WAR 08-14-2021-to-08-20-2021__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

Housecarl

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(483) 07-24-2021-to-07-30-2021__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

(484) 07-31-2021-to-08-06-2021__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

(485) 08-07-2021-to-08-13-2021__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

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US to leave troops in Afghanistan beyond May, 9/11 new goal

U.S. Asks Taliban to Spare Its Embassy in Coming Fight for Kabul

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DEA Memo to Agents: Stop Saying 'Mexican Cartels'
Matt Vespa
Matt Vespa

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@mvespa1
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Posted: Aug 13, 2021 12:45 PM

So, what explains this Beijing move to censor speech when talking about the war on drugs. I don’t even like the war on drugs. It’s a total failure, a war we should have called quits on decades ago—but we still wage it. Yet, as it stands now, drugs are still pouring across the border. It’s part of the immigration and securing our borders crisis, so it’s somewhat different than jailing people for recreational use, but the Drug Enforcement Administration has sent out what looks like a ‘woke’ memo instructing agents to stop referring to the Mexican drug cartels as…Mexican drug cartels. The Daily Caller's Jennie Taer obtained a copy of the memo:

Officials at the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) have been directed by their headquarters to stop using the term “Mexican cartel” when speaking with the media, according to an email exclusively obtained by the Daily Caller News Foundation from a government official.
A portion of the email sent mid-July stated: “Also, we need to now avoid saying ‘Mexican cartel’ or discussing the Mexican government or LE cooperation with Mexico. Please continue using ‘drug cartel,’ TCO, DTO, etc.”
[…]
The guidance came as the Mexican cartels continue surging drugs across the southern border and into the U.S. Between October and June, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) seized 358,302 pounds of drugs at the southwest border, including 8,093 pounds of lethal fentanyl.
Over the same time period in 2020, CBP seized 541,126 pounds of drugs at the U.S.-Mexico border. And over the 9-month period in 2019, CBP seized 498,281 pounds of drugs, and, during those months in 2018, they seized 677,179 pounds of drugs. The amount of fentanyl seized at the border has steadily increased throughout the last few years and the amount seized so far in 2021 has already exceeded what was captured in 2019 and 2020 combined.
This isn’t rocket science. A ton of drugs made by the cartels are pouring into the US from Mexico, but we just can’t say that they’re…Mexican drug cartels. They’re not Amish. They’re not Asian. This is an Obama holdover protocol. Just call it by something else and then it’s not a crisis anymore. Call it by something else to avoid dealing with this issue. It doesn’t make the problem go away, nor does it erase the ethnic or racial elements these woke liberals are so sensitive about. The Mexican drug cartels are a problem. There’s nothing wrong in saying that.
 

Housecarl

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TERRORISM

Published 6 hours ago
‘A matter of time until another 9/11’ warn experts as airport security weaker than ever
All while insiders have become alarmed over the potential of terrorism from Afghanistan, which some say has been downplayed under President Biden.

By Dana Kennedy New York Post

When former TSA undercover agents learned that a passenger with a loaded handgun breezed past scanners at Atlanta’s Hartsfield-Jackson Airport and boarded a flight to Tokyo in 2019, they were not surprised.

They had done the same thing on a regular basis, posing as potential terrorists with fake guns and bombs to test security — and getting waved through disturbingly often, they told The Post.

The Tokyo-bound gunslinger didn’t turn out to be a threat, they said, but agents pointed to leaked data from TSA in 2015 and 2017 showing that attempts by their "Red Team" of covert agents to smuggle in weapons, explosives and banned objects succeeded sometimes up to 95 percent of the time.

And they said this could mean another 9/11 is possible, a warning that came as the Department of Homeland Security issued a bulletin Friday saying the 9/11 20th anniversary could spur extremist violence.

CORONAVIRUS PANDEMIC COULD PERMANENTLY CHANGE GROCERY SHOPPING

"The TSA didn’t learn from what happened before," said former FAA Special Agent Brian Sullivan, telling The Post security failures exposed by the agency since then have opened the door to another.
"They’re making the same mistakes."

His concern was seconded by ex-FAA and TSA Red Team leader Bogdan Dzakovic, who used to strap functional, hard-resin plastic guns to his ankle and tape fake explosives to his back — and got past airport security multiple times in the late 1990s.

"We basically got by them most of the time," Dzakovic, now 67, told The Post from his home in Ohio. "Everyone knew how weak the system was. We knew something like 9/11 was going to happen."

Dzakovic, who testified before Congress after the Sept. 11 terror attack about his work, and how his concerns were brushed aside, believes a similar event could happen again.

"It’s just a matter of time until we get hit again just like we did on 9/11," Dzakovic said. "We don’t do jacks–t until someone gets killed. And the White House only cares about white supremacists now. It’s ludicrous."

In fact, one of the most recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports about the state of TSA covert testing stated that "this process has not yet resolved any identified security vulnerabilities."

One high-ranking current TSA official said the huge reduction in air travel during the pandemic allowed agents to spend extra time checking bags and patting down passengers, and led to an increase in weapons being found and confiscated.

"We lost half our passengers, but as a result everything slowed down and more checks were done," said the official, who asked not to be identified.

"The firearm detection rate went up 200 percent last year. What that meant was we were sacrificing speed for security up until then. The weapons were there, we just were rushing people through and not finding them."

