WAR 07-24-2021-to-07-30-2021__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
(480) 07-03-2021-to-07-09-2021__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

(481) 07-10-2021-to-07-16-2021__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

(482) 07-17-2021-to-07-23-2021__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

____________________________

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South Asia’s nuclear stability: What are the chances of war?

Kashaf Sohail holds an optimistic view regarding the nuclearization of South Asia. According to her, the presence of nuclear weapons in the region has maintained strategic stability. Nuclear weapons do pose a threat, however, an all-out war is very unlikely to happen.
ByKashaf Sohail

24 July 2021

The nuclearization of South Asia started in 1974 when India made its first nuclear test under the name ‘Smiling Buddha’. Although India started its program to become a regional hegemon, its initial stance was that its nuclear capability is for peaceful means. Yet Pakistan being the next-door neighbor fell into a security dilemma and perceived threat from India.

In 1998 India tested weaponized nuclear warheads in its ‘Operation Shakti’ which meant that India is now a nuclear weapon state. Shortly after India’s tests, Pakistan also conducted nuclear tests in 1998 declaring itself as a nuclear-weapon state too.

The nature of the conflict between the two states is territorial mostly and they have already fought three major wars and multiple minor conflicts due to geographic proximity.

Read more: Operation Shakhti: When India tested a nuclear device on its people

Arguments on nuclear weapons
India is the first South Asian state to acquire nuclear weapons and Pakistan is the only Muslim state to acquire nuclear weapons. But are their nuclear weapons for better or for worse?

There are two arguments, nuclear pessimism, and nuclear optimism. According to pessimists, since both the states have acquired nuclear weapons it has increased the threat of a nuclear war instead of maintaining strategic stability. On contrary, the optimists claim that both the states have decades-old enmity so possessing nuclear weapons actually ensures strategic stability.

Credible nuclear deterrence is ensured when a state can maintain three things; prevention of Preventive War; development of second-strike capability; and avoidance of accidental war.

Preventive war is an offensive action to end a developing threat before it creates trouble in the future. For optimists, the threat of preventive war existed when Pakistan was making a nuclear weapon but now it does not persist. But for pessimists, the military organizational behavior in India and Pakistan is making the threat of preventive war stand.

Read more: India ‘more likely’ to use military force against Pakistan: US report

The optimists argue that it was impossible for Pakistan to compete with India conventionally because the latter is economically and militarily stronger so it was necessary for Pakistan to acquire nuclear weapons. Now both states can equally compete on a strategic level but this is very less likely to happen as maintaining strategic stability is a priority.

The pessimists are skeptical about Pakistan’s tendency to attack with preventive war because of how its military command and control are under the greater influence of armed forces, unlike India. Optimists contend that deterrence does not depend upon who is deterring who.

The character or leadership of a state does not matter when a state has nuclear weapons. Even if the leadership has an aggressive and irrational mindset, everyone is aware of the destructive consequences so an irrational leader will also act rationally.

Read more: Op-ed: In quest to win power, leaders often generate huge problems

India’s destabilizing military strategy
Pessimists contend that India is always trying to provoke Pakistan which could be seen during 1986-87 when Indira Gandhi was in government and lost her domestic support because the military was in control. This resulted in a brass-tack crisis which was purely a military decision. Around 250,000 troops undertook massive military exercises at Rajasthan along with 1500 tanks.

Although India claims that it was just a military exercise but Cold Start or Sundar Ji doctrine reveals India’s intention of initiating a comprehensive attack on Pakistan. Lt. Gen P.N. Hoon of the Indian Army revealed in his book, “Brasstacks was the army’s preparation for a war against Pakistan and not a military exercise.”

The optimists assert that when South Asia was not nuclearized, the military deterrence was very low, resulting in three conventional wars, but now India and Pakistan will not end up in an all-out conflict. However, the optimists do partially agree with the pessimist argument of the threat to South Asian stability but in terms of tactical instability.

After the acquisition of nuclear weapons, strategic stability is ensured but it brought tactical instability in the region which was substantial before. Now border skirmishes occur frequently, leaving thousands of civilians and soldiers at risk on both sides.

Read more: Why is India moving heavy weapons towards Pakistan border?

The missile defense system is the greatest threat to the strategic stability of South Asia because if India fully develops the capability then Pakistan’s nuclear warheads will become irrelevant and the concept of mutually assured destruction will also be of no use. This in turn will give India the margin to start a preventive war by using its first-strike capability. It will also hamper Pakistan’s second-strike nuclear capability thus affecting South Asia’s nuclear deterrence.

The geographic proximity is a considerable reason that accidental war is very likely to happen e.g. if Pakistan is testing its missile then India might perceive it as a threat of preparation of attack and might as well launch a missile to retaliate. Any false intelligence report can also initiate an accidental war leaving states with no time to exchange messages.

In my opinion, the arguments posed by nuclear optimists are much more relevant. Pessimists’ explanation about the threat to strategic stability is mostly tilted towards Pakistan and its weaknesses. However, optimism maintains a balance between the two nuclear-weapon states in cultivating the strategic stability of South Asia.

We all are aware of the Indian extremist motives and the dream of Akhand Bharat which pretty much predicts that any future war would be initiated from India and less likely from Pakistan.

View: https://twitter.com/shwait_malik/status/1418028357837418496?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1418028357837418496%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.globalvillagespace.com%2Fsouth-asias-nuclear-stability-what-are-the-chances-of-war%2F


In the current scenario, there are clear intentions of Indian BJP, hijacked by RSS of which the present PM himself is a fundamentalist member. The abrogation of articles in terms of Kashmir did agitate Pakistan a lot but the reaction could not be very aggressive because now it is difficult to wage a war due to the destructive consequences.

So it could be concluded that the presence of nuclear weapons in the South Asian region has maintained strategic stability as proposed by nuclear optimism. The pessimist argument that nuclear weapons are posing a threat is significant but a proper war is very unlikely to happen, at least not until the missile defense system is acquired by India. Deterrence does not mean war cannot break out but it does mean that it is least likely to happen. In the current scenario, the strategic stability of South Asia is guarded.

The author is a columnist based in Islamabad. Her area of interests are terrorism and nuclear studies. She can be reached at kashafsohail26@icloud.com. The views expressed in the article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Global Village Space.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
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Greater Middle East provokes China to step up military power?

Mr. James Dorsey, an award-winning journalist, talks about how China is trying to strengthen bilateral ties by building military relations with other countries. He also talks about series of unfortunate events that have caused China to review its strategic thinking and what other countries are expecting from China when it comes to cooperation.
ByDr. James Dorsey

23 July 2021

China may have no short-term interest in contributing to guaranteeing security in parts of a swath of land stretching from Central Asia to the East coast of Africa, but that does not prevent the People’s Republic from preparing for a time when it may wish to build on long-standing political and military relationships in various parts of the world to project power and maintain an economic advantage.

Determined to exploit the principle of allegedly win-win relationships that are underwritten by economics, trade, and investment as the solution to problems, China has so far delayed if not avoided bilateral or unilateral political and military engagement in conflicts beyond its borders.

Read more: China kicks of first military drill in South China Sea

The question is how long it can continue to do so.

China stepping towards military superiority?
China took a first baby step towards greater power projection with the creation in 2017 of its first overseas military base in the East African state of Djibouti, a rent-a-base nation that hosts multiple military facilities for among others the United States, France, and Japan and potentially Saudi Arabia.

The base signals the importance China attributes to regions like the Gulf and the Horn of Africa.

A recent article in a Chinese military publication sheds further light on Chinese preparations for a day when it may have to project military might in different parts of the world. The article laid out Chinese thinking about the virtues of offering Middle Eastern, Asian, and African militaries and political elites training and educational opportunities.

“Students who can study in China are mostly local military and political elites or descendants of notable families. After they have studied and returned to their country, they have a high probability of becoming the top military and political leaders of the local country. This is very beneficial for China to expand its overseas influence and corresponding armaments exports,” the publication, Military Express, said.

The publication asserted that Chinese military academies were more attractive than their Western counterparts that impose “political conditions,” a reference to students having to hail from countries aligned with the West.

Read more: China: India ‘totally responsible’ for current military standoff on LAC

“Chinese military academy does a better job in this regard. There are no political conditions attached here. Foreign military students here learn Chinese strategies and tactics and learn to operate Chinese weaponry by themselves,” the publication said.

The publication failed to mention that China unlike Western producers also refrains from attaching political conditions to its arms sales like adherence to human rights.

Should China review its military power?
Recent months have not been necessarily kind to Chinese aspirations of remaining aloof to conflict beyond its borders, suggesting that reality on the ground could complicate China’s strategic calculations.

The US withdrawal from Afghanistan threatens to put an ultra-conservative religious regime in power on the border with Xinjiang, the north-western province where China is attempting to brutally Sinicize Turkic ethnic and religious identity.

Recent Taliban military advances have already bolstered ultra-conservative religious sentiment in neighboring Pakistan that celebrates the group as heroes whose success enhances the chances for austere religious rule in the world’s second-most populous Muslim-majority state.

“Our jihadis will be emboldened. They will say that if America can be beaten, what is the Pakistan army to stand in our way?” said a senior Pakistani official.

