WAR trouble brewing again in ukraine

northern watch

Has No Life - Lives on TB
Doge
@IntelDoge



Per CNN, the U.S. is considering sending warships into the Black Sea as a show of force for #Ukraine amidst an increased Russian military presence along the border with #Ukraine. U.S. is required to give 14 days notice of intention to enter, unknown if that's been done yet.
______________________________________
Global: MilitaryInfo
@Global_Mil_Info

16m


The U.S. is currently discussing the Russian military buildup with NATO allies and have detected more Russian troops on the border with Ukraine than at any time since 2014. Intelligence flights have increased to keep track of naval and ground movements.
The Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits is a 1936 agreement that gives Turkey control over the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits and regulates the transit of naval warships. The Convention guarantees the free passage of civilian vessels in peacetime, and restricts the passage of naval ships not belonging to Black Sea states. The terms of the Convention have been a source of controversy over the years, most notably about the Soviet Union's military access to the Mediterranean Sea.

Signed on 20 July 1936 at the Montreux Palace in Switzerland, the Convention permitted Turkey to remilitarise the Straits. It went into effect on 9 November 1936 and was registered in the League of Nations Treaty Series on 11 December 1936. It remains in force.

Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits - Wikipedia


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jward

passin' thru
Russian Ground Troop Units and Iskander ballistic missiles identified at Ukrainian border by Janes

by Thomas Bullock





Open-source intelligence specialist at Janes Thomas Bullock identifies fourteen ground troop units and Iskander short-range ballistic missile systems at the Ukrainian border.
Janes has identified at least fourteen Russian Ground Troop units that have moved or are moving to the Ukrainian area of operations since late March through open-source intelligence.

Janes has identified an influx of Central Military District troops from the 74th and 35th Motorised Brigades, 120th Artillery Brigade and the 6th Tank Regiment, equipped with tanks, infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), and long-range artillery including 2S19 MSTA-S 152 mm self-propelled guns, TOS-1A thermobaric multiple rocket launchers (MRLs), and BM-27 Uragan 220 mm MRLs entering Voronezh by train.

Janes has also identified the deployment of Iskander short-range ballistic missile systems, likely belonging to the 119 Missile Brigade, to Voronezh from the Sverdlovsk region.

A staging area has been established at a training ground south of Voronezh city equipped with P-260T Redut-2US long-range telecommunications complexes and a field hospital. The P-260T Redut-2US is a long-range army-level communications system that is not used at the battalion or brigade level, it is indicative of the scale of the deployment.

Crimea and the neighbouring Krasnodar regions have seen a similar build-up of troops and equipment including BMP-3 IFVs and 2S4 Tyulpan 240 mm self-propelled mortars. This time coming from Southern Military District units stationed hundreds of kilometres away in the southern and western Caucasus.

Analysis

Since late March, Russia has been identified moving large quantities of military equipment to its Ukrainian border, specifically the Crimea, Voronezh, and Rostov regions. The Russian Ministry of Defence has belatedly labelled these as control-check exercises for the Southern Military District and Black Sea Fleet and later still, declared national control-checks covering the entire military. It appears locally stationed units in Voronezh, the Southern Military District and eastern Crimea have indeed begun training exercises.

While Russia’s intentions are still unclear, this movement stands out as possibly the largest unannounced movement of troops since Russia’s invasion of Crimea and eastern Ukraine in 2015. Video footage shows trains carrying Russian troops are still heading to the area of operations, with some according to the freight tracking service GdeVagon not scheduled to arrive in Crimea until mid-April.

Current indicators suggest it is unlikely the forces deployed to the border are in an offensive posture. But this could change if Russia continues to move forces to the Ukrainian border. Janes has identified the movement of army air defence systems into the Voronezh region, which have not been observed with prior movements. While there is a strategic air defence unit based in Crimea, there had been no clear indications that tactical air defence assets were being transported to match the armoured forces that had been deployed prior to this.

Furthermore, the Russian Ministry of Defence announced the Black Sea Fleet would be reinforced with 10 landing and artillery vessels from the Caspian Flotilla, as part of the ongoing control check exercises. This is not a common occurrence and was not even seen during the Southern Military District’s district level exercise Kavkaz-2020 last summer. Additionally, two Black Sea Fleet landing ships are believed to be operating in the Mediterranean Sea and could easily join the Black Sea Fleet.

The true extent of the cross-military district deployments also remains to be seen. The latest footage of regional exercises from the Russian Ministry of Defence indicates at least elements of some units, such as the 74th Motorised Brigade, are still in Siberia. It is however not clear when this footage was filmed.







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Mongo

Veteran Member
EndGameWW3
@EndGameWW3

8m


Update: Kiev decided to additionally transfer another tank battalion to the Donbass to strengthen the Armed Forces of Ukraine located in this region.
42 armored vehicles, including infantry fighting vehicles, armored vehicles from personal transportation. , tanks, etc. .
That is pretty light (low numbers of tanks and IFVs compared to US Armor Battalions)
 

night driver

ESFP adrift in INTJ sea
That is pretty light (low numbers of tanks and IFVs compared to US Armor Battalions)
Does their doctrine work with a normally lower number of armor pieces than we are used to, or have we missed something during the build-up?

Schlub here admits to having lost sight of the Order of Battle setting up for the festivities we're looking at.
 

Dozdoats

On TB every waking moment
I have not seen this posted, if it is a dup please excuse. Just a snip as the whole article is best read at the source... The writer is a former Russian FAO (foreign area officer) who specialized in the US.
=======================

What will the Empire do to support the Ukronazis (OPEN THREAD #4)? | The Vineyard of the Saker

What will the Empire do to support the Ukronazis (OPEN THREAD #4)?
18067 ViewsApril 05, 2021 318 Comments

Dear friends,
There is a lot of speculation about what the consolidated West (aka the AngloZionist Empire) will do to protect its Ukronazi proxies. Here are my, bulletpoint style ideas (in no particular order):
  1. The West has already decided that Russia is the aggressor and Banderastan the victim of the Russian aggression. Even if the Ukies launch a massive artillery and armor attack on the LDNR (or even Crimea), the West will claim with a straight face that the evil Russkies attacked the innocent Ukrainians.
  2. I do not expect any NATO country to actually commit forces to to attack the Russian forces. At most, the Poles (who else?!) to move a mostly symbolic force into the western Ukraine (Lvov, Ivano-Frankovsk).
  3. However, the USA is not only weak, it is fantastically incompetent, ignorant and arrogant: a lot of high level western officials have declared that the USA/NATO will not “allow” Russia to threaten or attack the Ukraine. To me, this tells me that there are those who believe that if the US/NATO actually do engage Russian forces Russia will “blink”, and cower down in fear. Clearly, these people have never read a history book.
  4. I am convinced that if the US/NATO attack Russian forces, the Russians will counter-attack not only the actual forces which attacked Russia, but also the command centers which gave this US/NATO command centers which gave the order to attack and coordinated it.
  5. The biggest danger right now is that western politicians are completely misreading not only Putin, but all of Russia. They are missing the key point: Russia cannot and will not retreat further, she won’t meekly declare that the Donbass or Crimea belong to the Nazi regime in Kiev. Russia is ready, capable and willing to fight US/NATO forces if needed, including by using tactical and even strategic nukes.
  6. The Kremlin fully understands that the role of Poland in the NATO pact is one of a small but very loud attack dog: if the Poles really move into western Ukraine then this will only be if the US tells them to do so. There is a saying in Russian “Поляки не вояки” meaning “the Poles ain’t no soldiers”: they always and only attack when their enemy of the moment is weak and disorganized (that is why Churchill call Poland the “greedy hyena of Europe”). However, I fully expect Polish (and US, UK) “advisors” to be assisting the Ukronazi forces during their attack on the LDNR. As for the supposed Russia’s fellow Orthodox “brothers” like Bulgaria or Romania, they will do what they always did in the past: join any anti-Russian coalition. The good news is that their militaries are as bad as the Polish one (ready for parades, not ready for real warfare). Also, the Black Sea is, in military terms, a “Russian lake”. So these small countries will huff and puff, but won’t do anything stupid.
  7. Propaganda wise, it is clear that irrespective of what Russia decides to do, she will be completely demonized. The current level of anti-Russian hatred in the West is now equal to, or even higher, than before the Nazi attack on Russia during WWII. Check out the following illustrations of this reality: /snip/
What will the Empire do to support the Ukronazis (OPEN THREAD #4)? | The Vineyard of the Saker
 

night driver

ESFP adrift in INTJ sea
Somewhat important question...