In July 2019, TSA data shows 5.1 guns were seized per every million people searched, a number which jumped to 15.3 guns seized per million people, in July 2020 — while at the same time, the number of passengers dropped 75 percent.

The official added that those found carrying guns often are treated leniently.

"They say there will be a $10,000 fine if you get caught bringing a weapon through security but that’s BS. You get fined $500 tops," he said.

"The TSA is a 70,000-person bureaucracy that cares more about making sure I don’t carry more than three ounces of Grecian Formula than they are in preventing or anticipating the next terrorist attack," said Mike Boyd, an aviation consultant with 40 years of experience.

"The bosses care about politics, not people."

Boyd worries about screening lapses involving cargo handling and food-service providers.
"No one’s checking," Boyd said.

"There may be another 9/11 but it won’t necessarily look like 9/11," he said. "You need to be looking at cargo, the catering trucks, where the fuel is coming from."

Mary Schiavo, an aviation security expert and the former Inspector General of the Dept. of Transportation — which oversaw the FAA in the 1990s — said a big concern is the threat of unmanned drones or electromagnetic pulse weapons to disrupt cockpit operations.

"The TSA needs very smart young people savvy about artificial intelligence who understand this new technology and can get out in front of it to stop terrorists," she said. "But my experience with the TSA is they’re reactive, not proactive."

One simple fix that hasn’t been adopted involves installing an extra barrier between the cockpit and passenger cabin, a proposal that airlines have lobbied against.

"For 20 years we’ve been waiting for that secondary barrier," Sullivan said.

CLICK HERE TO READ MORE ON FOX BUSINESS

All while insiders have become alarmed over the potential of terrorism from Afghanistan, which some say has been downplayed under President Biden.

"I’m worried we’ve taken our eyes off overseas terrorism when we need to be focusing on it most," former U.S. Rep. Peter King (R-NY) told The Post.

"Our presence in Afghanistan meant we had eyes and ears on Pakistan which has nuclear weapons that we need to monitor carefully. We’re losing all that."

To read more from the New York Post, click here.

Conversation 1K Comments
 

Housecarl

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Hummm......

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South Korea displays capability to develop nuclear-powered submarines
Posted : 2021-08-15 16:57
Updated : 2021-08-16 10:19

Navy's first SLBM submarine shows technologies comparable to those of advanced countries

By Jung Da-min

South Korea has become a country that operates locally-built submarines capable of deploying submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), creating a basis for the development of nuclear-powered submarines, defense watchers said Sunday.

On Friday, the Navy received the country's first 3,000-ton-class submarine, reportedly equipped with six vertical launching systems (VLSs). The commissioning ceremony of the diesel air-independent propulsion (AIP) submarine, the Dosan Ahn Chang-ho ― named after a prominent independence fighter who led education reform and modernization movements during the Japanese colonial occupation ― took place at the Okpo Shipyard of Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering (DSME) on Geoje Island in South Gyeongsang Province.

The submarine is the first submarine developed under the Navy's Changbogo-III (KSS-III) Batch-I submarine construction project for 3,000-ton submarines. The submarine was launched in September 2018, commissioned on Aug. 13th, 2021 and it is expected to enter service in August 2022, after a yearlong evaluation.

Shin Jong-woo, a senior researcher at the Korea Defense and Security Forum, said that although the 3,000-ton class submarine is diesel-powered, its successful development and high proportion of locally made component parts proved that South Korea has created a basis for building 4,000-ton or 5,000-ton nuclear-powered submarines in the near future.

The Republic of Korea Navy's first 3,000-ton submarine made with local technology, the Dosan Ahn Chang-ho, docked at the Okpo Shipyard of Daewoo Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering (DSME) on Geoje Island in South Gyeongsang Province, Friday, during the commissioning ceremony. It is capable of firing submarine-launched ballistic missiles with its vertical launching systems. Courtesy of the Republic of Korea Navy
A graphic of the Republic of Korea Navy's first 3,000-ton submarine made with local technology, the Dosan Ahn Chang-ho / Courtesy of the Republic of Korea Navy
"Although it is a 3,000-ton diesel powered submarine, it is designed to carry six SLBMs. If the country succeeds in launching an SLBM from a submarine, it will become a country that possesses SLBM submarines," Shin said. South Korea has succeeded in the underwater test-launching of mockup missiles, according to media reports in July citing military officials.

"Even with SLBMs being conventional warheads, if submarines can be equipped with larger SLBMs, due to their destructive power, they will be considered weapons of high value."

The 83.5-meter-long and 9.6-meter-wide submarine can carry 50 crewmembers and can operate underwater for about three weeks without surfacing, with its AIP system, military officials said. The Navy said that 76 percent of its component parts were locally made, helping the military cut costs by lowering its dependence on technologies produced abroad.

But Shin said that there still remain questions over whether the 3,000-ton diesel submarines could be strategic weapons for the country when they are not nuclear-powered and not permitted to deploy nuclear weapons, as South Korea is bound to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Shin said that he believes South Korea's submarine technologies are comparable to those of advanced countries.

News of South Korea's submarine manufacturing advances comes as North Korea is believed to have completed the construction of a 3,000-ton submarine, which the North is said to have unveiled in July 2019.




