WAR 10-03-2020-to-10-09-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

[Housecarl]

WAR - 09-12-2020-to-09-18-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****
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WAR - 09-19-2020-to-09-25-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****
Sorry for the delay folks.....Meat world will have it's pound of flesh...... WAR - 08-29-2020-to-09-04-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR**** Sorry for the delay....HC (432) 08-08-2020-to-08-14-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****...

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(436) 09-05-2020-to-09-11-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR**** WAR - 09-05-2020-to-09-11-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR**** (433)...

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‘Blue Homeland’ and the Irredentist Future of Turkish Foreign Policy - War on the Rocks


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A Great Power War Could Require More Troops, and more Quickly, than the United States Can Generate—even with a Draft - Modern War Institute

Great power competition has become a popular topic in defense circles—and that’s putting it mildly. The National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy both address it, events are held to […]

mwi.usma.edu

A Great Power War Could Require More Troops, and more Quickly, than the United States Can Generate—even with a Draft

Justin Lynch | October 1, 2020

Great power competition has become a popular topic in defense circles—and that’s putting it mildly. The National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy both address it, events are held to discuss it, and the phrase may even be so popular that it becomes a cliche. Despite this focus, very little literature about the topic addresses a closely related and pressing issue (especially given the prospect of competition between great powers becoming conflict between great powers): the United States’ ability to quickly generate trained personnel to replace field losses during high-intensity conflicts. As long as this remains unaddressed, the United States will struggle to understand the limitations of its conventional military power in protracted wars.


If the United States needed to, it could almost certainly put one million new soldiers under arms. The issue here is not the ability to draft a large number of people; it’s the draft’s inability to train and deploy soldiers quickly enough to preserve strategic and operational advantages in a peer conflict. The best way to understand this issue is through a thought experiment. What follows is not a predictive model. It is a tool to help explain the implications of the military’s force structure and the Selective Service System’s policies. For simplicity’s sake, it will only address Army personnel.


Thought Experiment: Is the Selective Service System Ready for Great Power Conflict?


Background


The most likely scenario for a draft is a great power war. Many pundits today argue that nuclear weapons, economic entanglement, and other factors mean that any great power war will be short. However, earlier this year, the Center for a New American Security published “Protracted Great-Power War: A Preliminary Assessment.” In it, Dr. Andrew Krepinevich argues that there are contingencies in which nuclear-armed combatants will impose constraints on vertical escalation even while remaining committed enough to continue fighting a high-intensity conflict for an extended period.


The United States fought two great power wars against peer adversaries in the twentieth century, World War I and World War II. Adversaries in Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan did not have the same relative economic, technological, or military capabilities, and therefore do not meet the criteria for great power conflict. During World War I, 106,378 American soldiers died and 193,663 suffered non-fatal wounds over the fifty-four weeks between the start and finish of US combat operations. During World War II, 318,274 American soldiers died and 565,861 suffered non-fatal wounds during 191 weeks between the beginning and end of combat operations. If it is assumed based on trends from World War II that only 20 percent of treated, wounds were able to return to duty, the United States averaged a loss of 4,213 soldiers per week during protracted great power wars against peer rivals.


Congress authorizes the Army an end strength of 478,000 Regular Army, 189,250 Army Reserve, and 335,500 Army National Guard soldiers. This force has thirty-one active duty and National Guard brigade combat teams (BCTs) composed of 480,000 soldiers. The rest of the Army’s manpower is assigned to the institutional Army, such as schools, as well as functional and multifunctional brigades.


Scenario


Consider a scenario in which the United States is fighting a major, non-nuclear, protracted war against a great power adversary. As noted above, Dr. Krepinevich argues this to be both politically and strategically feasible. Assume the United States will lose thirty thousand soldiers before military and political leaders decide the Army will not be able to continue to meet its operational requirements with its existing force structure. Once the government has that realization, it could turn to the Selective Service System.


Timeline



To initiate a draft, Congress needs to amend the Military Selective Service Act. It is unlikely that doing so would be popular among the American people. Richard Kohn, a history professor at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill who studies war and the military, has described any move to reinstate the draft as likely to be “one of the most unpopular proposals presented to the Congress in many years.” Assume it would take one week for a hypothetical Congress to authorize and a hypothetical president to initiate a draft. Once this takes place, the Selective Service System is required to deliver the first inductees to the military for training within 193 days of its activation, or 27.5 weeks.


The inductees’ next step would be basic training. Drafts have historically been used to create large numbers of infantry soldiers. Today, the US Army’s infantry training, or one-station unit training, lasts twenty-two weeks. It is reasonable to assume that it would take an additional two weeks for newly drafted soldiers to begin arriving in theater to fight. If the above timeline holds true, it would take 368 days—just over one year—from the time military and political leaders realize the US Army’s force structure is insufficient to meet a conflict’s demands for the first draftees to arrive in theater.

Continued......

 

[Housecarl]

Continued.....

Moreover, that process is unlikely to create an Army as capable as our current all-volunteer force. For the last several decades, the Army has avoided using an individual replacement system. Instead, it prefers to use a unit replacement system, typically by deploying full BCTs. Soldiers need to learn to work together, both to build cohesion and to learn the intricacies of operations that cannot be learned as individuals. The unit replacement system is premised on an acknowledgement that s company’s worth of individuals is not a replacement for a company that has trained together.


The Army could mitigate this concern by taking the time to train and build units to send overseas together. Officers and NCOs serving in the institutional Army and in security force assistance brigades could be used to form the leadership of new BCTs, which could be filled in by draftees and trained as units. One approximation for the time required to train new brigades comes from a RAND study that estimates it will take 102 days to train a National Guard brigade before deploying it overseas. This would improve the combat effectiveness of replacements, but extends the timeline further, to a total of 470 days.


On top of the initial loss of thirty thousand casualties that we estimated would precede military and political leaders’ determination that the Army’s force structure was insufficient to meet its combat requirements, there are now 4,213 casualties a week that do not return to duty. The Army would have lost 251,502 soldiers by the time individual replacements would arrive in theater. If the Army decides to instead send trained brigades instead of individuals, that figure rises to 312,896. Those projections represent 25 percent and 31 percent, respectively, of the Army’s 2019 total authorized end strength of 1,002,750. If 90 percent of the casualties are from the 480,000 soldiers in BCTs—not an unrealistic assumption—the percentage changes to 47 percent and 59 percent of active- and reserve-component soldiers in BCTs lost. According to the Joint Staff’s Methodology for Combat Assessment, military units are severely attrited when they lose 30 percent of their personnel or equipment. In this thought experiment, the average BCT would be severely attrited before the first draftees complete one-station unit training, much less arrive in theater or participate in BCT training, and the entire Army would be severely attrited before the first trained BCTs would arrive in theater.

Importantly, there are other considerations that could reasonably be expected to make this situation even worse:

• The scenario assumes the casualty-producing conflict is the Army’s only commitment, allowing it to concentrate all active- and reserve-component soldiers. This carries with it a related assumption that the Army will not need to defend the homeland, continue to carry out existing overseas obligations, or fulfill new deterrence requirements to prevent other conflicts from flaring up.
• The thought experiment assumes the Selective Service System will be able to meet its 193-day timeline. The system faces a monumental task executed by an unproven team spread across the country. It relies on the military’s medical system to screen potential draftees, which may be challenging. In the case of a great power conflict, it is also probable that the homeland will be under some form of attack that will hinder a draft.
• The thought experiment focused on infantry because drafts are historically used to generate large infantry formations, and because most combat casualties are infantry soldiers. There are also servicemembers in other jobs who are likely to see a significant number of casualties in the event of a great power conflict, but who require more training. Air Force fighter pilots go through a forty-day Initial Flight Screening, twelve months at Specialized Undergraduate Pilot Training, five months at Introduction to Fighter Fundamentals, and six to eight months at a Formal Training Unit. In total, draftees who attends the Air Force’s Officer Training School and become fighter pilots experience twenty-four to twenty-six months of training before they arrive at an operational unit. Similarly, enlisted nuclear submariners go to basic training for seven to nine weeks, “A” School for three to six months, Naval Nuclear Power School for six months, and finally a Nuclear Power Training Unit for six months. In total, it takes the Navy sixteen to twenty months to create a nuclear submariner.

Reasonable people can disagree about the validity and importance of these assumptions—after all, certain steps could be taken that might adjust the timeline to some limited degree. But even so, the conclusion is unavoidable: with its current force structure, if the United States fights in a protracted, great power war that follows historical trends, the Army’s combat forces will be severely attrited before draftees arrive in theater.


Possible Solutions: Ends, Ways, and Means


Changing Means


The most interesting recommendation for changes to the Selective Service System come from Dr. Krepinevich’s colleagues at the Center for a New American Security, Elsa Kania and Emma Moore. They argue that the system should include a mechanism for individuals to register to mobilize quickly and deploy to front-line units if a draft is initiated. However, it is unclear how many people might be interested in volunteering for front-line service or how quickly it would take place compared to current timelines.


The National Commission on Military, National, and Public Service makes a similar suggestion, arguing that the United States should recognize a “national mobilization continuum.” Under this proposal, rather than beginning national mobilization with a draft, the president would officially call for Americans to voluntarily join the military. While this recommendation has value, particularly in reducing the 193-day delay before draftees arrive for training, it would also delay the initiation of a draft, increasing casualties before draftees arrive.


The military might also use an abbreviated training cycle. The thought experiment assumes draftees will complete the current, twenty-two-week one-station unit training that enlisted infantry soldiers currently undergo. This training was only fourteen weeks long for forty years though, so it is feasible that infantry training could be condensed. Basic Combat Training, the common training that soldiers receive prior to attending their specialty-specific training, is roughly ten weeks long.


Political leaders might also initiate a draft earlier. The thought experiment assumes that political leaders would not decide to initiate a draft until the Army incurred 34,213 casualties that did not return to duty. Political leaders might instead, anticipating the demands of a protracted, great power war, initiate a draft at the same time as they either declare war or authorize the use of military force.


These changes would come at a cost, however. The Army increased the amount of training for its infantry soldiers because its previous fourteen-week schedule did not produce soldiers sufficiently well trained and physically fit to perform well in line units, much less in a high-intensity conflict. This problem is only likely to increase for draftees. Today, 71 percent of young people are ineligible to join the military due to health issues, education, and criminal records. If those standards are reduced or waived, at least some previously ineligible personnel are likely to need more preparation than today’s volunteers, especially when the increasing technical sophistication of current weapon systems is taken into account.


Changing Ends


If the United States cannot change the number of military personnel available for combat operations during the initial phases of a great power war, it would need to consider changing its ends. This might mean limiting objectives more than is desired, either temporarily or permanently. During World War II, this might have included more delays to the invasion of Europe with an understanding that this might allow the Soviet Union to seize more territory, or an agreement to enter into negotiations with Berlin and Tokyo rather than demanding unconditional surrender.


Changing Ways


Similarly, the United States could change its strategic- and operational-level plans to rely more on the defense, or to attack enemies sequentially rather than simultaneously. Returning to the World War II example, this might have entailed further delaying operations in the Pacific to dedicate resources to the European theater, or establishing strong forward defenses with the aim of causing the Japanese and Germans to exhaust or attrit themselves trying to retake the terrain.


Another way to rely on ways rather than means to overcome this problem would be to substitute technology for people. The United States, in recent years, has preferred to use firepower and other types of technology to reduce risk to servicemembers. One of the third offset’s core concepts was to rely on technology to produce a qualitative advantage that reduces casualties and let a relatively small number of professional soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines defeat larger forces. While this is a laudable approach, it relies on an assumption that the United States can maintain advantageous technology asymmetries. That assumption is less certain today than it was a short time ago, and may be even less certain moving forward.


Accepting Risk


Changing the draft to enhance means may be impractical, relying on technological superiority to compensate for limited means with more effective ways may be unreliable, and the United States may not want to limit its ends to avoid enabling adversaries. The remaining option is to simply accept the risk that the United States may run out of combat forces if it fights in a protracted, great power conflict.


The American people and their leaders are right to be confident in their military and its abilities. But that confidence should be tempered by an understanding that great power conflicts have, in the past, required massive personnel commitments. Accepting risk or relying on technology, may be the best choices, but during great power conflicts they may have the potential to force the United States into scenarios without good choices. Is it possible that American combat units would be so severely attrited before draftees begin arriving in theater that the United States would be forced to either adjust political objectives or to use technology in a way that requires vertical escalation, the pinnacle of which is nuclear warfare? The above thought experiment shows that may be a potential outcome.


The United States has an important role to play in the world, and fulfilling it requires the ability to project power effectively in a variety of scenarios. The most extreme cases are protracted, great power conflict. Unfortunately, those conflicts and the casualties they produce are just as possible in the twenty-first century as they were in the twentieth. That requires us to ask difficult questions about whether the United States is prepared.




Justin Lynch served as an active-duty army officer before transitioning to the Army National Guard. As a civilian, he has served in multiple roles in the national security enterprise, and has written for Joint Force Quarterly, Modern War Institute, War on the Rocks, and several other national security journals.


The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use.....

US Secretary of Defense starts talks in Rabat | The North Africa Post

northafricapost.com

US Secretary of Defense starts talks in Rabat

0
Americas, Headlines, International, Maghreb, Morocco
October 2, 2020
A+ A-

US Secretary of Defense Mark Esper, who is visiting Morocco as part of a Maghreb tour, held separate talks Friday in Rabat, with the Minister Delegate in charge of the National Defense Administration, Abdeltif Loudyi, and the Lieutenant General of the Army, Inspector General of the Royal Armed Forces Abdelfatah Louarak.



Talks between Abdeltif Loudyi and the US official covered various aspects of bilateral cooperation in the field of national defense, as well as prospects for their development, the FAR General Staff said in a press release.

The two sides expressed satisfaction with the strength, excellence, durability and dynamism of bilateral cooperation, and agreed to bolster this cooperation, with focus on the consolidation of common security objectives, in particular, the improvement of military preparedness, the strengthening of skills, and the development of interoperability of forces.



Abdeltif Loudyi also proposed to consolidate military cooperation with the United States by promoting joint investment projects in Morocco in the defense industry sector, in order to promote technology transfer and gradually implement the kingdom’s autonomy strategy in this area.



The Moroccan official, on the other hand, highlighted the constant commitment and multidimensional strategy, led by Morocco, under the leadership of King Mohammed VI, in the fight against terrorism and the humanist management of migration crisis.



He also underlined Morocco’s role as an actor in regional stability in the Sahel and the Mediterranean, in particular the efforts made by Morocco in the framework of South-South cooperation, for economic development and capacity building of the military forces of several African countries, in particular through training and the exchange of expertise.



The talks between the US Defense Secretary and Inspector General of the Royal Armed Forces Abdelfatah Louarak, took stock of bilateral military cooperation, which includes the organization of combined exercises, the exchange of information visits and the participation in various trainings courses.



The two sides highlighted their ambition to develop the centuries-old cooperation relations between the two countries’ armies in the same spirit of friendship and shared trust.



They agreed that the deepening of these relations should materialize through the consolidation of technical cooperation and its diversification to integrate new components to further develop the interoperability of armies and their capacities to effectively face the threats that may arise.



They also pledged to monitor the work of the Morocco-USA Defense Advisory Committee to strengthen military cooperation between the two countries.



The high point of this cooperation remains the organization and conduct in Morocco of the combined Moroccan-American exercise “African Lion”, a major exercise, considered among the most important combined exercises in the world.



Morocco is the last leg of the US Defense Secretary’s Maghreb tour that too him to Tunisia and Algeria.

 

[Housecarl]

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Air Force C-17 Launched A Pallet Of Mock Cruise Missiles During Recent Arsenal Plane Test

The test was part of a larger set of experiments centered on improving the service's communications and data-sharing networks.

www.thedrive.com

Air Force C-17 Launched A Pallet Of Mock Cruise Missiles During Recent Arsenal Plane Test
The test was part of a larger set of experiments centered on improving the service's communications and data-sharing networks.

By Joseph Trevithick
October 3, 2020

• The War Zone

USAF
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A U.S. Air Force C-17A Globemaster III transport aircraft simulated the launch of multiple AGM-158 Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile cruise missiles via a palletized system during a recent major demonstration exercise. This is the latest in a series of experiments to evaluate the possibility of using cargo aircraft as so-called "arsenal planes" to provide additional strike capacity, especially during a high-end conflict.



Air Force Unveils First Test Of Arsenal Plane Concept And New CLEAVER Munition
By Joseph Trevithick Posted in The War Zone

Air Force Eyes "Bomb Bay In A Box" To Rapidly Turn Airlifters Into Flying Weapon Trucks
By Joseph Trevithick Posted in The War Zone

Air Force Close To Test Firing Low-Cost Cruise Missile As Work On Swarming Munitions Progresses
By Joseph Trevithick Posted in The War Zone

Air Force's Gray Wolf Program Tests Game-Changing Small Low-Cost Jet Engine
By Joseph Trevithick Posted in The War Zone

USAF Wants To Network Its Precision Munitions Together Into A 'Golden Horde' Swarm
By Joseph Trevithick Posted in The War Zone

The Air Force Strategic Development Planning and Experimentation (SDPE) office within the Air Force Research Laboratory announced on September 30, 2020, that it had conducted the test as part of the Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS) Onramp #2 event, which had wrapped up earlier that month. The 412th Test Wing led the palletized munition test flight, in cooperation with Air Mobility Command, which provided the C-17A from one of its units at McChord Air Force Base in Washington State.

It's not clear where the simulated launch actually took place, but the ABMS Onramp #2 included demonstrations at the ranges surrounding Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada, at the U.S. Army's White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico, and in the Gulf of Mexico. A combined operations center and intelligence fusion cell at Joint Base Andrews in Maryland helped coordinate the various activities.

USAF
A C-17A Globemaster III assigned to the 62nd Airlift Wing based at McChord Air Force Base, similar to the one used in the recent arsenal plane experiment.

The overall goal of the event was to explore how the various communications and data sharing networks and related systems under development as part of the ABMS program could help link together various sensors and weapon systems. Cruise missile defense was a major focus area, with the event including a first-of-its-kind demonstration of a U.S. Army howitzer shooting down a target drone acting as a surrogate cruise missile using a Hyper Velocity Projectile (HVP) after receiving targeting information from off-board sources.

Increased network connectivity is also extremely important for the arsenal plane concept, as cargo aircraft do not generally have means of identifying targets at stand-off ranges and then gathering the necessary information to engage them all on their own. Other platforms would almost certainly be responsible for feeding that information to airlifters operating in this role.

Transports, such as the C-17, would then use their large load carrying capacity, combined with palletized launch systems, to offer means of rapidly engaging a large number of targets across a broad area. Being able to quickly convert airlifters to and from an arsenal plane configuration would also give the Air Force a very flexible and relatively low-cost means of generating large amounts of extra strike capacity, especially compared to procuring additional heavy bombers.

"A Palletized Munitions capability could enable various airlift aircraft to employ a range of weapons en masse via a self-contained, roll-on/roll-off palletized system, and may offer an alternative way for the Air Force to bring more mass to the fight," Dr. Dean Evans, the Palletized Munitions Experimentation Program Manager at SDPE, said in a statement after the test during the ABMS Onramp event. "The successful demo represents a key step in SDPE’s Palletized Munitions Experimentation Campaign, which will determine if the Palletized Munitions concept is feasible and provides a competitive advantage for the warfighter."

The stealthy AGM-158 Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) family of land-attack cruise missiles would be especially capable and combat-proven weapons to combine with the arsenal plane concept. The standard A model has a range of around 230 miles, while the extended range B variant can hit targets out to around 575 miles or more. The Air Force is in the process of acquiring an extreme-range D version now, as well, that will have a range in excess of 1,000 miles. Integrating these weapons into the service's palletized munitions systems could also serve as a stepping stone to adding the AGM-158C Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM), a derivative of the JASSM, to the mix, further expanding the capabilities of future arsenal planes.

USAF
Air Force personnel load inert AGM-158 JASSMs onto a B-52 bomber.

It first emerged in April that AFRL was exploring palletized munitions concepts, or what it referred to as a "bomb bay in a box." The following month, the Air Force revealed that it had conducted at least five test flights of prototype and surrogate systems since January. At least one of these tests involved the release of a previously unseen multi-purpose expendable air vehicle dubbed the Cargo Launch Expendable Air Vehicles with Extended Range (CLEAVER).

Initially described a long-range stand-off precision-guided munition, it is possible that CLEAVER could be used to carry other payloads to carry out other missions, such as acting as a decoy using an electronic warfare package.

USAF
A pair of CLEAVER munitions on a palletized launch system fall from the back of an Air Force Special Operations Command MC-130J Command II special operations transport-tanker aircraft during another arsenal plane test earlier in 2020.

The Air Force is separately working on a program, known as Golden Horde, to increase the networking capabilities of its munitions, themselves, with the goal of enabling them to operate as autonomous swarms. There is another initiative, called Gray Wolf, that has been exploring technology that could be used in the development of low-cost cruise missiles. Both of these efforts would be very applicable to the arsenal plane concept, as well.

USAF
A test article developed under the Gray Wolf program, which was focused on exploring technologies applicable to low-cost cruise missiles.

C-17s and other airlifters acting as arsenal planes could also provide additional close air support or other strike capabilities in lower-risk environments using precision-guided bombs or other shorter-range weapons. The range of these aircraft would enable them to loiter for extended periods over portions of the battlefield, as well. The Air Force had already revealed that C-17 had flown just this kind of mission during the ABMS Onramp event, as well, dropping loads of palletized Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) GPS-guided bombs.

