WAR Regional conflict brewing in the Mediterranean
- Thread starter danielboon
- Start date
-
- Tags
- middle east
Evan Kohlmann
@IntelTweet
1h
Interestingly, the weapon used in last night's Shiite insurgent rocket attack targeting FOB Union III near the Green Zone in Baghdad was not Katyushas as is typical--but rather apparently involved a makeshift multiple rocket launch system using RPG rounds.
View: https://twitter.com/IntelTweet/status/1308474819256737792?s=20
Other evidence posted by "Sabereen News" suggests that the experimental RPG-based rocket system used to target FOB Union III is part of a broader effort by Shiite insurgents to defeat incoming fire defense systems at the U.S. embassy in Baghdad.
Shallower trajectory, transportable in a pinch in a Toyota Corolla sized car and cheap. The only issue being the range of the thing requiring more guile in deploying.
jward
passin' thru
Foreign Policy
@ForeignPolicy
2m
With France and Italy partnering up in the Mediterranean, Europe’s future stance toward Turkey is likely to stiffen.
View: https://twitter.com/ForeignPolicy/status/1308949317256871936?s=20
Turkish Aggression Pushed Italy and France to Join Forces in the Mediterranean. Now What?
Formerly competitors, Paris and Rome’s Pax Mediterranea may spell Ankara’s final estrangement from Europe.
By Michaël Tanchum | September 23, 2020, 3:39 PM
Italian Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte and French President Emmanuel Macron speak after the closing press conference of the seventh Med7 Mediterranean countries summit in Corsica on Sept. 10. Ludovic Marin/AFP/Getty Images
On Sept. 25, the heads of the 27 European Union nations were supposed to assemble at the European Council in Brussels to vote on sanctioning Turkey. At issue was what the EU had declared as Ankara’s illegal actions against Greece and Cyprus, both EU members. Specifically, Turkey has sent, and continues to send, ships to explore for undersea energy resources in those countries’ sovereign waters. The vote has now been pushed back a week due to a quarantine of the council’s president, but for Ankara, the delay only represents a postponement of the inevitable: a potential divorce from Europe. The troubled relationship has been frozen since 2018, when Ankara began its gunboat diplomacy in the Eastern Mediterranean. At that time, the council voted to freeze Turkey’s EU accession negotiations, and it suspended work on modernizing the bloc’s customs union with its eastern neighbor. A vote against Turkey next week could make the estrangement permanent.
The outcome of the sanctions vote could hinge on Italy’s longtime ambivalence. In the Byzantine complexity of Mediterranean geopolitics, it is Italy’s energy interests in war-torn Libya rather than its considerable investments in Eastern Mediterranean energy that will likely determine Rome’s choice. The mid-September resignation of the prime minister of Libya’s Government of National Accord (GNA), who had been caught in complicated politicking among Italy, France, and Turkey, suggests that Italy may have arrived at a tipping point and a major reset in Italy’s Mediterranean policy is underway.
Why is Italy the European Union’s swing state?
To sanction Turkey, the European Council will need the unanimous approval of all EU member states, and the votes are far from assured. Stepping into the breach to rally the EU’s support for Greece and Cyprus, in early September, French President Emmanuel Macron declared that President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Turkey was “no longer a partner” in the Eastern Mediterranean and urged Europe to speak with “a more united and clear voice.” The main target of Macron’s exhortation was Italy, which is France’s traditional European competitor in the Mediterranean and which has been among the strongest advocates of closer EU-Turkey relations.
With Greece, Cyprus, and France advocating strong action against Turkey while Italy, Malta, and Spain demur, the Mediterranean is evenly split. But if Italy shifts toward France, resulting in a meeting of minds between the EU’s two largest Mediterranean states, then it is likely that the entire southern EU will swing in favor of some form of sanctions. The momentum in the EU as whole would then be for a tougher line toward Turkey. To this end, Macron has called for a “Pax Mediterranea,” managed by a partnership of the EU’s Mediterranean nations. Behind his high-flown Latin, Macron is offering Italy a realpolitik reset in the Mediterranean’s great game—a comprehensive Franco-Italian partnership to police the region.
Who sets the rules of the Mediterranean’s great game?
The four largest countries in the Mediterranean basin—Egypt, Turkey, France, and Italy—comprise over half the region’s population and define the rules of the Mediterranean’s great game. Despite the interventions of outside actors, from Russia to the United Arab Emirates, it is the jockeying among the Mediterranean’s big four to dominate the region’s energy resources and commercial transit routes that defines regional geopolitics.
The hard-power competition among the four—which also boast the Mediterranean’s four most powerful militaries—has mostly played out in the Libyan civil war, which has pitted a partnership consisting of France and Egypt against Turkey. France is one of Egypt’s largest weapons supplier and has covertly cooperated with Cairo in support of eastern Libyan forces against the western GNA, which is militarily backed by Turkey and which Italy supports.
Italy’s decision to side with the GNA and Turkey is part of a broader effort to protect its own energy interests in Libya and to pivot to the Mediterranean basin. That rebalancing has seen Italy’s exports to Mediterranean markets outstrip exports to the United States and to China. Yet despite Italy’s trade advances and proximity to the Mediterranean’s southern shores, the country’s development of markets in North Africa has been constrained by France’s supersized influence.
Until Macron’s reprioritization of French foreign policy, leading ultimately to his call for a Pax Mediterranea, Paris had been unwilling to allow its relationship with Rome to develop greater parity. But Turkey’s increasing assertiveness in the Eastern Mediterranean and Libya changed Paris’s strategic calculus—and may make Rome think twice about its alignment with Ankara—providing momentum for a comprehensive Franco-Italian rapprochement.
posted for fair use
foreignpolicy.com
@ForeignPolicy
2m
With France and Italy partnering up in the Mediterranean, Europe’s future stance toward Turkey is likely to stiffen.
View: https://twitter.com/ForeignPolicy/status/1308949317256871936?s=20
Turkish Aggression Pushed Italy and France to Join Forces in the Mediterranean. Now What?
Formerly competitors, Paris and Rome’s Pax Mediterranea may spell Ankara’s final estrangement from Europe.
By Michaël Tanchum | September 23, 2020, 3:39 PM
Italian Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte and French President Emmanuel Macron speak after the closing press conference of the seventh Med7 Mediterranean countries summit in Corsica on Sept. 10. Ludovic Marin/AFP/Getty Images
On Sept. 25, the heads of the 27 European Union nations were supposed to assemble at the European Council in Brussels to vote on sanctioning Turkey. At issue was what the EU had declared as Ankara’s illegal actions against Greece and Cyprus, both EU members. Specifically, Turkey has sent, and continues to send, ships to explore for undersea energy resources in those countries’ sovereign waters. The vote has now been pushed back a week due to a quarantine of the council’s president, but for Ankara, the delay only represents a postponement of the inevitable: a potential divorce from Europe. The troubled relationship has been frozen since 2018, when Ankara began its gunboat diplomacy in the Eastern Mediterranean. At that time, the council voted to freeze Turkey’s EU accession negotiations, and it suspended work on modernizing the bloc’s customs union with its eastern neighbor. A vote against Turkey next week could make the estrangement permanent.
The outcome of the sanctions vote could hinge on Italy’s longtime ambivalence. In the Byzantine complexity of Mediterranean geopolitics, it is Italy’s energy interests in war-torn Libya rather than its considerable investments in Eastern Mediterranean energy that will likely determine Rome’s choice. The mid-September resignation of the prime minister of Libya’s Government of National Accord (GNA), who had been caught in complicated politicking among Italy, France, and Turkey, suggests that Italy may have arrived at a tipping point and a major reset in Italy’s Mediterranean policy is underway.
Why is Italy the European Union’s swing state?
To sanction Turkey, the European Council will need the unanimous approval of all EU member states, and the votes are far from assured. Stepping into the breach to rally the EU’s support for Greece and Cyprus, in early September, French President Emmanuel Macron declared that President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Turkey was “no longer a partner” in the Eastern Mediterranean and urged Europe to speak with “a more united and clear voice.” The main target of Macron’s exhortation was Italy, which is France’s traditional European competitor in the Mediterranean and which has been among the strongest advocates of closer EU-Turkey relations.
With Greece, Cyprus, and France advocating strong action against Turkey while Italy, Malta, and Spain demur, the Mediterranean is evenly split. But if Italy shifts toward France, resulting in a meeting of minds between the EU’s two largest Mediterranean states, then it is likely that the entire southern EU will swing in favor of some form of sanctions. The momentum in the EU as whole would then be for a tougher line toward Turkey. To this end, Macron has called for a “Pax Mediterranea,” managed by a partnership of the EU’s Mediterranean nations. Behind his high-flown Latin, Macron is offering Italy a realpolitik reset in the Mediterranean’s great game—a comprehensive Franco-Italian partnership to police the region.
