push on provincial capitals. Although it has overrun several such capitals briefly in the past, it has not yet been able to take and hold them. That track record is likely to be put to the test soon.

Other factors undermining government forces are corruption, desertion and ill-thought-out policy. The air support vital to holding the Taliban at bay has dwindled, with the Afghan air force badly overstretched and the US now operating from thousands of miles away.

A soldier alone standing guard, framed by coils of razor wire and floodlight towers against a blue sky

An Afghan soldier stands guard at Bagram airbase on Friday, the day of the US’s departure. Photograph: Mohammad Ismail/Reuters
In December last year, the government disbanded a supportive unit of the militia-like Afghan Local Police in Obe, under what looks increasingly like an ill-conceived demobilisation programme. Several other districts that fell to Taliban control had recently lost ALP forces as well, Clark wrote.

In Obe, the Taliban attack on the district centre had hardened into a siege by June. A few dozen men from the intelligence, police and army were stranded on a military base with just a glass of water a day, and dwindling food. They called desperately for air support or evacuation, but the only visitors who arrived were Red Crescent officials who had come to collect bodies.

The men had been reduced to stripping leaves off the trees to eat before a group of parents launched a three-day protest in Herat, demanding support for the besieged group. Initially polite, by day three the terrified and furious parents were burning tyres in the street and threatening suicide attacks. The next day, helicopters were dispatched, but for many it was already too late. “Bodies were carried out of injured men who would have survived if they got help sooner,” said one of the commandos bitterly.

At least one of the men trapped inside, who himself comes from Obe, has been quietly sounding out friends in the area and in Herat about organising a militia to try to reclaim the district.

For years, western-backed efforts aimed to disarm the country’s irregular militias. But the Taliban’s advances and the accelerated departure of foreign troops have convinced Afghans whose homes are threatened, and the officials who have to protect them, that they need more people to pick up guns and fight. Militias are forming around the country, many encouraged, financed or even called up by the government itself.

The fighter from Obe has lost brothers, his father and at least 20 more distant relatives to the Taliban, and refuses to consider surrender or collaboration. “The situation is catastrophic, and the government won’t even listen to me,” he said. “So now my work is just to be killed, or liberate my town.”

 

jward

passin' thru
Afghanistan: All foreign troops must leave by deadline - Taliban
BBC News

4-5 minutes



Any foreign troops left in Afghanistan after Nato's September withdrawal deadline will be at risk as occupiers, the Taliban has told the BBC.

It comes amid reports that 1,000 mainly US troops could remain on the ground to protect diplomatic missions and Kabul's international airport.
Nato's 20-year military mission in the country has all but ended.
But violence in the country continues to rise, with the Taliban taking more territory.
As Afghan forces prepare to take charge of security alone, concern is growing for the future of Kabul.
Taliban spokesman Suhail Shaheen said seizing Kabul militarily was "not Taliban policy".

But speaking to the BBC from the militant group's office in Qatar, he said no foreign forces - including military contractors - should remain in the city after the withdrawal was complete.
"If they leave behind their forces against the Doha agreement then in that case it will be the decision of our leadership how we proceed," Mr Shaheen told the BBC.
"We would react and the final decision is with our leadership," he said.
Diplomats, NGOs and other foreign civilians would not be targeted by the Taliban, he insisted, and no ongoing protection force for them was needed.

"We are against the foreign military forces, not diplomats, NGOs and workers and NGOs functioning and embassies functioning - that is something our people need. We will not pose any threat to them," he said.
Mr Shaheen described last week's withdrawal from Bagram Airfield - once the largest US military base in Afghanistan - as a "historic moment".
Under a deal with the Taliban, the US and its Nato allies agreed to withdraw all troops in return for a commitment by the militants not to allow al-Qaeda or any other extremist group to operate in the areas they control.
President Joe Biden set a deadline of 11 September - the 20-year anniversary of the 9/11 attacks on the US - for American troops to fully withdraw, but reports suggest the pullout may be complete within days.

An Afghan MP speaking on behalf of the Afghan government said the withdrawal was being carried out irresponsibly.
The MP, Razwan Murad, told the BBC that the government was ready for talks and a ceasefire and the Taliban should now prove that they were committed to peace.
Armed men declare they will support the Afghan army near Kabul
image copyrightReuters
image captionSome armed men have pledged to support the Afghan army in defending Kabul against the Taliban
Mr Shaheen denied that the militant group had played any part in the recent uptick in violence.
He insisted that many districts had fallen to the Taliban through mediation after Afghan soldiers refused to fight.
On Sunday, the Taliban captured another area in southern Kandahar province. The militants say they now control about a quarter of the country's nearly 400 districts.