Email
damin.jung@koreatimes.co.kr
 

Housecarl

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SYRIA, AIRPOWER, AND THE FUTURE OF GREAT-POWER WAR
AARON STEIN AND RYAN FISHEL
AUGUST 13, 2021
COMMENTARY

During the war in Syria, the U.S. Air Force participated in operations it rarely trained for. Russian fighter aircraft regularly flew sorties across the Euphrates River toward U.S. positions, even though the two countries were not direct antagonists in the conflict. In response, U.S. fighters would — during times of tension — intercept the incoming jets and engage in maneuvers to prevent them from dropping bombs near American and partner positions on the ground. Despite a deconfliction mechanism between Moscow and Washington to manage air operations, this type of incident has been a fairly common occurrence in Syrian airspace from 2016 to the present.

While the risk of uncontrolled escalation between the two powers remained low throughout most of the conflict, this was the first time that Western and Russian pilots have routinely flown so close to one another in combat since the 1973 Arab-Israeli war in Sinai. The air war in Syria is a great example of what great-power competition may actually look like in scenarios short of officially declared combat: urbanized and chaotic. Russian aerial operations, including how Moscow sought to shape broader opinion about the conflict, highlight how great powers may choose to use force in peripheral conflicts that challenge American interests, but not the U.S. conventional military directly.

As the U.S. Air Force prepares for conflict with Russia and China, its interactions with Russian forces in Syria offer valuable lessons about the “urbanization” of aerial combat and its operational and tactical nuances. First, great-power conflict may not result in direct combat, but instead involve each country fighting for strategic leverage in third countries using a mixture of airpower and elite ground forces. Second, powers hostile to the United States may try to complicate U.S. action in ways that fall below the threshold of officially declared war, but which skirt the line of hostile action and complicate how U.S. forces may use force in dense and complicated combat environments. Third, U.S. Air Force training scenarios do not fully account for the complexity of an air war resembling the American experience in Syria. As a result, assumptions about how adversaries may challenge U.S. interests with airpower should be updated beyond linear notions of Joint Forcible Entry, even while training for a high-end fight continues to ensure that U.S. pilots retain critical advantages over adversary nations.

The Challenge in Syria: Non-Hostile Adversaries
Syria was often downplayed as a “permissive” environment for air operations because friendly forces were not kinetically engaged by enemy air defenses. Nevertheless, the Air Force faced an almost impossibly complex situation operating in Syrian airspace. U.S. aircraft were flying in proximity to Russian jets, often in support of different ground actors, but with rules of engagement that did not classify the Russian Aerospace Forces as a hostile adversary. These interactions were also taking place within the “no escape zone” of both Russian air-to-air weapons and the relatively intact Syrian integrated air defenses. In short, the delineation between permissive and non-permissive was purely academic.

The United States and its coalition partners also chose not to degrade or disable the Syrian regime’s integrated air defense system, which remained potent throughout the war and used to fire at Israeli aircraft, but was rarely used to target American or coalition pilots. To make matters even more complicated, the Russians improved Syrian air defenses with the deployment of the S-300 and S-400, raising concerns that Russian technicians and operators may be present at these sites to help operate them. The Soviet Union used this tactic during the Cold War to deter the targeting of air defense sites in third countries mired in conflict.

To manage this air environment, the United States and Russia relied upon a deconfliction mechanism to prevent midair collisions and inadvertent escalation. The ostensible barrier in Syria’s northeast separating the two forces was the Euphrates River, which at its widest point is around 1,000 feet wide. The aircraft the United States and Russia deployed to Syria can cover 1 mile in about seven seconds at normal cruising altitude and airspeed, and air-to-ground weapon release zones were often several miles from a target. A large, easy to identify object makes sense to deconflict two air forces because a river never moves and can be seen from miles away, so pilots should have little trouble adhering to territorial boundaries to help minimize risk of unintended escalation and a midair collision. However, the deconfliction mechanism did not preclude either side from crossing the river. Instead, it asked each air force to provide pre-notification for planned flights that would cross the body of water. At times, Russia would simply choose not to provide that information, or cross the river during times of inclement weather to strike targets firing across at allied forces.

Russian forces could overfly U.S. positions — and drop weapons nearby — without eliciting a response from the Air Force because it was near impossible to discern Russian intent. Without having perfect clarity about what individual Russian pilots were doing, U.S. Air Force pilots were left to guess about whether Russians were fully briefed on U.S. ground positions. The Russians were also giving air support to the Syrian Arab Army, which would come under attack from the Islamic State operating on the eastern side of the Euphrates River. Thus, there was puzzlement among U.S. pilots about whether Russian jets were intentionally dropping munitions uncomfortably close to U.S. and partner positions, or striking obvious Islamic State targets shooting across the river at the Syrian Arab Army as it advanced on the “right side” of the deconfliction line. During times of diplomatic tension, particularly in 2017, Russian actions became more aggressive, and required U.S. action to prevent Russian fighters and attack aircraft from overflying U.S. positions. This dynamic meant that U.S. ground forces were occasionally more vulnerable to ground attack than is captured in the U.S. military’s doctrinal definition of control of the air.

