WAR 08-28-2021-to-09-03-2021__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

[Housecarl]

Playing a little catch-up...HC


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Does the United States Have Any Real Capability to Forward Deploy Nuclear Weapons Rapidly Outside of NATO Europe?

At the end of the Cold War, in an extraordinarily bad example of making national security policy, the United States, as part of what is called the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs), eliminated a

www.realcleardefense.com

Does the United States Have Any Real Capability to Forward Deploy Nuclear Weapons Rapidly Outside of NATO Europe?
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By Mark B. Schneider
August 27, 2021

At the end of the Cold War, in an extraordinarily bad example of making national security policy, the United States, as part of what is called the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs), eliminated almost its entire arsenal of nonstrategic or tactical nuclear weapons. Dick Cheney, then Secretary of Defense, rejected this proposal. Cheney rejected it because of the near-unanimous opposition from senior Defense Department officials before it came to the Pentagon as a dictate from the George H.W. Bush White House.[1] Then-Secretary of Defense Cheney and General Colin Powell, then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, announced that the U.S. would eliminate 1,300 nuclear artillery shells and 850 Lance short-range ballistic missile nuclear warheads. Bush asked the Soviet Union (and later Yeltsin’s Russia) to eliminate its nuclear artillery, nuclear air defense missiles, and nuclear landmines. Both announced their own PNIs. Reportedly, the announced U.S. reductions involved about 5,000 nuclear weapons. President Bush also said that under “normal circumstances, our ships will not carry tactical nuclear weapons” and asked the Soviet Union to do the same. It agreed. Cheney and Powell said that 500 U.S. tactical nuclear weapons would be removed from submarines and surface ships and that 50% of them would be destroyed. General Powell also stated that all U.S. land-based naval nuclear depth bombs would be destroyed. In fact, actual U.S. reductions went well beyond those announced. In 2011, senior Obama administration NSC official Gary Samore stated that “The U.S. has a very small number -- only a few hundred tactical nuclear weapons….In contrast, the Russians have a much larger number -- probably a few thousand [tactical] nuclear weapons…”

There are now three hostile nuclear-armed states in the Asia Pacific area that have strategic and nonstrategic nuclear weapons – Russia, China and North Korea. All three have nuclear-capable nonstrategic missiles. Significantly, the United States has none. In April 2021, Major General Michael J. Lutton, Commander, Twentieth Air Force, Air Force Global Strike Command, stated that:

Specifically, Russia, China, and North Korea share five themes in foreign nuclear development and proliferation:

• • Increasing numbers or capabilities of weapons in existing programs;
  • Enduring security threats to weapons and material;
  • Developing delivery systems with increased capabilities;
  • Developing nuclear weapons with smaller yields, improved precision, and increased range for military or coercive use on the battlefield;
  • Developing new nuclear weapons without conducting large-scale nuclear tests.

The INF Treaty eliminated our nonstrategic ballistic and cruise missile capability. As a result of decisions made in the Nuclear Posture Reviews of 1994 and 2010, the United States decided to eliminate all of its remaining naval tactical nuclear weapons.[2] Actual U.S. reductions apparently went beyond what was announced. In 2015, Russian Defense Minister General of the Army Sergei Shoigu stated that "About 200 US nuclear bombs are currently deployed in Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, Germany and Turkey.” Since eliminating all U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe has long been a basic Russian objective, General Shoigu clearly had no reason to understate the U.S. number.

Russia violated its commitments, particularly with regard to nonstrategic nuclear weapons, under the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives. Russia also violated the INF Treaty by developing and deploying prohibited missiles. These Russian violations are, in part, responsible for the current massive Russian advantage in nonstrategic or tactical nuclear weapons.

Russia has consistently claimed it has reduced its nonstrategic nuclear forces from Cold War levels by 75%.[3] Alexei Arbatov, a Russian expert and former Vice Chairman of the Duma Defense Committee, and others (e. g., former Obama administration Assistant Secretary of Defense Graham Allison) have said that the late Cold War Soviet tactical nuclear arsenal was comprised of 22,000 tactical nuclear weapons. Some 22,000 nonstrategic nuclear weapons appear reasonably consistent with the announced peak Soviet nuclear stockpile in 1986 of 45,000. Using 22,000 as a baseline for calculation, the number of nonstrategic nuclear weapons in the Russian inventory after a 75% reduction would be over 5,000. In 2014, Pravda.ru reported, “Russia, according to conservative estimates, has 5,000 pieces of different classes of TNW [tactical nuclear weapons] - from Iskander warheads to torpedo, aerial and artillery warheads!.” Dr. Philip Karber, President of the Potomac Foundation, has stated that roughly half of Russia’s 5,000 tactical nuclear weapons have been modernized with new sub-kiloton nuclear warheads for air-defense, torpedoes and cruise missiles.” The estimated 2,000 and growing Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review report appears to be a major underestimate. In February 2021, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John Hyten confirmed reports of large-scale Russian deployment of low-yield nuclear weapons when he stated there were “thousands [of] low-yield … and tactical nuclear weapons that Russia is building and deploying…”

In March 2021, a German publication said it had obtained a German Defense Ministry document that stated Russia has about 6,375 nuclear warheads ready for use. This number appears to be substantially higher than the threat level assumed in the U.S. 2018 Nuclear Posture Review.