The Taliban spokesman described the current government as "moribund" and referred to the country as the "Islamic emirate" - an indication that the group envisaged a theocratic basis for governing the country and were unlikely to agree to Afghan government demands for elections.
Mr Shaheen said elections had so far not been raised in negotiations between the Taliban and the Afghan government.
media captionFrom May 2021: Top US commander General Scott Miller reflects on Nato forces' time in Afghanistan ahead of its departure

US-led forces ousted the Taliban from power in Afghanistan in October 2001. The group had been harbouring Osama Bin Laden and other al-Qaeda figures linked to the 9/11 attacks in the US.
President Biden has said the American pull-out is justified as US forces have made sure Afghanistan cannot again become a base for foreign jihadists to plot against the West.
Afghan President Ashraf Ghani, meanwhile, insists that the country's security forces are fully capable of keeping insurgents at bay, but many believe the withdrawal risks casting the country back into the grip of the Taliban.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Well that didn't take long......

Posted for fair use.....

July 5, 2021

China has a big plan for post-US Afghanistan and it’s worth billions

KARACHI: As the US exits Afghanistan, Beijing is preparing to swoop into the war-torn country and fill the vacuum left by the departed US and NATO troops.

China is poised to make an exclusive entry into post-US Afghanistan with its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Speaking on condition of anonymity, a source close to government officials in Afghanistan told The Daily Beast that Kabul authorities are growing more intensively engaged with China on an extension of the $62 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)—the flagship project of BRI, which involves the construction of highways, railways and energy pipelines between Pakistan and China—to Afghanistan, reported international media.

American troops exited the main and final US military base in Afghanistan on Friday, and though the initial withdrawal date was slated for Sept. 11, security officials British wire service that the majority of troops would be out by July 4.

According to another source privy to conversations between Beijing and Kabul, one of the specific projects on the table is the construction of a China-backed major road between Afghanistan and Pakistan's northwestern city of Peshawar, which is already linked with the CPEC route. “There is a discussion on a Peshawar-Kabul motorway between the authorities in Kabul and Beijing,” the source told The Daily Beast on condition of anonymity. “Linking Kabul with Peshawar by road means Afghanistan’s formal joining of CPEC.”

In other words: The Afghan government, behind the scenes, is welcoming China immediately after saying goodbye to America.

China has been keen on extending its BRI to Afghanistan, and has been asking Kabul to join it for at least half a decade. But the US-backed Afghan government was hesitant to join BRI for fear it could raise eyebrows in Washington. “There has been continuous engagement between the Afghan government and the Chinese for the past few years but that made the US suspicious of President Ashraf Ghani government,” the source said. He added that now, the engagement is growing “more intense,” as US forces are leaving and “Ghani needs an ally with resources, clout and ability to provide military support to his government.”

After US President Joe Biden announced plans to fully withdraw American forces by Sept. 11, Chinese foreign ministry’s spokesperson Zhao Lijian confirmed last month that China was indeed having discussions with third parties, including Afghanistan, on the extension of CPEC.

Under its BRI strategy, China wants to connect Asia with Africa and Europe through land and maritime networks spanning some 60 countries. The strategy would not only promote inter-regional connectivity, but would also enhance China's influence across the world at an estimated cost of $4 trillion. By virtue of its location, Afghanistan can provide China with a strategic base to spread its influence across the world, ideally located to serve as a trade hub connecting the Middle East, Central Asia and Europe. “The Chinese have very carefully cultivated many political leaders to buy political support for the projects in Afghanistan at the same time,” the source said, adding that “the Chinese government can ill afford to see Afghanistan not webbed through the BRI.”

He continued: “Certainly, the investment that would be injected into the economy will employ many people and in the absence of other economic activities people may welcome it. But the political landscape in Afghanistan stands divided, and there will be some ethnic leaders who will oppose BRI, not because they see disadvantages, but because external actors want to stop it.”

