WAR 11-05-2022-to-11-11-2022__THEWINDSofWAR

Housecarl · Nov 5, 2022

________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Hummm......

Posted for fair use.....

US military nuclear chief sounds the alarm about pace of China's nuclear weapons program | CNN Politics

The Commander of US Strategic Command, which oversees the US nuclear weapons program, warned that China is developing nuclear weapons much faster than the US and called the issue a "near-term problem," during a speech at a closed event earlier this week.

www.cnn.com

US military nuclear chief sounds the alarm about pace of China’s nuclear weapons program

By Ellie Kaufman and Barbara Starr, CNN
Published 2:17 PM EDT, Fri November 4, 2022

CNN —
The Commander of US Strategic Command, which oversees the US nuclear weapons program, warned that China is developing nuclear weapons much faster than the US and called the issue a “near-term problem,” during a speech at a closed event earlier this week.

While Pentagon officials have been sounding the alarm about China’s military buildup and development of nuclear weapons for years, Richard’s comments paint the situation as more dire than other officials have stated publicly.

“As I assess our level of deterrence against China, the ship is slowly sinking,” Adm. Charles Richard said. “It is sinking slowly, but it is sinking, as fundamentally they are putting capability in the field faster than we are.”

Richard called the development of China’s nuclear weapons program a “near-term problem.”

“As those curves keep going, it isn’t going to matter how good our [operating plan] is or how good our commanders are, or how good our forces are – we’re not going to have enough of them. And that is a very near-term problem.”

Richard made the comments during a speaking engagement at the Naval Submarine League Annual Symposium on Wednesday. The event was closed to the public, but Richard’s comments were published in a Department of Defense news article Friday.

The Biden administration has consistently called China the US’s main global competitor and warned about the country’s development of its military and nuclear weapons program in a series of policy documents explaining the US’s defense and military strategy released at the end of October.

China is the US’s “pacing challenge” because it is “the only competitor with both the intent and increasingly the capability to systematically challenge the United States across the board, militarily, economically, technologically, diplomatically,” a senior defense official said about the strategy.

China “likely intends to possess at least 1,000 deliverable warheads by the end of the decade,” the Nuclear Posture Review, one of the policy documents, said of China’s nuclear weapons program.

Richard warned of China’s nuclear development in 2021, calling their program a “strategic breakout.”

“We are witnessing a strategic breakout by China. The explosive growth and modernization of its nuclear and conventional forces can only be what I describe as breathtaking, and, frankly, that word breathtaking may not be enough,” Richard said in 2021.

et2 · Nov 5, 2022

Xi appointed himself another unheard of term. The supreme leader. They’re getting ready. Many videos have come from China in the last year saying we’re going to war with America.

Housecarl · Nov 5, 2022

Talk about November Sierra............The author is a prime example of the current Admin's cohort....

Posted for fair use.....

The Nukes Never Went Away

We just forgot to fear them.

www.theatlantic.com

IDEAS

The Nukes Never Went Away

We just forgot to fear them.
By William Neuman
NOVEMBER 5, 2022, 7:30 AM ET

Russian President Vladimir Putin talks about using nuclear weapons against Ukraine, adding, “This is not a bluff.” President Joe Biden warns Americans of possible Armageddon. Experts discuss the nuances of so-called tactical nuclear weapons.

And news outlets are full of stories that give some version of The threat of nuclear war is back. But they are wrong: The threat never went away. Only the fear did.

In 1984, when I was in my last year of college, I sat down on a railway track near Vancouver, Washington. I was one of dozens of protesters who blocked the track to stop a train that was carrying nuclear warheads to the Trident submarine base in Puget Sound. The shipment’s special armored railcars carrying the warheads were painted white, so it became known as the “white train.” The Burlington Northern engine locomotive pulling the freight seemed very big as it crept forward at low speed and stopped a few feet from where I sat, looking up at it, on the gravel and ties of the roadbed. Police officers warned us to leave, and when we didn’t, they arrested us.

Similar protests had in the past resulted in the equivalent of traffic tickets or in dismissed charges. This time, someone in authority decided to make an example of us, and we were charged with the crime of “willfully obstructing” a train. The law had been on the books for close to a century, since the days when Washington farmers had rebelled against the railroad monopolies that charged them high prices to move their crops to market.

That fall, we went on trial in the Clark County courthouse, in Vancouver. It was a raucous hearing. There were 30 defendants, most of us acting as our own lawyers. I was a young hothead and kept mouthing off to the judge (and later, to the jail guards). We were all found guilty, and the leaders of the group (or the loudest, like me) were handed short jail sentences. In all, I spent about a week in the Clark County jail. The first night, as a reward for my back talk, I was placed in a bare cell with a man who was raving with delirium tremens, whom the guards had chained to a metal ring on the concrete floor.

For many of my generation, the possibility of nuclear war loomed over our lives like that train bearing down the track. We believed that a full-scale nuclear exchange between the two Cold War superpowers would make the planet uninhabitable, and we felt a moral urgency compelling us to act. Nuclear disarmament became the center of our political activism.

Tom Nichols: The nuclear question America never answers

I was born in February 1961, two weeks after John F. Kennedy’s inauguration. In between those two events, a B-52 bomber broke up midair over North Carolina, and two hydrogen bombs it was carrying fell to Earth. Back then, the incident received just a four-paragraph blurb in The New York Times, but recently declassified records show that one of the weapons came close to detonating, with a potential force 260 times greater than the bomb dropped on Hiroshima—a disaster that was prevented only by one simple switch, which was found on other occasions to be liable to fail.

A few months later, the Soviet Union conducted a test detonation of what has been called the Tsar Bomba, a colossal hydrogen bomb some 3,300 times more powerful than the Hiroshima device; this test remains the biggest man-made explosion ever carried out. The following year, the U.S. and the Soviet Union faced off in the Cuban Missile Crisis, which is perhaps the closest the world has come to nuclear annihilation; that was 60 years ago last month.

I grew up, and as a nerdy and politically aware teenager in the 1970s, I subscribed to the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. On its cover, the magazine featured the Doomsday Clock, with its hands poised just minutes before midnight to symbolize how close humanity was to nuclear destruction.

In the 1980s, Ronald Reagan became president. He escalated the Cold War, nearly doubling the defense budget in his first term, expanding the U.S. nuclear arsenal, denouncing the Soviet Union as the “evil empire,” and promoting a Star Wars system of satellite weaponry intended to knock intercontinental ballistic missiles carrying Soviet nuclear warheads out of the sky. Nuclear war seemed a very real, almost imminent threat—more so, perhaps, than at any other time since 1962.

In 1982, hundreds of thousands of people attended a nuclear-disarmament rally in New York’s Central Park. In November 1983, Americans had the bejesus scared out of them by The Day After, a television movie about the aftermath of an all-out nuclear conflict; the Sunday prime-time broadcast was watched by an estimated 100 million viewers, more than half the adults in the country.

In January 1984, a few months before I sat down on the train tracks, the atomic scientists advanced their clock to just three minutes to midnight, writing, “As we enter the new year, hope is eclipsed by foreboding. The accelerating nuclear arms race and the almost complete breakdown of communication between the superpowers have combined to create a situation of extreme and immediate danger.” And in 1986 came a reminder to the world of what a nuclear catastrophe could mean: A meltdown at the Chernobyl nuclear reactor in Ukraine (then still part of the U.S.S.R.) led to the release of a cloud of deadly radioactive material that blew across Northern Europe and beyond.

But then, miraculously, the world changed. In 1989, the Berlin Wall came down, and two years after that, the Soviet Union was no more. All of a sudden, there was only one superpower, and the threat of “mutual assured destruction”—MAD, for short—between two menacing nuclear-armed adversaries seemed to recede.

My father was born in Germany, fled the Nazis with his family, came to the U.S., eventually enlisted in the Army, and, near the end of the war, returned to Europe as a soldier. Later in life, he rarely talked about his military experience. From his silence, even more than his words, I understood that there was no glory in war, only destruction.

My father believed that politicians who had been to war were less likely to get the nation into another one, because they had seen the horror firsthand. That hasn’t always been borne out, but it did prove a crucial element of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev, the Soviet leader, had both seen the devastation of World War II and, with the memory of Hiroshima and Nagasaki still fresh, they avoided a headlong rush to catastrophe. As different in ideology and temperament as Kennedy and Khrushchev were, the historian Serhii Plokhy has written, “they had one thing in common that proved decisive—fear of nuclear war.”

When I was in high school, we read Hiroshima, by the journalist John Hersey, in class. The book, based on interviews that Hersey conducted in the months after the bombing, tells the stories of six people who survived the world’s first nuclear strike. I still have clear memories of Hersey’s account—in particular, his descriptions of people who were horribly burned by the blast or by radiation. “He reached down and took a woman by the hands,” Hersey wrote of a survivor who sought to help other victims, “but her skin slipped off in huge, glove-like pieces.”

I asked my son, who is 24, if the book had been assigned while he was in high school. No, he said, but he thought he remembered having seen the cover: “A big orange circle?” I looked it up online. Sure enough, the cover of the paperback, still in print today, is oddly ambiguous: a drawing of a big orange sun, either rising or setting, behind a vaguely oriental bridge. When I read the book, its cover image was a black-and-white photograph of a towering mushroom cloud. There was no mistaking its subject.

For my son’s generation, climate change is now the existential threat that makes people lose sleep. A 30-year-old friend told me that climate disaster is what the people in his circle who are starting families worry about most when they contemplate their children’s future. I asked whether he’d spent much time thinking about the threat of nuclear weapons. “Minimally,” he said. “Even now the drumbeat of nuclear war seems to be a distant thing. It’s not top of mind for most people of my generation. It seems a relic of history.”

I wondered whether Putin’s threats had penetrated this unconcern. “It seems as if the deterrence has been established sufficiently that he wouldn’t engage,” my friend said. “And so when he talks about it, I think most people of my generation think he’s posturing and trying to use it as leverage rather than a genuine threat.”

New generation, new horrors.

We all see storms growing more violent, hurricanes increasing in power, record flooding. In the face of these immediacies, the specter of nuclear war may seem an abstraction. Like radiation, it is invisible. We don’t see the bombs in their silos or the bombers and the submarines. We find it easy to think: Nuclear war is too risky; no one would dare try it. Deterrence has worked for more than seven decades, so it will continue working.

I recall a vigorous debate in the 1980s about whether the world would be safer without nuclear weapons or with them and the deterrence they provided. Those of us who dreamed of a nuclear-free future believed that deterrence must inevitably fail. As long as nations had nuclear arsenals, the risk—certainty, even—was that someday they would use them.

Now the predicament of Ukraine shows the limits of deterrence. It functioned between nuclear-armed states that could destroy each other; it falters, or perhaps never applied, in the case of a nonnuclear nation threatened by a nuclear power.

Putin, a dictator who traffics in terror, wants us to think that he has lost the fear that held Khrushchev and Kennedy back from disaster during the Cuban crisis. He talks about using nuclear weapons, some analysts tell us, because he wants to normalize the idea that they can be used in war, so that when he orders a strike, people will say, Well, I don’t like it, but that’s just how things are.

That desensitizing process, the erosion of shock value, has already begun. Other horrors have intervened. The nuclear dread has faded.