Read more: Brisk advances of Taliban highlights weaknesses of Afghan forces

Darker times for China
Nine Chinese nationals were killed last week in an explosion on a bus transporting Chinese workers to the construction site of a dam in the northern mountains of Pakistan, a region more prone to attacks by religious militants than Baloch nationalists, who operate from the province of Balochistan and are responsible for the bulk of attacks on Chinese targets in the South Asian nation.

It was the highest loss of life of Chinese citizens in recent years in Pakistan, the largest recipient of Chinese Belt and Road-related infrastructure and energy investments. China sees Pakistan as a key to the economic development of Xinjiang and part of its effort to Sinicize the region.

Indicating Chinese concern, China last month advised its citizens to leave Afghanistan and last week evacuated 210 Chinese nationals on a chartered flight. China last week delayed the signing of a framework agreement on industrial cooperation that would have accelerated the implementation of projects that are part of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

Complicating Chinese calculations is the fact that both Russia and Turkey are maneuvering for different reasons to strengthen Turkic identity in the Caucasus that potentially would be more sympathetic to the plight of the Uighurs and other Turkic Muslims.

Read more: CPEC: A road towards multiculturalism?

Turkey’s concern for Afghanistan’s Turkic minorities
Turkey moreover may see Afghanistan as another stepping stone towards recreating a Turkic world. Turkey has reportedly asked Azerbaijan, whom Ankara supported in last year’s Caucasus war against Armenia, to contribute forces to a Turkish contingent that would remain in Afghanistan after the US and NATO withdrawal to secure Kabul’s Hamid Karzai International Airport.

Turkish influence among Afghanistan’s Turkic minorities has been bolstered by the operation of Turkish schools, an increased number of Turkish scholarships, training of Afghan military and police personnel, the popularity of Turkish movies and television series, and efforts to mediate an end to conflict in the country.

The Taliban have rejected the continuation of a Turkish military presence that for the past six years as part of the NATO-led Resolute Support Mission. The Taliban insisted that Turkish soldiers were “occupiers in Afghanistan” who should leave with NATO and US forces even if they were also representatives of a “great Islamic nation.”

In anticipation of a threatening development in Afghanistan, China quietly established a small military post in 2019 in the highlands of Tajikistan, a stone’s throw from where Afghanistan’s Wakhan Corridor meets Xinjiang.

Read more: Turkey a counterbalance to Russia and China’s increasing influence in Central Asia

Strengthening or weakening diplomatic ties?
More recently, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Ji advised his interlocutors during a visit last week to Central Asia that going forward Chinese private military companies would play a greater role in securing Belt and Road-related strategic infrastructure projects.

Some analysts suggested that the Chinese companies would also be employed to train Central Asian militaries – a domain that was until now largely a Russian preserve.

In a similar vein, France’s withdrawal of its forces from West Africa steps up pressure on China to defend its overseas nationals and interests. Three Chinese construction workers were among five foreigners kidnapped by gunmen this weekend in southern Mali. No group has so far claimed responsibility for the kidnapping.

Read more: Blast in Upper Kohistan claims 13 lives, including 9 Chinese

All of this leaves aside the question of how long China will feel that it can rely on the US defense umbrella in the Gulf to secure the flow of energy and much of its trade against the backdrop of a reconfigured US regional commitment and increasingly strained relations between Washington and Beijing.

It also does not consider China’s ability to manage expectations of the People’s Republic’s willingness to engage, in some cases not only politically or militarily, but also economically.

That was evident during Mr. Wang’s most recent visit to the region, and particularly Syria, which for much of its civil war was home to Uighur jihadists who distinguished themselves in battle.

It was Mr. Wang’s second visit to the Middle East and North Africa in four months. Furthermore, Mr. Wang, last week discussed Afghanistan and Gulf security with his Saudi counterpart on the sideline of a regional cooperation meeting in Uzbekistan.

Read more: Message from Wang Yi, Foreign Minister of the People’s Republic of China

Can China be Syria’s knight in shining armor?
Syrian officials have for domestic and foreign policy reasons long touted China as the imaginary white knight that would come to the rescue in the reconstruction of the war-ravaged country.

“China is far less interested in Syria than Syria is in China… Syria has never been a priority in China’s economy-driven approach to the Middle East,” noted scholars Andrea Ghiselli and Mohammed Al-Sudairi.

The scholars cautioned however that “the significant potential impact of narratives created by local actors in the context of international politics,” a reference to Syria’s projection of China as its savior, cannot be ignored.

Implicit in the scholars’ conclusion is the notion that Chinese policy may in the future increasingly be shaped as much by decision-making in Beijing as developments on the ground in a world in which powers compete to secure their interest and place in the new world order.

Read more: Turkey and China tie themselves in knots over Syria and Xinjiang

Ultimately, the fundamental question underlying all these push factors is, according to Financial Times columnist Gideon Rahman, whether China has not only the capability and aspiration to become a superpower but also the will.

“If China is unwilling or unable to achieve a global military presence that rivals that of the US, it may have to find a new way of being a superpower – or give up on the ambition,” Mr. Rahman argues.

Dr. James M. Dorsey is an award-winning journalist and a senior fellow at Nanyang Technological University’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore and the National University of Singapore’s Middle East Institute as well as an Honorary Senior Non-Resident Fellow at Eye on ISIS. The article has been republished with the author’s permission. The views expressed in the article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Global Village Space.
 

jward

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U.S. hits one of two targets in missile defense test - agency
Reuters
A facility of Aegis Ashore Missile Defense Test Complex is pictured in Kauai, Hawaii, U.S in this photo taken by Kyodo January 18, 2019. Mandatory credit Kyodo/via REUTERS/File Photo

A facility of Aegis Ashore Missile Defense Test Complex is pictured in Kauai, Hawaii, U.S in this photo taken by Kyodo January 18, 2019. Mandatory credit Kyodo/via REUTERS/File Photo

WASHINGTON, July 24 (Reuters) - The United States intercepted one of two targets in a missile defense test conducted over the ocean northwest of Hawaii on Saturday, the U.S. Missile Defense Agency said in a news release.
The agency said it could not confirm whether the second target had been destroyed.

Missile defense tests are an opportunity to improve technology, but also to demonstrate the strength of U.S. defenses on the global stage. The Missile Defense Agency's stated mission is to develop a multi-layered system that could be used to protect the United States and its military forces, as well as U.S. allies.
The test on Saturday, dubbed "Flight Test Aegis Weapon System 33," aimed to intercept two short-range ballistic missile targets with two other missiles launched from a U.S. Navy warship.

The agency said the test was the most complex mission it has conducted to date.

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jward

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Updating Space Doctrine: How to Avoid World War III
Rep. Jim Cooper
July 23, 2021





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What should the United States do if one of its satellites were attacked and the Pentagon had no way to respond in space? The answer to this question is surprisingly revealing about Washington’s space policy.
One of my congressional colleagues said recently, “Let’s take out their ground stations with cruise missiles,” but that made me cringe. When asked a similar question at the National Press Club in March, Gen. John Raymond, chief of operations of the Space Force, said, “There’s no such thing as space war. It’s war,” but that worried me, too. What is the right answer?

Bombing an adversary’s ground station means attacking a sovereign asset like an embassy, probably killing enemy soldiers. Even if the prior attack destroyed one of our key satellites (which is not clear in the hypothetical), retaliating by blowing up a ground station and killing its staff seems disproportionate. If the satellite attack were to fail, bombing a ground station seems belligerent, but not responding at all risks encouraging future attacks. Either way, lowering a space conflict down to Earth means climbing up the escalatory ladder because it forces U.S. leaders to either create casualties on the ground or condone aggression in space.
I thought the new Space Force and the revival of the old Space Command were supposed to give America better options. No U.S. president should be boxed in like that. America needs better answers — and clearer thinking — fast or the Space Force and Space Command will be failures.

The clock is ticking because the United States has been inviting an orbital Pearl Harbor for decades. Gen. John Hyten, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs, calls our military satellites “big, fat, juicy targets.” He’s correct. They are both exquisite and relatively defenseless, just as the U.S. Air Force designed them. There are also constellations of NASA, commercial, and allied satellites that are completely vulnerable. At least the fleet at Pearl Harbor had big guns — its mistake was being caught off-guard. In comparison, most satellites are naked.
Our NATO allies are getting worried. Last month, they confirmed that the alliance’s mutual defense obligations extend to space, in theory bolstering deterrence but in practice expanding the U.S. military’s responsibilities. America’s treaty commitments have astronomical reach because tens of thousands of U.S. and allied satellites may soon be targets, each one dry tinder for war. Sadly, Americans read more about Space Command’s new headquarters than about safeguarding our infrastructure.

The United States can’t fall back on deterrence in space, whether by denial or punishment. No one today finds U.S. space assets too daunting to think of attacking. Satellites follow predictable orbits — the lowest of which can be reached by a missile within five to 15 minutes — and they and their ground stations are equally vulnerable to non-kinetic attacks such as laser dazzling, electronic jamming, and cyber attacks. Countries like China and Russia are exploiting this, which is why they’ve developed arsenals of anti-satellite systems. North Korea and Iran are also in the hunt. With so few satellites of their own to protect, they can focus on playing offense.
Deterrence by punishment, the threat of U.S. retribution after an attack, also seems feeble. The first problem is attribution. Although early warning systems would likely spot the heat flares accompanying an anti-satellite missile attack, determining the source of a sophisticated cyber attack is far more challenging. Absent a “smoking gun” anti-satellite missile launch, the United States would find it difficult to make a persuasive case for retaliation should a sensitive (or classified) space asset suddenly go offline, particularly if officials were uncertain why. There are tens of millions of pieces of space debris too small to track already in Earth’s orbits. How do you prove that space litter was not guilty?