Iran’s use of armed drones in Syria posed similar challenges for the Air Force. The United States created a second 34-mile zone in southern Syria around al-Tanf, an American- and coalition-controlled garrison near the shared border of Iraq, Syria, and Jordan. On June 8, 2017, an Iranian-made Shahed-129 drone was shot down while attacking a small coalition special operations outpost. While Iranian drones are often dismissed because they are rudimentary compared to U.S. platforms, the uncomfortable fact is that a relatively inexpensive drone the size of an MQ-9 Reaper operated unmolested in airspace the United States was patrolling, and where U.S. ground forces were present. The Air Force did ultimately use force to shoot down the drone, but only after the Iranians had fired on a U.S. ground position. This incident highlights how challenging air and ground operations can be in a war zone, even in relatively low-risk conditions.

In an environment with multiple non-hostile adversaries, true “control” over anything the opponent does in the air is aspirational, especially if unmanned and autonomous systems are present and engaged as well. In the case of the Shahed-129, the U.S. outpost was outside of a previously agreed upon deconfliction zone, and, due to the rules of engagement, the Iranian aircraft was not declared hostile prior to the engagement.

The incident represented some of the same fog and friction present during encounters with the Russian Aerospace Forces. Although the Shahed was successfully found and tracked by nearby F-15Es, its slow speed and small size made it challenging to target in a vast, open desert. This also marked the first time in almost 20 years that a U.S. aircraft engaged an enemy aircraft that was capable of attacking ground troops, although because of the rules of engagement, the drone had already fired a missile at its target, which was a small U.S. Special Forces base, and very nearly resulted in the first air-to-ground killing of U.S. forces since the Korean War.

Options to Consider
Future combat scenarios are more likely to resemble the messy, congested airspace that the U.S. Air Force faced in Syria than direct, large-scale combat between the United States and a hostile, nuclear-capable actor like Russia or China. The Russian intervention in Syria underscores how great powers can forward deploy air assets and sustain a rigorous and intense air campaign for years. The United States has, for close to three decades, demonstrated the efficacy of airpower and small numbers of ground forces to achieve a narrow set of military goals. The Russian example in Syria would suggest a greater willingness for others to adopt elements of U.S. military strategy and use expeditionary assets to secure political goals. These “urbanized” scenarios may play out in space, the South China Sea, or even future Afghanistan if another great power moves in. The U.S. military will need to resist the urge to conflate direct, head-to-head conflict with great-power competition. Napoleonic, linear conceptions of war may be less relevant between large, nuclear-armed states in the 21st century. To account for this change, the Air Force may have to update some critical assumptions and update training and planning, including down at the tactical level.

Currently, the Air Force is exclusively dependent on considerable intelligence resources and enabling assets to sustain flight operations. This reality is at odds with the push to distribute U.S. forces to better protect against advances in accurate fires by adversaries and proxies. The Air Force’s dependency on a rigid process to vet and assign targets for tactical aviation to strike also ensures that U.S. interventions in third-party conflicts are, almost by design, large and require resource-intensive enablers to sustain. In Syria, strikes against the Islamic State required thousands of hours of surveillance to accurately map enemy positions, a string of tankers to sustain Air Force operations, and a plethora of space-based assets to ensure real-time communication with a centralized planning cell in Qatar or back in the United States.

This model binds the Air Force, making it less agile and less capable of operating from austere locations, where centralized decision-making is often asynchronous to the speed of combat or lines of communication are missing or disrupted. The service, however, has identified the need to be more agile to complicate adversary targeting with long-range fires or small-scale attacks that are difficult to attribute. Tactical and operational training should include realistic challenges associated with a failed state that draws in two or more large powers in addition to key strategic audiences swaying international opinion. To some extent, this is already happening, although it is disparate and not widespread.

Planning for the Right Wars
The Air Force may be too wrapped up in its own assumptions, planning for a linear war that may never come, and investing long term in platforms that may quickly become obsolete, or require expensive upgrading to remain relevant. Therefore, it should consider expanding the range of scenarios that inform its mission planning and training, and ultimately procurement. The United States is more likely to face a Syria-like scenario in the near future, where large powers seek to shape narratives and garner leverage, than to fight a repeat of the Gulf War in the Baltic, or in a Taiwan-type event. These scenarios, of course, are not mutually exclusive, and preparation for a high-end fight is important to train for. However, lessons from messy, indirect conflicts should not be dismissed because they do not neatly ascribe to certain assumptions about where conflict is headed.

There is little doubt that in the skies over Syria, there were two great powers flying very capable jets in proximity to one another with mutually unknown intentions. A third power, Iran, was also present, as was a near failed state, Syria. This scenario does not fit the image of two superpowers fighting a large, neatly defined conventional war. However, it is the most recent example of how competition between two countries may actually take place in congested skies in a country where both actors are trying to project power. American airmen were unprepared to face the range of scenarios that they confronted in Syria. Looking ahead, the Air Force should learn those lessons and incorporate them into future training.

BECOME A MEMBER

Aaron Stein is the director of research at the Foreign Policy Research Institute and the author of the forthcoming book The US War Against ISIS: How America and its Allies Defeated the Caliphate.

Ryan Fishel is an F-15E fighter pilot, former weapon systems officer, and contributing editor to
The Merge defense newsletter. The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Air Force or Department of Defense.

UPDATE: The article has been updated to reflect that it was due to the rules of engagement, not necessarily the “Authorized Use of Military Force,” that the Iranian Shahed-129 drone was not declared hostile prior to the engagement.
 