My hope is that Putin’s nuclear bravado will backfire, just as his invasion has gone against plan. In trying to make nukes seem normal, just another weapon to deploy on the battlefield, Putin may inadvertently accomplish the opposite. Why did we sit on the train tracks all those years ago? We were in favor of disarmament, yes, but our more immediate goal was to make the weapons visible. We wanted people to see them. We wanted to shake people up, shock them, and make them aware of the threat we all faced. The need for that work never ended. People just got used to looking away.

William Neuman is the author of Things Are Never So Bad That They Can't Get Worse: Inside the Collapse of Venezuela. A former reporter and foreign correspondent for The New York Times, he served as the paper's Andes Region Bureau Chief from 2012 to 2016.

Housecarl · Nov 5, 2022

Hummm.....

Posted for fair use.....

https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/energy/these-are-the-nuclear-weapons-north-korea-has-as-fears-mount-of-atomic-test/2022/11/03/d69177aa-5b35-11ed-bc40-b5a130f95ee7_story.html

ENERGY

These Are the Nuclear Weapons North Korea Has as Fears Mount of Atomic Test

Analysis by Jon Herskovitz | Bloomberg
November 3, 2022 at 9:33 p.m. EDT

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has shown no interest in resuming talks with the US after agreeing in 2018 to work toward “complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” Instead, he has been busy making his nuclear-equipped arsenal bigger, deadlier and better able to strike America and its allies in Asia. Kim has fired off a record number of missiles this year to demonstrate his weapons advances and may soon conduct his first atomic bomb test in five years.

1. What is Kim working on?
An array of ballistic missiles designed to carry nuclear warheads to hit the US allies of South Korea and Japan, longer-range rockets that could strike American bases in Guam, as well as intercontinental ballistic missiles designed to deliver an atomic strike to New York or Washington. Kim has also modernized his missile arsenal, steering away from the Soviet-era Scud variants that had been a staple to produce rockets that rely heavily on domestic technology and can be manufactured despite sanctions. He’s also seeking to improve the technology to miniaturize warheads for strikes in the region and increase the power of warheads for an ICBM.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-apps/imrs.php?src=https://arc-anglerfish-washpost-prod-washpost.s3.amazonaws.com/public/2YOWXKC3GUI63PCAWWQTB6K644.jpg&w=540

• Kim has rolled out new solid-fuel ballistic missiles that are easier to move, hide and fire than many liquid-fuel versions. He’s launched more than 80 since May 2019, including nuclear-capable, super-fast KN-23 missiles that can strike all of South Korea -- and US forces stationed there -- within a matter of minutes. He has also launched KN-25 short-range missiles designed to be fired in rapid succession from a single launcher to overwhelm interceptors.
• It tested hypersonic missiles in September 2021 and again in January 2022, which are designed to deploy a high-speed glide vehicle that can carry a warhead and maneuver past interceptors.
• In October 2022, it fired its first missile over Japan in about five years, launching what appeared to be a Hwasong-12 intermediate-range rocket. It splashed into the Western Pacific after reaching an altitude of 970 kilometers -- more than twice as high as the International Space Station.

• The country also showed off last year, and again in January, what it said was a new delivery system to fire missiles off a train, making them harder for prying eyes to track.
2. Could Kim really hit the US?
He appears to have acquired that capability after successfully testing an intercontinental ballistic missile in November 2017, the Hwasong-15. A newer, larger ICBM, the Hwasong-17, was displayed at a military parade in October 2020 to mark the 75th anniversary of the ruling Workers’ Party. It may have exploded shortly after launch in a failed test in mid-March 2022. Eight days after that failure, North Korea fired off an ICBM that South Korea believes was the Hwasong-15. Weapons experts say the likely purpose of the Hwasong-17 is to deliver a multiple nuclear warhead payload that could overwhelm US defenses, or a single, high-yield weapon. North Korea is also said to be developing an ICBM that uses solid-fuel technology, potentially giving the US less warning of an imminent launch. Still, it’s unclear whether the country’s ICBMs could beat antimissile systems and are refined enough to strike their intended targets, as well as whether the warheads could survive reentry into the atmosphere.

3. How many nuclear devices does North Korea have?
Experts estimate that North Korea has assembled 40 to 50 nuclear warheads, the fewest among the nine nations with nuclear weapons. However, one estimate, from a 2021 study by the RAND Corp. and Asan Institute, put the number as high as 116. The country has conducted six atomic tests, with Kim responsible for the last four. The US, Japan and South Korea have all said Pyongyang could soon conduct another test. The first detonation in 2006 measured less than one kiloton, leaving experts wondering whether it had been a partial failure. (A kiloton is equal to the force of 1,000 metric tons [1,102 tons] of TNT). In the most recent test, in September 2017, the estimated yield of 120 to 250 kilotons dwarfed the 15 to 20 kiloton US bombs that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. North Korea probably has developed miniaturized nuclear devices to fit into its ballistic missile warheads, according to the assessment of “several” countries cited in a 2020 United Nations report.
4. Where does Kim’s military get its fissile material?

It has been self-sufficient for decades in fissile material, the main ingredient to create a nuclear chain reaction and explosion. The program today relies largely on enriched uranium and, according to weapons experts, produces enough annually for about six bombs. In addition, North Korea appeared in mid-2021 to have resumed plutonium-producing operations -- another means of creating fissile material -- at a nuclear reactor in its antiquated Yongbyon complex.
5. What other surprises might be out there?
North Korea may be working on ICBMs that carry multiple warheads and in-flight countermeasures to throw interceptors off the trail, according to Datayo, an open-source weapons research site. Kim has pushed to develop his fleet of submarines and is looking to deploy a new vessel soon that experts say could fire missiles.

6. How can the country afford all this?
The money needed is not huge in global terms. North Korea spends about $7 billion to $11 billion a year -- around 20-30% of its economy -- on its military, according to a US Defense Intelligence Agency assessment. That’s roughly equivalent to two days’ US military spending. Although international sanctions have hit the economy hard, North Korea evades some through methods such as clandestine transfers at sea of banned goods such as oil, and it generates cash by means that include ransomware attacks. Kim’s decade-old regime has already taken in as much as $2.3 billion through cybercrimes and is geared to rake in even more, US and United Nations investigators have said.
7. Wasn’t Trump going to fix this?

Former President Donald Trump’s talks with Kim, beginning with Singapore in June 2018, turned the duo from insult-throwing enemies into dialogue partners. But their three meetings didn’t produce any noticeable change, and North Korea has become what three decades of diplomacy had tried to prevent -- a state capable of developing, projecting and detonating atomic bombs. Kim has shown no interest in the President Joe Biden’s call for him to return to nuclear talks.

--With assistance from Paul Geitner.

More stories like this are available on bloomberg.com
©2022 Bloomberg L.P.
1 Comments

Housecarl · Nov 5, 2022

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NATO chief urges Turkey to stop stalling Sweden, Finland accession

Both Turkey's president and foreign minister tell the NATO secretary-general that steps from Sweden and Finland will determine the pace of Ankara’s ratification of the Nordic accession.

www.al-monitor.com

NATO chief urges Turkey to stop stalling Sweden, Finland accession

Both Turkey's president and foreign minister tell the NATO secretary-general that steps from Sweden and Finland will determine the pace of Ankara’s ratification of the Nordic accession.

November 3, 2022
Nazlan Ertan

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg urged Turkey to ratify the accession of Sweden and Finland to NATO as soon as possible, saying those two countries had lived up to their obligations to address Turkey’s security concerns.

But Mevlut Cavusoglu, Turkey’s foreign minister, said that while progress was made, it was still impossible to say that Turkey’s conditions had been fully met. Cavusoglu, however, added that Turkey had a more positive outlook toward the new Swedish government and was looking forward to the visit of Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson “in a few days.”

Stoltenberg is on a two-day visit to Turkey, the only country that has made no move to ratify the alliance’s Nordic expansion after Hungary said it would seek to seal the accession accord by mid-December. Stoltenberg will meet President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Defense Minister Hulusi Akar on Friday for further talks.

“The pace and the finalization of the ratification” for the Nordic enlargement would depend on the steps taken by Sweden and Finland, a brief statement from the presidency said after the Erdogan-Stoltenberg meeting late Friday.

In a joint press conference with Cavusoglu Thursday, Stoltenberg said that in NATO’s Madrid summit in June, all allies made “a historic decision” to invite Finland and Sweden to join the alliance. Turkey, which had been shuffling its feet, lifted its blockade at the eleventh hour with a trilateral memorandum that addressed its security concerns.

The trilateral memorandum commits the two Nordic countries to extend their full support to Turkey on threats against its national security, including the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). It states that the two countries would not support YPG/PYD (Syrian Kurdish groups which Turkey considers offshoots of the PKK in Syria) or FETO, the organization headed by US-based cleric Fethullah Gulen, which Ankara says carried out the unsuccessful putsch in 2016. The two countries also promise “to work with Turkey” on extraditions of people on Turkey’s wanted list and lift military embargoes on Ankara.

“Finland and Sweden have delivered on their agreement with Turkey. ... It is time to welcome them as full members of NATO,” Stoltenberg said, and finalizing the accession is “even more important in these dangerous times to prevent any misunderstanding or miscalculation in Moscow.”

Aware that Ankara is more concerned with Sweden than Finland, Stoltenberg cited the “major, concrete” actions Sweden had taken, such as strengthening legislation that prohibited membership in terrorist organizations, including the PKK, launching new tools for financial controls, and sharing intelligence. He also hinted that the new legislation might enable some extraditions.

“The secretary-general was a key figure on the memorandum, and we thank him. Authorities of both countries are underlining their commitment to it, but what matters is the concrete fulfillment of the issues in the deal,” Cavusoglu said. “The new [Swedish] government is determined, and the new PM will come to Turkey and we will meet and talk."

Besides the visit of Kristersson on Nov. 8, Cavusoglu also said that the next meeting of the trilateral mechanism will be in Stockholm later in November. “Some progress has been made, but we cannot say that all elements in the memorandum had been fulfilled,” he said, in a thinly veiled reference to Turkey’s extradition requests from Sweden.

Following the formation of the new government, Cavusoglu called his new counterpart Tobias Billstrom to congratulate him. Cavusoglu had criticized Sweden’s Foreign Minister Ann Linde and what he called her “so-called feminist policy” at a critical NATO meeting, attacking Linde’s embrace of the Syrian Kurdish leadership, which has strong female representation.

Many believe that Turkey, facing presidential and parliamentary elections next year, is unlikely to ratify the agreement before the end of the year, as Hungary announced it would do. However, Cavusoglu ducked the question, saying, “The pace depends on the steps of the two countries.”

On Wednesday, Finnish Prime Minister Sanna Marin said that all eyes were on Hungary and Turkey. “We are waiting for these countries to ratify our applications. I think it would be important that this would happen preferably sooner than later,” she said at a press conference following a Nordic Council.

Marin and Kristersson reiterated last week the two countries’ pledge to join the defense bloc together. The reiteration is important as Turkey has fewer problems with Finland than Sweden, which has a sizable and vocal Kurdish minority. However, Helsinki has repeatedly said that it would not detach its accession application from its neighbor.

“We do not have huge problems with Finland, but both countries and the secretary-general has asked to take the two applications together,” Mevlutoglu said at the press conference with Stoltenberg.