Assuming that the United States can persuasively attribute the attack, then it must convincingly defend against it. America has limited means of doing so but they are highly classified and would seem abstract and hard to believe to the world’s citizens. Forget the pretty pictures of the Rover on Mars — space attacks involve tracking bullets or lasers. America must be able to show its strength without compromising its sources. The U.S. House Armed Services Committee is already focusing on reducing such over-classification.
The sad condition of space deterrence is the reason that discussions of the Space Force and U.S. Space Command quickly turn to avenging satellite attacks on the ground. Since most officers in the Space Force were trained in other services, they over-learned the lessons the Pentagon has been trying to teach since the passage of Goldwater-Nichols in 1986. “Joint warfighting” and “multi-domain warfare” roll off the tongues of many officers. Those are usually the right answers — on Earth.

The Space Force should not take this thinking to orbit. Its official doctrine, published last year, lists multi-domain warfare as its fourth guiding principle, arguing that “not only are space operations global, they are also multi-domain.” That is entirely reasonable when it means that the Space Force serves U.S. troops on every continent. But another interpretation gives the Space Force a pass for 1) having no publicly declared deterrent capability of its own, and 2) risking a ground war following an anti-satellite attack. Such interpretations are either staggeringly presumptuous for a new service or a humble admission that it depends completely on its older, tougher siblings for protection. Neither explanation makes Americans feel secure.
Where does America go from here? First, the United States should create deterrence in space that the world knows and respects, not just reiterate empty and sometimes misleading space doctrines. America needs the will, the technology, and, yes, the publicity, to make deterrence real to potential adversaries. Establishing space deterrence will be made easier by the fact that any nation initiating a space attack would be transgressing a deep taboo, like dropping the atomic bomb on Hiroshima.

Another source of deterrence comes from fully understanding the space environment and its current players. Space wars are, by definition, remote-controlled robot wars. (I say robot instead of satellite because the latter term refers only to altitude and momentum, not other, more important, aspects of space machines.) Fortunately, the United States has a substantial advantage in virtually every field of space machinery. That alone should sober up an attacker.
Other ways of promoting deterrence include warning of denial of U.S. space discrimination capabilities — the ability to identify and track “space junk” — to any nation that crosses red lines, leaving their satellites more vulnerable to space debris. Another is to have legions of replacement satellites ready for launch, like modern terra-cotta warriors, rendering anti-satellite weapons useless. Impossible? That’s what was said about SpaceX’s reusable rockets. Expensive? Today you can 3D print rockets like Relativity Space is doing. Why not print enough rockets and satellites to make them safe through redundancy alone? Space has advantages: You can always make more robots.

Another fundamental of space is the recognition that no one should die for a robot. The laws of war haven’t caught up to this idea yet, but they will. This isn’t self-righteousness. It’s realism. The United States would have a hard time persuading a skeptical global public that it really knows why a U.S. satellite died without divulging national technical means. Even if it were able to positively attribute the attack, the Pentagon would then be put in the awkward position of arguing that twisted metal in orbit is answerable by spilled blood on the ground. Good luck with those arguments — especially in a world already addled with disinformation, which would cloud the credibility of any attribution. As expensive as satellites are, they are cheaper and less consequential than human life.
In my view, the Space Force and Space Command have unique obligations to deter conflict and, if they fail, to keep conflict in space lest it spread uncontrollably. Space attacks are like cancer: They easily metastasize. This is especially true at a time when the Space Force is far from self-reliant and self-sufficient in its hardware, software, or the people who support space systems.
As it matures, the Space Force should remember the phrase “What happens in Vegas stays in Vegas,” because what happens in space should stay in space. This is not permission for the Space Force to misbehave but a rule that the Space Force must clean up its own mess. Outside of Vegas, few people believe your story, even when you are telling the truth.

Jim Cooper is a member of the U.S. House of Representatives. He serves as chairman of the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces.

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jward

passin' thru
China Is Building A Second Nuclear Missile Silo Field

By Matt Korda and Hans Kristensen • July 26, 2021


The Hami missile silo field covers an area of about 800 square kilometers and is in the early phases of construction. Click on image to view full size.

Satellite images reveal that China is building a second nuclear missile silo field. The discovery follows the report earlier this month that China appears to be constructing 120 missile silos near Yumen in Gansu province. The second missile silo field is located 380 kilometers (240 miles) northwest of the Yumen field near the prefecture-level city of Hami in Eastern Xinjiang.
The Hami missile silo field is in a much earlier stage of development than the Yumen site. Construction began at the start of March 2021 in the southeastern corner of the complex and continues at a rapid pace. Since then, dome shelters have been erected over at least 14 silos and soil cleared in preparation for construction of another 19 silos. The grid-like outline of the entire complex indicates that it may eventually include approximately 110 silos.

Dome structures have been erected over 14 silo construction sites. Preparation is underway for another 19, and the entire missile field might eventually include 110 silos. Click on image to view full size.

The Hami site was first spotted by Matt Korda, Research Associate for the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists, using commercial satellite imagery. Higher resolution images of the site were subsequently provided by Planet.

The silos at Hami are positioned in an almost perfect grid pattern, roughly three kilometers apart, with adjacent support facilities. Construction and organization of the Hami silos are very similar to the 120 silos at the Yumen site, and are also very similar to the approximately one-dozen silos constructed at the Jilantai training area in Inner Mongolia. These shelters are typically removed only after more sensitive construction underneath is completed. Just like the Yumen site, the Hami site spans an area of approximately 800 square kilometers.

The Hami missile silo field has a grid-pattern where the silos are located approximately 3 kilometers from each other. Click on image to view full size.

Impact on the Chinese nuclear arsenal
The silo construction at Yumen and Hami constitutes the most significant expansion of the Chinese nuclear arsenal ever. China has for decades operated about 20 silos for liquid-fuel DF-5 ICBMs. With 120 silos under construction at Yumen, another 110 silos at Hami, a dozen silos at Jilantai, and possibly more silos being added in existing DF-5 deployment areas, the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) appears to have approximately 250 silos under construction – more than ten times the number of ICBM silos in operation today.

The number of new Chinese silos under construction exceeds the number of silo-based ICBMs operated by Russia, and constitutes more than half of the size of the entire US ICBM force. The Chinese missile silo program constitutes the most extensive silo construction since the US and Soviet missile silo construction during the Cold War.
The 250 new silos under construction are in addition to the force of approximately 100 road-mobile ICBM launchers that PLARF deploys at more than a dozen bases. It is unclear how China will operate the new silos, whether it will load all of them with missiles or if a portion will be used as empty decoys. If they are all loaded with single-warhead missiles, then the number of warheads on Chinese ICBMs could potentially increase from about 185 warheads today to as many as 415 warheads. If the new silos are loaded with the new MIRVed DF-41 ICBMs, then Chinese ICBMs could potentially carry more than 875 warheads (assuming 3 warheads per missile) when the Yumen and Hami missile silo fields are completed.

It should be emphasized that it is unknown how China will operate the new silos and how many warheads each missile will carry. Regardless, the silo construction represents a significant increase of the Chinese arsenal, which the Federation of American Scientists currently estimates includes approximately 350 nuclear warheads. The Pentagon stated last year that China had “an operational nuclear warhead stockpile in low-200s,” and STRATCOM commander Adm. Charles Richard said early this year that “China’s nuclear weapons stockpile is expected to double (if not triple or quadruple) over the next decade.” The new silos could allow China to accomplish this goal, if it is indeed the goal.
Although significant, even such an expansion would still not give China near-parity with the nuclear stockpiles of Russia and the United States, each of whom operate nuclear warhead stockpiles close to 4,000 warheads.

The Hami missile silo field domes are identical to silo domes seen at the Yumen missile silo field and the Jilantai training area.

Chinese motivations
There are several possible reasons why China is building the new silos. Regardless of how many silos China ultimately intends to fill with ICBMs, this new missile complex represents a logical reaction to a dynamic arms competition in which multiple nuclear-armed players––including Russia, India, and the United States––are improving both their nuclear and conventional forces as well as missile defense capabilities. Although China formally remains committed to its posture of “minimum” nuclear deterrence, it is also responding to the competitive relationship with countries adversaries in order to keep its own force survivable and capable of holding adversarial targets at risk.

Thus, while it is unlikely that China will renounce this policy anytime soon, the “minimum” threshold for deterrence will likely continue to shift as China expands its nuclear arsenal. The decision to build the large number of new silos has probably not been caused by a single issue but rather by a combination of factors, listed below in random order:
Ensuring survivability of nuclear retaliatory capability: China is concerned that its current ICBM silos are too vulnerable to US (or Russian) attack. By increasing the number of silos, more ICBMs could potentially survive a preemptive strike and be able to launch their missiles in retaliation. China’s development of its current road-mobile solid-fuel ICBM force was, according to the US Central Intelligence Agency, fueled by the US Navy’s deployment of Trident II D5 missiles in the Pacific. This action-reaction dynamic is most likely a factor in China’s current modernization.