Has he kept up with the adjustments to the Polish armed forces over the past 4 years??

OR (not mutually exclusive) have *I* been misled by propaganda discussing the advances to the armed forces in Poland??
 

northern watch

Has No Life - Lives on TB
US Mulls Sending Warships Into Black Sea To Be "Ready To Respond" To Ukraine Crisis

BY TYLER DURDEN
ZERO HEDGE
THURSDAY, APR 08, 2021 - 04:40 PM

A US defense official has told CNN on Thursday that the Biden administration is seriously considering sending warships into the Black Sea amid reports that Russia is mustering forces near the border with Ukraine in response to a renewed uptick in fighting in nearby Donbas.

The warships could be deployed "in the next few weeks in a show of support for Ukraine," the unnamed defense official described. And further, "The US Navy routinely operates in the Black Sea, but a deployment of warships now would send a specific message to Moscow that the US is closely watching, the official said," according to the CNN report.


Via AFP


Typically the US gives 14-days notice prior to sending warships into the Black Sea, according to a long established treaty with Turkey regarding use of the Bosporus to enter the waters.

Importantly, the new CNN reporting comes two days after Ukraine's president Volodymyr Zelensky personally urged NATO to immediately expand its Black Sea presence.

He had said in a phone call with NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg, "Such a permanent presence should be a powerful deterrent to Russia, which continues the large-scale militarization of the region and hinders merchant shipping," the president's press service indicated in a readout.

Despite a slew of international reports this week hyping threat of a Russian "offensive" in eastern Ukraine - based largely on Kiev officials loudly claiming as much - the Pentagon's official assessment still appears to be that the Kremlin is not preparing for some kind of offensive move on Ukraine.

Surprisingly even CNN is bluntly stating that the US doesn't see this as imminent, despite all the breathless reports over extra Russian troops in Crimea and near the border:

Although the US does not see the amassing of Russian forces as posturing for an offensive action, the official told CNN that "if something changes we will be ready to respond."
Their current assessment is that the Russians are conducting training and exercises and intelligence has not indicated military orders for further action, the official said, but noted that they are well-aware that could change at any time.
But should US battleships indeed enter the Black Sea (though they semi-regularly conduct drills there) during this particular period of heightened tensions, we can expect Russia will "answer" with a greater naval build-up in its own backyard - something which appears to have already begun in a preemptive fashion.

US Mulls Sending Warships Into Black Sea To Be "Ready To Respond" To Ukraine Crisis | ZeroHedge
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
US Mulls Sending Warships Into Black Sea To Be "Ready To Respond" To Ukraine Crisis

BY TYLER DURDEN
ZERO HEDGE
THURSDAY, APR 08, 2021 - 04:40 PM

A US defense official has told CNN on Thursday that the Biden administration is seriously considering sending warships into the Black Sea amid reports that Russia is mustering forces near the border with Ukraine in response to a renewed uptick in fighting in nearby Donbas.

The warships could be deployed "in the next few weeks in a show of support for Ukraine," the unnamed defense official described. And further, "The US Navy routinely operates in the Black Sea, but a deployment of warships now would send a specific message to Moscow that the US is closely watching, the official said," according to the CNN report.

Via AFP


Could Ukraine-Russia border tension escalate into a fresh conflict?

Typically the US gives 14-days notice prior to sending warships into the Black Sea, according to a long established treaty with Turkey regarding use of the Bosporus to enter the waters.

Importantly, the new CNN reporting comes two days after Ukraine's president Volodymyr Zelensky personally urged NATO to immediately expand its Black Sea presence.

He had said in a phone call with NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg, "Such a permanent presence should be a powerful deterrent to Russia, which continues the large-scale militarization of the region and hinders merchant shipping," the president's press service indicated in a readout.

Despite a slew of international reports this week hyping threat of a Russian "offensive" in eastern Ukraine - based largely on Kiev officials loudly claiming as much - the Pentagon's official assessment still appears to be that the Kremlin is not preparing for some kind of offensive move on Ukraine.

Surprisingly even CNN is bluntly stating that the US doesn't see this as imminent, despite all the breathless reports over extra Russian troops in Crimea and near the border:



But should US battleships indeed enter the Black Sea (though they semi-regularly conduct drills there) during this particular period of heightened tensions, we can expect Russia will "answer" with a greater naval build-up in its own backyard - something which appears to have already begun in a preemptive fashion.

US Mulls Sending Warships Into Black Sea To Be "Ready To Respond" To Ukraine Crisis | ZeroHedge
If you think the Persian Gulf is a shooting gallery, the Black Sea is comparable when the shooting starts to Savo Island and Iron Bottom Sound.
 

northern watch

Has No Life - Lives on TB
Tensions Escalate in Donbas and on Ukrainian Border

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 18 Issue: 57
By: Pavel Felgenhauer
April 8, 2021 04:46 PM Age: 1 hour


Increasingly deadly skirmishes between Moscow-backed “separatist” forces and the Ukrainian military in the eastern Ukrainian region of Donbas have claimed the lives of dozens of combatants and civilians since January 1. The ceasefire agreement arranged in July 2020 has largely collapsed. Yet despite intermittent clashes, the line of control in Donbas has not moved at all since the last big offensive by regular Russian armed units, in February 2015, which pushed the Ukrainian military out of the Debaltseve bulge north of Donetsk. As both sides accuse each other of initiating the present clashes (see EDM, April 5), talk is growing in Moscow, Kyiv, and in occupied Donetsk and Luhansk of a major escalation that may dramatically upend the present stalemate: Either the Ukrainian military will move forward decisively to reach the Russian border and push the Moscow-backed forces out of Ukrainian territory, or the Russians will use the pretext of resumed fighting to massively go in, defeat the Ukrainians and dramatically extend their zone of control. The winter snow is swiftly melting on the East European (a.k.a. Sarmatic) Plain, with rivers and creeks overflowing. The spring Rasputitsa, or mud season, is in full swing, effectively prohibiting offensive maneuverable mechanized warfare in Donbas and surrounding areas. But sometime by mid-May, the fields and dirt roads will dry up and a “big war” in and around Donbas will again be possible (see EDM, March 11).

Since the beginning of the conflict in 2014, Moscow’s proxy militias in Donbas have developed into regular military units—the 1st Corps, with headquarters in Donetsk, and the 2nd Corps in Luhansk. Both are under the operational control of Russia’s 8th Guards Army of the Southern Military District (SMD), with headquarters in Novocherkassk, on the Russian side of the border. Ukrainian and Western sources put the overall strength of the Russia-backed proxy forces in Donbas at over 30,000 men, with hundreds of tanks, other armor, heavy guns, multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS) of various types, and anti-aircraft missile assets (Moskovsky Komsomolets, March 19). The main battle force of the 8th Guards Army is the 150th Motor Rifle Division, recreated in 2016 and deployed in garrisons on the Russian side of the border with eastern Ukraine—in essence a double-sized mechanized division of six regiments and six additional separate battalions, with hundreds of tanks and other heavy asserts and over 10,000 men under arms. The 150th is the main operational reserve of the 1st and 2nd corps. In March 2021, the Russian military began a massive mobilization of the SMD, including Ground Forces, Aerospace Forces (Vozdushno-Kosmicheskiye Sily—VKS), as well as naval assets of the Black Sea Fleet (Chernomorsky Flot—ChF) and the Caspian Flotilla (Kaspiyskaya Flotiliya—KF). According to reports, the maneuvers were organized “to test battle-readiness and inter-service coordination” (Militarynews.ru, March 21).