“This concept, once fully mature, is for the munitions to behave just as if they were dropped from a bomber aircraft,” Air Force General Jacqueline Van Ovost, the head of Air Mobility Command, said during the Air Force Association's main annual convention, held virtually this year due to the COVID-19 pandemic, in September. "They separate from the airplane, they ignite their motors, fly to pre-designated waypoints using different flight altitudes, and then they strike their targets."

“Our ability to flex to use this airplane [the C-17] in multiple ways is what really brings this richness to operations. While we’re flying regular cargo deployments and distributions, there are still lots of legs where we’re flying airplanes where you have the capacity to do so," she continued. "We haven’t really looked at the full concept to see how many it would take, and this is not taking the place of any of the Global Strike capabilities. This is just the capability we want to have, should we need it, and if we pull it into an [operations] plan, that’s great."

This is certainly not the first time that the Air Force has explored the arsenal plane concept or looked into using airlifters as impromptu bombers, as you can read about more in this past War Zone piece. Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) is capable already of employing the huge GBU-43/B Massive Ordnance Air Blast (MOAB) bomb using its MC-130H Combat Talon II and MC-130J Commando II special operations transport-tankers.

View: https://youtu.be/2dIK1g__gg0


However, this is a highly specialized weapon that has been, to date, employed only once, in Afghanistan in 2017. AFSOC's AC-130 gunships are now guided weapons trucks in their own right, as well. "It's a little different from what special operations is doing," General Van Ovost had said last month of the present arsenal plane and palletized munitions efforts.

All told, the Air Force looks to be moving quickly to explore these concepts anew and it will be very interesting to see how these projects continue to evolve in the near term. If they are pursued to an operational capability, they could drastically increase the USAF's ability to carry large numbers of heavy weapons into the fight over long ranges, which is absurdly relevant considering the challenges faced with a potential fight against a peer-state, especially in the vast Pacific theater.

Contact the author: joe@thedrive.com

 

[Housecarl]

Hummm....

Posted for fair use.....

The United States Has a Role to Play in the Nile - War on the Rocks

The United States recently imposed punitive measures against Ethiopia over a dam that could plunge an entire region into chaos. The administration of

warontherocks.com

The United States Has a Role to Play in the Nile

Yasir Zaidan

October 2, 2020

Commentary

The United States recently imposed punitive measures against Ethiopia over a dam that could plunge an entire region into chaos. The administration of President Donald Trump is denying Ethiopia up to $130 million of financial aid after its unilateral decision to start filling the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. Ethiopia is building the dam on the Blue Nile, the main tributary of the Nile River. The dam, which is about nine miles from the Ethiopian-Sudanese border, is slated to provide energy for Ethiopia’s industrialization plans, but Egypt sees it as a threat because it would reduce its diminishing freshwater resources. The Ethiopian government started filling the dam without an agreement with the two other downstream countries, Sudan and Egypt, because of domestic political pressure and a belief in Addis Ababa that the United States was favoring Egypt.

Withholding aid jeopardizes the current African Union-sponsored talks between Sudan, Egypt, and Ethiopia to resolve the dispute over the dam. The United States — along with the European Union, World Bank, Kenya, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Mali — is an observer to the negotiations, and its move has been perceived by Ethiopia as a neocolonial intervention to impose a biased agreement in favor of Egypt. Ethiopia’s unilateral move was wrong and has weakened its negotiation position, but the U.S. decision to withhold aid will make it more difficult for Ethiopia to reach an agreement with its neighbors. The current talks present the last chance to solve the dispute, since the first stage of the dam-filling process is already complete. The United States should support the African Union trilateral talks and not intervene on behalf of one side or another. Additionally, the development has wider geopolitical implications: China invested $1.2 billion into the project — nearly one-quarter of the total cost — and Ethiopia may try to play China and the United States off of each other for support.

Background

In 2011, Ethiopia began building the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam in a gorge of the Blue Nile. If completed, it would be the largest hydroelectric project in Africa, and twice as big as Lake Tana, Ethiopia’s largest natural lake. It is expected to generate about 6,000 megawatts of electricity, which should cover the local electricity shortage and provide $1 billion a year in exports.

Ethiopia’s government relies heavily on the promise of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam project to spark economic growth and investment, and enable massive industrialization initiatives. Most Ethiopians hope that this strategic project will alleviate poverty and raise the standard of living.

However, Ethiopians’ aspiration for prosperity might complicate the lives of millions of Egyptians. Cairo considers the dam construction to be an imminent threat to its water resources. The Nile provides almost all of Egypt’s water. In 1959, Egypt signed a treaty with Sudan that would give Egypt two-thirds of the Nile’s water, but even that is no longer enough to meet the growing need. This treaty, however, gave Egypt veto rights against upstream countries like Ethiopia, who themselves may experience water shortages in the near future. Moreover, Egyptian leaders have stated that the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam project is a matter of national security, since the Nile is the backbone of the country’s agricultural sector and the main source of its freshwater. Cairo is willing to use any option to protect their interests — in fact, several Egyptian leaders have stated that military force should not be ruled out.

Sudan has taken a different approach. Government officials declared that they support Ethiopia’s right to utilize its water resources. However, they also raised serious concerns about unilateral moves and emphasized the necessity of cooperation among Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt. On the one hand, Khartoum expects to gain enormous benefits from the dam, which is meant to provide it with low-cost electricity. Furthermore, the dam will protect Sudan from the flooding that burdens it annually. This summer, the country suffered from the worst floods since 1912, which caused the death of 86 people and catastrophic damage. But the dam is not all good news for Sudan. The project would decrease the amount of silt available for agriculture and the manufacturing of bricks, and it would be a humanitarian disaster for Sudan if the dam suffered a rupture.

Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan have held several rounds of talks since 2010. In March 2015, they signed a Declaration of Principles on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam in Khartoum. The document prioritized cooperation under the premise of avoiding significant harm to any country. It also asked the signatories to agree on guidelines and rules for the first filling of the reservoir. However, a major technical disagreement between Egypt and Ethiopia on the duration of reservoir filling has not been resolved. Egypt is concerned about the amount of water that Ethiopia will release during the filling duration. In normal rainfall years, filling would not be a problem, but during a prolonged drought, it would present a serious decrease in the Nile’s water flow. While Sudan and Egypt demand that Ethiopia release a fixed amount of the water from the dam’s reservoir, Ethiopia insists that it should have some flexibility to deal with drought. Egypt is also concerned that a drought might take place during the filling process, which is why it is calling for a longer filling period.

U.S. Interest in Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam

After years of unsuccessful talks between Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia, Egypt requested that the United States mediate between the three countries to reach an agreement, believing that Washington is well-positioned to bring about an agreement.

In October 2019, the U.S. Treasury Department and the World Bank called for a new round of talks, which did not succeed. Egypt was the only signatory of the proposed deal. Months later in June 2020, Egypt and Sudan asked the U.N. Security Council to engage the issue, as Ethiopia announced that it would be filling the dam unilaterally in mid-July.

On July 22, 2020, officials from the three countries agreed to resume talks under the African Union umbrella in a final push to reach an agreement before the second stage of the dam filling. However, these talks will be doomed to fail if the United States continues to block Ethiopia from financial aid before reaching an agreement.

Withholding U.S. aid will also produce a “rally ’round the flag” effect in Ethiopia, since the government has long represented the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam as a symbol of national sovereignty. It was financed mostly by Ethiopian people, who believe that the dam will end their country’s long fight with poverty. Some Ethiopian media outlets called the dam “the new Adwa,” referring to the Battle of Adwa that marked the Ethiopians’ defeat of Italian colonizers.

I experienced these negative sentiments firsthand when I visited Matamma, a border town between Sudan and Ethiopia, in November 2018. Ethiopian border control officers denied my entrance, even though Sudanese and Ethiopian nationals are permitted to cross the border. I learned later that officer mistook me for an Egyptian. Animosity toward Egypt is common in Ethiopia because of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam dispute.

Last month, Ethiopian Foreign Minister Gedu Andargachew reinforced this nationalistic narrative about the dam when he said in a controversial tweet that “the Nile is ours.” However, the Ethiopian government’s approach to the talks is not only a matter of foreign policy and sovereignty, but ties into internal political and security dynamics as well. Addis Ababa’s bold and unexpected step to start the dam-filling process unilaterality is a distraction from Ethiopia’s internal turmoil. Tensions are rising between the Tigray regional government and the central government in Addis Ababa as the former holds regional elections and defies federal directions.

Abiy Ahmed, the Ethiopian Prime Minister, is also facing growing discontent in the Oromo region, where 166 people died in the unrest after the assassination of the Ethiopian singer, Hachalu Hundessa. As a result of this domestic upheaval, the government is internally vulnerable and likely feels pressure to harden their negotiation position with respect to the dam.

Looking Ahead

The United States should reinstate its financial aid to Ethiopia and support the ongoing African Union process to reach an agreement. While Ethiopia’s unilateral decision to fill the dam was unhelpful, Washington’s response has limited Addis Ababa’s options in dealing with the dispute, stoked anti-Americanism, and reinforced the belief that the United States is only concerned about protecting Egyptian interests. Ethiopia, which helped provided support for U.S. counter-terrorism missions in Somalia, likely feels cornered. The United States can expect Ethiopia to play the China card by highlighting its growing ties with Beijing, which played a vital role in financing the project.

The United States can help stabilize the dispute over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. Washington should use its influence in Sudan, Egypt, and Ethiopia to support trilateral talks in the African Union. It is in its national interest to maintain stability in the region, and supporting the Africa Union talks would prevent uncertainty and chaos.


Yasir Zaidan is a lecturer of international affairs at the National University in Sudan, and a Ph.D. student at the University of Washington.


Commentary

• Horns of a Dilemma
  Global Democracy in the Trump Era
  
• Commentary
  Arming Without Aiming? Challenges for Japan’s Amphibious Capability
  
• Net Assessment
  Understanding America’s Declining Global Influence
  

 

[Housecarl]

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Understanding America’s Declining Global Influence - War on the Rocks

Why is America’s global influence in decline? And what can be done to get it back? In a recent study, the RAND Corporation’s James Dobbins, Gabrielle

warontherocks.com

Understanding America’s Declining Global Influence

Zack Cooper, Melanie Marlowe, and Christopher Preble

October 1, 2020

Podcasts - Net Assessment

Why is America’s global influence in decline? And what can be done to get it back? In a recent study, the RAND Corporation’s James Dobbins, Gabrielle Tarini, and Ali Wyne, trace the former unipolar power’s struggles to several factors, but point chiefly to “the classic cycle of hubris followed by nemesis.” A sequence of “success, overconfidence, overstretch, failure, and retreat,” they write, explains how “domestic politics, foreign policy, and external events interacted to diminish American influence.” Chris, Melanie, and Zack appreciated the effort, but had some questions. The study’s attempt to score American successes and failures dating back to 1945 falls flat, but the global public’s reactions to these efforts isn’t in dispute: the United States isn’t trusted to solve the world’s problems, and many worry that it is making things worse. What can be done to reinvigorate Americans’ global engagement, and win back the trust of allies and partners? And who will take the lead in getting us back on track? Zack praises FBI director Chris Wray for doing his job, and Chris and Melanie give shout outs to acts of human decency.

Net Assessment

Understanding America’s Declining Global Influence
RT 00:55:33

Links:

• James Dobbins, Gabrielle Tarini, Ali Wyne, “The Lost Generation in American Foreign Policy,” RAND, September 2020
• Dina Smeltz, Ivo H. Daalder, Karl Friedhoff, Craig Kafura, and Brendan Helm, “Divided We Stand,” Chicago Council on Global Affairs, September 17, 2020
• “US election: Trump Won’t Commit to Peaceful Transfer of Power,” BBC News, September 24, 2020
• Devlin Barrett, “FBI Director Affirms Russia’s Aim to ‘Denigrate’ Biden Ahead of Election,” The Washington Post, September 17, 2020
• Eliott C. McLaughlin, “Portland Protests Remain Largely Peaceful Until Night Falls and Police are Targeted, Authorities Say,” CNN, September 28, 2020
• Ryan Bergeron, “A 72-Year-Old Woman was Quietly Living in a Dilapidated House. Then an Electrician Sparked a Community to Help Her Rebuild,” CNN, September 24, 2020
• “Unsung Heroes 2020,” The Atlantic Council
• Scott Lincicome, “It’s Time We Had a Talk about Tariffs,” The Dispatch, September 29, 2020

Podcasts, Net Assessment

 

[Housecarl]

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China’s contemporary nuclear debates: What’s brewing? - The Sunday Guardian Live

Chinese analysts place the onus of China’s future nuclear trajectory on developments that take place in the US. US Department of Defense (DOD)

www.sundayguardianlive.com

China’s contemporary nuclear debates: What’s brewing?

Manpreet Sethi

• Updated
• :
• October 3, 2020,
• 10:22 PM

Chinese analysts place the onus of China’s future nuclear trajectory on developments that take place in the US.

US Department of Defense (DOD) recently released its annual report to Congress offering an assessment of military and security developments in China. On the nuclear front, it proffered two important estimates—China’s nuclear stockpile “will at least double in size” from the “low 200s” over the next decade; “China intends to increase the peacetime readiness of its nuclear forces by moving to a launch-on-warning (LOW) posture”.

If these assessments prove true, it would mean an abandonment of an expressed nuclear philosophy that has guided China since its first nuclear test on 16 October 1964. Premier Mao had premised deterrence on small numbers sufficient to cause unacceptable damage, and on counter-retaliation that did not require weapons to be on hair-trigger alert. China’s White Paper on National Defence released in July 2019 reiterated this posture.

The US, however, contends that China will give up minimalism and defensiveness as its capability advances. President Xi Jinping has indeed shown a propensity for more military ostentation and aggressive postures. Having elevated the PLA Rocket Force to the position of the fourth arm of the military alongside the Army, Navy and Air Force, he has described it as the “core strength of China’s strategic deterrence, the strategic support for the country’s status as a major power, and an important cornerstone safeguarding national security”.

Meanwhile, also visible amongst Chinese analysts are debates on China’s nuclear strategy and posture. These provide an insight into contemporary concerns of the nation. Of course, given the nature of the Chinese system, the outsider is allowed to “see” only that which the Party desires. So, what is China signalling?

One debate revolves around whether China should continue to maintain its nuclear forces on low alert levels or move to LOW. Pointing to the combined American military capabilities of missile defence, high-precision long-range missiles, low-yield nuclear weapons, and offensive space and cyber capabilities, China claims they erode the credibility of its deterrence based on a small nuclear arsenal. Hence, the argument to place nuclear forces on low-alert levels to escape destruction before launch. Chinese strategists argue that the outcome of this debate will be determined by how the US shapes its relations with Beijing.

A related issue under discussion is whether China should continue with the strategy of no first use (NFU). While most Chinese strategists dismiss need for change, they nevertheless contend that developments in the US are upsetting strategic stability and compelling the country to rethink its NFU commitment. A constructive US-China relationship would reassure Beijing and help it to retain the NFU, just as growing competition would strengthen voices seeking a revision of the doctrine.

Another debate swirls around China’s participation in nuclear arms control and whether it should increase nuclear numbers before stepping into any negotiations. Currently, Beijing has rejected such engagement till such time as American and Russian arsenals reduce to its level. An increase in China’s own arsenal has also been hinted at. Some Chinese scholars suggest that it is up to the US to find ways to incentivise Beijing to engage in arms control.

Evidently then, in all ongoing nuclear deliberations, Chinese analysts place the onus of the future nuclear trajectory of their country on developments that take place in the United States and on their bilateral relations. By following this approach, China makes the US a stakeholder in its nuclear behaviour. This is an intelligent strategy of deflecting criticism for personal actions, or inactions, by abdicating own responsibility for nuclear decisions.
This game is being played between China and the US. Given the American approach to nuclear deterrence, which is premised on large arsenals maintained for first use on hair-trigger readiness, it is not surprising that they conclude that current Chinese articulations are indicative of imminent changes. However, considering the similarity in Chinese and Indian practice of nuclear deterrence, New Delhi should make its own assessment of what these debates signal.

It is inevitable that numbers in the Chinese arsenal will grow owing to its deployment of missiles which can carry multiple warheads. Beijing finds this necessary to defeat American missile defences, and it has the fissile material to undertake this expansion. But it is unlikely that China will alter its NFU or alert levels. Both these postures allow it to maintain a high moral ground on nuclear issues and put others on the defensive. Also, Beijing has adequate confidence in its second-strike capability to effectively signal certainty of nuclear retaliation. It will continue own efforts to buttress these, including through development of asymmetric capabilities. Meanwhile, it will continue to chastise American capability build-up for posing a threat to its nuclear deterrence. This will buy it time to evade participation in nuclear arms control till it wants to engage. And, it will be able to play the victim.

While India needs to watch the developments carefully, it need not rush into making worst-case assumptions about China’s nuclear strategy. In fact, even if China abandons its positions under influence of Western concepts or because it now has the means to do so, it should be no reason for India to blindly follow suit. Fortunately, in nuclear deterrence, weapons need not match piece for piece. India needs to retain its focus on measures that ensure a credible nuclear riposte to cause unacceptable damage. This attention should not dither irrespective of China’s nuclear behaviour.

Manpreet Sethi is Distinguished Fellow, Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi.

 

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India reiterates No First Use nuclear policy, bats for global elimination of nukes

India-'s reiteration of its nuclear doctrine is significant given the situation it has now found itself.

www.deccanchronicle.com

India reiterates No First Use nuclear policy, bats for global elimination of nukes

DECCAN CHRONICLE.
Published Oct 4, 2020, 4:08 am IST
Updated Oct 4, 2020, 4:19 am IST

India's reiteration of its nuclear doctrine is significant given the situation it has now found itself.

Representational image.



New Delhi: India on Saturday reiterated its nuclear doctrine of “No First Use” against nuclear weapon states and non-use against non-nuclear weapon states. India also reiterated its commitment to a universal, verifiable and non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

New Delhi's position was reiterated by Foreign Secretary Harsh Vardhan Shringla at the "High-level Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons".


India's reiteration of its nuclear doctrine is significant, as it comes at a time when the armed forces are on alert at the borders, both at the LoC with Pakistan and the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with China, and also in readiness for any contingency to face a “two-front war”, a euphemism for a hypothetical Sino-Pakistani joint attack on India. Both these neighbours also possess nuclear weapons.

Foreign Secretary Shringla said, “India espouses the policy of "No First Use” against nuclear weapon states and non-use against non-nuclear weapon states. India reiterates its long-standing and unwavering commitment to universal, verifiable and non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament leading to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, in line with the Final Document of the First Special Session of the UN General Assembly on disarmament (SSOD-1).”


"We believe that nuclear disarmament can be achieved through a step-by-step process underwritten by a universal commitment and an agreed multilateral framework. India remains convinced of the need for meaningful dialogue among all States possessing nuclear weapons, for building trust and confidence," he added.

The Foreign Secretary also reminded the international community that India has been tabling an annual resolution in the UNGA on ‘Reducing Nuclear Danger’ since 1998. The annual resolution calls for immediate and urgent steps to reduce the risks of unintentional and accidental use of nuclear weapons, including through de-alerting and de-targeting.

 

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Our ICBMs Are Necessary and No They Are Not on Hair-Trigger Alert

A flurry of opinion pieces have called into question the Air Force’s decision to award the contract to begin building the country’s new intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Fo

www.realcleardefense.com

Our ICBMs Are Necessary and No They Are Not on Hair-Trigger Alert

By Rebeccah Heinrichs
October 03, 2020

A flurry of opinion pieces have called into question the Air Force’s decision to award the contract to begin building the country’s new intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). For example, in an article by William D. Hartung, he asks, "What’s the rush?” My answer to that is: half a century is hardly a rush.

That is how old the current Minuteman IIIs are, and senior officials across Republican and Democratic administrations have said for years that we could no longer extend the life of those old systems without unacceptable risk. Following ten years of study, rigorous analyses, and development, the U.S. will replace the Minuteman III with the Ground-based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD).


One of the most persistent criticisms of GBSD is less about the system and more about ICBMs, generally. Indeed, Mr. Hartung is transparent about his ultimate objective, which is "eliminating land-based nuclear missiles altogether." Critics claim ICBMs put the country at risk of barreling us into a nuclear holocaust because they are on “hair trigger alert.” Mr. Hartung lauds Former Defense Secretary William J. Perry’s warning: “The highest probability of starting a nuclear war is a mistaken launch caused by a false alarm and a rushed decision to launch nuclear-armed ICBMs…”

If we are going to look to Secretary Perry for counsel on this matter, it merits considering his 2009 report, which he co-authored with former Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger. Regarding "hair trigger alert," the two former Secretaries of Defense penned: "This is simply an erroneous characterization of the issue. The alert postures of both countries are, in fact, highly stable. They are subject to multiple layers of control, ensuring clear civilian and indeed presidential decision-making." Secretaries Perry and Schlesinger also stated in this study that “The [ICBM] force is also immediately responsive in a highly controlled manner.”

The beauty in our ICBMs' alert status is that they offer the United States a powerful prompt response option that can hit any target on the other side of the planet. But one should not conclude that an on-alert status means that we are a hair's breadth away from launching ICBMs at an unsuspecting country accidentally or due to the wrong belief that we are under nuclear attack.

The United States fields an extensive array of sensors to provide warning of a massive launch of ICBMs against our missile fields. We have satellites to detect the infra-red plumes, an array of radars to detect inbound missiles, other satellites to detect the movement of mobile ICBMs and other forces, and other intelligence assets. And, realistically, should an enemy decide to launch a nuclear attack against the United States, barring an act of insanity, it would occur within a broader context of tensions. So this hypothetical nightmare scenario, where we would have a believable warning of enemy launch that is, in fact, a false alarm, is highly unlikely.