In December 2017, Bill Gertz reported, “Russia is aggressively building up its nuclear forces and is expected to deploy a total force of 8,000 warheads by 2026 along with modernizing deep underground bunkers, according to Pentagon officials. The 8,000 warheads will include both large strategic warheads and thousands of new low-yield and very low-yield warheads to circumvent arms treaty limits and support Moscow’s new doctrine of using nuclear arms early in any conflict.” In August 2019, then-Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters Rear Admiral (ret.) Peter Fanta confirmed the Gertz story, stating that “The Russians are going to 8,000 plus warheads.”[4] Again, it does not appear that such a threat level was assumed in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review. In April 2021, noted Russian journalist Pavel Felgenhauer wrote, "Indeed, taking into account nonstrategic (tactical) nuclear weapons, which no one has ever verifiably counted, Russia may have more (maybe twice as many overall) than all the other official or unofficial nuclear powers taken together.” He may well be correct.

It is not only the number of Russian tactical nuclear weapons but the diversity of types that is of concern.[5] According to a 2017 Defense Intelligence Agency report on Russia Military Power, Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons "…include air-to-surface missiles, short-range ballistic missiles, gravity bombs, and depth charges for medium-range bombers, tactical bombers, and naval aviation, as well as anti-ship, anti-submarine, and anti-aircraft missiles, and torpedoes for surface ships and submarines. There may also be warheads remaining for surface-to-air and other aerospace defense missile systems.” A similar but slightly longer list appears in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review report. Russia has clearly maintained the diverse Soviet tactical nuclear arsenal, albeit at reduced but still very large numbers. Since the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, Russia has revealed the development and deployment of a wide array of strategic and nonstrategic nuclear-capable hypersonic missiles. A popular Moscow weekly summed up the situation, “The Russian tactical nuclear arsenal dominates Europe…”

The 2018 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review report stated that "China, too, is modernizing and expanding its already considerable nuclear forces….China's military modernization has resulted in an expanded nuclear force, with little to no transparency into its intentions.” China is now engaged in a massive expansion of its strategic nuclear forces. It very much looks like China is engaged in a “Sprint To Nuclear Superiority.” The 350-400 DF-41 large ICBM silos now under construction have the potential to carry 3,500-4,000 nuclear warheads. This is only a part of Chinese strategic modernization.

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[Housecarl]

Continued.....

No one expected such a large and rapid expansion in Chinese nuclear forces in 2018. Indeed, China may have a much larger stockpile of nuclear weapons, particularly nonstrategic nuclear weapons, than they are generally given credit with.[6] The biggest difference in estimates of the current Chinese nuclear weapons number is in the estimates for Chinese nonstrategic nuclear weapons. For example, The South China Morning Post reported that "…a source close to the Chinese military said that its stockpile of nuclear warheads had risen to 1,000 in recent years, but less than 100 of them are active.” "Active" is apparently a reference to storing nonstrategic nuclear weapons separate from their delivery systems. China, through its English language mouthpiece Global Times, has indicated that the annual Pentagon report estimate of the “low-200s” for the Chinese nuclear weapons inventory understates the current Chinese arsenal and that the Pentagon number is what they reportedly had in the 1980s.

Recently, the Chinese Communist Party has been threatening nuclear first use and continuous nuclear strikes against Japan. While there have been occasional threats from Chinese generals before, a direct linkage to the Chinese Communist Party is new, and the formulation goes well beyond anything we have heard in the past.

The U.S. 2018 Nuclear Posture Review report states, "North Korea is illicitly developing a range of strategic and nonstrategic nuclear systems to threaten the United States, allies, and partners. It may mistakenly perceive that these systems, when coupled with the threat of a strategic nuclear attack against the United States, would provide advantageous nuclear escalation options in crises or conflict.” North Korea probably has more nuclear weapons than then they are generally credited with. Almost all estimates of the number of North Korean nuclear weapons assume an unreasonable large amount of fissile material necessary to make a bomb.