The SMD has over 50 permanent-readiness battalion tactical groups (BTG), 50 tactical VKS squadrons and some 50 warships of the ChF and the KF, nuclear-capable heavy field artillery, along with ballistic and cruise missiles (TASS, April 6). Today, these forces are on the move or already deployed in forward positions on the Ukrainian border and in occupied Crimea. The 22nd Army Corps is permanently deployed in Crimea as part of the Coastal Troops of the ChF. The 126th Permanent-Readiness Brigade, armed with modern Russian T-72B3 tanks, is the main offensive asset of the 22nd Corps, together with the 127th Special Forces (Spetsnaz) Brigade. Elements of the 7th Mountain Division of the Airborne Troops (Vozdushno-desantnye voyska—VDV) and other reinforcements have been moved to Crimea, where they are exercising airborne and sea-landing assaults, utilizing tanks and other heavy equipment (Militarynews.ru, March 18).

On March 21, media outlets revealed that three large Cold War–era, Polish-built landing ships of the Baltic Fleet—the Minsk, Korolev and Kaliningrad—steamed south through the British Channel, escorted by a single corvette, apparently heading to the Black Sea, possibly with marines and tanks onboard (Militarynews.ru, March 21). On April 8, officials announced that ten high-speed landing and artillery ships of the KF were being moved from the Caspian Sea, through the Volga and Don rivers, the Volga-Don Canal, and the Sea of Azov, into the Black Sea to run exercises (Interfax, April 8). In all, taking into account the assault landing capabilities of the ChF, Russia’s Military-Maritime Fleet (Voyenno-Morskoy Flot—VMF) could be gathering some 30 land-assault and support ships in the Black Sea for a possible large-scale landing from sea and air as part of a “deep” strategic offensive, possibly targeting beaches somewhere between Mykolaiv and Odesa. Additional forces have been arriving in the Voronezh and Belgorod oblasts, north of Donbas, from the Central Military District. The Kremlin declared Moscow can deploy its troops anywhere on Russian territory, and the deployed forces will stay on the Ukrainian border as long as needed. The deputy chief of President Vladimir Putin’s administration, Dmitry Kozak, said, “If Ukraine initiates a flare-up in Donbas and there will be a threat of a massacre, we [Russia] will be forced to intervene.” According to Kozak, this will spell the end of the Ukrainian state (Interfax, April 8). An independent Ukrainian national state has apparently always been seen in Moscow as unnatural.

Washington has pledged to back Kyiv in its standoff with Moscow without spelling out the exact nature of said support. In response on April 6, Russia began a massive mobilization and forward deployment of all of its armed forces in all its military districts and the Northern Fleet “to test battle-readiness” (TASS, April 6). Hundreds of thousands of Russian soldiers are evidently being mobilized and on the move. Russia looks to be signaling that it is preparing for a possible escalation of future clashes with Ukraine into war with the United States and its transatlantic allies. Or Moscow may be hoping a credible nuclear threat will deter the West from intervening in any possible Russo-Ukrainian fray, subsequently forcing Kyiv to yield. The Russian strategic nuclear forces (Raketnye Voyska Strategicheskogo Naznacheniya—RVSN) have been put on maximum battle readiness, with mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) moved into field firing positions (Nsn.fm, April 7). Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov told journalists, “Russia is ready to face the worst-case scenario in US-Russian relations.” He added, “When facing an aggressive and unpredictable adversary [the US], one must always be mobilized” (Interfax, April 8).

Tensions Escalate in Donbas and on Ukrainian Border - Jamestown
 

night driver

ESFP adrift in INTJ sea
Black Sea is a Russian POND!!

I would really seriously consider resigning a commission if ordered to take my ship in there
 

Red Baron

Paleo-Conservative
_______________
If you think the Persian Gulf is a shooting gallery, the Black Sea is comparable when the shooting starts to Savo Island and Iron Bottom Sound.
Kinda like Cuba and North Korea send warships to Lake Michigan.

That is how Russia considers the Black Sea.
 

northern watch

Has No Life - Lives on TB
Russia in Review: Russia Opens Permanent Training Center in Belarus and Sets Conditions for Permanent Military Basing

By George Barros
ISW Research
April 8, 2021

Key Takeaway: Joint Russian-Belarusian military exercises in March 2021 demonstrated several new Russian capabilities that could support a permanent Russian force presence in Belarus. Russia’s efforts to cement control of Belarusian forces and permanently deploy forces to Belarus increase Russia’s capacity to threaten NATO’s eastern flank. Russia and Belarus announced plans to open three permanent combined combat training centers in Russia and Belarus. The Kremlin is likely increasing Belarus’ military readiness and integration with Russian forces, augmenting the Kremlin’s capability to mobilize more units for longer durations and increasing Russia’s total force projection capability against NATO. Russian military pilots may begin operating out of Belarusian airbases in 2021. The Kremlin additionally used March 2021 exercises to prepare for Russia’s upcoming annual capstone strategic readiness exercise, Zapad 2021, in September, during which Russian units will likely deploy to Belarus on a significantly larger scale than ever before.

Russian combined military exercises with Belarus in March 2021 established new capabilities to support a permanent Russian military presence in Belarus. Russia and Belarus have held monthly combined military exercises since September 2020.[1] The March 2021 iteration of these exercises demonstrated several new Russian capabilities that advance the Kremlin’s campaign to create a permanent force presence in Belarus to threaten NATO’s eastern flank.




Russia and Belarus announced plans on March 5 to open three permanent combined combat training centers in Russia and Belarus at an unspecified future date. Russia and Belarus will open a ground forces training center in Nizhny Novgorod, Russia, a naval center in Kaliningrad, Russia, and an air force and air defense center in Grodno, Belarus.[2] Belarus, it should be noted, is landlocked and has no navy. These centers will likely support the Kremlin’s campaign to integrate the Belarusian military into Kremlin-controlled command structures and doctrine. The establishment of a permanent Russian training center in Belarus—which will likely contain a small permanent force as well as regularly rotating combat units from Russia—will enable a near-permanent Russian deployment in Belarus.

Russian military pilots may begin operating out of Belarusian airbases in 2021. Belarusian and Russian Air Force officials conducted a combined training on March 18 to, in part, plan relocating Russian Air Force assets to Belarusian airfields.[3] Self-declared Belarusian president Alexander Lukashenko previously proposed hosting Russian military aircraft in Belarusian airbases for joint use by Russian and Belarusian airmen—as opposed to opening a new Russian airbase in Belarus, which Lukashenko has previously rejected—on March 2.[4] Russian pilots’ access to Belarusian airfields, if achieved, would enhance Russian force projection capabilities against NATO’s eastern flank and constitute a significant threat to the West.