Since August, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has repeatedly criticized Sweden for failing to deliver its promises, particularly on the extradition of about 30 people requested. Sweden made one extradition in August, but the case concerned fraud and not terrorism. In late September, Swedish authorities lifted a ban on military exports to Turkey, meeting another of Ankara's demands.

Ankara-Stockholm ties soured further in October when the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned Sweden’s envoy over “disgraceful” comments about the Turkish president on Swedish state TV. The rebuke coincided with a Swedish delegation visit to Turkey today to discuss the implementation of the memorandum, particularly the extradition demands. Bekir Bozdag, Turkey’s defense minister, said his ministry renewed some extradition requests.

Kristersson, whose center-right government took office in mid-October, has been trying to break the impasse and persuade Turkey to proceed with the ratification. Paying a visit to NATO headquarters three days after taking office, Kristersson assured that his country would honor the agreement with Turkey and cooperate on fighting terrorism.

The newly elected premier told journalists that new legislation gives Sweden “more tools to prove in practice that we are delivering what we were promising.” Kristersson also sent a two-page letter to Erdogan, showing the 14 steps Sweden had taken to fulfill its obligation. The letter, dated Oct. 6, said Sweden's security and counter-terrorism police "has intensified its work against the PKK" and "carried out new analyses of PKK's role in threats to Sweden's national security and in organized crime (and) this is likely to lead to concrete results.”

Read more: NATO chief urges Turkey to stop stalling Sweden, Finland accession

Housecarl · Nov 5, 2022

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Iran says it tests satellite-carrying rocket, U.S. calls move 'destabilising'

Iran's Revolutionary Guards tested a new satellite-carrying rocket on Saturday, state media reported, a move the United States called "unhelpful and destabilising".

www.reuters.com

2 minute read November 5, 20227:09 AM PDT Last Updated 9 hours ago

Iran tests satellite-carrying rocket, state TV reports

Reuters
DUBAI, Nov 5 (Reuters) - Iran's Revolutionary Guards tested a new satellite-carrying rocket on Saturday, state media reported, a development likely to anger the United States.

Washington fears the same long-range ballistic technology used to put satellites into orbit could also be used to launch nuclear warheads. Tehran has regularly denied having any such intention.

"The flight test of this satellite carrier with a solid-fuelled engine ... was successfully completed," state news agency IRNA reported.

The Ghaem 100, Iran's first three-stage launch vehicle, will be able to place satellites weighing 80 kg (176 lb) in an orbit of 500 km (310 miles) from the earth's surface, IRNA said.

Amirali Hajizadeh, head of the Revolutionary Guards' aerospace division which developed the Ghaem 100, said the rocket would be used to launch Iran's Nahid satellite for the telecommunications ministry, state media reported.

Saturday's operation tested the first sub-orbital stage of the rocket, the reports added.

Iran, which has one of the biggest missile programmes in the Middle East, has had several failed satellite launches in the past few years, blamed on technical issues.

A U.N. resolution in 2015 called on Iran to refrain for up to eight years from work on ballistic missiles designed to deliver nuclear weapons following an agreement with six world powers.

Iran says it has never pursued the development of nuclear weapons and, therefore, the resolution does not apply to its ballistic missiles, which Tehran had described as an important deterrent and retaliatory force.

----------------------------------------------------------

From Times of Israel:

https://pbs.twimg.com/media/FgzWRMyXwAEJLG6?format=jpg&name=small

Note that it is on a road mobile TEL......

Also check this site:

Qased

www.b14643.de

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Housecarl · Nov 7, 2022

Hummm.....

Posted for fair use.....

Putin’s nuclear bluff has worked, it has lessons for India: Begin by precisely assessing the disposition of Pakistan’s tactical nuclear weapons

Foreign minister S Jaishankar’s bilateral visit to Moscow takes place amidst a heightened global perception of Russia’s nuclear threat. But the status of Russian nuclear forces on the ground has remained unaltered since President Putin...

timesofindia.indiatimes.com

FROM TOI PRINT EDITION

Putin’s nuclear bluff has worked, it has lessons for India: Begin by precisely assessing the disposition of Pakistan’s tactical nuclear weapons

November 7, 2022, 9:26 PM IST Jayant Prasad in TOI Edit Page, Edit Page, India, World, TOI

Foreign minister S Jaishankar’s bilateral visit to Moscow takes place amidst a heightened global perception of Russia’s nuclear threat. But the status of Russian nuclear forces on the ground has remained unaltered since President Putin ordered defence minister Sergei Shoigu to put the country’s deterrence forces on high combat alert in February. There have really been no signs of a higher state of nuclear readiness. In any case, Putin and the Russian foreign office have since disavowed possible nuclear weapons use.

Even the speculations have not been about the possible use of Russian strategic arsenal but remained restricted to tactical nuclear weapons. Limited use of TNWs is unlikely to change conventional battle outcomes unless these are used in large numbers, which is impractical as it would adversely affect the user’s forces too and contaminate the battlefield.

Read full opinion on TOI+

Housecarl · Nov 7, 2022

Hummm.....

Posted for fair use.....

Teaching Irregular Warfare in the Era of Strategic Competition - Modern War Institute

The 2022 National Security Strategy focuses on US leadership in strategic competition over the future of international order. The document lays out the threats and challenges the United States faces […]

mwi.usma.edu

TEACHING IRREGULAR WARFARE IN THE ERA OF STRATEGIC COMPETITION

Elena Pokalova | 11.07.22

The 2022 National Security Strategy focuses on US leadership in strategic competition over the future of international order. The document lays out the threats and challenges the United States faces today from adversaries such as Russia and China. In order to prevail over such competitors and secure US leadership in the future, the United States needs to reconsider the way it approaches teaching irregular warfare (IW) in its professional military education (PME) institutions.

Russia and China have demonstrated the rising significance of IW in the era of strategic competition. The Kremlin has used “little green men” to annex Crimea and deployed the Wagner Group to foment separatism in eastern Ukraine. China has stolen Western technology to get ahead and used its Belt and Road Initiative to undermine Western economic institutions. In what looks like an increasingly multipolar world, more and more actors are willing to resort to IW to compete; the United States’ IW curriculum needs to reflect that fact.

In the era of strategic competition, IW has become about building influence, creating leverage, and undermining opponents through all instruments of national power. It is about the use of all available capabilities to pursue hostile intentions without having to resort to the use of military force. When wars do break out, US adversaries have shown that IW is about fighting dirty, with little regard to internationally accepted norms and rules of armed conflict. What has been unthinkable for Western democracies has become the norm for autocratic governments in Moscow or Beijing. As a result, US PME students need to graduate with a proficiency in IW if they wish to fight and compete effectively.

IW Curriculum

To date, IW has had a light presence in PME curricula. The situation has begun to change with the publication of the IW Annex to the 2018 National Defense Strategy. However, most IW-relevant courses have focused on the operational level, examining best practices in counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, resistance operations, or countering information warfare. Such competencies are not enough. The basic knowledge of best practices is similar to training in which officers are given checklists that they have to follow to achieve a desired outcome. But without understanding the larger context and the fundamental variables at work in IW, simply following best practices might be counterproductive. Best practices work only when combined with a deep knowledge of the adversary and an understanding of the strategic logic behind its actions. In order to achieve that, IW proficiency in the contemporary world in the era of strategic competition should include the following competencies.

First, students of IW should have a solid understanding of how the United States fights wars and how others do. They should be proficient in conventional warfare and should have a clear understanding of how IW fits into what happens on the battlefield. As the war in Ukraine demonstrates, conventional warfare and IW go hand in hand. In addition to the conventional genius of the Ukrainian military, Kyiv has been able to gain advantage with the help of IW operations like the covert attack on Saky airbase in Crimea or the bombing of the Kerch Strait Bridge that connects Russia to Crimea. In the era of strategic competition, adversaries are even more likely to rely on IW to avoid direct confrontations that are costly. As a result, students of IW should know what strengths and weaknesses come with conventional warfare and IW, how the United States can maximize its strengths and minimize weaknesses, and what lessons it can learn from past wars.

Second, students of IW should know how the United States competes and how others do. IW is not all about warfare. In fact, successful IW often involves undermining an adversary without having to fight at all. Russia, for example, has used troll factories to spread propaganda and undermine its opponents, while China has used its Belt and Road Initiative to undermine US economic interests. Such actions demonstrate that US opponents will use all instruments of national power to build influence and create leverage. As a result, students of IW should study statecraft and comparative politics. They should know how the United States conducts foreign policy and how others do. They should be proficient in how US adversaries use various forms of power, employ hostile ideologies, and manipulate political legitimacy to fight without fighting. This knowledge is essential to comprehend how the US military fits into strategic competition and how US interagency partners can work with the military toward the same objectives.

Third, students of IW should invest in critical thinking. Critical thinking remains one of the most crucial capabilities for a warfighter. As explained above, US adversaries will exploit any combinations of tools and methods to compete. Adversaries such as China, Russia, and Iran will not adhere to US-led rules-based ways to interact with others: they will eagerly weaponize humans, food, and energy. No matter how well trained and prepared the US military is to fight an opponent, PME graduates need excellent analytical skills to quickly navigate among the surprises and tricks that permeate IW. The United States needs to invest more effort in active learning and scenario-based exercises to allow students to practice applying their theoretical knowledge and practical skills to real-life situations. Students of IW should graduate as agile thinkers who can quickly pivot to put the pieces of IW puzzles together.

Fourth, students of IW need education in strategic networking. A lot of IW work happens with interagency partners outside of the Department of Defense. For example, the US Departments of Transportation and Commerce are working with Ukraine on infrastructure resilience. As a result, students of IW should be able to effectively communicate with interagency partners. Additionally, successful strategic competition can depend on international partnerships. The more friends, allies, and partners the United States has, the fewer opportunities for malign influence Russia and China will have. For example, Central Asian states today offer a unique networking opportunity for the United States: hesitant to trust Russia due to its invasion of Ukraine, they are also cautious about the hidden costs that come with China’s expansion in the region. Students of IW should be able to identify the importance of such networking and should be capable of engaging with interagency and international partners so that the United States can improve its ability to make a phone call to prevent a war.

Fifth, students of IW should be trained to conduct themselves ethically. Too often, the Kremlin would point out that the United States is no better than Russia, and that the Russian government is only doing in Ukraine what the United States has done in many parts of the world. US students of IW have to be able to counter such narratives. Democratic regimes come with checks and balances, transparency and accountability, and the rule of law—ideals that place additional constraints on democratic governments. Authoritarian regimes in Moscow and Beijing do not have to answer to the same standards of public oversight as the United States. So wouldn’t getting rid of the constraints allow the United States to compete more effectively?

The answer is no. Emulating Russian or Chinese behavior will only undermine the United States’ international standing. The world is currently witnessing how ethical conduct is working in favor of Ukraine: Kyiv is confidently building international support through the professionalization of its special operations forces and its strict adherence to international rules of armed conflict. Russia, meanwhile, is isolating itself even further by sending prisoners to the front lines in Ukraine who then unsurprisingly engage in war crimes. Students of IW have to be proficient in ethical ways of fighting and competing that will bring the United States more leverage, recognition, and global leadership without undermining the very principles and ideals Washington says it stands for.

