WAR 10-28-2022-to-11-04-2022__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

[Housecarl]

Hi folks. I know I've been rather sparce of late. My "work/life balance" has been rather off the last couple of weeks so I've been posting a lot off of my phone and lurking a lot more than I like. Anyhow I figured I should at least get a new WoW thread up while I had a chance to. Thanks go out to Jward and others who kept the thread going in my absence. HC

(268) 09-03-2022-to-09-09-2022__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****​

(269) 09-10-2022-to-09-16-2022__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

(270) 09-17-2022-to-09-23-2022__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****​

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WAR - 09-17-2022-to-09-23-2022__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

This mighta got one o' my own rare Merdes - or I shouldn't have had that last cup o' coffee :: shrug :: ..it's not just that they're seeking the training, of course they are, but the way the geopolitical shifting sands and choosing teams is increasingly belligerent and in the open. China's...

www.timebomb2000.com

BRKG - Russian Drone Swarm Attacks Large Section of Ukr. Power.

This headline is from a Rumble video, but you can get there through this utube video. 1.44 View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VmCxTEb-kls This fellow does weather but also world news. The rumble video goes into more detail about what the drones are taking out. Nothing any where else...

www.timebomb2000.com

ALERT - RUSSIA INVADES UKRAINE - Consolidated Thread

Oh *F* !!!!!! Not the kings of the east !!! It's too crazy !!! And if you don't know what I'm talking about it's in the B. :shkr: Too bad our politicians in power are pushing trannies.

www.timebomb2000.com

ALERT - The Winds of War Blow in Korea and The Far East

Hans Kristensen @nukestrat 5h I share China’s opposition to South Korea getting nukes (it would be a disaster for NPT, the region, and provide no added security for South Korea), but it’s rich coming from a country that’s holdings it’s hand over North Korea’s nukes and building up its own.

www.timebomb2000.com

GOV/MIL - N. Korea likely to conduct nuclear test, but U.S. prepared for all contingencies

(LEAD) N. Korea likely to conduct nuclear test, but U.S. prepared for all contingencies: State Dept. | Yonhap News Agency 변덕근 (ATTN: UPDATES with remarks from NSC spokesperson John Kirby in last 6 paras) By Byun Duk-kun WASHINGTON, Oct. 24 (Yonhap) -- North Korea is believed to be...

www.timebomb2000.com

CRISIS - The Horsemen Ride - Monday, 10/24/2022 Through Friday, 10/28/2022

10/24/2022 "Everyone must go with us, must accept our spirit, or he won't get air to breathe, anymore. We shall deny him every possibility of making a living. He will waste away. If somebody says he wants to be left in peace: No. my friend, I shan't leave you in peace. I would't think of...

www.timebomb2000.com

INTL - Europe: Politics, Economics, Military- October 2922

Still having vision and tablet problems. Please post articles about Europe on this thread :)

www.timebomb2000.com

WAR - CHINA THREATENS TO INVADE TAIWAN

Is clock really ticking down toward a Taiwan war? Jeff Pao 5-7 minutes PLA soldiers in a training formation. Concerns are rising China is preparing for an invasion try on Taiwan. Photo: China's Eastern Theater Command The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) called for boosting the People’s Liberation...

www.timebomb2000.com

BRKG - China's Semiconductor Industry 'Decapitated Overnight: Biden told US engineers working there quit or lose US citizenship. Everyone reportedly quit.

All US citizenship bears is obligations anyway.

www.timebomb2000.com

WAR - Jammu/Kashmir main thread

this is all we need MERDE Indeed..... "Normally" a "test" would be over and end either in the ocean or your own controlled territory, ideally both. WTF happened here was either just plain stupid or extraordinarily stupid and thus politically driven.

www.timebomb2000.com

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Hummm.......

Posted for fair use.....

Australia drops nuclear weapon opposition

Australia has abstained from a vote on a nuclear weapons ban treaty at the United Nations.It ends years of Canberra siding with the United States by actions on the treaty to ban the deadly weapons and comes as Australia looks to nuclear submarines to boost its navy.

au.news.yahoo.com

Australia drops nuclear weapon opposition​

Fri, 28 October 2022 at 5:16 pm·1-min read

Australia has abstained from a vote on a nuclear weapons ban treaty at the United Nations.

It ends years of Canberra siding with the United States by actions on the treaty to ban the deadly weapons and comes as Australia looks to nuclear submarines to boost its navy.

Signatories to the treaty agree not to develop, test, produce, acquire, possess, stockpile, use or threaten to use nuclear weapons.

But the world's major nuclear superpowers, like the US, the UK, Russia, China or India are not signatories to the ban.

Australia's abstention came on Saturday morning, Canberra time, and puts it on the fence of the contentious issue.

It follows Foreign Minister Penny Wong criticising Russia for blocking progress at a major nuclear non-proliferation conference in August.

Russia barred a consensus outcome on the final document at the tenth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons following a four-week review of the cornerstone disarmament treaty.

At the time Senator Wong said Russia was "deliberately obstructing progress" on meaningful action on nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and the use of atomic energy".

Australia also recently faced criticism from nuclear powers for joining a Pacific push to help deal with the consequences of nuclear testing.

New Zealand, a signatory to the nuclear weapons ban, has previously pushed for Australia to join.

 

[Housecarl]

Hummm......

Posted for fair use.....

NATO wants to place nuclear missiles on Finland’s Russian border — Finland says yes

According to Newsweek, on October 26th, “Finland Will Allow NATO to Place Nuclear Weapons on Border With Russia”. They cite Finnish media reports. Allegedly, a condition that NATO had placed on Finland to join NATO was to allow America’s nuclear missiles to be positioned on Finland’s Russian...

moderndiplomacy.eu

DEFENSE​

NATO wants to place nuclear missiles on Finland’s Russian border — Finland says yes​

Published 4 hours ago
on October 29, 2022
By Eric Zuesse

According to Newsweek, on October 26th, “Finland Will Allow NATO to Place Nuclear Weapons on Border With Russia”. They cite Finnish media reports. Allegedly, a condition that NATO had placed on Finland to join NATO was to allow America’s nuclear missiles to be positioned on Finland’s Russian border, which is closer to Moscow than any other except Ukraine’s. Whereas Ukraine’s would be 5 minutes from blitz-nuking Moscow so as to preemptively decapitate Russia’s retaliatory command, Finland’s would be 7 minutes — only around 120 seconds longer for Russia to be able to launch its retaliatory strikes. Finland now is to vote on the bill joining NATO, on that basis (i.e., to become America’s spearhead to defeat Russia in WW III). Obviously (assuming that NATO had, indeed, given Finland’s leaders to believe that saying yes to this would increase NATO’s likelihood of expediting Finland’s application to join), NATO is set upon checkmating Russia into capitulation if Finland does join.

Newsweek reports also that “The U.S. already has around 100 nuclear weapons in Europe, positioned in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey according to the Federation of American Scientists. Britain and France, both NATO members, also maintain their own independent nuclear arsenals.”

None of those countries borders Russia. They’re all much farther away.

During the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, JFK refused to allow the Soviet Union to place its missiles only 1,131 miles away from Washington DC and warned that the U.S. would launch WW III if they did; so, the Soviet Union decided not to.

The Finnish border reaches as close as 507 miles away from Moscow, at the Finnish city of Kotka. The Ukrainian border reaches significantly closer: 317 miles from Shostka to Moscow, and 353 miles from Sumy to Moscow — as being the Russia-bordering nation that would pose the biggest danger to Russia if added to NATO. Finland is #2 — only Ukraine is even worse in a Russian view.

Russia invaded Ukraine in order to be able to move that potential 317 miles back to at least the 1,131 miles that everyone in 1962 agreed would be too close to Washington DC and therefore justification for America to launch WW III to prevent.