Russian forces conducted expanded Russian-Belarusian battalion-level unit exercises, advancing the Kremlin’s efforts to integrate Belarusian combat units into Russian command structures. The Kremlin continued efforts to integrate Russian and Belarusian units down to the battalion level during their March 2021 military exercises.[5] Russian and Belarusian forces conducted exercises as a single combined combat battalion for the first time in September 2020.[6] Russian and Belarusian forces formed three combined battalions in March 2021. The Kremlin’s increasing capability to create integrated units with Belarus is likely intended to support a permanent Russian presence in Belarus and will allow the Kremlin to better employ Belarusian forces outside of Belarus in future operations. The Kremlin may also be preparing Russian forces to subsume elements of Belarusian combat units in the event of a Russian intervention against the will of the Belarusian government—an unlikely but dangerous course of action ISW has previously warned of.[7]

The Kremlin is likely prioritizing increasing interoperability between Russian airborne forces—Russia’s main rapid reaction force—and partner forces in Belarus and the rest of the former Soviet Union (FSU). Two of the three combined combat battalions Russia and Belarus formed in March 2021 involved airborne units. These battalions marked a significant advance in the Kremlin’s effort to develop airborne cooperation with Belarus. Airborne units are Russia’s principal rapid reaction force and would likely be among the first units used in the event of a sustained Russian deployment to Belarus or a hybrid operation against NATO’s eastern flank.[8] Moscow’s development of airborne forces in Belarus could support other assessed Kremlin efforts to project Russian military force in the FSU, including Belarus.[9] The Kremlin likely seeks to tie a multinational Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) force to its own command structures to use these forces for its own campaigns.[10] The Kremlin may deploy a Kremlin-controlled multinational CSTO force to Belarus to obfuscate Russian efforts to undermine Belarusian sovereignty, for example.[11]

The Kremlin is likely increasing Belarus’ military capability to mobilize more units for longer durations. Belarusian units exercised more intensively and for longer durations in March 2021 than they did in similar monthly exercises in fall 2020.[12] Five of Belarus’ six principal maneuver units exercised simultaneously in Russia and Belarus in March 2021; Belarus has not previously exercised elements of that many brigades in both Russia and Belarus simultaneously.[13] Belarusian logistical tasks’ complexity increased in March 2021 to support longer exercise deployments.[14] The Kremlin likely seeks to leverage an enhanced Belarusian capability to simultaneously mobilize multiple brigades—and multiple elements of the same brigade—for longer periods of time to augment the Kremlin’s total force projection capability against NATO’s eastern flank.

The Kremlin used units based far from Belarus’ borders in exercises for the first time, indicating a likely priority to distribute interoperability experience throughout the Russian military. Belarusian forces conducted combined training with Central Military District and Southern Military District elements for the first time since ISW began closely watching the Belarus crisis as it began in August 2020.[15] Russian units outside the Western Military District (WMD) have not participated in previous combined Russian-Belarusian exercises in this period.[16]

The Kremlin publicly leveraged military learning from Nagorno Karabakh for the first time. The Belarusian Ministry of Defense stated that combined air-defense training in March 2021 leveraged military learning from the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war.[17] The Kremlin will likely increasingly prioritize electronic warfare, air defense, and UAV/counter-UAV operations from lessons learned in Nagorno Karabakh.

The Kremlin additionally used the March 2021 exercises to prepare for Russia’s upcoming annual capstone strategic readiness exercise, Zapad 2021. Belarusian forces conducted intensified joint communications and air defense exercises with the expressed goal of increasing Russian-Belarusian interoperability to prepare for Zapad 2021. Conventional Russian forces will likely deploy to Belarus in September 2021 for Zapad 2021 on a significantly larger scale than they did for the last annual Russian strategic readiness exercise in Belarus, Zapad 2017.[18] The Kremlin may not return Russian units to Russia after Zapad 2021 officially ends, opting instead to keep them in Belarus and postured against NATO.[19]
The following is a list of exercises and joint activities that Russian and Belarusian forces conducted in March 2021. This list includes nominally independent Belarusian activity that likely advanced Russian objectives given their consistency with previously observed patterns of joint Russian-Belarusian activity. Exercises are grouped by type, day, and location, as applicable.