Strategic Commanders have repeatedly pushed back on the notion of “hair trigger alert” over the years, but Admiral Richard W. Mies said it so well before a Senate committee in 2001 it is worth repeating here at length:

I would also like to challenge the perception that our forces are on "hair-trigger" alert – a characterization routinely used to justify de-alerting proposals. Multiple, stringent procedural and technical safeguards have been in place and will remain in place to guard against accidental or inadvertent launch. Rigorous safeguards exist to ensure the highest levels of nuclear weapon safety, security, reliability, and command and control. Additionally, the policy of the United States is not to rely on "launch on warning." As I stated earlier, our forces are postured such that while we have the capability to respond promptly to any attack, we will never need to rely upon "launch on warning." The diversity, flexibility, and survivability of our strategic forces and our command and control networks are designed to ensure we are never faced with a "use them or lose them" dilemma, and we are always capable of an assured response.

It is no wonder the Obama administration affirmed the triad's salience and eschewed calls to shelve any leg after rigorous analysis. ICBMs continue to provide an indispensable role in bolstering the effectiveness of that deterrent, especially now, when the United States faces adversaries with the ability to pose a strategic threat to the United States and our way of life.

The country’s 400 Minuteman IIIs are housed in silos and dispersed in Montana, Nebraska, and North Dakota. An enemy would need to launch a large-scale attack against the American homeland to diminish this leg of the triad. To quote Secretaries Perry and Schlesinger again: “The ICBM force imposes on a prospective aggressor the need to contemplate attacking only with a very large number of nuclear weapons, substantially depleting its forces while ensuring a devastating response by the United States.” Put another way, our ICBMs significantly raise the bar for any enemy who is even contemplating a strategic attack against the U.S. homeland.

The United States should be looking for ways to further complicate an adversary's calculations, not simplifying them. Without U.S. ICBMs, adversaries could focus their targeting only on the sea and air legs of the triad. Our bombers and submarines operate from a handful of bases. This creates a more than plausible nightmare scenario wherein fewer bases tempt adversaries to contemplate executing a first strike that would have a devastating impact on the survival of the United States.

The challenge for policymakers and strategists is to ensure the triad is credible to deter our adversaries from concluding that a strategic attack is ever worth the cost. A credible nuclear force is one that is reliable, safe, and leverages modern technology to meet the challenges of today and for decades to come. The decision to replace the Minuteman III program with the GBSD program is a welcome move toward this end.


Rebeccah L. Heinrichs is a senior fellow at Hudson Institute where she specializes in nuclear deterrence and missile defense.

 

[jward]

Legitimacy, Consent, and the Search for a Successor
A century after the end of the Ottoman Empire, no successor to Istanbul’s sultan-caliph has emerged
Frederic C. Hof Frederic C. Hof is Diplomat in Residence at Bard College. He served as ambassador and special adviser for transition in Syria under President Barack Obama.
October 4 2020 14:50 EST

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Caliph Riding in Procession Through Constantinople (Photo by George Rinhart/ Corbis via Getty Images/ Newlines.
My academic record as an undergraduate at Georgetown University, many moons ago, is eminently forgettable. Yet there is one classroom-related episode I remember clearly – perhaps the only one.
John Ruedy, later to emerge as a brilliant professor of Middle Eastern history, was paying his dues as a junior member of the faculty, teaching a course in comparative politics. I was focused on Asia. Having enrolled as a cadet in Georgetown’s Army Reserve Officer Training Course, I sensed I would eventually be traveling to Asia, specifically to Vietnam. In this case I proved to be prophetic.

Ruedy traversed many regions in his classes, but it was when he got to the Middle East that he spoke the words that have stuck with me:
“Ladies and gentlemen, it has been 45 years since the passing of the Ottoman Empire. Forty-five years. And yet the question that defines politics in nearly every Arab country is the following: Who, with the passing of Istanbul’s sultan-caliph, is entitled to rule? Who or what replaces the sultan-caliph and the Ottoman system in terms of political legitimacy?”
Two years earlier, in the summer preceding my senior year of high school in 1964, I had lived with a Syrian family in Damascus as an American Field Service “American abroad.” The president of Syria was Amin al-Hafiz, a Baathist general who had been installed in power via a coup the year before.
Mealtime conversations with my Syrian family and friends often centered on the prospective political longevity of al-Hafiz and the Baath Party. Three years earlier, Syria had seceded from the United Arab Republic, an Egypt-dominated union of the two countries. There were rumblings of pro-Nasserist sentiment and plotting within Aleppo-based Syrian military units. Would the Egyptians come back? Was al-Hafiz wielding power himself or merely fronting for others? Would his fellow military officers back him or pluck him from the presidential palace and deposit him in Mezzeh Prison?

Members of government gathering before the putsch led by Salah Jadid. Picture taken in 1963 / Derzi/ AFP via Getty Images/ Newlines.
To a 17-year-old American, daily Damascene gossip about coups was something new and different.
The American political system I knew and experienced seemed anchored in law and rooted in customs meant to transcend the ambitions and whims of politicians. John F. Kennedy had been assassinated only a few months earlier, followed by a seamless, if scrappy, constitutionally mandated transition to Lyndon Johnson. When Johnson took the oath of office, even those of us who had worshipped JFK accepted that the system was working. No one questioned whether LBJ was entitled to serve as president. Even those who opposed his policies or took exception to his persona recognized he had the right to occupy the Oval Office, that his exercise of power was entirely legitimate.

John Ruedy’s words crystallized for an otherwise clueless sophomore what he had witnessed in Damascus two years earlier: political power without the stabilizing benefit of legitimacy. Today, hearing the incumbent US president refuse to commit to a peaceful transition of power if voted out of office, I find myself thinking back to those lessons from Syria. Today, hearing the incumbent US president refuse to commit to a peaceful transition of power if voted out of office, I find myself thinking back to those lessons from Syria.
Had I been sufficiently wise or educated to have asked my Syrian family and friends whether they thought al-Hafiz had the right to serve as president, it might have provoked a question in response:
“What do you mean by ‘right?’ He and his Baathist colleagues seized power a year ago. Like the Egyptians they first supported and then expelled, the Baathists expropriate our property and repress us with an intelligence network that grows like a weed. Our opinions mean nothing to them. Yes, al-Hafiz is the president of the republic. He has the title. But someday he will be gone. We have no say in any of it.”

Compared to some of the leaders in the Arab world today, al-Hafiz was a person of moderation and grace. Still, what legitimacy he had was fragile. He and the system he represented had not replaced the absent sultan-caliph. Syria was in effect a political free-for-all in the mid-1960s. A half-century later, the direst consequences of political illegitimacy would destroy the place.
During the centuries of empire, no Ottoman ruler was without internal opposition. Yet only along the empire’s predominantly Christian edges – Greece and the Balkans – and in the Persian-influenced Shiite east was there substantial sentiment that the sultan-caliph had no right to rule. Good and bad, sober and foolhardy men occupied Topkapi Palace for centuries, running a vast empire through appointed governors who, in turn, ruled through local feudal and religious authorities. Actively seeking the consent of the governed was not part of the Ottoman formula; tacit consent was sufficient. But the rule of the sultan-caliph was an accepted fact of life nearly everywhere, with his right to rule rarely questioned.

Much of the Arab world still searches for the sultan-caliph’s systemic successor. The search was sidetracked by Europeans carving up the empire post-World War I, a diversion continued by those purporting to be leaders during the era of independent states. With rare exceptions, these leaders – Gamal Abdel Nasser and his successors in Egypt, al-Hafiz and his successors in Syria, Abdel Karim al-Qasim and his successors in Iraq, and others elsewhere – have sought legitimacy from a variety of ingredients: nationalism, populism, pseudo-socialism, anti-imperialism, personal charisma, personality cults, political Islam, strategic corruption, and violent repression. Every conceivable ingredient has gone into the mix save the one that counts: the consent of the governed, solicited and respected.
Some would-be successors to the sultan-caliph did better than others in conjuring legitimacy, or at least the appearance thereof.

Nasser’s enormous charisma and his successful 1956 resistance to the tripartite aggression enabled him to mask destructive micromanagement. Until his death in 1970, there existed in Egypt strong consensus that he had the right to rule.
Syria’s Hafiz al-Assad brought real science to strategic corruption, masquerading despotic family and minority sect rule as the modern, secular alternative to Islamist sectarianism. His son Bashar would add superficial modernization and a rhetorical commitment to liberalization to create the appearance of legitimacy before quickly falling back on mass repression and state terror for political survival.
Legitimacy involves agreement that the political system purporting to govern has the right to govern. This is not a matter defined by public opinion about the performance of a specific political leader. Most Americans, according to polling, believe that President Donald Trump is performing poorly. Yet very few deem him to be serving illegally.

Legitimacy is not the same as majoritarianism. In 2012, the Muslim Brotherhood achieved power in Egypt via a sharply contested election. Once in office it deemed itself unconstrained by consensus and unanswerable to the broad consent of the governed. Many Egyptians came quickly to see the Brotherhood as governing illegitimately. Many Egyptians also see the dictatorial successor regime as illegitimate.
Legitimacy – or at least the appearance of it – can be purchased (or rented) by producing outstanding economic results. China is one example. It can also be squandered in places where it exists or appears to exist. For example, no succession of military gains will ever enable Bashar al-Assad to rule legitimately in Syria. His regime has presided over vast war crimes in a still-young 21st century.
In Lebanon, a grasping, corrupt, and thoroughly self-serving political class has utterly liquidated any claim to legitimacy the pseudo-democratic political system may once have had. The Lebanon that came out of the Ottoman Empire and French colonization has lost a sultan but preserved sectarianism and feudalism.
Lebanon’s path to statehood and political legitimacy will require nothing short of a national revolution, one that holds the discredited political class accountable for its thievery and negligence. Accountability will likewise be a prerequisite for legitimate systems to be built in Syria, Iraq, Egypt, and elsewhere.

Ironically, as one surveys the Arab world for legitimate rule, the only positive reviews one hears are often from monarchies: Morocco, Jordan, and Oman. There may be citizens in all three places opposed to governmental policies and personalities, but in all three there is broad agreement that the system enjoys the sanction of law and that officials – including kings – are generally responsive to the wishes of those they govern.
There are also mass Arab political movements dedicated to the proposition that religion is the source of political legitimacy and that models of governance enacted by the Prophet Muhammad and his early successors should be followed.
Yet, when political Islamists in the Middle East have gained power, as with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Hamas in Gaza, they have unfailingly demonstrated the same lesson as politico-religious leaders elsewhere: When human beings purport to implement the will of God, the results – incompetence, intolerance, corruption, and relentless self-service – are often indistinguishable from those produced by people inspired by earthly motives. Claiming to represent the will of God in the politics of mankind is an abomination – yet it never seems to go out of fashion.

Gamal Abdel Nasser gets a kiss from a citizen of Cairo / via Getty Images/ Newlines.
John Ruedy lived until August 2016, some 50 years after delivering the lecture that resonated in the mind of one of his least-talented students, yet he did not live long enough to see a successor for the sultan-caliph. The search for that successor, in a systemic if not personal sense, continues in much of the Arab world. As someone who loved the Arab world, Ruedy was fully appreciative of the region’s greatest asset – not culture, not creativity, not even cuisine, but people. A population overflowing with talent and initiative; women and men whose skill and initiative are routinely repressed by the greed, violence and corruption of rulers; women and men who have often been obliged to emigrate to places like the United States, France, and Britain to be able to live freely, prosper economically, and contribute immeasurably.
But why are places like Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, and Iraq unable to hold their populations and create legitimate political systems featuring consent of the governed and rule of law?

They can. But it will take events much stronger than the Arab Spring to make it happen.
In the 21st century, the successor to the sultan-caliph will not be found through the crudely manipulative, top-down methodologies of the 20th century. Succeeding systems will be found by unleashing the repressed skills of people far more talented than their abysmal political masters. Youth-driven revolutions – ideally peaceful, though that may depend on nonviolence by rulers – will be required.
The peoples of the Arab world will find the answer to Ruedy’s formulation when consent of the governed and rule of law replace official repression and larceny. Until then, other thieves, in the Middle East and beyond it, stand to benefit from official negligence, incompetence, and violence. Western officials should keep in mind the perils of illegitimacy in their dealings with Arab states and leaders. Having a “favorite dictator” in the Arab world does not comport with American national security interests. It has been only a century since the departure of the sultan-caliph. Yet, ideally much less than another century will be required to find his legitimate, systemic replacements.
If Professor Jack Ruedy were still around today, “45 years” would be the only segment of his statement to be updated. Illegitimate governance continues to reign where the sultan once ruled.

TAGS: Egypt, Middle East, Ottoman Empire, Syria, Trump
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Legitimacy, Consent, and the Search for a Successor

A century after the end of the Ottoman Empire, no successor to Istanbul’s sultan-caliph has emerged

newlinesmag.com

 

[jward]

just a lil refresher course, just for fun. .. .

MODERN CHEMICAL WEAPONS-A BASIC PRIMER

De FaaktoMarch 13, 201951.1k

De Faakto Intelligence Research Observatory

Modern Chemical Weapons-A Basic Primer

Methodology-OSINT research

Background & Summary
The U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense defines a chemical weapon as, “A chemical substance…intended for use in military operations to kill, seriously injure, or incapacitate humans (or animals) through its toxicological effects.” Modern Chemical Weapons were first deployed in World War I by German Forces in Ypres, Belgium. By the end of WW I, chemical weapons caused 1.3 million casualties and approximately 100,000 fatalities. Since the introduction of modern Chemical weapons in the Great War, chemicals have been used in WW II, the war in Vietnam, the North Yemen Civil War, the Iran Iraq War, and most recently the War in Syria. The “Geneva Protocol” prohibits the use of chemical and biological weapons in the field of conflict. The protocol does not regulate the production, research or stockpiling of chemical weapons. The protocol does not govern the use of chemical weapons in domestic conflict (Civil War), nor are countries prohibited from retaliating with chemical weapons should an adversary attack with chemical weapons. Weaponized chemicals are classified as, Blister Agents (vesicants), Nerve Agents (Organophosphates), Choking Agents (Pulmonary/Lung), Blood Agents (disrupt oxygen carrying mechanism) and Riot Agents (temporary incapacitation). Chemical weapons are delivered in two phases. The delivery phase carries the agent to the target and the dissemination phase disperses the chemical onto the desired target. Delivery mechanisms include ballistic missiles, air dropped gravity bombs, rockets, artillery shells, aerosol canisters, land mines and mortars. Dissemination is accomplished through explosive detonation, which expel chemical laterally and alternatively aerodynamic dissemination, a non-explosive which deploys the chemical agent through dispersion lines.

Historical Timeline of Modern Chemical Weapons

1914-1918
World War I
Chemical weapons cause

• 3 million Casualties (Science History Institute, 2015)
• Estimated 90,000 to 100,000 fatalities, primarily from phosgene gas

German military uses chemical weapons-22 April 1915

• The first large-scale use of chemical weapons in war at Ypres, Belgium
• Approximately 170 metric tons of chlorine gas
• 5,730 chlorine cylinders are buried along a four-mile stretch of the front
• More than 1,100 people are killed by the attack and 7,000 are injured (Science History Institute, 2015)

1939–1945
World War II

• Poison gases are used in Nazi concentration camps to kill civilians
• Japanese forces in Asia used mustard and Chloroacetophenone (CN) gases and are suspected of using lewisite (Grunden, 2017)

1961–1971
Vietnam War
The United States

• Deploys Agent Orange & Napalm (Science History Institute, 2015)
• Agent Orange-Herbicide Agent- tactical herbicide removes dense foliage, destroys enemies cover, causes a myriad of long term health problems
• Napalm-incendiary firebomb fuel gel mixture weapon (Science How Stuff Works, 2019)

1963–1967
North Yemen Civil War- Coup d’état
Egypt

• Deploys mustard gas and a nerve agent in Yemen (Science History Institute, 2015)
• Nerve agent-likely an organophosphate VX or Sarin (Non-proliferation Review, 2001)

1980s
Iran-Iraq war
Iraq & Iran

• Chemical Weapons are deployed by Iraq against Kurdish minority (Science History Institute, 2015)
• Iran develops a domestic chemical weapons program in response
• Iraq deploys Tabun (organophosphate) & Mustard gas (blistering agent) (CIA, 1988)
• Iran later develops and deploys Mustard gas and a choking agent, likely phosgene (CIA, 1988)

2013
Syrian Civil War
Syrian military and Islamic State deploy

• Nerve agents
• Vesicant-blister agents
• Choking agents
• Syrian Government Forces deploy Sarin nerve agent against civilians-hundreds are killed (Science History Institute, 2015)

Defining Chemical Weapons

The U.S. Army

• The U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense defines a chemical weapon as, “A chemical substance…intended for use in military operations to kill, seriously injure, or incapacitate humans (or animals) through its toxicological effects”

The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

• “A Chemical Weapon is a chemical used to cause intentional death or harm through its toxic properties. Munitions, devices and other equipment specifically designed to weaponize toxic chemicals also fall under the definition of chemical weapons”

The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons further breaks chemical weapons into 3 parts

Toxic chemicals and their precursors

• Toxic chemicals are defined as ‘any chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals’
• This includes all such chemicals, regardless of their origin or method of production, and regardless of whether they are produced in facilities, in munitions or elsewhere
• Precursors are chemicals that are used for the production of toxic chemicals

Munitions or devices

• Any munitions or devices specifically designed to inflict harm or cause death through the release of toxic chemicals
• Among these could be mortars, artillery shells, missiles, bombs, mines or spray tanks

Equipment ‘directly in connection’ with munitions and devices

• Any equipment specifically designed for use ‘directly in connection’ with the employment of the munitions and devices identified as chemical weapons

Chemical Weapons Conventions
The Geneva Protocol

• Signed in 1925, the Geneva Protocol was drafted and signed at the Conference for the Supervision of the International Trade in Arms and Ammunition
• Geneva Protocol prohibits the use of chemical and biological weapons in the field of conflict
• The Geneva Protocol does not regulate the production, research or stockpiling of these weapons
• Nations reserve the right to retaliate with chemical weapons should it be subject to an adversarial chemical attack
• The Geneva Protocol does not regulate the use of chemical weapons for internal conflicts
• Interest in verifiable elimination of existing stockpiles of chemical weapons fuelled the push for the more robust Chemical Weapons Convention in 1993 (Arms Control Association, 2019)

The Chemical Weapons Convention
The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) requires each state party to,

• Declare and destroy all the chemical weapons (CW) and CW production facilities it possesses, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, as well as any CW it abandoned on the territory of another state (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2019)
• The CWC was opened for signature on 13 January 1993, and entered into force on 29 April 1997

Classifications of Chemical Weapons

• Blister Agents or Vesicants
• Nerve Agents
• Choking Agents
• Blood Agents
• Riot Control Agents (classified as chemical weapon if used in warfare)

Blister Agents & Vesicants

• Blister agents (or vesicants) are chemical agents that cause victims to develop burns or blisters (vesicles) on their skin, as well as eyes, lungs, and airway irritation
• Although not usually fatal, exposure can result in severe blistering and blindness
• Death, if it occurs, results from neurological factors or massive airway debilitation (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2019)

Exposure to vesicants cause

• Skin erythema (redness & Swelling)
• Blistering
• Respiratory symptoms-cough, shortness of breath, pneumonitis, acute lung injury
• Burns skin, mucous membranes and eyes; blisters skin, windpipe, and lungs
• Ocular (eyes) Burns & Conjunctivitis (inflammation of the conjunctiva & sclera of the eye)
• Nausea, vomiting & gastrointestinal symptoms (CDC, 2019)
• Bone marrow suppression resulting in reduced red blood cells, white blood cells & platelets

Chemical Blister Agents & Vesicants

• Lewisite Nitrogen Mustard
• Phosgene Oxime (CX)
• Sulphur Mustard (mustard gas)

Nerve Agents (Organophosphates)

• Nerve agents (anticholinesterase) inhibit cholinesterase enzymes
• The cholinesterase enzymes are responsible for the hydrolysis of acetylcholine, a chemical neurotransmitter
• This inhibition creates an accumulation of acetylcholine at cholinergic synapse that leads to over-stimulation and transmission of nerve impulse (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2019)

Exposure to nerve agents (organophosphates) causes cholinergic syndrome

• Excess respiratory and oral secretions
• Diarrhea and vomiting
• Diaphoresis
• Convulsions (seizures)
• Altered mental status
• Miosis (pinpoint pupils)
• Bradycardia (heart rate less then 60)
• Tachycardia (heart rate greater then 100)
• Mydriasis (blown pupils)
• Hypertension
• Fasciculation’s (muscle twitches)
• Generalized weakness
• Paralysis
• Respiratory arrest
• Death (CDC, 2019)

Nerve Agents –Organophosphates
G agents

• Sarin (GB)
• Soman (GD)
• Tabun (GA)

V agents

• VX (CDC, 2019)

Choking Agents
(May also be known as Lung or Pulmonary Agents)

• Choking agents attack lung tissue when inhaled, leading to respiratory failure
• Choking agents cannot be absorbed through the skin and generally do not cause external injuries (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2019)

Exposure to choking agents causes

• Severe irritation or swelling of the respiratory tract
• Irritation occurs in lining of the nose, throat, and lungs (CDC, 2019)
• Choking agents act on lung alveoli to produce acute pulmonary edema (fluid on lungs)