The reason why the difference between 317 miles versus 507 miles is only around two minutes, is that the slowest part of the flight is the earliest, while accelerating. Practically speaking, for Washington to position its nuclear-warheaded missiles 507 miles from The Kremlin is virtually the same as to position them at the nearest point on Ukraine’s border. One can already see that Russia actively resists this.

In 1962, missiles were far slower than they are today. So, in order for there to be an equivalency between the 1,131 miles from Cuba in 1962, Russia would need to keep U.S. missiles about 2,000 miles from America’s closest land-based nuclear missiles today. The present situation is considerably more dangerous to Russia than the Cuban Missile Crisis was to America in 1962.

According to leading American scientists who specialize in evaluating such matters, America’s recent nuclear-weapons policy “creates exactly what one would expect to see, if a nuclear-armed state were planning to have the capacity to fight and win a nuclear war by disarming enemies with a surprise first strike.”

Newsweek’s disclosure on October 26th suggests that this is, indeed, what the U.S. Government has been, and is, planning for: “to fight and win a nuclear war by disarming enemies with a surprise first strike.” (That meta-strategy is called “Nuclear Primacy,” and in America it replaced the “M.A.D.” or Mutually Assured Destruction meta-strategy in around 2006.)

During WW II, Finland was on the Nazi side and participated with the Germans in their “Operation Barbarossa invasion of the Soviet Union.” If it joins NATO, Finland would be repeating that now, but only against Russia.

All U.S. foreign polices, in both the Democratic Party and the Republican Party, are “neocon,” and that means funded by and for U.S.-and-allied billionaires and centi-millionaires — not for ANY public — in order to increase yet further the scope of their global empire.

 

[Housecarl]

Hummm.......

Posted for fair use.....

NATO forces and nuclear weapons should be stationed in Poland, president Duda says

Poland is looking to participate in NATO’s Nuclear Sharing Program and host additional alliance troops in its territory, Head of the International Policy Bureau in the Chancellery of the President of Poland, Jakub Kumoch told Polish broadcaster Polsat News on Oct. 28.

news.yahoo.com

NATO forces and nuclear weapons should be stationed in Poland, president Duda says​

7

Fri, October 28, 2022 at 1:38 PM·1 min read

Kumoch specified the negotiations with NATO on the matter were at a “conceptual” stage, and were precipitated by Russia violating its 1997 pact with the alliance by invading Ukriane.

Read also: “RAMSTEIN” AND NATO WILL INCREASE THE SUPPORT OF UKRAINE

“In 1997, a pact was signed between NATO and Russia, on the basis of which there is a commitment that no additional permanent NATO forces should be deployed in Eastern Europe,” said Kumoch.

“...We believe, as President [Andrzej Duda] said at the NATO summit, that this act is dead, Russia simply annulled it with its aggression against Ukraine.”

Read also: Ukraine’s success in negotiations with Russia to depend on victories on battlefield, says NATO chief

Nuclear Sharing Program is part of NATO's nuclear deterrence policy, allowing for transfer of nuclear warheads to member states that don’t have their own nuclear weapons.

Read the original article on The New Voice of Ukraine

 

[Housecarl]

Hummm.....

Posted for fair use.....

Biden's nuke review abandons campaign rhetoric on disarmament - Responsible Statecraft

While the new nuclear posture document curbs some of the worst excesses of the Trump era, it lacks vision for world without atomic weapons.

responsiblestatecraft.org

NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Biden’s nuke review abandons campaign rhetoric on disarmament
While the new nuclear posture document curbs some of the worst excesses of the Trump era, it lacks vision for world without atomic weapons.

OCTOBER 28, 2022
Written by
Emma Claire Foley

Yesterday, the Biden administration released its long-awaited Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) as part of a suite of documents, along with the National Defense Strategy and the Missile Defense Review, outlining the administration’s approach to national security and nuclear strategy. The NPR, produced once per administration as a programmatic statement, was originally anticipated to be released early this year. However, eight months into the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which has included repeated threats of nuclear use, the strategic landscape has altered considerably.

The introductory letter to the documents frames ours as a “decisive decade.” Yet, likely as a result of the instability caused by the Ukraine invasion and its uncertain outcome, their horizons are relatively short.

The NPR itself, at 28 pages, is about a third as long as that produced by the Obama administration in 2010 and, beyond a clear framing of China and Russia as the foils for U.S. nuclear policy, contains relatively little in the way of detailed analysis of the global political environment to contextualize its positions. Even if the assertion that China “likely intends to possess at least 1,000 deliverable warheads by the end of the decade” proves true, it would still fall far short of U.S. and Russian arsenals.

Gone is the open aggression of the Trump NPR and the sense that the person behind the keyboard had one hand on the big red button as they type. Rather, the Biden NPR throws several carefully worded bones to those who would have the United States honor its obligation to pursue disarmament under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, affirming the overarching goal of “a world without nuclear weapons.”

From a disarmament perspective, however, this measured approach almost makes it harder to realize how much has been lost, and how much ground has been ceded. Some of the worst excesses of the previous administration have been scaled back — most significantly, it calls to eliminate the nuclear sea-launched cruise missile and retire the B-83 gravity bomb — and the Review explicitly calls for a reduced role for nuclear weapons in the overall U.S. national security strategy.

Yet it bears the effects of a broad shift in perception around nuclear use, driven in part by a concerted campaign by the defense industry and its allies in government and the think tank world to popularize the notion of so-called “low-yield,” more “usable” nuclear weapons, as well as relatively frequent threats of nuclear use from world leaders in recent years. In the face of advocates’ calls for a “no first use” policy, or a lesser “sole purpose” declaration, the NPR leaves the door open for nuclear use, attempting to portray such a catastrophic eventuality as fundamentally manageable: such a decision might be taken in order to ensure “the lowest level of damage possible on the best achievable terms for the United States and its Allies and partners.” Battlefield nuclear use is portrayed as a possible unfortunate reality of contemporary warfare, and the challenge seems to be, not to do everything in our power to make sure that a nuclear weapon is never again used, but instead to develop “resilience” in the face of their eventual “limited” use.

Additionally, sweeping aside the fact that the president still is the only person empowered to launch U.S. nuclear weapons, it paints broader decision-making processes around nuclear policy as collective, taken with concern for the demands of international law and the safety of civilians. These statements should be viewed with extreme skepticism by anyone familiar with how nuclear weapons actually work. Indeed, reading the NPR, it seems that its authors consider nuclear weapons use — if not a resulting all-out nuclear war — very possible, if not likely.

The sections on force modernization bear out this impression. Though the Review nods to the possibility of uncontrolled escalation involving the U.S. intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force, it counters and minimizes arguments that these weapons are destabilizing and unnecessary, albeit in rather vague terms. Replacement of Minuteman III ICBMs with the $300 billion Sentinel (previously known as the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent or GBSD) program, is presented unequivocally as necessary and cost-effective in the programmatic findings of the NPR.

Taking in the document as a whole, the picture is still grimmer. Trump-era resistance to the militarization of space has receded, and the focus on space is now a central focus of strategic thinking and technological development. Negative effects of climate change are acknowledged and accepted as inevitable, and the government’s effort to manage it will heavily rely on armed authorities at the military and civilian level.

Missile defense, which has been shown over and over again to be unable to reliably perform its mission of stopping incoming missile attacks, continues to command many billions of dollars of federal investment every year. Against calls for reducing defense spending, which have grown louder at the grassroots level and in Congress, the NPR seems to suggest that the United States will remain more or less committed to the status quo for “the foreseeable future” — also its stated timeline for maintaining U.S. nuclear weapons.

So, what will happen in Biden’s “decisive decade” and what would have to change to allow for real progress on disarmament? Besides an end to Russia’s war in Ukraine, the report lays out a few general conditions: “enduring improvements in the security environment, a commitment to verifiable arms control among the major nuclear powers, further progress in developing non-nuclear capabilities, and an assessment of how nuclear-armed competitors and adversaries may react.”

