WAR 09-04-2021-to-09-10-2021__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

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(486) 08-14-2021-to-08-20-2021__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

(487) 08-21-2021-to-08-27-2021__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

(488) 08-28-2021-to-09-03-2021__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

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Seoul nearing completion of massive ballistic missiles

Seoul nearing completion of massive ballistic missiles

www.koreatimes.co.kr

Posted : 2021-09-04 09:00
Updated : 2021-09-04 09:24

Seoul nearing completion of massive ballistic missiles

Critics say ballistic missiles still not comparable to strategic nuclear weapons

By Jung Da-min

The military is seeking to develop massive ballistic missiles, which some believe hold the same destructive power as tactical nuclear weapons.

According to the Ministry of National Defense's mid-term defense plan for 2022 to 2026, announced Thursday, South Korea is planning to deploy a variety of surface-to-surface missiles with increased destructive power that can be launched from land or sea.

The ministry's latest five-year plan has raised expectations among military watchers that the ballistic missiles are expected to be deployed within the given period.

According to Yonhap News, the military has almost completed the development of a surface-to-surface ballistic missile that can carry a warhead with a weight of up to three tons, and is expected to determine the timing of its introduction to the military after a series of test launches.

While some military watchers say the massive ballistic missile will increase South Korea's arms competitiveness, bringing a similar effect to having strategic nuclear weapons, critics said such a ballistic missile, even if powerful enough to destroy underground facilities in North Korea, is still not comparable to a strategic nuclear weapon, thus leaving Seoul still vulnerable to Pyongyang's nuclear arsenal.

Shin Jong-woo, a senior researcher at the Korea Defense and Security Forum, said the development of ballistic missiles with heavier warheads was already underway and has been accelerated especially after a South Korea-U.S. summit in May, in which President Moon Jae-in and U.S. President Joe Biden agreed to terminate U.S. missile guidelines on South Korea that have long restricted Seoul's development of missiles.

Shin said ballistic missiles with heavier warheads would be able to destroy underground facilities, but deploying them is still not the same as deploying far more powerful strategic nuclear weapons.

"South Korea has been boosting its military budget and developing weapons including ballistic missiles, but it has not being effective in terms of costs, when nuclear weapons are much more powerful than others," Shin said.

Nevertheless, other military watchers said it is still important for the South to develop more powerful weapons to counter military threats from the North.

"Pyongyang has been urging the South to stop deploying more powerful weapons while saying it is a condition for dialogue, but unless it stops its nuclear development, Seoul is also urged to prepare for possible military threats from the North," said Moon Sung-mook, a senior researcher at the Korea Research Institute for National Strategy.

So far, the South's military and the state-run Agency for Defense Development have developed ballistic missiles, including the Hyunmoo-2A with a payload weight of 1.5 tons, the Hyunmoo-2B with a one-ton carrying capacity and the Hyunmoo-2C cruise missile capable of delivering a warhead weighing two tons.

If successfully developed, the new three-ton ballistic missile is expected to be able to penetrate tens of meters underground, destroying tunnels, command posts and underground missile silos. The ballistic missile is reportedly able to strike all parts of North Korea within its range of 350 to 400 kilometers, if launched from close to the border area.

"According to the termination of the U.S. missiles guidelines on South Korea in May, the newly developed missiles would be able to destroy tunnels and buildings, while the existing ones were for striking aboveground targets. We will develop a missile with improved precision by reducing the error area from the size of a tennis court to the size of a building entrance," the defense ministry said.

damin.jung@koreatimes.co.kr

 

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More than 20 arrested in raid on Oregon marijuana farm run by cartel, deputies say

Investigators said they've seized thousands of marijuana plants from an illegal farm in Deschutes County apparently run by a Mexican cartel. The Deschutes County Sheriff's Office said on Thursday it searched the 30-acre property in Alfalfa. >>More Local News. Deputies said they seized more than...

katu.com

Raid on Oregon marijuana farm run by cartel nets thousands of plants, deputies say
by KATU Staff
Friday, September 3rd 2021

6
VIEW ALL PHOTOS

An aerial view of a section of the marijuana farm raided by authorities. (Photo: Deschutes County Sheriff's Office)

ALFALFA, Ore. — Investigators said they've seized thousands of marijuana plants from an illegal farm in Deschutes County apparently run by a Mexican cartel.

The Deschutes County Sheriff's Office said on Thursday it searched the 30-acre property in Alfalfa.

>>More Local News
Deputies said they seized more than 9,000 marijuana plants, 2,800 pounds of processed marijuana, and firearms on the farm.

They believe the farm was operated by an illegal Mexican drug cartel, which trafficked people to the farm to work.
More than 20 people were detained and then later released. Many others fled.

Detectives said arrests are likely.

 

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Joint US-Australian Hypersonic Cruise Missile Moves Ahead - Breaking Defense

SCIFiRE is aimed at maturing an air-breathing hypersonic conventional cruise missile launched from either a fighter or a bomber.

breakingdefense.com

• AIR WARFARE, GLOBAL

Joint US-Australian Hypersonic Cruise Missile Moves Ahead
SCIFiRE is aimed at maturing an air-breathing hypersonic conventional cruise missile launched from either a fighter or a bomber.

By THERESA HITCHENS
on September 03, 2021 at 12:04 PM

WASHINGTON: The Defense Department’s joint effort with Australia to develop an air-breathing hypersonic cruise missile took a step forward yesterday, with the Air Force issuing round-two contract options to Boeing and Lockheed Martin.

The program, called Southern Cross Integrated Flight Research Experiment (SCIFiRE), is aimed at maturing “a solid-rocket boosted, air-breathing, hypersonic conventional cruise missile, air-launched from existing fighter/bomber aircraft, through the completion of a preliminary design review,” according to the DoD contract announcement.

The joint program — signed into existence by DoD and Australia’s Ministry of Defense Last November — is an Allied Prototyping Initiative (API) under the the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering. It is being executed by the Air Force. And as with all things hypersonic, the service is not being super forthcoming about what exact technologies are being developed on what exact timetable.

“The new weapon will be a Mach 5-class precision strike missile that is propulsion-launched and powered by an air-breathing scramjet engine,” states the Australian Air Force website. “It will be capable of being carried by tactical fighter aircraft such as the F/A-18F Super Hornet, EA-18G Growler and F-35A Lightning II, as well as the P-8A Poseidon maritime surveillance aircraft.”

SCIFiRE is an outgrowth of a previous US-Australian collaboration, begun in 2007, called the Hypersonic International Flight Research Experimentation (HIFiRE) program, which aimed to develop baseline hypersonic technologies. “The most recent HIFiRE test, successfully conducted in July 2017, explored the flight dynamics of a Mach 8 hypersonic glide vehicle, while previous tests explored scramjet engine technologies,” explains the Congressional Research Service (CRS) in a report updated Aug. 25.

SCIFiRE, CRS explains, is aimed at furthering air-breathing hypersonic technologies, with demo tests “expected by the mid -2020s.” A key advantage for DoD in working with its Australian counterparts is the Woomera Test Range, which is one of the largest weapons test facilities in the world. “Australia reportedly operates seven hypersonic wind tunnels and is capable of testing speeds of up to Mach 30,” CRS notes.

According to a March Government Accountability Office report, SCIFiRE intends “to demonstrate an operational hypersonic cruise missile through two to four flight tests,” with the effort being viewed by the Air Force as a bridge between the joint DARPA-Air Force Hypersonic Air-breathing Weapon Concept (HAWC) project.

The Air Force chose Boeing, Lockheed Martin and Raytheon in June to compete in an initial effort, bringing their designs through Systems Requirements Review. It awarded contracts with potential values of up to $47.2 million to Boeing, $33.5 million to Lockheed Martin and $33.7 million to Raytheon under an options scheme.

Yesterday, the Air Force exercised follow-on contract options for Boeing and Lockheed to continue work through next August to take the program through Phase 1 Preliminary Design Review. The award to Boeing was worth $39.7 million; to Lockheed Martin, $27.2 million.

While Raytheon has not been granted a follow-on option at this time, a spokesperson said today that this does not equate to the company being cut from the program. “We continue to work the program elements we’ve already been awarded,” the spokesperson said. (This statement likely means that the issue is timing — so keep an eye open for another Air Force announcement.)

Hypersonic cruise missiles would be smaller than the boost-glide systems that use a conventional rocket boosters to accelerate the weapon to Mach 5-plus, after which the glide body containing the warhead detaches from the booster and coasts, skipping along the upper limits of the atmosphere like a stone across a pond.

The beauty of air-breathing missiles powered by scramjets — at least for the Air Force — is that they can be made smaller, and thus can be carried by fighter jets and not just larger bomber aircraft. They also are potentially cheaper.
The downside is that hypersonic cruise missile tech, at least up to now, hasn’t been considered as mature as boost-glide capability (some 56% of current DoD investment in hypersonic missiles is in boost-glide systems, according to GAO).
That said, the Air Force has been struggling to get its signature boost-glide effort, the AGM-183 Air Launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW), off the ground. ARRW, for which Lockheed Martin is the prime contractor, in July flopped a second flight test because its motor failed to ignite.