Chemical Choking Agents

• Ammonia
• Bromine (CA)
• Chlorine (CL)
• Hydrogen chloride
• Methyl bromide
• Methyl isocyanate
• Osmium tetroxide
• Phosgene
• Diphosgene (DP)
• Phosgene (CG)
• Phosphine
• Phosphorus, elemental, white or yellow
• Sulfuryl fluoride (CDC, 2019)

Blood Agents

• Blood agents are chemical agents that enter the victim’s blood and disrupt the body’s use of oxygen (Arms Control Association, 2019)

Exposure to blood agents

• Arsenic-based blood agents cause red blood cells to burst
• Cyanide-based blood agents disrupt cellular processing of oxygen
• At high doses, death from cyanide poisoning occurs within minutes (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2019)

Blood Agents

• Arsine (SA)
• Carbon Monoxide
• Sodium monofluoroacetate (compound 1080)
• Cyanide– Cyanogen chloride (CK) – Hydrogen cyanide (AC) – Potassium cyanide (KCN) – Sodium cyanide (NaCN)

Riot Control Agents

• Riot control agents, such as tear gas, are considered chemical weapons if used as a method of warfare
• States can legitimately possess riot control agents and use them for domestic law enforcement purposes
• States that are members of the Chemical Weapons Convention must declare what type of riot agents they possess (Arms Control Association, 2019)

Exposure to riot control agents cause

• Temporary incapacitation of a person
• Irritation to the eyes, mouth, throat, lungs, and skin
• Tears, coughing
• Constricts airway
• Nausea and vomiting (CDC, 2019)

Riot Agents

• Tear Gas (CS)
• Pepper Spray (OC)
• Chloroacetophenone (CN)
• Chlorobenzylidenemalononitrile (CS)
• Chloropicrin (PS)
• Bromobenzylcyanide (CA)
• Dibenzoxazepine (CR) (CDC, 2019)

Chemical Weapon Delivery
There are two phases to a chemical weapon attack (Arms Control Association, 2019)

1. Delivery- launching of the rocket, bomb, or artillery shell
2. Dissemination- dispersal of the chemical agent from the weapon

Chemical Weapons Delivery Mechanisms

• Ballistic missiles
• Air dropped gravity bombs
• Rockets
• Artillery shells
• Aerosol canisters
• Land mines
• Mortars (Arms Control Association, 2019)

How Chemical Weapons Delivery Mechanisms Function

• Artillery shells-dispersion occurs through an explosive charge that expels the chemical agent laterally (Arms Control Association, 2019)
• Air delivered systems-gravity bombs, spray tank, or rockets
• Ballistic missiles-airburst to disperse chemical agents over a broad area
• Cruise missiles-can disperse chemical agents in a gradual and controlled fashion
• Unmanned Aerial Vehicles-are ideal platforms for slower dissemination of chemicals

Dissemination

• Effectiveness is determined by dissemination methods
• Explosive dissemination-expels the chemical laterally
• Aerodynamic dissemination-non explosive delivery mechanism that deploys the chemical agent through dispersion lines (Arms Control Association, 2019)

Conclusion & Recommendations
Chemical weapons are a threat to all nation states. Chemical weapons conventions are, to some extent an effective policing mechanism, but have no jurisdiction over non-signatory nations or stateless actors. Nations that are signatory to chemical conventions are sanctioned to; research, develop and stockpile chemical weapons. Despots, Terrorists and Failed States pose considerable risk for the deployment of chemical weapons. Using strategic propaganda an entity can stage a chemical weapons attack; disguise the origin of chemical, and assign blame to adversarial forces. This allows the entity to retaliate under the pretext of justifiable cause. Basic chemical weapons are simple to manufacture, and industrial chemicals are impossible to monitor and control. All professional militaries and government agencies responsible for the preparation and counter measures of chemical warfare should prudently, invest in defensive and or offensive chemical weapons programs that intelligently balance adversarial risk and deterrence.



Resources
A Brief History of Chemical War- SARAH EVERTS-Science History Institute (2015) A Brief History of Chemical War
No Retaliation in Kind: Japanese Chemical Warfare Policy in World War II-W.E. Grunden- Springer, Cham (2017) No Retaliation in Kind: Japanese Chemical Warfare Policy in World War II
How Napalm Works-Jacob Silverman-Science How Stuff Works (2019) How Napalm Works
Chemical & Biological Weapons in Egypt-Dany Shoham-Non-proliferation Review (1998) https://www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/npr/shoham53.pdf
Impact and Implications of Chemical Weapons Use in the Iran Iraq War-Central Intelligence Agency-Internal Memorandum-Declassified (1988) https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0001079783.pdf
What is a Chemical Weapon? – Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (2019) What is a Chemical Weapon?
Chemical-warfare Agents: An Overview U.S. ARMY MEDICAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF CHEMICAL DEFENSE CHEMICAL CASUALTY CARE DIVISION-U.S. Government-U.S. Army (ND) https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=1100
Chemical Weapons FAQ-Factsheets & Briefs-Arms Control Association (2018) Chemical Weapons: Frequently Asked Questions | Arms Control Association
Glossary-James Martin Center for Non-proliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies-Nuclear Threat Initiative (2019) Glossary | Learn | NTI
Case Definition: Vesicant (Mustards, Dimethyl Sulfate, and Lewisite)-Center for Disease Control & Prevention-U.S. Government (2019) Case Definition: Vesicant (Mustards, Dimethyl Sulfate, and Lewisite) | CDC Emergency Preparedness & Response
Case Definition: Nerve Agents or Organophosphates- Center for Disease Control & Prevention-U.S. Government (2019) CDC | Case Definition: Nerve Agent Poisoning
Vesicants- Center for Disease Control & Prevention-U.S. Government (2019) CDC Blister Agents/Vesicants | Emergency Preparedness & Response
Choking Agents- Center for Disease Control & Prevention-U.S. Government (2019) CDC Pulmonary Agents | Emergency Preparedness & Response
Blood Agents- Center for Disease Control & Prevention-U.S. Government (2019) CDC Blood Agents | Emergency Preparedness & Response
Riot Control Agent- Center for Disease Control & Prevention-U.S. Government (2019) CDC Riot Control Agents | Public Health Emergency Preparedness & Response
posted for fair use

MODERN CHEMICAL WEAPONS-A BASIC PRIMER - De Faakto

De Faakto Intelligence Research Observatory Modern Chemical Weapons-A Basic Primer Methodology-OSINT research Background & Summary The U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense defines a chemical weapon as, “A chemical substance…intended for use in military operations to...

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[jward]

The tank is dead. Long live the tank.
by Jon Hawkes, Sam Cranny-Evans and Mark CazaletOctober 1, 2020

Experimental Feature: Audio Read Version

From the day that the concept of a tank was introduced there has been debate about the utility of these vehicles. Hard to build, difficult to man and drive, and ultimately vulnerable once deployed, tanks have never been the perfect package that they externally represent. The late Professor Ogorkiewicz wrote in his 2016 book Tanks, of how Lieutenant Colonel J. F. C. Fuller came to realise the limits of tanks during the 1917 Ypres offensive.1 And, following that war, only Britain and France continued to see utility in the tank for close to a decade, before the Soviet Union began to enter the field.2

The contemporary discussion around the abiding value of the tank is not therefore new, however the context and the nature of the modern battlefield has changed considerably since 1916, and this in turn warrants a different discussion around the value of the tank. To be clear, this article is intended to initiate discussion, it is a reflection of those issues that must be considered when balancing forces. There is value to any asset deployed to the battlefield, from an entrenching shovel to aircraft carriers, providing that they are used properly and adequately supported.

We have chosen three select areas, which all influence the utility of tanks; the Totality of the Battlefield (TotB), the totality of technology, and the totality of society. Much of this discussion should be regarded as a “Red Team Exercise”, a deliberate attempt to pull apart entrenched thinking. And, while it is framed against the current climate that prevails within the British Army, it should be understood that these considerations will apply in some measure to every single force in the world.

Part 1: The Totality of the battlefield
The modern battlespace has much in common with those of the Second World War; if tanks are caught in the open by aerial or artillery assets, they are unlikely to survive as the 12th SS Hitlerjugend Division found during the 1944 Allied Operation ‘Charnwood’ to capture Caen.3 This point has been proven time and again; the Iran-Iraq War, Operation ‘Desert Storm’, Grozny, Zelenopillya, and now Idlib, have all demonstrated that the tank has its limits.
Russian tactics in Ukraine involved the integration of Orlan-10 UAVs into a reconnaissance-fire complex, whereby the UAVs were paired with Soviet-era 2S1 Gvozdika howitzers.4 In a very short space of time this complex was able to inflict massive damage on Ukrainian forces, including the destruction of four AN/TPQ-48 radars, 37 vehicles, a munitions depot and 310 Ukrainian personnel.5 Turkish forces inflicted heavy losses on the Syrian Army during fighting around Idlib in February 2020 using missiles fired from the Baryaktar TB2 UAV, and coordinated artillery strikes.6 Turkey’s Defence Minister, Hulusi Akar, claimed that Operation ‘Spring Shield’, had accounted for the deaths of 2,200 Syrian troops, 103 tanks, six air defence systems and 72 howitzers, according to a 1 March report in the Washington Post.7

The key to tactical success in both conflicts was not any specific piece of equipment, it certainly was not a tank; it was the speed and organization of a complete force, coming together at the right moment with the right information to influence the battlefield.
In Ukraine, during the 2014 seizure of the Crimean Peninsula, the Russian forces were numerically outnumbered, but used speed and surprise to effectively defeat the Ukrainian forces guarding the peninsula, according to the 2017 paper from the RAND Corporation titled Lessons from Russia’s Operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine.8 The authors of that paper note that “Russia’s military demonstrated it could put national leadership decisions into effect almost immediately, implementing operational planning quickly and without major errors.”9 These examples serve to illustrate that a conflict can be decided at a strategic level through rapid and aggressive action. There is certainly a place for the tank within this scenario, however the most important element of all operations was the organization of the forces involved, and the speed with which they acted.

What does this mean for the British Army and its tanks? Put very simply, a discussion around the enduring value of the tank for the British Army in any scenario neglects, or refuses, to address the fact that success in a conflict is the result of the totality of the battlefield. This means that the British Army, and the armed forces as a whole, must work together to ensure that they are able to present a cohesive and organized force that can influence the outcome. A myopic focus on the tank seems to ignore inconvenient truths, and usually rests rather heavily on the tiresome adage that begins “a tank is like a dinner jacket…”
For example, had the Ukrainian forces on Crimea had clear information about Russian intentions, and the supporting political will to act, it is unlikely that the Russians would have achieved such an easy success. Or, if the Syrian forces in Idlib were properly supported by air defence assets, and had different TTPs, the Baryaktar TB2 may have had less of an effect. The presence of tanks in both conflicts had no more bearing on the outcome than the temperature at the time. It follows that first and foremost, every asset that an army puts into the field should be prepared to work together, and the political will should exist to allow them to do so.

Furthermore, any conflict whereby the British Army faces a developed opponent like Russia will likely include the prodigious use of precision guided munitions during the opening stages of the conflict, as discussed by Michael Kofman in a 2019 War on the Rocks article.10 Russia, he avers, is aware of the technological disadvantages between its forces and NATO’s, and has no intention of fighting a war where those disadvantages can be brought to the fore. The goal, he states, is either functional defeat of an opponent as a military system, or physical annihilation.11 In real terms this means the destruction of critical infrastructure and the upper echelons of NATO’s command and control system. In effect, if the British Army is to plan for war with Russia, it needs to ensure that it is well-protected from the top down, and that robust systems are in place to ensure its forces can operate at speed, and possibly without the vital information that they have traditionally relied upon.

In a broader sense, the success of any sub-peer conflicts will likely hinge on the UK’s ability to organise and deploy an effective fighting force at short notice. Fighting in Mosul has shown that an insurgent force can maul and disrupt an organised opponent if given the space and time to prepare.12 Tanks do have an inherent value in such conflicts, providing they can reach the battlespace in a timely manner.
If this reasoning holds, a debate needs to be had about whether or not the British armed forces as a whole, have the required capabilities to meet the challenges that might be demanded of them, before any debate around the value of tanks can ensue.

Part 2: The Totality of technology
Beyond the totality of the battlefield aspect, there are technological limitations that suggest the tank is no longer the apex predator. In addition, significant shortcomings reduce many of its former strengths to a point where its utility could be questioned in contrast with competing capabilities.
The purpose of a tank is to utilise its unique technologically enabled strengths of protection, firepower and mobility to deliver aggressive, mobile, shock action to exploit the enemy’s loss of initiative in response to the tank’s effects. Of these strengths, firepower has continued to improve and may see the adoption of 130 mm guns and integrated ATGMs, however mobility and protection are falling behind, leaving the tank vulnerable.
It is widely agreed that the future character of warfare will be dominated by complex terrain, especially urban environments.13 These environments, more so than any other, result in AFVs being subjected to 360 degree, all elevation attacks rather than the classical frontal arc attacks of anticipated engagements in the 20th century.

 

[jward]

continued...

As such, tanks need all-aspect protection to ensure survival, however, contemporary technologies are approaching the limits of what is possible in physically protecting platforms. Disruptive breakthrough solutions are either unable to assure full spectrum protection or not yet mature enough to field. The result is that the tank is by no means an apex predator, able to take at least a single hit from any relevant threat and keep fighting to ensure delivery of accompanying infantry onto the objective and support them there.
Even with increased armour packages, tanks will become more vulnerable to the near horizon threat landscape, which includes larger 130+ mm guns and new ATGMs with more than 1,500 mm of penetration.14 Complex situational awareness and communication systems, also an essential element of survivability, remain vulnerable to blast/fragmentation damage, and contemporary ATGMs and long rod APFSDS penetrators exceed protection capabilities outside the frontal arc and in some cases within it. ATGMs, and other projectiles utilising a shaped charge effect to defeat armour, can also be directed into a top attack profile, striking the MBT at its weakest point with no practical means of defence.
Active Protection Systems (APS) have been hailed as a partial solution to this problem – they offer a credible and operationally proven hard counter to missiles and rockets, defeating them away from the vehicle and creating the option to either reduce the volume of armour or repurpose it to specifically face the threat of APFSDS projectiles.
However no user has made the bold step to reduce protection in order to rely on an APS to exclusively defend the platform against specific threat types, instead fitting them as additional assets. This is in large part because APS remains unable to defeat several threats including APFSDS penetrators and top attack missiles.15 Political considerations also render the decision to deliberately remove physical protection from a vehicle unpalatable, owing to the risk of culpability if a vehicle is destroyed that might not have been, had the legacy armour remained.

Novel armour technologies such as electric reactive armour, or active camouflage in the visual, near visual and infrared spectrums could change the paradigm.16 In both cases, solutions have been developed and posed but remain impractical and, as with APS, have been viewed as additional capabilities at further weight and size cost, rather than alternatives to enable reduced weights.
A result of this armour induced weight increase has been a loss of trafficability and tactical mobility. Most contemporary MBTs have gained 10-20 tonnes17 over their service lives without commensurate engine and running gear upgrades, which has led to reductions in their comparative mobility over challenging terrain.18 The physics of terramechanics are finite, and with the same power and surface contact area but increased weight, surface pressure is increased, power-to-weight ratio is reduced and overall tractive performance is lowered. A loss of mobility in this way means a reduction in terrain access, making a force’s movements easier to predict, and reducing its agility in combat.19

More broadly, heavier vehicles experience increased maintenance requirements and mechanical failures, thus requiring larger logistical footprints to project and support.20 Deploying such a force becomes slower and harder with limited strategic enabling resources, as well as being easier to predict and plan against. The consequence of this has been borne out in recent analytical wargames, where movements of major combat elements that were readily predicted saw entire formations destroyed by peer/peer+ fires before they could make forming up points. It was assessed that had those forces been lighter and possessed greater terrain access, this would not have been the case.
All of this is not to say that the tank is technologically defunct, it is to say that the totality of tank technology does not possess the overmatch of protection and mobility it once held. Without breakthrough technologies, the tank’s utility becomes more uncertain in contrast with compelling alternatives in lighter weight classes that are no more or less overmatched but offer greater mobility and reduced logistical tails. Establishing ways to increase protection at reduced weight, whether physical or with disruptive technologies in the outer layers of the survivability onion, are critical to returning the tank to the apex position in the battlefield. Without them, questions will continue to remain over its tactical utility.

Part 3: The totality of society
The key problem is not just that the battlefield has changed, but society and economies have changed also. The UK no longer commands a globe-spanning empire enabling an expensive technologically advanced standing army, instead it spends around 2% of a gradually shrinking GDP on defence. On top of this there is a greater reliance on foreign designs and expertise, while large portions of the UK’s defence industrial base have ossified or decayed during the late 1980s and early 1990s. This is coupled with increasing platform complexity, which has driven up costs.
Politically, there is little public appetite for increasing defence spending. Polling varies depending on the particular conflict,21 but generally speaking a growing portion of the British public opposes kinetic interventions 2223 preferring humanitarian responses instead. There is also a strong public demand for improving social services in the wake of a decade of austerity, the economic shocks of COVID-19, and the UK’s exit from the EU. As such, increases to defence spending are less popular with the public than competing priorities such as schools, hospitals, and policing. In recent YouGov polling, defence ranked second after foreign aid in answer to the question “What sector is the UK government spending too much on?”24

This raises the question of priorities, and which assets will serve the British Army best going forwards. In the latter portion of the 20th century and the start of the 21st century, the UK primarily fought in relatively low-intensity conflicts against inferior opposing forces, and was usually backed by its allies. With the partial exception of the first Gulf War, tanks have not been a prominent component of these conflicts, and their retention has come with an opportunity cost, as the money saved by scrapping the tanks could have been put toward more mission-flexible and generally useful platforms such as a modern IFV.
The UK’s tank design philosophy has focused on survivability, which has also increased the cost and weight of the vehicles. This is exemplified with the Challenger 2 Theatre Entry Standard TELIC (TEST), weighing 74.8 tonnes25, notably heavier than any NATO ally MBT. However, modern ATGMs such as Kornet have provided an increase in lethality which passive armour has been unable to match.26 This results in a low cost-effectiveness for vehicles such as Challenger 2, which remain vulnerable to modern ATGMs in spite of their weight. Equipping the vehicles with hard-kill active protection systems is a partial solution to modern ATGMs, but this further increases the cost and complexity of the vehicles. Any cost increases make the tank more expensive to field in meaningful quantities, and adds to the already considerable logistics train required to deploy them, further straining the UK’s limited defence budget.

Lastly, falling recruitment in the UK means that the Army must heavily prioritise sending new recruits to maintain the capabilities which are the most useful within the likely conflict scenarios.27 In most African or Middle Eastern conflict scenarios, tanks cannot be deployed quickly enough to influence the outcome, as Operation ‘Serval’ and the Russian intervention in Syria have shown. In the scenario of conflict with Russia, it is unlikely that the success or failure of the endeavour will hinge on the performance of 200 British tanks. Therefore, maintaining a tank fleet that is larger than required amid low recruitment also creates an opportunity cost in personnel. Manning armoured regiments means that other regiments, that are better suited to likely conflict scenarios, may become under-manned.
At present, the UK has a tank fleet that is too expensive to buy or maintain in sufficient quantities to make a difference against a peer/peer+ opponent such as Russia, is difficult to deploy anywhere quickly, and still fairly vulnerable to modern anti-tank weapons. Furthermore, it becomes increasingly difficult to justify the cost-efficiency of the tank within the UK’s limited budget, recruitment figures, and range of realistic or likely combat missions.

Some tanks are deader than others
Is the tank dead? No. It remains a credible platform with strong application in many scenarios and for many users. For Russia in particular, the tank is far from dead. In many likely conflict scenarios Russia’s tanks will not have to deploy very far from its borders, and in cases where they do such as Syria, the lighter weight of Russian Tanks, makes these deployments less of a logistical burden. Countries close to Russia such as Poland, may need tanks because they are a viable means of defeating other tanks, and in the most likely threat scenarios the Russians will come to them, so deploying over distance is unnecessary.
It could be argued that modern IFVs are a credible alternative to the MBT for the UK. Many modern examples such as the CV90 Mk IV, and the Kurgants-25 with Epokha turret demonstrate a good balance of firepower and have utility in more scenarios than MBTs.28 The typical armament of modern IFVs including a cannon, machine guns and ATGMs enables the engagement of most targets that the vehicle is likely to encounter, including armour, and the vehicle is equally suited to dealing with infantry. The IFV’s lighter weight makes it less of a logistical burden and enables more rapid deployment to developing conflicts, and the attendant infantry dismounts offer a greater range of tactical possibilities than a tank’s heavy weaponry. In sum, the above is intended to indicate some of the factors that decide whether or not the tank is useful. It shows that the debate is not, and cannot be binary, nor is it limited to comparing gun and armour values and deciding a winner. There are many questions to be considered and answered that range from analysis of whether or not tanks are generally suitable in their current form, to whether or not they are the best value option for the UK in its present and future financial positions.

The tank is dead. Long live the tank. » Wavell Room

 

[jward]

US Army To Dissolve Rapid Equipping Force, Asymmetric Warfare Group
It’s part of the service’s shift from counterinsurgency to near-peer fights, but some observers are concerned
By Patrick Tucker

Technology Editor
October 2, 2020

The U.S. Army on Friday announced that it will shutter the Asymmetric Warfare Group and the Rapid Equipping Force, two organizations created to speed information and gear to troops fighting insurgents and adversaries in Afghanistan and Iraq.
The service established the Asymmetric Warfare Group, or ASG, in 2006 out of Fort Meade in Maryland to “rapidly transfer current threat-based observations and solutions (TTPs) to tactical and operational Army commanders in order to defeat emerging asymmetric threats,” according to the group’s website. An operational unit of Training and Doctrine Command, AWG was seen as a means to quickly get intelligence about rapidly-changing insurgent tactics and weapons to soldiers downrange, at the “operational point of need.”