End of Part 1
 
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northern watch

Has No Life - Lives on TB
Russian-Belarusian airborne (VDV) exercises at the Polivno Training Ground in Ulyanovsk, Russia (March 9-20)
March 9
  • A battalion-sized element of the Russian 31st Airborne Brigade based in Ulyanovsk and an unspecified company of the Belarusian 38th Airborne Brigade formed a combined Russian-Belarusian reinforced airborne battalion and began exercises emphasizing airborne and peacekeeping operations.[20]
March 11
  • An airborne infantry element of the Belarusian 38th Airborne Brigade conducted small arms live-fire exercises.[21]
March 15
  • Russian and Belarusian airborne elements conducted exercises and deployed a mobile reserve with army aviation helicopters.[22]
March 18
  • A Russian-Belarusian “consolidated peacekeeping unit” of the combined reinforced battalion conducted peacekeeping exercises to practice managing observation posts and checkpoints, escorting humanitarian convoys, patrolling designated areas with ground and air vehicles, facility protection, demining, defense operations, and maintaining peace between two warring parties.[23] This exercise could support a potential Belarusian deployment to Syria or Ukraine.[24]
March 20
  • The company of the Belarusian 38th Airborne Brigade returned to Belarus.[25]
Russian-Belarusian airborne exercises at the Osipovichsky training Ground in Mogilev, Belarus (March 15-27)
March 14
  • A reinforced company of the Russian 234th Airborne Regiment of the Guards 76th Airborne Division based in Pskov and the Belarusian 357th Battalion of the 103rd Airborne Brigade formed a combined Russian-Belarusian reinforced airborne battalion at the Osipovichsky training ground in Mogilev, Belarus.[26]
March 15 – 27
  • The combined Russian-Belarusian reinforced battalion conducted parachute exercises, maneuvers, and ambush tactics to relieve an encircled friendly force.[27]
  • The combined Russian-Belarusian reinforced battalion conducted force protection exercises emphasizing convoy escorts and anti-ambush actions.[28]
  • Belarusian engineers deployed a bridge to cross a water obstacle.[29]
  • A combined Belarusian-Russian company-sized element of the combined reinforced battalion performed a parachute exercise; the company departed from the Machulishchi airfield and parachuted into the Osipovichsky Training Ground[30]
March 26
  • The combined Russian-Belarusian reinforced battalion conducted combat exercises emphasizing holding a line, routing an enemy force into a prepared ambush, and destroying an enemy force with an airborne vertical envelopment.[31]
March 28
  • The reinforced company of the Russian 234th airborne regiment returned to Russia.[32]
Russian-Belarusian mechanized battalion exercises at the Mulino Training Ground in Nizhny Novgorod, Russia (March 10-April 2)
March 9
  • A company-sized element drawn from the Belarusian 6th, 19th, and 120th mechanized brigades and a company-sized element of the Russian 1st Tank Army based near Moscow formed a combined reinforced mechanized battalion at the Mulino Training Ground in Nizhny Novgorod, Russia.[33]
March 15-18
  • The combined Russian-Belarusian reinforced mechanized battalion conducted exercises using drones to identify and destroy enemy firing positions with indirect fire.[34]
  • The combined Russian-Belarusian reinforced mechanized battalion used drones to identify and destroy enemy firing positions with indirect fire and conducted an armored counterattack.[35]
  • Likely Russian electronic weapons specialists of the 1st Tank Army interfered with a simulated enemy force’s communications, and tank elements of the combined Russian-Belarusian reinforced mechanized battalion conducted live-fire exercises.[36]
  • Russian and Belarusian motorized rifle and tank elements of the combined Russian-Belarusian reinforced mechanized battalion conducted exercises to practice an armored offensive under simulated enemy electronic weapons suppression and to practice countering an enemy air attack and enemy combat UAVs.[37]
March 22
  • Belarus rotated its forces at the Mulino Training Ground, roughly doubling Russian and Belarusian participation in the exercise.[38]
  • Scouts of the Russian 1st Tank Army conducted exercises on psychological operations aimed to demoralize an enemy force and convince them to surrender with targeted text messages and propaganda leaflets.[39]
March 25
  • A reinforced battalion-sized force with artillery, scouts, and signals elements of the Russian 1st Tank Army practiced destroying ground targets with 120mm and rocket artillery using UAV reconnaissance.[40]
March 26
  • The WMD transferred 20 Russian armored vehicles to Belarusian forces for combined battalion exercises.[41]
March 29 – April 2
  • The combined Russian-Belarusian reinforced mechanized battalion conducted armor exercises emphasizing cordoning a settlement and urban combat tactics.[42]
  • A Russian chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense (CBRN) element, likely of the WMD, conducted exercises to protect Russian and Belarusian armored vehicles.[43]
  • Tank and motorized rifle elements of the combined Russian-Belarusian reinforced battalion conducted exercises using drones to identify and destroy enemy firing positions with tank fire.[44]
Belarusian airborne exercises at the Brestsky Training Ground in Brest, Belarus
March 3
  • An element of the Belarusian 38th Airborne Brigade conducted parachute exercises.[45]
March 10
  • A reinforced company of the Belarusian 38th Airborne Brigade conducted live-fire exercises to neutralize an enemy force planning to conduct raids on critical infrastructure to destabilize Brest.[46]
March 18
  • Elements, likely of the Belarusian 38th Airborne Brigade, conducted live-fire exercises with 120mm artillery.[47]
March 25 – April 5
  • Elements of the Belarusian 38th Airborne Brigade conducted exercises emphasizing maneuvers, overcoming a water obstacle, and airborne parachute drops in multiple training grounds in Brest.[48]
Belarusian Signals Activity
March 11
  • Elements of the Belarusian 85th Communications Brigade deployed to unspecified areas in Belarus to perform coordinated signals exercises, likely in coordination with other Belarusian signals units.[49]
March 15-19
  • Elements of the Belarusian 127th Communications Brigade conducted signals training at the Obuz-Lesnovsky and Domanovo Training Grounds in Brest, Belarus. [50] This exercise’s stated objective is to test Belarusian military communications readiness to support the Russian-Belarusian Regional Grouping of Forces (RGV)—a strategic formation of Russian and Belarusian units tasked with defending the Union State—and check the technical feasibility of transmitting communications from Belarus to Russia in preparation for Zapad 2021.[51]
  • Elements of the Belarusian 83rd Radiocommunications Center conducted exercises emphasizing deploying and camouflaging mobile communications equipment at the Obuz-Lesnovsky Training Ground in Brest, Belarus.[52]
  • Elements of the Belarusian 742nd Field Communications Center conducted exercises emphasizing deploying and camouflaging communications equipment to support the Belarusian 38th Airborne Brigade and prepare for Zapad 2021.[53]
  • Unspecified Russian signals “representatives” visited Belarus on March 16-18 to discuss coordinating field communication between Russian and Belarusian units, prepare for Zapad 2021, and attend the ongoing Belarusian signals exercises at the Obuz-Lesnovsky Training Ground.[54]
  • Communications elements of the Belarusian 85th Communications Brigade completed training exercises in unspecified training grounds near Brest, Minsk, and Grodno on March 19. The stated objective of these exercises is to test a communication system similar to the one that will be deployed during Zapad 2021.[55]
  • Communications elements of the Belarusian 86th Communications Brigade deployed to unspecified areas in Belarus to conduct exercises with the stated objective to prepare for Zapad 2021 on March 19.[56]
March 24
  • A Belarusian military communications delegation met with their Russian counterparts in an unspecified location in Russia to discuss developing field communications systems between Russian and Belarusian forces and improving the RGV’s integrated communication system.[57]
Belarusian Air Defense Activity
March 10
  • Elements of the Belarusian 377th Anti-Aircraft Missile Regiment conducted exercises to practice deploying the unit to a new position and increasing unit cohesion in simulated combat conditions.[58]
March 18
  • Unspecified Russian officials—likely senior officers—from Russia’s 6th, 4th, and 14th Air Force and Air Defense (VVS-PVO) Armies completed a joint staff headquarters training with Belarusian air-defense forces that emphasized planning operations with the RGV, planning deployments of Russian Air Force assets to Belarusian airfields, and controlling subordinate units of Russia and Belarus’ unified regional air defense system.[59] The Belarusian Ministry of Defense stated that combat in Nagorno Karabakh and Syria informed this training. Belarus has troops in neither Syria nor Nagorno Karabakh.
  • A Belarusian anti-aircraft missile battalion of the Minsk-based 15th Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade conducted exercises emphasizing mobilizing and deploying equipment from stored positions.[60]
March 29
  • An element, likely a battalion, of the Belarusian 115th Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade completed air-defense exercises at the Brestsky Training Ground to prepare for Zapad 2021.[61]
  • A Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) delegation visited Belarus on March 29-April 2 to examine the Belarusian territories where Zapad 2021 will occur and discuss the formation of the joint Russian-Belarusian Air Force and Air Defense Forces training center in Grodno.[62]
Belarusian Logistics Exercises
March 9
  • A brigade-sized Belarusian element conducted readiness exercises emphasizing mobilizing equipment from storage bases in unspecified locations in Belarus.[63]
March 10-11
  • Elements of the Belarusian 36th Road and Bridge Brigade conducted exercises emphasizing countering enemy sabotage and reconnaissance and practiced deploying a field camp.[64]
March 16
  • A battalion-sized Belarusian mechanized element practiced transferring ammunition and equipment from rear storage bases in an unspecified location in Belarus.[65]
March 19
  • Elements of the Belarusian Vitebsk-based 19th and Slonim-based 11th Mechanized Brigades conducted combat readiness exercises to practice resupplying Belarusian units that conducted live fires in unspecified locations in Belarus.[66]
Miscellaneous Belarusian Exercises and Activity that Support Russian Lines of Effort
March 16
  • A company of the Belarusian 103rd Airborne Brigade held an exercise with Belarusian border guards at the Belarusian-Latvian border in Polotsk, Belarus.[67] This exercise’s stated objective is to foster interoperability between Belarusian airborne and border guard forces “in the event of the need to perform special operation forces tasks in border areas.”[68]
March 17
  • The Belarusian Army activated approximately 1,000 reservists across Belarus and conducted mechanized brigade reserve officer training in Pechi, Minsk Oblast, Belarus, and likely other locations in Belarus.[69]
  • Tank and artillery elements, likely of the Belarusian 6th Mechanized Brigade, conducted live-fire exercises at the Gozhsky Training Ground in Grodno, Belarus.[70] The Belarusian 6th Mechanized Brigade continued exercising in Grodno until at least March 31.[71]
March 19
  • Reserve officers of the Belarusian 19th Mechanized Brigade received “special ideological, fire, and tactical” training.[72]
March 22
  • The Belarusian North Western Operational Command (a Belarusian command structure roughly equivalent to a Russian military district) conducted operational planning staff training emphasizing the use of forces based on “an analysis of the results of modern wars and conflicts.”[73] This training’s stated goal is to prepare Belarusian forces for Zapad 2021.
  • A reinforced battalion of the Belarusian 120th Mechanized Brigade conducted live-fire and maneuver exercises at the 227th combined arms training ground in Borisov, Belarus.[74]
March 29
  • Elements of the Belarusian 51st Artillery Brigade conducted artillery live-fire exercises at the Osipovichi Training Ground in Mogilev, Belarus.[75]
March 30-31
  • A reinforced battalion of the Belarusian 6th Mechanized Brigade and elements of the Belarusian 557th Engineering Brigade conducted mechanized combat exercises to practice defensive operations, launching counterattacks, repelling air attacks, and overcoming water obstacles at the Gozhsky Training Ground in Grodno, Belarus on March 30.[76]
  • Chief of the Russian General Staff Valery Gerasimov and Chief of the Belarusian General Staff Major General Viktor Gulevich discussed military cooperation on the RGV, Zapad 2021, CSTO, and the terms of the three new combined combat training centers in Moscow, Russia on March 30-31.[77]
  • A battalion-sized reservist element of the Belarusian 19th Mechanized Brigade conducted basic combat training exercises in Zaslonovo, Belarus, on March 31.[78]
  • A reinforced battalion of the Belarusian 120th Mechanized Brigade began battalion tactical exercises at the 227th Combined Arms Training Ground in Borisov, Belarus on March 31.[79]
End of Part 2
 