However, there are still credible alternatives to maintaining the “nuclear triad” of land-, sea- and air-based missiles — including eliminating land-based missiles — that could substantially reduce the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal and rein in defense spending without compromising security. In a country where defense spending continues to trump all other priorities, with increasingly obvious negative consequences for human and societal health, the Nuclear Posture Review’s vocal commitment to “resilience” above all should deeply concern the public given the continued lack of investment in human security.

Biden has pulled back from his campaign promises of transformative steps toward arms control and disarmament — now is the time for advocates to demand the administration make good on its reaffirmed commitment to a world without nuclear weapons.

 

[Housecarl]

Hummm.....

Posted for fair use.....

Is Biden Going to Keep Wasting America’s Money on New Nukes?

Let's read between the lines in the administration's recent nuclear review.

slate.com

POLITICS

Is Biden Going to Keep Wasting America’s Money on New Nukes?​

Let’s read between the lines.​

BY FRED KAPLAN
OCT 28, 2022 2:23 PM

There are two stand-out passages in the 25-page “Nuclear Posture Review” that the Biden administration released on Thursday. The first could be seen as a last-ditch olive branch to the Islamic Republic of Iran. While expressing “great concern” over its advances in uranium-enrichment, the report states: “Iran does not today possess a nuclear weapon, and we currently believe it is not pursuing one.” This may signal to Tehran that Biden does not consider a revival of the Iran nuclear deal to be an utterly lost cause (though at this point it is quite unlikely)

The second is a brutal warning to North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un:

Any nuclear attack by North Korea against the United States or its Allies and partners is unacceptable and will result in the end of that regime. There is no scenario in which the Kim regime could employ nuclear weapons and survive.

No American President has ever been so firm or specific on the consequences of a North Korean nuclear attack. No one has outright said that it would mean the death of Kim and the destruction of his power structure.

Other than that, the posture review—the latest edition of a congressionally mandated report, written at the Pentagon and vetted by the White House during every administration—is a slog of cliches. More than that, it’s a sign that another casualty of the war in Ukraine and various other messes in the world is the suspension of creative thinking about nuclear strategy—and, with it, the splurging of hundreds of billions of dollars on new nuclear weapons, many of which are unnecessary. Other than those two passages about Iran and North Korea, it strikes no new ground, sparks no new insights, and its authors seem aware of this, to the point where they did all they could to bury the report—literally.

Ordinarily a self-standing document, the 2022 edition of the review is hidden away as a chapter of the larger, even drearier National Defense Strategy, which was also issued on Thursday. (I had to phone a Pentagon public-affairs official to help me find the nuclear report; the official had to ask a colleague to help him find it.) And the new report is badly written, I suspect deliberately so, to prevent ordinary citizens from grasping the true depths of its banality. (If you’ve never read one of these reports before, more than half of it will be indecipherable.)

It’s a shame. When Joe Biden came into office, some hoped that he would make some changes in the nuclear realm—perhaps adopt a “no-first-use” policy or, in any case, reduce the size of the arsenal. In the final days of his tenure as Barack Obama’s vice president, Biden said in a speech, fully approved by Obama, that deterring (and, if necessary, responding to) a nuclear attack should be the “sole purpose” of U.S. nuclear weapons.

Ever since the atomic age began, U.S. policy has expressly reserved the right to use nuclear weapons not only in response to an enemy’s nuclear attack but also in response to an enemy’s non-nuclear invasion of an ally—especially if the U.S. and its allies are unable to resist the invasion with conventional forces alone. In other words, deterring a nuclear attack has not been the “sole purpose” of our nuclear weapons. Biden suggested, in his late-Obama-era speech, that it should be.

Then again, President Obama himself led his National Security Council in two debates on whether the U.S. should officially declare a no-first-use policy—and decided not to. He was convinced to leave the policy unchanged for three reasons. First, our allies would panic that we were abandoning them. Second, they might respond by building nuclear weapons of their own, thus setting off regional arms races. Third, we might want to use nukes in response to a large-scale biological-weapons attack. So, although Obama thought that no U.S. president should actually would use nuclear weapons first, he saw the value in reserving the right to do so—if just to deter a wide range of enemy attacks.

As a compromise, Obama’s Nuclear Posture Review said that deterring a nuclear attack was the “fundamental” purpose of nuclear weapons—and added that the U.S. would never use nuclear weapons first against a country that had signed, and was in compliance with, the Non-Proliferation Treaty. This would still make first-use possible against Russia, China, or North Korea. It also provided some incentive for other adversaries not to go nuclear.

Biden’s posture review repeats Obama’s language, though less clearly.

This was in many ways predictable but there was some chance that Biden might decide not to “modernize all three legs of the nuclear Triad”—i.e., to build all-new replacements for our aging intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, bombers, and cruise missiles. Obama had been manipulated into agreeing to fund them, at least in the short run, in exchange for getting the Senate to ratify the New START arms-reduction treaty, and Biden knew that Obama had regretted doing so. Biden could reverse that move, since these weapons were all in their early stages of research and development. Some of the existing weapons could simply be modified rather than replaced. Several of Biden’s second-tier officials in the Pentagon and the NSC were inclined toward this view.

But this prospect has fallen by the wayside as well. Biden’s review fully supports pushing ahead with all the new nuclear weapons—which are estimated to cost roughly $2 trillion over the next 25 years. Lots of vague formulas are mustered to rationalize this decision (e.g., “these replacement programs are planned to deliver modernized capabilities to avoid any gaps in our ability to field a credible and effective deterrent”), but none of them make sense, and this would be obvious if someone had written those passages in plain English.

Biden, of course, is in a spot. Given the rising tensions with Russia and China, it would be politically difficult, if not impossible, to cut back on existing plans to build more weapons, even if these weapons do nothing, objectively, to improve our security. In fact, a case can be made that we would be safer if we reduced the number of land-based ICBMs or eliminated them entirely. Just because Moscow and Beijing are wasting their money on new nukes doesn’t mean that Washington has to follow suit. It’s all theater.

The posture review does announce the cancellation of one nuclear weapon: a new sea-launched nuclear cruise missile. on the grounds that a new low-yield, submarine-launched ballistic missile can handle the mission well enough. Despite Biden’s concessions on every other aspect of the “nuclear enterprise,” Republicans will no doubt accuse him of “appeasement” on this one; my guess is the cruise missile will be funded after all. Liberals sometimes get hammered for “throwing money” at a problem. There is currently no resistance to throwing money at the weapons budget; in fact, there’s enormous resistance to not throwing it.

 

[Housecarl]

Hummm.....Goes with other moves that have included the US manufacture of RPG-7 launchers....
(For images and videos please see article source. HC)

Posted for fair use.....

U.S. Army Is Looking To Buy AK-74 Assault Rifles

The Army says it is willing to take certain AK-74 clones, but is not interested in offers of other AK-style guns.

www.thedrive.com

U.S. Army Is Looking To Buy AK-74 Assault Rifles​

The Army says it is willing to take certain AK-74 clones, but is not interested in offers of other AK-style guns.
BYJOSEPH TREVITHICK | PUBLISHED OCT 28, 2022 6:47 PM
THE WAR ZONE

The U.S. Army says that if you have stocks of Russian-made 5.45x39mm AK-74 assault rifles, or copies made in other countries, it may be interested in buying them. Why exactly the service might want them isn't entirely clear, but the AK-74 is one of the predominant standard service rifles in the Ukrainian military. The Army, as well as other branches of the U.S. military, does also maintain stocks of various foreign small arms for use by special operations forces, to arm mock enemy or faux local partner forces during training exercises, and to support various research and development and test and evaluation activities.