In May 2021, General Paul LaCamera, then-nominated to be the next commander of U.S. forces in South Korea, stated, “In January of this year, [North Korean leader] Kim Jong-un announced plans and programs to expand its nuclear deterrent, specifically, the development of miniaturized nuclear warheads, tactical nuclear weapons, and even multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles.” The development of MIRV warheads implies a relatively large and growing stockpile. The 2018 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review report lists 11 types of North Korean nuclear-capable ballistic missiles. This suggests a relatively large and growing nuclear arsenal. An important April 2021 Rand Corporation report concluded that:

…we estimate North Korea’s number of nuclear weapons from 2017 through 2027, with the starting value of 30 to 60 nuclear weapons in 2017, with one to two plutonium weapons added by 2020, and with the numbers growing by either 12 weapons per year (120 total by 2027) or 18 weapons per year (180 total by 2027). These estimates suggest that, in 2020, North Korea already could have had 67 to 116 nuclear weapons, and, by 2027, North Korea might have 151 to 242 nuclear weapons.

The assumption in the Rand report is that a nuclear weapon “requires 20 kg of HEU [highly enriched uranium].” HEU comprises and will comprise a large percentage of North Korean fissile material. It is clear that many types of nuclear weapons, particularly low-yield, do not require about 20-kg of HEU. It could be that essentially all open source estimates of the current and future North Korea nuclear capability dramatically underestimate the number of weapons.

Irrespective of whether one believes the high or low estimates of Russian, Chinese and North Korean nuclear capabilities, it is clear that these states have a monopoly on the deployment of both strategic and nonstrategic nuclear weapons and, critically, their capabilities are growing. Equally worrisome, they also have a monopoly on nonstrategic ballistic and cruise missile nuclear capabilities.

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[Housecarl]

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As a result of the 1991-1992 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives, the 2002 and the 2010 Nuclear Posture Reviews, the only tactical nuclear weapon retained by the U.S. was the B-61 nuclear bomb. The 2010 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review report recognized the importance of the forward deployment of nuclear weapons as part of extended deterrence but, regrettably, reduced our capability. It announced a bad decision eliminating the U.S. nuclear submarine-launched nuclear cruise missiles (SLCMs), arguing that, "The United States will retire the nuclear-equipped sea-launched cruise missile (TLAM-N). This system serves a redundant purpose in the U.S. nuclear stockpile. It has been one of a number of means to forward-deploy nuclear weapons in times of crisis. Other means include forward-deployment of bombers with either bombs or cruise missiles and forward-deployment of dual-capable fighters….The deterrence and assurance roles of TLAMN [Tomahawk nuclear land attack missile] can be adequately substituted by these other means, and the United States remains committed to providing a credible extended deterrence posture and capabilities." It also noted, "These decisions [the nuclear-capable F-35 and the B61-12 nuclear bomb] ensure that the United States will retain the capability to forward-deploy nonstrategic nuclear weapons in support of its Alliance commitments.”

The U.S. nuclear SLCM was hardly redundant. It was the only highly survivable U.S. nonstrategic nuclear weapon that had been retained under the 1991 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives. Delays in the availability of the B61-12 nuclear bomb and the F-35 have limited current U.S. nonstrategic nuclear weapons to older versions of the B61 with non-stealthy F-16s and F-15s as the delivery systems. The F-35s with the B61-12s will reportedly be deployed in Europe in 2022-2024. There is no indication that the F-15EX fighter will be nuclear-capable.

For a number of reasons, U.S. nuclear-capable heavy bombers, while capable of forward deployment, do not represent a good idea for projecting nonstrategic nuclear capability. They are old, carry old weapons and are limited in number. If forward based, they are less survivable.

Under the New START Treaty classification system, the U.S. has only 46 deployed nuclear-capable heavy bombers. The current U.S. penetrating bomber force consists of only 20 B-2s, of which only 11 are deployed. The main function of our heavy bombers is now conventional attack. Our heavy bombers carry a wide variety of conventional weapons. The U.S. B-52 carries the AGM-86B, an early 1980s vintage nuclear cruise missile that is now inadequate and declining in reliability and being a pre-stealth design. It is so old that the conventional version of it has been retired. In June 2017, General John Hyten, commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, said replacing the existing nuclear AGM-86B Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) is particularly needed because it is so old, “It’s a miracle that it can even fly,” and its reliability was “already unacceptable” and would get worse every year. The new nuclear ALCM, the LRSO, is about a decade in the future. The advanced nuclear-capable B-21 bombers will only begin to be deployed in the late 2020s. Until the new nuclear air-launched cruise missile is operational, the only thing it can deliver its nuclear bombs. This is hardly the best weapon against advanced air defenses.