Who sets the rules of the Mediterranean’s great game?
The four largest countries in the Mediterranean basin—Egypt, Turkey, France, and Italy—comprise over half the region’s population and define the rules of the Mediterranean’s great game. Despite the interventions of outside actors, from Russia to the United Arab Emirates, it is the jockeying among the Mediterranean’s big four to dominate the region’s energy resources and commercial transit routes that defines regional geopolitics.
The hard-power competition among the four—which also boast the Mediterranean’s four most powerful militaries—has mostly played out in the Libyan civil war, which has pitted a partnership consisting of France and Egypt against Turkey. France is one of Egypt’s largest weapons supplier and has covertly cooperated with Cairo in support of eastern Libyan forces against the western GNA, which is militarily backed by Turkey and which Italy supports.
Italy’s decision to side with the GNA and Turkey is part of a broader effort to protect its own energy interests in Libya and to pivot to the Mediterranean basin. That rebalancing has seen Italy’s exports to Mediterranean markets outstrip exports to the United States and to China. Yet despite Italy’s trade advances and proximity to the Mediterranean’s southern shores, the country’s development of markets in North Africa has been constrained by France’s supersized influence.
Until Macron’s reprioritization of French foreign policy, leading ultimately to his call for a Pax Mediterranea, Paris had been unwilling to allow its relationship with Rome to develop greater parity. But Turkey’s increasing assertiveness in the Eastern Mediterranean and Libya changed Paris’s strategic calculus—and may make Rome think twice about its alignment with Ankara—providing momentum for a comprehensive Franco-Italian rapprochement.
posted for fair use
Turkish Military Maneuvering Pushed Italy and France to Join Forces in the Mediterranean. Now What?
Formerly competitors, Paris and Rome’s Pax Mediterranea may spell Ankara’s final estrangement from Europe.
foreignpolicy.com
Posted for fair use.....
www.arabnews.com
Haftar, Saleh in surprise Cairo visit for crisis talks on Libya
Updated 23 September 2020
Mohammed Abu Zaid
September 23, 2020 23:30
451
CAIRO: Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi on Wednesday held crisis talks with the commander of the Libyan National Army (LNA), Khalifa Haftar, and parliament speaker, Aguila Saleh, on latest developments in the Libya conflict.
The meeting in Cairo followed a surprise visit to the Egyptian capital by Haftar and Saleh on Tuesday that coincided with a speech at the UN by El-Sisi in which he said Egypt would intervene if the “red line” provinces of Sirte and Jufra were crossed.
During Wednesday’s discussions in Cairo, held in the presence of Abbas Kamel, head of the Egyptian General Intelligence Service (GIS), El-Sisi was briefed on efforts from all parties to implement a cease-fire and Libyan attempts to advance the peace process under the auspices of the UN.
According to media reports, Haftar, Saleh, and Egyptian officials would be reviewing military matters and progress on political initiatives.
The visit came within the framework of coordination and consultation talks on a number of issues, most notably the fight against terrorism, and Egyptian efforts to broker security and stability in Libya through political dialogue. Initiatives on Libya that took place in Geneva and Morocco, such as holding elections and forming a new government, were also likely to be on the agenda.
In June, Haftar and Saleh met with the Egyptian president and announced the Cairo Declaration for a cease-fire and resolution to the political crisis in Libya. Sources said their latest visit was to clarify Cairo’s position with international and Libyan parties, discuss a comprehensive solution to the Libyan crisis through international agreements, and smooth over any misunderstandings.
The unscheduled trip was due to recent developments in Libya and the intention of the Government of National Accord (GNA) to establish an army in Libya, the sources added.
Salah Al-Nimroush, minister of defense in the GNA which is headed by Fayez Al-Sarraj, has announced the start of programs to build and develop his government’s army with the help of Turkey.
He also said that a military training center had been set up in the suburbs of the Libyan capital and that the priority was to build the army, according to international standards, with the young support force that participated in the defense of Tripoli.
As well as security, the subject of Libyan oil was up for discussion with the Egyptian authorities.
Last week, the Libyan army announced its agreement to reopen oil fields and resume exports on condition that guarantees were made for the fair distribution of oil revenues and the prevention of their use for funding terrorism and fueling corruption.
In a speech addressed to Libyans, Haftar said that the General Command of the army would not hesitate to make concessions as long as they were in the interests of the Libyan people, with the aim of preventing further deterioration of the economic situation in the country.
Haftar, Saleh in surprise Cairo visit for crisis talks on Libya
CAIRO: Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi on Wednesday held crisis talks with the commander of the Libyan National Army (LNA), Khalifa Haftar, and parliament speaker, Aguila Saleh, on latest developments in the Libya conflict. The meeting in Cairo followed a surprise visit to the Egyptian...
www.arabnews.com
Haftar, Saleh in surprise Cairo visit for crisis talks on Libya
Updated 23 September 2020
Mohammed Abu Zaid
September 23, 2020 23:30
451
- The meeting in Cairo followed a surprise visit to the Egyptian capital by Haftar and Saleh on Tuesday
CAIRO: Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi on Wednesday held crisis talks with the commander of the Libyan National Army (LNA), Khalifa Haftar, and parliament speaker, Aguila Saleh, on latest developments in the Libya conflict.
The meeting in Cairo followed a surprise visit to the Egyptian capital by Haftar and Saleh on Tuesday that coincided with a speech at the UN by El-Sisi in which he said Egypt would intervene if the “red line” provinces of Sirte and Jufra were crossed.
During Wednesday’s discussions in Cairo, held in the presence of Abbas Kamel, head of the Egyptian General Intelligence Service (GIS), El-Sisi was briefed on efforts from all parties to implement a cease-fire and Libyan attempts to advance the peace process under the auspices of the UN.
According to media reports, Haftar, Saleh, and Egyptian officials would be reviewing military matters and progress on political initiatives.
The visit came within the framework of coordination and consultation talks on a number of issues, most notably the fight against terrorism, and Egyptian efforts to broker security and stability in Libya through political dialogue. Initiatives on Libya that took place in Geneva and Morocco, such as holding elections and forming a new government, were also likely to be on the agenda.
In June, Haftar and Saleh met with the Egyptian president and announced the Cairo Declaration for a cease-fire and resolution to the political crisis in Libya. Sources said their latest visit was to clarify Cairo’s position with international and Libyan parties, discuss a comprehensive solution to the Libyan crisis through international agreements, and smooth over any misunderstandings.
The unscheduled trip was due to recent developments in Libya and the intention of the Government of National Accord (GNA) to establish an army in Libya, the sources added.
Salah Al-Nimroush, minister of defense in the GNA which is headed by Fayez Al-Sarraj, has announced the start of programs to build and develop his government’s army with the help of Turkey.
He also said that a military training center had been set up in the suburbs of the Libyan capital and that the priority was to build the army, according to international standards, with the young support force that participated in the defense of Tripoli.
As well as security, the subject of Libyan oil was up for discussion with the Egyptian authorities.
Last week, the Libyan army announced its agreement to reopen oil fields and resume exports on condition that guarantees were made for the fair distribution of oil revenues and the prevention of their use for funding terrorism and fueling corruption.
In a speech addressed to Libyans, Haftar said that the General Command of the army would not hesitate to make concessions as long as they were in the interests of the Libyan people, with the aim of preventing further deterioration of the economic situation in the country.
jward
passin' thru
Turkey's foreign policy becoming alarmingly militarized
Serious structural problems have hit Turkish foreign policy in the past two years, badly eroding its crisis-management and problem-solving capacities.
People wave Turkish flags in front of an electronic billboard displaying the face of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan at a rally on the streets of Kizilay Square in reaction to the failed military coup on July 17, 2016, in Ankara, Turkey. Photo by Chris McGrath/Getty Images.
Metin Gurcan
@Metin4020
Sep 22, 2020
As recently as early September, Turkish media was beating the war drums as tensions escalated with Greece over territorial and gas exploration rows in the Eastern Mediterranean. The pro-government media, in particular, was abuzz with commentaries on how Turkey’s military power was superior to that of Greece and how Turkey would easily win a potential war with its neighbor. The same pro-government commentators and retired generals are now lauding the merits of diplomacy and dialogue while accusing those who fail to change tune of promoting tensions and war.