The Army Contracting Command-New Jersey (CCNJ) posted a notice "seeking potential sources to supply AK-74-type Kalashnikov Assault Rifles and Support Parts" on the U.S. government's SAM.gov contracting website yesterday. CCNJ said this posting was made on behalf of the Program Manager for Soldier Lethality (PMSL) and the Combat Capabilities Development Command-Armaments Center (CCDC-AC), but offered no further details about why either entity might be interested in this potential purchase and what the guns might be used for more specifically. The War Zone has reached out to the Army for more information.

The contracting notice also does not say how many of the Soviet-designed AK-74s the Army might be looking to buy in total, but does offer specifics in terms of what the Army is looking for in terms of the weapons themselves. "For the purposes of this effort, the AK-74-type Kalashnikov Assault Rifle is defined as follows: One (1) AK-74-type Kalashnikov Assault Rifle with fixed stock and approx. 16 inch barrel."

A standard array of accessories to go along with each gun – four magazines, one cleaning kit, one oil bottle, one shoulder sling, and one user's manual – is also desired. However, the Army says it will "recognize that the availability of these accessories is dependent on the condition and source of the rifles and may not be included."
CCNJ's notice is somewhat confusing in terms of what alternative guns it says the Army might be willing to accept in lieu of actual Soviet/Russian-produced AK-74s.

"Weapon systems of interest are those that follow the design pattern of rifles from Romania (eg. md.86), Russia (eg. AK-74), and East Germany (eg. MPi AK74). Weapons manufactured elsewhere are also desirable provided they adhere to the AK-74 pattern," it says. "Conversely, Bulgarian AR-SF and Polish Tantal-pattern rifles are not considered AK-74 pattern weapons for the purposes of this Sources Sought notice."

East German MPi-AK-74s are direct copies of the AK-74, which were produced in that country under license from the Soviet Union during the Cold War. However, the Romanian PA md. 86 is something of a hybrid of the earlier 7.62x39mm AKM design and the AK-74. It's not clear why those guns are acceptable, but AKM-derived Polish Tantals are not. Despite the similarities in external appearances, a true AK-74 only has around 50 percent commonality in its parts with the AKM.

The Bulgarian AR-SF and other AK-series-based designs made by the Arsenal company in that country only appear to be currently offered in the NATO-standard 5.56x56mm and Soviet-designed 7.62x39mm calibers, rather than the AK-74's 5.45x39mm, which could explain the issue there. Bulgaria did also license-produce actual AK-74s during the Cold War, any remaining stocks of which would be acceptable under the definitions provided in CCNJ's recent contracting notice.

"Sources are sought for functional AK-74 weapon systems. New Production items are preferred. Rifles in new old-stock/unissued, refurbished, or surplus conditions are satisfactory as long as they are determined to be safe-to-fire," the contracting notice adds. "Rifles assembled from previously-used or loose parts (i.e. 'parts kits') are also of interest."

There are certainly various potential secondary sources of AK-74s and clones, with the guns having been exported to dozen of countries over the years. When it comes to new production guns, Russia continues to be the main producer of new AK-74-type rifles chambered in the 5.45x39mm cartridge, which appears to be a central requirement for the Army. Various companies elsewhere around the world, including in the United States, do continue to make various new AK-style rifles or assemble examples from parts kits. While some of these are in 5.45x39mm, it is easier to find them in the far more popular 5.56x45mm and 7.62x39mm calibers.

As already noted, what the Army plans to do with any AK-74s it buys is not immediately clear. Transferring them to the Ukrainian armed forces is certainly one possibility. At least early in the conflict, Ukrainian forces, especially volunteer Territorial Defense Forces units, were often short on small arms. Troops were sometimes seen armed without outright antique World War I and World War II-era machine guns. It's unclear whether things are as dire as they sometimes initially appeared, but small arms have been and continue to be among foreign military aid packages for Ukraine's military.

Just today, the Pentagon announced a new aid package for Ukraine's military that includes, among other things, unspecified small arms and 2,750,000 rounds of related ammunition. This tranche of aid is a so-called "draw-down," meaning the items are coming directly from the U.S. military's existing inventory, but additional weapons and other materiel are also being purchased on Ukraine's behalf via a separate mechanism known as the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI).

At the same time, the Army and other elements of the U.S. military routinely buy and otherwise acquire foreign weapons and other military equipment for a host of purposes. This includes operational use by special operations forces units, to arm individuals standing in for opposing forces (OPFOR) and friendly locals during training exercises, and to support research and development and test and evaluation programs.

If the guns are indeed bound for Ukraine, it is perhaps somewhat ironic that the U.S. Army is now looking to potentially buy Russian-made rifles to help the Ukrainians fight back against Russia's invasion. Regardless of what the intended purpose of this purchase of AK-74s might be, it may well prompt a response from the Russian government.

Authorities in Russia have for years been particularly critical of U.S. government efforts to offer or otherwise facilitate alternative sources of Soviet-designed small arms and small arms ammunition to allies and partners, claiming that the real goal is to reduce the country's share of the international arms market. More recent reports have suggested that Russia's arms exports could be headed nosedive due to broad and crippling Western sanctions over its invasion of Ukraine and the reputational damage resulting from the poor performance of Russian forces in the conflict.

Whatever the Army might want these AK-74s for, they certainly won't be buying them directly from factories in Russia.

Contact the author: joe@thedrive.com

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There's a South Korean firm that makes AKs as well that the Finns are buying for their equivalent to the National Guard....

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use.....
(For images please see article source. HC)

Rafale Fighter Jets' Export Success Is Taking A Toll On French Pilots; Report Calls It Detrimental For Air Force

Rafale Fighter: French air force pilots are facing training deficit, according to French lawmakers on behalf of the National Defense and Armed Forces Committee

eurasiantimes.com

Rafale Fighter Jets’ Export Success Is Taking A Toll On French Pilots; Report Calls It Detrimental For Air Force​

EUROPE
ByTanmay Kadam

October 29, 2022
French military pilots are facing an alarming training deficit, according to a recent report by a French lawmaker on behalf of the National Defense and Armed Forces Committee that discussed the challenges the French Air Force pilots will face in 2023.

The report prepared by the French Parliament member Frank Giletti noted that the fighter pilots in the French Air Force are expected to fly only for 147 hours in 2023, against 162 in 2022, which is below NATO standards that require a combat pilot to clock at least 180 flight hours per year.

“This training deficit is particularly detrimental, while the current strategic context requires, on the contrary, a hardening of the operational preparation of our airmen,” Giletti remarked.

The French Ministry of Armed Forces responded to Giletti’s remarks saying the deficit in the flying hours of the pilots was linked to aircraft availability.

“This situation results partly from the sale-export of Rafales to Croatia, which limits the number of airframes available and the production capacity of flight hours,” the French Ministry of the Armed Forces explained.

Burden On French Fighter Pilots​

In November 2021, Croatian Defense Minister Mario Banožić and his French counterpart Florence Parly signed a deal for 12 used Rafale F3-R fighter jets to modernize the Croatian Air Force.

As EurAsian Times discussed earlier, there was a time when Rafale struggled to get buyers, but of late, the French-made fighter jet has become one of the most sought-after fighter jets in the world.

Greece had also signed a defense agreement in January 2021 to purchase 18 Rafale fighters, of which six jets were delivered on January 18. Moreover, Athens decided to increase the purchase order by adding six more jets in September.

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) struck a deal in December 2021 to buy 80 new Rafales, which was also the largest order in the history of this aircraft.


In February, Indonesia also ordered six Rafale fighter jets and later added 36 more. The first batch of six Rafale fighters is scheduled for delivery in 2026.

Therefore, Dassault’s assembly lines would be busy for the foreseeable future, meaning the export success of the fighter would continue to put a burden on the flight hours of the French fighter pilots.

To make up for the 24 used Rafale fighter jets sold to Greece and Croatia, the French Ministry of Armed Forces will place a new order for 42 Rafale jets in 2023, but reports suggest they will not be delivered before 2027. The new Rafales to be ordered could be in the advanced F4 configuration.