The only improvement to U.S. strategic bomber capability until the B-21s come online will be the B61-12 bombs which are a nuclear JDAM. Yet, in 2017, General Herbert J. “Hawk” Carlisle, then-Commander of the Air Force Air Combat Command, stated that, "The Air Force also must have a follow-on to the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) satellite-guided bomb that is stealthy and maneuverable enough to survive the last few miles of an attack on ever-improving air defense systems.” JDAMs have a small standoff range which could help stealth aircraft penetrate defenses. However, when depending on a 30 years old penetrating bomber, this is not a terribly great improvement. In the conventional realm, we do not rely on JDAMs to attack heavily defended targets.

Deterrence depends on survivability. There is no practical way of protecting heavy bombers with aircraft shelters (as is possible with fighter aircraft) from the massive Chinese force of medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, not to mention the emerging threat of Chinese hypersonic missiles. Russia does not have the same number of nonstrategic nuclear missiles but still poses a serious threat and is ahead in developing and deploying hypersonic missiles. Hypersonic missiles have a shorter time of flight than ordinary ballistic missiles. This reduces the survivability of aircraft. Hence, relying on forward deployed heavy bombers to project extended nonstrategic nuclear deterrence against high-intensity threats does not seem to be very plausible, at least until we develop and deploy effective defenses against hypersonic missiles. Even then, the logic of the Triad applies just as well to nonstrategic nuclear weapons. It makes no sense to have a deterrent based solely on aircraft.

There are a number of reports, including Russian state media and U.S. Congressional Research Service, that the U.S. has removed one-third of its nuclear bombs from NATO Europe. According to Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda of the Federation of American Scientists:

The United States has one type of nonstrategic nuclear weapon in its stockpile, the B61 gravity bomb. The weapon exists in two modifications: the B61-3 and the B61-4. A third version, the B61-10, was retired in September 2016. Approximately 230 tactical B61 bombs of all versions remain in the stockpile. About 100 of these (versions −3 and −4) are thought to be deployed at six bases in five European countries: Aviano and Ghedi in Italy; Büchel in Germany; Incirlik in Turkey; Kleine Brogel in Belgium; and Volkel in the Netherlands. This number has declined since 2009 partly due to the reduction of operational storage capacity at Aviano and Incirlik (Kristensen 2015, 2019c). The remaining 130 B61s stored in the United States are for backup and potential use by U.S. fighter-bombers in support of allies outside Europe, including northeast Asia.

Sputnik News, which is Russian state media, also says that the U.S. has reduced its nuclear weapons in NATO Europe to 100 and “about 130 B61s [are] now said to be stored at bases in the U.S. and kept ready for operations in Asia or other locations outside Europe.” Again, Sputnik News has no motive to understate the number of U.S. nonstrategic nuclear weapons. According to Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “We estimate that approximately 1,800 [U.S.] warheads are currently deployed, of which roughly 1,400 strategic warheads are deployed on ballistic missiles and another 300 at strategic bomber bases in the United States. An additional 100 tactical bombs are deployed at air bases in Europe.” Note the absence of any indication of deployment of nonstrategic nuclear weapons at any fighter bases in the U.S.
In 2021, STRATCOM Commander Admiral Charles Roberts stated that two-thirds of U.S. nuclear weapons are “operationally unavailable." This seems consistent with the Kristensen/Corba numbers for deployed U.S. nuclear weapons.

Thus, there is a serious question of whether or not the U.S. has any real capability to forward deploy nonstrategic nuclear weapons to the Asia Pacific on any timely basis. It is not only the small number of U.S. nonstrategic nuclear weapons and the lack of stealthy delivery systems. To forward deploy nuclear weapons, it is necessary to have certified aircraft and crews to operate nuclear weapons and nuclear-certified maintenance and security forces. It is quite possible that such a capability does not really exist. There is certainly nothing in the annual presentations to the Congress concerning U.S. fighter capability that suggests there are any high readiness units based in the U.S. for deployment to Asia to deter Chinese, Russian and North Korean first use of nuclear weapons.

In the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, the Trump administration decided to improve our deterrent against nonstrategic nuclear attack by deploying low-yield Trident missile warheads and developing nuclear submarine-launched cruise missiles. The number of low-yield Trident warheads is small. According to Hans Kristensen and Matt Corda, the number is under 25. Under the Biden Administration, both of these programs are apparently at risk since they are under attack from Russia and the American left.

The Navy slow-rolled the nuclear SLCM program, and in 2021 the Acting Secretary of the Navy terminated funding for the program. This was done without Pentagon leaders being consulted.