Sixth, the United States needs a continued commitment to build its foreign language expertise. The United States is woefully behind in foreign language skills. Budgetary constraints often lead to cuts in critical foreign language education. But the United States has already seen how the dearth of foreign language expertise can affect its warfighting. In order to win, the US military needs experts who not only have a deep understanding of US adversaries, but will also be able to converse with those adversaries in their language. Linguistic competence opens so many doors to cultural proficiency, which is invaluable in reading IW prompts and signals. The US government needs to expand opportunities for IW students to gain linguistic competency, even if at a basic level. Exposure to the Russian, Chinese, or Persian languages can help US soldiers better understand the way US adversaries think.

Only when students of IW have a foundation in the six competencies above should they also study best practices in particular branches of IW. These can include what has worked and what has failed in countering terrorist and insurgent groups, what has proven to be effective in resistance operations, or what has been successful in countering propaganda and disinformation. Applications of best practices without an intimate knowledge of an enemy can lead to counterproductive results. But IW expertise that is grounded in the six competencies above will allow students of IW to make better decisions—and help the United States compete more effectively in all forms of warfare, conventional and irregular alike.

Elena Pokalova is professor and department chair, College of International Security Affairs, National Defense University.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

Housecarl · Nov 7, 2022

Hummm.....(For all of the images and tweets please see article source. HC)

Posted for fair use.....

All The Air Combat Developments Out Of China's Massive Air Show

We break down all the new aircraft, air combat concepts, and munitions that have emerged from China's biggest arms expo so far.

www.thedrive.com

All The Air Combat Developments Out Of China’s Massive Air Show

We break down all the new aircraft, air combat concepts, and munitions that have emerged from China’s biggest arms expo so far.
BYJOSEPH TREVITHICK|PUBLISHED NOV 7, 2022 8:49 PM
THE WAR ZONE

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The latest iteration of China's Zhuhai Airshow will formally open tomorrow and we are already seeing all-new aircraft designs, including a number of advanced drones, and improved variants of existing types. Various new and advanced air-launched weapons and other systems are also on display at the event, which is really more of a massive trade expo for China's defense industry than a traditional air show. It perhaps offers the biggest glimpse into what China's capabilities look like today and what its military technology aspirations are for tomorrow. As always, many concepts have to be taken with a grain of salt, but China has proven its ability to pursue much of what it presents at these shows, making claims about widespread 'vaporware' of the past less potent today.

Pictures, videos, and other information has already emerged on social media from the show. We've already seen what appears to be a previously unseen stealthy flying wing-type drone from the Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group (CAIG) and another new uncrewed design from the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) that at least draws heavy influences from the Boeing Australia MQ-28 Ghost Bat. A new air-launched ballistic missile that the H-6K large missile carrier aircraft is capable of firing has also been unveiled. Now, just a day before opening, a ton of new developments have occurred that are really worth pointing out.

So, with this in mind, The War Zone has put together a round-up of aerial combat-related items that are worth bringing attention to.

From The Show
This year's Zhuhai Airshow is the first time that J-20 stealth fighters will be on display on the ground for the general public. The jets have participated in previous iterations of the event, but in flybys only.

As a result, new, more detailed views of the J-20 stealth fighter's cockpit have emerged. From what we can see now, the J-20 appears to have a single large wide-area flat-screen digital multi-function display for the pilot to use, along with the wide-angle heads-up display. Such an arrangement provides superior flexibility and situational awareness compared to older multi-screen layouts.

This year's Zhuhai Airshow has already yielded a number of other detailed shots of the J-20's various external features, as well. The video in the Tweet immediately below just gives a good look at the range of motion of the aircraft's various control surfaces.

A concept for a Chinese stealthy tailless sixth-generation combat jet is also on display at Zhuhai, but appears to be very crude in what it actually shows. It may be more intended to reflect potential future capabilities than any particular active development. That being said, China's aerospace industry is known to be working on a sixth-generation combat jet and similar core designs have previously appeared in publicly available Chinese aviation engineering white papers, as you can read more about here. In recent years, this general planform has also more or less emerged as the default when it comes to publicly-discussed future fighter jet-like combat aircraft concepts, including those related to America's Next Generation Air Dominance initiative, or NGAD.

Regardless, the tailless combat jet model appears to be more real than the Aviation Industry Corporation of China's (AVIC) Ultravic kiosk. This area of Zhuhai contains an entirely fictitious 'space fighter' that looks at least as if it would be more at home in an anime, if it's not actually based on a particular design, and seems to be solely intended to promote general interest and investment in AVIC.

It is now confirmed that the aerial tanker version of the Y-20 airlifter is designated the YY-20 (possibly YY-20A), rather than YU-20 or Y-20U as had been previously used to refer to these aircraft. Detailed shots of the YY-20 at Zhuhai also show that it has redesigned landing gear sponsors, which come to much sharper points at their fronts and rears. The overall shape is reminiscent, in broad strokes, of the landing gear sponsons on the Airbus A400M airlifter/tanker.

A new variant of the KJ-500 airborne early warning and control aircraft, possibly designated the KJ-500A, which features an aerial refueling probe, has made its debut appearance at Zhuhai. The addition of the aerial refueling capability will allow these aircraft to stay on station longer, even in operating areas that require longer transits to get to.

A new video, seen below, has emerged with additional details about CASC's MQ-28 clone, which is called the FH-97A, confirming a number of things posted in The War Zone's initial analysis, which you can find here. As expected, the computer-generated presentation shows these drones operating primarily in the air-to-air role networked together with crew J-20 stealth fighters, as well as each other. The clip shows crewed-uncrewed teams of J-20s and FH-97As flying in formation to avoid and otherwise penetrate through enemy air defenses and working cooperatively in air-to-air combat against what appears to be a U.S. Air Force F-22 Raptor stealth fighter.

The video also confirms that the FH-97A is expected to be equipped with multi-spectral sensors in a stealthy windowed enclosure on top of the nose and behind transparencies on either side of the forward fuselage for spotting and tracking threats, as The War Zone had initially suggested was likely the case. As we thought, its primary armament will be miniature infrared-guided air-to-air missiles in a pop-out launcher nestled in the bottom of the fuselage, but the clip says it could be armed for air-to-ground missions, too.
The computer-generated presentation says that the FH-97A's overall design is focused on stealth and maneuverability, and shows that it will take off and land from conventional runways. The clip says it will be equipped with a distributed 'mesh' data-sharing networking capability and will able to operate either together with crewed platforms, where it will act essentially as an "external bomb bay" for those aircraft as part of a complete "closed-loop attack chain," or autonomously.
It has been announced at this year's Zhuhai Airshow that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has officially adopted the CAIG Wing Loong-10 jet-powered drone, giving it the military designation WZ-10. These drones will ostensibly be used as electronic warfare platforms. CAIG has said in the past that the design, also known as the Cloud Shadow, can be armed with various air-to-ground and anti-ship weapons, and it is certainly possible that the PLA will eventually acquire versions for use in other roles, too.

Continued.....

Housecarl · Nov 7, 2022

Continued.....

CAIG has also unveiled a new member of its Wing Loong armed drone family, the Wing Loong 3, which features, among other things, larger wings than the preceding Wing Loong 2. Work on the Wing Loong 3 dates back to at least 2018, if not before. It is as least very closely related to the Wing Loong 2, which first emerged publicly in 2015 and is roughly analogous to the U.S. MQ-9 Reaper. The original Wing Loong design, or Wing Loong 1, was a smaller design more similar in size and capability to the American MQ-1 Predator.

CAIG says that the Wing Loong 3 has a maximum takeoff weight of 6,200 kilograms (13,669 pounds), versus the Wing Loong 2's 4,200 kilograms (9,259 pounds). Data the company provided at Zhuhai also says that the Wing Loong 3 has an absolute maximum range of 10,000 kilometers (just under 6,214 miles) and can stay aloft for up to 40 hours at a time, substantially greater than the Wing Long 2's 3,000-kilometer (1,864 miles) range and 20-30 hour endurance. The drone's actual range and endurance on any particular sortie would, of course, be heavily dependent on its exact configuration and stores loadout. Extended-range operations would also require a robust beyond-line-of-sight data link and/or a higher degree of autonomy.

Interestingly, the Wing Loong 3 on display at Zhuhai, which may simply be a mockup, is seen loaded with a PL-10E infrared-guided air-to-air missile, what looks to be a sonobuoy launcher, and a small air-launched uncrewed aircraft under its wings, among other stores.

The air-launched drone is very broadly reminiscent visually of the General Atomics Sparrowhawk. It's not clear if the Chinese design is intended to be recovered in flight like Sparrowhawk, but it could still similarly intended to provide valuable stand-off capabilities for its non-stealthy parent in higher-end threat environments.
The sonobouy launcher is a capability that is also now being seen on other drones, including General Atomics' Reaper family, and could allow the Wing Loong 3 to provide valuable additional capacity in support of anti-submarine operations.
CAIG also has a Wing Loong 1E drone on display. This is an advanced version of the older Wing Loong 1 that first emerged earlier this year and features the ability to carry more stores, among other improvements. The "E" in the designation could indicate an export focus. The Wing Loong 1 series is already one notable example of China's successes in selling armed and otherwise more robust military drones on the international market, with examples reportedly in service or set to enter service in the coming years in a dozen countries.

New close-up views of the Guizhou WZ-7 Soaring Dragon, which features an unusual jointed wing design, have emerged from this year's Zhuhai preparations. The WZ-7, which made its public debut at Zhuhai last year, is understood to be a high-altitude, long-endurance design primarily focused on intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions.

The China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC) has again brought an example of its Tian Ying, or Sky Hawk, flying wing drone. This uncrewed aircraft design was first unveiled at Zhuhai in 2018, at which time the company said it had already been in development for four years. The type is something akin to a small stealthy UCAV/ISR flying wing platform and it has been indicated on multiple occasions that it, or a version of it, could end up being deployed on carriers.

With commercial-off-the-shelf uncrewed aerial systems armed with improvised munitions only continuing to show themselves to be real threats on modern battlefields, it's no surprise that Chinese companies are offering more robust designs. This includes the Loong 4, a hexacopter, and the Loong 5, a so-called "hybrid" vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) capable design with pusher props at the ends of its twin tail booms, as well as vertical rotors on underwing booms. These drones are seen in the computer-generated videos in the Tweets below armed mortar bomb-style projectiles.

What looks to be a mockup of an uncrewed hypersonic testbed called the MD-22 has been displayed at the show. It's unclear how close this design may be to coming to fruition and whether there is any expectation that it could be developed in an operational platform. The design is reportedly expected to be 10.8 meters long, have a wingspan of 4.5 meters, weigh around 1 ton empty and have a maximum takeoff weight of some 4 tons, and be able to hit speeds of up to Mach 7 on sorties that could see the drone cover distances up to 8,000 kilometers. The range figure seems unlikely, but it may just represent aspirational ideas or even similar concepts with more realistic metrics that are under development.

Whatever the case, the MD-22 does mirror similar developments in the United States, such as the Stratolaunch Talon-A, which is intended primarily to support research and development and test and evaluation activities related to other hypersonic systems, including aircraft and weapons. The Chinese military actively pursuing a number of hypersonic capabilities that the MD-22 could help in the development of, at least in part, among other potential uses.
Examples of the most advanced members of the PLA's helicopter fleets – the Z-20 transport helicopter, the Z-8L transport helicopter, and the Z-10 attack helicopter – are unsurprisingly at Zhuhai. Close-up looks at one of the Z-20s show various sensors and modern defensive systems.