northern watch

Has No Life - Lives on TB
[1] Mason Clark, “Belarus Warming Update: Lukashenko Softens His Opposition to Protests, Seeking Leverage Against Increased Russian Pressure,” Institute for the Study of War, September 14, 2020, Belarus Warning Update: Lukashenko Softens His Opposition to Protests, Seeking Leverage against Increased Russian Pressure.
[2] [“Results of Talks Between the Ministers of Defense of Belarus and Russia,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 16, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111189/; [“Talks Between the Heads of the Defense Ministries of Belarus and Russia,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 5, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/110984/; “Defence Ministers of Russia and Belarus Discussed Joint Activities for 2021,” Russian Ministry of Defense, March 5, 2021, https://eng.mil dot ru/en/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12347433@egNews; Belarusian Ministry of Defense, Telegram, March 16, 2021, https://t dot me/modmilby/3992.
[3] [“Joint Headquarters Training Completed in the Air Force and Air Defense Forces,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 18, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111272/.
[4] [“Lukashenko Spoke About the Details of Negotiations with Putin and Reacted to Speculation,”] Belta, March 2, 2021, https://www.belta dot by/president/view/lukashenko-rasskazal-o-podrobnostjah-peregovorov-s-putinym-i-otreagiroval-na-domysly-430898-2021/; Maria Leyva, [“Lukashenko Refused to Create a Russian Military Base in Belarus,”] RBK, October 6, 2015, https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/06/10/2015/5613ebe59a794769839c9e3f.
[5] Elements of the Russian 234th airborne regiment formed a brigade-sized unified combat formation with Belarusian forces in March 2021 similarly to how a 234th Brigade Tactical Group (BTG) did with Belarusian airborne units in September 2020. George Barros, “Belarus Warning Update: NEXTA Actively Encourages Belarusian Security Service Defections,” Institute for the Study of War, September 20, 2020, Belarus Warning Update: NEXTA Actively Encourages Belarusian Security Service Defections.
[6] George Barros, “Belarus Warning Update: NEXTA Actively Encourages Belarusian Security Service Defections,” Institute for the Study of War, September 20, 2020, Belarus Warning Update: NEXTA Actively Encourages Belarusian Security Service Defections.
[7] George Barros, “Belarus Warning Update: NEXTA Actively Encourages Belarusian Security Service Defections,” Institute for the Study of War, September 20, 2020, Belarus Warning Update: NEXTA Actively Encourages Belarusian Security Service Defections.
[8] The majority of Russian units that have deployed to Belarus since the crisis began have overwhelmingly been airborne units. George Barros, “Belarus Warning Update: Upcoming CSTO Exercise Could Support Russian Military Deployment to Belarus,” Institute for the Study of War, November 6, 2020, Belarus Warning Update: Upcoming CSTO Exercise Could Support Russian Military Deployment to Belarus.
[9] The Kremlin likely seeks to leverage Russian airborne units to create a new capability to rapidly deploy Russian-controlled Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) forces in the FSU. Russian and Belarusian forces conducted joint exercises in November 2020 testing the use of a Russian airborne command post as the command and control basis of the CSTO’s Rapid Reaction Force – a strategic force of approximately 18,000 personnel designed to rapidly respond to military crises in the FSU. Joint Russian-Belarusian airborne capabilities development could support this effort. George Barros, “Belarus Warning Update: Upcoming CSTO Exercise Could Support Russian Military Deployment to Belarus,” Institute for the Study of War, November 6, 2020, Belarus Warning Update: Upcoming CSTO Exercise Could Support Russian Military Deployment to Belarus.
[10] George Barros, “Belarus Warning Update: Upcoming CSTO Exercise Could Support Russian Military Deployment to Belarus,” Institute for the Study of War, November 6, 2020, Belarus Warning Update: Upcoming CSTO Exercise Could Support Russian Military Deployment to Belarus.
[11] George Barros, “Russia in Review: Putin’s ‘Peacekeepers’ Will Support Russian Wars,” Institute for the Study of War, November 16, 2020, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russia-review-putins-“peacekeepers”-will-support-russian-wars; George Barros and Mason Clark, “Belarus Warning Update,” Institute for the Study of War, October 8, 2020, Belarus Warning Update: The Kremlin Will Likely Use October Military Exercises to Advance its Hybrid War in Belarus.
[12] George Barros, “Belarus Warning Update: Russia Deploys a Third Battalion Tactical Group to Belarus,” Institute for the Study of War, September 22, 2020, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/belarus-warning-update-russia-deploys-third-battalion-tactical-group-belarus; George Barros, “Warning: The Kremlin Deploys a Brigade-Sized Force to Belarus Near Polish Border,” Institute for the Study of War, September 21, 2020, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/warning-kremlin-deploys-brigade-sized-force-belarus-near-polish-border; George Barros, “Belarus Warning Update: Multiple Russian Military Exercises Occurring in the Western Military District, Belarus, and Moldova,” Institute for the Study of War, September 19, 2020, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/belarus-warning-update-multiple-russian-military-exercises-occurring-western-military; George Barros, “Belarus Warning Update: Upcoming CSTO Exercise Could Support Russian Military Deployment to Belarus,” Institute for the Study of War, November 6, 2020, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/belarus-warning-update-upcoming-csto-exercise-could-support-russian-military-deployment; George Barros and Mason Clark, “Belarus Warning Update: The Kremlin Will Likely Use October Military Exercises to Advance its Hybrid War in Belarus,” Institute for the Study of War, October 8, 2020, Belarus Warning Update: The Kremlin Will Likely Use October Military Exercises to Advance its Hybrid War in Belarus.
[13] Elements of the Belarusian 6th, 19th, and 120th, mechanized brigades and the 38th and 103rd VDV brigades, exercised in both Russia and Belarus in March 2021.
[14] Belarus rotated forces for a month-long exercise – a logistical task more sophisticated that what Belarusian forces have done before in monthly exercises – for the first time since the crisis in Belarus began in August 2020. [“Goodbye, Mulino!”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 22, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111361/; [“Servicemen of the Republic of Belarus Arrived in the Nizhny Novgorod Region to Participate in a Joint Exercise with Servicemen of the Western Military District,”] Russian Ministry of Defense, March 23, 2021, https://function.mil dot ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12350389@egNews; [“Joint Battalion Tactical Exercises with Units of the Ground Forces of the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 23, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111420/.
[15] The 31st airborne brigade and 14th Air Force and Air Defense (VVS-PVO) Army are subordinate to the Central Military District. The 4th VVS-PVO Army is subordinate to the Southern Military District. George Barros, “Belarus Warning Update: The Kremlin May Have Used Kavkaz 2020 Exercises in Part to Prepare for a Conventional Russian Military Deployment to Belarus,” Institute for the Study of War, September 26, 2020, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/belarus-warning-update-kremlin-may-have-used-kavkaz-2020-exercises-part-prepare; Mason Clark and George Barros, “Russia’s Unprecedentedly Expansive Military Exercises in Fall 2020 Seek to Recreate Soviet-Style Multinational Army,” Institute for the Study of War, October 20, 2020, Russia’s Unprecedentedly Expansive Military Exercises in Fall 2020 Seek to Recreate Soviet-Style Multinational Army.
[16] Russian Southern Military District and Belarusian units exercised together in the Kavkaz 2020 exercises in September 2020. However, Kavkaz 2020 – Russia’s annual strategic readiness capstone exercise for 2020 – included many international partners and was not part of the new monthly Russian-Belarusian exercises that began in Fall 2020. Mason Clark and George Barros, “Russia’s Unprecedentedly Expansive Military Exercises in Fall 2020 Seek to Recreate Soviet-Style Multinational Army,” Institute for the Study of War, October 20, 2020, Russia’s Unprecedentedly Expansive Military Exercises in Fall 2020 Seek to Recreate Soviet-Style Multinational Army.
[17] [“Joint Headquarters Training Completed in the Air Force and Air Defense Forces,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 18, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111272/; Belarusian Ministry of Defense, Telegram, March 18, 2021, https://t dot me/modmilby/4023; [“From March 16 to 18, the Air Force and Air Defense Forces Will Host a Joint Staff Training,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 15, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111153/.
[18] George Barros, “Belarus Warning Update: Putin Intensifies Russian-Belarusian Military Integration,” Institute for the Study of War, October 27, 2020, Belarus Warning Update: Putin Intensifies Russian-Belarusian Military Integration.
[19] George Barros, “Belarus Warning Update: Putin Will Increase Pressure on Lukashenko to Integrate Belarus in 2021,” Institute for the Study of War, December 18, 2020, Belarus Warning Update: Putin Will Increase Pressure on Lukashenko to Integrate Belarus in 2021.
[20] [“Two Joint Russian-Belarusian Tactical Exercises of the Airborne Forces of Russia and the Special Operations Forces of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus Will Be Held in March This Year,”] Russian Ministry of Defense, March 7, 2021, https://function.mil dot ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12347675@egNews; [“On Holding a Joint Battalion Tactical Exercise,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 9, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111022/; [“The Exercise is Completed,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 19, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111331/; [“Skillfully! Well-Coordinated! Together!”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 18, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111296/; [“A Combined Peacekeeping Unit Repelled an Attack on the Observation Post of the Peacekeeping Forces of a Conditional Illegal Armed Group at the Stage of Live Firing as Part of the Russian-Belarusian Tactical Exercises,”] Russian Ministry of Defense, March 18, 2021, https://function.mil dot ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12349542@egNews; [“Paratroopers of the Russian Federation and Belarus Worked Out Actions at a Conditional Checkpoint Near Ulyanovsk,”] TASS, March 18, 2021, https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/10938849; [“A Belarusian-Russian Group Conducted A Peacekeeping Mission – Video,”] Sputnik, March 19, 2021, https://sputnik dot by/video/20210319/1047177205/Belorussko-rossiyskaya-gruppirovka-otrabotala-mirotvorcheskuyu-missiyu--video.html; [“A Unit of a Separate Airborne Assault Unit of the Special Operations Forces of Belarus Arrived in Ulyanovsk to Participate in a Joint Russian-Belarusian Exercise,”] Russian Ministry of Defense, March 9, 2021, https://function.mil dot ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12348049@egNews.
[21] [“Peacekeepers Are Being Trained for a Joint Russian-Belarusian Tactical Exercise in Ulyanovsk,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 11, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111103/.
[22] [“In One language,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 15, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111166/.
[23] [“A Combined Peacekeeping Unit Repelled an Attack on the Observation Post of the Peacekeeping Forces of a Conditional Illegal Armed Group at the Stage of Live Firing as Part of the Russian-Belarusian Tactical Exercises,”] Russian Ministry of Defense, March 18, 2021, https://function.mil dot ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12349542@egNews; [“Skillfully! Well-Coordinated! Together!”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 18, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111296/; [“Paratroopers of the Russian Federation and Belarus Worked Out Actions at a Conditional Checkpoint Near Ulyanovsk,”] TASS, March 18, 2021, https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/10938849; [“A Belarusian-Russian Group Conducted A Peacekeeping Mission – Video,”] Sputnik, March 19, 2021, https://sputnik dot by/video/20210319/1047177205/Belorussko-rossiyskaya-gruppirovka-otrabotala-mirotvorcheskuyu-missiyu--video.html.
[24] George Barros with Jennifer Carafella, “Belarus Warning Update: Belarusian Forces may Deploy to Syria in Late 2021,” Institute for the Study of War, February 4, 2021, Belarus Warning Update: Belarusian Forces May Deploy to Syria in Late 2021.
[25] [“To Home - With Peacekeeping Experience,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 21, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111341/.