Deputy Chief of Staff Frederic Parisot had already warned the French parliament in a hearing on July 20, 2022, that the training shortage would extend for two years. “However, the situation remains acceptable, provided that the aircraft of the [future orders] are delivered on time,” he explained.

Mirage-2000s Could Be Used As Agressor Aircraft​

Military transport pilots are also experiencing less flying, with only 189 flight hours expected in 2023, far below the minimum 320 hours required by NATO standards.

According to the Ministry, this is because of the low availability of the C130H and A400M fleets caused by deployment delays and technical problems.

Giletti also pointed out that the current missions did not provide the most appropriate way for pilots to practice combat skills.

“Increasing operational readiness is all the more essential since the operations currently carried in the Levant, the Sahel or Ukraine hardly mobilize the skills required in high-intensity combat, so that the latter cannot be acquired other than by training.”

Giletti’s report also provided two recommendations to address this issue. The first is to continue developing and maturing simulated training and potentially account for it within the standards of a pilot’s operational activity.

The second recommendation was forming a ‘Red Air’ fleet of fighters that would replicate the role of adversary aircraft to provide realistic training, referred to as adversary air services (ADAIR), to French pilots.

The report suggested that the Dassault Mirage 2000 fighters being phased out gradually provide a window of opportunity to employ these fighters for this purpose. Alternatively, another solution could be to outsource this task to private contractors.

The French Navy has already implemented the second solution by hiring private contractor ARES to train the naval fighter pilots using 12 Mirage 2000 fighters procured from Qatar to avoid burdening its 42 carrier-capable Rafale-Marine (Rafale -M) fighters.

However, the report noted that the private ‘Red Air market in France is still in its infancy.


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[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use.....

JUST IN: Ukraine Highlights Need for Strong Industrial Base

JUST IN: Ukraine Highlights Need for Strong Industrial Base

www.nationaldefensemagazine.org

INDUSTRIAL BASE

JUST IN: Ukraine Highlights Need for Strong Industrial Base​

10/28/2022
By Meredith Roaten

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has demonstrated the importance of strategic logistics planning and has increased the U.S. military’s focus on working closely with the commercial sector, a senior defense official said.

The scramble to provide munitions and arms to Ukraine and backfill depleted stocks has highlighted the need to be in tune with the commercial sector as well as the defense industrial base, said Rear Admiral Joseph Noble, director of logistics operations at the Defense Logistics Agency. Defense companies have spoken widely about the supply shortages that the industry is facing because of the war.

“The good news is that I think it has reinvigorated or reinforced the importance of what we do each and every day,” he said during a DefenseNews event Oct. 28. “It does kind of amp up the pucker factor a little bit in the sense of, ‘Hey, we really got to make sure that we know what we're doing and that we've got a good plan and that we're able to execute the plan.’”

One lesson learned from Ukraine is the strategic need to sustain and maintain aging weapon systems, he noted.

“If you have a widget that you need for that weapon system, and you haven't procured that widget for many, many years, or you've not operated that system for many, many years, it can be very difficult to find those sources or to find those assets,” Noble said.

Raytheon Technologies announced in the summer that the supply chain for the Stinger missile was hampered because some suppliers hadn’t produced parts for as long as decades.

Ultimately, the United States’ advantage is that it can utilize its commercial sector in addition to the defense industrial base, he said.

“We can take a little bit of comfort in the much bigger commercial sector and much broader and more resilient commercial supply chains where we are,” he said.

The DLA’s strategy is to make sure that the supply chains for categories that are non-military such as food, fuel, medical are more stable.

“The key is really just making sure that we can plug into those and that we can access those quickly and effectively,” he said.

Then, the defense-side industrial base can focus on supplying the more specific needs for the military, “so that when I do need that widget or when the warfighter needs that widget that has a long lead time to manufacture, we're not waiting for that lead time,” he said.

Another way the DLA is considering dealing with obsolete parts is additive manufacturing, Noble said. While the technology is not as cost effective for mass production, additive manufacturing would come in handy during wartime operations.

“If one of the military services needed to be able to produce that widget forward on the battlefield, and they had the additive manufacturing capability that they could print a replacement widget … it would be very readiness effective from a warfighting advantage perspective,” he said.

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VIEW ALL ARTICLES

 

[jward]

You're welcome. Always happy to lend you a well manicured hand or two when needed/wanted
..n always happy to see you find yer way back home. : )

 

[jward]

Integrated idiocy: US not ready for a major war​

Seth Cropsey​

---

The US Defense Department’s opposition to eminently necessary force-structure changes, combined with the subjects of the National Defense Strategy, confirms that the United States is not prepared for an impending Eurasian war.
As the risks of such a war increase in the coming months, President Joe Biden’s administration should reconsider and change course to recognize that we live not in a decisive decade as the White House understands it, but a decisive decade for military confrontation.

Washington is bracing itself for the usual defense-budget wars in the coming weeks. The Defense Department – in truth, Kathleen Hicks, the supremely powerful, politically astute deputy secretary of defense – wishes to cut multiple major warships, including one commissioned only in 2020, to which the US Marine Corps (USMC) and Congress have objected.
Meanwhile, Biden’s Defense Department released the National Defense Strategy (NDS), ostensibly the military counterpart to the National Security Strategy.
These must be considered in turn. Typically, line-item budgetary fights do not signify great policy disputes. This case is exceptional.
Congress, alongside the USMC, wants to keep large surface combatants like the Ticonderoga-class cruisers in the fleet, alongside two expeditionary sea bases, other small surface combatants, and a handful of amphibious warships.
It also seeks to mandate a greater number of amphibious warships in the fleet at any given time, setting a minimum of 31.
The congressional argument stems from the USMC’s new Force Design 2030 concept, which is the most coherent, ambitious, and well-thought-out attempt by any of the Sea Services at crafting a legitimate strategy and force structure since the early 1980s.

That is not to say FD2030 is perfect – from a technical viewpoint, its envisaged light amphibious warships are too small to mount point-defense systems or have robust redundancies, but too large and slow to evade enemy fire. Yet it is a deeply necessary first step toward revamping stultified American strategic thinking and encouraging the military to be ready to “fight tonight,” as it always boasts.
The Pentagon, through the mouth of the White House’s Office of Management and Budget, is up in arms. The US Navy has been brought alongside, primarily because of a poor institutional culture and a service chief and secretary who, despite their obvious merits as men and public servants, are unable to assert themselves either against departmental bureaucracy or the bigger stifling effect of an administration that wants to cut defense.
Hicks’ transmitted argument is that the navy must modernize, and therefore must cut as rapidly as possible now to free up resources for development and expansion later in the decade.

Indeed, the ships that the administration seeks to foist on the navy years in the future would be irrelevant to a Sino-American conflict in the next few years. And, as Secretary of State Antony Blinken noted in an interview last week, a Chinese attack against Taiwan is on a “much faster timeline” than had been thought.
The ships Congress demands the navy retain would make an appreciable difference in a Eurasian war. The Ticonderoga cruisers are the US Navy’s best fleet air defense and command platforms. The expeditionary staging bases that the Pentagon would cut are integral, both now and in the future, to the FD2030 concept – without them, the USMC will struggle to forward-deploy to the First Island Chain.
Even the littoral combat ship (LCS), a poorly designed vessel stemming from an ill-conceived non-strategy, has a role policing the exits to the Second Island Chain, particularly if “up-gunned” through new dual-use developed sensors.

Integrated deterrence​

Yet this conviction that time remains in America’s favor permeates the Biden administration’s strategic thought. Indeed, it is one of two pillars of its entire defense strategy, as can be seen in the NDS that was made public on October 27. The Biden administration’s top two priorities are “defending the homeland” and “deterring strategic attacks,” and then “deterring aggression.”
The NDS text clarifies each term: Defending the homeland means defending critical American and allied infrastructure, in essence from sabotage; deterring strategic attacks means deterring nuclear use; and third, deterring aggression means conventional military deterrence.