 

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This "Ghost Fleet" Ship Firing An SM-6 Missile From A Modular Launcher Is A Glimpse Of The Future

Adding modular weapons launchers to the Navy's experimental unmanned vessels will allow the service to explore new distributed warfare concepts.

www.thedrive.com

This "Ghost Fleet" Ship Firing An SM-6 Missile From A Modular Launcher Is A Glimpse Of The Future
Adding modular weapons launchers to the Navy's experimental unmanned vessels will allow the service to explore new distributed warfare concepts.

BY TYLER ROGOWAY
SEPTEMBER 3, 2021

• THE WAR ZONE

The U.S. Department of Defense has just given us our first glimpse of what will likely be a common sight in the future—smaller ships, some of which will be unmanned or minimally manned, sporting modular launchers capable of firing the most advanced standoff weapons in the inventory. In this case, the launcher shown was used to fire an SM-6 missile, which is quickly becoming one of the most relevant and flexible weapons in the Pentagon's entire arsenal.

The DoD posted a video of the Unmanned Surface Vessel (USV) Ranger testing a containerized four-pack SM-6 launcher. Ranger is an experimental vessel that is part of the service's Ghost Fleet Overlord program aimed at defining unmanned warship capabilities and their concepts of operations, which you can read more about in this past piece of ours.


US NAVY VIDEO SCREENCAP
USV Ranger with the launcher and communications systems on its payload deck.

SM-6 is capable of swatting down air-breathing threats, such as fixed-wing planes, helicopters, and cruise missiles, while also being able to intercept ballistic missiles during their terminal phase of flight. In addition, SM-6 also has a secondary strike capability, and is able to hit fixed targets on land and moving targets, such as ships, at sea with great precision over long ranges. Its high-speed and quasi-ballistic missile mode of attack makes it hard to defend against. The type is also being developed as potentially a key component of future hypersonic weapons defense architecture.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1433852377870839808

View: https://twitter.com/DeptofDefense/status/1433852377870839808?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1433852377870839808%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.thedrive.com%2Fthe-war-zone%2F42254%2Fvideo-of-ghost-fleet-ship-firing-an-sm-6-missile-from-a-modular-launcher-is-a-glimpse-of-the-future


The U.S. Army is now also pursuing the SM-6, which is slated to get a big leap in performance in its next-generation form, as well. The U.S. Army will employ SM-6 on land, primarily against land targets, but it could also potentially be used as a networked interceptor to counter aerial, hypersonic, and ballistic missile threats, as well as in an anti-ship role.



THE PENTAGON IS ADDING TWO MORE LARGE UNMANNED SURFACE VESSELS TO ITS GHOST FLEET PROGRAMBy Brett TingleyPosted in THE WAR ZONE
THE ARMY HAS OFFICIALLY SELECTED THE NAVY'S SM-6 MISSILE TO BE USED IN A STRIKE ROLEBy Tyler RogowayPosted in THE WAR ZONE
NAVY SM-6 MISSILE SUCCESSFULLY HIT A TARGET BARGE DURING BIG MANNED-UNMANNED TEAMING TESTBy Joseph TrevithickPosted in THE WAR ZONE
AUSTAL'S LIGHT AMPHIBIOUS WARSHIP DESIGN IS A THROWBACK TO WWII'S TANK LANDING SHIPSBy Thomas NewdickPosted in THE WAR ZONE
NAVY SM-6 MISSILE WILL ATTEMPT TO SWAT DOWN A MOCK HYPERSONIC WEAPONBy Joseph TrevithickPosted in THE WAR ZONE

With this in mind, and considering the weapon's networking capabilities, deploying it aboard ships in a containerized manner is a no-brainer. Working essentially as distributed weapons platforms, these ships could spread out over great distances and launch on targets remotely with cueing from off-platform sensors arranged throughout the battlespace, such as on major surface combatants, fighter aircraft, airborne sensor aircraft, space satellites, and much more. Networked weapons concepts like this—where they do not have to rely on targeting from their launch platform—will enable the Pentagon's future "kill-web" that will range over thousands, not hundreds, of miles.

USN
SM-6 launch from a cruiser's Mk4 41 VLS

The launcher could have larger implications itself. It is probable, not just possible, that it could launch other weapons that are compatible with the Navy's Mk 41 vertical launch system (VLS), as well as possibly others. Even if it could just also handle BGM-109 Tomahawk cruise missiles, it would provide incredible flexibility that can be deployed virtually anywhere. This includes on the ground. In fact, this could have direct commonality with the launcher the Army envisions for both the SM-6 and the Tomahawk.

TWITTER SCREENCAP/USN VIDEO
The launcher seen aboard Ranger in the Navy's new video.

In fact, the launcher seen in the Navy's video appears to be the same one, or at least a very close evolutionary cousin of, the modular four-cell launcher we have recently seen associated with the updated land-based Tomahawk. It was used to execute the first land-launched Tomahawk test since the end of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. You can read all about that test and the launcher in this article of ours.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1294302271094820866

View: https://twitter.com/USArmsControl/status/1294302271094820866?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1294302271094820866%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.thedrive.com%2Fthe-war-zone%2F42254%2Fvideo-of-ghost-fleet-ship-firing-an-sm-6-missile-from-a-modular-launcher-is-a-glimpse-of-the-future

DOD
Land-based Tomahawk test from a modular four-cell launcher shortly after the end of the INF treaty.

In the naval domain alone, such a modular system, along with communications needed to connect to networks that are tied to command and control elements, could be deployed on pretty much any ship. That includes potential unmanned assets, as well as existing manned ones, like support and replenishment ships. This is a concept that the Navy has been eyeing for some time. The Navy's forthcoming smaller ships designed specifically to support U.S. Marines' distributed operations could also field such a containerized system. Even commercial vessels could be quickly drafted into the role as distributed weapons nodes during a conflict.

Finally, the Coast Guard could leverage such a concept for its future icebreakers which will face an increasingly contested environment in the Arctic. Deploying such containerized systems is already something the Coast Guard is mulling over for these new vessels.

The bottom line here is that this little video is certainly a glimpse of what's to come. As the Navy continues to wrestle with the vast operational, tactical, and strategic challenges that the Pacific Theater, in particular, represents, moving to a highly distributed and platform-diversified combat strategy won't just be advantageous, it will be essential. This new launcher, and the further leveraging of the SM-6, as well as distributing these capabilities across what will be the truly massive battlefields of the future, are absolutely key components in preparing for this new reality in modern warfare.

Contact the author: Tyler@thedrive.com

 

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ANZUS at 70: Extended nuclear deterrence | The Strategist

The extent to which the ANZUS Treaty turns upon the US provision of a nuclear umbrella to its smaller ally is a topic both complex and controversial. J.G. Starke opined that, while the treaty certainly ...

www.aspistrategist.org.au

ANZUS at 70: Extended nuclear deterrence

7 Sep 2021 | Rod Lyon

The extent to which the ANZUS Treaty turns upon the US provision of a nuclear umbrella to its smaller ally is a topic both complex and controversial. J.G. Starke opined that, while the treaty certainly didn’t prohibit resort to nuclear weapons in fulfilment of acting ‘to meet the common danger’, a simple test of proportionality meant the common danger would have to be virtually existential.

Some believe that Australia doesn’t face existential threats, and therefore that any US commitment to resort to nuclear weapons in defence of Australia is meaningless. Others have argued that the US has never provided any such public commitment anyway—that Australia has occasionally claimed such protection, but without any direct confirmation from a US president (the person who would need to approve the use of US nuclear weapons).

Moreover, the supposed nuclear relationship seems, at first glance, to find little expression in direct defence cooperation. There are no specific ‘nuclear sharing’ arrangements of the sort that the US has with some of its NATO allies, for example, under which the host country supplies and operates tactical-range delivery vehicles and the US supplies and controls the nuclear warheads.

But parts of that picture are misleading. The second clause of the Nixon Doctrine, for example, does offer a general nuclear assurance to US allies in Asia. The joint facilities do constitute a unique and highly prized form of alliance nuclear sharing. Moreover, some readers will remember that the ANZUS alliance broke apart precisely over the issue of extended nuclear deterrence when New Zealand declared itself nuclear-free back in the mid-1980s—and interpreted that to mean that its own ally’s nuclear-powered or -armed vessels couldn’t enter the country’s ports or airfields.

Bob Hawke, the Australian prime minister at the time, underlined the policy difference between Canberra and Wellington, insisting that Australia couldn’t claim the benefits of nuclear deterrence if it wasn’t prepared to contribute to it.

But the ending of the Cold War, a decade of US unipolarity in the 1990s, and a subsequent focus on the ‘war on terror’ post-9/11 has meant that—in the intervening years—Australian policymakers typically haven’t had to spend much time contemplating issues relating to the nuclear side of the alliance.

That’s changing fast. Nuclear weapons may have been of marginal interest to Australian governments in the quarter-century following the end of the Cold War but, in recent years, that interest has returned with a vengeance, driven by a series of ominous geopolitical events: more competitive great-power relations, a rapidly shifting power balance in Asia, the apparent weakening of US commitment to its allies—and even to a liberal world order—under the Trump administration, and the growing risk of a more densely proliferated nuclear world (advertised by North Korea’s successes in its nuclear-testing and ballistic-missile programs).

The strongest evidence of a new, heightened, Australian engagement with the central questions of extended deterrence comes from the defence strategic update of 2020, and the apparent rejection of US extended deterrence that unfolds there. With remarkable aplomb, the document notes that US conventional and nuclear weapons have been central to the deterrence of nuclear attack on Australia, but then abruptly states that Australia intends to become more self-reliant in deterring adversaries.