The Army stood up the Rapid Equipping Force, or REF, in 2002 at Fort Belvoir as a sort of workaround to the obstacles and delays that were common in the buying and distribution of vital equipment related to counterterrorism and counter-insurgency. The organization sought to provide “rapid solutions to problems Soldiers in Afghanistan encountered while conducting their mission. Such solutions can be developed in-house by REF engineers, and fielded quickly to Soldiers using commercial off-the-shelf or government-created technology,” according to a 2014 Army story. The story described the REF as “something the service needs for the long-term.”

But amid the Pentagon’s shift from the counterinsurgency operations that consumed most of its efforts in the decades following the 9/11 attacks, the Army in 2017 established the Army Futures Command in Austin, Texas, to develop next-generation technology that can help in fights against near-peer competitors such as China and Russia.
But there are still soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan, even their numbers are shrinking. That makes the Army’s announcement “concerning,” according to Andrew Hunter, a senior fellow in the International Security Program and director of the Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

“There is still a need in the Army for being able to rapidly respond to new and emerging threats,” Hunter told Defense One in a message. “In some ways now more than ever, given the stepped-up efforts by adversaries to attack U.S. forces through unconventional means. And the Army has been DoD's primary engine for executing rapid acquisition.
“I think the key here is what organizations are picking up the mission to do this and whether they are resourced for it. However, the tenor of the statement is not encouraging on this count since it suggests that resources from the REF and AWG are begin shifted to other purposes.”
Retired Army lieutenant general Mike Nagata, who was the director of strategy for the National Counterterrorism Center from 2016 to 2019 and commanded Special Operations Command Central before that, said “'Asymmetry in warfare' and the need for 'rapid fielding of new capabilities' are as important today as they have ever been, and I personally think even moreso given the rapidly increasing complexity of our National Security challenges. What will take the place of both the AWG and the REF? If they are being replaced by other organizations or efforts that will be better, faster, and more effective, so much the better. If not… then it begs the question, 'why?'"

The groups will be fully dissolved by Sept. 30, 2021, the Army said in a Friday press release. “All lessons learned will be maintained by the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center (CAC), via the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), Centers of Excellence (COEs), and other TRADOC enterprise stakeholders,” it said

posted for fair use

US Army To Dissolve Rapid Equipping Force, Asymmetric Warfare Group

It’s part of the service’s shift from counterinsurgency to near-peer fights, but some observers are concerned.

www.defenseone.com

 

[jward]

Yemen's war shifts focus to Marib, thousands of displaced at risk
By Reuters Staff
5 Min Read

MARIB, Yemen (Reuters) - In Yemen’s gas-rich region of Marib, fighters loyal to the Saudi-backed government recited Koranic verses before launching a hail of mortar and machine gun fire towards rocky mountains, in a desperate bid to push back Houthi forces.

A truck drives past the Safer oil refinery in Marib, Yemen September 30, 2020. REUTERS/Ali Owidha
The commanding officer peered through his binoculars at the dust and plumes of black smoke thrown up by the firing, aimed at a group of elusive enemy Houthi snipers.
A few dozen kilometres (miles) away, hundreds of displaced civilians in makeshift camps waited for water, food and medicine from humanitarian groups - a further sign that despite United Nations peace efforts, the near six-year-old war grinds on.

“We have more than 1,500 families in this camp and they already moved three times ... because the fighting keeps following them,” said Mohsen Mushalla, director of al-Sowaida camp some 15 km from Marib city.
“They don’t have water, electricity, a hospital and the nearest town is 10 km away. Just bringing water is enough hardship,” Mushalla added.

Fighting has raged for months in Marib, the last stronghold of the internationally recognised government.
It was ousted from power in the capital, Sanaa, in late 2014 by the Iran-aligned Houthi movement, prompting a Saudi-led coalition to intervene.
The war, which has caused the world’s worst humanitarian crisis, has been in stalemate for years. The government of President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi has also fought separatists in the south who seek independence.

CEASEFIRE REMAINS ELUSIVE
Some diplomats and experts say that a Houthi victory in Marib, which would hand the group complete control of the northern half of Yemen, could have “ripple effects” on the conflict across Yemen and scupper U.N. efforts to secure a nationwide ceasefire.
Houthi forces have opened three frontlines in Marib region, advancing in recent months from the northern district of Madghal, the southern town of Rahabah and from the west in Sarwah.


Slideshow ( 4 images )
The group has seized six districts and large parts of Sarwah, which lies 80 km from Marib city - the last line of defence before Yemen’s biggest gas and oil fields. But progress has slowed and victory is not guaranteed.

“Marib is a military operation for both sides but it is a pressure tool for the Houthis on the negotiating table,” said a diplomat involved in the talks.
“Luckily, the fighting has slowed down over the last two weeks, thanks to the Houthi-Saudi indirect talks and because the battle has been exhausting for both sides.”
Saudi Arabia and the Houthis began back-channel talks last year.
The Saudi-led coalition and Houthi officials did not immediately respond to requests for comment on the status of fighting in Marib or the broader conflict.


SWEEPING DESERT LANDSCAPES
The violence has escalated since U.N. Special Envoy to Yemen Martin Griffiths pressed both parties to agree on a ceasefire deal that would pave the way for broader negotiations to end the war that has killed more than 100,000 people.

Earlier this month, Griffiths told the 15-member U.N. Security Council that he sent an advanced draft of the agreement to the parties, and warned the international community not to underestimate the political importance of Marib.
The fighting in Marib has displaced nearly a million people, the U.N. said, and threatens around 750,000 refugees who have settled in the city since the war started in 2014.
“We know that any intensification of the conflict will put them (displaced civilians) at extreme risk and we’re very worried that many of the people who live in Marib city will themselves become displaced by the conflict,” Lise Grande, U.N. Humanitarian Coordinator for Yemen, told Reuters.


In Marib city, giant billboards expressed support for President Hadi, while the red, white and black national colours flew in crowded streets. Vendors offered grilled corn on the cob.
“I fled the fighting in Aden, this city hosts refugees from all over Yemen ... we call on the international community to stop missile strikes on the city as only refugees and children suffer from them,” said Nermeen al-Hashidi, a Marib resident.
In al-Sowaida camp, tents are set amid the towering hills of the desert, and children walk barefoot while others drink water directly from big white cisterns left in the fierce heat.
“I have a wife and five children living inside this tent,” said Mohamad Abdullah Qassim, a refugee.

“The international organisations have provided us with it, but I’m not sure that they are very helpful. Other tents burned in a big fire next to us.”
Additional reporting by Mohamed Ghobari in Aden and Jacob Greaves and Tarek Fahmy in Dubai; Writing by Aziz El Yaakoubi; Editing by Mike Collett-White
Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

posted for fair use

Yemen's war shifts focus to Marib, thousands of displaced at risk

In Yemen's gas-rich region of Marib, fighters loyal to the Saudi-backed government recited Koranic verses before launching a hail of mortar and machine gun fire towards rocky mountains, in a desperate bid to push back Houthi forces.

www.reuters.com

 

[Zagdid]

The Air Force is doing live-fire testing with its new helicopter, the Jolly Green II

The goal of the ground testing was to verify the weapons' functionality and accuracy and to demonstrate they are safe to employ operationally.

www.businessinsider.com

The Air Force is doing live-fire testing with its new helicopter, the Jolly Green II
Samuel King, US Air Force
Sep 28, 2020, 12:36 PM

An HH-60W Jolly Green II, foreground, and an AH-64 Apache at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, May 19, 2020. US Air Force/Samuel King Jr.

Deep within Eglin's range, rapid, powerful gunfire reverberated across the expanse beginning August 17. Live-fire testing began for the HH-60W Jolly Green II's three primary weapons.

The goal of the ground testing was to verify the weapons systems functionality, accuracy, and to demonstrate the guns are safe to employ operationally. The 413th Flight Test Squadron testers and their partners performed the testing over a three-week period.

The three weapons tested were: the GAU-2, a 7.62 mm Gatling gun with a 3,000 rounds per minute fire rate, the GAU-18, a .50 caliber legacy machine gun with a 650-800 round fire rate, and the GAU-21, a .50 caliber newly designed machine gun with a 950-1100 round fire rate.

"It was great to see all the team's planning and hard work finally pay off to get us to execution and gather this initial live-fire data," said Maj. Christopher Hull, 413th FLTS chief test engineer.

An HH-60W Jolly Green II conducts its first aerial refueling ever with an HC-130J tanker over southern Alabama, August 5, 2020. US Air Force/Master Sgt. Tristan McIntire

The first HH-60W built, commonly referred to as Whiskey 1 within the unit, was used for the ground testing.
Whiskey 1 contains specialized test instrumentation that allows, aircraft manufacturer, Sikorsky, to monitor hundreds of parameters during the flights and envelope expansion testing. That specialized instrumentation allowed the testers to record the stress and strains in the aircraft caused by firing the weapons.

The helicopter's guns can rotate independently providing an almost 360-degree firing arc. This created a unique challenge for the squadron's engineers to develop test and safety plans not typically encountered with fixed wing aircraft.
Details such as blade rotation, human factors and instrumentation were examined and controlled for before the actual testing could begin according to Hull.

The Jolly Green's aircrew not only operated the weapons, they were part of the evaluation as well. The crew wore special instrumentation that measured the weapon's blast effects on their bodies.

That data is part of a larger DOD study to better understand the effects of weapon blast on the human body, specifically as it relates to traumatic brain injury. The goal is to reduce injuries to service members who operate such weapons.

An HH-60W Jolly Green II at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, May 19, 2020. US Air Force/Samuel King Jr.

The ground testing phase is just the first step in the evaluation of the weapons. Data from the tests will be evaluated by the Air Force's Non-Nuclear Munitions Safety Board, who will then clear the HH-60W for live fire flight testing. That testing is currently scheduled for later in 2020.

"It's been a great privilege to see all the hard work and dedication the team demonstrated to get this far," said Tech. Sgt. Lucas Spain, 413th FLTS's HH-60 special mission aviator evaluator. "I have no doubt the team will continue to execute our test mission to the best of our abilities so Air Force Rescue can continue to live by our motto, "These Things We Do… That Others May Live."

The live-fire tests are just another of the many 2020 milestones for the HH-60W. So far, the Jolly Green II completed aerial refueling, radar, weather and defensive system testing to name a few.

 

[Housecarl]

I wonder what the internal security/law enforcement budget for them is projected to look like in the same period?..........

Posted for fair use.....

France plans 4.5% defence budget increase for 2021

The French Armed Forces Ministry presented a EUR49.7 billion (USD58.3 billion) draft 2021 defence budget to parliament on 28 September. The budget request would increase...

www.janes.com

02 October 2020
France plans 4.5% defence budget increase for 2021

by Emmanuel Huberdeau


The French Armed Forces Ministry presented a EUR49.7 billion (USD58.3 billion) draft 2021 defence budget to parliament on 28 September. The budget request would increase defence spending by 4.5%, compared to 2020 and 22% since 2017, and includes EUR22.3 billion for procurement, EUR12.3 billion for salaries, EUR8.5 billion for pensions, and EUR4.6 billion for operating costs.

France is set to receive nearly 100 Griffon armoured vehicles in 2020, to be followed by 157 more in 2021. (Armée de Terre)

During a press conference held at the ministry on 30 September, the Direction Générale de l’Armement (DGA), the French procurement agency, and the three armed service branches presented the main equipment delivered in 2020 and the status of ongoing programmes. In 2021, the DGA plans to order 30 H160M helicopters (21 for the army, 8 for the navy, and 1 for the air force), 120 upgraded Véhicule Blindé Léger (VBL) light reconnaissance vehicles, 12,000 HK416F rifles, one Frégate de Défense et d'Intervention (FDI) frigate, 45 Mer-Mer 40 Block 3C upgrade kits for Exocet anti-ship missiles, 367 MICA NG air-to-air missiles, 150 MICA NG training missiles, and 13 Syracuse IV satellite communications ground stations. The demonstration phase of the Franco-German-Spanish Future Combat Air System (FCAS) should to be launched in 2021.

 

[Housecarl]

Hummm....Recall the reports of "killer drones" out of Mexico and the current Caucus flare up.....

Posted for fair use.....

This New Urban Combat Drone Is a Shotgun Toting Hexacopter

Killer drones are making it increasingly difficult to hide on today’s battlefields.

www.popularmechanics.com

New Urban Combat Drone Is a Shotgun Toting Hexacopter
Killer drones are making it increasingly difficult to hide on today’s battlefields.


By Kyle Mizokami

Oct 2, 2020




✈︎You love military news. So do we. Let's nerd out over them together.
i9 allows a drone to do the most dangerous part of the job. With the new drone, British troops might break down the entry door with a demolition charge and then send the i9 in. Flying high and fast, the drone would outpace the defenders beneath it, identify them, and line up on an enemy target. The i9 operator could verify the targets are hostile and then authorize the drone to open fire.

British Royal Marine Commandos prepare to breach a building in Twentynine Palms, United States. In the future, these commandos would send a drone into the building first to neutralize enemy troops inside.
UK Ministry of Defense


The i9 is a hexacopter, meaning it uses a total of six pairs of rotating blades to achieve lift. According to the Times, the designers have eliminated “wall suck”—a phenomenon that occurs when a hovering drone flies too close to a wall or ceiling. The flat surface disrupts air flow to the drone’s propellers, causing them to stop providing lift and the drone to crash.
This content is imported from {embed-name}. You may be able to find the same content in another format, or you may be able to find more information, at their web site.




One of the most important aspects of the drone is that it uses so-called “machine vision” to identify targets. The drone will automatically pick out enemy combatants that appear in its video camera field of vision, rather than having the operator do so manually via his or her handheld screen. The process is similar to a self-driving car identifying road signs and obstacles by recording them and then comparing them to a visual library of road objects.

Commercial hexacopter drone.
Omer MessingerGetty Images


Human beings aren’t the only targets for the i9. The drone can apparently function as a flying “battering ram,” knocking enemy drones out of the sky autonomously. This autonomous capability is important as drones can fly quite fast, faster than a human can manually intercept them with another drone.
The i9 is one of the first drones available to Western armies equipped with weapons of its own. It won’t be the last.

 

[jward]

The Pentagon Wants Stealth Rocket Fuel. Could It Trigger A Nuclear War?

Michael PeckContributor

Aerospace & Defense
I cover defense issues and military technology.

This photo provided by the Defense Department's Missile Defense Agency, taken Jan. 28, 2016, shows a ... [+]

ASSOCIATED PRESS
The U.S. military wants a stealthy rocket fuel to enable U.S. missiles to avoid detection.


But could undetectable missiles trigger a nuclear war?


The project “seeks to develop solid propellants that exhibit reduced IR [infrared] signatures while maintaining thrust to mass ratio performance,” according to the research solicitation from the Missile Defense Agency. “Detection of missile launch and booster burnout are important threat identification points. Since remote IR surveillance is often used to detect and track missile launches, the ability to avoid detection through IR signature reduction would be beneficial for mobile defense platforms as well as forward deployed offensive assets.”


The fact that America’s missile defense organization wants a low-IR propellant isn’t necessarily sinister. While anti-missile lasers are on the way, for now U.S. ballistic missile defense — Ground-Based Interceptors and Patriot missiles on land, and Aegis SM-3 and SM-6 missiles at sea – relies on rockets to shoot down other rockets.


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However, rocket-based interceptors use boosters that generate plenty of heat and light (see the blast in this video of a Ground-Based Interceptor test). It’s logical to assume that adversaries could use the infrared flash of an interceptor to pinpoint and destroy U.S. missile defense launchers and ships. In addition, the infrared plume from an interceptor rocket could potentially be detected in mid-flight, giving an incoming offensive missile a chance to deploy decoys or take evasive action.

But stealth rockets could generate a much more catastrophic risk. Nuclear deterrence – which has kept the U.S. and Russia from annihilating each other for 70 years – is based on the assurance that both sides could detect a first strike in time to launch a retaliatory strike. This is why America and Russia – and now China – have satellites in orbit that are designed to detect the infrared signature of an ICBM launch. The U.S., for example, maintains the Defense Support Program constellation of missile warning satellites, which are being replaced by Space-based Infrared System (SBIRS) satellites.

But rocket fuel that produces a minimal infrared plume raises the possibility that a nation could launch a surprise nuclear attack with low-IR missiles. Given that an ICBM takes 15 to 30 minutes to reach its target, and that a warhead descends through the atmosphere at Mach 23, even a few minutes could make a difference for whether the defender can intercept the incoming missiles, or launch a retaliatory strike before its own ICBMs are destroyed.

The fact that the U.S. military specifies that the stealth rocket fuel would be used on “forward deployed offensive assets” suggests the Pentagon wants offensive missiles that can’t be detected by an adversary.

Critics fear this could have unintended consequences. “The U.S. is actually the country that relies the most on detecting IR signatures for strategic warning of nuclear attacks, and tactical warning of theater missile attacks,” Brian Weeden, a former U.S. Air Force officer and an expert on space warfare, tells me.

“So if this technology were developed, I think it could actually hurt U.S national security more than help it. And history shows that technology has a way of proliferating, particularly if it has significant military value.”

James Acton, a physicist and co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, is skeptical about the feasibility of rocket fuel that can minimize IR emissions without sacrificing performance.

He also worries that a stealthy rocket fuel could provoke Russia and China.

“They will interpret this as a way to conduct preemptive strikes against their nuclear forces,” Acton says. “And frankly, it's not clear to me what else it would be useful for.”

60 B-52s Shot Down In One Day? Today’s U.S. Air Force Can’t Survive World War II Losses

Russia’s Icebreaker Rocket Can Punch A Hole Through The North Pole


Follow me on Twitter or LinkedIn.
Michael Pec

posted for fair use

The Pentagon Wants Stealth Rocket Fuel. Could It Trigger A Nuclear War?

Undetectable missiles could spark Russian and Chinese fears of a U.S. first strike.

www.forbes.com

 

[jward]

2REGIONAL PROGRAM POLITICAL DIALOGUE SOUTH MEDITERRANEAN
WWW.KAS.DEPOLDIMEDINSIDE LIBYAFOREWORD

The Regional Program Political Dialogue South Mediterranean (PolDiMed) of the Konrad-Ade-nauer-Stiftung (KAS) in cooperation with LIBYA DESK™ is delighted to present our second monthly report on Libya. This new format examines the most important political, economic and social developments of the previous month, which are of central importance for understanding the situation in Libya. The report is based on reliable Libyan sources and provides a summary and a contextualization of developments in the wider Libyan context.

The report is being publi-shed every first week of each month. While much attention has been paid to the external and geopolitical dimensions of the situa-tion in Libya, voices from within Libya are central to understanding local developments and the evolution of the Libyan conflict as well as its impact on the wider Mediterranean region. As an inclusive Libyan-led and Libyan-owned political resolution to the year-long conflict is needed, these monthly reports emphasize the most important events within Libya and aim to give a better picture of what happens “Inside Libya”.

Based on existing KAS-PolDiMed formats such as the Libya Brief and the Libya Task Force, we consider it necessary to shed light on the dynamics within Libya and to emphasize the impor-tance of initiating a national dialogue process in the spirit of the UN-led Berlin process. We hope that these monthly reports will give our readers a better picture of the dynamics of the ongoing Libyan conflict, its actors and multiple dimensions.Thomas VolkDirector Regional Program Political Dialogue South MediterraneanKonrad-Adenauer-Stiftung

3REGIONAL PROGRAM POLITICAL DIALOGUE SOUTH MEDITERRANEANWWW.KAS.DEPOLDIMEDINSIDE LIBYAEXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1. The resumption of intra-Libyan talks on both political and economic topics is cause for op-timism and gives added avenue for the formation of a new government. Yet, any faux pas could lead to a conflagration.
2. September saw the continuation of protests throughout Libya, with a severe intensification of social tensions in the east. 3. Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj sought to enact a range of policies to calm protesters in wes-tern Libya, but ultimately failed to do so and announced plans to resign by the end of October 2020.
4. Eastern-based Prime Minister Abdullah Al-Thani submitted his government’s resignation to the House of Representatives following public outrage over corruption and deteriorating living conditions.
5. Intra-Libyan meetings abounded over the past month, often hosted by foreign powers seeking to push for a political agreement while retaining influence over the Libyan file.
6. A sidelined Khalifa Haftar accepted an overture by Deputy Prime Minister Ahmed Maiteeq to kick-start an agreement that paves the way for a resumption of Libyan oil production.
7. Should the agreement to reopen Libyan oil facilities gain further endorsements, it would severely encroach on the independence of key economic institutions but unify bureaucracy.
8. If appropriately leveraged, the resumption of dialogue amongst Libyan factions could usher in a new setting for Libya’s economic institutions that may affect items such as debt levels and foreign exchange rates.
9. As Libya’s political vacuum expands, so does the threat of extremist activity. The past month has seen renewed activity by extremist groups, particularly in southern Libya.
10. The thorny question of foreign mercenaries and local militias brought up in talks risks adding to the country’s security vacuum. Armed groups on standby since the end of the Tripoli offensive are growing more unstable and increasingly belligerent.

PDF of report available:

https://www.kas.de/documents/282499/282548/Inside+Libya+-+September.pdf/3972f99b-6a0b-134d-d4c2-4769210dbe0b?version=1.2&t=1601628318741

 

[jward]

The Key to Armenia’s Tank Losses: The Sensors, Not the Shooters
Jack Watling
RUSI Defence Systems, 6 October 2020
Military Sciences, Land Forces, Land Operations


Amid a lively debate about the viability of the UK’s heavy armour, the loss of over 42 Armenian T-72s to Azerbaijani forces in Nagorno-Karabakh requires further analysis.
Despite the heavy Armenian armoured losses, the key lessons from the videos Azerbaijan has published online are not about armour. Rather, they reflect how the density of sensors on the modern battlefield is changing the balance in combined arms warfare.