Such abrupt turns on key matters of national interest have become alarmingly frequent in Turkey since President Recep Tayyip Erdogan assumed super executive powers in 2018, showing that Ankara’s foreign policy has fallen into the trap of short-termism and become increasingly unpredictable.
Moreover, almost everyone in Ankara feels entitled to speak on foreign policy matters. The president’s spokesperson and communications chief as well as the ministers of Defense, Economy, Energy and even the Interior have come to readily pass a comment. Ranting against Turkey’s adversaries is today a highly popular thing in Ankara. Foreign policy bluster has seemingly become an easy way for members of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) to raise their profiles and advance their political careers. It is usually riskless and with high populist returns.
Amid these frequent about-turns and the cacophony of messages, foreign policy in Ankara today is a realm of inconsistency and confusion.
In the past two years, Erdogan has claimed credit for any bold foreign policy move, including Turkey’s military operation in northeast Syria in October 2019, its maritime deal with Libya the following month, and efforts to assert itself in Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean. But when it comes to less illustrious events such as Washington’s retaliation for Ankara’s purchase of Russian air defense systems, President Donald Trump’s brash letter to Erdogan over Syria, the killing of 36 Turkish soldiers in a strike in Idlib or Greece’s militarization of Aegean islands near Turkey’s shores, no one is around to be accountable to the public.
In short, foreign affairs have become a tool to furbish Erdogan’s image, the result of which is a highly personalized foreign policy.
On Sept. 17, for instance, presidential spokesperson Ibrahim Kalin framed Ankara’s decision to pull a research ship out of disputed waters in the Mediterranean Sea as Erdogan’s personal gesture to Greece. “Our president has given a chance to diplomacy again. Hopefully, the Greek side will use this as an opportunity to advance the talks,” he said.
A grave repercussion of Erdogan’s foreign policy posture, which has come to mirror his short-tempered and polarizing style in domestic politics, is the erosion of institutional decision-making and execution on foreign policy matters. The Foreign Ministry’s institutional capacity has been seriously damaged and overly politicized, including through nepotistic appointments and promotions.
Since 2018, the gap between Ankara’s dreams or desires and the reality on the ground or the realpolitik has widened as well. Ankara has come to pursue dreams of “spoiling games” by others rather than a foreign policy based on its economic and military capacity. The defensive, status quoist leaning of Turkey’s foreign policy in the past was hardly the best example, but its current offensive, revisionist brand is devoid both of a grand strategy and a capacity matching ambitions, which makes it extremely risky. Because of its failure to develop a realistic, rational and strategic framework, Turkey has grown increasingly isolated, trying to compensate for its risky loneliness with revisionist military activism.
Until the 2010s, Ankara used only limited military force to manage a complex, multi-threat environment. Its main priority was the four-decade domestic conflict with the outlawed Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). Diplomacy and deterrence were used to freeze rivalry in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the Cyprus conflict. This began to change in the summer of 2018 when Erdogan assumed sweeping powers under a new executive presidency system.
Turkey’s embrace of muscular methods is rooted in profound transformations in its external environment and domestic dynamics.
Externally, Ankara’s threat perceptions have shifted east and south, owing to growing security risks in the Eastern Mediterranean, Iraq, North Africa and Syria, and to strategic competition with Egypt, Russia, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and other regional powers. Ankara was particularly unnerved by NATO’s passivity on its southern flank during the Syria crisis, which contributed to a security vacuum there. In relying on the People’s Protection Units — the PKK’s Syrian franchise — to counter the Islamic State, Western powers ignored or dismissed Turkey’s well-known concerns. Also, there is a pervasive and enduring sense among the Turkish ruling elite that the Western security block failed to adequately support Ankara during and after the coup attempt of July 2016.
A number of domestic factors have also driven the militarization of foreign policy. First, foreign policy has become a crucial plank of Ankara’s political agenda since the executive presidency system took effect. Military actions abroad enjoy strong popular support and help sustain Erdogan’s popularity. In particular, his embrace of a more nationalist discourse at home has helped consolidate his de facto coalition with the ultranationalist Nationalist Movement Party.
Second, military deployment abroad is popular with the armed forces themselves. It boosts morale and motivation through extra pay and promotion opportunities and provides valuable experience in joint force operations.
A third domestic driver of Turkey’s more militaristic approach is its role in harmonizing ties between the military and civilian leadership, who agree on the need to enhance Turkey’s military capabilities and defense industry. The military is more concerned with the technical dimensions of this consensus as part of a transformation and restructuring process called Vision 2033. Politicians, meanwhile, are keen to use this new capacity and energy in domestic and foreign policy. They also hope that keeping the army busy abroad will make civilian control of the military easier as the generals focus on external rather than domestic affairs. Finally, the boom in the Turkish defense industry allows Ankara to pursue a more independent strategy and display its defense systems for the purpose of international marketing.
The fundamental problems of Turkish foreign policy today could be summarized as follows:
posted for fair use
www.al-monitor.com
Serious structural problems have hit Turkish foreign policy in the past two years, badly eroding its crisis-management and problem-solving capacities.
Metin Gurcan
@Metin4020
Sep 22, 2020
As recently as early September, Turkish media was beating the war drums as tensions escalated with Greece over territorial and gas exploration rows in the Eastern Mediterranean. The pro-government media, in particular, was abuzz with commentaries on how Turkey’s military power was superior to that of Greece and how Turkey would easily win a potential war with its neighbor. The same pro-government commentators and retired generals are now lauding the merits of diplomacy and dialogue while accusing those who fail to change tune of promoting tensions and war.
Such abrupt turns on key matters of national interest have become alarmingly frequent in Turkey since President Recep Tayyip Erdogan assumed super executive powers in 2018, showing that Ankara’s foreign policy has fallen into the trap of short-termism and become increasingly unpredictable.
Moreover, almost everyone in Ankara feels entitled to speak on foreign policy matters. The president’s spokesperson and communications chief as well as the ministers of Defense, Economy, Energy and even the Interior have come to readily pass a comment. Ranting against Turkey’s adversaries is today a highly popular thing in Ankara. Foreign policy bluster has seemingly become an easy way for members of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) to raise their profiles and advance their political careers. It is usually riskless and with high populist returns.
Amid these frequent about-turns and the cacophony of messages, foreign policy in Ankara today is a realm of inconsistency and confusion.
In the past two years, Erdogan has claimed credit for any bold foreign policy move, including Turkey’s military operation in northeast Syria in October 2019, its maritime deal with Libya the following month, and efforts to assert itself in Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean. But when it comes to less illustrious events such as Washington’s retaliation for Ankara’s purchase of Russian air defense systems, President Donald Trump’s brash letter to Erdogan over Syria, the killing of 36 Turkish soldiers in a strike in Idlib or Greece’s militarization of Aegean islands near Turkey’s shores, no one is around to be accountable to the public.
In short, foreign affairs have become a tool to furbish Erdogan’s image, the result of which is a highly personalized foreign policy.
On Sept. 17, for instance, presidential spokesperson Ibrahim Kalin framed Ankara’s decision to pull a research ship out of disputed waters in the Mediterranean Sea as Erdogan’s personal gesture to Greece. “Our president has given a chance to diplomacy again. Hopefully, the Greek side will use this as an opportunity to advance the talks,” he said.
A grave repercussion of Erdogan’s foreign policy posture, which has come to mirror his short-tempered and polarizing style in domestic politics, is the erosion of institutional decision-making and execution on foreign policy matters. The Foreign Ministry’s institutional capacity has been seriously damaged and overly politicized, including through nepotistic appointments and promotions.
Since 2018, the gap between Ankara’s dreams or desires and the reality on the ground or the realpolitik has widened as well. Ankara has come to pursue dreams of “spoiling games” by others rather than a foreign policy based on its economic and military capacity. The defensive, status quoist leaning of Turkey’s foreign policy in the past was hardly the best example, but its current offensive, revisionist brand is devoid both of a grand strategy and a capacity matching ambitions, which makes it extremely risky. Because of its failure to develop a realistic, rational and strategic framework, Turkey has grown increasingly isolated, trying to compensate for its risky loneliness with revisionist military activism.
Until the 2010s, Ankara used only limited military force to manage a complex, multi-threat environment. Its main priority was the four-decade domestic conflict with the outlawed Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). Diplomacy and deterrence were used to freeze rivalry in the Eastern Mediterranean and in the Cyprus conflict. This began to change in the summer of 2018 when Erdogan assumed sweeping powers under a new executive presidency system.
Turkey’s embrace of muscular methods is rooted in profound transformations in its external environment and domestic dynamics.