Increasing the readiness of the ICBM force: Transitioning from liquid-fuel missiles to solid-fuel missiles in silos will increase the reaction-time of the ICBM force.
Protecting ICBMs against non-nuclear attack: All existing DF-5 silos are within range of US conventional cruise missiles. In contrast, the Yumen and Hami missile silo fields are located deeper inside China than any other Chinese ICBM base (see map below) and out of reach of US conventional missiles.
Overcoming potential effects of US missile defenses: Concerns that missile defenses might undermine China’s retaliatory capability have always been prominent. China has already decided to equip its DF-5B ICBM with multiple warheads (MIRV); each missile can carry up to five. The new DF-41 ICBM is also capable of MIRV and the future JL-3 SLBM will also be capable of carrying multiple warheads. By increasing the number of silos-based solid-fuel missiles and the number of warheads they carry, China would seek to ensure that they can continue to penetrate missile defense systems.

Transitioning to solid-fuel silo missiles: China’s old liquid-fuel DF-5 ICBMs take too long to fuel before they can launch, making them more vulnerable to attack. Handling liquid fuel is also cumbersome and dangerous. By transitioning to solid-fuel missile silos, survivability, operational procedures, and safety of the ICBM force would be improved.
Transitioning to a peacetime missile alert posture: China’s missiles are thought to be deployed without nuclear warheads installed under normal circumstances. US and Russian ICBMs are deployed fully ready and capable of launching on short notice. Because military competition with the United States is increasing, China can no longer be certain it would have time to arm the missiles that will need to be on alert to improve the credibility of China deterrent. The Pentagon in 2020 asserted that the silos at Jilantai “provide further evidence China is moving to a LOW posture.”

Balancing the ICBM force: Eighty percent of China’s roughly 110 ICBMs are mobile and increasing in numbers. The US military projects that number will reach 150 with about 200 warheads by 2025. Adding more than 200 silos would better balance the Chinese ICBM force between mobile and fixed launchers.
Increasing China’s nuclear strike capability: China’s “minimum deterrence” posture has historically kept nuclear launchers at a relatively low level. But the Chinese leadership might have decided that it needs more missiles with more warheads to hold more adversarial facilities at risk. Adding nearly 250 new silos appears to move China out of the “minimum deterrence” category.

National prestige: China is getting richer and more powerful. Big powers have more missiles, so China needs to have more missiles too, in order to underpin its status as a great power.

The Hami and Yumen missile silo fields are located deeper inside China than any other ICBM base and beyond the reach of conventional cruise missiles. Click on image to view full size. Image: Google Earth.

What to do about it?
China’s construction of nearly 250 new silos has serious implications for international relations and China’s role in the world. The Chinese government has for decades insisted it has a minimum deterrent and that it is not part of any nuclear arms race. Although it remains unclear how many silos will actually be filled with missiles, the massive silo construction and China’s other nuclear modernization programs are on a scale that appears to contradict these polices: the build-up is anything but “minimum” and appears to be part of a race for more nuclear arms to better compete with China’s adversaries. The silo construction will likely further deepen military tension, fuel fear of China’s intensions, embolden arguments that arms control and constraints are naïve, and that US and Russian nuclear arsenals cannot be reduced further but instead must be adjusted to take into account the Chinese nuclear build-up.

The disclosure of the second Chinese silo missile field comes only days before US and Russian negotiators meet to discuss strategic stability and potential arms control measures. Responding to the Chinese build-up with more nuclear weapons would be unlikely to produce positive results and could cause China build up even more. Moreover, even when the new silos become operational, the Chinese nuclear arsenal will still to be significantly smaller than those of Russia and the United States.
The clearest path to reining in China’s nuclear arsenal is through arms control, but this is challenging. The United States has been trying to engage China on nuclear issues since the late-1990s, but so far with minimal success. Rather than discuss specific limitations on weapon systems, these efforts have been limited to increasing transparency about force structure plans and strategy, and well as discussing nuclear doctrine and intentions.

The Trump administration correctly sought to broaden nuclear arms control to include China, but fumbled the effort by turning it into a public-relations pressure stunt and insisting that China should be part of a New START treaty extension. Beijing not surprisingly rejected the effort, and Chinese officials have plainly stated that “it is unrealistic to expect China to join [the United States and Russia] in a negotiation aimed at nuclear arms reduction,” particularly while China’s arsenal remains a fraction of the size.
Bringing China and other nuclear-armed states into a sustained arms control dialogue will require a good-faith effort that will require the United States to clearly articulate what it is willing to trade in return for limits on Chinese forces. In this regard, it is worth noting that the absence of limits on US missile defenses is of particular and longstanding concern to both China and Russia. When the Bush administration decided to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002, officials from both countries explicitly stated that the treaty’s demise would be highly destabilizing, and implied that they would take steps to offset this perceived US advantage. Nearly 20 years later, the knock-on effects of this decision are clear. Putting US missile defenses on the negotiating table could help clear the path towards enacting a new arms control agreement that ultimately keeps both Chinese and Russian nuclear arsenals in check.

But the Chinese nuclear modernization is driven by more than just missile defenses. This includes the nuclear modernization programs of the United States, India, and Russia, the significant enhancements of the conventional forces of those countries and their allies, as well as China’s own ambitions about world power status.
Later this year (or early next year) the parties to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) will meet to review the progress of the treaty. Although the treaty does not explicitly prohibit a country from modernizing or even increasing its nuclear arsenal, reduction and eventually elimination of nuclear weapons are key pillars of the treaty’s goal as reaffirmed by numerous previous NPT conferences. It is difficult to see how adding nearly 250 nuclear missile silos is consistent with China’s obligation to “pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament…”

Background information:
Our Hami missile silo discovery was first featured in the New York Times on 26 July 2021.
This publication was made possible by generous support from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the New Land Foundation, the Ploughshares Fund, and the Prospect Hill Foundation. The statements made and views expressed are solely the responsibility of the author.

← First New START Data After Extension Shows Compliance
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Posted for fair use.....

A New Revolution in the Middle East
July 22, 2021

WRITTEN BY


Jon B. Alterman

Senior Vice President, Zbigniew Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy, and Director, Middle East Program

To hear some people describe it, the global energy transition is nigh. Widespread awareness of climate change has galvanized consumers and governments alike to get serious about abandoning hydrocarbons. The financial world has read the new sentiment and pivoted away from oil and gas. Investors are now pouring billions into renewables, and China sees renewable energy as a national security imperative. Soon, oil production will outstrip demand, and as prices fall, producers will produce even more to make up for lower volumes, suppressing prices still further. Oil prices are going to drop off a cliff.

An alternative view is that the energy transition will take decades, and the built infrastructure to consume hydrocarbons ensures a robust market for many years. While electric cars get attention, approximately 90 percent of new car sales are still gas-fueled, and charging infrastructure is still billions of dollars and decades away. Existing homes have gas furnaces and gas stoves, and they last decades. Virtually all of the world’s jet fuel is petroleum based, and the world is becoming ever more reliant on plastics, which are derived from oil. That is to say nothing of the developing world, where most of the world’s population lives, and which often operates on smaller economic margins than wealthier nations. These countries’ consumption is rising sharply as incomes increase, and they are likely to rely on existing equipment and technology for longer. While the wealthy can spend thousands on green products, for much of the world’s population, oil and gas will remain the affordable and available fuels.

There are reasonable arguments for both of these views, and no one can say with any certainty how technology, regulation, or consumer behavior will unfold. For the Middle East, which scenario comes closer to fruition is of profound importance. Oil and gas revenues drive the region’s economies, since the region is comprised almost entirely of energy-exporting states and labor-exporting states. Poorer states send workers to the richer ones, and workers send billions back home to their families. The world’s strategic attention to the region is also contingent on energy production. Religion and tourism will keep the region in the public’s mind, but for governments, the region’s irreducible significance is a product of global energy markets.

The idea that oil prices will drop off a cliff is predicated on the notion that oil is a market, and even small imbalances have large economic consequences. Today, global oil consumption is approximately 100 million barrels/day, and the system has relatively little capacity to produce more. When consumption threatened to outstrip supply in 2008, oil reached $140/barrel. When the Covid-19 pandemic suppressed demand in the spring of 2020, the world began to run out of storage, and oil prices plunged. Saudi Arabia took the biggest hit, cutting production by about 20 percent while prices still dropped below $30/barrel, less than half of their previous level. It took more than six months of reduced global oil production to work through the oversupply.

A sustained drop in global consumption, however small, would pressure Gulf countries to boost production in an effort to drive higher-cost producers out of the market and ensure that they are not left with even lower-value barrels in the ground when consumption drops still further. This partly explains the spat over production this month between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

We don’t know who the winners and losers of the next decade will be in the Middle East. The increased volumes of low-cost producers might make up for lower prices, leading to a renewed strategic focus on Middle Eastern producers. Alternatively, the imperative of market discipline may fall to Middle Eastern producers, who would need to constrain production to prevent prices from collapsing. How this plays out will matter.