When Republican Senators challenged this decision, Secretary of Defense General (ret.) Lloyd Austin said he had “not seen the memo, but I would say that all of us, all the services, and the department, are again making tough choices in terms of what to prioritize and where to accept risk. That memo has to be pre-decisional because of where we are in the process.” This is a very bad signal about the Biden administration’s intent. Under current circumstances, cutting back on what can only be seen by our adversaries as a minimal deterrent capability would be irresponsible. It will not exactly reassure our Asian allies, particularly Japan. Termination of the U.S. nuclear SLCM program combined with little or no capability to forward deploy nonstrategic nuclear weapons on a timely basis would almost be inviting first use of nuclear weapons against us and our allies.

Dr. Mark B. Schneider is a Senior Analyst with the National Institute for Public Policy. Before his retirement from the Department of Defense Senior Executive Service, Dr. Schneider served in a number of senior positions within the Office of Secretary of Defense for Policy including Principal Director for Forces Policy, Principal Director for Strategic Defense, Space and Verification Policy, Director for Strategic Arms Control Policy and Representative of the Secretary of Defense to the Nuclear Arms Control Implementation Commissions. He also served in the senior Foreign Service as a Member of the State Department Policy Planning Staff.
Notes:
[1] Colin Powel, My American Journey, (New York: Ballan tine Books, 1995), pp. 525-527
[2] "Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, General Colin Power, Chairman, JCS, Pete Wilson, ASD (Public Affairs) Saturday 28, 1991—10:00 a.m.," mimeo., pp 2–3
[3] “Russia not advising U.S. to raise issue of intermediate, short-range missiles at NPT conference,” Interfax, April 17, 2015, available at Sign in to ProQuestprofessional/professional newsstand/docview/1673933213/ fulltext/17A63AC25CD5930F3B/1?accountid=155509&site=professionalnewsstand&t:ac=17A63AC25CD5930F3B/1&t:cp=maintain/resultcitationblocksbrief&t:zoneid=transactionalZone_17afe2af21f
[4] “082319 Crane Naval Submarine Warfare Center Symposium on Strategic Nuclear Weapons Modernization and Hypersonics with Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matter Peter Fanta,” mimeo
[5] Aleksey Arbatov, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Problems and Solutions: Strategic Offensive Weapon Reductions Could Extend to Nonstrategic Munitions,” Voyenno-Promyshlenny Nezavisimoye Online, May 20, 2011. Translated by World News Connection. No longer available on the internet; Aleksey Arbatov, “‘Concepts’: Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons; Dilemmas and Approaches; The Path to a Nuclear-Free World Promises To Be Long,” Moscow Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye Online, May 20, 2011. Translated by World News Connection.; "In a Broad Context," Krasnaya Zvezda Online, April 29, 2011. Translated by WorldNews Connection
[6] “China may have 1,600-1,800 nuclear munitions – experts,” Interfax, September 28, 2012. (Translated by World News Connection which is no longer available on the internet.): Aleksey Arbatov, “Russia: Problems in Involving PRC in Nuclear Arms Limitation, Transparency Talks,” Voyenno-Promyshlennyy Kuryer Online, July 8, 2012. (Translated by World News Connection.)

 

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Japan Keeps Intercepting China Military Drones and Spy Planes

China's unmanned aerial vehicles and People's Liberation Army warplanes have been detected in the skies around Japan on three consecutive days amid ongoing military exercises.

www.newsweek.com

WORLD
Japan Keeps Intercepting China Military Drones and Spy Planes

BY JOHN FENG ON 8/26/21 AT 11:11 AM EDT

apan says it has scrambled fighter aircraft to intercept Chinese military drones and accompanying surveillance aircraft on three consecutive days this week as its defense forces took part in a series of readiness exercises with regional allies.

Thursday marked the third straight day of Chinese unmanned aerial vehicle sightings reported by the Japanese Defense Ministry's Joint Staff Office. Images of the drones were captured by fighters of the Japan Air Self-Defense Force.

According to illustrated flight paths released by the office, Japan detected a Chinese TB-001 reconnaissance drone loitering in the East China Sea on Tuesday. The following day, Japan intercepted a BZK-005 UAV and two People's Liberation Army Y-8 support aircraft of the maritime patrol and intelligence-gathering variants.

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Wednesday's three Chinese aircraft transited the Miyako Strait into the Western Pacific through the international airspace between the islands of Okinawa and Miyako, said the Joint Staff Office press release.

After the TB-001 and two Y-8s returned on Thursday following similar flight patterns, Japan's Defense Ministry characterized the drone as serving both surveillance and attacking functions.

None of the PLA aircraft intruded into Japanese airspace, a Kyodo News report said on Wednesday.