According to the source, a senior officer in Afghanistan’s foreign service had told him that Chinese officials had engaged with foreign minister Salahuddin Rabbani about five years ago, to discuss the extension of CPEC and BRI. The minister was interested—that is, until an Indian ambassador went on the offensive to push back on the deal. The Indian ambassador to Afghanistan even approached the US ambassador in Kabul to express his concerns, the source said. Ultimately, the American ambassador allegedly pressured Rabbani into backing away from further talks on CPEC with the Chinese.

In another instance, “an emotional diplomat openly accused President Ghani of siding with the Chinese and offering them Afghan resources," the source said, and the project was stalled.

But now, in light of the US exit, Beijing might be in a good position to pick up where they left off and push Kabul to join the BRI, especially if an American withdrawal leads to the installation of the Taliban regime. Since last February, when the Trump administration signed a peace deal with the Taliban, the Chinese officials have reportedly been in frequent contact with representatives from the militant group.

“The Taliban certainly offers a more unified partner to Chinese. But other regional countries have been trying to bring together warlords to think of resistance rather than of peace with the Taliban,” the source revealed to The Daily Beast.

As part of its homework strategy for Afghanistan, China has launched some strategic projects, including the construction of Taxkorgan airport on Pamirs Plateau in the northwest Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, which borders Afghanistan. China is also the builder and operator of Gwadar seaport in Pakistan’s Balochistan province, also bordering Afghanistan. Both Taxkorgan and Gwadar are being developed under CPEC.

“Washington’s departure from Afghanistan gives Beijing a strategic opportunity,” Michael Kugelman, the deputy director and senior Associate for South Asia at the Wilson Center in Washington told The Daily Beast. “There will certainly be a vacuum to fill, but we shouldn’t overstate China’s capacity to fill it. With Afghanistan’s security situation sure to spiral out of control, there’s only so much China will be able to do to deepen its footprint.”

As China’s strategic partner, Pakistan could prove a trump card for China in the Afghan endgame. “I think China could achieve more success than the US in Afghanistan given its close ties with and enormous leverage over Pakistan,” Sudha Ramachandran, an India-based analyst on South Asian political and security issues, told The Daily Beast. “China wants to ensure that instability in Afghanistan does not impact BRI adversely, and it wants to push Afghanistan to join CPEC or BRI.”

Still, China’s ability, Kugelman explained, to deepen its footprint in Afghanistan will “depend in great part on whether it reaches an understanding with the Taliban, which will see its influence continue to grow whether it holds power or not. If the Taliban is okay with China building out infrastructure and other projects in Afghanistan, Beijing will be in a much better place.”

“China could well bring the Taliban on board with BRI. The insurgents have said they will support development projects if they serve Afghan national interests,” he added.

What China actually needs to extend its Belt and Road programme to Afghanistan is, ultimately, peace. Beijing has gone so far as to offer infrastructure and energy projects worth billions of dollars to the Taliban in return for peace in Afghanistan.

“The Taliban isn’t the only challenge to overcome,” said Kugelman. “There are many sources of violence, both anti- and pro-state, in Afghanistan. So China will still face an extremely insecure environment, even if it gets Taliban buy-in for its projects.”

There’s no doubt that the strategic assets in Taxkorgan, Wakhan and Gwadar will strengthen China’s logistical infrastructure, helping it achieve its long-term economic and security objectives in the region. Peace, though, remains the actual key to China’s master plan for a post-US Afghanistan.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Posted for fair use.....

OPINION
China to fill the Vacuum in Afghanistan with US Departure?
Bill Wenger
Bill Wenger

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Posted: Jul 05, 2021 12:01 AM
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The opinions expressed by columnists are their own and do not necessarily represent the views of Townhall.com.

Afghanistan has always been in the “too hard” box. However, China is succeeding where others have failed, and to our distinct strategic disadvantage.

Alexander the Great, who along with many others, attempted to subdue Afghanistan and failed said: “May God keep you away from the venom of the cobra, the teeth of the tiger, and the revenge of Afghans.”

Afghanistan, the Graveyard of Empires, effectively thwarted and eventually drove from their lands many would be conquerors, Alexander, the Persians, Tamerlane, Genghis Khan, the British, the Russians and now the USA. China may well be the first in history to dominate, or at least, get the Afghans to cooperated to China’s significant advantage as the USA summarily withdraws after 20 years of expending vast treasure in lives lost and those wounded and severely altered as well as three-trillion USD wasted.