The text of paragraph 2.22 of the update carries weighty implications, suggesting as it does a willingness to move towards an independent Australian nuclear capability. The growth of Australian interest in long-range offensive strike capabilities seems to complement that shift in declaratory policy.

Both the shift in language and new interest in long-range missile technologies, including land-strike capabilities, suggest that some important judgements have been made behind closed doors in Canberra. Those judgements apparently concern the broader durability of the US alliance system in general, and the waning credibility of US extended nuclear deterrence in particular. But, if so, the government has been reticent about building a public consensus around those decisions.

Such reticence is understandable. For one thing, Australians aren’t used to thinking about nuclear weapons as direct contributors to the country’s defence; they’re more inclined to see them as abstract contributors to global order. Moreover, there’s certainly no bipartisan consensus on the question of an Australian nuclear-weapon program. Given that any such program would straddle decades, embarking on such a course in the absence of some degree of bipartisan consensus would probably be a recipe for failure.

Then there are the challenges the country would face in the diplomatic, technical and strategic realms. If it wished to build a nuclear arsenal, Australia would have to leave the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and abrogate the Treaty of Rarotonga (the foundation document of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone). It would need to acquire fissile materials, construct a safe, reliable nuclear warhead, and either build or purchase a delivery vehicle appropriate to its needs. And it would need a strategic policy that explained to potential adversaries, allies and neighbours just how Australia envisaged using its nuclear arsenal.

All in all, that’s a challenging set of policy hurdles. With a new administration in the White House, perhaps both allies will be more prepared for a serious discussion about extended nuclear deterrence and what comes after.

This post is an excerpt from ANZUS at 70: the past, present and future of the alliance, published by ASPI with support from the American Chamber of Commerce in Australia and edited by Patrick Walters.

AUTHOR
Rod Lyon is a senior fellow at ASPI. Image: Ray Tang/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images.

 

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The Danger of an Inadequate Nuclear Threat Assessment

Every U.S. operational plan in the Department of Defense rests on the assumption that strategic nuclear deterrence will hold.

nationalinterest.org

September 6, 2021 Topic: Nuclear Strategy Region: Americas Tags: NuclearWeaponsStockpileChinaRussia


The Danger of an Inadequate Nuclear Threat Assessment
Every U.S. operational plan in the Department of Defense rests on the assumption that strategic nuclear deterrence will hold.

by Peter Huessy

The vice commander of the U.S. Strategic Command told a Mitchell Institute nuclear seminar forum on August 27 that China may replace Russia as the top nuclear-capable adversary of the United States. Lt. Gen. Thomas Bussiere said he was concerned about the recent discovery that China is building up to four hundred new intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) silos in Western China. This construction could be completed within the next two to four years if it is done at a pace not unlike that of the United States when it constructed its original Minuteman ICBMs. The missile slated for deployment in these silos would be the Chinese Dongfeng-41, which can carry six to ten warheads.

When is the crossover point? Is it when China actually deploys more nuclear weapons than Russia? “We believe, in the next few years,” Bussiere said. While the two nations have differing national objectives, there are indications that those nations are “cooperating across different spectrums and presenting a cooperative deterrence model,” he said.

Bussiere noted that “both China and Russia have the ability to unilaterally escalate a conflict to any level of violence in any domain, in any geographic location, at any time, with any instrument of their national power . . . we haven’t faced a . . . global situation like that in 30-plus years,” according to the Air Force Association’s John Tirpak. And while China will soon exceed Russia force capability, “there is no framework under which to negotiate arms limits with China, and China has expressed no interest in creating one,” Bussiere said.

Bussiere’s warning may come as a surprise to many national security specialists. Depending upon the source one references, China is often assumed today to want only a limited arsenal, on the order of no more than 250-350 warheads in its deployed nuclear force, consisting of a limited number of land-based fixed and mobile ICBMs, some submarine-launched missiles, and a modernizing strategic bomber force.

This current force has long been described by the Chinese government and similarly mimicked by many western analysts, including some U.S. intelligence agencies, as a “small minimal deterrent,” which is largely passive, with China overall described as a non-threatening economic and nuclear power characterized by a “peaceful rise.”

Less common is the view that China may already have a deployed nuclear force approaching 1000-3000 warheads as asserted by a number of U.S. experts on the subject such as Rick Fisher, Brad Thayer, Peter Pry and Mark Schneider.
However, whatever size China’s nuclear arsenal may currently be, it is dramatically growing to a level that could be equal to or be greater than the entirety of the current U.S. or Russian deployed strategic nuclear force.

There are at least three serious implications of the size of the Chinese build, which would require a robust analysis by Congress—such as within the U.S.-China Commission—or by the U.S. intelligence community.

First, the Russian strategic, long-range warheads (under New START Treaty limits) potentially available for deployment exceed that of the United States. Second, Russia’s shorter range, theater nuclear forces (under no arms deal limits) are at least now 400 percent of the U.S. total. These things are happening under the shadow of a new, third element: China’s deployed nuclear warheads. These warheads have not been part of an arms control framework (no arms deal restricts China’s nuclear forces) or an explicit new threat for sizing the U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent force.

Here the question is simple. Do numbers matter? Does the size of the U.S.-deployed nuclear arsenal—90 percent of which is bounded by the 2010 New START Treaty with Russia—now have to be examined in light of the major Chinese build-up? Does the future hold an environment where during a crisis the United States could be facing as many as five thousand combined strategic warheads held by Russia and China?

Deterrence in the current geostrategic landscape is often considered viable as long as the United States has a secure, credible retaliatory capability—even under scenarios where the United States fully rides out an enemy first strike and even if the United States was deploying its forces on a day-to-day non-generated peacetime pace.

Here some background is important.

Many in the disarmament community do not believe numbers matter in terms of securing deterrence as long as the United States can inflict serious damage to an adversary, which is often usefully described as the number of cities that it could attack. The founder of Global Zero, Bruce Blair, testified before Congress in 2019 that 300-600 deployed U.S. warheads were sufficient.

Others believe deterrence is credibly maintained only by being able to destroy an adversary’s major nuclear and military capabilities, as well as its leadership, without which an enemy country cannot wage war and maintain hegemonic power.

Totalitarian states are willing to accept the deaths of millions of their own people, and the destruction of many of their cities, and still consider it “victory” were they to prevail in a nuclear conflict. And prevailing may have much to do with the assumption that enemies of the United States make with respect to the prospects of being able to take out U.S. nuclear forces.

In 1972, when the first arms deal was signed, Strategic Armed Limitation Talks (SALT I), the United States had over twenty-seven hundred nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs), including over one thousand missile silos, forty-one submarines of which dozens were at sea, and hundreds of strategic bombers, many of which were airborne. That force eventually would grow to roughly twelve thousand deployed strategic warheads as did the force of the USSR.

America’s SNDV level was down to eleven hundred prior to the 2010 New START Treaty agreement, and Russia was around five hundred. But in the New START negotiations, to secure Russian consent, as Gen. James Cartwright once said, the United States more than split the difference with Moscow and cut its SNDV platforms from eleven hundred to seven hundred.

But that seven hundred number is not as robust as it might appear. Russia or China, to deliver counterforce damage and disarm the United States, has to destroy roughly five hundred targets—four hundred ICBM silos, forty Launch control facilities, three bomber bases, two SSBN submarine ports, and some C3I nodes. The fully survivable force is currently those submarines we rotate at sea or are in transit, some four to eight submarines. That is currently a survivable force, according to nuclear experts.

However, advocates of deeper warhead reductions beyond New START want to unilaterally eliminate U.S. land-based ICBMs, which would reduce the U.S. deployed warheads to one thousand. They want to reduce the U.S. target list with which Russia and China have to be concerned to around as few as twelve to sixteen assets.

Now, the U.S. retaliatory capability from an un-generated, day-to-day deployment, if one assumes its ICBMs and bombers are destroyed on the ground along with its submarines in port, is arguably six SSBNs submarines on patrol, each with twenty missiles and an assumed 480 warheads.

However, will that be adequate when the United States is facing both a fully nuclear-armed China and Russia? After all, Mark Schneider believes China and Russia combined might have over seven hundred ICBM silos, requiring some fourteen hundred warheads—assuming that two warheads per silo are needed to ensure a high probability of destruction.

If the United States aims its retaliatory capability at enemies cities, would totalitarian personalities accept the destruction of upwards of 25 percent of their population in exchange for the annihilation of their enemy and world domination? The answer to that question might be “yes” but a person cannot answer it intelligently unless they analyze the new nuclear balance which is now changing in the world today.

While arms deals did in fact reduce deployed nuclear forces dramatically starting with the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and the subsequent reduction agreements beginning with START I in 1991, U.S. nuclear deterrence cannot be achieved through arms control. The U.S. “nuclear modernization holiday” that will have lasted over forty years is in large part due to “global zero” being thought of as a serious idea and not a fantasy.

So, what is to be done?

Does deterrence require the continued U.S. counter-force doctrine—of having enough survivable nuclear capability to inflict at least equivalent counterforce/counter value damage on the enemy, especially enough to ensure adversary political-military leaders do not survive a nuclear exchange? Or does the United States adopt disarmament group opposition to counterforce doctrine and adopt arms control as a means of reducing nuclear weapons to such low levels that in the interim stage from “global zero” to only “city busting” is a deterrent option?