Externally, Ankara’s threat perceptions have shifted east and south, owing to growing security risks in the Eastern Mediterranean, Iraq, North Africa and Syria, and to strategic competition with Egypt, Russia, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and other regional powers. Ankara was particularly unnerved by NATO’s passivity on its southern flank during the Syria crisis, which contributed to a security vacuum there. In relying on the People’s Protection Units — the PKK’s Syrian franchise — to counter the Islamic State, Western powers ignored or dismissed Turkey’s well-known concerns. Also, there is a pervasive and enduring sense among the Turkish ruling elite that the Western security block failed to adequately support Ankara during and after the coup attempt of July 2016.
A number of domestic factors have also driven the militarization of foreign policy. First, foreign policy has become a crucial plank of Ankara’s political agenda since the executive presidency system took effect. Military actions abroad enjoy strong popular support and help sustain Erdogan’s popularity. In particular, his embrace of a more nationalist discourse at home has helped consolidate his de facto coalition with the ultranationalist Nationalist Movement Party.
Second, military deployment abroad is popular with the armed forces themselves. It boosts morale and motivation through extra pay and promotion opportunities and provides valuable experience in joint force operations.
A third domestic driver of Turkey’s more militaristic approach is its role in harmonizing ties between the military and civilian leadership, who agree on the need to enhance Turkey’s military capabilities and defense industry. The military is more concerned with the technical dimensions of this consensus as part of a transformation and restructuring process called Vision 2033. Politicians, meanwhile, are keen to use this new capacity and energy in domestic and foreign policy. They also hope that keeping the army busy abroad will make civilian control of the military easier as the generals focus on external rather than domestic affairs. Finally, the boom in the Turkish defense industry allows Ankara to pursue a more independent strategy and display its defense systems for the purpose of international marketing.
The fundamental problems of Turkish foreign policy today could be summarized as follows:
-
It lacks a grand strategy, succumbing to a short-termism trap.
-
Foreign policy is increasingly becoming a tool of daily politics at home, shaped by a populist approach that prioritizes domestic consumption and thus glues foreign policy to the government’s domestic political agenda.
-
It is growing over-personalized, echoing Erdogan’s polarizing and populist approach at home.
-
The foreign affairs field has become intertwined with political career planning as AKP politicians are now easily appointed as ambassadors or to other foreign posts.
-
The decision-making process is often devoid of comprehensive consultations and transparency, leading to uncertainty, arbitrariness and unpredictability in foreign policy decisions.
-
All senior figures in Ankara feel free to go into the realm of foreign policy, which often results in a muddle of messages. For foreign actors, especially those in the West, this could create confusion as to who is their interlocutor on the Turkish side and fuel a perception of a deepening governance and management crisis in Ankara.
posted for fair use
Turkey's foreign policy becoming alarmingly militarized
Serious structural problems have hit Turkish foreign policy in the past two years, badly eroding its crisis-management and problem-solving capacities.
www.al-monitor.com
jward
passin' thru
EndGameWW
@EndGameWW3
1h
Iran Guards open new naval base near Strait of Hormuz
View: https://twitter.com/EndGameWW3/status/1309160725164818433?s=20
Article posted below in it's entirety
Iran Guards open new naval base near Strait of Hormuz
This handout photo courtesy of US Navy shows the aircraft carrier USS Nimitz (CVN 68) and the guided-missile cruiser USS Philippine Sea (CG 58) steam in formation during a Strait of Hormuz transit on September 18, 2020. (AFP)
Short Url
Iran Guards open new naval base near Strait of Hormuz
TEHRAN: Iran’s Revolutionary Guards have unveiled a new naval base aiming to project “dominance” over the strategic Strait of Hormuz, state media reported, following months of tensions with arch-enemy the United States. The “Martyr Seyed Majid Rahbar” base lies in the southern province of...
Updated 28 sec ago
AFP
September 24, 2020 12:58
2957
TEHRAN: Iran’s Revolutionary Guards have unveiled a new naval base aiming to project “dominance” over the strategic Strait of Hormuz, state media reported, following months of tensions with arch-enemy the United States.
- The vital shipping lane and nearby Gulf waters was the scene of heightened US-Iranian tensions late last year
The “Martyr Seyed Majid Rahbar” base lies in the southern province of Hormozgan, near the entrance to the narrow Strait of Hormuz through which a fifth of world oil output passes.
The vital shipping lane and nearby Gulf waters were the scene of heightened US-Iranian tensions late last year when ships were mysteriously attacked, drones downed and oil tankers seized.
“This base has been built with the purpose of total dominance over the entry and exit of extraterritorial aircraft and naval vessels” at the entrance to the Gulf, Guards commander Major General Hossein Salami said on Wednesday.
“This location is one of the country’s most strategic defensive points,” he added, quoted by state TV’s website.
His remarks come days after a US aircraft carrier passed the waterway to enter the Gulf , amid Washington threats to enforce United Nations sanctions on Iran.
The Guards on Wednesday released on their official Sepah News website drone-captured photos reportedly showing the USS Nimitz.
In June last year, Iran shot down a US Global Hawk drone over the strait after it allegedly violated the Islamic Republic’s airspace, a claim the US has denied.
The enemies have twice come to the brink of direct confrontation since then.
Washington has blamed Tehran for last year’s mysterious attacks against oil tankers in the nearby Gulf of Oman as well as an attack on Saudi oil facilities, with Iran denying all charges.
jward
passin' thru
Jason Brodsky
@JasonMBrodsky
3h
#BREAKING: U.S. Special Envoy for Iran Elliott Abrams announces to U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee that U.S. will announce new sanctions on #Iran today, including on the judge who sentenced #NavidAfkari to death.
@JasonMBrodsky
3h
#BREAKING: U.S. Special Envoy for Iran Elliott Abrams announces to U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee that U.S. will announce new sanctions on #Iran today, including on the judge who sentenced #NavidAfkari to death.
northern watch
TB Fanatic
northern watch
TB Fanatic
jward
passin' thru
..documentation n photos can be found on the twitter thread..
Mustafa Habib
@Mustafa_Habib33
Dramatic developments in #Iraq.. What kind of warning that the U.S sent to Iraq, which forced today both Fatah Alliance led by Hadi Ameri & #PMF forces to disavow the targeting of #Green_zone & the international coalition forces. It is not only military warning but financial one!
Today, in strange & appears confused, Fateh alliance issued statement denouncing the targeting of embassies & diplomatic missions, rejecting the killings & kidnappings of Iraqis in the streets, & calling on the PMF to respect the law.
Also today, suddenly, the head of PMF Faleh Al-Fayyad issues order to expel the leader of 18th Brigade, Hamed Al-Jazaery & the leader of 30th Brigade, Waad Qaddo, from their positions, both of them are accused of crimes against humanity and corruption
Before that, the US ambassador held many meetings with Iraqi officials within the past five days, including President Barham Salih, Chairman of the Supreme Judicial Council, Faiq Zaidan, Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein, former PM Haider al-Abadi & Defense Minister Jumah Inad.
According to many sources, this time the US made a serious threat that it would lift its protection for Iraqi funds, and the it extend waiver for Iraq to import Iranian energy maybe will be for the last time
Breaking: And now the Prime Minister Mustafa Al-Kadhimi holding an urgent meeting with the Shiite parties at the home of former Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi
All this happening, while #IraqiProtest prepare for launching new large demonstrations next Friday in 1 October, which is the first anniversary of the protests started last year and led to kill 500 demonstrators, then expelled former PM Adel Abd al-Mahdi from his post
Mustafa Habib
@Mustafa_Habib33
Dramatic developments in #Iraq.. What kind of warning that the U.S sent to Iraq, which forced today both Fatah Alliance led by Hadi Ameri & #PMF forces to disavow the targeting of #Green_zone & the international coalition forces. It is not only military warning but financial one!
Today, in strange & appears confused, Fateh alliance issued statement denouncing the targeting of embassies & diplomatic missions, rejecting the killings & kidnappings of Iraqis in the streets, & calling on the PMF to respect the law.
Also today, suddenly, the head of PMF Faleh Al-Fayyad issues order to expel the leader of 18th Brigade, Hamed Al-Jazaery & the leader of 30th Brigade, Waad Qaddo, from their positions, both of them are accused of crimes against humanity and corruption
Before that, the US ambassador held many meetings with Iraqi officials within the past five days, including President Barham Salih, Chairman of the Supreme Judicial Council, Faiq Zaidan, Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein, former PM Haider al-Abadi & Defense Minister Jumah Inad.