Integrated deterrence confirms the de-emphasis on actual conventional warfare. The NDS identifies three types of deterrence, by denial, by “resilience,” and what would be termed punishment.
Deterrence by resilience is a clever but vacuous term: It is more properly an offshoot of deterrence by denial, not an independent deterrence concept. In turn, the NDS loops in sanctions, various “offensive cyber,” and other unclear means alongside traditional kinetic actions when describing deterrence by punishment.
The implication is that, even in wartime, non-military means can substitute for military ones. This helps pull the rug out from building the platforms that remain indispensable to successful combat operations.
The NDS was released alongside two other documents, the Missile Defense Review and Nuclear Posture Review.
The NPR is far more relevant for the Biden administration’s strategic picture. It explicitly states that, given the multiple major-power threats the country faces, it is entirely possible that the US might need to use nuclear weapons to deter one Eurasian competitor from exploiting a Eurasian contingency and launching a war of conquest.
In other words, nuclear brinksmanship is back on the table, even as the US narrows its nuclear options by, in the NPR, cutting new nuclear cruise missiles.

But these apparently thorny issues of defense strategy and force structure vanish if one assumes, as the Biden administration does, that a major war will not come for another 10 years; that the US has time to prepare; that the most important step the country can take is to ensure its resilience, not its military power.
The danger is that the Biden administration’s assumption is wrong. By quietly but substantially pruning back US military power in the short term and hinting at long-term investments and a “smarter” defense policy, the White House and Pentagon are putting the US in a strategic bind. For if the major Eurasian confrontation begins within the next decade, the US may need to resort to the unthinkable, whether that be offensive nuclear use or capitulation.
The overuse that creates a truism does not negate its truth: A nation goes to war with the military it has, not the one it wished it had.
Integrated idiocy: US not ready for a major war

 

[Housecarl]

Hummmm......

Peter Zeihan Warns "This Is A Lot SCARIER Than We Ever Thought"​

25,853 views Nov 2, 2022
85 Comments
RT 11:28

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Eg5DibxFJ6U&ab_channel=Factopediatv

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use.....
(For all of the images please see article source. HC)

China’s H-6K Bomber Spotted With New Air-Launched Ballistic Missile

It looks like China plans to equip its long-range H-6K jets with a smaller air-launched ballistic missile similar to Russia’s Kinzhal.

www.thedrive.com

China’s H-6K Bomber Spotted With New Air-Launched Ballistic Missile​

It looks like China plans to equip its long-range H-6K jets with a smaller air-launched ballistic missile similar to Russia’s Kinzhal.

BYTHOMAS NEWDICK | PUBLISHED NOV 3, 2022 4:22 PM
THE WAR ZONE

A new weapon, an air-launched ballistic missile, or ALBM, for China’s Xi’an H-6K bombers, has emerged. While its origins are unconfirmed, the missile looks very similar to the CM-401, previously known as a truck- or ship-launched anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) that is also capable of hitting static land targets. The latest development seems to point again to the considerable efforts Beijing is making to increase its advanced air-launched anti-shipping capability, which is becoming a fundamental part of its wider and fast-evolving anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategy. But even if this is not intended to be an air-launched ASBM, or at least not in its first iterations, the ability to unleash it on land targets is very concerning, as well.

The initial photos show H-6K serial number 11097 with a pair of the new missiles — which are presented in inert, form-factor-representative captive rounds — on the center pylons under its wings, arriving at the civilian Zhuhai Jinwan Airport for the Airshow China trade exhibition. This particular aircraft is assigned to the 8th Bomber Division of the Southern Theater Command, People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF). Missile-toting aircraft from this unit have also taken part in previous editions of Airshow China.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1588171054048251904

View: https://twitter.com/zhao_dashuai/status/1588171054048251904?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1588171054048251904%7Ctwgr%5E29ce2ffec5ca4a586aaf3b0988bfba8e7f7c7e69%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.thedrive.com%2Fthe-war-zone%2Fchinas-h-6k-bomber-spotted-with-new-air-launched-ballistic-missile

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1588085780479721474

View: https://twitter.com/RupprechtDeino/status/1588085780479721474?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1588085780479721474%7Ctwgr%5E29ce2ffec5ca4a586aaf3b0988bfba8e7f7c7e69%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.thedrive.com%2Fthe-war-zone%2Fchinas-h-6k-bomber-spotted-with-new-air-launched-ballistic-missile

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1588076244964413440

View: https://twitter.com/FierceDragons/status/1588076244964413440?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1588076299205181442%7Ctwgr%5E29ce2ffec5ca4a586aaf3b0988bfba8e7f7c7e69%7Ctwcon%5Es2_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.thedrive.com%2Fthe-war-zone%2Fchinas-h-6k-bomber-spotted-with-new-air-launched-ballistic-missile

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1588076329198813184

View: https://twitter.com/viggen990105/status/1588076329198813184?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1588076329198813184%7Ctwgr%5E29ce2ffec5ca4a586aaf3b0988bfba8e7f7c7e69%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.thedrive.com%2Fthe-war-zone%2Fchinas-h-6k-bomber-spotted-with-new-air-launched-ballistic-missile


In terms of its appearance, the mystery weapon has obvious similarities to the CM-401 ASBM, suggesting it may be an adaptation of this same missile for an air-launched application.

The state-owned China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC) publicly unveiled the CM-401 at Zhuhai in 2018, as we reported on at the time. Back then, CASIC displayed two launch platforms: an 8x8 truck-mounted type and an apparent deck launcher for ships. Each version was armed with two self-contained missiles.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1588120669891559424

View: https://twitter.com/RupprechtDeino/status/1588120669891559424?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1588120669891559424%7Ctwgr%5E29ce2ffec5ca4a586aaf3b0988bfba8e7f7c7e69%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.thedrive.com%2Fthe-war-zone%2Fchinas-h-6k-bomber-spotted-with-new-air-launched-ballistic-missile


Since then, not a huge amount more has become known about the CM-401, although it’s thought to have a maximum diameter of approximately 2.8 feet. That puts it in broadly the same class as the Russian Iskander quasi-ballistic missile, which has also been adapted for air launch, as the Kinzhal. The Kinzhal, too, has been frequently attributed an anti-ship role, although this is apparently yet to be demonstrated.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1588102499826896897

View: https://twitter.com/jesusfroman/status/1588102499826896897?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1588102499826896897%7Ctwgr%5E29ce2ffec5ca4a586aaf3b0988bfba8e7f7c7e69%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.thedrive.com%2Fthe-war-zone%2Fchinas-h-6k-bomber-spotted-with-new-air-launched-ballistic-missile


Overall, though, the mystery missile’s profile is generally in keeping with other similar developments around the world, including the tapering, or bi-conic, shape of its body. A rough estimate of the new missile’s size — which includes an approximate length of around 23 feet — also seems to match fairly well with what we know about the CM-401.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1588085683318497280

View: https://twitter.com/ryankakiuchan/status/1588085683318497280?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1588087766201819136%7Ctwgr%5E29ce2ffec5ca4a586aaf3b0988bfba8e7f7c7e69%7Ctwcon%5Es2_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.thedrive.com%2Fthe-war-zone%2Fchinas-h-6k-bomber-spotted-with-new-air-launched-ballistic-missile


According to CASIC, the CM-401 — at least in its original ground-launched and ship-launched applications — has a maximum range of just over 180 miles. The H-6, meanwhile, is widely attributed with a range of 3,700 miles, although the H-6K, with its more efficient engines, can fly significantly further still and can refuel in flight. In addition, the missile’s range would likely be increased greatly via air launch, with the delivery aircraft’s altitude extending the missile’s reach and improving its end-game kinematic performance.