End of Part 3
 

northern watch

Has No Life - Lives on TB
[26] https://t dot me/modmilby/3970; [“We are glad to welcome you on Belarusian soil (video)”] https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111141/; [“On Conducting a Battalion Tactical Exercise with Personnel of 103rd Airborne Brigade,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 12, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111130/.
[27] [“The Active Phase of the Joint Exercise of the Special Operations Forces of the Republic of Belarus and the Airborne Forces of Russia Opened at the Training Ground Near Mogilev,”] Russian Ministry of Defense, March 22, 2021, https://function.mil dot ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12350330@egNews; Viktoria Ivashechkina, [“Airborne Forces and Special Forces: The Active Phase of the Exercises of Russia and Belarus Started Near Mogilev,”] Tv Zvezda, Mach 23, 2021, https://tvzvezda dot ru/news/2021323120-USc1f.html; “Belarusian, Russian Paratroopers in Joint Army Exercise,” Belta, March 22, 2021, https://eng.belta dot by/society/view/belarusian-russian-paratroopers-in-joint-army-exercise-138398-2021/; [“Joint Airborne Double Strike,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 24, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111451/.
[28] Russian Ministry of Defense, Facebook, March 24, 2021,
View: https://www.facebook.com/1492252324350852/posts/2908892426020161/
.
[29] [“Establishing a Bridge: Russian-Belarusian paratroopers led a convoy through a water barrier near Mogilev”] TV Zvezda, March 25, 2021, https://tvzvezda dot ru/news/20213251124-hEfhn.html.
[30] “Belarusian, Russian Paratroopers in Joint Army Exercise,” Belta, March 22, 2021, https://eng.belta dot by/society/view/belarusian-russian-paratroopers-in-joint-army-exercise-138398-2021/.
[31] [“Russian Paratroopers and Servicemen of the Special Forces of Belarus Blocked and Destroyed a Mock Enemy at a Joint Exercise Near Mogilev,”] Russian Ministry of Defense, March 26, 2021, https://function.mil dot ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12351015@egNews; [“Not Instead, But Together,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 26, 2021 https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111543/.
[32] [“Personnel of the Reinforced Paratrooper Company of the Pskov-Guards Airborne Assault Force of the Airborne Forces Arrived From the Republic of Belarus to their Point of Permanent Deployment,”] Russian Ministry of Defense, March 28, 2021, https://function.mil dot ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12351297@egNews.
[33] [“Preparation for the Exercise are in Full Swing,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 11, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111102/; [“Shoulder to Shoulder,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 15, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111155/; [“Servicemen of the Republic of Belarus Arrived in the Nizhny Novgorod Region to Participate in Joint Exercises with Servicemen of the Western Military District,”] Russian Ministry of Defense, March 10, 2021, https://function.mil dot ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12348115@egNews; [“Servicemen of the Republic of Belarus Arrived in the Nizhny Novgorod Region to Participate in a Joint Exercise with Servicemen of the Western Military District”] Russian Ministry of Defense, March 23, 2021, https://function.mil dot ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12350389@egNews/; [“Shoulder to Shoulder,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 17, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111245/.
[34] [“Russian and Belarusian Servicemen have Practiced the Use of Drones During an Exercise in the Nizhny Novgorod Region,”] Russian Ministry of Defense, March 17, 2021, https://function.mil dot ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12349331@egNews.
[35] [“In the Nizhny Novgorod Region, the Military Personnel of the Western Military District and the Republic of Belarus Jointly Stopped the Offensive of the Mock Enemy,”] Russian Ministry of Defense, March 19, 2021, https://function.mil dot ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12349683@egNews.
[36] [“Officers of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus Gained Unique Experience in Managing Disparate Units During a Bilateral Exercise Near Nizhny Novgorod,”] Russian Ministry of Defense, March 19, 2021, https://function.mil dot ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12349631@egNews.
[37] [“Allies Win,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 19, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111329/; [“Russian-Belarusian military exercises began in the Nizhny Novgorod region,”] Regnum, March 15, 2021, https://regnum dot ru/news/polit/3215627.html
[38] The rotation brought participation in the exercise from approximately 80 Belarusian personnel and 200 Russian personnel to 150 Belarusian personnel and 350 Russian personnel. [“Joint Battalion Tactical Exercises with Units of the Ground Forces of the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 23, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111420/; [“Goodbye, Mulino!”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 22, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111361/; [“Servicemen of the Republic of Belarus Arrived in the Nizhny Novgorod Region to Participate in a Joint Exercise with Servicemen of the Western Military District,”] Russian Ministry of Defense, March 23, 2021, https://function.mil dot ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12350389@egNews; [“A Company Tactical Exercise of Military Personnel of the Western Military District and the Republic of Belarus Started in the Nizhny Novgorod Region,”] Russian Ministry of Defense, March 15, 2021, https://function.mil dot ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12349007@egNews; [“Shoulder to Shoulder,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 15, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111155/; [“Shoulder to Shoulder,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 17, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111245/; [“Allies Win,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 19, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111329/.
[39] Anton Valagin, [“The Military Captured the City by SMS,”] Rossiyskaya Gazeta, March 22, 2021, https://rg dot ru/2021/03/22/reg-pfo/voennye-zahvatili-gorod-po-sms.html; Anastasia Eremina, [“Nizhny Novgorod Servicemen Worked Out the Capture of a City Using SMS-Messages,”] Kommersant, March 22, 2021, https://www.kommersant dot ru/doc/4740895.
[40] [“Artillerymen of the Western Military District, as Part of an Exercise Near Nizhny Novgorod, Destroyed More Than 50 Targets of a Simulated Enemy,”] Russian Ministry of Defense, March 25, 2021, https://function.mil dot ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12350804@egNews.
[41] [“Servicemen of the Republic of Belarus Received Military Equipment to Participate in Joint Tactical Exercises,”] Russian Ministry of Defense, March 26, 2021, https://function.mil dot ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12350999@egNews.
[42] [“Russian-Belarusian Battalion Tactical Exercise Started in the Nizhny Novgorod Region,”] Russian Ministry of Defense, March 29, 2021, https://function.mil dot ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12351408@egNews.
[43] [“In the Nizhny Novgorod Region, the Military Personnel of the Western Military District Carried Out a Special Treatment of Armored Vehicles Involved in a Joint Russian-Belarusian Exercise,”] Russian Ministry of Defense, March 29, 2021, https://function.mil dot ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12351399@egNews
[44] [“In the Nizhny Novgorod Region, Units of the Western Military District and the Republic of Belarus Held Joint Exercises,”] Russian Ministry of Defense, April 1, 2021, https://function.mil dot ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12352044@egNews.
[45] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 3, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/110881/.
[46] [“The Landing Force Storms the Skies,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 3, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111051/.
[47] [“With a Female Name ‘NONA,’”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 18, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111284/.
[48] [“Tactical Exercise With the 38th Brest Separate Guards Airborne Assault Brigade,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 27, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111569/; [“Barriers Do Not Exist for Special Forces,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 31, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111665/; [“Barriers Do Not Exist for Special Forces,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, April 5, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111790/.