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Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan’s Latest Merger Enables Renewed Attacks in Pakistan

Publication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 19 Issue: 16
By: Abdul Sayed

August 13, 2021 06:22 PM Age: 2 days

The Pakistani Taliban, known as Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), announced on August 7 that it had merged with a former al-Qaeda-affiliated, anti-state Pakistani jihadist group once led by Ustad Aslam (Umar Media, August 7). It becomes the ninth jihadist group to join the TTP since July 2020. Among the other groups are three TTP splinters, two al-Qaeda affiliates, a faction of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), and two jihadist groups from South Waziristan (Terrorism Monitor, January 5). The al-Qaeda affiliates led by the late Amjad Farooqi and Ustad Ahmad Farooq both played significant roles for al-Qaeda in Pakistan after 9/11.

The Ustad Aslam group developed from the Amjad Farooqi-led group. Aslam was a close aide of Farooqi before Farooqi was killed in a Pakistani security forces raid in September 2004 in the Nawab Shah district of Pakistan’s Sindh province (Dawn, September 27, 2004). The Farooqi group was the first al-Qaeda Pakistani affiliate to play major roles in the al-Qaeda-led anti-state jihadist war in Pakistan. Farooqi, with Ustad Aslam and other accomplices, masterminded the abduction of the Wall Street Journal journalist and U.S. citizen Daniel Pearl in February 2002. They were responsible for multiple suicide attacks, including against the Pakistani Army Chief and President General Pervez Musharraf in December 2003. [1] The Farooqi group later became better more known as the “Ustad Aslam group” in the Pakistani media and the jihadist community in Waziristan as Ustad Aslam was seen as superseding Farooqi. [2]

This article provides insights into the Ustad Aslam group’s critical roles in the post-9/11 al-Qaeda anti-Pakistani state jihadist war to explain this merger’s significance for the TTP and its implications on the jihadist war against Pakistan in the near future.

From Lashkar-e-Jhangvi to al-Qaeda
Ustad Aslam, a.k.a. Qari Yasin, came from to the Lodhran district of Pakistan’s Punjab province. [3] His militancy began when he joined the Sunni sectarian clandestine terrorist group LeJ in the late 1990s and became its most wanted member. He subsequently moved to Afghanistan and became an instructor there in LeJ training camps. In Afghanistan, Aslam participated in advanced urban warfare courses with al-Qaeda and other Arab jihadist experts. He became specialized in explosives, electronics, and bombmaking. With several other LeJ cadres, he received training from the al-Qaeda explosives expert, Midhat Mursi, a.k.a. Abu Khubab al-Misri. [4] Amjad Farooqi was also in Afghanistan with Aslam and the LeJ members at this time. Aslam joined Farooqi’s group to establish the first al-Qaeda-linked anti-state jihadist group in Pakistan after 9/11 (Dawn, September 27, 2004). The group was consequently named after Amjad Farooqi.

The Pakistani state support for the United States in the global war on terror (GWoT) against the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and jihadist allies angered the previously state-loyal Pakistan jihadists who now turned against Islamabad. [5] However, for LeJ, reasons for going to war against the Pakistani state had even deeper roots. Since the mid-1990s, LeJ was involved in brutal sectarian attacks in Pakistan’s urban centers, particularly in its largest Punjab province and the country’s largest city, Karachi. The group killed hundreds of people from Shia sects, including government officials, high-ranking security officers, and Iranian diplomats and cadets. They further planted bombs in an attempt to the assassinate Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in 1999 in Lahore, which he narrowly escaped. LeJ also killed U.S. citizens in Karachi in 1997 (DNI, September 2013). [6] Thus, LeJ was the primary focus of the Pakistani counterterrorism operations in the country before 9/11, which resulted in the arrests and killings of its dozens of its members. The rest of the LeJ militants enjoyed shelter in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan with al-Qaeda and Kashmiri jihadist groups. [7]

When the jihadists were fleeing from Afghanistan to Pakistan after the post-9/11 U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, LeJ had no other option except to also relocate to Pakistan. [8] This led to the killing of several cadres, including its founder and commander-in-chief, Riaz Basra (Dawn, May 15 2002). As a result, LeJ was destroyed, and its remaining members were left without leadership. To avenge its slain leader and other arrested or slain members as well as the Pakistani state’s role in the GWoT, Aslam and several other scattered LeJ cadres came under the command of Farooqi in close league with al-Qaeda to wage a ‘revenge war’ against the Pakistani state and its security agencies. [9]

Training the First Generation of Anti-State Pakistani Jihadists in Waziristan
Aslam and his comrades moved to the South Waziristan district of Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province—which was at the time one of the seven Pakistani tribal agencies part of the Federally Administer Tribal Areas (FATA)—in 2004. South Waziristan was emerging as the new safe haven for al-Qaeda and its local and foreign allies. [10] Umar Faiz Aqdas, who was Aslam’s LeJ comrade and a close friend from his same caste in another district in Punjab, also succeeded Farooqi, and Aslam became the late Ajmad Farooqi group’s second-in-command. [11] Abu Khubab al-Misri was also residing with them in the Mehsud area of South Waziristan, and they started training the new generation of anti-state Pakistanis for al-Qaeda, some of whom rose to senior leadership positions and became the founding figures of al-Qaeda’s South Asian franchise, al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS). [12]