Additionally, what is the role for space-based missile defenses, especially if they are designed to make disarming nuclear missile strikes obsolete where “he who strikes first no longer wins.”

Part of the emerging posture the United States might seek is a greater number of platforms or assets, apart from the extent to which warhead levels are limited. Years ago, I asked Cartwright if it didn’t make more sense to expand our platforms and SNDVs even as the United States reduced warheads so the calculus of deterrence improved. He explained the Russians would not agree.

But if the United States did expand its SNDVs, it would take decades and hundreds of billions more defense costs. Although having one thousand ICBMs, more than thirty submarines with 480 missiles, and some sixty-plus strategic bombers on strip alert would markedly improve the strategic balance. For example, the future seven to one ratio of Russian and Chinese strategic warheads to U.S. nuclear assets would no longer be the threat, but with a ratio closer to three to one.

In short, do numbers matter and is improving stability possible? In the early Reagan administration, multiple National Security defense directives sought an end to the Soviet empire and a more secure and stable nuclear balance. How? A ban on multiple-warhead land-based missiles, moving more nuclear forces to sea on survivable submarines, preserving America’s dual-use strategic bombers for their critically needed conventional mission, in addition to robust missile defenses and major reductions in arms through arms control agreements.

It’s no secret that Soviet political leaders had elaborate plans to strike NATO and particularly the United States pre-emptively. But during the Reagan administration, surviving U.S. nuclear capabilities, even after a “successful” Soviet first strike, was over two thousand U.S. nuclear weapons. This was a formidable deterrent, more credible than the estimated four hundred to five hundred retaliatory warheads that might be the minimal deterrent under the unreasonable assumptions a person can make today.

The commander of U.S. Strategic Command, Adm. Charles Richard said on August 12, 2021, that America is “witnessing a strategic breakout by China . . . The explosive growth in their nuclear and conventional forces can only be what I described as breathtaking." He added that “frankly, that word ‘breathtaking’ may not be enough.” Richard characterized China as a “peer” nuclear competitor and noted that we now face two nuclear “peer” competitors, Russia, and China, compared to one during the Cold War.

The United States did previously build during the Reagan era three hard-target-kill-capable missiles able to take out key Soviet military targets, including the Soviet reserve ICBM force. But the five hundred Peacekeeper warheads the Reagan administration deployed are retired, the remaining highly capable four hundred high-yield W-88 sea-based warheads may not hold all newly hardened targets at risk, while the advanced cruise missile has also been eliminated. The remaining Minuteman ICBM force is much improved but reportedly not necessarily capable of taking out super hard thirty thousand psi concrete silos.

But the United States is still nearly a decade away before the modernized platforms enter the deterrent force. What is needed is a full analysis of whether the planned nuclear force, (much less a smaller one), can deal with the newly expanding Chinese and Russian nuclear forces, including deeply buried hardened targets, many defended by advanced defenses.

Richard explains that every U.S. operational plan in the Department of Defense rests on the assumption that strategic nuclear deterrence will hold. Also, he notes that if strategic nuclear deterrence doesn’t hold, then “none of our other plans, and no other capability that we have is going to work as designed. We can’t afford to have nuclear deterrence fail.”

Peter Huessy is the director of Strategic Deterrent Studies at the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies.

 

[Pinecone]

The bolded bit in the above article is not very reassuring. Thanks, HC.

 

[jward]

South Korea Successfully Launches Ballistic Missile From Its New Submarine: Report
The Republic of Korea's peculiar program to arm its submarines with conventionally-armed ballistic missiles has reached a major milestone.
By Thomas Newdick September 7, 2021

DSME

South Korea has reportedly conducted successful underwater ejection tests of a ballistic missile from a submarine for the first time. The development and fielding of an indigenous submarine-launched ballistic missile, or SLBM, would place South Korea among a select group of countries with this capability.

The test-firing was first reported today by South Korea’s Yonhap news agency, with the ejection tests being performed from the first of the Republic of Korea Navy’s Dosan Ahn Changho class diesel-electric attack submarines, each of which has a capacity for six SLBM tubes, although these can also be alternatively loaded with cruise missiles. Some reports suggest that two such tests may have taken place, but there is no official word on the trials, in keeping Seoul’s official policy of secrecy on these matters. As such, there is no word on where the test campaign took place or details about its full scope.

SIPA VIA AP

The Hyunmoo 2B short-range ballistic missile, on which the new SLBM is understood to be based.

The boat in question, however, was the lead ship of this new class, which was commissioned last month. The Dosan Ahn Changho class is significantly larger than previous South Korean submarines, at around 3,800 tons submerged, and is equipped with a fuel cell-based air-independent propulsion system.

The ejection of the SLBM from the submarine follows similar tests using a submerged barge, which The War Zone reported on in July. It’s unclear whether the missile ejected from the submarine completed a full launch cycle, including engine ignition, followed by missile flight, although reports so far only confirm its underwater ejection from the submarine.

South Korea's Mysterious Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile Tested From Underwater Platform: Report By Thomas Newdick Posted in The War Zone

South Korea’s New Sub Could Be Capable Of Firing Ballistic Missiles By Tyler Rogoway Posted in The War Zone

Why Would The South Korean Navy Be Eyeing A Nuclear Submarine Capability? By Joseph Trevithick Posted in The War Zone

South Korea Reveals Plan to Hit The North With a Huge Missile Barrage If War Erupts By Joseph Trevithick Posted in The War Zone

South Korea Tests Ballistic Missile That Can Hit Anywhere Inside North Korea By Joseph Trevithick Posted in The War Zone


An earlier launch of an SLBM from a ground test facility also took place at the Anheung test facility late last year.
This sequence is also reported by Naval News, citing “an informed source from the defense industry,” who said last week’s test was used, in particular, to demonstrate the reliability of the ‘cold launch’ ejection method, which pops the missile out of its vertical launch tube using compressed air, prior to ignition of the solid-fuel rocket engine.

Test-firing of Trident II SLBMs by the USS West Virginia, showing the ‘cold launch’ method:


According to Naval News, a third test scheduled for mid-September will complete the development of the new SLBM. This test will confirm the accuracy of the missile, after a ballistic flight over the Anheung test facility, and should pave the way for full-scale missile production and deployment.
However, neither the South Korean Ministry of Defense nor the country’s Agency for Defense Development, which is responsible for its defense industry, have so far provided further details of the latest test. However, Yonhap describes the SLBM as the Hyunmoo 4-4, which is sometimes called the K-SLBM, and which was reportedly also involved in the previous test from the submerged barge. The news agency attributes the missile with a range of 311 miles (500km) and suggests it’s a naval variant of the Hyunmoo 2B ballistic missile.

Since the previous SLBM test involving a submerged barge, the South Korean Ministry of Defense has also revealed more details of its plans for missile development, broadly. Its recently published defense budget proposal for 2022-2026 calls for weapons “with significantly enhanced destructive power” as part of its response to North Korea’s expanding missile capabilities, although it does not make specific mention of SLBMs. Nevertheless, these weapons are being developed against the backdrop of North Korea’s expanding missile arsenal which presents particular risks to ground-based missiles in South Korea. A submarine-launched weapon presents an inherently more survivable option.

As well as the SLBM program, South Korea’s renewed focus on ballistic missile development includes land-based weapons, too. Also disclosed in the recent budget proposal was a new ballistic missile capable of carrying a warhead weighing up to three tons, compared to the two tons for the Hyunmoo 4 short-range ballistic missile (SRBM), and with a range of between 220 and 250 miles (350 and 400km). According to reports, this new missile would be tailored to destroy hardened underground sites, including North Korea’s nuclear storage facilities.

YTN NEWS CAPTURE

A still from a video showing a test launch of the Hyunmoo-4 SRBM, currently the largest South Korean ballistic missile.


In all, the budget proposal calls for around $1.3 billion for defense technology research and development over the next year, an increase of 76 percent.
These missile projects have been enabled by Seoul having stepped away from the series of restrictions on missile range that had been in place since 1979, under a bilateral agreement with the United States. Most recently, these put a range cap of 500 miles on South Korean missiles. After U.S. President Joe Biden and South Korean President Moon Jae-in agreed to scrap these limits, South Korea is now able to develop ballistic missiles capable of reaching targets far beyond the Korean Peninsula.

AP Photo/Alex Brandon)

President Joe Biden talks during a joint news conference with South Korean President Moon Jae-in, in Washington in May.


If the development of this first-generation South Korean SLBM proceeds successfully, it could be the stepping stone to an altogether more robust conventionally armed ballistic missile deterrent. While the first of the Dosan Ahn Changho class boats are expected to be able to carry six SLBMs, or alternatively cruise missiles, subsequent vessels are expected to have 10 vertical launch silos. There has also been talk of a potential follow-on nuclear-powered submarine design. Ultimately, the removal of the missile restrictions would allow Seoul to field SLBMs with a range greater than 500 miles, too.

BREAKING. South #korean just became the first country to launch a ballistic missile (currently ejection test) from an AIP #Submarine. See https://t.co/Q5M3DsPieS

Game changer

Was surprised how much larger the KSS-III class is than the ROMEO. pic.twitter.com/GohZyRuxhe
— H I Sutton (@CovertShores) September 7, 2021​

While developments in North Korea remain the primary concern for South Korea’s policy-makers and war planners, such a capability would also offer deterrence against threats further afield, including China and Russia.
Already, South Korea possesses submarine-launched cruise missiles that can attack targets across North Korea, although it could be that the unique attributes of an SLBM are seen as justification for this complex and expensive development effort. Conventionally armed SLBMs would offer South Korea something like a quasi-second-strike capability to help to deter aggression from the north, although such a capability cannot be compared with a true nuclear second-strike capability, in terms of strategic impacts and overall deterrent value. Furthermore, the speed of response and kinetic energy offered by an SLBM could provide an ideal way of attacking a hardened target at short notice, for example decapitating regime command bunkers in the opening phase of a conflict.