According to many sources, this time the US made a serious threat that it would lift its protection for Iraqi funds, and the it extend waiver for Iraq to import Iranian energy maybe will be for the last time
Breaking: And now the Prime Minister Mustafa Al-Kadhimi holding an urgent meeting with the Shiite parties at the home of former Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi
All this happening, while #IraqiProtest prepare for launching new large demonstrations next Friday in 1 October, which is the first anniversary of the protests started last year and led to kill 500 demonstrators, then expelled former PM Adel Abd al-Mahdi from his post
Posted for fair use.....
Ahead of F-35 Buy UAE May Look to Sell Some of its F-16 Jets to Greece
As the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is expected to progress on its desire to buy F-35 jets, it could be looking to sell some of its F-16 jets, probably to Greece to which it dispatched four “Desert Falcons” for participation in exercises with the Greek Air Force (GAF). The move could have...
www.defenseworld.net
Ahead of F-35 Buy UAE May Look to Sell Some of its F-16 Jets to Greece
- Our Bureau
- 12:16 PM, September 23, 2020
- 7036
Greek F-16 jets
As the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is expected to progress on its desire to buy F-35 jets, it could be looking to sell some of its F-16 jets, probably to Greece to which it dispatched four "Desert Falcons” for participation in exercises with the Greek Air Force (GAF).
The move could have political benefits for Abu Dhabi as it seeks to weigh in on the side of Greece in Turkey’s dispute with Athens over Eastern Mediterranean hydrocarbon prospecting.
While Abu Dhabi has given no indication so far that its F-16s are for sale, it may not need 80 of them if it gets to buy an estimated 12 F-35s from the US following its peace deal with Israel.
UAE’s F-16s are among the most advanced in the world. First received in 2004, its fleet of 80 F-16 jets feature a Northrop Grumman APG-80 AESA radar, conformal fuel tanks as standard, an integrated Northrop Grumman electronic warfare system and a MIL-STD 1773 databus. Called the Block 60, they are just a step behind the F-16 Block 70/72 Viper- the latest iteration of the venerable American fighter.
The move could have political benefits for Abu Dhabi as it seeks to weigh in on the side of Greece in Turkey’s dispute with Athens over Eastern Mediterranean hydrocarbon prospecting.
While Abu Dhabi has given no indication so far that its F-16s are for sale, it may not need 80 of them if it gets to buy an estimated 12 F-35s from the US following its peace deal with Israel.
UAE’s F-16s are among the most advanced in the world. First received in 2004, its fleet of 80 F-16 jets feature a Northrop Grumman APG-80 AESA radar, conformal fuel tanks as standard, an integrated Northrop Grumman electronic warfare system and a MIL-STD 1773 databus. Called the Block 60, they are just a step behind the F-16 Block 70/72 Viper- the latest iteration of the venerable American fighter.
Chief of Staff of the UAE Armed Forces Lt. Gen. Hamad Mohammed Thani Al Rumaithi, in Greece
For Greece, the UAE F-16s would introduce them to the most modern F-16s short of the F-16 Viper and immediately help to a large extent, match its Air Force against that of Turkey’s.
Greece boasts a fleet of some 150 F-16 fighters. In December 2019, Greek Defense Minister Nikos Panagiotopoulos told the parliament that 84 of the GAF’s 150 F-16s would be upgraded to the advanced Viper class by 2027 costing $1.5 billion. The upgrades are only expected to arrive starting 2027 and until then it will be vulnerable to Turkey’s advanced fighter planes.
Though Greece has announced a decision to buy Dassault Rafale jets, these too would not arrive until 2026 that is, if it signs the contract with Dassault latest by 2021.
If Greece buys UAE’s F-16s, it would also help the US checkmate France which first sent aircraft for exercises and later entered into negotiations with Athens to sell Rafale jets.
Greece boasts a fleet of some 150 F-16 fighters. In December 2019, Greek Defense Minister Nikos Panagiotopoulos told the parliament that 84 of the GAF’s 150 F-16s would be upgraded to the advanced Viper class by 2027 costing $1.5 billion. The upgrades are only expected to arrive starting 2027 and until then it will be vulnerable to Turkey’s advanced fighter planes.
Though Greece has announced a decision to buy Dassault Rafale jets, these too would not arrive until 2026 that is, if it signs the contract with Dassault latest by 2021.
If Greece buys UAE’s F-16s, it would also help the US checkmate France which first sent aircraft for exercises and later entered into negotiations with Athens to sell Rafale jets.
F-35 fighter
The participation of the Emirati F-16s in GAF exercises was followed up with a visit by Lt. General Hamad Mohammed Thani Al Rumaithi, Chief of Staff of the UAE Armed Forces to Greece who inspected the site of joint military exercises in the Greek island of Crete on Monday.
Later, Al Rumaithi met separately with Nikos Panagiotopoulos, Minister for National Defence of Greece, and his Greek counterpart, General Konstantinos Floros. “The two meetings discussed ways to strengthen cooperation and joint action between the UAE and Greece, particularly in defence and military areas and accelerate military coordination and cross visits,” according to a UAE government release.
The sudden interest to intensify military cooperation between Greece and UAE hides more than it reveals. The UAE is trying to become a regional economic and military power as is evident from its participation in the Libyan conflict on the side of the Haftar militia where it is locked in battle with Turkey (which supports the GNA- the UN recognized Libyan government).
Later, Al Rumaithi met separately with Nikos Panagiotopoulos, Minister for National Defence of Greece, and his Greek counterpart, General Konstantinos Floros. “The two meetings discussed ways to strengthen cooperation and joint action between the UAE and Greece, particularly in defence and military areas and accelerate military coordination and cross visits,” according to a UAE government release.
The sudden interest to intensify military cooperation between Greece and UAE hides more than it reveals. The UAE is trying to become a regional economic and military power as is evident from its participation in the Libyan conflict on the side of the Haftar militia where it is locked in battle with Turkey (which supports the GNA- the UN recognized Libyan government).
jward
passin' thru
AS-Source News / MILITARY
@ASBMilitary
10m
BREAKING: Kata’ib Hezbollah is vowing to attack #USA’s facilities in #Iraq following #Pompeo threats.
They don’t speak very often unlike most resistance groups, but when they do, they act. We’re going to see some fireworks.
__________________________________
Evan Kohlmann
@IntelTweet
10m
Iraqi Shiite insurgent faction Ashab al-Kahf has vowed, "we will not stop. This is a message for all to understand, not under these circumstances or under any circumstances--regardless of whether under a government friendly to the US or under one that is not friendly to the US."
________________________________
Evan Kohlmann
@IntelTweet
10m
While public attention has drifted away from Iraq over the past 6 months, tensions between the U.S. and Shiite militia forces are once again simmering, as a recent increase in tempo of attacks by Shiite insurgent factions appears to be edging each side towards a confrontation.
As the Iraqi gov't has mostly failed in its efforts to curb the attacks, the U.S. gov't is losing patience and may seek to carry out further airstrikes targeting Shiite militiamen, with the future of the regime of Prime Minister al-Kadhimi hanging precariously in the balance.
________________________________
Last edited:
jward
passin' thru
BenSabti
@BeniSabti
#BREAKING-Iranian opposition: Iranian security council ordered to evacuate 6 villages in Kurdish area near Iran-Iraq border, probably due to tentions between USA & Iran.
View: https://twitter.com/BeniSabti/status/1309523951287181312?s=20
--------------------------------
raz zimmt
@RZimmt
Replying to
@BeniSabti
and
@JasonMBrodsky
It seems more likely to me that it has something to do with tension with the Kurds. This area has witnessed clashes between Iranian security forces and Kurdish rebel groups.
@BeniSabti
#BREAKING-Iranian opposition: Iranian security council ordered to evacuate 6 villages in Kurdish area near Iran-Iraq border, probably due to tentions between USA & Iran.
View: https://twitter.com/BeniSabti/status/1309523951287181312?s=20
--------------------------------
raz zimmt
@RZimmt
Replying to
@BeniSabti
and
@JasonMBrodsky
It seems more likely to me that it has something to do with tension with the Kurds. This area has witnessed clashes between Iranian security forces and Kurdish rebel groups.
northern watch
TB Fanatic
northern watch
TB Fanatic
northern watch
TB Fanatic
jward
passin' thru
.. well, yes, he is not wrong ..
INTELSky
@Intel_Sky
35s
Something is going to happen in Syria.
Qatar Airways Boeing 787-8 Dreamliner as QR628 is avoiding the Syrian
airspace. Photos: 1 (now, September) - 2 (August)
View: https://twitter.com/Intel_Sky/status/1309581770757533696?s=20
INTELSky
@Intel_Sky
35s
Something is going to happen in Syria.