Aslam enjoyed high respect in the jihadist community in South Waziristan, particularly by the Mehsud tribes, for his and his group’s high-level of knowledge on modern terrorist tactics. Al-Qaeda and the TTP’s Mehsud leadership, therefore, consulted Aslam and his organization in planning major attacks in Pakistan. [13] Aslam became popular in the Ajmad Farooqi group in South Waziristan, which became evident by that group increasingly becoming known as the “Ustad Aslam group.” [14]

The Ustad Aslam group proceeded to strike major Pakistani cities, including the capital, Islamabad, with further high-profile attacks. Aslam planned the largest terrorist attacks in the history of Pakistan, which were the September 2008 Marriott Hotel bombing in Islamabad and the October 2009 attack in its twin city, Rawalpindi, on the General Headquarters of the Pakistan Army (The Express Tribune, March 20, 2017). Although the former is known as Pakistan’s 9/11, the latter was the worse attack in the history of the Pakistan Army. The group also claimed the attack on the Sri Lankan cricket team and the bombing of the office of the Pakistani intelligence agency, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), in Lahore in 2009. [15] Besides these attacks, Aslam and his group also helped TTP and al-Qaeda plan several other major attacks in the country. [16] These attacks turned Pakistan into one of the world’s most insecure countries due to the al-Qaeda-linked jihadist threat.

Ustad Aslam as Emir
After the Pakistan Army General Headquarters attack, Ustad Aslam and his group became a top priority of the Pakistani counterterrorism operations. As a result, Pakistani law enforcement agencies killed and arrested several of the group’s members and damaged its urban network. In addition, U.S. drone strikes targeted the group’s hideouts and training centers in South Waziristan. While Ustad Aslam survived multiple drone strikes, Umar Faiz Aqdas was killed in such an attack in the latter half of 2010. [17]

Ustad Aslam succeeded Aqdas as leader of the group that had in any event been known as the “Ustad Aslam group,” but some of his comrades were unhappy with this development. Aslam’s harsh criticism of TTP Emir Hakeemullah Mehsud’s policies resulted in tensions between the two groups. [18] Aslam was close to the Mufti Wali ur-Rehman Mehsud group, which hosted the Amjad Farooqi group in the South Waziristan Mehsud areas. [19] Both Mehsuds were lieutenants of TTP founding emir, Baitullah Mehsud. Differences between the Mehsuds began over the successorship of Baitullah Mehsud after his death in a U.S. drone strike in August 2009. [20] It was the beginning of intra-TTP conflicts, which later turned into brutal TTP infighting and led to its splintering in 2014. [21]

Some members of Aslam’s group suggested that he not involve the organization in the rivalry between the two Mehsuds, but when he ignored their advice some of the group members parted ways with him and joined the Ustad Ahmad Farooq group (not to be confused with the former “Ajmad Farooqi group”). [22] [23] By then, however, Ustad Aslam had become a prominent name in the anti-state Pakistani jihadist landscape. As a result, other al-Qaeda and TTP affiliates members rushed to join him. For example, most of the fighters who followed al-Qaeda senior Pakistani leader Ilyas Kashmiri joined the Ustad Aslam group after a U.S. drone strike killed Kashmiri in June 2011. [24] [25]

Due to intense targeting by U.S. drones and Pakistani counterterrorism operations, the Ustad Aslam group has remained out of the media for much of the past decade and could not claim any major terrorist attacks. However, the group helped the TTP and al-Qaeda plan attacks and provided training to its members. [26] This is how the Ustad Aslam group allied with TTP, but did not join TTP until Ustad Aslam himself was finally killed in a U.S. drone strike on March 17, 2017. Aslam was killed alongside a TTP commander in charge of its suicide battalion, who hosted Ustad Aslam in Bermal district of Afghanistan’s Paktika province, which borders South Waziristan (The News, March 21, 2017). [27] Paktika had become al-Qaeda’s and TTP’s home after a Pakistani military operation rooted them out of Waziristan in 2015.

Implications for Pakistan’s Future
Although Ustad Aslam is highly respected and adored by the TTP, he had never merged his group into TTP. Thus, the current move of the Ustad Aslam group to join the TTP shows that the organization might have achieved a level of strength and trust that had not existed when it was at the peak of its operations, before it splintered in 2014. A senior Pakistani journalist and expert on the TTP, Ihsan Tipu Mehsud, argues that the Ustad Aslam group’s merger with the TTP is at least symbolically significant, if not also operationally. [29] These groups have suffered immensely in the wake of military operations across Pakistan and are scattered, isolated, and lack an operational command and control mechanism. They are in desperate need to find refuge with like-minded organizations. And in such a desperate time, the TTP once again came forward to embrace the Ustad Aslam group.

As a result, Ustad Aslam group’s merger with the TTP brings the most skilled and experienced experts of urban terrorism under control of TTP leadership. The group has trainers who know sophisticated terrorist techniques and helped al-Qaeda deal its heaviest blows to the Pakistani state and its military. The intense Pakistani counterterrorism campaigns and the U.S. drone strikes have damaged its organizational cohesion and scattered its operational network inside Pakistan. However, the recently strengthened TTP now has the resources and urban network to strike Pakistan with deadly attacks like in the past.