Before tackling this, some myths need to be challenged. There is a tendency for Western soldiers to dismiss what can be learned from these incidents because the videos show limited tactical proficiency being displayed by Armenian troops. This is misguided for several reasons. The snippet videos usually show armour manoeuvring, when camouflage is hard to maintain, and which Western forces would equally have to do if they were to affect the outcome of battle. The videos have also been selected as examples of Azerbaijani successes. However, there is actually a lot of evidence of Armenian forces digging in, concealing positions, and deploying decoys, of which at least two were struck by Azerbaijani forces.

More importantly, this dismissal of evidence suggests a lack of appreciation of just how naked the modern battlefield has become. Against a peer adversary it is entirely reasonable to expect the battlefield to be swept by ground-moving target indicator (GMTI) radars, with tactical units able to scan terrain out to 150 km. Night or day, unusual cross-terrain movements, coordinated spacing, and lack of adherence to civilian roads, all make military vehicles highly distinct to trained operators.
A further layer of scrutiny will come from electronic warfare units. Dependency upon radio in Western operations is a hard habit to kick, especially given the stringent safety standards in exercises. Western forces tend to leave a tell-tale map of electronic signatures for an adversary to analyse. Even platoon infantry attacks tend to see a lot of exchanges on the company net. For a competent adversary these signatures offer another potent tool to map Western forces’ movements.
Such stand-off ISTAR techniques are unlikely to provide track-quality targeting solutions, unless the adversary intends to saturate a large area. It is the threat of area targeting that has driven the UK to experiment with dispersed manoeuvre with its STRIKE concept, rendering long-range area saturation uneconomical. But these techniques will be quite capable of identifying areas of interest to prioritise the allocation of UAVs and other electrooptical sensor bearers.

The hope that camouflage will conceal vehicles from observation is highly optimistic. The proliferation of infrared and thermal imaging cameras makes concealment harder – by night or day – and even vehicles under thermal screens can often be given away by personnel leaving those screens to urinate or similar, all too human, needs. More importantly, some traces are hard to cover. The best evidence that armour will be unable to hide is that Western tracked vehicles struggle to avoid observation by friendly UAVs on exercise, which can quickly follow track marks on the ground to the woodblock where a vehicle is hiding.
To conclude from this that the tank’s days are numbered, however, is a serious error. From the videos in Nagorno-Karabakh it is evident that unarmoured vehicles and dismounted infantry are faring no better, even those dug into positions with camouflage screens. Indeed, the lack of protection means they will likely fare worse since there are more kinds of munitions that are lighter and easier to employ that can kill them.

Besides the vulnerability of other kinds of vehicle, the ability to inflict persistent attrition upon an adversary at reach does not change the fact that land warfare is about taking and holding ground, and the ground will still ultimately need to be assaulted. Once committed to an assault on defended positions, armour remains critical to rapid success with acceptable losses. The challenge is to get a combined arms formation within striking distance without it having suffered heavy losses before entering the direct fire zone. Armenia, for instance, has lost the equivalent number of tanks to more than a third of the UK’s heavy armour inventory.

The lessons are far reaching. Heavy formations must likely disperse to avoid being engaged by area-of-effect munitions at reach. This makes protecting them from UAVs and air attack more challenging, requiring the integration of short-ranged air defences (SHORAD) across tactical units, along with EW – specifically electronic attack – capabilities. This means a move away from camouflage towards hard protection, able to sanitise areas of the battlefield of enemy ISTAR assets. This does not prevent detection, however, since finding UAVs and engaging them will require radar – especially at night – which implies the need for emissions detectable by enemy EW.
Therefore, a broader shift in mindset is required as to how combined arms manoeuvre functions. Infliction of attrition against enemy ISTAR must be prioritised to degrade the enemy’s sensor picture to a point where they will struggle to distinguish decoys from real targets. Deception, saturating the electromagnetic spectrum, and other active rather than passive means will be needed to protect the force as it moves into direct contact. Once in contact many traditional tactics and capabilities will remain relevant.

A critical challenge to be worked out is how to transition from a dispersed approach to a concentrated attack, since at the forming-up point there will be a significant vulnerability to artillery, anti-tank guided weapons and other threats. This is a key area of focus in developing robust tactics.
Challenges like this transition – ultimately resolvable through tactics and the employment of systems of technologies – highlight how the debate over future capabilities needs to shift. The challenge is not whether tanks are obsolete, but how a system of capabilities can be fielded and trained that gets the force to where it needs to be, with enough combat power to achieve the desired result. It is the system, not the platforms, and the balance within that system that we need to get right.

That new system of fighting – understanding the balance of capabilities critical to the future of combined arms operations – must also go further than articulating how to blind the enemy’s sensors. It must also outline how to reverse the calculus and impose comparable challenges on the enemy. Here there are more difficult structural questions to be resolved. The British Army had intended to disband 32 Regiment Royal Artillery, responsible for employing tactical UAVs, because it felt that UAVs should become organic across the force. There is a risk, however, that this would leave UAVs as an enabler to augment what regiments do already. The absence of a community of excellence to challenge thinking, develop new tactics and inform other units about the implications, is a problem, which has led to the regiment ultimately being retained. At the same time, keeping UAVs as a capability integrated throughout the force promises to encourage combined arms employment. Similar challenges might be asked about counter-UAV and EW systems. Should they be grouped at echelon, or attached organically to manoeuvre elements? If the latter is pursued, how can British forces avoid fratricide in the electromagnetic spectrum?

The answers to these questions can only be found through experimentation. In that sense while the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh highlights some key deficiencies in British forces – SHORAD, EW, UAVs – the answer cannot be a series of binary trade-offs between platforms. Instead, it cuts to the heart of what the Chief of the General Staff, General Sir Mark Carleton-Smith, highlighted in his recent address on the Integrated Review: the British Army should build a force fit for a new age of warfare.

Jack Watling is Research Fellow for Land Warfare in the Military Sciences team at RUSI.

Banner Image: Screenshot from UAV footage of an Armenian T-72 released by Azerbaijani Ministry of Defence. Government Licence.

posted for fair use

The Key to Armenia’s Tank Losses: The Sensors, Not the Shooters

Amid a lively debate about the viability of the UK’s heavy armour, the loss of over 42 Armenian T-72s to Azerbaijani forces in Nagorno-Karabakh requires further analysis., Despite the heavy Armenian armoured losses, the key lessons from the videos Azerbaijan has published online are not about...

rusi.org

 

[Housecarl]

Hummm.........

Posted for fair use.....

WSJ News Exclusive | U.S., Russia Move Toward Outline of Nuclear Deal, Administration Says

U.S. and Russian negotiators made progress on a new framework accord that would freeze each side’s nuclear arsenal and outline the parameters for a detailed treaty that would be negotiated next year, a senior Trump administration official said.

www.wsj.com

U.S., Russia Move Toward Outline of Nuclear Deal, Administration Says
Trump administration official’s comments suggest the two sides might be able to come to terms on broad principles

By Michael R. Gordon
Oct. 5, 2020 5:34 pm ET

U.S. and Russian negotiators made progress Monday on a new framework accord that would freeze each side’s nuclear arsenal and outline the parameters for a detailed treaty that would be negotiated next year, a senior Trump administration official said.

The accord, if it comes together in the coming month, would give each side something it......(rest behind paywall, HC)

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use....

Work Begins On Starlink-Like Constellation Of Small Hypersonic Missile-Tracking Satellites

The Pentagon's grand space strategy envisions a shift from larger, expensive satellites to massive constellations of smaller, easier to replace ones.

www.thedrive.com

Work Begins On Starlink-Like Constellation Of Small Hypersonic Missile-Tracking Satellites
The Pentagon's grand space strategy envisions a shift from larger, expensive satellites to massive constellations of smaller, easier to replace ones.
By Joseph Trevithick
October 6, 2020

• The War Zone

The U.S. military has hired L3Harris and SpaceX to build small satellites with powerful infrared sensors capable of spotting and tracking ballistic missiles and hypersonic weapons. These satellites could become part of a large and broader early warning constellation with hundreds of space-based sensors and communications nodes watching for incoming threats, monitoring their flight, and potentially providing targeting data to missile defense assets.

The Pentagon announced that the Space Development Agency (SDA) had awarded the contracts to L3Harris and SpaceX, worth around $193.5 million and just over $149 million, respectively, on Oct. 5, 2020. Each company will be responsible for building four satellites, each with a wide field of view (WFOV) overhead persistent infrared (OPIR) sensor, in support of work on what SDA calls Tranche 0 of the Tracking Layer of the planned overarching early warning constellation.



Air Force Is Looking Beyond Traditional Orbits To Get An Upper Hand In Space
By Joseph Trevithick Posted in The War Zone

The Air Force And SpaceX Are Teaming Up For A 'Massive' Live Fire Exercise
By Brett Tingley Posted in The War Zone

Space Force Boss Says One Of Russia's Killer Satellites Fired A Projectile In Orbit
By Joseph Trevithick Posted in The War Zone

Space Force Looks Go For Launch But Questions Remain About How It Will 'Dogfight In Space'
By Joseph Trevithick Posted in The War Zone

USAF Secretary Gives Ominous Warning That Show Of Force Needed To Deter Space Attacks
By Joseph Trevithick Posted in The War Zone

"SDA is developing the low-cost proliferated WFOV space vehicles that provide the missile warning and the tracking information for national defense authorities, as well as tracking and cueing data for missile defense elements," Mark Lewis, the Acting Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, said in a statement to C4ISRNET.


"This capability [the Tracking Layer] encompasses space-based sensing, as well as algorithms, novel processing schemes, data fusion across sensors and orbital regimes, and tactical data products able to be delivered to the appropriate user," according to SDA's website. This Layer's Tranche 0 could eventually grow to 20 satellites and this portion of the larger constellation may eventually have as many as 200 space-based sensors.

DOD
SpaceX's satellite will be derived from that company's Starlink design, which was originally designed as part of an effort to provide increased access to broadband internet for commercial and military purposes. An as-yet-unknown subcontractor will be providing the OPIR sensor.

L3Harris is developing both its satellite and sensor in-house. The company has not yet released details about the design of either one.

SDA's goal is to launch the first Tranche 0 satellites into Low Earth Orbit (LEO) in 2022 and then have moved on to the Tranche 1 stage by 2024, where the Tracking Layer will be able to provide persistent monitoring for missile and hypersonic threats over specific regions of interest. The hope is that there will be enough satellites in orbit by 2026 to provide global early warning coverage.

SpaceX
An artist's conception of a SpaceX Starlink satellite deploying its solar array after arriving in space.

The idea is that the Tracking Layer will also be more responsive, flexible, and resilient to the ever-more real prospect of an enemy anti-satellite attack by using this large, distributed constellation of small satellites. At present, the U.S. military's space-based early warning capability comes from a relatively limited number of larger satellites, such as the Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS) constellation, which you can read about in more detail here. SBIRS notably provided an advance alert that Iranian ballistic missiles were headed toward bases hosting U.S. troops in Iraq in January, giving those individuals time to seek cover. SBIRS' sensors are also known to be powerful enough to spot infrared events that are much smaller than a ballistic missile blasting off, such as the launch of smaller missiles, large explosions, and even artillery fire.

The Tracking Layer isn't the only planned distributed space-based sensor program in the works, either. It's "going to combine with activities in the Missile Defense Agency as they build toward their Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS) medium field of view (MFOV) space vehicles," Acting Deputy Undersecretary of Defense Lewis added in his statement to C4ISRNET.

SDA's planned space-based early warning architecture will also include a so-called Transport Layer, which will consist of hundreds of satellites with communications and data-sharing systems. "The idea is it connects to the National Defense Space Architecture—the NDSA transport layer—via optical intersatellite links," Lewis explained. "And that will enable low latency dissemination for missile warning indications. It will provide track directly to the joint warfighters."

DOD
An infographic showing a notional National Defense Space Architecture, including the planned Tracking and Transport layers.

These "optical intersatellite links" have not been described in detail, but sound very much like a laser communications system. Work on laser-based communications in space, and for sending data to and from space-based systems and terrestrial nodes, has been going on for decades and a number of systems have already demonstrated the capability on an experimental level. Laser communications offer improved performance and reliability over traditional systems, especially over very long distances. In addition, using laser light rather than radio waves to transmit these signals makes these systems impervious to radio frequency jamming or spoofing and immune to intercept by traditional signals and electronic intelligence systems.

In August, York Space Systems and Lockheed Martin received their own contracts from SDA, worth $94 million and $188 million, respectively, for the first Transport Layer satellites. Tranche 0 of the Transport Layer is expected to consist of 20 satellites, as well.

SDA has also talked about developing more layers to provide additional early warning coverage, as well as other support, again in a distributed manner that would be more survivable in face of anti-satellite attacks. These could include a Custody Layer, focused on tracking mobile threats, such as ballistic missile transporter-erector-launchers, on the ground, and a Navigation Layer offering an alternative to the GPS constellation as part of a concept commonly referred to as Assured Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT). An additional Deterrence Layer could also provide outward coverage of potential threats further out in space, an area of growing concern for the U.S. military.

Maintaining these large, distributed constellations would also require rapid space launch capabilities, an area that the U.S. military has been heavily investing in already and that you can read more about in these previous War Zone pieces. There is also the potential to use other space-based systems, including small space stations, to provide on-orbit repairs and other services in the future.
With potential American adversaries, ranging from Russia and China to Iran and North Korea, continuing to expand their ballistic missile arsenals and introduce new systems, including hypersonic weapons, the importance of early warning capabilities is only set to keep growing in the near term. Russia, in particular, as well as China, are also pursuing a variety of anti-satellite capabilities, including potential on-orbit interceptors launched from small "killer satellites," which challenge the U.S. military's existing space-based infrastructure.

DIA
A U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency infographic showing the various ways one satellite might disable or destroy another beyond a simple a kinetic attack.

Questions and concerns about the feasibility and practicality of the planned National Defense Space Architecture have already cropped up. In many ways, the basic concept as it stands now is reminiscent of the Brilliant Eyes space-based sensor constellation that was to be part of the infamously abortive Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), better known by the derisive nickname Star Wars. That effort, which formally began in 1983, was ultimately abandoned amid ballooning costs and technical issues.

While there have been significant technological developments in the intervening decades that could help make the new layered system a reality, there remain a number of hurdles. The difficulty in tracking hypersonic threats after launch when they "go cold" and are difficult for infrared sensors to find, let alone track, is one particularly obvious challenge. This issue is already present when it comes to tracking traditional ballistic missiles, which also have a smaller thermal signature in the mid-course portion of their flight.

The U.S. military has been working on a Midcourse Tracking Sensor project to help address this problem, but it remains to be seen when that system will be available for widespread use and if it will be small enough to fit on the satellites SDA is looking at for its Tracking Layer. There has already been separate criticism of the idea that small, commercial derivative satellites will be able to suitably support military requirements, in general.

"Launching hundreds of cheap satellites into theater as a substitute for the complex architectures where we provide key capabilities to the warfighter will result in failure on America’s worst day if relied upon alone. The analysis shows that,” then-Secretary of the Air Force Heather Wilson said in 2019. “Increasing the number of satellites helps. But numbers alone are not enough. The study also found that space missions that are not well aligned with commercial, low-Earth orbit satellite are actually better off staying where they are or making other changes to protect themselves.”

USAF
Former Secretary of the Air Force Heather Wilson.

When it comes to emerging hypersonic threats, even if U.S. military early-warning satellites can spot and track them, there is also a real debate about whether it ever be truly feasible to try and intercept them. "There is no defense against hypersonic ... you're not gonna defend against it," Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff U.S. Army General Mark Milley told members of Congress at a hearing this past March. "Those things are going so fast you're not gonna get it. You gotta shoot the archer. You gotta go deep, downtown and you gotta get it on the offense."

There is also simply a matter of cost. While using distributed constellations of small, relatively low-cost satellites, the total numbers SDA is looking at for its various layers could still very well be fairly expensive to establish and maintain. To support the idea of rapidly replacing lost satellites in a conflict, there will also need to be sufficient stockpiles of spare systems in reserve and on-call launch services ready to put them into space on short notice.

For some sense scale, fully replacing the loss of just a tenth of a constellation consisting of 1,000 satellites would mean putting 100 new satellites into orbit. At the same time, it is also worth noting that SpaceX has demonstrated the ability to launch dozens of Starlink satellites at a time.




All told, it will be very interesting to see how SDA's plans for the overarching National Defense Space Architecture continue to evolve now that work on the first tracking and transport satellites is underway.
Contact the author: joe@thedrive.com

 

[Housecarl]

Mercenaries are reshaping the battlefield
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View: https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=toZoQan-QQU

#Private #armies are big business, and global in scope. But how did this arrangement come about?

 

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Geopolitics after the pandemic | The Strategist

There is no single future until it happens, and any effort to envision geopolitics in the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic must include a range of possible futures. I suggest five plausible futures in 2030, ...

www.aspistrategist.org.au

Geopolitics after the pandemic

7 Oct 2020 | Joseph S. Nye

There is no single future until it happens, and any effort to envision geopolitics in the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic must include a range of possible futures. I suggest five plausible futures in 2030, but obviously others can be imagined.

The end of the globalised liberal order. The world order established by the United States after World War II created a framework of institutions that led to a remarkable liberalisation of international trade and finance. Even before the Covid-19 pandemic, this order was being challenged by the rise of China and the growth of populism in Western democracies. China has benefited from the order, but as its strategic weight grows, it increasingly insists on setting standards and rules. The US resists, institutions atrophy and appeals to sovereignty increase. The US remains outside the World Health Organization and the Paris climate agreement. Covid-19 contributes to the probability of this scenario by weakening the US ‘system manager’.

A 1930s-like authoritarian challenge. Mass unemployment, increased inequality and community disruption from pandemic-related economic changes create hospitable conditions for authoritarian politics. There is no shortage of political entrepreneurs willing to use nationalist populism to gain power. Nativism and protectionism increase. Tariffs and quotas on goods and people increase, and immigrants and refugees become scapegoats. Authoritarian states seek to consolidate regional spheres of interest, and various types of interventions increase the risk of violent conflict. Some of these trends were visible before 2020, but weak prospects for economic recovery, owing to the failure to cope with the Covid-19 pandemic increase the probability of this scenario.

A China-dominated world order. As China masters the pandemic, the economic distance between it and other major powers changes dramatically. China’s economy surpasses that of a declining US by the mid-2020s and China widens its lead over one-time potential contenders like India and Brazil. In its diplomatic marriage of convenience with Russia, China increasingly becomes the senior partner.

Not surprisingly, China demands respect and obeisance in accordance with its increasing power. The Belt and Road Initiative is used to influence not just neighbours but partners in places as distant as Europe and Latin America. Votes against China in international institutions become too costly, as they jeopardise Chinese aid or investment, as well as access to the world’s largest market. With Western economies having been weakened relative to China by the pandemic, its government and major companies are able to reshape institutions and set standards to their liking.

A green international agenda. Not all futures are negative. Public opinion in many democracies is beginning to place a higher priority on climate change and environmental conservation. Some governments and companies are re-organising to deal with such issues. Even before Covid-19, one could foresee an international agenda in 2030 defined by countries’ focus on green issues. By highlighting the links between human and planetary health, the pandemic accelerates adoption of this agenda.

For example, the US public notices that spending $700 billion on defence did not prevent Covid-19 from killing more Americans than died in all its wars after 1945. In a changed domestic political environment, a US president introduces a ‘Covid Marshall Plan’ to provide prompt access to vaccines for poor countries and to strengthen the capacity of their healthcare systems. The Marshall Plan of 1948 was in America’s self-interest and simultaneously in the interest of others, and had a profound effect on shaping the geopolitics of the ensuing decade. Such leadership enhanced US soft power. By 2030, a green agenda has become good domestic politics, with a similarly significant geopolitical effect.

More of the same. In 2030, Covid-19 looks just as unpleasant as the influenza pandemic of 1918–20 looked from 1930 and with similar, limited long-term geopolitical effects. Prior conditions persist. But, along with growing Chinese power, domestic populism and polarisation in the West, and more authoritarian regimes, there is still some degree of economic globalisation and a growing awareness of the importance of environmental globalisation, underpinned by a grudging recognition that no country can solve such problems acting alone.

The US and China manage to cooperate on pandemics and climate change, even as they compete on other issues such as navigation restrictions in the South or East China Seas. Friendship is limited, but rivalry is managed. Some institutions wither, others are repaired and still others are invented. The United States remains the largest power, but without the degree of influence it had in the past.

Each of the first four scenarios has about one chance in 10 of approximating the future in 2030. In other words, the chances are less than half that the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic will profoundly reshape geopolitics by 2030. Several factors could alter these probabilities. For example, the rapid development of effective, reliable and cheap vaccines that are widely distributed internationally would enhance the probability of continuity and reduce the probability of the authoritarian or Chinese scenarios.

But if US President Donald Trump’s re-election weakens America’s alliances and international institutions, or damages democracy at home, the probability of the continuity scenario or the green scenario would decrease. On the other hand, if the European Union, which was initially weakened by the pandemic, succeeds in sharing the costs of member states’ response, it could become an important international actor capable of increasing the likelihood of the green scenario.