The series of drone sightings coincide with ongoing military drills involving the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, who conducted joint exercises with Britain's visiting Queen Elizabeth Carrier Strike Group on August 24. The drills—joined by Japanese destroyer JS Asahi and helicopter carrier JS Ise—took place south of Okinawa, according to Japan's Ministry of Defense.

On August 26, Japan's maritime forces joined the navies of the United States, India and Australia—all partners of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue—for the start of exercise Malabar 2021 in the Philippine Sea, the U.S. Seventh Fleet said in a press release.

Japan's concerns about Chinese military expansion into the East and South China seas and across the Taiwan Strait have increased in frequency and urgency in recent months, culminating in its call for a "sense of crisis" in its annual defense white paper in July.

In a surprising development with potentially groundbreaking implications for collective security in the Indo-Pacific region, ruling party officials from Japan have invited their Taiwanese counterparts for bilateral security talks, which are scheduled to take place virtually on Friday.

In a monthly press conference on Thursday, China's Defense Ministry spokesperson Tan Kefei accused Japan of exaggerating Beijing's military threat. "To use this as an excuse for its own military expansion is very wrong and irresponsible," he said.

 

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Hasty US Pullout from Afghanistan Invokes Regional Talk of Post Pax Americana - Breaking Defense

America’s allies in the Middle East are weighing options to avoid meeting the fate of the Afghani government, as regional scholars talk of the post Pax Americana era.

breakingdefense.com

• ALLIES, GLOBAL, MIDDLE EAST, THREATS

Hasty US Pullout from Afghanistan Invokes Regional Talk of Post Pax Americana
America’s allies in the Middle East are weighing options to avoid meeting the fate of the Afghani government, as regional scholars talk of the post Pax Americana era.

By RIAD KAHWAJI
on August 27, 2021 at 2:45 PM

DUBAI: The chaotic withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan has sent shockwaves throughout the Middle East, where America’s allies are weighing the impact on the region’s security amidst talk from scholars of the post Pax Americana era.

Footage of Afghans begging for entry into Kabul airport, with some of them dangling from the sides and wheels of US military transporters, were played on and on by regional media outlets and circulated on social media platforms with comments that mostly ended with questions about US credibility and reliability as a security partner. Those questions are only set to intensify after the deadly attack on Kabul’s airport that left 13 Americans dead.

Of course, Iran and its allies — including the powerful Hezbollah group in Lebanon — were quick to capitalize on this precious moment as evidence of the fading power of the United States and a sign of things to come.

“Let all the allies of America watch the fate of all those who put their faith in it,” said Mohammed Raad, head of Hezbollah Parliamentary Block, who told a crowd of party supporters at a recent ceremony in Lebanon that all America’s allies will face the same fate of the Afghan government.

For US allies in the Middle East, especially in the Gulf Arab states, there was little official reaction to the American exit from Afghanistan. In fact, military transporters from the UAE, Bahrain, Qatar and Saudi Arabia as well as other Arab countries participated in Washington’s massive effort to airlift thousands of foreigners and Afghanis, who had worked for Western agencies and NATO forces, out of the country.

But it is impossible to ignore the public statements from political commentators, scholars and, via social media, the public. And those comments make is clear that there are new doubts about America’s ability to keep its promises.

“The US pullout from Afghanistan was hasty and chaotic, with catastrophic consequences on the image and reputation of America,” said Abdulkhaleq Abdullah, a UAE political science professor and commentator. “The world has entered the post Pax Americana phase and the Gulf Arab States have to be prepared for this.”

In a recent Arab News op-ed, Nadim Shehadi, a prominent scholar and associate fellow at the Chatham House think tank in London, wrote: “We are again in a bipolar world — not that of the Cold War, but a psychological one. At one pole are the triumphalism, ecstasy and jubilation of America’s enemies; at the other are denial, disbelief and allies [lamenting] another sign of the end of Pax Americana.”

Put more bluntly: “Don’t count on the US any more, and don’t put all your eggs in one basket,” said Abdullah Alshayji, Political Science Professor at Kuwait University.

Alternative Options

The question now facing Gulf leaders is what alternative options they have. After all, these elites have tied themselves closely to the United States for years; a decoupling isn’t as easy as simply flipping a switch.

“Leaders of the Gulf Arab States do sense the declining interest of US officials in the region as an area of vital interest, and therefore have to explore new options like developing their own defense capabilities and not repeat the Afghani model of building a paper-tiger army that fell apart in the first real confrontation with the Taliban,” Abdullah said.


“In light of Washington’s failure or reluctance to deal with the Iranian threats and attacks in the Strait of Hormuz, the Gulf Arab States should seek to secure a bigger military presence for other powers such as Britain, France and the EU, as well as other Eastern powers such as China, India and South Korea,” Abdullah added. “Internationalization of the Gulf security is one of the options in the post Pax Americana era.”