Already, however, there has been some suggestion that the original CM-401 might actually have a much greater range than CASIC claims, potentially even being able to reach targets at up to 600 miles, although this remains unconfirmed. This could be realized, at least to some degree, via a reduction in warhead size that also better fits the ASBM role.

Flying to its target, the CM-401 apparently is capable of using a ‘porpoising’ or ‘skip-glide’ trajectory in which the warhead abruptly pulls up at least once as it begins the terminal stage of its flight. This makes defense against the weapon more difficult, allows course adjustments, and, potentially, can also further extend its range under some circumstances.

https://www.thedrive.com/uploads/2022/11/03/Screen-Shot-2022-11-03-at-4.29.31-PM.png?auto=webp&optimize=high&quality=70&width=1200

A Chinese graphic showing a ballistic missile with the ‘porpoising’ or skip-glide trajectory associated with the CM-401. via Chinese internet

Even without the porpoising flightpath, the CM-401 is a very tricky target, with the manufacturer claiming a terminal speed of between Mach 4 and 6. Again, with delivery from an aircraft flying at altitude, this figure could also increase. This kind of performance could well put it in the hypersonic bracket (meaning speeds of Mach 5 and above), a trait shared by many ballistic missiles, including Kinzhal, with its high-speed endgame.

Another interesting claim from CASIC concerns the option of the CM-401’s launch platform firing two missiles on different trajectories against either one or two targets at once. This further complicates defenses against the threat. With two missiles on each H-6K, it’s feasible that the same kind of dual-launch capability could be employed. Depending on its weight, it’s even conceivable that an H-6K could carry more than two of the new missiles, although that would likely impose a severe performance penalty.

The CM-401 was apparently developed to tackle big and fairly slow-moving naval targets like aircraft carriers, as well as other major surface combatants and high-value vessels.

Based on a cutaway of the mockup of the CM-401 shown previously at Zhuhai, the missile seems to use a phased array radar in the nose to actively home in on the target during its terminal phase.

It’s easy to see how such a missile would fit into China’s multi-layered anti-ship defenses, particularly in the South China Sea. What’s more, by deploying H-6Ks to airstrips on China’s man-made islands in that region, the ASBMs would be able to reach targets at a much greater distance. For some time now, China has deployed missile-capable H-6 bombers to these islands, including Woody Island in the northern portion of the South China Sea.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1293423729486307329

View: https://twitter.com/RupprechtDeino/status/1293423729486307329?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1293423729486307329%7Ctwgr%5E29ce2ffec5ca4a586aaf3b0988bfba8e7f7c7e69%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.thedrive.com%2Fthe-war-zone%2Fchinas-h-6k-bomber-spotted-with-new-air-launched-ballistic-missile


Continued.....

 

[Housecarl]

Continued.....

Interestingly, CASIC also says that the CM-401 has a secondary land-attack function, which could also be relevant for an air-launched development of the same weapon. This would provide another similarity with the Kinzhal, which has reportedly been used in combat in Ukraine against fixed installations on land. Bringing another land-attack missile to the H-6’s inventory could also be attractive for China. The H-6K is primarily armed with up to six subsonic air-launched cruise missiles, although there have been persistent reports that the aircraft is also intended as a launch platform for an air-launched hypersonic missile. Regardless, the value to China of a land-attack ALBM against high-value static targets, like Andersen Air Force Base on Guam or Wake Island, is fairly clear.

An official video from China’s People’s Liberation Army Air Force showing H-6 bombers taking part in a simulated attack on Andersen Air Force Base on Guam:

View: https://youtu.be/OBOho1AOKYY


The South China Sea is also just one of a number of maritime flashpoints in which China might want to call upon air-launched ASBMs. In the East China Sea, tensions between China and Japan run high due to conflicting territorial claims.

Even closer to home, the Taiwan Strait has seen rising tensions in recent months, and should Beijing attempt to “reunify” Taiwan with the People’s Republic of China by force, then efforts to remove any maritime surface threats from the theater would be a priority. The CM-401, when launched from China’s coast, could even hit targets on the eastern coast of Taiwan. With air launch, a weapon in this class would be able to range much further and attack with much greater unpredictability.

At this point, we have no confirmation that the missile forms under the H-6K are indeed related to the CM-401. However, the H-6 does seem to be fast becoming a ‘weapon truck’ of choice for carrying outsized stores like this, as well as high-speed drones. The Chinese are clearly looking at the H-6 in a similar light to how the U.S. Air Force views the B-52. With that in mind, even when the H-20 stealth bomber arrives, the H-6 could still be very useful for launching larger payloads at standoff ranges that also allow these increasingly vulnerable aircraft to stay well away from enemy defenses.

China already is established as a pioneer in the field of air-launched ballistic missiles, or ALBMs, with the H-6 having previously been adapted for the carriage of a much larger weapon in this class. This is the weapon known by the Western designation CH-AS-X-13 and associated with the H-6N version of the bomber, specially adapted for the carriage of outsize loads.

The video in the Tweet embedded below shows some of the best footage we have seen so far of the much larger CH-AS-X-13 ALBM:

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1516425727121494032

View: https://twitter.com/lqy99021608/status/1516425727121494032?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1516425727121494032%7Ctwgr%5E29ce2ffec5ca4a586aaf3b0988bfba8e7f7c7e69%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.thedrive.com%2Fthe-war-zone%2Fchinas-h-6k-bomber-spotted-with-new-air-launched-ballistic-missile


The CH-AS-X-13 also remains generally mysterious, although it appears to be related to the YJ-21, or Eagle Strike 21, a weapon that is itself thought to be a ship-launched version of the ground-based, medium-range DF-21D (CSS-5 Mod 5), an ASBM that reportedly became operational in 2010. It could be, therefore, that there are now two ALBMs of different range classes developed for the H-6, both of which have their origins in ground-based/ship-launched weapons.

It is worth noting that the concept of an air-launched ballistic missile is actually nothing new, with the U.S Air Force planning to adopt a nuclear-tipped ALBM, known as the Skybolt, as a payload for its B-52s more than 50 years ago. This project was canceled, however, and it’s only more recently that the concept has reappeared, not only in China but also in Russia and Israel.

China now appears very much wedded to the concept of missiles in this class, and adapting existing ballistic missile designs for carriage by long-range bombers seems to make a good deal of sense. After all, the range of these weapons could also allow H-6Ks to engage threats closer to the mainland from within the country’s own air defense umbrella — akin to the benefits of potentially being able to engage carrier strike groups in the South China Sea from the Gobi Desert. They could also fly far out to sea to take on far more remote targets.

Moreover, China’s anti-ship weapons now range from subsonic cruise missiles launched from stealthy catamarans, all the way up to medium- and intermediate-range ASBMs with maneuvering warheads. These have reportedly demonstrated capabilities, at least to some degree, against moving targets.

Alongside more established shore- and sea-based anti-ship missiles, an emerging class of air-launched weapons now seems to be becoming part of a multi-faceted approach to reinforce China’s various territorial claims across the Asia Pacific region, and deny opponents access to wide areas during potential regional conflicts.
Contact the author: thomas@thedrive.com

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Ukraine Situation Report: North Korea Covertly Arming Russia

Patrick Chase
I think that we all need to take a minute to step back and think about just how far Russia has fallen. In the 80s and 90s, the Soviet Union and then Russia provided ballistic missile design information to North Korea. North Korea then transferred that information to Iran by way of their joint missile development program. And now Russia is procuring missiles made with their own 40-year-old technology from Iran (but with precision guidance that is beyond anything they themselves can make. The Iskander has proven to be a very inaccurate weapon in both Nagorno-Karabakh and Ukraine). As a Russian colleague of mine has pointed out, after all of this why do we assume that their nukes would actually work? [*] Do you think that they actually have any confidence that they will at this point? It's been over 30 years since their last test, and they haven't invested in stockpile stewardship, simulation, and component verification the way the US has (and if they had the money would undoubtedly have been stolen). It seems quite possible to me that Russia is avoiding a nuclear demonstration or attack in Ukraine for the simple reason that it might fail, and in so doing reveal that they have a "Potemkin Deterrent". [*] The correct answer is of course "because we have to do so in the absence of compelling information otherwise", but I also think that we must consider and exploit Russia's own inevitable uncertainty in this respect.
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[jward]

Thank you for tackling The Warzone article; they're real pitas to share.
Tylar I know you must read here--- isn't there any other way to effectively present your info that we can effectively share??