In general, land-based ballistic missiles already constitute a critical part of South Korea’s response to an attack from the North, and SLBMs would add an additional degree of survivability. Meanwhile, these weapons, regardless of where they are launched from are also much harder to defend against and can carry larger warheads. With that in mind, expanding these types of options would be in keeping with the Republic of Korea’s broader ballistic missile developments.

So, why SLBMs and not SLCMs? For one: short flight times and SLBMs can accommodate larger conventional payloads to destroy hardened targets; this has been a focus of recent South Korean missile development efforts (see: Hyunmoo-4).
— Ankit Panda (@nktpnd) September 7, 2021​

Furthermore, as The War Zone has examined in the past, there remains a possibility that Seoul may eventually seek to add nuclear warheads to its burgeoning ballistic missile force, for which the highly survivable SLBMs would be a prime candidate.

朝鮮通信社/AP

North Korean Pukguksong-5 SLBMs on display during a parade in Pyongyang in January.


While the potential for South Korean authorities to pursue this course of action seems remote, at present, it would provide a direct counter to North Korean nuclear capabilities, including SLBMs, although Pyongyang’s efforts to field these onboard operational submarines have so far achieved only limited success. Nuclear-armed South Korean SLBMs would also potentially free the country from its reliance on the United States when it comes to nuclear deterrence and would be a hedge against political winds shifting and the U.S. taking a less direct role in the defense of South Korea.

Whatever the long-term plan for South Korea’s still-mysterious SLBMs, the program is making progress and this type of weapon, in particular, would seem to tally with the country’s ambitions to field ever more destructive missiles to help ward off the enduring threat from the North.
Contact the author: thomas@thedrive.com

Please see source for a number of additional videos
Posted for fair use

South Korea Successfully Launches Ballistic Missile From Its New Submarine: Report

The Republic of Korea's peculiar program to arm its submarines with conventionally-armed ballistic missiles has reached a major milestone.

www.thedrive.com

 

[jward]

Under Secretary Bonnie Jenkins’ Remarks: Nuclear Arms Control: A New Era?


Remarks

NATO Conference on WMD Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation
Copenhagen, Denmark
September 6, 2021





Under Secretary Bonnie Jenkins’ Remarks to the 17th Annual NATO Conference on WMD Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation

As prepared
Good morning, it is an honor to speak to you today at what is my first in-person public event since I was confirmed as the new Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security. Before I begin I also want to recognize my friends and esteemed colleagues on this panel. All of us present are committed to the goal of a world without nuclear weapons, and I look forward to having frank and constructive conversations with you on how to create the conditions necessary to achieve this important goal.

Our current strategic environment is one of increasing geopolitical tension and competition. As we are all keenly aware, both Russia and China are engaged in extensive, destabilizing nuclear buildup that poses new threats to collective security and endangers the international rules-based order. We also face persistent challenges from Iran and North Korea. Iran has expanded its nuclear and ballistic missile development and proliferation programs, while North Korea continues its efforts at
evading sanctions and expanding its WMD arsenal. These myriad challenges lead us towards one simple question: how can we reduce nuclear tensions and diminish the danger of a nuclear miscalculation or conflict? For the United States, the answer to this question begins with re-engaging the international community, re-emphasizing the importance of effective arms control and risk reduction measures, maintaining our commitments to nuclear safety and security, and ensuring that U.S. nuclear guarantees are safe and credible.

President Biden’s decision to extend the New START Treaty during his first days in office was a positive first step by this Administration to advance our shared objective of reducing nuclear tensions. By extending New START, the United States and Russia continue to ensure that we will have a stable and predictable foundation for the next five years as we explore future arms control steps. However, New START does not cover all of Russia’s nuclear weapons. Rather, Russia continues to develop novel nuclear weapons of intercontinental range that are not covered by New START. It also fields an arsenal of 1,000 to 2,000 ‘non-strategic’ nuclear weapons, and the number of these weapons is expected to grow. These developments, coupled with Russia’s pursuit of aggression and employment of hybrid tactics, substantially increase the risk of miscalculation and escalation.

In light of these pressing challenges, the United States is determined to use the time provided by the five-year extension of New START to pursue a new dialogue with Russia on what nuclear arms control measures should follow. Our Strategic Stability Dialogue on July 28 was a positive engagement for both sides. But this was only the beginning of the “deliberate and robust” conversation we need to have with Russia on how to adapt our nuclear arms control framework to better address evolving threats, and I look forward to both sides making tangible progress in future discussions. Our efforts are guided by several key concepts. First, we will look to capture new kinds of intercontinental-range nuclear delivery systems. Second, we will seek to address all nuclear warheads, including those which have not been limited previously, like so-called non-strategic nuclear weapons. Third, we will seek to retain limits on Russian intercontinental-range ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments after New START expires in 2026. We approach this dialogue with an open mind and look forward to serious and substantive discussions.

Meanwhile, we also take note of the fact that the People’s Republic of China is carrying out an increasingly assertive foreign policy and intensifying its pursuit of expansive and unlawful maritime claims in the South China Sea. The PRC is also implementing Military-Civil Fusion,
or MCF, a national-level strategy to bootstrap itself towards global military and economic dominance. The PRC’s approach hurts the business and security interests of many countries and organizations around the world. The United States is committed to taking the necessary steps to address these challenges by helping Allies and partners to protect our economies, intellectual property, and national security from the PRC’s aggressive approach. That is why the Biden-Harris Administration has made pursuing new risk reduction measures with Beijing a priority. We don’t have to wait for a near-disaster to begin discussions on how to reduce tensions in the Indo-Pacific. That conversation begins with a frank and open discussion.

Previously, PRC officials have sidestepped a meaningful dialogue on nuclear weapons by pointing to a larger U.S. nuclear arsenal. In fact, the United States has steadily reduced the size of our arsenal over the past several decades and has shown clear, continued interest in pursuing nuclear arms control. In contrast, Beijing is planning to substantially expand its nuclear arsenal. The PRC’s nuclear build-up, which has accelerated in the last year, now looks to include novel nuclear-powered capabilities and a massive increase of its silo-based ICBM forces. The destabilizing dynamic originating from the PRC’s rapid and opaque nuclear build-up cannot be ignored.

It is our hope that China will come to see that arms control is in its security interests. Arms control is not a trap designed to weaken China’s defenses, but a mechanism to reduce risk and the chance of unnecessary arms races. Past experience has taught us why meaningful arms control and risk reduction is worthwhile and can avoid unpredictable crises that could escalate to nuclear use. The unfortunate reality is that the United States and the PRC do not have the benefit of the same mature arms control relationship that we have with Russia, which was forged through decades of Cold War nuclear competition and cooperation. However, we will apply and tailor the lessons we’ve learned in the U.S.-Russia arms control process when possible to U.S.-PRC discussions.

I also would like to take a moment to quickly discuss Iran and North Korea and how the United States is tackling the WMD challenges emanating from both countries. Iran continues its extremely troubling violations of the JCPOA by enriching uranium up to 60 percent and producing uranium metal. This recent IAEA report was met with grave concern in capitals across Europe. Such provocative actions do not put us on a path toward a positive solution. However, the United States stands ready to find a way forward to not only reduce the concerns surrounding Iran’s nuclear program, but also address other WMD threats emanating from Iran. As for North Korea, the United States is taking a practical approach that is open to diplomacy with North Korea. While
we are clear-eyed about the prospects for successful engagement with North Korea on its nuclear and missile programs, our policy will prioritize making tangible progress that increases the security of the United States, our allies, and our deployed forces. As we do so, the United States will continue to implement and promote sanctions against North Korea, as these mechanisms are vital to interrupting North Korea’s efforts to procure the items necessary to further develop its WMD programs.

Next, I wanted to affirm that the United States supports the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and is committed to work to achieve its entry into force, recognizing the significant challenges that lie ahead in reaching this goal. In line with the goals of the CTBT, the United States continues to observe its zero-yield nuclear explosive testing moratorium and calls on all states possessing nuclear weapons to declare or maintain such a moratorium. The United States also supports a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty and is continuing its moratorium on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. We further call on all nuclear weapons possessing states to support and implement such a moratorium on fissile material production.

In closing, I want to reiterate that the Biden-Harris Administration strongly believes that multilateralism and international cooperation are essential tools to counter the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other WMDs. We believe the NPT Treaty remains the cornerstone of our global nuclear nonproliferation regime. Its ongoing tenth review cycle marks the Treaty’s 50th anniversary – an historic landmark for an agreement that has made the world safer and more prosperous. However, this important anniversary has arrived at a time of increasing tensions among nuclear-weapon states, one that demands our renewed leadership and focus to achieve meaningful progress on arms control and disarmament. The enduring success of the NPT cannot be taken for granted and requires sustained effort in each new decade.