Qatar Airways Boeing 787-8 Dreamliner as QR628 is avoiding the Syrian
airspace. Photos: 1 (now, September) - 2 (August)
View: https://twitter.com/Intel_Sky/status/1309581770757533696?s=20
jward
passin' thru
Aleph א
@no_itsmyturn
48m
USAF
activity near the Iraqi/Syrian borders
------------------------------------------
The Cavell Group
@TCG_CrisisRisks
2m
Baghdad: Much military activity tonight. Several Iraqi army units ordered to redeploy to Baghdad and Iraqi and US helicopters are up.
@no_itsmyturn
48m
USAF
activity near the Iraqi/Syrian borders
------------------------------------------
The Cavell Group
@TCG_CrisisRisks
2m
Baghdad: Much military activity tonight. Several Iraqi army units ordered to redeploy to Baghdad and Iraqi and US helicopters are up.
Last edited:
danielboon
TB Fanatic
northern watch
TB Fanatic
Armenian Resettlement From Lebanon to the Occupied Territories of Azerbaijan Endangers Peace Process
Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 17 Issue: 132
By: Vasif Huseynov
September 23, 2020 04:49 PM Age: 2 days
Nagorno-Karabakh (Source: International Crisis Group)
On August 25, the Armenian media announced the arrival of two ethnic-Armenian families from Beirut, Lebanon, to the occupied territories of Azerbaijan (Asbarez, August 25). This was declared part of Yerevan’s assistance programs to Lebanon’s Armenian community. The wider initiative specifically includes a plan to resettle in Armenia and the occupied territories of Azerbaijan (namely, Karabakh) Lebanese-Armenians who suffered socio-economically as a result of the August 4 explosion at the Beirut port warehouses.
A day after last month’s catastrophic event in Beirut, “President” Arayik Harutyunyan, the leader of the local administration of the occupational forces in Karabakh, held a phone conversation with Aram I, the Catholicos of Cilicia, who heads the Armenian Apostolic Church based in Lebanon. Harutyunyan told Aram that Karabakh’s separatist authorities were ready to receive 100–150 families (Civilnet, August 5). Later, speaking at an August 25 meeting devoted to the assistance programs to Lebanese-Armenians, Harutyunyan declared that his administration would “welcome and provide housing to all […] compatriots who wish to move” to Karabakh (Asbarez, August 25).
Map of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (Source: RFE/RL)
According to Harutyunyan, Lebanese-Armenians are encouraged to resettle in their “homeland” by the provision of housing and other necessities. On September 10, the Armenian media disseminated a video of the settlement of the first Lebanese-Armenian family in Shusha, a historical Azerbaijani town in Karabakh (Twitter.com/aghavalyan, September 10). Local media further reported on plans to move 15 additional families in the near future (Arstakhpress.am, September 8).
The settlement of Armenians in the occupied territories outraged the Azerbaijani government and public, adding more fuel to the already-strained tensions between the two conflicting nations, enflamed by the border clashes in July (see EDM, July 14). Hikmet Hajiyev, the foreign policy advisor to the president of the Republic of Azerbaijan, stated that “Armenia aims to alter the demographic situation across Azerbaijan’s occupied territories by pursuing the illegal settlement policy.” Referring to international law, Hajiyev noted that the Geneva Convention of 1949 proscribes the transfer of the civilian population of the occupying state into the territory it occupies. “Ironically, such actions are considered a crime under Armenia’s own legislation. In Article 390 of Armenia’s Criminal Code, the occupying power’s deportation of the local population and transfer of its people to the occupied territories is a grave violation of international humanitarian law, punishable by 8–12 years of imprisonment,” Hajiyev told a local news outlet in Baku (Azertag, September 12).
It is not the first time that ethnic Armenians have been resettled in Karabakh and other occupied territories of Azerbaijan. In the wake of the outbreak of the Syrian civil war, more than 15,000 Armenians applied for asylum in Armenia, some of whom ended up in Karabakh (BBC, April 23, 2015). The new settlements have been promoted by Armenian leaders as an instrument to consolidate the control over the occupied region and generate a new demographic situation. This was officially adopted as a priority for 2017–2020 by Bako Sahakyan, Harutyunyan’s predecessor. Under his rule, funds ($800,000) from the budget of the local regime were allocated to populate and develop new settlements in the adjacent territories around Karabakh for the first time (President.nkr.am, October 16, 2017; Crisisgroup.org, December 20, 2019).
Thanks to satellite imagery provided by Azercosmos, Azerbaijan’s satellite operator, Baku has been able to track the expansion of new settlements in this region. One such image, shared by the Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs on August 15, reveals the construction of a 15-house residential complex in Kalbajar, in the northwestern part of the occupied area (Report.az, August 15). The joint press release of the foreign ministry and Azercosmos warned that the growth of the number of homes there, from six in January 2020 to fifteen in August, shows that this settlement is likely to be further expanded. According to the shared information, similar residential complexes have been established in other parts of the occupied territories: the “Aracamux” residential complex in Jabrayil and “Ariavan” in Lachin region, as well as in Zangilan and the village of Khanlig in Gubadli region.
On September 14, Azerbaijan’s foreign ministry sent a letter of protest to the Minsk Group of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the international institution tasked with the mediation of the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. “We call on the international community to take practical steps to hold accountable the Armenian government, which keeps the Azerbaijani territories under occupation and [is] carrying out illegal activities in these lands,” the Azerbaijani foreign ministry’s address declared (Mfa.gov.az, September 14).
Although the Minsk Group has yet to comment on Azerbaijan’s appeal, the international body’s previous fact-finding missions in the occupied territories, in 2005 and 2010, already reported evidence of new settlements. In 2005, the co-chairs of the Minsk Group warned against the potential repercussions of this process, underscoring that new housing construction creates a fait accompli for the future negotiations on the status of the region and, as such, seriously complicates the peace process (Europarl.europa.eu, accessed September 23, 2020). Azerbaijan laments that such international criticism is insufficient and fails to affect the process. This why, according to some local experts, Baku is presently considering other means to shake up the status quo in the conflict (Oxu.az, September 16).
jamestown.org
Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 17 Issue: 132
By: Vasif Huseynov
September 23, 2020 04:49 PM Age: 2 days
Nagorno-Karabakh (Source: International Crisis Group)
On August 25, the Armenian media announced the arrival of two ethnic-Armenian families from Beirut, Lebanon, to the occupied territories of Azerbaijan (Asbarez, August 25). This was declared part of Yerevan’s assistance programs to Lebanon’s Armenian community. The wider initiative specifically includes a plan to resettle in Armenia and the occupied territories of Azerbaijan (namely, Karabakh) Lebanese-Armenians who suffered socio-economically as a result of the August 4 explosion at the Beirut port warehouses.
A day after last month’s catastrophic event in Beirut, “President” Arayik Harutyunyan, the leader of the local administration of the occupational forces in Karabakh, held a phone conversation with Aram I, the Catholicos of Cilicia, who heads the Armenian Apostolic Church based in Lebanon. Harutyunyan told Aram that Karabakh’s separatist authorities were ready to receive 100–150 families (Civilnet, August 5). Later, speaking at an August 25 meeting devoted to the assistance programs to Lebanese-Armenians, Harutyunyan declared that his administration would “welcome and provide housing to all […] compatriots who wish to move” to Karabakh (Asbarez, August 25).
Map of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (Source: RFE/RL)
According to Harutyunyan, Lebanese-Armenians are encouraged to resettle in their “homeland” by the provision of housing and other necessities. On September 10, the Armenian media disseminated a video of the settlement of the first Lebanese-Armenian family in Shusha, a historical Azerbaijani town in Karabakh (Twitter.com/aghavalyan, September 10). Local media further reported on plans to move 15 additional families in the near future (Arstakhpress.am, September 8).
The settlement of Armenians in the occupied territories outraged the Azerbaijani government and public, adding more fuel to the already-strained tensions between the two conflicting nations, enflamed by the border clashes in July (see EDM, July 14). Hikmet Hajiyev, the foreign policy advisor to the president of the Republic of Azerbaijan, stated that “Armenia aims to alter the demographic situation across Azerbaijan’s occupied territories by pursuing the illegal settlement policy.” Referring to international law, Hajiyev noted that the Geneva Convention of 1949 proscribes the transfer of the civilian population of the occupying state into the territory it occupies. “Ironically, such actions are considered a crime under Armenia’s own legislation. In Article 390 of Armenia’s Criminal Code, the occupying power’s deportation of the local population and transfer of its people to the occupied territories is a grave violation of international humanitarian law, punishable by 8–12 years of imprisonment,” Hajiyev told a local news outlet in Baku (Azertag, September 12).