China has been rather quietly to the western observer, positive and potentially lucrative and strategically advantageous relationships with the Afghans for years. What is China seeking and how are they working to achieve their goals?

China’s aims are nearly parallel and complementary. China allied with Pakistan, never a loyal ally of the US, wants the abandoned southern bases vacated by the Americans as well as access to Indian Ocean warm water ports in Pakistan. With the US leaving particularly Bagram Air Field as well Kabul International and Kandahar Air Field, the nearest US air support facility devolves to 1,300 miles distant Qatar or a carrier group in the Indian Ocean or Persian Gulf. The US is then militarily far removed from the China mainland and the quickly evolving and changing Indian sub-continent.

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Afghan mineral wealth is vast, considerable, strategic and a long-standing goal of China. As with most of the involvement of the US in Afghanistan, American citizens, as well as our politicians, diplomats and most of or military leadership have ignored what China is now on the cusp of controlling. China is also negotiating and expanding the infrastructure necessary for transport of resources and military hegemony by development of the Belt Road Initiative and related road, rail and air initiatives across central Asia.

Afghanistan’s estimated $ 1 to $3 Trillion in mineral wealth includes their famous rare semi-precious gems in abundance, copper, iron, gold (potentially several $100 billion), uranium, rare earth elements and the critical lithium so vital to batteries for alternative energy sources. Afghan sources of lithium may well be the largest in the world. China already controls 73% of the world’s production vs. 12% for the US. Add to this extensive, already known natural gas and petroleum deposits for which China negotiated production arrangements with the Afghan Government beginning in 2011 with production beginning in 2012.

Why were all these natural resources heretofore ignored by the US? They were not. The Washington, D.C. establishment as well as we troops on the ground knew well of these specified and partially explored riches. Efforts were made by previous US administrations to work with the Kabul government for the mutual benefit of both the Afghans and the US. The issue was, as it continues to be in Iraq, securing the production sites and transportation capability to mine, refine and transport these riches. The security situation was simply too difficult to permit exploitation of the resources.

How is China succeeding where others have failed in this endeavor? First, with the departure of the US and NATO forces a major impediment to China’s operation in Afghanistan is not only eliminated, but the ability of China to operate in and transport plunder from Afghanistan is greatly enhanced. Second, China is cagey sufficiently to better and more accepting than were US officials to understand the tribal warlord nature of the significantly decentralized governance of Afghanistan that is tribal, local and controlled by dictatorial warlords who can be optioned and bought off by cunning and ruthless Chinese methods. Remember, the Chinese are the decedents of the most successful conquers of Afghanistan who ruled this land for 500 years by use of the horrendously aggressive and brutal methods.

I have walked the ground of the city Balkh, northwest of Mazar-e Sharif, Afghanistan where Genghis Kahn and his sons in 1220, brutally murdered the entire population of over one-million souls and absolutely leveled the city. The Chinese will do whatever is needed to bribe, steal or eliminate any Afghans who stand in the way of their agenda.

With the US leaving, the Taliban and their allies, Al Qaida, are in ascendency and gaining ever more control of Afghan territory. As a result of this resurgence, the disrespected, largely incompetent, and highly corrupt central Afghan government largely only in partial control of Kabul, leaves Afghanistan ripe for piece-meal conquest by bribes, intimidation or force by the well-organized and single-minded Chinese.

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How and why have we ended here? One only needs to hear the recent opinions of former Defense Secretary Leon Panetta and former National Security Advisor, Gen. H.R. McMaster to validate our reason for our strategic failure after 20 years of mis-guided efforts in Afghanistan. Panetta admitted: “I think the bottom line is that we did not ever develop a comprehensive and tight mission for what we were going to do in Afghanistan.”
Sagely and right on target, McMaster added:
I agree with the secretary that we never had a sustained and sustainable, reasoned approach to Afghanistan. I think our experience there is little understood… I don’t think we’ve ever really integrated all elements of national power and efforts of like-minded partners to accomplish well-defined and commonly understood objectives and goals in Afghanistan.
These two accurate strategic assessments lead one to ask, “Why did not these two, along with their similarly empowered government and military predecessors, with significant national power and influence as to the strategy for Afghanistan not take the necessary actions?”

We should leave the quagmire of Afghanistan because we have failed. However, the way we are leaving without a residual plan by the Biden administration continues the long-demonstrated completely incompetent manner in which we have handled the Afghanistan campaign to our strategic disadvantage.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Posted for fair use.....