[49] [“Exam for Signalmen,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 11, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111099/.
[50] [“Readiness to Complete Tasks,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 16, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111188/; https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111254/; [“127th Guards Communications Brigade Participates in Control Exercises on Tactical and Special Training,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 19, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111316/; [“They Are Always Connected,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 23, 2021 https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111414/.
[51] [“Readiness to Complete Tasks,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 16, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111188/; [“127th Guards Communications Brigade Participates in Control Exercises on Tactical and Special Training,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 19, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111316/.
[52] [“Signalmen Hhave a Crunch Time,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 17, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111261/.
[53] [“To Keep the Connection Reliable,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 17, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111260/.
[54] [“Visit of the Russian Delegation of Signalmen to the Republic of Belarus,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 17, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111254/.
[55] [“They Are Always Connected,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 23, 2021 https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111414/.
[56] [“Preparation for the Main Exam of the Year,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 19, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111317/.
[57] [“Visit of the Belarusian Delegation of Signalmen to the Russian Federation,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 24, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111459/.
[58] [“Strength Test,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 10, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111066/.
[59] [“Joint Headquarters Training Completed in the Air Force and Air Defense Forces,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 18, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111272/; Belarusian Ministry of Defense, Telegram, March 18, 2021, https://t dot me/modmilby/4023; [“From March 16 to 18, the Air Force and Air Defense Forces Will Host a Joint Staff Training,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 15, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111153/.
[60] [“They Checked Combat Readiness,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 18, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111297/; [“Military Unit 30151,”] Fanipol Online, Accessed, April 5, 2021, http://fanipol dot net/business/business.php?id=30; [“Young Servicemen of Military Unit 30151 Swore Allegiance to the Motherland,”] DZR, June 16, 2020, https://dzr dot by/novobranczy-v-ch-30151-prisyagnuli-na-vernost-rodine/.
[61] [“Combat Readiness is the Priority,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 29, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111609/.
[62] [“Visit of the Delegation of the Aerospace Forces of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 29, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111602/; [“Delegation of the Aerospace Forces of the Russian Armed Forces Visits Belarus,] Belta, March 29, 2021, https://www.belta dot by/society/view/delegatsija-vozdushno-kosmicheskih-sil-vs-rossii-poseschaet-belarus-434813-2021/; [“A Delegation of the Russian Aerospace Forces Has Arrived in Belarus to Prepare the Zapad-2021 Exercises,”] TASS, March 29, 2021, https://tass dot ru/armiya-i-opk/11019551.
[63] [“The Armed Forces Began the Second Stage of a Comprehensive Check of Troops,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 9, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111021/.
[64] [“Special Tactical Exercise,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 15, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111164/.
[65] [“A Complex Check Continues,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 16, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111190/.
[66] [“A Comprehensive Check Continues in the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 19, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111323/.
[67] [“Airborne Shield at the Borders of the Fatherland,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 16, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111219/.
[68] [“Airborne Shield at the Borders of the Fatherland,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 16, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111219/.
[69] [“A Complex Check Continues,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 17, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111264/.
[70] [“The Power of the ‘Staff,’”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 17, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111262/.
[71] [“Exercise Is the Best School and Baptism by Fire,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 31, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111666/.
[72] [“The Mood is a Fighting One,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 23, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111432/.
[73] [“Joint staff training is being held at the North Western Operational Command,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 22, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111388/.
[74] [“Battalion Tactical Exercise of the 120th Separate Guards Mechanized Brigade,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 22, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111390/.
[75] [“Everyone Knows Their Maneuver,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 29, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111591/.
[76] [“A Large-Scale Exercise at the Gozhsky Training Ground,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 30, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111642/.
[77] [“Within the Framework of Bilateral Military Cooperation”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 30, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111635/; [“Issues of Military Cooperation Between Belarus and Russia Discussed in Moscow,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 31, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111674/; [“Chiefs of General Staffs of Russia and Belarus Discussed Issues of Joint Defense Policy in Moscow”] Russian Ministry of Defense, March 31, 2021, https://function.mil dot ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12351838@egNews.
[78] [“Margin of Safety,”] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 31, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111667/.
[79] ["Our Armor is Strong and Our Tanks Are Fast,"] Belarusian Ministry of Defense, March 31, 2021, https://www.mil dot by/ru/news/111683/.


Posted by Institute for the Study of War at 10:09 AM

End of Part 4


ISW Blog (iswresearch.org)
 

AlfaMan

Has No Life - Lives on TB
More astonishingly crappy music . . . .
I'd rather have the balalaika music than the Russian rap I've heard in some of the other videos. Russian rap makes German rap sound good!

A more appropriate song to go with all this

Aquarium-Moscow October

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x1kXQD24_rI


Or,
Soldat-Lyube

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UoYtlPb_4Wg


Lyrics

Third day on the road, wind, stones, rains,
Still ahead and ahead, our company holds up
Third day on the road, hey, brother, don't be sad -
An order is an order, every one of us knows.

Write a little letter, nothing is dearer for fighters.
Write a couple of words, you girls, for your boys.

And at sunrise ahead marches on the company of soldiers
Goes on, to win and to not die;
And you, give them a smoke out there, comrade chief sergeant,
I believe in your spirit, soldier, soldier, soldier…

Third day on the road, wind, stones, rains,
At sunrise we to battle, the day shall begin with fire.
Third day on the road, and who knows what awaits us,
Third day on the road and sunrise comes.

Write a little letter, how is our beloved home doing?
From far-far away clouds shall carry it to me.
And at sunrise the company goes on ahead.

Earth fell, from the sky earth fell,
Tearing the scream: "A bitch you are, war!"
Armor melted, the machine gun choked breathlessly,
You looked into the eyes of death, sergeant of the guard
 
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