It is not the first time that ethnic Armenians have been resettled in Karabakh and other occupied territories of Azerbaijan. In the wake of the outbreak of the Syrian civil war, more than 15,000 Armenians applied for asylum in Armenia, some of whom ended up in Karabakh (BBC, April 23, 2015). The new settlements have been promoted by Armenian leaders as an instrument to consolidate the control over the occupied region and generate a new demographic situation. This was officially adopted as a priority for 2017–2020 by Bako Sahakyan, Harutyunyan’s predecessor. Under his rule, funds ($800,000) from the budget of the local regime were allocated to populate and develop new settlements in the adjacent territories around Karabakh for the first time (President.nkr.am, October 16, 2017; Crisisgroup.org, December 20, 2019).
Thanks to satellite imagery provided by Azercosmos, Azerbaijan’s satellite operator, Baku has been able to track the expansion of new settlements in this region. One such image, shared by the Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs on August 15, reveals the construction of a 15-house residential complex in Kalbajar, in the northwestern part of the occupied area (Report.az, August 15). The joint press release of the foreign ministry and Azercosmos warned that the growth of the number of homes there, from six in January 2020 to fifteen in August, shows that this settlement is likely to be further expanded. According to the shared information, similar residential complexes have been established in other parts of the occupied territories: the “Aracamux” residential complex in Jabrayil and “Ariavan” in Lachin region, as well as in Zangilan and the village of Khanlig in Gubadli region.
On September 14, Azerbaijan’s foreign ministry sent a letter of protest to the Minsk Group of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the international institution tasked with the mediation of the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. “We call on the international community to take practical steps to hold accountable the Armenian government, which keeps the Azerbaijani territories under occupation and [is] carrying out illegal activities in these lands,” the Azerbaijani foreign ministry’s address declared (Mfa.gov.az, September 14).
Although the Minsk Group has yet to comment on Azerbaijan’s appeal, the international body’s previous fact-finding missions in the occupied territories, in 2005 and 2010, already reported evidence of new settlements. In 2005, the co-chairs of the Minsk Group warned against the potential repercussions of this process, underscoring that new housing construction creates a fait accompli for the future negotiations on the status of the region and, as such, seriously complicates the peace process (Europarl.europa.eu, accessed September 23, 2020). Azerbaijan laments that such international criticism is insufficient and fails to affect the process. This why, according to some local experts, Baku is presently considering other means to shake up the status quo in the conflict (Oxu.az, September 16).
Armenian Resettlement From Lebanon to the Occupied Territories of Azerbaijan Endangers Peace Process
On August 25, the Armenian media announced the arrival of two ethnic-Armenian families from Beirut, Lebanon, to the occupied territories of Azerbaijan (Asbarez, August 25). This was declared part of Yerevan’s assistance programs to Lebanon’s Armenian community. The wider initiative specifically...
jward
passin' thru
Evan Kohlmann
@IntelTweet
13m
Iraqi Shiite insurgent group Quwaat al-Zulfiqar has issued a new statement claiming that "the resistance" is allegedly targeting "senior CIA officers" in Iraq "and they have kept silent and did not acknowledge their losses."
Quwaat al-Zulfiqar also accused the U.S. of attempting to "distort the image of the resistance... and trying to deceive the Iraqi people by playing up nationalist themes, its diplomatic reputation, and its sovereignty."
@IntelTweet
13m
Iraqi Shiite insurgent group Quwaat al-Zulfiqar has issued a new statement claiming that "the resistance" is allegedly targeting "senior CIA officers" in Iraq "and they have kept silent and did not acknowledge their losses."
Quwaat al-Zulfiqar also accused the U.S. of attempting to "distort the image of the resistance... and trying to deceive the Iraqi people by playing up nationalist themes, its diplomatic reputation, and its sovereignty."
jward
passin' thru
article is posted in it's entirety on the WoW thread for this week. . .
northern watch
TB Fanatic
jward
passin' thru
Evan Kohlmann
@IntelTweet
13m
There are unconfirmed reports from Iraqi sources that a foreign national has allegedly been stabbed to death inside the UN mission in Iraq's Kirkuk Province.
@IntelTweet
13m
There are unconfirmed reports from Iraqi sources that a foreign national has allegedly been stabbed to death inside the UN mission in Iraq's Kirkuk Province.
jward
passin' thru
well..yeah?
Iran International English
@IranIntl_En
6m
US State Department Spokesperson Morgan Ortagus: #Iran has continued its longstanding practice of arming and training #terrorists and militia groups throughout the Middle East, inflaming conflicts in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen.
Iran International English
@IranIntl_En
6m
US State Department Spokesperson Morgan Ortagus: #Iran has continued its longstanding practice of arming and training #terrorists and militia groups throughout the Middle East, inflaming conflicts in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen.
Plain Jane
Just Plain Jane
Armenia, Azerbaijan declare martial law amid clashes – DW – 09/28/2020
Fighting has erupted between Armenia and Azerbaijan around the separatist region of Nagorno-Karabakh. Both sides have blamed each other; Armenia claims the alleged Azerbaijan attack is a declaration of war.
www.dw.com
Nagorno-Karabakh declares martial law as violence erupts
Fighting has erupted between Armenia and Azerbaijan around the separatist region of Nagorno-Karabakh. Both sides have blamed each other; the Armenian Defense Ministry said two Azerbaijani helicopters were shot down.
Armenia and Azerbaijan on Sunday accused each other of reigniting their decadeslong conflict in the enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh after fresh violence erupted in the breakaway region.
Armenia's Defense Ministry said its military shot down two Azerbaijan military helicopters after an Azerbaijani bombing campaign against civilian targets. It added that three of its adversary's tanks had also been hit.
"The entire responsibility for this lies with the military-political leadership of Azerbaijan," insisted an Armenian Defense Ministry spokesperson.
Azerbaijan, meanwhile, accused Armenian forces of launching "deliberate and targeted" attacks on Nagorno-Karabakh.
"There are reports of dead and wounded among civilians and military servicemen," Azerbaijan's president said.
Read more: Azerbaijan police detain opposition protesters
Martial law announced
Authorities in Nagorno-Karabakh said the city of Stepanakert has been shelled and urged residents to get to safety. Numerous houses in villages have been destroyed, with injuries reported.
The breakaway region immediately declared "martial law and total military mobilization," Karabakh's president Araik Harutyunyan told an emergency parliament session. He said that those liable for military service had been called up for duty.
The new clashes represent the first major outbreak of violence since 2016 between the two neighbors over Azerbaijan’s breakaway, mainly ethnic Armenian region in the southern Caucasus.
The two sides have been involved in a dispute since the fall of the Soviet Union and had engaged in border conflicts earlier this year.
Read more: Angela Merkel in Azerbaijan calls for peace with Armenia
Tensions heightened
Violence first erupted in the region when ethnic Armenians seized Karabakh from Azerbaijan in the 1990s. 30,000 people were killed during the war.
A ceasefire, that was signed in 1994, largely put an end to the full-scale conflict, however, peace talks mediated by France, Russia and the United States collapsed in 2010.
Azerbaijan has made repeated threats to take back the region by force. Although the region declared independence, it is heavily reliant on Armenian support and Armenia has stated that it would defend the territory militarily.
ab/mm (AFP, Reuters)
Merde......
northern watch
TB Fanatic
Clashes between Armenia and Azerbaijan threaten South Caucasus stability
By Nvard Hovhannisyan, Nailia Bagirova
September 27, 20203:38 AMUpdated 22 minutes ago
YEREVAN / BAKU (Reuters) - Clashes erupted between Armenia and Azerbaijan on Sunday over the volatile Nagorno-Karabakh region, reigniting concern about instability in the South Caucasus, a corridor for pipelines transporting oil and gas to world markets.
Both sides, which fought a war in the 1990s, reported fatalities. Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, a breakaway region that is inside Azerbaijan but is run by ethnic Armenians, declared martial law and mobilised their male populations.
Armenia said Azerbaijan had carried out an air and artillery attack on Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan said it had responded to Armenian shelling and that it had seized control of up to seven villages, but Nagorno-Karabakh denied this.
The clashes prompted a flurry of diplomacy to prevent a new flare-up of a decades-old conflict between majority Christian Armenia and mainly Muslim Azerbaijan, with Russia calling for an immediate ceasefire and Pope Francis leading calls for talks.