In Abdullah’s opinion, Gulf Arab leaders should end their differences, close ranks and consolidate their military capabilities.
“Priority should be given in the near future to unify the Gulf armies and to integrate them operationally and institutionally, and this can only happen if a strategic political decision is taken by the leadership,” he said. “We have to become more self-reliant defensively, with more allies in the East and West.”

Regional analysts found it notable that there have been several high-level visits to Turkey, Egypt, Jordan and Qatar in the last week from the UAE’s National Security Advisor Sheikh Tahnoun bin Zayed Al Hahyan. The high-profile talks with the Qatari Emir in Doha were particularly interesting; that represented the culmination of months-long efforts to mend the strained relations between the UAE and Qatar, along with its strategic ally Turkey.

All told, the moves seem to be steps taken to consolidate the Arab and regional front against Iran, under the assumption the US may not be as study a wall against Iranian activity as previously hoped. That’s not directly on the Afghanistan situation, of course; Washington’s frequent foreign policy changes and contradictory approaches in dealing with Iran’s threats have shaken US relations with its Arab allies and undermined the trust between the two sides.

The current US Administration is yet to make clear its strategy to deal with the many complex issues in the volatile Middle East region, and has recently revealed plans to pull out some of its forces in Iraq.

Whatever moves the Gulf Arab states make, however, unilateral action against Tehran seems unlikely, as the remaining American forces in the region still provide a security blanket against Iranian actions. Unless Washington makes any credible moves to alter this reality, its regional allies will most likely maintain the status quo.

And that, says Albadr Al Shateri, a professor at National Defense University in the UAE, is a key thing to remember: even if the American focus is shifting to the Pacific, there’s no need for Arab leaders to assume that America is truly abandoning the region.

“The Middle East represents a vital and primary interest to the United States. Israel’s safety is part of the US political culture and protecting the flow of oil in and out of the Gulf is crucial for the global economy that is dominated by Washington.”
Ultimately, Al Shateri said, “The US has too many grand strategic interests in the Middle East region that prevent it from abandoning it.”

 

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Diplomacy Shaken Not Stirred - War on the Rocks

Mark Twain once said that history doesn’t repeat itself, but it does rhyme. The repetition of patterns of events and responses is one reason that scholars

warontherocks.com

DIPLOMACY SHAKEN NOT STIRRED
PAUL EDGAR
AUGUST 20, 2021
PODCASTS - HORNS OF A DILEMMA

Mark Twain once said that history doesn’t repeat itself, but it does rhyme. The repetition of patterns of events and responses is one reason that scholars and policymakers often turn to the past for insight into how to best deal with contemporary events. It is also why classic works of history and strategy — such as Thucydides’ The History of the Peloponnesian War — have become classic and remain relevant. In this episode of Horns of a Dilemma, Dr. Paul Edgar, associate director of the Clements Center at the University of Texas, Austin, goes 1,000 years before Thucydides to find enduring lessons as told in an inscription on a statue from the 15th century BCE. While the names of the rulers and powers may not be familiar, Edgar illustrates how the themes of strategy, alliance, and statecraft in great-power competition are familiar and relevant to power struggles today. This talk was recorded at the Summer Seminar on History and Statecraft, sponsored by the Clements Center at the University of Texas, Austin, and held in Beaver Creek, Colorado.

Image: Enyavar via Wikimedia Commons

Pod Cast RT 41:48
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[Housecarl]

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SWJ El Centro Reseña del libro – Fuerzas Armadas, Guardia Nacional y violencia en México | Small Wars Journal

Review of Raúl Benítez Manaut and Elisa Gómez Sánchez, Eds. "Fuerzas Armadas, Guardia Nacional y violencia en México" en español. The text assesses the implementation of Mexico's Guardia Nacional (National Guard) in light of concerns of insecurity and militarization.

smallwarsjournal.com

Mon, 08/30/2021 - 3:35 pm
SWJ El Centro Book Review - Armed Forces, National Guard and Violence in Mexico
Pedro Left

This review is available in English here .​

Raúl Benítez Manaut and Elisa Gómez Sánchez, Eds. Armed Forces, National Guard and violence in Mexico . Mexico City: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung and Collective for Analysis of Security with Democracy, AC, 2021 [ISBN: 978-607-95380-7-1, Electronic, 87 pages]