We remain hopeful and committed to achieving a positive outcome for the upcoming Review Conference in which states reaffirm their commitment to the NPT, recognize its enduring benefits, and recommit to preserving and strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime. We know that our NATO Allies support the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons – one dedicated to the principle of undiminished security for all. Their efforts towards this goal have been ever more effective and verifiable, which has promoted international stability. We hope that with our combined efforts, the results of the NPT Review Conference will reflect the central role of nonproliferation in providing
security benefits to all States Parties, serve as an essential foundation for progress on disarmament, and provide a framework for cooperation on peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Again, I want to thank you for the opportunity to speak here today. The issues that we face regarding the future of nuclear arms control, while daunting, must be solved, and it is venues like these, where Allies and partners can come together to share ideas, that help build a bridge to a safe, prosperous, and secure future. I look forward to continuing the conversation during the panel discussion and throughout this conference.
Thank you.

Under Secretary Bonnie Jenkins’ Remarks: Nuclear Arms Control: A New Era? - United States Department of State

Under Secretary Bonnie Jenkins’ Remarks to the 17th Annual NATO Conference on WMD Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation As prepared Good morning, it is an honor to speak to you today at what is my first in-person public event since I was confirmed as the new Under Secretary of State...

www.state.gov

 

[Housecarl]

Hummm.....

Posted for fair use.....

Third Generation Gangs Strategic Note No. 42: Brazilian Gangs Utilize Human Shields, Explosives, and Drones in a New ‘Cangaço’ Style Urban Bank Raid in Araçatuba, São Paulo | Small Wars Journal

On Sunday 29 August 2021, at approximately 2200 hours, around 20 armed gunmen conducted a series of raids on three banks in Araçatuba, São Paulo, killing at least three. The armed commando wore bulletproof vests and helmets and used assault rifles, explosives, and drones. Hostages were also used...

smallwarsjournal.com

Sun, 09/05/2021 - 4:01pm
Third Generation Gangs Strategic Note No. 42: Brazilian Gangs Utilize Human Shields, Explosives, and Drones in a New ‘Cangaço’ Style Urban Bank Raid in Araçatuba, São Paulo
John P. Sullivan, José de Arimatéia da Cruz, and Robert J. Bunker

On Sunday 29 August 2021, at approximately 2200 hours, around 20 armed gunmen conducted a series of raids on three banks in Araçatuba, São Paulo, killing at least three. The armed commando wore bulletproof vests and helmets and used assault rifles, explosives, and drones. Hostages were also used as human shields to hamper their capture and facilitate escape. Blockades constructed from burning vehicles, as well as explosives were deployed to facilitate their escape during the ‘mega-robbery.’ Brazil has been plagued by this type ‘urban bank raid’ in recent years.

Human Shields tied to roof and hood of vehicle fleeing Bank Robbery Source: Screen Shot from video by Yuri Macri @yurimacri. Twitter, 29 August 2021,

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1432210171711922182

View: https://twitter.com/yurimacri/status/1432210171711922182?s=20
.​

Key Information: “Brazil bank robbers tie hostages to getaway cars in Araçatuba.” BBC News. 30 August 2021, Brazil bank robbers tie hostages to getaway cars in Araçatuba:

Bank robbers strapped hostages to the top of their getaway vehicles after a raid in the southern Brazilian city of Araçatuba.
Police said that at least three people were killed, among them one suspect.
Officials said more than 20 people took part in the heist, blocking off roads with burning vehicles and placing explosive devices across the city…
…News site G1 reports that the gang used drones to monitor the movements of the police from the air.
It is not the first time Araçatuba has been targeted by bank robbers. In 2017, criminals took control of various strategic spots throughout the city, attacked police stations and blocked roads as part of their robbery of a private security firm.

Key Information: “Assalto em Araçatuba: Gate localiza 98 explosivos espalhados por criminosos que atacaram bancos.” G1 (Globo), (Rio Preto e Araçatuba). 31 August 2021, Assalto em Araçatuba: Gate localiza 98 explosivos espalhados por criminosos que atacaram bancos:

Policiais do Grupo de Ações Táticas Especiais (Gate) localizaram 98 explosivos deixados pela quadrilha que atacou bancos em Araçatuba, nesta segunda-feira (30).
Os artefatos foram encontrados nas ruas, nos bancos, nos carros abandonados entre Gabriel Monteiro e Bilac, e também em um caminhão deixado pelo grupo perto das agências bancárias. Confira abaixo:

• 32 artefatos nas ruas
• 29 artefatos no caminhão abandonado
• 18 artefatos deixados no Banco do Brasil
• 19 artefatos achados em carros abandonados em Bilac
• 70 cartuchos de emulsão no caminhão[1]

Key Information: “‘Éo mesmo modus operandi’, diz delegado sobre assalto a banco em Criciúma e ação de quadrilha em Araçatuba.” G1 (Globo). 30 August 2021, 'É o mesmo modus operandi', diz delegado sobre assalto a banco em Criciúma e ação de quadrilha em Araçatuba:

Cidades cercadas
Nas duas ações, os criminosos cercaram a região central das cidades. Em Criciúma, o grupo promoveu bloqueios e barreiras na tentativa de dificultar a chegada da polícia até o local.
Em Araçatuba, eles também fecharam algumas entradas da cidade com veículos em chamas para evitar que equipes chegassem ao local, segundo a polícia. Na cidade paulistana, um drone foi usado para monitorar a movimentação dos agentes.[2]

Key Information: Gabriel Stargardter, “Robbers in Brazil stage brazen bank raids, taking hostages; at least 3 dead.” Reuters. 31 August 2021, Robbers in Brazil stage brazen bank raids, taking hostages; at least 3 dead:

More than 20 heavily armed men carried out the attack, using 10 cars, Alvaro Camilo, the executive secretary of Sao Paulo's military police, said at a news conference. As the criminals made their getaway, they used locals as human shields, and burned cars, while leaving a trail of explosive booby traps across the city, the military police said in a statement.
The attackers used drones to monitor the streets as they entered the city, hit the banks, and made their getaway, the statement said.

Continued.....

 

[Housecarl]

Continued.....

Third Generation Gangs Analysis
The “Novo Cangaço” (“New Struggle”) refers to a type of brigandage or social banditry reminiscent of that form of criminality found in Brazil in the 1920s-1930s.[3] Typically, these attacks are characterized by brazen urban bank robberies. These incidents resemble light infantry assaults. In the recent ‘Mega-Robbery’ sequence, around 15-20 armed criminal commandos attacked three banks in the center of Araçatuba, western São Paulo. Hostages were taken and used as human shields to deny counter-fires, streets were blockaded to facilitate escape and evasion (E&E), and explosives were deployed to hinder interdiction. The offenders’ assault succeeded, resulting in the death of three persons.[4]
Other recent attacks are largely centered in São Paulo (SP), but have also occurred in Criciúma, Santa Catarina (2 December 2020) and Cametá, Pará (1 December 2020).[5] These were preceded by an April 2017 assault on an armored care warehouse in Ciudad del Este, Paraguay by gang members using assault rifles, grenades, explosives, and a .50 caliber rifle.[6] The Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) or First Capital Command were suspected in those prior sequences.

Explosives recovered by Grupo de Ações Táticas Especiais (GATE), Polícia Militar do Estado de São Paulo (PMESP) from the Araçatuba Mega-Robbery Sequence, 29 August 2021. Source: PMESP.​

Indeed, just over a year ago, the PCC was suspected in a complex urban bank robbery scenario in Botucatu, SP. In that sequence, on 30 July 2020, “A group of about 40 armed and masked thugs attacked at least three bank branches in the city—one of which was destroyed by explosives—took residents hostage and, for more than three hours, exchanged fire with police officers, injuring two of them. One of the suspects was also shot and later died.”[7]

Proximity (and likely command detonated) Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) were used as obstacles on escape routes by the robbery crew on 29 August 2021. Recovered by the Polícia Militar do Estado de São Paulo (PMESP). Source: PMESP.​

The Novo Cangaço has been described in the Brazilian press:

This criminal modality, which frightens the population because of the violence used, is called by police officers the “new cangaço”, in an allusion to the historical band of Lampião, who brought fear to cities in the northeastern hinterland in the mid-1930s...
…Generally, according to experts, suspects who contribute to gangs that attack banks are: arms dealers, corrupt police officers and employees of companies that pass or sell cargoes to criminals (learn more below).[8]

The classification Novo Cangaço refers to a type of criminal activity, specifically brigandage or activities by brigands following the style of classic Brazilian social bandits from the Northeast of Brazil. Lampiao and Maria Bonita were notorious “Cangaceiros.” The Cangaço started around colonial times in Brazil’s Northeast region (Bahia, Paraiba, Rio Grande do Norte) and ended in the 1930s at the hands of Getulio Vargas. The Novo Cangaço (New Cangaço), unlike the old Cangaço, are more organized, better armed, have international connections, and mostly rob Brazilian banks (Banco do Brazil, Itau, Caixa Econômica Federal).[9] Earlier this year, several cangaço raids were documented in four separate Brazilian states:

Between the 5th and 16th of April [2021], there were at least ten attacks in different cities in four states: São Paulo (SP), Paraná (PR), Bahia (BA) and Minas Gerais (MG). The targets were at least 13 bank branches and one financial [institution]. The gangs prefer to attack, for the most part, institutions that keep money in small towns, where the security forces do not have the military power to face heavily armed gangs.[10]

Explosives are a core element of the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) used in urban bank raids. As mentioned above, nearly 100 explosive artifacts were recovered in this recent bank assault sequence. A secondary TTP involves the taking of hostages during such incidents for the purposes of negotiation and use as human shields, however, this is the first instance in which they have been tied to getaway vehicles. The current fate of the ten hostages that were tied to the getaway vehicles is unclear. A tertiary bank heist TTP also appears to be the strewing bank notes along the getaway route, which results in civilians clogging the streets/choke points which impedes pursuing police and military forces. However, while this tactic was utilized during the Criciúma incident taking place in December 2020, it was not utilized in the present incident.[11] Another emergent TTP identified is the use of drones for ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) purposes—as occurred in this incident.[12].