In terms of advanced rotorcraft, AVIC has put a model of a previously unseen tilt-rotor design on display. The design is reminiscent of Bell's V-280 Valor, especially in terms of the rotating nacelle design.

CASC also has a model of a smaller uncrewed tilt-rotor design, broadly reminiscent of the Bell V-247, on display.

Chinese firm MASTARS, which describes itself as focused primarily on rapid prototype and low-volume manufacturing, has a model at its booth at Zhuhai showing an advanced compound helicopter type with dual main rotors and a pusher prop, as well as small stub wings on either side of the fuselage for weapons and other stores. It's unclear whether this design, which looks very similar, at least externally, to the Boeing-Sikorsky SB>1 Defiant compound helicopter, reflects an active development effort that MASTARS is in some way involved in.

AVIC is displaying what could be a new variant or derivative of the PL-10 air-to-air missile with some type of radar seeker instead of infrared guidance.

What appears to be a new stealthy-looking air-launched store has appeared at this year's Zhuhai. AKF98A is seen written on its side, but what its formal nomenclature might be is unclear, as is its exact function. It would appear to be designed with some kind of integrated propulsion system, like a small jet engine, which could point to it being a new air-launched cruise missile.

Some experts and observers have suggested it might be a dispenser of some kind, which could be filled with submunitions or other payloads, like small expendable electronic warfare jammers. Two years ago, an unpowered Chinese submunition-filled glide bomb emerged, which looked to be broadly similar in form and function to the U.S. AGM-154 Joint Stand-Off Weapon (JSOW). It's possible that the AKF98A could reflect a desire for a powered weapon with greater stand-off range in this same general category, similar to past U.S. military efforts to develop a powered JSOW derivative.
Pictures of the AFK98A showed it next to another unpowered precision-guided weapon, which appears to be a laser-guided bomb in the 1,000-kilogram weight class. It's not immediately clear if this weapon, which looks to be designated YJ1000-1 is actually new, as it appears very similar, at least externally, to a previously seen weapon called the JL-5. It is, of course, possible that the YJ1000-1 reflects an improvement on the core design or is otherwise a variant of some kind.

AVIC has brought a separate powered precision-guided munition to this year's Zhuhai called the LS-6. This weapon, which has pop-out wings that would also give it additional stand-off range, looks broadly akin to a concept for a powered version of the U.S. Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) family of GPS-assisted Inertial Navigation System (INS) guided bombs that Boeing has shown in the past.

Various other older air-launched precision-guided weapons types, as well as dumb bombs, are also on display.

Jet engine development has long been an area where Chinese companies have notably lagged behind their western counterparts, but some firms like Shenyang have made some notable progress in this field in recent years. A number of designs that appear to be either variants or derivatives of the domestically-produced Shenyang WS-10 are on display at Zhuhai, including at least two different types with thrust vectoring capabilities.

This includes one with a stealthy-looking exhaust arrangement with the ability to vector thrust in at least two directions (2D), up and down, as well as an example with a more conventional exhaust configuration and 3D thrust vectoring. The stealthier type, which may be designated the WS-19, could be intended for more advanced versions of the existing stealth fighters, like the J-20 or the J-35, or a new sixth-generation combat jet. The 2D nozzle looks very much like the F-22's low-observable arrangement that is attacked to its F119 turbofans.

Shenyang's parent company, the Aero Engine Corporation of China (AECC), also has what is reportedly a new high-pass jet engine on display. The design looks more intended for commercial, rather than military use, though of course it could be used to power larger military types, like future variants of the Y-20.

That's it for now, but the Zhuhai Airshow runs from tomorrow through the end of the coming weekend. We'll be sure to keep you in the loop as the show unfolds.
Contact the author: joe@thedrive.com

Housecarl · Nov 10, 2022

Posted for fair use.....

UN agency: Iran increases highly enriched uranium stockpile

The U.N. atomic watchdog says it believes that Iran has further increased its stockpile of highly enriched uranium

abcnews.go.com

UN agency: Iran increases highly enriched uranium stockpile

The U.N. atomic watchdog says it believes that Iran has further increased its stockpile of highly enriched uranium
By EMILY SCHULTHEIS Associated Press
November 10, 2022, 1:31 PM

VIENNA -- The U.N. atomic watchdog said Thursday it believes that Iran has further increased its stockpile of highly enriched uranium and criticized Tehran for continuing to bar the agency's officials from accessing or monitoring Iranian nuclear sites.

In its quarterly report, the International Atomic Energy Agency said that according to its assessment, as of Oct. 22, Iran has an estimated 62.3 kilograms (137.3 pounds) of uranium enriched to up to 60% fissile purity. That amounts to an increase of 6.7 kilograms since the IAEA's last report in September.

That enrichment to 60% purity is one short, technical step away from weapons-grade levels of 90%. Nonproliferation experts have warned in recent months that Iran now has enough 60%-enriched uranium to reprocess into fuel for at least one nuclear bomb.

The IAEA report, which was seen by The Associated Press, also estimated that as of Oct. 22, Iran’s stockpile of all enriched uranium was at 3673.7 kilograms — a decrease of 267.2 kilograms since the last quarterly report in September.

The Vienna-based IAEA said it was unable to verify the exact size of Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium due to limitations that Tehran imposed on U.N. inspectors last year and the removal of the agency’s monitoring and surveillance equipment in June at sites in Iran.

It has been nearly two years since IAEA officials have had full access to monitor Iran’s nuclear sites, and five months since the surveillance equipment was removed.

The IAEA’s assessment comes as efforts to revive Iran's 2015 nuclear deal with world powers, which eased sanctions on Iran in return for curbs on its nuclear program, have stalled.

The United States unilaterally pulled out of the nuclear deal — formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA — in 2018, under then-President Donald Trump. It reimposed sanctions on Iran, prompting Tehran to start backing away from the deal’s terms.

State Department spokesman Ned Price told reporters in Washington Thursday that the U.S. “echo concerns that there has been no progress in clarifying and resolving Iran’s outstanding safeguards issues.”

"We urge Iran to fully cooperate with the IAEA’s safeguards investigation so that the agency can be confident that all the nuclear material in Iran is under those safeguards,” he said.

The IAEA said in its report that the lack of cooperation from Iran would have a “significant impact” on the agency’s ability to reestablish its knowledge of Iran’s activities since its cameras were removed in June.

“Any future baseline for the ... JCPOA verification and monitoring activities would take a considerable time to establish and would have a degree of uncertainty,” the report stated. “The longer the current situation persists, the greater such uncertainty becomes.”

A separate report, also seen by the AP, said IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi is “seriously concerned” that Iran has still not engaged on the agency’s probe into man-made uranium particles found at three undeclared sites in the country. The issue has become a key sticking point in the talks for a renewed nuclear deal.

Grossi met with Mohammad Eslami, vice president and head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization, in late September to discuss the topic. The second report on Thursday noted that IAEA officials will travel to Tehran for a technical visit by the end of November.

That meeting, the IAEA report said, “should be aimed at effectively clarifying and resolving” remaining safeguards issues.

The IAEA has for years sought answers from Iran to its questions about the particles. U.S. intelligence agencies, Western nations and the IAEA have said Iran ran an organized nuclear weapons program until 2003. Iran has long denied ever seeking nuclear weapons, insisting its nuclear program is peaceful.

Housecarl · Nov 10, 2022

Hummm......

Posted for fair use.....

U.S. Pacific Allies Want to Work Together to Blunt Chinese Nuclear Threat - USNI News

As China builds up its nuclear weapons arsenal and expands its conventional military forces, United States allies in the Pacific are asking Washington for an extended deterrence alliance in the region, three security experts said Wednesday. Toshi Yoshihara, a senior fellow at the Center for...

news.usni.org

U.S. Pacific Allies Want to Work Together to Blunt Chinese Nuclear Threat

By: John Grady
November 10, 2022 4:36 PM

As China builds up its nuclear weapons arsenal and expands its conventional military forces, United States allies in the Pacific are asking Washington for an extended deterrence alliance in the region, three security experts said Wednesday.

Toshi Yoshihara, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic Budgetary Assessment, said China has played up the idea that extended deterrence “tends to be very fragile” when a crisis arises. Beijing believes it could split apart allies before a conflict with the threat of using theater nuclear weapons he said.

This immediate threat from China to use nuclear weapons against U.S. allies – like Japan and the Republic of Korea – in Northeast Asia has caused Tokyo and Seoul to consider new security arrangements, Yoshihara said. Efforts to reposition nuclear weapons in the region and drafting new agreements on employment that were once “unthinkable” could now be possible.

There is no treaty arrangement like NATO in the Indo-Pacific that has a consultative process for the use of nuclear weapons, the panelists noted.

Russia has used this same threat of using theater nuclear weapons since 2014 and raised the possibility again following major setbacks in its invasion of Ukraine. Both Moscow and Beijing have included this option in publicly announced military doctrine.

China is building hundreds of new missile silos in the western part of the country, fielding road mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles, developing a fleet of new strategic bombers with improved long-range strike capabilities and putting to sea additional ballistic missile submarines, Yoshihara noted. These developments mark “a change in tone” in what analysts believed Beijing’s ambitions were as late as 2010.

View: https://youtu.be/6KAJUJ1iCGw

Gone is the “mean and effective force” of sea- and land-based nuclear weapons to deter attack, replaced with a force fitting with President Xi Jinping’s goal of China possessing “a world-class military” that is capable of acting regionally and globally.

Speaking at the Heritage Foundation online event, Franklin Miller, a principal at the Scowcroft Group, described China’s nuclear build-up “as highly impressive.” He noted that the build-up happened as Beijing probed western resolve over its building of artificial islands in the South China Sea, territorial claims across the Indo-Pacific, harassment of neighbors like Taiwan and Vietnam and provocative maritime activities around the Japanese Senkaku Islands.

“What is the aim of this build-up” at all levels of range and across the triad, he asked rhetorically.

Miller and the others said the major consequence of what is often called the “Chinese nuclear breakout” is that “we must be thinking of deterring Russia and China simultaneously,” not consecutively. The question the U.S. must answer is “can we cover the targets Russia and China hold most dear” to deter the two nations.

When answering that question, “we need to have a sense of urgency” that includes pursuing missile defense for Guam, potentially expanding the Australia United Kingdom United States (AUKUS) technology transfer agreement to include Japan and South Korea, and rebuilding America’s own conventional weapons arsenal.

Brad Roberts, former deputy assistant defense secretary for nuclear and missile and defense policy, said it also means Washington needs to handle threats in Europe and in the Indo-Pacific.

Several times during the discussion, Russia’s and China’s previous declaration of a “no limits” partnership came up as a possibility that could set off simultaneous crises. But what the partnership actually means after the Kremlin’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine is unclear.

“We’re going to be asking more [of] allies; they’re going to be asking more of us” when it comes to deterrence, he said.

Roberts said the nuclear posture the United States has now reflects the end of the Cold War. “That posture is just of alignment” with the changed circumstances globally. In addition to working more closely with allies, he said Washington’s current commitment to rebuilding the U.S. nuclear triad is actually a replacement strategy rather than a modernization one.