Governments throughout the Middle East have been preparing for a post-oil world for years, but they remain far from their targets. In the Gulf states, the transition from high-productivity, low-wage workers subsidizing the efforts of low-productivity, high-wage workers will take years. Private sectors strain to provide jobs for new entrants to the workforce, and youth unemployment tops 30 percent in many countries. Youth alienation is a problem every government is considering in the decade since the Arab uprisings. It is a problem no government is convinced it has under firm control.

And the energy transition will matter for more than just the Middle East. Energy security drives much of China’s recent investment in the region. If the Chinese government decides that its energy security derives from mines in Africa and not wells in the Middle East, we should expect Chinese attention and capital to shift. If there is a more enduring role for oil and gas in the global energy picture, more contestation between the United States and China for regional influence is possible. Finally, it is possible that Western states will turn away from hydrocarbons for ecological reasons, while China and the developing world remain devoted to them for economic reasons. This could manifest almost as a U.S. abdication of a future role in the Middle East, with China picking up much of the slack.

What is especially important to grasp here is how much of how this develops is beyond the ability of Middle Eastern governments to shape. The principal drivers of the global energy transition will come from outside the region. They will have a profound impact inside the region, and they will shape the way the region relates to the rest of the world. To hear some people tell it, that change could be profound, and it could be coming very soon.

Jon B. Alterman is a senior vice president, holds the Zbigniew Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy, and is director of the Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

Commentary is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).
© 2021 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.
 

jward

passin' thru
July 27, 2021 Topic: Missile Defense Region: Americas Blog Brand: The Buzz Tags: MissilesStrategyWeaponsChinaWar
Why America Needs Broader Missile Defense Capabilities

China and Russia have made great strides in developing hypersonic missiles that could deliver nuclear payloads and evade current missile defenses.


by John Rossomando

China is in the midst of a nuclear buildup that merits a strong response.

China’s increasing belligerence combined with the discovery of what are believed to be 120 missile silos in a 700 square mile deployment area near Yumen City, located in north-central China, is a reminder that the United States needs to develop a broader missile-defense network and push ahead with nuclear modernization.

For the first time since the Soviet Union exploded its first atomic bomb in 1949, the United States finds itself amid a three-way nuclear arms race. We are in an arms race whether the Biden administration and the Democrats want to acknowledge it or not. Inaction and playing ostrich will not make it disappear.
Close Chinese-Russian military ties raise concern that the two powers could pool their nuclear arsenals in case of war to attack the United States and its allies.

“I would also like to single out the words from this statement that say that our ties now surpass such a form of interstate interaction as the military-political alliances of the Cold War era,” Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov said earlier this month. “This is the most important guideline for deepening relations between Russia and China in all areas without exception.”

The Trump administration made arms control with China a priority, but the Biden administration has been largely quiet.
President Joe Biden began his term by giving Vladimir Putin an unconditional renewal of the 2010 START treaty without any preconditions on Russian nuclear modernization or including China in an arms-control regime. From a treaty perspective, China is off the leash and has zero treaty restrictions to its buildup or the number of nuclear missiles it can develop.

The Biden administration requested $8.9 billion for the Missile Defense Agency in its May budget wish list, down from $10.5 billion in the current fiscal year. Greater investment is needed because the costs of doing nothing will be much less than the costs associated with the destruction of American cities or other potential nuclear targets.
The George W. Bush administration built the first real missile-defense system. The Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) has a narrow focus that protects American targets from North Korea was deployed in the 2000s. A total of forty-four interceptors are located at Ft. Greeley, Alaska and at Vandenberg Space Force Base in California.

This current missile-defense program provides no real protection against the growing threats from Russia or China. Only twelve of the nineteen tests of the GMD have succeeded in the past two decades. Meanwhile, forty-three of fifty-three tests of the shipborne Aegis Missile Defense have succeeded. The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense that provides mobile, deployable missile defense has a perfect record of sixteen successful tests and sixteen intercepts.
“Russia has actually fielded the hypersonic technology. China has been developing hypersonic technology,” Rep. Mike Turner, the ranking Republican on the House Armed Services subcommittee on strategic forces, said earlier this month at The Hudson Institute. “We don’t have in place what is necessary to ensure that we both even up on the sensing side and the response side . . . to defend against such weapons, and at the same time we’re not fielding them ourselves.”

China and Russia have made great strides in developing hypersonic missiles that could deliver nuclear payloads and evade current missile defenses. The Russians claim their newly fielded Tsirkon hypersonic glide vehicle is invisible to radar; it would be particularly lethal if it could carry a nuclear warhead. China’s new hypersonic DF-17 cruise missile could carry a nuclear warhead.
Technological advances could make ideas from the Reagan-era Strategic Defense Initiative such as “Brilliant Pebbles” practical, and they could fill in the capability gap left by shortcomings in ground-based missile-defense platforms. “Brilliant Pebbles” would use satellite-based interceptors that target intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in their boost phase, eliminating them before they can deploy their nuclear warheads.

Another possible component could be a series of networked laser satellites that also could destroy ICBMs during the launch phase.
These newly discovered Chinese silos could potentially house DF-5C nuclear missiles that U.S. intelligence analysts believe could carry multiple warheads. China is well on its way to having the two hundred ICBMs that the U.S. Defense Department sounded an alarm about last year. Having multiple warheads on each ICBM would multiply the threat to the American homeland.

“Construction began in March 2020, although the vast majority of construction occurred after February 2021, suggesting an extremely rapid pace of construction over the past few months,” nuclear weapons analysts Jeffrey Lewis and Decker Eveleth wrote on the Arms Control Wonk blog. “(In earlier conversations we stated that construction began after February 2021, although a closer examination of historical imagery shows that we simply overlooked some earlier construction.)”
Lewis previously dismissed top Trump arms negotiator Amb. Marshall Billingslea’s warning that China was undertaking a nuclear arms buildup in October 2020, telling CNN he didn’t see any reason for alarm. The Trump administration was aware of what China was up to, according to a source with first-hand knowledge.

The Defense Department estimated that China had one hundred missile silos in total last year. This latest buildup suggests that China has discarded its longstanding claim to not having a no first-strike nuclear doctrine, a senior Trump administration official said under the condition of anonymity. Recent Chinese Communist Party (CCP) propaganda threatening a nuclear strike against Japan if it defends Taiwan reinforces this concern, and the proliferation of the coronavirus pandemic around the globe shows that the CCP has little interest in human life.
This development shows that China’s leadership hopes to have enough nuclear missiles to be able to survive a strike from the American nuclear deterrent.

The Biden administration’s decision to spend trillions on pet projects in the wake of the coronavirus pandemic, which the CCP let proliferate globally, killing four million worldwide, shows it has little excuse not to provide similar defense against a nuclear attack by a hostile peer like China. Although the chances of a nuclear exchange are statistically considered remote, there isn’t an excuse not to put defenses into place now instead of waiting until later.
Investments on par with former President Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative are needed to protect the homeland and America’s allies from nuclear attack amid the breakdown of international arms-controls.

John Rossomando is a senior analyst for Defense Policy and served as Senior Analyst for Counterterrorism at The Investigative Project on Terrorism for eight years. His work has been featured in numerous publications such as The American Thinker, Daily Wire, Red Alert Politics, CNSNews.com, The Daily Caller, Human Events, Newsmax, The American Spectator, TownHall.com and Crisis Magazine. He also served as senior managing editor of The Bulletin, a 100,000-circulation daily newspaper in Philadelphia and received the Pennsylvania Associated Press Managing Editors first-place award in 2008 for his reporting.
posted for fair use
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Posted for fair use.....

Russian Encroachment In Eastern Europe Drove Poland’s Purchase Of Abrams Tank
https://www.realcleardefense.com/ar...of_abrams_tank_787255.html#comments-container
By Sarah White
July 27, 2021

This month, the sale of 250 U.S.-produced Abrams tanks to Poland was officially announced. On July 14, the sale was confirmed in a statement by Poland’s deputy prime minister and ruling party leader, Jaroslaw Kaczynski. “Our army will be enriched by a large number of Abrams tanks which are the most advanced in the world,” said Kaczynski. “If all goes well, deliveries will begin next year.”

Polish defense minister Mariusz Blaszczak likewise confirmed the sale: "So we are ordering the most modern tanks. Tanks available in the best-equipped version, tanks that are combat proven, tanks which were constructed to counter the most modern Russian T-14 Armata tanks.”

The sale, valued at USD $5.9 billion, is positive news for Polish national security. Poland is the most heavily fortified NATO country on the front line with Russia and one of the NATO members that spend the highest share of its GDP on defense.

Though it had already purchased the High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS), the Patriot air defense system, and the coveted F-35 fighter from the U.S., Poland’s acquisition of the M1—technically the M1A2 SEP v3—means that it will become a more secure buffer on NATO’s eastern front.

Poland has been long overdue for an upgrade to its land combat vehicles. Up until this point, Poland has relied on a patchwork of obsolescent Soviet-manufactured tanks and aging German Leopard tanks to deter aggression from Russia.

