The Russian Armed Forces sought to create exclusively reservist units but likely did not accomplish its goals due to low engagement.
[21] The Russian Defense Ministry hoped to recruit more than 100,000 reservists starting in August 2021, but it is unlikely the Kremlin was able to achieve its goals on such a short timeline.
Mobilization
Current law limits mobilization of reserves to soldiers and sailors younger than 45 and officers younger than 55. Men who transferred to the reserve less than two years ago, fathers of three or more children, and those with criminal records are also exempt from mobilization under current law.
[22] The Russian State Duma adopted a bill on February 22 to strengthen general mobilization, making it mandatory for men to appear at a military commissar’s office without receiving a conscription notice from regional authorities.
[23] This law will reduce the administrative time needed to enlist conscripts if the Kremlin announces martial law. Russian independent media source Vazhnye Istorii explained that the Russian military can activate both reservists and new conscripts during general mobilization, including those previously exempted from conscription.
[24] In the event of a general mobilization, the Russian Army will likely attempt to fill the ranks of nascent reserve units and backfill combat casualties from units already serving in Ukraine.
The Russian cadre-and-reserve units concentrated around Ukraine before the invasion almost certainly required a significant reserve call-up to fill out. As the ground offensive in Ukraine stalls, the Russian military likely faces a requirement for a new reserve call up to fill out additional units and replace individual losses in these units. There is reporting as of March 5 that 3,000 individual replacements are being mobilized across the Russian border from Kharkiv to replace combat losses in Russian units.
[25]
As early as December 2021, the Russian Committee for Soldier’s Mothers claimed that newly signed reservists and contractors started deploying to units near the Ukrainian border.
[26] The Committee claimed that the new reservists arrived in Belgorod Oblast to the following units: Training Military unit in Kovrov (unit number 306616), 752nd Motorized Rifle Regiment (Valuyki), 3rd Motorized Rifle Division (Boguchar, Valuyki), 4th Guards Tank Division, and 2nd Guards Motor Rifle Division.
[27] US officials also note that Russian reservists will be integrated across all 120-125 battalion tactical groups following the initial invasion.
[28]
Conclusion
Russia is likely rapidly exhausting the manpower it can readily use to generate additional effective combat power even as its forces lose combat effectiveness in Ukraine amid high losses. Russian efforts to mobilize more manpower can bring more people into Russian combat units, but those people are unlikely to be well-enough trained or motivated to generate large amounts of new combat power.
Mobilization efforts are likely to start producing diminishing returns as Russia moves through the categories of fully-trained and recently-released reservists into categories of people further removed from their initial military experiences and/or those who will undergo hasty training before deployment to the front lines. Individual replacements for battlefield losses are unlikely to have the same training as their predecessors, and new units or those reinforced by these augmentees will not have undergone unit-level training prior to employment. More units and reservist replacements will likely appear in Ukraine, therefore, but the net effect on Russia’s actual combat capability will likely be small and diminishing.
A declaration of martial law and general mobilization would not overcome the structural challenges of Russia’s hybrid cadre-and-reserves and contract-soldier system. Creating cohesive fighting units cannot be accomplished overnight. Replacing individual combat casualties in Ukraine with recalled reservists who have gone years without military training is unlikely to dramatically increase Russian combat power.
[1] The Future of the Russian Military
[2] The Future of the Russian Military
[3] https://www dot kp.ru/putevoditel/obrazovanie/vesennij-prizyv/;
https://www dot interfax.ru/russia/794657
[4] http://publication dot pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202202180067;
https://nv. Dot ua/world/geopolitics/rossiya-prodolzhaet-styagivat-voyska-k-granice-s-ukrainoy-analitik-cit-na-radio-nv-50205189.html;
https://vk dot tatarstan.ru/index.htm/news/2000133.htm
[5] https://www dot kp.ru/putevoditel/obrazovanie/vesennij-prizyv/;
Timebomb 2000. Dot consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_18260/673dfb400c48363d58052a3dd0e762af36f38979/
[6] Timebomb 2000 dot consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_18260/
[7] https://www dot interfax.ru/russia/794657;
https://ria dot ru/20210930/trebovaniya-1752464085.html
[8] https://iz dot ru/1036012/2020-07-16/v-rossii-zavershilsia-vesennii-prizyv;
https://tvzvezda dot ru/news/202012311053-F2LZR.html;
https://iz dot ru/960313/video/osennii-prizyv-v-armiiu-zavershaetsia-v-rossii
[9] https://intumen dot ru/armiya/god-v-armii.html?utm_referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2F
[10] http://pravo dot gov.ru/proxy/ips/?docbody=&nd=102053139#:~:text=%D0%A1%D1%82%D0%B0%D1%82%D1%83%D1%81%20%D0%B2%D0%BE%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%BD%D0%BE%D1%81%D0%BB%D1%83%D0%B6%D0%B0%D1%89%D0%B8%D1%85%20%D0%B5%D1%81%D1%82%D1%8C%20%D1%81%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%BE%D0%BA%D1%83%D0%BF%D0%BD%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%82%D1%8C%20%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%B2,2.
[11] https://www dot cnn.com/2022/02/25/europe/russia-ukraine-military-comparison-intl/index.html;
How Do the Militaries of Russia and Ukraine Stack Up?;
https://gogov dot ru/articles/population-ru/military;
The Future of the Russian Military
[12] The Best or Worst of Both Worlds?;
https://www.dia.mil/Portals/110/Ima...cations/Russia_Military_Power_Report_2017.pdf
[13] The Best or Worst of Both Worlds?
[14] https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/...-20-russian-state-mobilization-monaghan-2.pdf
[15] https://understandingwar-my.sharepo...tAtUAswnUxdmQBwm0bkwsaGMESiVAyLNTbnA?e=abfgqR;
[16] https://news dot vtomske.ru/news/187931-eto-ne-podgotovka-k-voine-tomskii-voenkom-poyasnil-zachem-armiya-uvelichivaet-lyudskoi-rezerv
[17] Российская армия увеличивает людской резерв. Зачем? - BBC News Русская служба
[18] https://novochgrad dot ru/texts/help/id/40825.html ;
https://republic dot ru/posts/101526?fbclid=IwAR300FtWIKzIZHnRTSNZnx7Z3D4fhyvhDQL7tC1Fdo-iP-0WRhcplHSbQz4
[19] Российская армия увеличивает людской резерв. Зачем? - BBC News Русская служба;
https://www dot ng.ru/armies/2021-12-24/11_8335_army5.html
[20] https://www dot admnkz.info/web/guest/news/one/-/asset_publisher/JE0WkfMvNUCn/content/id/3671290
[21] https://www dot interfax-russia.ru/south-and-north-caucasus/report/boevoy-armeyskiy-rezervnyy-sostav-sozdadut-v-yuzhnom-voennom-okruge-do-konca-avgusta
[22] Timebomb 2000 dot consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_18260/89c4b6f3cfb74e2fe8a1c3c7c523591031444778/
[23] https://www dot the-village.ru/people/the-question/rossiyanam-stali-prihodit-povestki-iz-voenkomata;
https://sozd dot duma.gov.ru/bill/361804-7
[24] https://t dot me/istories_media/928
[25]
View: https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/265329312446821
[26] https://t dot me/wwwagentsmedia/649
[27] https://t dot me/wwwagentsmedia/649
[28] https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/24/world/europe/ukraine-war-military.html
View Citations
www.criticalthreats.org