On the nuclear sea-launched cruise missile, which the Biden administration canceled, the panelists agreed it was an option that had value. Yoshihara said that in his meetings with Japanese officials, they regularly asked why the administration canceled the program.

Other options that panelists offered to address an assurance and deterrence gap without trying to match Moscow and Beijing weapon for weapon are to ensure all bombers, including the F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter, are capable of carrying long-range stand-off missiles, build more B-21s than projected and extend the construction of the Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines.

Roberts stressed that while militaries may have a doctrine for how to use theater nuclear weapons during a crisis, there remains a “question of political engagement” on their employment. “This is a new problem, how do we deter Xi and [Vladimir] Putin?” He added, “Interestingly, Putin has backed down recently” from using nuclear weapons in Ukraine.

Housecarl · Nov 10, 2022

Hummmm................

Posted for fair use.....

On Nuclear Treaty, at Least, Biden Aims for Fresh START With Russia

Washington and Moscow look set to keep New START alive with working-level talks, despite historic tensions.

foreignpolicy.com

REPORT

On Nuclear Treaty, at Least, Biden Aims for Fresh START With Russia

Washington and Moscow look set to keep New START alive with working-level talks, despite historic tensions.

By Robbie Gramer, a diplomacy and national security reporter at Foreign Policy.
FP subscribers can now receive alerts when new stories written by this author are published. Subscribe now | Sign in

NOVEMBER 10, 2022, 3:20 PM
The Biden administration has announced that it will restart nuclear arms control talks with Russia, even as tensions spike over the latter’s war in Ukraine, coupled with the threat of Moscow using nuclear weapons.

The talks are expected to take place in Cairo in the near future, current and former U.S. officials said, and represent the first move by both sides to revive their mutual arms control agenda since U.S. President Joe Biden first halted dialogue after Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine in February. The talks represent a test of whether the United States and Russia can conduct high-stakes diplomatic negotiations, even as U.S.-made weapons contribute to the mounting Russian death toll on battlefields in Ukraine. Gen. Mark Milley, the United States’ top military officer, said on Wednesday that at least 100,000 Russian troops have been killed or wounded since the invasion began.

The talks also showcase the Biden administration’s willingness to engage with Russian President Vladimir Putin on certain foreign-policy issues, even as it blankets Russia with devastating sanctions and aims to make it an international pariah for its unprovoked invasion of Ukraine.

The existing arms reduction treaty, New START, caps the number of intercontinental-range nuclear weapons in both Washington’s and Moscow’s arsenals and allows each side to conduct on-site weapons facility inspections in the other country. This allows experts from each country to visit the other country’s weapons sites to view the number of nuclear weapons, launch vehicles, and other details to confirm that both sides are adhering to the treaty. The treaty allows up to 18 on-site inspections per year.

It is the last remaining arms control treaty in place between Russia and the United States, which respectively have the first- and second-largest nuclear arsenals in the world. Under the terms of the treaty, which was first signed in 2010, both countries agreed to cap the number of nuclear warheads they could deploy on delivery systems to 1,550.....(rest behind subscription wall. HC)

Housecarl · Nov 10, 2022

Posted for fair use.....

After 40 years of safe skies, US special operators have to worry about threats from above, SOCOM commander says

US commanders say the rapid emergence of drones as military weapons means US troops need to get used to facing threats from above.

www.businessinsider.com

After 40 years of safe skies, US special operators have to worry about threats from above, SOCOM commander says

Stavros Atlamazoglou
16 minutes ago

The widespread use of drones in Ukraine underscores their rapid development as battlefield tools.
The US military has been paying close attention to how drones have been used in recent conflicts.
US officials say the spread of drones means US troops need to get used to facing threats from above.

The times are changing on the battlefield, and that's especially true for US special operators, who now have to account for threats that didn't exist a few years or even a months ago.

Like the rest of the US military, US Special Operations Command has been paying very close attention to the innovations on the battlefield in Ukraine.

One of the most interesting but also concerning developments has to do with drones. Both Moscow and Kyiv have drones in the skies over Ukraine, dropping improvised munitions on soldiers, guiding artillery fire, identifying enemy formations, and taking out armored vehicles.

Ukraine's military claims to have shot down over 1,000 Russian drones, but unmanned aerial systems continue to proliferate. Russia has invested heavily in loitering munitions, buying Iranian-made Shahed-136 drones and using them widely against civilian infrastructure, capturing international attention.

Ukraine is also using its fair share of unmanned aerial systems. Its military and public have shown an enviable ability to adapt to the war and devise solutions that are within their limited means in order to deal with the much bigger Russian military.

Ukrainian civilians and troops have used commercial drones for military purposes, including kinetic strikes and intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance operations.

The US special-operations community is paying close attention to these developments and is incorporating lessons from the ground in Ukraine in preparation for the next fight.

Special operators vs. drones

The US military, particularly its special-operations community, has been using drones for years, but US special operators are used to operating in an environment in where they have complete air superiority, meaning that nothing from the sky can pose a threat to them.

That superiority couldn't last forever, and its erosion became apparent during the fight against ISIS in Iraq and Syria in the late 2010s.

This summer, the outgoing commander of SOCOM, Gen. Richard Clarke, talked about the drone problem and how the special-operations community is addressing it.

At the Aspen Security Conference in July, Clarke said that during his nearly four decades in the Army, he had "never had to look up" when operating on the ground, whether that was in Afghanistan, Iraq, or Syria.

"I never had to look up because the US always maintained air superiority and our forces were protected because we had air cover," Clarke said. "But now with everything from quad-copters that very small up to very large unmanned aerial vehicles, we won't always have that luxury."

In the decades following the Korean War, no US ground troops were killed by enemy air attack and US aircraft were rarely shot down, but US commanders have warned that their aerial advantage is unlikely to continue.

In an interview with Joint Forces Quarterly earlier this year, Clarke likened drones to improvised explosive devices, or IEDs, which insurgents were able to build on a large scale to target US troops in the Middle East and Afghanistan.

Drones "are the IEDs of the future," Clark said in the interview. "Everyone remembers 2003-2004 when the number one killer of our forces was IEDs — first in Iraq, and then it transitioned into Afghanistan. Now, an IED has wings and it can move. The wire that connected that IED or the remote device is now harder to defeat."

Getting 'left of launch'

Generally, US special operators can take out unmanned aerial systems in two ways.

The first is with old-fashioned kinetic action, using small-arms fire or anti-aircraft missiles to shoot it down. The second is with electronic warfare, jamming the drone's flight controls so that it is unable to perform its mission.

Clarke said SOCOM is interested in another way to disrupt enemy drones — by preventing enemies from getting them in the first place.

In addition to developing ways to counter unmanned aircraft in the air, SOCOM is "looking where we can be 'left of launch' to disrupt supply chains, transportation, [and] development before it's too late," Clarke, who retired from the military in August, told Joint Forces Quarterly.

At the conference in July, Clarke said that there are opportunities for SOCOM, the Pentagon, and US intelligence agencies to work together to try to stop adversary drones before they launch.

"What are those supply chains and what are the intel and what are the norms of behavior for countries that are going to use these drones?" Clarke said.

That kind of intervention could be tough, as adversaries are developing resilient supply chains. Iran continues to develop missiles and drones despite tight US sanctions. Russia, facing increasingly strict Western sanctions, is likely to do the same, and China has invested heavily in own military capabilities.

Moreover, an effort like Clarke described would require a combined interagency effort that would likely focus more countering adversaries through intelligence efforts rather than through military action.

But drones are here to stay, and while the threat they pose to US forces is "the current problem," Clarke said in July, there also needs to be attention to "what's going to come home to roost."

"Some of these technologies could be used by our adversaries on our near abroad or even into our homeland," Clarke said.

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a defense journalist specializing in special operations, a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ), and a Johns Hopkins University graduate. He is working toward a master's degree in strategy and cybersecurity at the Johns Hopkins' School of Advanced International Studies.

Read next

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Investigators found Western parts in the Iranian drones Russia has been using to wage war in Ukraine and terrorize its cities

Housecarl · Nov 11, 2022

Hummm......

Posted for fair use.....

Sweden will not join NATO’s nuclear deterrent sharing program

Sweden will opt out of NATO’s nuclear deterrent sharing program and will not host nuclear weapons on its territory after joining the alliance, according to a Nov. 11 report by Reuters.

news.yahoo.com

Sweden will not join NATO’s nuclear deterrent sharing program

Fri, November 11, 2022 at 3:06 PM·1 min read

According to Swedish Foreign Minister Tobias Bilström, his country is following the lead of its northern neighbors, including Finland. Finnish President Sauli Niinistö also ruled out the possibility of deploying nuclear weapons in his country.

Read also: Sweden ponders weapons production for Ukraine

At the same time, Commander-in-Chief of the Swedish Armed Forces Mikael Byden recently recommended to the country’s government not to set any restrictions, specifically on the deployment of nuclear weapons, before Sweden becomes a full member of the alliance.

Read also: NATO officially invites Sweden and Finland to join the alliance

The accession of Sweden and Finland to NATO has already been ratified by 28 out of 30 member states, and now hinges on the approval of the Turkish and Hungarian parliaments.

Read the original article on The New Voice of Ukraine

---------

Posted for fair use.....

Sweden to spurn nuclear weapons as NATO member, foreign minister says

Sweden plans to declare nuclear weapons cannot be stationed on its territory when the country joins the NATO military alliance, following in the footsteps of its Nordic neighbors, the Swedish foreign minister told local news agency TT on Friday.

www.reuters.com

1 minute readNovember 11, 20227:23 AM PSTLast Updated 8 hours ago

Sweden to spurn nuclear weapons as NATO member, foreign minister says

Reuters
STOCKHOLM, Nov 11 (Reuters) - Sweden plans to declare nuclear weapons cannot be stationed on its territory when the country joins the NATO military alliance, following in the footsteps of its Nordic neighbors, the Swedish foreign minister told local news agency TT on Friday.

Sweden and Finland applied to join NATO earlier this year in a move triggered by Russia's invasion of Ukraine. So far, the application has been ratified by 28 of NATO's 30 countries.

Sweden's supreme commander raised eyebrows this month when he recommended that the government should not insert any red lines in the final negotiations with NATO, such as bans against permanent alliance bases or nuclear weapons on Swedish soil.

However, Foreign Minister Tobias Billstrom said Sweden would join Denmark and Norway in unilaterally declaring that it would not allow nuclear weapons in Sweden.

"It is still the long-term Moderate Party position," he told TT. "We have never intended to change the conditions for the application submitted by the previous government," he said.

A Moderate Party-led alliance won the September general election, ending eight years of Social Democratic rule in Sweden.

Reporting by Johan Ahlander; editing by Niklas Pollard

Housecarl · Nov 11, 2022

Hummm.....(Washington Post doesn't mention North Korea or anyone else.....)

Posted for fair use......

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/11/11/nuclear-posture-review-three-powers/

THE POST'S VIEW

Opinion

The nuclear arms race grows from two to three major competing powers

By the Editorial Board
November 11, 2022 at 12:41 p.m. EST

Every president since the end of the Cold War has published a review of the U.S. approach to nuclear weapons: their purpose, scope and prospects. President Biden’s Nuclear Posture Review, completed some time ago but declassified late last month, forecasts dark clouds on the horizon. What was a competition between two nuclear superpowers, the United States vs. the Soviet Union and then Russia, is growing to three.