Notes
[1] See for details, Pervez Musharraf, In the Line of Fire (Simon & Schuster, UK, 2006)
[2] See for details, Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud, Inqilab-i-Mehsud, (Mehsuds Revolution) [In Urdu], (Al-Shahab Publishers: Paktika, 2017).
[3] Pakistan Most Wanted Terrorist Book, issued by the Pakistan Federal Investigating Agency (FIA), 2016, p.215.
[4] Author interviews with former Pakistani and Afghan jihadists in Afghanistan, June 2021.
[5] See for details, Syed Saleem Shahzad, Inside al-Qaeda and the Taliban, (Pluto Press, London, 2011)
[6] Muhammad Amir Rana, A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan, (Mashal Books, Lahore, 2011), pp.203-213.
[7] Ibid
[8] Shahzad, 2011, p.9.
[9] Ibid
[10] Ibid
[11] Moeenuddin Shami, With Ustad Farooq, Nawai Afghan Jihad, Issue.4, Vol.11, pp.58-61.
[12] One important example is Engr Malik Muhammad Adil, aka Suhail, who later became the AQIS explosive in charge; for details see, Moeenuddin Shami, With Ustad Farooq, Nawai Afghan Jihad, Issue.12, Vol.10, pp.40-43.
[13] Author interview with an internationally known Pakistani journalist, Ihsan Tipu Mehsud, who hails from the South Waziristan Mehsud area and covering TTP and Pakistani militancy over the years, remotely conducted, August 10, 2021.
[14] See for details, Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud, Inqilab-i-Mehsud, (Mehsuds Revolution) [In Urdu], (Al-Shahab Publishers: Paktika, 2017).
[15] Mehsud, 2017, p.402.
[16] Author interview with Ihsan Tipu Mehsud, August 10, 2021.
[17] Mehsud, 2017, p.448, and Shami, Nawai Afghan Jihad, Issue.4, Vol.11, pp.58-61.
[18] Author interview, June 2021.
[19] Author interview with Ihsan Tipu Mehsud, August 10, 2021.
[20] For details see, Abdul Sayed and Tore Hamming, Revival of the Pakistani Taliban, April/May 2021, Volume 14, Issue 4.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Author interview, June 2021.
[23] Shami, Nawai Afghan Jihad, Issue.4, Vol.11, pp.58-61.
[24] Author interview with Ihsan Tipu Mehsud, August 10, 2021.
[25] Seth Nye, Al-Qa`ida´s Key Operative: A Profile of Mohammed Ilyas Kashmiri, CTC Sentinel, September 2010, Volume 3, Issue 9.
[26] Author interview with Ihsan Tipu Mehsud, August 10, 2021.
[27] Mehsud, 2017, p.462.
[28] Author interview with Ihsan Tipu Mehsud, August 10, 2021.
TM-August-13-2021-Issue.pdf
 

jward

passin' thru
Suspected terrorists crossing border 'at a level we have never seen before,' outgoing Border Patrol chief says

by Anna Giaritelli, Homeland Security Reporter |

| August 16, 2021 01:47 PM

Unprecedented numbers of known or suspected terrorists have crossed the southern border in recent months, the outgoing Border Patrol chief said.

The head of the Border Patrol, Rodney Scott, told his 19,000 agents before retiring on Aug. 14 that their national security mission is paramount right now despite the Biden administration's focus on migrant families and children who are coming across the United States-Mexico boundary at record rates.



“Over and over again, I see other people talk about our mission, your mission, and the context of it being immigration or the current crisis today being an immigration crisis,” Scott said in a video message to agents, obtained by the Washington Examiner. “I firmly believe that it is a national security crisis. Immigration is just a subcomponent of it, and right now, it’s just a cover for massive amounts of smuggling going across the southwest border — to include TSDBs at a level we have never seen before. That's a real threat.”

TSDB refers to known or suspected terrorists, as identified in the FBI's Terrorist Screening Database.

BIDEN RE-CREATING WORST CONDITIONS FOR THOUSANDS OF MIGRANT CHILDREN SEPARATED AT BORDER

"Your peers or you are taking criminals, pedophiles, rapists, murderers, and like I said before, even TSDB alerts off the streets and keeping them safe from America," Scott said. "Even if we processed several thousand migrants that day and even if thousands of them were allowed into the U.S., you still took those threats off the street, and I think that's worth it. So please don’t ever undersell how important your mission is."

The surge of migrants from mostly Central American countries has prompted Border Patrol to pull more than 40% of agents from the field to help transport, process, and care for people in custody, meaning fewer agents are able to patrol for national security threats. Often, smugglers send over large groups of families and children to divert agents to one area and then run other contraband or people over the border where agents are not present.

Shortly after taking office in January, CBP told members of Congress that federal law enforcement had stopped four people on the terror watchlist. A CBP news release about these specific encounters was taken down from the government agency's website hours after going up, prompting complaints from Republicans about the Department of Homeland Security's transparency.

The congressional briefing confirmed what House Republicans had said during a border tour in Texas in March. House Homeland Security Committee ranking member John Katko, a former federal prosecutor who was based in El Paso, Texas, during his time as a lawyer, said the international cartels were "masterfully" exploiting the border due to an easing of Trump-era border restrictions.

"People they've caught in the last few days [in Border Patrol's El Paso sector] have been under the terror watchlist," Katko said. "Individuals that they have on the watchlist for terrorism are now starting to exploit the southern border."

The four terror watchlist matches represented a greater number than the average total seen in recent years. Although several thousand people are denied entry to the U.S. at airports each year as a result of being on the list, it is unusual for people to be encountered trying to get into the U.S. between land border crossings. The four matches were citizens of Serbia and Yemen.