For years there had been speculation about how Poland was going to acquire new tanks and various options it might have pursued in doing so. Poland petitioned France and Germany to participate in their Main Ground Combat System (MGCS) but had been denied membership as of 2020. Meanwhile, South Korea mounted a campaign to sell its Black Panther K2 tank to Warsaw, and there was a time when that purchase seemed like a possibility. However, a sale did not materialize.

In any case, acquiring the Abrams is ultimately more to Poland’s advantage than the Leopard or Panther options. The M1 is the most cutting-edge tank in the world. Most importantly, it could be equipped with the Trophy active protection system (APS) that distinguishes it as the most resilient vehicle against the anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) that the new Russian Armata tanks are believed to be equipped with. Neither the Leopard nor the Panther offers quite the same advantage in defensive technology.

The sale is also good news for the security of NATO’s eastern front as a whole. Russia’s military activity in the region for the last decade has underscored the true vulnerability of former Soviet countries to Russian encroachment through a conventional attack.

Russia’s 2014 illegal annexation of the Crimean Peninsula from Ukraine demonstrated to the international community that aggression and conventional invasion were no longer hypothetical actions in Moscow’s playbook. That reality has been repeatedly confirmed by the continuing situation in Eastern Ukraine, where clashes with Russian-backed insurgents have been frequent.

More recently, twin crises in Ukraine and Belarus have called additional attention to the true vulnerabilities in the defenses of frontline countries, particularly Poland. The political crisis in Belarus resulting from mass efforts to oust its authoritarian president Alyaksandr Lukashenka created a power vacuum in Minsk, which Vladimir Putin and Moscow swiftly stepped in to fill.

In what was effectively a soft takeover of the Belarusian government, Russia has used this opportunity to deploy a tank battalion to Belarus’ border with Poland, revealing the full extent to which the latter’s aging tank battalions exposed it to the danger of conventional conflict breaking out in this area, already full of potential hot spots between the Baltic States and the Black Sea.

This April, a massive buildup of Russian forces descended on the Crimean border with Ukraine. Some were later recalled by Moscow after NATO raised the alarm, and the international community took an unequivocal stance to condemn the move. However, about 80,000 troops and their equipment were left behind in Crimea.

Other NATO allies in Eastern Europe, such as the Baltic States, are similarly vulnerable. However, the strategic pressure placed on Poland by Moscow has often been the most overt.
https://www.realcleardefense.com/ar..._of_abrams_tank_787255.html?muid=l6rFQ69tU4Sm
Given this, Warsaw appears ready to deploy the Abrams tanks to its border with Belarus as soon as deliveries begin in 2022. Blaszczak stated that as soon as the Polish military receives the tanks from the U.S., they will be deployed to the eastern part of the country. "These tanks will be in the first line of defense, of course, if there will be such a need," he said.

With the increasing sophistication of Russia’s armed forces and Moscow’s well-established willingness to use both hard and soft power to expand its sphere of influence, Poland’s vulnerability makes the rest of the region more vulnerable in turn. The Abrams is a reinforcement that improves the preparedness of the front as a whole for the sudden event of a conventional Russian attack.
Sarah White, M.A., is Senior Research Analyst at the Lexington Institute.
 

jward

passin' thru
Joint Chiefs Seek A New Warfighting Paradigm After Devastating Losses In Classified Wargames
U.S. Forces "failed miserably" in the wargames, which simulated a battle for Taiwan among other scenarios.
By Brett Tingley July 27, 2021

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are rethinking the United States’ warfighting concepts after failing “miserably” in a wargame that simulated a variety of scenarios. Many of the Pentagon’s core strategies for conducting warfare proved themselves futile in the face of modern threats and capabilities, forcing the Joint Chiefs to explore a warfighting concept known as “Expanded Maneuver.” While the overall concept is new, many of the ideas in Expanded Maneuver build on the overarching focus on distributed operations and information-sharing networks the Pentagon has been pursuing in recent years.

The Expanded Maneuver concept was described by General John Hyten, the 11th Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in reporting by Defense One’s Tara Copp. The specifics of the wargame that prompted Hyten to rethink warfare are classified, but an unnamed defense official told Copp that one of the scenarios simulated a battle for Taiwan. While Hyten didn’t reveal much about the wargames themselves, he did state that the simulated U.S. forces were swiftly and thoroughly dominated. “Without overstating the issue, it failed miserably. An aggressive red team that had been studying the United States for the last 20 years just ran rings around us. They knew exactly what we're going to do before we did it,” Hyten said this week during a launch event for the National Defense Industrial Association’s Emerging Technologies Institute.



message-editor%2F1627407055764-jadc2usnmc2michaelhlehman.jpg

USN/MC2 Michael H. Lehman

A recent Joint All-Domain Command & Control System demonstration at Joint Base Langley-Eustis

One of the issues that compounded the blue forces’ losses in the wargame was the fact that U.S. forces concentrated together in one area in order to combine firepower and reinforce one another. “We always aggregate to fight, and aggregate to survive. But in today’s world, with hypersonic missiles, with significant long-range fires coming at us from all domains, if you're aggregated and everybody knows where you are, you're vulnerable,” Hyten said.

Another decisive factor was that the “blue team,” or simulated American forces, lost their ability to use networked communications from the outset of the wargame. “We basically attempted an information-dominance structure, where information was ubiquitous to our forces. Just like it was in the first Gulf War, just like it has been for the last 20 years, just like everybody in the world, including China and Russia, have watched us do for the last 30 years,” Hyten said according to Defense One. “Well, what happens if right from the beginning that information is not available? And that’s the big problem that we faced.”


message-editor%2F1627407163478-generaljohnhyten.jpg

DOD

General John Hyten


Prior tabletop wargames that also portrayed China as the central adversary had similar outcomes and prompted similar discussions within the Pentagon. Earlier this year, Air Force Lieutenant General Clint Hinote, the service's Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategy, Integration, and Requirements, stated that “we should never play this war game scenario [of a Chinese attack on Taiwan] again, because we know what is going to happen. [...] The definitive answer if the U.S. military doesn’t change course is that we’re going to lose fast.” Hinote even added that the F-35 would essentially be useless in such a conflict, and that “Every fighter that rolls off the line today is a fighter that we wouldn’t even bother putting into these scenarios.”

F-35 Cueing Artillery To Take Out Air Defense Site During Test Is A Glimpse Of The Future By Joseph Trevithick Posted in The War Zone

Today's F-35As Not Worth Including In High-End War Games According To Air Force General By Joseph Trevithick Posted in The War Zone

USAF Wants Units To Rapidly Build And Fly From New Bases In The Middle Of A Future War By Joseph Trevithick Posted in The War Zone

Air Force To Build Alternate Airbase On Tinian Island In Case Guam Gets Knocked Out By Tyler Rogoway Posted in The War Zone

Rocket Delivery Of Cargo Anywhere In An Hour In New Air Force Budget Proposal By Joseph Trevithick Posted in The War Zone


The new Expanded Maneuver concept outlined by General Hyten contains four key directives for the services to integrate in order to better compete on the battlefield of today: contested logistics, joint fires, Joint All-Domain Command and Control, and information advantage. These aren’t necessarily new ideas, and in fact, build on initiatives that have already been in development.

Contested logistics in this sense refers to finding new concepts for keeping warfighters stocked with fuel and other supplies no matter where they are operating. This would also include being able to defend logistics assets and requiring logistic units to possibly have to fight their way to forward areas. Several initiatives along these lines are already in progress. The U.S. Army, for one, has explored new ideas in recent years that would see combat brigades be able to operate for a whole week without resupply. The Air Force is also pursuing a “Rocket Cargo” concept that aims to be able to put 100 tons of cargo anywhere on Earth within an hour using rocket technologies already available on the commercial market.


message-editor%2F1627407243567-usmclogisticswargamesgtanthonyortiz.jpg

USMC/Sgt Anthony Ortiz

U.S. Marines from Combat Logistics Battalion 8 work together with Navy personnel during an Expeditionary Logistics Wargame in 2012.

Hyten also expanded on how the concept of joint fires is integral to his Expanded Maneuver vision. “You have to aggregate to mass fires, but it doesn't have to be a physical aggregation,” Hyten said. “It could be a virtual aggregation for multiple domains; acting at the same time under a single command structure allows the fires to come in on anybody. It allows you to disaggregate to survive.” Hyten admitted that joint fires is “unbelievably difficult to do.”

Still, this concept has been explored in the past. The Marine Corps, for one, has eyed using combat units spread out in small boats as opposed to using centralized larger ships, largely based on lessons learned from wargaming. The Air Force has also tested using F-35s to cue artillery strikes, allowing it to remain undetected by not engaging threats directly while still using its sensors to identify and mark targets. Larger, more distributed live-fire tests of similar concepts have been conducted involving assets simultaneously on the ground, in the air, and in space.

Hyten’s third directive, Joint All-Domain Command and Control, or JADC2, is an attempt to connect sensors and communication networks from across the services into a singular architecture. Essentially, JADC2 would create a digital cloud-like environment for sharing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance data, as well as other information, across the DOD’s vast system of communications networks in order to enable faster decision-making. The Air Force, in particular, has tested a wide variety of systems that could eventually fall under the larger JADC2 umbrella, including some that utilize joint fire concepts. Assets like the shadowy RQ-180 could fit into this architecture, serving as long-endurance, survivable information gateways in contested environments.



message-editor%2F1627407619497-usarmywargamescommandpostcomputingenvironment.jpg

US Army

A demonstration of the Command Post Computing Environment which combines warfighting functions into a common user interface, reducing the training burden on Soldiers and accelerating the integration of new capabilities.