The newcomer is China, whose President Xi Jinping will meet with President Biden on Monday. Other nations have joined the atomic club — there are now nine — but China’s ambitions put it in the first rank. “By the 2030s the United States will, for the first time in its history, face two major nuclear powers as strategic competitors and potential adversaries,” the report says. In more than a bit of understatement, it adds: “This will create new stresses on stability and new challenges for deterrence, assurance, arms control, and risk reduction.”

Both the United States and Russia have deployed 1,550 nuclear warheads on strategic or long-range delivery vehicles. This was allowed under the 2010 New START accord, the last of the major arms control treaties still in force, which expires in 2026. China, which for many years kept a nuclear arsenal in the low hundreds of warheads, now appears to be heading toward at least 1,000 by the end of this decade, and is building a land-sea-air triad of delivery vehicles similar to that of Russia and the United States. All three nations are also pushing ahead with weapons in other domains, including hypersonic glide vehicles and cyberweapons, and both the United States and Russia maintain short-range or tactical nuclear weapons that have never been covered by treaty.

For much of the Cold War nuclear age, the two superpowers accepted arms control treaty limits to preserve some kind of stability. But now the United States faces a duo of nuclear adversaries who might prove far less willing to sign up for new treaty limits. The Biden posture review notes that while there is substantial past experience with crisis management with Russia, Washington “has made little progress” with China, which has refused to engage in negotiations about its nuclear forces. The review adds that “the scope and pace” of China’s nuclear weapons expansion, “as well as its lack of transparency and growing military assertiveness, raise questions regarding its intentions, nuclear strategy and doctrine, and perceptions of strategic stability.”

This bodes ill for the years ahead. Without arms control treaties, verification and crisis management channels, the United States might find itself in a dangerous three-way nuclear arms race with reduced visibility into Russian and Chinese nuclear forces. Such unbridled competition could bring with it the potential for miscalculation and misperception. President Vladimir Putin’s unsettling nuclear threats with regard to Ukraine are just a taste of what might erupt in a broader arms race. The State Department confirmed Tuesday that the United States and Russia will soon return to talks about resuming inspections under the New START accord. That’s a promising sign, but a three-way nuclear arms control negotiation is still a long way off. It will require leaders to exert political willpower that is lacking at present.

jward · Nov 13, 2022

Drones, land mines, who knows what all they bought to bolster their capabilities (I hear Ukraine's had quite an impressive assortment for sale. . .)

Improvised Anti-Vehicle Land Mines (IAVMs) in Mexico: Cartel Emergent Weaponry Use - HS Today

By John P. Sullivan, Robert J. Bunker, and David A. Kuhn

12-15 minutes

IAVMs: A New Trend?
In our recent article at Counter-IED Report, we identified improvised cartel use of improvised anti-vehicle mines (IAVMs) in both Michoacán (by the CJNG or Cárteles Unidos – CU) and in Tamaulipas – a Northern state bordering Texas – by unspecified huachicoleros (fuel thieves) from the rival Cártel del Golfo (Gulf cartel – CDG) or Cártel del Noreste (Northeast cartel – CDN).

Five IAVM incidents have been documented. These incidents are summarized below and in Table 1. The incidents occurred between January 2021 and February 2022. An additional incident in September 2021 has been mentioned, but not confirmed. That unconfirmed incident apparently involved a man who stepped onto a possible anti-personnel mine. Additional unverified incidents have been suggested but not confirmed. The five documented incidents are briefly summarized below.

Incident No 1: Undisclosed Urban Area. Michoacán (2 January 2021)
This incident occurred in an area contested by the Cárteles Unidos (CU) and Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG). The incident was captured on security camera video. The video shows a CJNG Improvised Armored Fighting Vehicle (IAFV) driving down the street while taking small-arms fire and possibly responding with small-arms fire from its mounted infantry compartment. As the IAFV passes the center of the security camera footage, an explosive device – presumed to be a CU IAVM (Improvised Anti-Vehicle Mine) – is detonated.

Incident No 2: Peña Blanca Area, Tamaulipas (5 October 2021)
This incident occurred during morning hours in Comales, Tamaulipas, at the access point for Santa Rosalía de Camargo Gas Collection Station – a Petróleos Mexicanos (Pemex) facility – on the road from Peña Blanca. News reports state the device involved a booby trap combining ponchallantas (road spikes or caltrops) on the highway with an active IED (composed of explosive-filled PVC pipe and a 40mm grenade next to it) hidden in the bushes a few meters away. It was speculated that some form of trigger/detonation link – such as an electronic wire – sent a signal to the IED once a vehicle passed over the ponchallantas. The area involved is the site of ongoing engagements (involving artisanal armored vehicles or IAVFs) between the CGG and CDN.

Incident No 3: Apatzingán, Michoacán (31 January 2022)
This incident occurred at approximately 1030 hours (10:30 am) when a Ejército Mexicano (Mexican Army) convoy drove over a land mine while traversing a dirt road near Apatzingán. The vehicle involved was reportedly a ‘Sandcat’ light armored vehicle (LAV). At least one and up to four additional soldiers were said to be injured. The incident occurred in an area contested by the Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG) and the Cárteles Unidos (CU). While it remains unknown if the Ejército Mexicano (Mexican Army) convoy was explicitly targeted or the target was one of the competing cartels contesting the area, the direct attack against state forces is strategically significant.

Improvised Anti-Vehicle Land Mines (IAVMs) in Mexico: Cartel Emergent Weaponry Use Homeland Security Today

Ejército Mexicano (Mexican Army) Light Armored Vehicle Involved in Mine Attack, January 2022. Source: Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional (National Defense Secretary) – SEDENA

Incident No 4: El Aguaje, Michoacán (12 February 2022)
This incident occurred in a small hamlet, El Aguaje, located between Tepalcatepec and Aguililla, Michoacán. A 79-year-old farmer and his passenger, his 45-year-old son, were killed when he drove his truck over a land mine (IAVM). The area is contested by the Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG) and Cárteles Unidos (CU) fighting over it, with the local CU faction, Los Viagras, fighting against CJNG. It has not been confirmed if the target of the attack was an opposing cartel – either CJNG or CU – or if the target were SEDENA or other state security personnel. The farmer and his son, as civilians (non-combatants), were not the intended target of the land mine.

Incident No 5: Greater Tepalcatepec and Aguililla Region, Michoacán
(Mid-February 2022-Early April 2022)
This incident exemplifies the ongoing demining campaign by SEDENA’s Army (Ejército Mexicano) Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) units. These missions are often supported by Secretaría de Seguridad Pública de Michoacán (SSP–Michoacán) and Guardia Nacional (GN) personnel. The ongoing operation took place from mid-February 2022 through early April 2022 when this incident overview was written. Initial reports of 250 land mines/IAVMs cleared (demined) by late February 2022 have now risen to over 500 land mines/IAVMs potentially cleared (demined) by early April 2022.

Conclusion
In an earlier C-IED Report (Spring-Summer 2021), we observed an absence of land mine use by Mexican cartels – specifically, we said there was an “absence of land mines; neither improvised or military grade anti-personnel or anti-vehicular land mines have been used by the cartels in Mexico.” Since then, these criminal armed groups (CAGs) have begun to use land mines (IAVMs) in their suite of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs).
In addition, in our Autumn 2022 C-IED Report, summarized here, we noted: “The fielding of CJNG IAVMs is still very much in its entrepreneurial (experimental) phase as witnessed with their earlier shift in weaponized drone utilization from point detonation (one time drone use) to standoff bombardment (multiple-drone use) capabilities. The various CJNG IAVMs designs currently being produced are artisanal, likely utilizing different explosive mixtures, and with triggering mechanisms derived from pressure activation, cell phone (and/or radio signal), and possibly binary chemical reaction methods (as reported). The expectation is that some basic IAVM design(s) may become standardized or the cartel will at some point simply attempt to bring in and utilize foreign made military grade landmines instead.”

While cartel land mine use is in the early experimental phase, the future use and proliferation of both anti-vehicle and anti-personnel mines can’t be discounted. Nor should their use be over-emphasized. The experimental use of weaponry is part of the Mexican crime ecosystem (or narcoscape). In the past, we have seen experimental use of car bombs (IEDs and VBIEDs), weaponized aerial drones, improvised armored fighting vehicles, and early indicators of IAVM potentials. Such experimentation and use of military TTPs should be expected to continue. These trends are of concern not only to Mexican police and military, but also to law enforcement personnel throughout the Western Hemisphere and obviously to Customs and Border Protection personnel along the U.S.-Mexico border.
Table 1: Documented Improvised Anti-Vehicle Mi ne (IAVM) Incidents

Date	Cartel	Location	Explosive Device	Incident
2 January 2021	Cárteles Unidos (CU)	Undisclosed Urban Area, Michoacán; Greater Tepalcatepec and Aguililla Region Assumed	Unknown Device Type and Detonation Method	Damage to or Destruction of a Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG) IAFV; Injuries or Fatalities
5 October 2021	Cártel del Golfo (Gulf; CDG) or Cártel del Noreste (Northeast; CDN)	Peña Blanca Area, Tamaulipas	Explosive-Filled PVC Tube; 40mm Grenade for Additional Effect; Pressure/ Other Detonation Method Via Electronic Wire (Fuze)	Booby Trap Discovered and Rendered Safe by SEDENA Patrol; Meant for Competing Cartel (CDG or CDN) or Mexican Security Forces
31 January 2022	Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG) or Cárteles Unidos (CU)	Apatzingán, Michoacán	Unknown Device Type and Detonation Method; Possibly Ammonium Nitrate Based	Damage to a SEDENA ‘SandCat’ Light Armored Vehicle (LAV); Soldier Injuries
12 February 2022	Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG) or Cárteles Unidos (CU)	El Aguaje, Michoacán	Unknown; Likely PVC Pipe Filled with Explosives; Pressure Sensitive Fuzing	Farmer Driving Over a Land Mine Killed and Son Injured
Mid-February 2022 to Early April 2022	Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación (CJNG)	Greater Tepalcatepec and Aguililla Region	At Least Four IAVM Designs Evident	Over 250 Land Mines/IAVMs Cleared/Demined by SEDENA (Later Reports of Over 500 Potentially Cleared)

Source: Bunker, Kuhn, and Sullivan, Counter-IED Report 2022
Additional Reading
Robert J. Bunker and John P. Sullivan, Eds., Illicit Tactical Progress: Mexican Cartel Tactical Notes 2013-2020. Bloomington: Xlibris, 2021.
This article is an abridged version of Robert J. Bunker, David A. Kuhn, and John P. Sullivan, “Use of Improvised Land (Anti-Vehicle) Mines in Mexican Crime Wars.” Counter-IED Report, Autumn, 2022. All rights remain with the authors. © Copyright 2022