Pipelines shipping Caspian oil and natural gas from Azerbaijan to the world pass close to Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenia also warned about security risks in the South Caucasus in July after Azerbaijan threatened to attack Armenia’s nuclear power plant as possible retaliation.
Nagorno-Karabakh broke away from Azerbaijan in a conflict that broke out as the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991.
Though a ceasefire was agreed in 1994, after thousands of people were killed and many more displaced, Azerbaijan and Armenia frequently accuse each other of attacks around Nagorno-Karabakh and along the separate Azeri-Armenian frontier.
In Sunday’s clashes, Armenian right activists said an ethnic Armenian woman and child had been killed. Azerbaijan said an unspecified number of its civilians had been killed. Nagorno-Karabakh denied a report that 10 of its military were killed.
Armenia said Azeri forces had attacked civilian targets including Nagorno-Karabakh’s capital, Stepanakert, and promised a “proportionate response”.
“We stay strong next to our army to protect our motherland from Azeri invasion,” Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan wrote on Twitter.
Azerbaijan denied an Armenian defence ministry statement saying Azeri helicopters and tanks had been destroyed, and accused Armenian forces of launching “deliberate and targeted” attacks along the front line.
“We defend our territory, our cause is right!” Azerbaijan’s president, Ilham Aliyev, said in an address to the nation.
INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, whose country has mediated between former Soviet republics Armenia and Azerbaijan, spoke by phone to the Armenian, Azeri and Turkish foreign ministers.
Turkey said Armenia must immediately cease what it said was hostility towards Azerbaijan that will “throw the region into fire”, and Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan said on Twitter that Ankara would continue to show solidarity with Azerbaijan.
Erdogan urged the Armenian people to “take hold of their future against their leadership that is dragging them to catastrophe and those using it like puppets”.
France also urged the sides to end hostilities and immediately restart dialogue. The pope appealed to Armenia and Azerbaijan to resolve their differences through negotiations, saying he was praying for peace.
At least 200 people were killed in a flare-of the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan in April 2016. There are frequent skirmishes and at least 16 were reported killed in clashes in July.
Additional reporting by Tuvan Gumrukcu in Ankara; Writing by Gabrielle Tétrault-Farber and Vladimir Soldatkin; Editing by Stephen Coates and Timothy Heritage
uk.reuters.com
By Nvard Hovhannisyan, Nailia Bagirova
September 27, 20203:38 AMUpdated 22 minutes ago
YEREVAN / BAKU (Reuters) - Clashes erupted between Armenia and Azerbaijan on Sunday over the volatile Nagorno-Karabakh region, reigniting concern about instability in the South Caucasus, a corridor for pipelines transporting oil and gas to world markets.
Both sides, which fought a war in the 1990s, reported fatalities. Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, a breakaway region that is inside Azerbaijan but is run by ethnic Armenians, declared martial law and mobilised their male populations.
Armenia said Azerbaijan had carried out an air and artillery attack on Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan said it had responded to Armenian shelling and that it had seized control of up to seven villages, but Nagorno-Karabakh denied this.
The clashes prompted a flurry of diplomacy to prevent a new flare-up of a decades-old conflict between majority Christian Armenia and mainly Muslim Azerbaijan, with Russia calling for an immediate ceasefire and Pope Francis leading calls for talks.
Pipelines shipping Caspian oil and natural gas from Azerbaijan to the world pass close to Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenia also warned about security risks in the South Caucasus in July after Azerbaijan threatened to attack Armenia’s nuclear power plant as possible retaliation.
Nagorno-Karabakh broke away from Azerbaijan in a conflict that broke out as the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991.
Though a ceasefire was agreed in 1994, after thousands of people were killed and many more displaced, Azerbaijan and Armenia frequently accuse each other of attacks around Nagorno-Karabakh and along the separate Azeri-Armenian frontier.
In Sunday’s clashes, Armenian right activists said an ethnic Armenian woman and child had been killed. Azerbaijan said an unspecified number of its civilians had been killed. Nagorno-Karabakh denied a report that 10 of its military were killed.
Armenia said Azeri forces had attacked civilian targets including Nagorno-Karabakh’s capital, Stepanakert, and promised a “proportionate response”.
“We stay strong next to our army to protect our motherland from Azeri invasion,” Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan wrote on Twitter.
Azerbaijan denied an Armenian defence ministry statement saying Azeri helicopters and tanks had been destroyed, and accused Armenian forces of launching “deliberate and targeted” attacks along the front line.
“We defend our territory, our cause is right!” Azerbaijan’s president, Ilham Aliyev, said in an address to the nation.
INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, whose country has mediated between former Soviet republics Armenia and Azerbaijan, spoke by phone to the Armenian, Azeri and Turkish foreign ministers.
Turkey said Armenia must immediately cease what it said was hostility towards Azerbaijan that will “throw the region into fire”, and Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan said on Twitter that Ankara would continue to show solidarity with Azerbaijan.
Erdogan urged the Armenian people to “take hold of their future against their leadership that is dragging them to catastrophe and those using it like puppets”.
France also urged the sides to end hostilities and immediately restart dialogue. The pope appealed to Armenia and Azerbaijan to resolve their differences through negotiations, saying he was praying for peace.
At least 200 people were killed in a flare-of the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan in April 2016. There are frequent skirmishes and at least 16 were reported killed in clashes in July.
Additional reporting by Tuvan Gumrukcu in Ankara; Writing by Gabrielle Tétrault-Farber and Vladimir Soldatkin; Editing by Stephen Coates and Timothy Heritage
Reuters | Breaking International News & Views
Find latest news from every corner of the globe at Reuters.com, your online source for breaking international news coverage.
uk.reuters.com
northern watch
TB Fanatic
Armenian PM warns against any Turkish involvement in conflict with Azerbaijan
By Nvard Hovhannisyan, Nailia Bagirova
September 27, 20208:53 AM Updated 2 hours ago
YEREVAN (Reuters) - Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan called on the international community on Sunday to ensure that Turkey does not involve itself in Armenia’s conflict with Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh region, trading barbs with Ankara.
Turkey, an Azeri ally, had earlier sharply criticised Armenia after clashes between Armenian and Azeri forces broke out in the morning, saying Yerevan was an obstacle to peace and vowing to continue its support for Baku.
Pashinyan said Turkey’s behaviour could have destructive consequences for the South Caucasus and neighbouring regions.
Both sides, which fought a war in the 1990s, reported fatalities. Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, a breakaway region that is inside Azerbaijan but is run by ethnic Armenians, declared martial law and mobilised its male population.
The military command of Azerbaijan proposed to the command of the Armenian garrison located in the settlement of Agdere to lay down its arms and surrender, Azerbaijan’s defence ministry said in a statement. The armed forces of Nagorno-Karabakh described the statement as disinformation.
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) said on Sunday it was concerned about the humanitarian impact of the conflict escalation and called on the sides “to take all measures necessary to ensure that civilian life and infrastructure is respected and protected”.
Additional reporting by Stephanie Nebehay; Writing by Vladimir Soldatkin and Margarita Antidze; Editing by Nick Macfie
uk.reuters.com
By Nvard Hovhannisyan, Nailia Bagirova
September 27, 20208:53 AM Updated 2 hours ago
YEREVAN (Reuters) - Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan called on the international community on Sunday to ensure that Turkey does not involve itself in Armenia’s conflict with Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh region, trading barbs with Ankara.
Turkey, an Azeri ally, had earlier sharply criticised Armenia after clashes between Armenian and Azeri forces broke out in the morning, saying Yerevan was an obstacle to peace and vowing to continue its support for Baku.
Pashinyan said Turkey’s behaviour could have destructive consequences for the South Caucasus and neighbouring regions.
Both sides, which fought a war in the 1990s, reported fatalities. Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, a breakaway region that is inside Azerbaijan but is run by ethnic Armenians, declared martial law and mobilised its male population.
The military command of Azerbaijan proposed to the command of the Armenian garrison located in the settlement of Agdere to lay down its arms and surrender, Azerbaijan’s defence ministry said in a statement. The armed forces of Nagorno-Karabakh described the statement as disinformation.
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) said on Sunday it was concerned about the humanitarian impact of the conflict escalation and called on the sides “to take all measures necessary to ensure that civilian life and infrastructure is respected and protected”.
Additional reporting by Stephanie Nebehay; Writing by Vladimir Soldatkin and Margarita Antidze; Editing by Nick Macfie
Reuters | Breaking International News & Views
Find latest news from every corner of the globe at Reuters.com, your online source for breaking international news coverage.
uk.reuters.com