Customs and Border Protection, the parent agency of the Border Patrol, would not share information about terrorism-affiliated encounters, adding that its personnel rely on multiple levels of screening to prevent people who are national security or public safety threats.

"While encounters of known and suspected terrorists at our borders are very uncommon, they underscore the importance of the critical work our agents carry out on a daily basis to vet all individuals encountered at our borders," a CBP spokesperson wrote in an email.

"DHS works with our international partners to share intelligence and other information, including to prevent individuals on the terrorist watchlist from entering the United States," the official wrote. "CBP adjudicates individuals encountered at and between our ports of entry against several classified and unclassified databases to determine if they pose a threat to national security, consistent with the law."

The Washington Examiner was first to report in June that Biden administration officials were forcing out Scott at Border Patrol headquarters in Washington after 16 months on the job.

One person with firsthand knowledge of Scott's decision said in May that Scott was told to retire, resign, or move away from headquarters. The decision by Scott's bosses was “completely driven by politics," even though Scott's position is apolitical and he is a 29-year employee of the Border Patrol.

"I did choose to retire, but I am not retiring to run away from this crisis. I’m just going to fight for you from a slightly different angle," Scott said in his message to agents, though he did not explain his future plans.

CLICK HERE TO READ MORE FROM THE WASHINGTON EXAMINER

"I am asking each one of you to look in the mirror and remind yourself, and if you haven’t thought about it before, think about the fact that you are not immigration police and our job is not immigration on the border," Scott said. "Our job is to know who and what comes in this country and then to filter it out based on the rules applied by Congress and by law. That’s critically important, and when you put it in the context of immigration only, I think you miss the bigger fight. This job is extremely important. Your mission's very important."

Posted For Fair Use
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Hummmm......And can probably be applied to other areas as well.......

Posted for fair use.....

Fall of Kabul serves as warning for Sahel
Published on 16.08.2021 at 22h21 by APA News

Respected intellectual and influential activist, Moussa Tchangari, Secretary General of the Nigerien association “Alternative Espaces Citoyens” in a column called on the Sahel’s ruling elites and their Western allies to undertake profound political reforms. Otherwise, the region risks suffering the same fate as Afghanistan, where the Taliban are returning to power twenty years after being driven out by the US army.In Afghanistan, a country that has been at war for 20 years, the Taliban have taken control of several cities, including the capital Kabul. The country’s president, Ashraf Ghani, is on the run, and the few senior members of his regime still in the country are preparing to hand over power to their sworn enemies. This is what all the major world media are reporting; and all this has been played out in the space of a few days, as the deadline for the final withdrawal of the US army, the main pillar of the international coalition that launched the war in 2001, approaches.




In Washington, London, Paris, Berlin and Ottawa, the capitals of the great powers that have been involved in the war in Afghanistan for nearly 20 years, the leaders are in disarray. They are helplessly watching the return to power of the Taliban, having no more plans for this country where they have deployed thousands of soldiers and spent crazy sums of money, apart from evacuating their nationals and their Afghan “collaborators.” “This is not Saigon,” said a senior US official, but it is a debacle. In some respects, it is even more resounding than the one in Vietnam in 1975 with the fall of Saigon.



In the Sahel, where some of the states have been waging a harsh war against various armed groups ideologically close to the Afghan Taliban for some years, the fall of Kabul sounds a warning of what may happen in the coming years if the ruling elites and their Western supporters continue to ignore calls for bold political reforms. In any case, the fall of Kabul is a powerful indication that the war against armed jihadist groups cannot be won without such reforms, which are the only way to bring the greatest political and military force, namely “ordinary people,” into the fight.



After 20 years of fighting, which have resulted in huge losses of human life, mainly among the Afghan population, the Western armies, equipped with the most sophisticated war arsenals, have failed against the determined Taliban; but this failure is first and foremost that of the Western political leaders, who have committed all their forces (soldiers, arms, money, expertise) to this war, relying on a corrupt elite, which shares with the Taliban a deep rejection of democracy. One still remembers the Afghan elections which, although supervised by the “big democratic countries,” were marked by the grossest frauds.




In Afghanistan, 20 years of war have enriched a deeply corrupt elite, brought to and maintained in power by foreign armies; but it must be said that these 20 years of war have also enriched the Western military-industrial complex, security companies and experts of all kinds. The money swallowed up by this war, the human lives it has taken away, are a loss only for the “ordinary people” of Afghanistan and the small taxpayers of the countries involved; and it is because the war is not a misfortune for everyone that it is still going on in the Sahel, against a backdrop of corruption of the elites, denial of rights and refusal of dialogue and reform, at the risk of one day seeing “Talibis on motorbikes” pouring into the capital cities.



In the Sahel, it is urgent that men and women of goodwill stand up and proclaim that the current war cannot be won with the same foreign armies that did not win it in Afghanistan, but also with the same type of corrupt leaders who have no patriotism whatsoever, and the same type of defence and security forces, which sometimes commit serious abuses and are plagued by the business practices of their leaders. If this war is to be won, it will only be through a broad-based will and bold initiatives aimed at building a new political and social contract that restores sovereignty to the people and creates the conditions for a dignified life for the millions of people who are currently deprived of it.
 
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