Other influences are possible, and Covid-19 may produce important domestic changes related to inequalities in healthcare and education, as well as spurring the creation of better institutional arrangements to prepare for the next pandemic. Estimating the long-term effect of the current pandemic is not an exact prediction of the future, but an exercise in weighing probabilities and adjusting current policies.

Author
Joseph S. Nye Jr, a professor at Harvard, is the author of Do morals matter? Presidents and foreign policy from FDR to Trump. This article is presented in partnership with Project Syndicate © 2020. Image: Galina Sandalova/Getty Images.

 

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Taking “De Oppresso Liber” to the Streets: Why the US Army’s Special Forces Qualification Course Needs to Become More Urban - Modern War Institute

There are two thousand years of experience to tell us that the only thing harder than getting a new idea into the military mind is to get an old idea […]

mwi.usma.edu

Taking “De Oppresso Liber” to the Streets: Why the US Army’s Special Forces Qualification Course Needs to Become More Urban

Sandor Fabian | October 7, 2020

There are two thousand years of experience to tell us that the only thing harder than getting a new idea into the military mind is to get an old idea out.
— B. H. Liddell Hart

The old military maxim, “train as you fight,” remains as relevant as ever. And yet, at least in one particular and important way, it is not being followed in the current US Army Special Forces Qualification Course (SFQC).


Unconventional warfare has been the foundation of the SFQC from its beginnings and although historically its curriculum has always been updated to reflect the characteristics of actual conflicts, the training requirements generated by the emergence of urban warfare as the primary way of conflict do not seem to have gained appropriate attention in the US Army’s Special Forces training. If the SF community wants to maintain its strategic relevance—specifically, its ability to enable local resistance forces—it must understand that such future resistance will increasingly be conducted in major urban centers. The US Army must acknowledge this reality, and the educational and training implications associated with it, and realign the curriculum of the SFQC toward combat skills that enable future SF operators to effectively conduct their operations in complex, built-up areas.


How the US Army Trains its Special Forces Soldiers at the SFQC


According to the academic handbook published by the JFK Special Warfare Center and School, the SFQC is designed to train US Army officers and noncommissioned officers and is sixty-seven weeks long (with an additional thirty-six weeks for medical sergeants) with six phases of training and mainly conducted at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.


The first phase is six weeks long and introduces the candidates to the foundations of Special Forces history, attributes, tasks, land navigation, and unconventional warfare. During the nine-week second phase, trainees focus on small-unit tactics and skills that enable them to effectively operate as part of an ODA—the twelve-soldier Operational Detachment Alpha. The small-unit training is mostly conducted in traditional “green” areas with little focus on operations in urban settings. During the sixteen-week third phase, students undertake specialized training based on their individual SF military occupational specialties to prepare them for their future roles within an ODA. This phase also contains only limited information about the opportunities and challenges generated by built-up areas. The fourth phase of the SFQC centers on a four-week culmination exercise, called Robin Sage, where students are being both trained and evaluated in their SF skills while they are performing their duties in an unconventional warfare–based scenario. The exercise is conducted on both private and public property ranging across ten counties and covering approximately 4,500 square miles. While Robin Sage includes some direct-action tasks conducted in urban settings, the main focus of the exercise is on enabling guerrillas in remote areas. The fifth phase five is twenty-five weeks long and focuses on language and culture training. Taught skills also include rapport-building techniques, cultural mitigation strategies, and interacting through interpreters. The SFQC culminates with the five-week final phase, during which students are awarded the SF tab and green beret, and also includes military free fall parachute training.


The point of describing the entire SFQC training pipeline is to draw out an important fact: although there are some elements of urban warfare, the current curriculum clearly lacks a sufficient focus on the combat skills that will be increasingly necessary for success in future operations.


Why Realign?


The 2017 US National Security Strategy clearly switches focus from fighting terrorism toward great power competition. Although the US military still seeks to maintain the capabilities it needs to address terrorism and other nonstate threats, it has clearly shifted its orientation toward the requirements that will enable it to fight near-peer and peer competitors such as China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. While the specific roles and tasks of SF in this new environment are still being debated in both military circles and academia, several recent developments provide some significant clues about the likely future role of Army SF—and the terrain in which they must be prepared to fulfill it.


Although a direct confrontation between the United States and a great power competitor on within either party’s own territory might be possible in the long term, a conflict between these actors are highly likely to at least start on the soil of one or more partner or allied countries. Recently, more and more small countries aligned with the United States and NATO have begun to realize this fact. They have also acknowledged the fact that, in the event of an aggression against their territory, they cannot defend themselves conventionally and it will take some time for US help to arrive. For these reasons several potentially vulnerable countries have started to implement new strategic approaches to try to mitigate an aggressor’s conventional military capabilities. One example of such an approach in smaller states is the total defense concept, which aims to regain national sovereignty through resistance operations after an invasion and during any subsequent occupation.


Significantly, these countries have also recognized that modern resistance operations against a numerically and technologically superior conventional enemy are most viable in urban areas. A series of wargames conducted by the RAND Corporation in 2014 and 2015 produced a sobering and widely quoted conclusion: in the event of an attack against the Baltic states, Russian forces could arrive at either Estonia’s capital of Tallinn or Latvia’s capital of Riga (or both) within thirty-six to sixty hours. But that vulnerability also presents a potential opportunity for threatened states. “The Russians can get to Tallinn in two days,” Brig. Gen. Riho Uhtegi, commander of the Estonian Defence League and former commander of Estonian special operations forces, said in 2018. “But they will die in Tallinn. And they know this. . . . They will get fire from every corner, at every step.”


Uhtegi’s assessment reflects observations from recent conflicts where it has become clear that while modern conventional forces can easily advance through natural landscapes they struggle when they enter built-up areas. The characteristics of the modern cities prevent conventional forces to effectively employ their normal tactics, techniques, and procedures while also significantly reducing the capabilities of modern conventional equipment and weapon systems—and sometimes even them irrelevant. At the same time, the same characteristics act as force multipliers for the resistance force. Recent examples from Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria clearly demonstrate that even in less developed urban areas a significantly inferior resistance force can make life extremely difficult for conventional militaries. The key takeaway for SF from these developments is that in future conflicts, in order to maximize their contribution by supporting and enabling a resistance force behind enemy lines, they must be prepared to operated effectively in urban settings. SF training begins with the SFQC, and it should be made to reflect these realities by realigning it to incorporate more training focused on dense urban terrain.


What to Do?


Although it is paramount that the SFQC continues to train future SF operators for the basics of special operations across all phases of the course, parts—perhaps even the majority portions—of phases two, three, and four should be redesigned and placed into an urban scenario. During the small-unit tactics phase, a balance must be struck between learning how to operate in traditional “green” environments and learning tactics, techniques and procedures that will enable them to effectively conduct small-unit operations in urban settings. That balance should tilt toward the latter. SF personnel operate among the people, and in a world that has been more urban than rural for years and is becoming more urbanized every day, SF training environments should also be more urban than rural. Learning how to navigate and survive in major cities, how to conduct infiltration and exfiltration using nonstandard platforms on the surface, in subsurface, and in the air, how to maneuver in small and large formations, and how to train indigenous forces to conduct these activities in urban terrain should be the primary focus of the second phase.


Each part of the individually focused military occupational specialty training should also be redesigned to better reflect the requirements of future urban combat. While continuing to provide comprehensive training across the full spectrum of military problems Special Forces officers’ education should emphasize the development of skills that will enable future detachment commanders to effectively lead their teams and indigenous forces in urban terrain. Besides being trained in the specific characteristics of urban operations (with special focus on urban resistance), future detachment commanders must also have a clear understanding of the functions of other 18-series specialties in urban settings.


The training undertaken by each of the noncommissioned officers should also be modified. For example, after learning the basics of direct- and indirect-fire systems and their associated procedures, weapons sergeants should be extensively trained on how to best utilize these systems in and adapt procedures to urban environments. They should also be educated about the capabilities and limitations of the future adversaries’ weapons to be able to mitigate their effects in built-up areas as well as how to operate those weapons effectively so they and the supported resistance force can make the best use of captured enemy weapons.


Engineer sergeants’ training should also be realigned toward the skills necessary for effective urban combat. All five modules of the training—construction, demolition, improvised explosive devices, reconnaissance, and field exercise—should incorporate urban-specific considerations. These SF soldiers must have a deep understanding of the characteristics of man-made urban structures and their utility in resistance operations; small- and large-scale demolitions and their consequences within, under, and between buildings; the creation, deployment, and employment of improvised explosive devices in built-up areas; and how to assess and conduct reconnaissance of enemy infrastructure. These are just some of the general skills that urban environments require and that should be included in the training of the engineer sergeants.


Turning to medical sergeants, many might argue that the individual skills of these SF team members should be the same under all conditions. However, military operations—especially resistance operations—conducted far from the support of conventional forces and in a complex urban environment generate unique requirements. Some examples might include the creation and long-term operations of field treatment facilities (probably discreet and possibly even clandestine) in built-up areas, the utilization of civilian medical centers and pharmacies without detection, long-term care for wounded team members and indigenous force members, reaction to mass-casualty events in tight physical spaces, and instructing physically separated (trapped) individuals on the application of self-aid.


Finally, the content and focus of communications sergeants’ training should also be reconsidered given the specific considerations of complex, built-up areas on communication and the opportunities presented by the presence of major information networks in modern cities. While communications sergeants must be masters of all modern communication platforms they also should have deep knowledge and skills in the application of less sophisticated methods like communication tactics, techniques and procedures used by terrorist groups and insurgents. Additionally, it is crucial that communications sergeants understand the capabilities and limitations (both outside and inside built-up areas) of the communication platforms of near-peer and peer competitors so they can both avoid detection and effectively target enemy communications.


The recommended changes in both the second (small-unit tactics) and third (specialty-specific training) phases of the SFQC naturally lead to the requirement to make significant changes in the design of the Robin Sage scenario, as well. While the fundamental idea of the US Army’s SF soldiers supporting and enabling indigenous resistance forces should remain in the framework of the exercise, it should also be updated to realistically reflect future requirements. The indigenous resistance forces in coming conflicts will fight in major cities as guerrilla warfare moves “out of the mountains,” and those forces will increasingly take on a character shaped by their urban settings—composed perhaps in part by some surviving conventional military members, but also by lawyers and bus drivers, factory workers and IT engineers. The Robin Sage exercise must be updated to match this reality in terms of its scenario, duration, setup, role players, and mission. In short, it should offer an opportunity for students to be trained and evaluated under the conditions that correspond to their most likely future operations and not their past activities.

Realigning a foundational training course is extremely difficult, but sometimes it must be done. If the US Army wants its Special Forces to remain the sharpest possible tip of the spear, optimized for the missions it is most likely to face in an era of great power competition, then now is the time for SFQC to do just that. Changes in the US National Security Strategy, the emergence of near-peer and peer competitors, the reconceptualization of US partner and allied countries’ defense strategies, and the emergence of urban environments as the battlefield of future the future must lead those responsible for the curriculum of the SFQC to implement fundamental changes across the different phases of the course. While the specific changes required need deeper investigation than this article can provide, an open and much-needed discussion should begin. The motto of US Army SF, De Oppresso Liber, will continue to be put to the test in future conflicts. Whether or not future SF soldiers will be adequately prepared to free the oppressed depends on whether the Army is ready give them the training that they need.




Sandor Fabian is a former Hungarian Special Forces lieutenant colonel with more than twenty years of military experience. He is a graduate of the Miklos Zrinyi Hungarian National Defense University, holds a master’s degree in Defense Analysis (Irregular Warfare) from the US Naval Postgraduate School, and has a graduate certificate in National Security and Intelligence Studies from the University of Central Florida. Sandor is currently a faculty member at the NATO Special Operations School and a PhD candidate in Security Studies at the University of Central Florida. His research has appeared in Defense & Security Analysis, the Special Operations Journal, Combating Terrorism Exchange, the Florida Political Chronicle, and the Hungarian Seregszemle journal.


The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.

 

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Trilateral Arms Control Initiative between US, Russia and China

Defense
Trilateral Arms Control Initiative between US, Russia and China

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Published 1 day ago
on October 6, 2020

By Hananah Zarrar

Since the Cold War and disintegration of Soviet Union, various nuclear arms control agreements have remained an important component of the bilateral relationship between the United States (US) and Russia. In fact, these have been a major stabilizing factor between the two traditional rival states. The Trump administration and its shift from globalism towards nationalism, resultantly dissolved a number of bilateral agreements like the Iran JCPOA deal and stepped back from a number of multilateral accords such as the climate change Paris Agreement. Consequently, the US lost its credibility for any future cooperative engagements under its present leadership. After its withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 2019,the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty(New START) -the only major bilateral nuclear agreement is now breathing its last. As the expiry date of the Treaty approaches i.e. February 2021, the US wants the decades-long framework of bilateral arms control to be reframed in a trilateral structure with the inclusion of China as a third tier via extension and modification of the New START.

Recently, the Trump administration showed flexibility in its demand of Chinese participation in the trilateral nuclear arms control talks with Russia. The US is now seeking a politically binding framework with Russia that covers all nuclear warheads, establishes a verification regime, and could include China in the future. Yet, there is divergence on key issues where Russia is demanding an unconditional extension of the Treaty, while the US administration opposes it with calling for limiting all types of nuclear warheads possessed by Russia as a condition for prolonging the Treaty.

The new arms control arrangement proposed by the US will be difficult for China to accept due to the existing asymmetry between their nuclear arsenals.US-China relations are proceeding in a downward spiral with accelerating trade war and failing bilateral engagements. Given the escalating level of mistrust, China would remain reluctant to join any bilateral or trilateral engagements with the US in near future or at least until the current leadership dissolves. Moreover, given the difference in the size of its nuclear arsenal vis-à-vis two of the biggest nuclear weapon states, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian called the US‘ neither serious nor sincere’ in the proposed negotiations and instead emphasized extension of the existing New START treaty limiting the number of nuclear warheads bilaterally.

There are several major reasons behind Chinese reluctance to join a trilateral arrangement of nuclear arms control. Firstly, the asymmetric nature of nuclear arsenals between the three states -where the US and Russia hold 20 times more nuclear warheads and more efficient delivery systems than China. The Chinese government also wants the US to cut down the number of its nuclear warheads from around 5 to 6 thousands to a few hundred and reach the level of China, which is rather unrealistic given the status of foremost nuclear weapon states, matured doctrines and evolving postures of both leading nuclear weapon states. Lastly, the current US administration and its policies aimed at containing China, is another major cause for concern at least till the presidential elections and formation of a new administration in the US.

Here, two predictive perspectives arise. Firstly, China is likely to remain reluctant towards the idea of its inclusion in any future arms control arrangement. Contrarily, the new administration -possibly Democrat – with strong advocacy of nuclear arms reduction, could convince China with its negotiable conditions in formulating a completely new framework of future nuclear arms control. The scope and dimension of such an arrangement will strengthen the general ambitions of arms control and disarmament globally. This is due to the fact that inclusion of a third-tier in such a strategic arms control accord may bring greater consensus and pave way towards future multilateral arrangements. Such arrangements would be able to attract other nuclear weapon states to demonstrate their credibility via increased responsible approach towards non-proliferation and arms control ambitions. Where it remains necessary to extend New START between the existing two party states, China’s inclusion maybe decisive in evaluating whether a major bilateral arms control would be equally successful once upgraded to three-tiered or multi-tiered structure or not.

Despite the current circumstances, a trilateral arms control model holds some individual gains for China and Russia. While accepting the proposition, along with the status of a strong contemporary economic power, China would step into the status of strategically significant power with the two foremost nuclear weapon states. Thus, providing China another reason to strengthen its regional hegemonic status. Russia supported Chinese stance of staying away from arms control accord because Russia finds it logical due to greater asymmetry in nuclear arsenal of Beijing vis-à-vis Moscow or Washington. Inclusion of third-tier in strategic arms control that has similar bitter and competitive relations with the US, would likely strengthen Sino-Russian joint position within the framework later.

The nature of an initial trilateral model could be one that has China as the arbitrator for cutting down the warhead numbers where future negotiations could be possible under equal criteria. The emerging cooperative nature of Russo-Chinese relations regionally, is another aspect that may convince China to join such arrangement that would directly put pressure on the US in any contradictory scenario or treaty formed under the trilateral model of nuclear arms control. Russia and China are moving closer to each other in the Asia-Pacific region, in terms of political and military competition with the US. This politico-military cooperation and mutual regional interests could later impel Russia to back the Chinese stance of bringing the ‘majority-rule criterion’ within the trilateral arms control agreements.

However, keeping in view the current stance of all three relevant parties, any progress in preserving the only major strategic arms control treaty between the US and Russia is now likely to occur post-US presidential elections.

 

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Gunmen kill 25 displaced people in Burkina Faso, UN says

Armed assailants have killed 25 displaced people in northern Burkina Faso as their convoy tried to make its way home, the United Nations refugee agency, UNHCR, said on Wednesday.

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Gunmen kill 25 displaced people in Burkina Faso, UN says

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Edward McAllister Reuters

Published
Oct 7, 2020 11:59AM EDT

DAKAR, Oct 7 (Reuters) - Armed assailants have killed 25 displaced people in northern Burkina Faso as their convoy tried to make its way home, the United Nations refugee agency, UNHCR, said on Wednesday.

The gunmen, who carried out the attack near the town of Pissila in the Center-North region on the night of Oct. 4, separated the men from the group and shot them. The women and children were let go, UNHCR said in a statement based on survivors' testimony.

"The attack on the (internally displaced people) occurred as they were returning to their homes from Pissila, hoping for an improved security situation there," the U.N. said.

Long an island of calm in a restive region, Burkina Faso has descended into violent chaos since 2018 as Islamist groups sowed ethnic discord and carried out multiple attacks.

This year alone, hundreds of people have been killed in dozens of attacks on civilians. Over 1 million people are displaced, more than one in every 20 inhabitants, the UN says.

(Reporting by Edward McAllister; Editing by Hereward Holland and Alexandra Hudson)

 

[jward]

Russia Reports Successful Test Launch of Hypersonic Missile
October 08, 2020




(Russian Defense Ministry Press Service via AP)

MOSCOW (AP) — Russian President Vladimir Putin on Wednesday hailed the successful test launch of a new Zircon hypersonic cruise missile as a “big event” for the country.
Speaking to Putin via a video call, Russian General Staff chief Valery Gerasimov said the test launch took place Tuesday from the Admiral Groshkov frigate located in the White Sea, in the north of Russia.

The missile successfully hit a target in the Barents Sea, he added.
“Equipping our Armed Forces — the army and the navy — with the latest, truly unparalleled weapon systems will certainly ensure the defense capability of our country in the long term,” said Putin, who was celebrating his 68th birthday Wednesday.
In 2019, Putin had said the Zircon would be capable of flying at nine times the speed of sound and have a range of 1,000 kilometers (620 miles).

Russia Reports Successful Test Launch of Hypersonic Missile

MOSCOW (AP) — Russian President Vladimir Putin on Wednesday hailed the successful test launch of a new Zircon hypersonic cruise missile as a “big event” for the country. Speaking to

www.realcleardefense.com

Russia Tests Anti-Ship Hypersonic Missile Against Sea Target

A Zircon missile was fired from a Russian frigate against a target in the Barents Sea.

By Steven Stashwick

October 08, 2020

A common hypersonic glide body launches from Pacific Missile Range Facility, Kauai, Hawaii, at approximately 10:30 p.m. local time, March 19, 2020, during a Department of Defense flight experiment.

Credit: Flickr/U.S. Pacific Fleet
On Tuesday the Russian Navy successfully tested its Zircon hypersonic cruise missile against a maritime target in the Barents Sea.

Russia’s state-owned TASS news agency reported that the missile was launched by the North Sea Fleet frigate Admiral Gorshkov, striking a maritime target 450 kilometers away and reaching a maximum speed of Mach 8. The Zircon was first tested from the Admiral Gorshkov against a land target in January and again in July.

The Zircon is a scramjet-propelled anti-ship cruise missile that has been under development since 2011. Russian President Vladimir Putin revealed in 2019 that the missiles will have a maximum range of 1,000 kilometers and that, following the dissolution of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces treaty with the United States in 2019, a mobile, land-based variant of the Zircon would be developed as well.

It was not reported whether Tuesday’s target was stationary or maneuvering when it was hit, leaving open questions about the effectiveness of the missile’s guidance and maneuverability. If the Zircon works as advertised, it would present a significant potential threat against any other navy’s surface fleet. The speed of maneuverable hypersonic weapons is so great that they are considered to be effectively impossible for targeted vessels to defend against.

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TASS earlier announced that the Zircon would also be test fired from a submarine in 2020 alongside the surface tests conducted by the Admiral Gorshkov, but those launches have not been reported to have taken place yet.

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The Zircon is launched from universal vertical launch tubes similar to the Vertical Launch System on U.S. Navy destroyers and cruisers. The Russian Navy’s Steregushchiy-class corvettes and Admiral Gorshkov-class frigates are equipped with this launching system. Russia has about six of these corvettes in service with 24 planned, and five frigates in active service out of a planned class of 15 vessels.

The U.S. Navy is also developing hypersonic missiles but is focusing on larger boost-glide systems that will be capable of much greater ranges and are more likely to be used for strikes against high-priority targets on land instead of against an adversary fleet.

The United States is attempting to develop defensive systems to shoot down an incoming hypersonic weapon, focusing on capabilities that can be fielded in the near term. Most of these efforts are being focused on the “glide phase” that longer-ranged boost-glide hypersonic systems utilize. These weapons are initially lofted to high altitudes using rockets or ballistic missiles before the weapon detaches and glides unpowered to its target at hypersonic speeds. Shorter-ranged scramjet weapons like the Zircon do not have this relatively lengthy glide phase and are powered for their entire flight.