Explosive artifacts recovered by the Polícia Militar do Estado de São Paulo (PMESP) from the Araçatuba Mega-Robbery Sequence, 29 August 2021. Source: PMESP.​

The complexity of this attack demanded synchronized response from São Paulo’s Military and Civil Police (Polícia Militar do Estado de São Paulo – PMESP and Polícia Civil do Estado de São Paulo – PCESP) and ultimately Brazil’s Federal Police.[11] This type of complex attack sequence is similar to the ‘urban siege’ tactics developed by terrorists. Indeed, many of the same issues of tactical and operational co-ordination are required to address the TTPs employed in Novo Cangaço scenarios.[12] This bank assault sequence, initiated by a heavily armed and highly coordinated criminal gangs, along with and similar incidents in recent years, suggest that these criminal armed groups (CAGs) are evolving in sophistication and now possess operational capability beyond those possessed by most municipal or state level law enforcement agencies.
Sources
Assalto em Araçatuba: Gate localiza 98 explosivos espalhados por criminosos que atacaram bancos.” G1 (Globo), (Rio Preto e Araçatuba). 31 August 2021, Assalto em Araçatuba: Gate localiza 98 explosivos espalhados por criminosos que atacaram bancos.
“Brazil bank robbers tie hostages to getaway cars in Araçatuba.” BBC News. 30 August 2021, Brazil bank robbers tie hostages to getaway cars in Araçatuba.
Chris Dalby, “The Descent into Madness of Brazil’s Bank Robberies.” InSight Crime. 31 August 2021, The Descent into Madness of Brazil’s Bank Robberies.
“‘Éo mesmo modus operandi’, diz delegado sobre assalto a banco em Criciúma e ação de quadrilha em Araçatuba.” G1 (Globo). 30 August 2021, 'É o mesmo modus operandi', diz delegado sobre assalto a banco em Criciúma e ação de quadrilha em Araçatuba.
Gabriel Stargardter, “Robbers in Brazil stage brazen bank raids, taking hostages; at least 3 dead.” Reuters. 31 August 2021, Robbers in Brazil stage brazen bank raids, taking hostages; at least 3 dead
Leber Tomaz, Caroline Borges, Fabio Rodrigues, and Carolina Andrade, “De onde vêm armas, munições e explosivos usados por quadrilhas do ‘novo cangaço’ em ataques recentes a bancos no Brasil?” G1 (Globo). 18 April 2021, De onde vêm armas, munições e explosivos usados por quadrilhas do 'novo cangaço' em ataques recentes a bancos no Brasil?.
Endnotes
[1] In English, the title reads: “Assault in Araçatuba: Gate [Grupo de Ações Táticas Especiais] locates 98 explosives spread by criminals who attacked banks.” The text reads: “Police from the Special Tactical Actions Group (Gate) located 98 explosives left by the gang that attacked banks in Araçatuba, this Monday (30)…The [explosive] artifacts were found on the streets, on banks, in abandoned cars between Gabriel Monteiro and Bilac, and also in a truck left by the group near bank branches. Check it out below:
• 32 artifacts on the streets
• 29 artifacts in the abandoned truck
• 18 artifacts left at Banco do Brasil
• 19 artifacts found in abandoned cars in Bilac
• 70 emulsion cartridges in the truck.”
[2] The similarities in TTPs used in the 2 December 2020 raid in Criciúma were emphasized. In English, the title reads: “‘It’s the same modus operandi,’ says senior official about bank robbery in Criciúma and gang action in Araçatuba.” The text reads: “Fenced cities…In both actions, criminals surrounded the central region of cities. In Criciúma, the group promoted roadblocks and barriers in an attempt to make it difficult for the police to arrive at the location…In Araçatuba, they also closed some entrances to the city with burning vehicles to prevent teams from reaching the scene, police said. In the city of São Paulo, a drone was used to monitor the movement of agents.” Fenced cities evoke themes of ‘urban siege.’ See Note 14 below.
[3] See our earlier note, John P. Sullivan, José de Arimatéia da Cruz, and Robert J. Bunker, “Third Generation Gangs Strategic Note No. 33: Brazilian Gangs (Quadrilhas) Wage Urban Bank Raids in a New ‘Cangaço’.” Small Wars Journal. 2 February 2020, Third Generation Gangs Strategic Note No. 33: Brazilian Gangs (Quadrilhas) Wage Urban Bank Raids in a New ‘Cangaço’ | Small Wars Journal.
[4] Chris Dalby, “The Descent into Madness of Brazil’s Bank Robberies.” InSight Crime. 31 August 2021, The Descent into Madness of Brazil’s Bank Robberies.
[5] Op. cit, Sullivan, da Cruz, and Bunker, Note 3.
[6] John P. Sullivan and Robert J. Bunker, “Third Generation Gangs Strategic Note No. 4: Brigands, Bank Robbery, and Brazilian Gang Evolution at Ciudad del Este and the Triple Frontier.” Small Wars Journal. 26 May 2017, Third Generation Gangs Strategic Note No. 4 | Small Wars Journal.
[7] In Portuguese, “Um grupo de cerca de 40 bandidos armados e mascarados atacou pelo menos três agências bancárias da cidade — uma delas foi destruída por explosivos —, fez moradores reféns e por mais de três horas trocou tiros com policiais, ferindo dois deles. Um dos suspeitos também foi atingido e morreu.” “A ameaça do ‘novo cangaço’, que causa terror no interior de SP.” BBC via G1 (Globo). 30 July 2020, https://g1.globo.com/sp/bauru-maril...gaco-que-causa-terror-no-interior-de-sp.ghtml.
[8] In Portuguese, “Essa modalidade criminosa, que assusta a população pela violência empregada, é chamada por policiais de "novo cangaço", numa alusão ao histórico bando de Lampião, que levava o medo a cidades do sertão nordestino em meados dos anos de 1930…Geralmente, segundo os especialistas, os suspeitos que contribuem com as quadrilhas que atacam bancos são: traficantes de armas, policiais corruptos e funcionários das empresas que passam ou vendem as cargas para os criminosos (saiba mais abaixo). Leber Tomaz, Caroline Borges, Fabio Rodrigues, and Carolina Andrade, “De onde vêm armas, munições e explosivos usados por quadrilhas do ‘novo cangaço’ em ataques recentes a bancos no Brasil?” G1 (Globo). 18 April 2021, De onde vêm armas, munições e explosivos usados por quadrilhas do 'novo cangaço' em ataques recentes a bancos no Brasil?.
[9] See Luiz Bernardo Pericás, “Cangaço and Cangaceiros: Rural Banditry in the Brazilian Northeast.” Latin American History. 24 October 2018, https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780199366439.013.546.
[10] In Portuguese, “Entre os dias 5 a 16 de abril, foram pelo menos dez ataques em cidades diferentes de quatro estados: São Paulo (SP), Paraná (PR), Bahia (BA) e Minas Gerais (MG). Os alvos foram ao menos 13 agências bancárias e uma financeira. Os bandos preferem atacar, em sua maioria, instituições que guardam dinheiro em cidades pequenas, onde as forças de segurança não têm poderio bélico para enfrentar bandos fortemente armados.” Op. cit. Leber Tomaz, Caroline Borges, Fabio Rodrigues, and Carolina Andrade, Note 8.
[11] Rachael Bunyan, “Brazilian bank robbers leave cash strewn across the streets to aid their getaway as residents rush to pick it up after spectacular raids on four banks across city.” Daily Mail. 1 December 2020,https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/ar...rs-leave-cash-strewn-streets-aid-getaway.html.
[12] An unconfirmed precursor incident using a surveillance drone in the state of Ceará, Brazil may have taken place some years earlier. See Susan Friedberg, “Thieves Used Drone to Rob Bank.” Dedrone. 18 August 2015,https://blog.dedrone.com/en/thieves-used-drone-to-rob-bank.
[13] “A Polícia Federal, juntamente com as demais forças de Segurança Pública do estado de São Paulo, está atuando ativamente na investigação do roubo ocorrido nas agências bancárias da cidade de Araçatuba e na busca dos criminosos, aguardando a conclusão dos trabalhos do Grupo de Ações Táticas Especiais (GATE) na localização e desativação dos artefatos explosivos, a fim de que a normalidade seja restabelecida o mais breve possível à populaçãolocal.” [“The Federal Police, together with other Public Security forces in the state of São Paulo, are actively investigating the theft that occurred at bank branches in the city of Araçatuba and in the search for criminals, awaiting the conclusion of the work of the Special Tactical Actions Group (GATE) in the location and deactivation of explosive devices, so that normality is restored as soon as possible to the local population.” “Roubo a agências bancárias em Araçatuba/SP.” Nota à Imprensa. 30 August 2021 (2250 hours). Polícia Federal, Setor de Comunicação Social da Superintendência da PF em São Paulo, https://www.gov.br/pf/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/2021/08/nota-a-imprensa-3.
[14] See John P. Sullivan, “Policing Urban Conflict: Urban Siege, Terrorism and Insecurity.” Stratfor. 10 April 2018, https://marcom.stratfor.com/horizon...conflict-urban-siege-terrorism-and-insecurity.
For Additional Reading
Chris Dalby, “The Descent into Madness of Brazil’s Bank Robberies.” InSight Crime. 31 August 2021.
John P. Sullivan and Robert J. Bunker, Eds., Strategic Notes on Third Generation Gangs. Bloomington, IN: Xlibris, 2020.
John P. Sullivan, José de Arimatéia da Cruz, and Robert J. Bunker, “Third Generation Gangs Strategic Note No. 33: Brazilian Gangs (Quadrilhas) Wage Urban Bank Raids in a New ‘Cangaço’.” Small Wars Journal. 2 February 2020.
John P. Sullivan and Robert J. Bunker, “Third Generation Gangs Strategic Note No. 4: Brigands, Bank Robbery, and Brazilian Gang Evolution at Ciudad del Este and the Triple Frontier.” Small Wars Journal. 26 May 2017.
Carlos Frederico de Oliveira Pereira, Gangues Territorias e Direito International dos Conflitos Armadas. Curitiba: Juruá Editora, 2016.