John P. Sullivan, Robert J. Bunker, and David A. Kuhn
Dr. John P. Sullivan was a career police officer, now retired. Throughout his career he has specialized in emergency operations, terrorism, and intelligence. He is an Instructor in the Safe Communities Institute (SCI) at the University of Southern California, Senior El Centro Fellow at Small Wars Journal, Contributing Editor at Homeland Security Today, and Associate with C/O Futures, LLC. He served as a lieutenant with the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department, where he has served as a watch commander, operations lieutenant, headquarters operations lieutenant, service area lieutenant, tactical planning lieutenant, and in command and staff roles for several major national special security events and disasters. Sullivan received a lifetime achievement award from the National Fusion Center Association in November 2018 for his contributions to the national network of intelligence fusion centers. He has a PhD from the Open University of Catalonia, an MA in urban affairs and policy analysis from the New School for Social Research, and a BA in Government from the College of William & Mary. Dr. Robert J. Bunker is the Director of Research and Analysis of C/O Futures, LLC and a Senior Fellow with Small Wars Journal-El Centro. An international security and counterterrorism professional, he was Futurist in Residence at the Behavioral Science Unit (BSU) at the Federal Bureau of Investigation Academy in Quantico, VA, Minerva Chair at the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) of the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, and has taught at Claremont Graduate University, the University of Southern California, and with other universities. Dr. Bunker holds degrees in the fields of history, anthropology-geography, social science, behavioral science, government, and political science and has trained extensively in counterterrorism and counternarcotics. He has delivered hundreds of presentations including—U.S. congressional testimony—with well over 600 publications across various fields and formats. His email is docbunker@cofutures.net . David A. Kuhn is an Associate with C/O Futures, LLC and an Associate with Small Wars Journal-El Centro. He is a subject matter expert in analysis, technical instruction, and terrorism response training related to stand off weaponry (MANPADS, threat, interdiction, aircraft survivability, et. al), infantry weapons, small arms, IED/VBIEDs, WMD, and other threat and allied use technologies. He is presently the principal of VTAC Training Solutions and has career-long experience in supporting governmental operations and corporate initiatives in the fields of homeland security, vulnerability assessment, technical operations, and project management, with additional focus and expertise in areas involving facility threat/risk assessments, underwater operations, and varied engineering technologies.

Improvised Anti-Vehicle Land Mines (IAVMs) in Mexico: Cartel Emergent Weaponry Use - HS Today

These trends are of concern not only to Mexican police and military, but also to law enforcement personnel throughout the Western Hemisphere.

www.hstoday.us

jward · Nov 20, 2022

How the rivalry between America and China worries South-East Asia

Asia | Elephants in the long grass (OLIPHANTS!)

The region’s 700m people have much to lose

Nov 17th 2022 | SINGAPORE
WHEN Donald Trump began slapping tariffs on imports from China in early 2018, Indonesia’s president, Joko Widodo (or Jokowi, as he is called) saw opportunity. He asked foreign visitors how Indonesia might take advantage of the growing spat. Could he, for instance, entice multinational companies to shift parts of their supply chains from China?

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How times have changed. Under Mr Trump’s successor as president, Joe Biden, the trade war with China has intensified, and been reinforced by geopolitical, ideological and even military competition that at times has seemed to risk conflict. On the Chinese side, an all-powerful President Xi Jinping speaks of a titanic struggle with an American-led West. On the American one, Mr Biden in October announced draconian controls to stop Chinese companies from benefiting from American technology—a clear bid to keep China down. He has also broken with a decades-long policy of rhetorical obfuscation in which America refused openly to commit itself to defending Taiwan, the self-governing island whose eventual unification with the mainland is the Communist Party’s most sacred tenet.

In the face of superpower rivalry, South-East Asians feel powerless. They are “the grass, not the elephants”, regional strategists say. Jokowi has shifted from seeing opportunity to sounding the alarm. This month he told The Economist he was “very worried” about the possibility of a conflict over Taiwan, not least because it could destroy the region’s hopes for development and prosperity. He pushed hard for this week’s meeting between Mr Biden and Mr Xi in Bali, on the eve of his hosting of world leaders there for the G20 summit. He called it the “most difficult” G20 ever. “We should not divide the world into parts,” he said, in his opening speech. “We must not allow the world to fall into another cold war.”
Otherwise, President Vladimir Putin’s war in Ukraine dominated deliberations at the g20, where the mood against Russia’s invasion hardened. For South-East Asian leaders, it is not their fight: only a minority of the region’s governments have openly condemned the invasion. Yet Asia is grappling with its consequences, including disrupted food supplies and rising prices.

The faraway conflict has also underlined the importance of peace at home. As the prime minister of Singapore, Lee Hsien Loong, put it at a national-day rally in August: “Look at how things have gone wrong in Europe. Can you be sure that things cannot go wrong in our region too? Better get real, and be psychologically prepared.”
Taiwan is the main security concern of South-East Asian policymakers. They have long worried about a superpower clash. But it was thought more likely to be in the South China Sea, where China’s vague but expansive “nine-dash line” encompasses nearly the whole sea and where it has built military installations on offshore reefs. This has changed, says a regional diplomat. “The nine-dash line,” the diplomat says. “That’s not a red line. [For China] Taiwan is the real red line.”

Island in a storm

In that context, regional strategists are alarmed by the American shift in rhetoric. They think the Biden administration has gone too far. They also deplore the visit to Taiwan in August by Nancy Pelosi, the Democratic speaker of the House of Representatives, as needlessly provocative. China responded with live-fire military exercises all around the island. They are therefore nervous about the consequences if Ms Pelosi’s likely Republican replacement, Kevin McCarthy, follows through on his promise to visit Taiwan, too.
They also worry that a dearth of trust acts as an obstacle to communication. In turn, mutual disdain grows. A South-East Asian diplomat who talks to both sides says Chinese officials look at America’s political polarisation as proof of great-power decline. Both sides complain that conversations are superficial. Chinese and American officials, says the diplomat, are not pulling their counterparts aside for frank discussions over how to defuse tensions. The pandemic, in reducing face-to-face meetings, made a bad situation worse.

As for the weaponisation of technology against China, even America’s closest friends in South-East Asia say the administration is taking the region down a dangerous road. It forces countries to take sides in painful ways. Singapore has already accepted that in a bifurcated world where technology is “friend-shored” the city-state will end up hewing to American-led supply chains. But what if America extends sanctions to tech-heavy Chinese firms operating outside China? This, says one Singaporean official, would create a huge dilemma for a city-state whose reputation is built on being a safe, predictable, open-for-business jurisdiction. For that matter, will Indonesia’s budding industry powering electric vehicles one day be forced to choose between America and China?

Mr Biden and his team are aware of some of the region’s concerns. Just before the g20, the American president was in Phnom Penh, where Cambodia hosted the annual summit of the ten-country Association of South-East Asian Nations (asean). He assured asean it was “the heart” of his policy in the Indo-Pacific region. He promised a “new era” of co-operation—a recognition that the region’s interests had been somewhat ignored.
For all that their economies are bound to China’s, South-East Asians do want American engagement as a counterweight to their huge northern neighbour. China’s presence brings economic possibilities but also perils, such as military expansion in the South China Sea, indebtedness from Chinese-led infrastructure projects and China’s subversion of asean unity as it turns Cambodia and Laos into client states.

American involvement, then, is welcome. But, says one political leader, it has to be within a more “balanced” framework that provides long-term economic commitment. In Phnom Penh and Bali, Mr Biden promised this. America and Japan (which considers itself cannier at steering poorer Asian countries than its American ally, see Banyan) proposed new ways to help Indonesia decarbonise. Many South-East Asians are sceptical that the promises will amount to much. Mr Biden’s Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, a proposition for American involvement in the region, lacks heft. Only a few pockets of Mr Biden’s administration, such as the commerce department, are pushing for more openness. Too much of his Asia policy, regional strategists say, is driven by anti-China ideology.

There was, then, relief at Mr Biden’s meeting with Mr Xi. It did not represent a reset, but restored communication. At the least, says one South-East Asian official, the two elephants have trumpeted a desire to prevent a descent towards war. The grass gets a little reprieve, but for how long?■
Correction (November 18th 2022): The original version of this article misstated a word Jokowi used in his opening speech at the G20 summit. He said the world should not be allowed “to fall into another cold war”.

How the rivalry between America and China worries South-East Asia

The region’s 700m people have much to lose

www.economist.com

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Putin’s nuclear bluff has worked, it has lessons for India: Begin by precisely assessing the disposition of Pakistan’s tactical nuclear weapons​

On TB every waking moment

TEACHING IRREGULAR WARFARE IN THE ERA OF STRATEGIC COMPETITION​

On TB every waking moment

All The Air Combat Developments Out Of China’s Massive Air Show​

On TB every waking moment

On TB every waking moment

UN agency: Iran increases highly enriched uranium stockpile​

On TB every waking moment

U.S. Pacific Allies Want to Work Together to Blunt Chinese Nuclear Threat​

On TB every waking moment

REPORT​

On Nuclear Treaty, at Least, Biden Aims for Fresh START With Russia​

Washington and Moscow look set to keep New START alive with working-level talks, despite historic tensions.​

On TB every waking moment

After 40 years of safe skies, US special operators have to worry about threats from above, SOCOM commander says​

Special operators vs. drones​

Getting 'left of launch'​

On TB every waking moment

Sweden will not join NATO’s nuclear deterrent sharing program​

Sweden to spurn nuclear weapons as NATO member, foreign minister says​

On TB every waking moment

Opinion The nuclear arms race grows from two to three major competing powers​

passin' thru

Improvised Anti-Vehicle Land Mines (IAVMs) in Mexico: Cartel Emergent Weaponry Use - HS Today​

passin' thru

How the rivalry between America and China worries South-East Asia​

The region’s 700m people have much to lose​

Island in a storm​

WAR 11-05-2022-to-11-11-2022__THEWINDSofWAR

(270) 09-17-2022-to-09-23-2022__THEWINDSofWAR

US military nuclear chief sounds the alarm about pace of China’s nuclear weapons program

The Nukes Never Went Away

These Are the Nuclear Weapons North Korea Has as Fears Mount of Atomic Test

NATO chief urges Turkey to stop stalling Sweden, Finland accession

Iran tests satellite-carrying rocket, state TV reports

FROM TOI PRINT EDITION

Putin’s nuclear bluff has worked, it has lessons for India: Begin by precisely assessing the disposition of Pakistan’s tactical nuclear weapons

TEACHING IRREGULAR WARFARE IN THE ERA OF STRATEGIC COMPETITION

All The Air Combat Developments Out Of China’s Massive Air Show

UN agency: Iran increases highly enriched uranium stockpile

U.S. Pacific Allies Want to Work Together to Blunt Chinese Nuclear Threat

REPORT

On Nuclear Treaty, at Least, Biden Aims for Fresh START With Russia

Washington and Moscow look set to keep New START alive with working-level talks, despite historic tensions.

After 40 years of safe skies, US special operators have to worry about threats from above, SOCOM commander says

Special operators vs. drones

Getting 'left of launch'

Sweden will not join NATO’s nuclear deterrent sharing program

Sweden to spurn nuclear weapons as NATO member, foreign minister says

Opinion

The nuclear arms race grows from two to three major competing powers

Improvised Anti-Vehicle Land Mines (IAVMs) in Mexico: Cartel Emergent Weaponry Use - HS Today

How the rivalry between America and China worries South-East Asia

The region’s 700m people have much to lose

Island in a storm