Systems designed to intercept hypersonic weapons during an unpowered glide may not work against a scramjet-powered weapon. Instead, the U.S. Navy may have to rely on so-called “terminal phase” systems that try to hit incoming missiles just before they strike their targets, which may have much lower likelihood of success against hypersonic weapons. If the U.S. Navy cannot figure out a way to defend against anti-ship hypersonic weapons, they may have to find ways to sink the ships that carry them before they can be launched.
posted for fair use

Russia Tests Anti-Ship Hypersonic Missile Against Sea Target

A Zircon missile was fired from a Russian frigate against a target in the Barents Sea.

thediplomat.com

 

[jward]

Elon Musk and the U.S. military plan to build a reusable 7,500mph rocket that can deliver 80 tonnes of cargo, including weapons, anywhere in the world in 60 minutes

• SpaceX — and aerospace firm xArc — have signed a contract with the US forces
• A rocket could ship cargo from Florida to Afghanistan, for example, in an hour
• Such a journey by cargo plane presently takes around 15 hours to undertake
• SpaceX has landed reusable rockets before, but never with a full cargo payload
• The first experimental demos of the -principle are expected to begin next year

By Ian Randall For Mailonline

Published: 06:55 EDT, 9 October 2020 | Updated: 08:28 EDT, 9 October 2020

A cargo-delivery rocket that can deliver weapons via space to anywhere in the globe within an hour is being developed by Elon Musk's SpaceX for the US military.
The system would allow materials to be transported the 7,500-odd miles from Cape Canaveral, Florida, to the US-run Bagram airfield in Afghanistan in under an hour.
In contrast, a Boeing C-17 Globemaster III — a military transport aircraft the US owns a 233-strong fleet of, that can fly at maximum of 590mph — would take 15 hours.
The rocket will be able to carry an 80 ton payload, similar to that of a single C-17 — and proof-of-principle tests are expected to begin next year.

A cargo-delivery rocket that can deliver weapons and hardware to anywhere in the globe within an hour is being developed by Elon Musk's SpaceX for the US military. Pictured, a SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket is launched into orbit carrying a payload of communications satellites

The system would allow materials to be transported the 7,652 miles from Cape Canaveral, Florida, to the US-run Bagram airfield in Afghanistan in under an hour by rocket (yellow), as opposed to the 15 hours such a journey presently takes in a C-17 cargo plane (orange)
The collaboration — which will also include Texas aerospace firm xArc — was announced by US Transportation Command's General Stephen Lyons.
The first steps in the project will involve an assessment of the potential costs and challenges that will need to be overcome to deliver cargo globally in an hour.
'Think about the speed associated with that,' General Lyons said at the conference.
'I can tell you SpaceX is moving very, very rapidly in this area. I’m really excited about the team that’s working with SpaceX.'

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SpaceX has previously demonstrated the ability to vertically land and reuse the booster rockets for its Falcon 9 system onto drone ships out at sea.
However, the aerospace technology firm has never landed a rocket carrying a full payload — and the newly-proposed rocket would carry four times the cargo.
Beyond speed, one major advantage of ferry military cargo via rocket is that — at present — flying over another country via orbit does not require permission from foreign governments, unlike when transporting goods by air.
At present, each C-17 cargo aircraft cost the US military around $218 million — it is unclear at present how this, and operating costs, would compare with the rocket.

A Boeing C-17 Globemaster III (pictured) — a military transport aircraft which the US owns a 233-strong fleet of, that can fly at up to 590mph — would take 15 hours to ferry cargo from Florida to Afghanistan. SpaceX's proposed cargo rocket could make the journey within an hour
Key to the realisation of a rocket-based cargo-carrying system is the ability to ensure safe and accurate landings.
'We send humans up into space safely, so sending cargo via orbit is not a problem. The challenge will be bringing it down,' Douglas Barrie — an aerospace expert from the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies — told the Times.

'How would they bring it down, by parachute or controlled descent? And could it be guaranteed to arrive in the right place?'
Mr Barrie also questioned the cost and the very concept, adding: 'Normally you associate space-based delivery with intercontinental ballistic missiles.'
'What would be the urgency for sending military cargo through space?'
Video playing bottom right...
Click here to expand to full page


WHY DOES SPACEX RE-USE ROCKETS AND OTHER PARTS?
SpaceX tries to re-use rockets, payload fairings, boosters and other parts to try to cut down on the cost of each rocket mission.
The total cost of one of its Falcon 9 launches is estimated to reach £44 million ($61m), while each of its larger Falcon Heavy flights costs £65 million ($90m).
The space company has previously re-used first-stage and second-stage rocket boosters, in addition to one of its previously flown Dragon capsules.
The Dragon spacecraft are used as the final stage of SpaceX missions to resupply the International Space Station.


In an incredible accomplishment, the Falcon Heavy's reused side boosters landed smoothly back down to Earth on two separate launchpads about 8 minutes in.
SpaceX is currently testing a system to recover the fairings of its Falcon 9 rockets.
The payload fairings are clam shell-like nose cone halves that protect the craft's payload.
SpaceX recovered a payload fairing for the first time in 2017.
During its first Falcon Heavy launch in February 2018, the firm landed two of the firms side boosters simultaneously on separate launchpads.

Read more:

• Musk on new mission to deliver US military weapons by space | World | The Times

videos available at source
posted for fair use

SpaceX is developing a rocket to deliver weapons for the US military

The system would allow materials to be transported the 7,500-odd miles from Cape Canaveral, Florida, to the US' Bagram airfield in Afghanistan in under an hour.

www.dailymail.co.uk

 

[jward]

Small rotations to far-flung Southeast Asian countries are likely the future of INDOPACOM assignments

Meghann Myers

1 day ago

A C-130 Hercules delivered soldiers onto the newly renovated Angaur Airfield for training exercises in the Republic of Palau, Sept. 6, 2020. (Army)

HONOLULU — The days of U.S. troops concentrated in hubs like South Korea and Japan are about to be on the wane, as the Defense Department’s Indo-Pacific Command review takes a hard look at where it needs to be in order to counter China’s growing military might in that massive swath of the world.

The post-World War II order has focused on northeast Asia, with roughly 50,000 troops based in Japan and another 30,000 or so in South Korea. But that is likely to start shifting.
“I don’t think we’re looking to have fixed bases in fixed places, right?” an INDOPACOM official told reporters in Hawaii in early September.

DoD has been showing more interest in rotational deployments, rather than building new, large bases with all the infrastructure necessary to house troops as a duty station.
“I think that’s, one, too expensive. Two, I think that you rely, then, on all of the agreements that you have to have to do that, and time," the official said. “I think we have the opportunity to look across the whole South Pacific,” as a means staying close to China, “and fixed bases aren’t necessarily it.”

The department has been toying with this concept for several years now. In 2015, the 2nd Infantry Division announced it would bring home its South Korea-based brigade combat team, replacing it with heel-to-toe rotations.
Then in 2020, the Air Force pulled back its permanent bomber presence in Guam, replacing it with a rotational B-1 task force that will do the same mission.
Europe has seen a similar shift, starting with the Army in 2016, which began deploying an armor brigade on a rotational basis after bringing some Germany-based combat units back to the U.S.

DoD doubled down on that trend in July, announcing that not only would some units be moving from Germany to Belgium and Italy, but the entire 2nd Cavalry Regiment would be moving back to the states, to be replaced with a rotational force deploying to Eastern Europe.

Pentagon’s plan to rearrange forces in Europe gets the third degree from both sides of the aisle
Though the Pentagon has proposed moving 12,000 troops out of Germany, officials could not offer details about the cost or the proposed timeline for carrying out the plan.
Meghann Myers, Joe Gould, Aaron Mehta

That plan came out of a U.S. European Command review, which each combatant command has undergone or is currently undergoing. It’s also faced massive resistance from Congress, but it hasn’t deterred military leadership from singing the praises of rotational deployments.

What’s the deal with China?

When defense officials talk about the Indo-Pacific, they talk about it in relation to the U.S.'s souring relationship with China, as it continues to both build up its military and expand its influence in the world, whether that’s economic investment in Africa and South America, or quite literally expanding its “territory.”
“For example, it builds islands where none existed, and it puts runways and ports on them — and missiles,” John Schaus, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, told Military Times in August.

The People’s Liberation Army, China’s armed forces, have been on a modernization path, he added, which means that the U.S. has to continue to upgrade its own capabilities to stay ahead of the game.
Those developments are not necessarily a build-up to war, as experts agree that the Chinese government mostly seeks to grow its own position in the world, rather than take out any competitors.
“To the extent that China is either threatening, or flexing ― I think, in China’s mind, those are just different points on the same sliding scale,” Schaus said.

What war with China could look like
A host of scenarios could push China and the United States into some kind of conflict.
Todd South, Philip Athey, Diana Stancy Correll, Stephen Losey, Geoff Ziezulewicz, Meghann Myers, Howard Altman

But aside from equipment and manpower, the U.S. military’s edge has come from presence ― the ability to be at the right place, or get there quickly, in order to deter or tamp down on a conflict.
Since the mid-20th century, the U.S. forces have been massed in northeast Asia, most notably in Japan and South Korea.

But those relationships have been delicate. While military leaders sing the praises of the Republic of Korea’s armed forces and its relationship with U.S. troops stationed there, the Trump administration has demanded the country increase the roughly $1 billion it contributes to support the American presence there.
The White House has made the same ask of Japan, requesting an increase from $2 billion to $8 billion a year. Japan, in particular, has had a fraught relationship with its American guests.

“I think Japan is carefully considering what its military can and should do, and definitely would find ways to partner with the U.S. where that makes sense,” Schaus said.
The U.S. presence in those countries has ostensibly helped with deterring North Korea’s aggression, and as China has transformed its economic and military power, it’s been a reminder of the post-World War II order the U.S. is trying to maintain.

“Quite frankly, some of what we’ve seen from China suggests that they’re moving in the opposite direction,” David Helvey, who is performing the duties of the deputy assistant defense secretary for Indo-Pacific affairs, told reporters while visiting Hawaii, home of INDOPACOM headquarters, in early September, adding that China was undermining that dynamic, isolating itself.

‘In the U.S. column’

In an attempt to strike a balance against China’s expansion, the U.S. has been reaching out to Indo-Pacific nations.
Esper visited Hawaii in late August ― where he sat down with INDOPACOM leadership and held calls with several Indo-Pacific leaders ― as well as Guam, for a meeting with the then-Japanese defense minister. He also visited Palau, a long-time U.S. ally that just opened a runway suitable for landing C-130s carrying troops and cargo.

It was the first time that a defense secretary ever made his way to Palau, though civil affairs troops have been rotating there since the 1970s.
"I think, the Civic Action Teams — how can we replicate that in other countries?” Esper told Military Times following that trip. “It’s a high-payoff, low-cost way to get the teams out there. They’re just a good asset to do that diplomacy on the ground.”

Those CATs, primarily Navy Seabees, but more recently, Army and Air Force engineers, have mostly done community projects during their deployments. That includes free car repairs, building playgrounds and running an apprenticeship program for locals.
The Palau runway project was completed this summer and opens up that country — about 2,700 miles southeast of China — as a possible U.S. military transportation hub.

"These are minor muscle movements that could lead, eventually, to a major muscle movement,” Esper said. “So you get small teams like this out there doing the groundwork, forging the diplomacy.”
DoD has its eye on that model for other countries, according to the INDOPACOM official.

“Vietnam, should they continue to open up with us, I think there’s some great opportunity there,” he said.
Along the Mekong Delta, in southern Vietnam, he added, there’s opportunity: “Whether that’s with small CATs that can help with dam construction or dam preservation, there’s work all the way around the corner,” he added, from China’s eastern shore to its southern and western neighbors.

There are similar opportunities in Papua New Guinea, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Sri Lanka and Indonesia, he added, based on the willingness of those countries' militaries to collaborate.
“There was some sense at one point that we don’t have any opportunity in Cambodia — I would disagree,” he said.

The possibility is still up in the air, following the removal of a U.S.-built facility on one of its naval bases, which it denies was in preparation for a Chinese presence there.
“And I think it is indicative of how the region realizes that, if you want to have a rules-based international order, you’ve got to be part of it,” he said.

After postponing a scheduled March trip due to the coronavirus pandemic, Esper also has plans to visit India — the very key “Indo” in the recently re-branded INDOPACOM.
It’s “not necessarily about directly countering the Chinese, but bringing countries into the U.S. column,” through offering support, Schaus said, in a situation where China might come offering economic investment in an attempt to curry favor.

Long a more neutral party in the China-U.S. geopolitical tension, India’s run-ins with Chinese troops along its border have created an opening for more cooperation with the U.S.
This summer, a battle killed 20 Indian soldiers after a stand-off. In dispute is tens of thousands of square miles of the Himalayan mountains, which China has laid claim to, while India insists they are occupying it.

“I think they’ve seen here that they’ve got to be careful, too,” the INDOPACOM official said. “China’s pushing everywhere.”
But troops in every country is not necessarily on the table.

“I think it’s probably unrealistic to expect a larger U.S. permanent presence, at least in the near- to mid-term,” Schaus said, when asked whether more troops would keep China in check. “But I think a reduction in presence would similarly send a bad signal about U.S. commitment.”

What’s more likely, he added, is more joint exercises ― maybe not larger ones, like the Japan-India-U.S. Malabar, or even last year’s bilateral Tiger Triumph ― but smaller, more targeted training opportunities that focus on the the capabilities that would best help India defend itself.

“I think it’ll probably be a mix,” in terms of conventional and special operations forces," Schaus said, and probably more on the training side, rather than counter-terror. “The kinds of special operations activity that we will be more interested in going forward, if China remains a primary pacing rival in the region, will be different than what we’ve been doing with countries for the last 20 years or so.”

Heading south

“As you look at all of those things, that can be a little off-balance,” the INDOPACOM official said of current U.S. basing. “And if we’re trying to have some sort of capability or capacity, should we have to go to what we don’t want — nobody wants to have any sort of conflict — but should you have to do that, I can’t be myopically focused.”

Marine Corps activates first new base in nearly 70 years
Camp Blaz will soon be the home of nearly 5,000 Marines of III Marine Expeditionary Force, currently based on Okinawa, Japan.
Philip Athey

This has been in the works for years, with the construction of Marine Corps Camp Blaz, Guam. By roughly 2025, the plan is to move 5,000 Okinawa, Japan-based Marines to Guam.
The permanent base had been in the works since 2006, with a long process to get there. Carved out of the island jungle, it required first selecting and leveling a site.

Digging up the ground proved to be the real challenge on an island with thousands of years of indigenous history.
Working with Guam’s State Historic Preservation office, “every time we find a discovery, to figure out what the disposition is going to be ― and if it’s human remains, for example, will determine what’s going to happen with the human remains, whether it’s going to remain in place or whether it will be moved into a storage facility,” Lt. Cmdr. Rick Moore, spokesman for Joint Region Marianas, told Military Times in late August.

In addition to human remains, site excavators found cultural artifacts and other sensitive items, each time slowing the construction process.
“So we have a ... cultural repository in coordination with the University of Guam and the Guam Museum, where a large amount of historic artifacts and culturally valuable items are going to be placed in a climate-controlled facility,” Moore said.

Though Blaz officially opened in early October, barracks and other buildings still need to be constructed.
“Some of the Marines will be permanently assigned to Guam, some will be on a rotational basis,” Moore said.

Recent research has shown that permanent basing, even with the cost of facilities to support a full-time military community, costs less than rotational deployments, but DoD continues to beat the drum for rotations despite the theoretical cost.
The ultimate plan will probably be a hybrid rotational-permanent model, the INDOPACOM official said, adding, “and that’s not trying to be wishy-washy.”

The INDOPACOM review was expected to be finished by the end of September, but a senior defense official told Military Times that there’s no planned roll-out for its results.


https://www.militarytimes.com/news/...ely-the-future-of-indopacom-assignments/About Meghann Myers

 

[Housecarl]

Elon Musk and the U.S. military plan to build a reusable 7,500mph rocket that can deliver 80 tonnes of cargo, including weapons, anywhere in the world in 60 minutes

• SpaceX — and aerospace firm xArc — have signed a contract with the US forces
• A rocket could ship cargo from Florida to Afghanistan, for example, in an hour
• Such a journey by cargo plane presently takes around 15 hours to undertake
• SpaceX has landed reusable rockets before, but never with a full cargo payload
• The first experimental demos of the -principle are expected to begin next year

By Ian Randall For Mailonline

Published: 06:55 EDT, 9 October 2020 | Updated: 08:28 EDT, 9 October 2020

A cargo-delivery rocket that can deliver weapons via space to anywhere in the globe within an hour is being developed by Elon Musk's SpaceX for the US military.
The system would allow materials to be transported the 7,500-odd miles from Cape Canaveral, Florida, to the US-run Bagram airfield in Afghanistan in under an hour.
In contrast, a Boeing C-17 Globemaster III — a military transport aircraft the US owns a 233-strong fleet of, that can fly at maximum of 590mph — would take 15 hours.
The rocket will be able to carry an 80 ton payload, similar to that of a single C-17 — and proof-of-principle tests are expected to begin next year.

A cargo-delivery rocket that can deliver weapons and hardware to anywhere in the globe within an hour is being developed by Elon Musk's SpaceX for the US military. Pictured, a SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket is launched into orbit carrying a payload of communications satellites

The system would allow materials to be transported the 7,652 miles from Cape Canaveral, Florida, to the US-run Bagram airfield in Afghanistan in under an hour by rocket (yellow), as opposed to the 15 hours such a journey presently takes in a C-17 cargo plane (orange)
The collaboration — which will also include Texas aerospace firm xArc — was announced by US Transportation Command's General Stephen Lyons.
The first steps in the project will involve an assessment of the potential costs and challenges that will need to be overcome to deliver cargo globally in an hour.
'Think about the speed associated with that,' General Lyons said at the conference.
'I can tell you SpaceX is moving very, very rapidly in this area. I’m really excited about the team that’s working with SpaceX.'

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• It's the new Concorde! Jet start-up company Boom unveils...
• Astronauts aboard the International Space Station receive...
• Elon Musk's SpaceX wins $149 million contract to build..
• . Elon Musk's SpaceX provides Washington towns ravaged by...

SpaceX has previously demonstrated the ability to vertically land and reuse the booster rockets for its Falcon 9 system onto drone ships out at sea.
However, the aerospace technology firm has never landed a rocket carrying a full payload — and the newly-proposed rocket would carry four times the cargo.
Beyond speed, one major advantage of ferry military cargo via rocket is that — at present — flying over another country via orbit does not require permission from foreign governments, unlike when transporting goods by air.
At present, each C-17 cargo aircraft cost the US military around $218 million — it is unclear at present how this, and operating costs, would compare with the rocket.

A Boeing C-17 Globemaster III (pictured) — a military transport aircraft which the US owns a 233-strong fleet of, that can fly at up to 590mph — would take 15 hours to ferry cargo from Florida to Afghanistan. SpaceX's proposed cargo rocket could make the journey within an hour
Key to the realisation of a rocket-based cargo-carrying system is the ability to ensure safe and accurate landings.
'We send humans up into space safely, so sending cargo via orbit is not a problem. The challenge will be bringing it down,' Douglas Barrie — an aerospace expert from the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies — told the Times.

'How would they bring it down, by parachute or controlled descent? And could it be guaranteed to arrive in the right place?'
Mr Barrie also questioned the cost and the very concept, adding: 'Normally you associate space-based delivery with intercontinental ballistic missiles.'
'What would be the urgency for sending military cargo through space?'
Video playing bottom right...
Click here to expand to full page


WHY DOES SPACEX RE-USE ROCKETS AND OTHER PARTS?
SpaceX tries to re-use rockets, payload fairings, boosters and other parts to try to cut down on the cost of each rocket mission.
The total cost of one of its Falcon 9 launches is estimated to reach £44 million ($61m), while each of its larger Falcon Heavy flights costs £65 million ($90m).
The space company has previously re-used first-stage and second-stage rocket boosters, in addition to one of its previously flown Dragon capsules.
The Dragon spacecraft are used as the final stage of SpaceX missions to resupply the International Space Station.


In an incredible accomplishment, the Falcon Heavy's reused side boosters landed smoothly back down to Earth on two separate launchpads about 8 minutes in.
SpaceX is currently testing a system to recover the fairings of its Falcon 9 rockets.
The payload fairings are clam shell-like nose cone halves that protect the craft's payload.
SpaceX recovered a payload fairing for the first time in 2017.
During its first Falcon Heavy launch in February 2018, the firm landed two of the firms side boosters simultaneously on separate launchpads.

Read more:

• Musk on new mission to deliver US military weapons by space | World | The Times

videos available at source
posted for fair use

SpaceX is developing a rocket to deliver weapons for the US military

The system would allow materials to be transported the 7,500-odd miles from Cape Canaveral, Florida, to the US' Bagram airfield in Afghanistan in under an hour.

www.dailymail.co.uk

Hummmm.....I recall seeing proposals along these lines from the 60's. That being said, such a launcher would make the SS-18 look like a kid's toy....

 

[danielboon]

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1316124346373505024

View: https://mobile.twitter.com/AFP/status/1316124346373505024

 

[Housecarl]

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1316124346373505024

View: https://mobile.twitter.com/AFP/status/1316124346373505024

Regardless of Russia's "cooperation" with Beijing, Moscow's biggest concern is future aggressive actions by the CCP against their far east territory as well as rising radicalized Muslim expansion, to include now Turkish actions. The Russianswer don't have the boots to counter this, only the firepower.