Categories: El Centro - Third Generation Gangs - Brazil

 

[Housecarl]

Hummm.....

Posted for fair use.....

China nukes NATO call to join nuclear arms control talks, cites bare minimum for 'national security'

NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg is urging China to join international efforts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons amid concerns that the country is rapidly developing missiles capable of carrying atomic warheads

www.firstpost.com

China nukes NATO call to join nuclear arms control talks, cites bare minimum for 'national security'
NATO is urging China to join international efforts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons amid concerns that the country is rapidly developing missiles capable of carrying atomic warheads

FP Staff
September 08, 2021 13:27:32 IST

NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg recently urged China to join international efforts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons amid concerns that the Asian superpower is rapidly developing missiles capable of carrying atomic warheads.

However, Beijing hit back at NATO, saying that China pursues a defensive nuclear strategy and keeps its nuclear weapons to a “minimum necessary for its national security”, and accused the body of hyping up the threat from China.

Laying out his priorities for nuclear disarmament at NATO’s annual arms control conference on Monday, Stoltenberg said that more countries must be included in future missile restriction talks, not just Russia.

“As a global power, China has global responsibilities in arms control. And Beijing, too, would benefit from mutual limits on numbers, increased transparency, and more predictability,” Stoltenberg said. “These are the foundations for international stability.”

Warning that Beijing’s nuclear arsenal is rapidly expanding, he said “China is building a large number of missile silos, which can significantly increase its nuclear capability. All of this is happening without any limitation or constraint. And with a complete lack of transparency.”

In 2019, the United States pulled out of the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces, or INF, treaty, blaming Russia for violating the bilateral pact. It was the first arms control measure to ban an entire class of weapons: ground-launched cruise missiles with a range between 500 kilometers and 5,000 kilometers. Russia denies that it broke the rules.

As the pact fell apart, China continued to build such weapons and it has shown little sign that it’s inclined to join in such arms proliferation talks.

However, China has maintained a belligerent stance to this suggestion and has rejected the out-of-hand fears voiced by Stoltenberg about a Chinese nuclear weapons build-up.

NATO hyping up China's nuclear threat, says China
Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin dismissed the NATO chief's comment by saying that the Chinese government has “serious concern and firm opposition to NATO playing up China’s nuclear threat"

He reiterated that China follows a self-defensive nuclear strategy, with nuclear forces always kept at the minimum level required to safeguard national security.

"We are committed to no first use of nuclear weapons at any time or under any circumstances and pledge unconditionally not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones. China has never taken part in any form of the nuclear arms race, nor has it deployed nuclear weapons overseas. No country will be threatened or should feel threatened by China's national defense capability as long as it does not intend to threaten or undermine China's sovereignty, security and territorial integrity," Wenbin said.

He further warned that what the member countries of NATO should be really worried about was the body's nuclear sharing policy. As a political and military organization formed during the Cold War, NATO has the largest nuclear arsenal enabled by the nuclear sharing arrangements to this day.

Wenbin further stated that some NATO members are ramping up efforts to modernise nuclear power. Many countries share the view that NATO's nuclear sharing arrangements violate the stipulations of the NPT and that its nuclear capability lacks transparency, which exacerbates risks of nuclear proliferation and conflicts.

"It is typical double standards when NATO chooses to be evasive about its own issue while trying to mislead the public and hyping up the so-called "China nuclear threat". If NATO truly cares about nuclear arms control, it should abandon the Cold War mentality, abolish nuclear sharing arrangements, and pull out the large number of nuclear weapons deployed in Europe," he added.

Wenbin instead asked NATO to urge the US to earnestly fulfill its special and primary responsibilities in nuclear disarmament and "further drastically and substantively reduce its nuclear stockpile, so as to create conditions for realizing comprehensive and complete nuclear disarmament."

Not the first time
Earlier this year, in May, Beijing had accused NATO of exaggerating the threat from China and "creating confrontation", after a vow from the Western allies to work together to counter the "systemic challenges" posed by its policies.

This came after NATO leaders made the commitment, as US president Joe Biden renewed Washington's transatlantic ties at his first summit with the allies.

In a broad statement of intent, the leaders said China's increasingly assertive actions in building a nuclear arsenal and space and cyber warfare capabilities threatened the international order.

In an angry response, a statement from the Chinese mission to the European Union called for NATO to "view China's development rationally, stop exaggerating various forms of 'China threat theory' and not to use China's legitimate interests and legal rights as excuses for manipulating group politics (while) artificially creating confrontations".

China's military budget — the second largest in the world after the US, though still less than a third of Washington's — is set to increase by 6.8 percent in 2021, the finance ministry had announced in March.

Beijing has also poured billions into its space programme in a bid to make up ground on pioneers Russia and the United States.

During the NATO summit earlier this year, leaders had said that they were "concerned" by China's coercive policies — and highlighted its "rapid development" of nuclear arsenal, greater military cooperation with Russia, and "lack of transparency and disinformation".

These concerns came after the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) published a study in July-end on new construction work. With the help of satellite images, FAS discovered a large area near Hami in the northwestern region of Xinjiang where silos for nuclear missiles were under construction. Even The Washington Post reported about a similar new site with missile storage or launch facilities near Yumen in Gansu province.

But NATO also held out the prospect for "a constructive dialogue with China where possible".

"Based on our interests, we welcome opportunities to engage with China on areas of relevance to the Alliance and on common challenges such as climate change," the leaders said.

"Reciprocal transparency and understanding would benefit both NATO and China."

With inputs from AFP
Updated Date:September 08, 2021 13:27:32 IST

 

[danielboon]

Russia and Belarus launch 'hot phase' of huge war games
By Reuters Staff
3 MIN READ

MOSCOW (Reuters) -Russia and ex-Soviet ally Belarus on Friday launched the active “hot phase” of a three-month-long military exercise involving 200,000 troops, which has alarmed Ukraine and some NATO nations.


Slideshow ( 5 images )
The live fire drills are the culmination of the “Zapad-2021” war games, and will run until next Thursday on Russia’s and Belarus’s western flanks including sites close to NATO and the European Union’s borders.
Russia’s Ministry of Defence released footage of warships and tanks opening fire and fighter jets taking off. It said the troops had practiced repelling an aerial attack. Separately, it said it tested S-400 air defence systems on Russian-annexed Crimea.
Mathieu Boulegue, a research fellow at Britain’s Chatham House think tank, said the first three days of the “hot phase” drills were expected to focus on defending against an attack from the West, with the next four days focused on how troops would strike back with a counter-offensive.

Neighbours such as Ukraine and NATO members Poland and Lithuania say such big exercises so close to the frontier risk being provocative. President Vladimir Putin denies the drills are directed against any foreign power and says they are sensible given increased NATO activity near Russia’s borders and those of its allies.
The Western alliance, which has accused Russia of under-reporting troop movements in the past, has urged Moscow to be transparent and said it will be watching closely.
The manoeuvres are held every four years, but this year’s drill has been seen as a particular signal of Russia’s support for Belarus and its leader Alexander Lukashenko, who has been ostracised by the West for cracking down on dissent.

Russia sees Belarus as a strategically important buffer to its west, and helped to keep Lukashenko in power with loans and political backing while he crushed a popular uprising last year.
Putin and Lukashenko held Kremlin talks on Thursday, described as focusing on the push to more closely integrate their economies. They are due to inspect the exercises personally at some point, according to Belarusian state media.
Russia’s Defence Ministry said the active phase of the drills would take place at nine sites in Russia and five sites in Belarus. The exercises involve 200,000 personnel, 80 planes and helicopters, 290 tanks and 15 naval ships, it says.
Military personnel from Armenia, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Mongolia are also due to participate.

Russia and Belarus launch 'hot phase' of huge war games

Russia and ex-Soviet ally Belarus on Friday launched the active "hot phase" of a three-month-long military exercise involving 200,000 troops, which has alarmed Ukraine and some NATO nations.

www.reuters.com

 

[danielboon]

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1436222926630658051

View: https://twitter.com/mod_russia/status/1436222926630658051