The concept of information advantage Hyten describes as part of Extended Maneuver is essentially a sum of the other three concepts, enabled by real-time information and data sharing across the entire military enterprise. Hyten says that if these concepts could be successfully deployed throughout the services, “the United States and our allies will have an information advantage over anybody that we could possibly face.” While Hyten didn’t specifically mention machine learning or artificial intelligence, other military leaders have signaled in the past that these systems will play a huge part in establishing and maintaining information advantage in the future.
As the Center for New American Security’s Becca Wasser notes on Twitter, sometimes the integration of new concepts like Hyten’s Extended Maneuver can be hindered by what she calls a “broken” process of developing new military strategies and visions.
A friendly reminder that the US loses wargames all the time. This isn’t a new development; this game is being publicized for a reason.

To me, this speaks volumes about how the US concept development process is broken—and that’s a more damning problem than losing a wargame. https://t.co/KQX4So3Bap
— Becca Wasser (@becca_wasser) July 27, 2021
Both. The process is deeply flawed and more focused on protecting parochial interests than producing joint or service concepts that net us the advantages we need. But if I had to point to one, I would say joint concepts are the most in need of reinvigoration.
— Becca Wasser (@becca_wasser) July 27, 2021

Hyten has been particularly vocal about this broken process in the past, claiming that what worries him most is that America's defense-industrial complex has lost the ability to "go fast," meaning bureaucratic red tape can often hold back progress when it comes to military innovation.

There is always a push-and-pull struggle between the interests of each branch of the services, the military-industrial complex, and the true realities of joint capabilities. Getting the vast enterprise that is the U.S. military to coordinate and work together on massive paradigm shifts in terms of concepts of joint operations is not easy, to say the least. Many past joint networking concepts over the last few decades have failed, leaving some to wonder if the new push for JADC2 will succeed or succumb to inter-service competition, technological roadblocks, and recalcitrance.

Simulated U.S. “blue team” forces losing in wargaming is nothing new, and past wargames have likewise shown that some current concepts of joint operations would lead to devastating losses. Still, the fact that this latest classified wargame directly simulated a battle over Taiwan - a prospect which seems more and more likely, based on some recent developments - could give military leadership pause to rethink entrenched warfighting and developmental concepts.
The Joint Chiefs’ General John Hyten may not be introducing completely novel ideas with his Extended Maneuver vision, but given that Hyten says the simulated U.S. forces “failed miserably” should be enough for the Joint Chiefs to reevaluate current warfighting capabilities and tactics in light of potential adversaries’ rapidly advancing capabilities and growing ambitions.
Contact the author: Brett@TheDrive.com

Posted for fair use
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Posted for fair use.....

Gulf Cartel Boss Behind Civilian Massacre Found Dead in Mexican Border City

by Ildefonso Ortiz and Brandon Darby
29 Jul 20217

A regional Gulf Cartel commander believed to be the mastermind of a massacre that killed 15 innocent civilians this summer is dead due to presumed infighting. The murder comes days after the organization announced a truce after four years of factional war.

The murder took place this week when state authorities found the body of Edgar “Maestrin” Valladares Hernandez inside a vehicle with an unidentified man on the outskirts of Reynosa, Tamaulipas. Both victims were shot several times. According to information released by the Tamaulipas Attorney General’s Office, authorities found an ID card belonging to Valladares Hernandez. However, authorities used “forensic studies” to fully identify the victim.

The murder comes days after the Gulf Cartel posted banners throughout the state announcing a truce. Two main factions from Reynosa and Matamoros were waging a fierce turf war for more than four years and killed hundreds.

Valladares Hernandez is considered one of the masterminds behind a violent attack in Reynosa on June 19, where cartel gunmen killed 15 innocent civilians. One of the theories under official consideration supposes the Gulf Cartel killed Valladares as part of the terms of truce–rather than a sign of renewed factional hostilities.


Ildefonso Ortiz is an award-winning journalist with Breitbart Texas. He co-founded Breitbart Texas’ Cartel Chronicles project with Brandon Darby and senior Breitbart management. You can follow him on Twitter and on Facebook. He can be contacted at Iortiz@breitbart.com.


Brandon Darby is the managing director and editor-in-chief of Breitbart Texas. He co-founded Breitbart Texas’ Cartel Chronicles project with Ildefonso Ortiz and senior Breitbart management. Follow him on
Twitter and Facebook. He can be contacted at bdarby@breitbart.com.
 

jward

passin' thru
Even a Short War Over Taiwan or the Baltics Would Be Horrific for Civilians
Daniel R. Mahanty

9-11 minutes



False promises are at the heart of making war. In August 1914, German and British soldiers were sent to the front on the false promise they would be home by Christmas, as were American soldiers shipped to Korea 36 years later. The Vietnam War and Iraq War were both started and sustained by false promises of purpose and outcome. In the 1960s, U.S. Army Gen. William Westmoreland spoke of a “crossover point” to victory in Vietnam, and during his presidency George W. Bush promised “peace in the greater Middle East” by means of war in Iraq. The “global war on terror,” as Bush termed it, came with its own false promises, including the idea that so-called precision airstrikes could kill only terrorists—and not families attending a wedding party.
As the United States emerges from the shadow of the forever wars into a new era of superpower competition where war between the great powers is thinkable again, it seems to be preparing for the next war on the basis of a particularly dangerous false promise: that large numbers of civilians, including in major population centers in Asia and Europe, won’t be affected by it.

The modern augurs of war are war games, exercises, complex estimates, and even fictionalized yet realistic sneak previews of the future. A bounty of think tank reports, public accounts of war games, speculative analyses, entire magazine issues, and at least two popular novels—2034 and Ghost Fleet—together provide a terrifying glimpse into the most likely and consequential flash points, actions, and reactions involving a conflict between the United States and either China or Russia. Each follows a slightly different path that depends on the assumptions made by the authors or scenario designers. Despite difference in the details, most involve a rapid, if unintended, escalation from gray zone operations (such as cyberattacks on critical infrastructure, disinformation campaigns, and other forms of hybrid conflict) to amphibious or overland invasions, airstrikes, and, in some cases, major missile attacks. The most common scenarios of a U.S. war with China involve a confrontation over Taiwan or a dispute over territory in the East China Sea, such as the Senkaku Islands. A potential NATO confrontation with Russia usually involves conflict in one of the three Baltic states. The scenarios are similar in that few make any meaningful reference to the effects of war on civilians and civilian infrastructure, even as the scenarios expand first to regional and then global levels of destruction.

The fact that civilian losses go all but unmentioned is unsettling because it directly contradicts humanity’s experience in every war in modern history. But it is also surprising given that most of the imagined scenarios involve direct armed confrontations near or in large population centers. One recent analysis speculates that China may already be practicing for a massive bombing raid against Taiwanese air defense systems and military bases. It’s not hard to imagine that this would include Taiwan’s largest naval base, which is in Kaohsiung City (population 2.8 million), and other facilities in or near heavily built-up areas. In other scenarios (examined here, here, and here), China launches strikes against U.S. and other allied facilities in Japan, on Guam, in the Philippines, and/or in Australia. Guam, the Japanese prefecture of Okinawa, and the two Japanese cities of Yokosuka and Sasebo, which host likely military targets in these scenarios, together are home to more than 2.2 million people. Meanwhile, a number of contingencies centered around the Baltic states (discussed here, here and here) anticipate Russian attacks on NATO facilities, possibly near or within such cities as Tallinn, Estonia.

Nor are the United States and its allies the only countries with civilians at risk. In a conflict with China, some analyses see Taiwan targeting airfields and ports on China’s coast with its arsenal of high-mobility artillery rocket systems or standoff land attack missiles. Possible targets are located in the densely populated provinces of Fujian, Zhejiang, and Guangdong. U.S. strikes, meanwhile, could target Chinese bases further inland. All told, airstrikes by U.S. and/or Taiwanese forces using missiles of various ranges, payloads, and effects could conceivably fall within the vicinity of tens of millions of people in China. In Europe, according to at least one war game, a NATO counterattack could target Russian military installations near the city of Kaliningrad, Russia, where almost 500,000 people live.

Yet for some reason—and contrary to all historical experience—the millions of people who could be directly or indirectly affected on either side of a great-power conflict don’t seem to play much of a role when tomorrow’s wars are modeled. One storyline sees “salvoes of missiles” launched at the runways of the U.S. Air Force’s Kadena Air Base on Okinawa and severely damaging U.S. air power, but it makes nary a mention of the fact that the base is situated within less than a mile of kindergartens, schools, and nurseries—all on a densely populated strip of the island. It’s not hard to imagine those “salvoes” (meaning 10 missiles? 100? 1,000?) containing one or more missiles that land astray of the intended target. What’s more, any direct civilian casualties would only be part of the devastation that would befall the civilian population in Asia or Europe in the case of war, including from energy, food, and water disruptions—not to mention the terrible economic fallout.