The US And NATO Leave Afghanistan (And The World) At The Mercy Of Terrorists – OpEd
July 5, 2021 N. S. Venkataraman 0 Comments
By N. S. Venkataraman


The decision of the USA / NATO forces to withdraw from Afghanistan is a definite incentive for the Islamic terrorists and extremists to continue their offensive moves around the world. By withdrawing the forces, USA and other NATO countries have virtually conceded their defeat against acts of terrorism in a decisive manner. If the USA and other NATO partners think that they would not be affected by Taliban terrorists taking over Afghanistan, this would be a naïve view.

It is well known that the real target of Islamic terrorists is the USA and West European countries. Now that these countries have boosted the confidence of the terrorists by running away from the battle in Afghanistan, the determination of the Islamic terrorists to weaken the western nations and spread their influence around the world will become much more stronger. They would further increase the intensity of terrorist acts and seriously disrupt the peaceful conditions in several countries.

Obviously, US President Biden and other West European leaders have come to the conclusion that the war in Afghanistan have become too costly for them and it would be prudent to withdraw, inspite of the setback to the global fight against terrorism.

Perhaps, some section of the people in the USA and Western Europe question as to why they should take responsibility for checking the spread of terrorists across the world. They would realize that their thought process is flawed, if they understand that they themselves would be the victims of the acts of terrorism in the coming years, if global terrorism is left unchecked.

Already the demographic balance in several West European nations and in Canada and even in countries like Australia have been seriously disrupted due to the massive entry of muslim population as migrants and refugees , of which some could be terrorist outfits. It is well known that Islamic extremists believe that they can “take over” Europe and North America by rapidly increasing the muslim population in these countries. Past US Presidents realized this and tried to stop the flow of immigrants but the present US President Biden seems to have other ideas. Several people in European countries realize their folly of allowing unchecked flow of Muslims as migrants and refugees but it is too late now and the damage has already been done.

Apart from the Islamic extremists, the immediate gainer of the US and NATO forces withdrawing from Afghanistan would be China, which is always ready to fish in troubled waters. China may not be concerned about the spread of terrorism in one part of the world or the other, if China could convert the situation to its advantage by self-centred clever strategies.

Certainly, the image of USA and West European countries as strong nations with uncompromising commitment to the cause of democracy and freedom have been weakened. In this situation, China’s ambition to emerge as super power in the world would be strengthened in the coming years. China may even succeed in attaining this status before long, if US President Biden would give up or dilute the fight against terrorist outfits..

With Pakistan now being reduced to the level of extended territory of China for all practical purposes, China would cleverly use the Pakistan government to enter Afghanistan by negotiating with the Taliban terrorists and would bring Afghanistan under it’s control
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India would be a major sufferer due to the weakening stance of USA and West European countries against terrorism, since India is also an important target for Islamic terrorists, just as USA and West European nations are.

India is facing a serious threat due to the likely unholy axis between China, Pakistan and Taliban led Afghanistan, as they all have the common aim of weakening India and disrupting the peace in the country.

In short, President Biden seems to have reacted without adequate forward planning and with a sense of panic by withdrawing from Afghanistan and giving a free hand to the Taliban terrorists there.

In the past, the USA had bitter experiences in Vietnam and Korea when it sent it’s troops to fight against the local forces, in the name of fighting for peace and democracy. US virtually gained nothing in the process.

While Vietnam somehow rehabilitated itself by becoming a democratic country, North Korea has gone under China’s influence and is now a bitter opponent of the USA. Afghanistan too may shape like North Korea and come under China’s control and becomes a bitter opponent of the USA.
NSV.jpg

N. S. Venkataraman
N. S. Venkataraman is a trustee with the "Nandini Voice for the Deprived," a not-for-profit organization that aims to highlight the problems of downtrodden and deprived people and support their cause. To promote probity and ethical values in private and public life and to deliberate on socio-economic issues in a dispassionate and objective manner.
 

jward

passin' thru
:(

FJ
@Natsecjeff
I mostly tweet about Afghan War these days. PS. All tweets/RTs not necessarily endorsements. All opinions personal. #MENA #AFG #Conflicts #Militancy #Terrorism

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URGENT: It has been brought to our attention that #OSINTcommunity contributor
@Natsecjeff
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