 

[jward]

Japan a woefully late entrant in the hypersonic race​

Gabriel Honrada​

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Japan is weighing whether to deploy hypersonic missiles by 2030, a potential muscular response to China and North Korea’s recent missile technology advances and increasingly provocative actions and behaviors.
The proposal, if realized, would boost Japan’s counterstrike capabilities and build up its long-range missile arsenal to include hypersonic missiles, Nikkei reported this week. Whether the plan will be enough to deter China and North Korea, however, is already in doubt.

The three-step plan is expected to be reflected in Japan’s upcoming and highly anticipated new national security strategy, the Nikkei report said.
The first step would be to acquire Tomahawk and other battle-tested missiles from the United States, which can be quickly transferred with Washington’s approval.
In this step, Japan envisions modifying vertical launchers for interceptor missiles aboard its Aegis-equipped destroyers to carry Tomahawk cruise missiles, which have a range of 1,250 kilometers and can put the Korean Peninsula and nearby Chinese locations within range depending on the launch position, the Yomiuri Shimbun reported last month.
The second step of the plan involves upgrading its indigenous Type 12 anti-ship missile, including by extending its range from 200 to 1,000 kilometers.

Japan plans to deploy 1,000 of these upgraded missiles by 2024, thereby enhancing their ground-attack capabilities while enabling them to be launched from ships, fighter jets and missile launchers from its Southwest Islands and Kyushu, Asia Times in August.
A Type-12 Surface-to-Air missile fired by Japan’s Special Defense Forces. Image: Wikipedia
The third and final step would be the introduction of hypersonic weapons by 2030. The Nikkei report notes hypersonic missiles are far more difficult to intercept than the subsonic Tomahawk and Type 12 missiles, thereby enhancing their deterrent value.
Japan has already tested an indigenous scramjet engine, a critical component for hypersonic weapons. A scramjet is an air-breathing engine in which the forward motion of the aircraft or missile compresses intake air, with airflow in the combustion chamber always remaining supersonic.

This July, Japan launched a test rocket equipped with a scramjet engine that reached Mach 5.5 during its descent, as reported by The Japan Times. Nikkei notes that Japan’s Ministry of Defense (MOD) is looking at starting hypersonic weapons development with this technology next year.
In March 2020, Japan revealed two hypersonic weapons concepts, namely the Hypersonic Cruise Missile (HCM) and the Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile (HVGP). Defense website Global Security notes that the scramjet-powered HCM is similar to conventional cruise missiles, albeit with faster flight speeds and greater ranges.
At the same time, the HVGP will be equipped with a solid-fuel rocket engine capable of boosting its warhead and maintaining high velocity while gliding to its target.

China’s increasingly aggressive behavior over Taiwan, North Korea’s threat to test a nuclear weapon and provocative missile tests by both countries appear to be pushing Japan into upgrading its missile arsenal in response.
China’s barrage of missile tests in the aftermath of US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s controversial August visit to Taiwan set off alarm bells in Japan’s defense establishment and provided more motivation to increase defense-related spending.
Five Chinese missiles landed in Japan’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) during the tests, sending a message to Japan that America’s military presence in its territories makes it a potential target in any Taiwan invasion scenario.
China also fired its DF-17 hypersonic missile during those tests, Chinese state media outlet Global Times reported at the time.

A DF-17 missile is unveiled during the military parade in Tiananmen Square. Photo AFP / Greg Baker
North Korea’s near-incessant missile tests this year may have compelled Japan to expedite the acquisition of counterstrike capabilities. This week, North Korea fired 23 missiles into nearby waters, including a failed suspected intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) that forced Japan to issue evacuation warnings in northern and central parts of the country.
North Korea has also upped the ante by threatening to use nuclear weapons in response to US-South Korea joint military drills that it views as an invasion rehearsal.
While North Korea recently promulgated a new law authorizing the pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons in a broader range of situations, analysts doubt that Pyongyang would fire the first nuclear shot against superior US and South Korean forces and arsenals.

At the same time, North Korea has been actively pursuing hypersonic weapons, with state media outlet Korean Central News Agency stating in October, “the development of the long-range cruise missiles … is of great significance in attaining the main goal of the five-year plan for the development of national defense science and weapon systems.”
North Korea is believed to have successfully tested a hypersonic weapon in January this year, according to analysts quoted by Breaking Defense.
Apart from China and North Korea’s threats, unreliable US missile defense systems may have driven Japan to conclude that the best defense against a missile attack is a pre-emptive strike that takes out enemy missiles before they are launched.

Asia Times has previously noted that the Patriot missile system used by Japan has a dismal success rate, with the US initially claiming an 80% success rate during the 1991 Gulf War, later reducing it to 50%, then stating that it had only confidence of success in one-quarter of intercept cases.
US tests of the Aegis system, which is also deployed aboard Japan’s missile defense destroyers, achieved a mixed record of 34 out of 43 successful intercepts in 2022.

In October, Janes reported that the US had approved the sale of 32 SM-6 interceptor missiles worth US$450 million to improve Japan’s missile and air defense capabilities and improve interoperability between the two sides’ forces. However, those missiles would be of limited value against China and North Korea’s hypersonic missile threats.
An SM-6 missile launch. Photo: Facebook / Military and Space Electronics
Asia Times has noted that the SM-6 has only “nascent” capability against hypersonic weapons, with its effectiveness against maneuvering hypersonic targets still questionable at best. In May 2021, a pair of SM-6 missiles failed to destroy a medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) target while tests in 2015 and 2017 were successful, indicating a mixed record.
But even if Japan takes a pre-emptive stance against China and North Korea’s hypersonic threats, its ambitious missile plans may quickly come up against operational challenges.

In a 2018 article for The Strategist, Rowan Allport notes that although Japan has recently acquired the first of three RQ-4B Global Hawk large, high-altitude, long-endurance unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), ostensibly for targeting North Korea or China’s missile launchers, these drones lack speed, maneuverability and stealth, meaning that they could be shot down by North Korea’s aging but formidable air defenses and the more modern ones fielded by China.
He also notes that although Japan could acquire stealthier drones such as the RQ-170 Sentinel and RQ-180, their deployment will take time and at present are reportedly in short supply.
Allport also notes that Japan has only minimal satellite targeting capabilities, meaning it is reliant on the US to provide this critical capability.
Allport also notes that North Korea – and possibly China – have made significant efforts to harden their missile storage and launch facilities from attack.
For example, he mentions that North Korea has had decades to build hardened bunkers, which small cruise missile warheads may be unable to penetrate.

He also notes that North Korea has built tracked missile launchers that enable offroad launches and that China and North Korea have developed railway-mounted missiles, compounding the difficulty of tracking and destroying their respective arsenals through a high-speed, time-sensitive element.
All in all, then, Japan’s hypersonic missile plan may ultimately not be enough to deter China and North Korea from using their hypersonic weapons, especially if armed conflict erupts before Japan’s own hypersonics are deployed and ready as envisioned by 2030.

Japan a woefully late entrant in the hypersonic race

Japan is weighing whether to deploy hypersonic missiles by 2030, a potential muscular response to China and North Korea’s recent missile technology advances and increasingly provocative actions and…

asiatimes.com