It’s possible that the lack of concern for civilians in scenarios of future conflict stems, at least in part, from an abiding public faith that the U.S. military will follow the laws of war and act honorably, perhaps unlike some of its potential adversaries. But while it’s true that the military is unlikely to intentionally target civilians, it also doesn’t appear to be planning to do all that much to spare them from harm. Of late, some military officials have even publicly warned anyone looking for restraint and accountability with regards to civilians to look elsewhere. Writing in Just Security, U.S. Marines Lt. Col. John Cherry, British Royal Air Force Squadron Leader Kieran Tinkler, and law professor Michael Schmitt caution that routine policies and procedures to minimize civilian harm, which became commonplace during the era of counterinsurgency operations, will simply be “unworkable” in a conflict among the major powers. Less diplomatically, but no less honestly, a former U.S. Army judge advocate general, retired Lt. Gen. Charles Pede, and Col. Peter Hayden recently issued a stern warning to humanitarians and civilian policymakers who have come to expect “highly constrained, policy-driven rules of engagement.” In the next war, there will be no hesitation; only, according to the authors, “winning swiftly through the efficient use of force.”

In reality, it’s unlikely the American public will apply much pressure for restraint, especially if the United States or one of its allies is attacked first. In a recent survey conducted by my organization, the Center for Civilians in Conflict, and ReThink Media, 61 percent of just over 1,000 Americans polled favored airstrikes against Russia or China in response to an attack on U.S. military assets, even if those airstrikes were to lead to 10,000 civilian deaths. This kind of finding is not terribly new: 67 percent of Americans surveyed after the December 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor supported bombing Japanese cities in response. It may alarm U.S. allies in Asia that more respondents to my organization’s recent survey (37 percent) were willing to tolerate 10,000 civilian deaths due to fighting in an allied Asian country, such as Japan, than in the territory of a European ally, such as one of the Baltic states (27 percent). Combined with recent research on the correlation between racist attitudes and white Americans’ support for U.S. military interventions in other countries, this survey result could serve as a warning that Americans might tolerate more devastating effects of war on Asians—even those living in an allied country—than on Europeans, just as they did during World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War.

Today, military commanders and the civilian politicians who might send them to war may be accepting too readily the spurious claim that “sharp wars are brief.” Not only is a major conflict unlikely to be brief, but it also will almost certainly be devastating for millions of people. As the next era of superpower competition heats up, raising the real risk of the country’s political leaders marching headlong into the next tragic episode of human folly, we should make sure that war’s perpetual, inevitable, innocent victims—civilian populations—are not excluded from the policy debate.

 

jward

passin' thru
A-10 Warthogs Are About To Operate From A U.S. Highway For The First Time
We have seen USAF highway exercises in Europe and the Pacific, and now they are coming closer to home.
View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kwo2QprI4R8
By Thomas Newdick July 29, 2021


A-10s on Estonian highway
1st Special Operations Wing / Public Domain

Thomas Newdick View Thomas Newdick's Articles

@CombatAir


For the first time in recent history, the U.S. Air Force is going to take its aircraft out onto highways in the United States for an exercise. Four A-10C Warthog attack aircraft and a pair of C-146A Wolfhound special operations transports are due to take part in the road-landing drill, which is a part of the wider Exercise Northern Strike. As well as being a unique event in the United States, the upcoming highway deployment reflects the ever-increasing importance of dispersed operations for the U.S. military, including as part of the Air Force’s Agile Combat Employment (ACE) initiative.
The highway exercise will take place on August 5 and is being run by the Michigan Air National Guard. With the help of the Michigan Department of Transportation (MDOT). A stretch of the Michigan State Highway M-32 near Alpena will be closed off for five hours, as the A-10s and C-146s touch down there.



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Master Sgt. Scott Thompson

An A-10C from the 107th Fighter Squadron, Selfridge Air National Guard Base, Michigan, conducts close air support training at Grayling Aerial Gunnery Range in Waters, Michigan, in 2019.




“This is believed to be the first time in history that modern Air Force aircraft have intentionally landed on a civilian roadway on U.S. soil,” said U.S. Air Force Colonel James Rossi, Alpena Combat Readiness Training Center commander. “Our efforts are focused on our ability to train the warfighter in any environment across the continuum so our nation can compete, deter, and win today and tomorrow.”
The highway drills will be conducted by the Michigan Air National Guard’s 127th Wing, which flies A-10Cs from Selfridge Air National Guard Base. Also involved is the Air Force’s 355th Wing, which also operates A-10Cs, as well as combat search and rescue assets from Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona, Finally, there is participation by the Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC), from Duke Field, Florida, which is responsible for the C-146A, among other platforms.

This particular stretch of highway has been chosen due to its proximity to the Alpena Combat Readiness Training Center that’s one of the facilities being used for Northern Strike 21-2, described as “one of the National Guard’s largest joint, readiness producing exercises.” The maneuvers will be run out of Michigan’s National All-Domain Warfighting Center (NADWC), a huge training range where sea, land, air, space, and cyber capabilities can all be put to the test. Here, flying assets have around 17,000 square miles of special-use airspace in which to train.
For its part, the Michigan Air National Guard will also bring useful expertise to the highway drill, A-10s from the 127th Wing’s 107th Fighter Squadron having operated from austere locations in the past, among them various deployments from highways in Estonia, including as part of the multinational Saber Strike exercise in 2018.



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Air National Guard/Tech. Sgt. Christopher Schepers

An A-10C assigned to the 104th Fighter Squadron, Maryland Air National Guard, takes off for a training mission during Saber Strike 15 from Ämari Air Base, Estonia, in 2015.


What’s more, the A-10 was designed to be able to undertake just these kinds of missions as part of its requirement to keep fighting on the Cold War-era battlefield. It’s optimized for short takeoffs and landings and its landing gear boasts low-pressure tires for operating from highways and even rougher non-standard surfaces.




While much of its work is cloaked in secrecy, the C-146, which is a militarized Dornier Do 328, is also known to operate from austere locations with some regularity, fulfilling tasks such as discrete movements of special operations forces teams in different hotspots around the world. It is not clear if the two types will be operated independently, or if the C-146s will be used in support of the Warthogs, for example bringing in maintenance personnel and flight-line equipment. In the past, AFSOC MC-130J Commando II special operations tankers have been used to set up forward arming and refueling points (FARPs) for tactical fighters, so this kind of synergy is not altogether new.



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U.S. Air Force/Dan Neely

A C-146A Wolfhound from the 919th Special Operations Wing taxies on the Duke Field flight line.


It’s also not clear how much preparation work will need to be done to the highway itself before it accepts these jets, but, as we have explored in the past, standard highway strips sometimes require fairly significant changes to be made, such as removing crash barriers, power lines, signage, and lighting.
We do know that to facilitate the exercise, traffic will be detoured, with route signs to help redirect road traffic. The electrical power supply will also be temporarily shut down for residences immediately surrounding the landing area.
The highway exercise is certainly in keeping with the Air Force’s emerging operational concepts, especially Agile Combat Employment (ACE), which aims to ensure that airpower can be sustained even without access to regular airbases, which are likely to be high-priority targets for the enemy in any peer conflict, whether in Europe or the Pacific. While both these areas of operation have hosted ACE exercises, sometimes including the use of austere airstrips, practicing for these contingencies in the Continental United States is new.



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U.S. Air Force/Senior Airman Ericka A. Woolever

An F-16C assigned to the 555th Fighter Squadron lands during an Agile Combat Employment exercise at Amendola Air Base, Italy, in February this year.


Interestingly, just last week we reported that the United Kingdom was considering undertaking snap exercises in which its fighter jets operate from civilian airfields and perhaps even stretches of highway. This is all part of a move toward dispersed operations in times of tension, moving precious aircraft away from vulnerable established airbases. For the U.S. Air Force, this kind of approach could also be relevant, especially in Europe and Asia, where aircraft are increasingly concentrated on a small number of sprawling airbases.
Other aspects of this year’s Northern Strike exercise also stress some of the tenets of ACE, including the rapid insertion of an Air Expeditionary Wing (AEW) into a bare-base environment, testing the ability to move airpower assets rapidly and then set up operations in an unfamiliar setting. In this case, the 127th Wing will deploy from Selfridge ANBG to the Alpena Combat Readiness Training Center.



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U.S. AIR FORCE

An A-10 taking off from Alpena Combat Readiness Training Center with a live AGM-65 Maverick missile, while other jets are loaded with the same weapons on the flight line.


Once at Alpena, the 127th Wing will “establish logistics and communications in order to receive follow-on forces, generate mission employment including the austere landing on M-32, and project combat power across all domains,” said U.S. Air Force Brigadier General Bryan Teff, Michigan Air National Guard adjutant general for air.
“Michigan’s NADWC is uniquely postured to provide ample training airspace and facilities to accommodate training for the future high-end fight,” Teff added. “Michigan is integral to the joint fight and future warfighter. The joint force cannot execute without training as we fight.”
While ACE concepts, including highway operations, might be becoming more commonplace across the Air Force, there’s no doubt that having jets land on Michigan State Highway M-32 will be a unique milestone for the service, in the CONUS at least. We will continue to bring coverage of this historic training event once it kicks off next week.
Contact the author: thomas@thedrive.com
 
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