In Mexico, the armed forces are perceived as privileged and autonomous institutions that have received political, legal and public support throughout their history. The status quo of these militarized institutions remains the same and untouchable after the country underwent a democratic transition at the beginning of the 21st century. In developing countries like Mexico, autonomous military institutions can bring problems such as prolonging conflicts at the expense of civilians and endangering the country's democracy. Armed Forces, National Guard and Violence in Mexico addresses the impacts of the aforementioned factors and the civil-military relationship during the 21st century. The editors of the book are Raúl Benítez Manaut, professor at UNAM (National Autonomous University of Mexico )and president of CASEDE (Collective Analysis of Security with Democracy) and Elisa Gómez Sánchez, coordinator of the Political Dialogue for the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Mexico. After an introduction from the editors, the text is divided into four main chapters, each written by leading Mexican researchers: Raúl Benítez Manaut, Alejandro Pocoroba García, Lisa Sánchez Ortega, and Raúl Zepeda Gil.

Historical perception
In the first chapter, Raúl Benítez Manaut analyzes the historical perception of the autonomy of the Mexican armed forces and the civil-military relationship during the 21st century. During the one-party period (1929-2000), the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party) established a vertical civil-military relationship with the armed forces that included privileges and exemptions that did not change during the democratic transition in 2000 and then abandoned the nationalist doctrine and modernized military structures. With the upsurge in violence by the cartels and the military, President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) initiallyDuring his three previous presidential campaigns, he criticized the military's role in public security. After winning the 2018 elections, AMLO changed his position, dismantled the Federal Police and created the Mexican National Guard. Despite the fact that military institutions enjoy high popularity rates, the civil-military relationship is complicated. Civil society organizations (CSOs) criticize their handling of the war on drugs, corruption and impunity regarding human rights violations and the lack of strengthening of CSOs. The arrest and release of the former head of SEDENA (Secretary of National Defense) Salvador Cienfuegos Zepeda by the DEA ( Drug Enforcement Agencyor Drug Control Administration) at the end of 2020 emphasize the nationalistic attitude of the military institutions that they denounce before the public as a lack of respect for their reputation. [1]

Reestablishment of the National Guard
In the second chapter, Alejandro Pocoroba García discusses the formation of the Mexican National Guard. The chapter is divided into four components. First, the origins of the institution can be traced back to the Mexican-American war as an auxiliary force made up of armed citizens through compulsory military service for the defense of federalist interests and foreign intervention. However, their influence diminished throughout the 20th century with the incorporation of permanent military cadres and other institutions of the armed forces. Second, AMLO reestablished this institution in 2019, as part of its strategy in the fight against organized crime to participate in non-military civilian tasks, for which the author emphasizes the National Guard as a de jure institution.civil and de facto military. Third, international organizations such as Amnesty International and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) expressed concern about the possible deterioration in human rights while some CSOs, such as Mexico United Against Crime, questioned AMLO's security strategy arguing that could escalate the violence. Finally, the author reflects that during the following years the National Guard will increase its influence on public security and on the president's justification of its creation due to corrupt police institutions.

Militarization of public security
In the third chapter, Lisa María Sánchez Ortega analyzes the militarization of public security from the legal point of view. She opens the debate on the use of militarization, its effects within the spheres of public security and politics, as well as the different results it can have depending on the duration, strength and circumstances of the operations. Then he reviews militarization during the second half of the 20th century, when anti-drug tasks were handled by the defunct PGR (Attorney General's Office) and the civil authority was in charge of eradication efforts, although military interference increased especially as a result of the American pressure that led to mass eradication, seizures and arrests. During the administrations of Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000) and Vicente Fox (2000-2006), the former increased interdiction efforts, capture of drug lords, and the creation of new security agencies while the latter carried out an operation to dismantle drug gangs and enacted a law that legitimized military influence in peacetime. On the other hand, Sánchez Ortega shows that militarization during the Calderón (2006-2012) and Peña Nieto (2012-2018) administrations not only did not stop the violence or drug trafficking or bring peace, but the armed forces benefited from legal frameworks that legitimize their conduct, even if they are accused of human rights violations.

Continued.....

 

[Housecarl]

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The social, judicial and political bases of the conflict
In the last chapter, Raúl Zepeda Gil analyzes the social, legal and political bases of the armed conflict in Mexico ; the damage caused to the human rights of Mexican citizens and the appropriate public policy alternatives to solve the country's security problems. It also discusses the consequences of the "international drug prohibition regime" on Mexican society and the punitive criminal philosophy of populist conservatism, the deterioration of the legal system, the budgetary privileges of the military, and modifications to the modus operandi.and organized crime structures when confronting military bodies. It then describes the types of crimes and human rights violations that civilians suffer when they fall into the hands of organized crime and the armed forces, such as homicides, extrajudicial executions and enforced disappearances. Finally, the author takes a holistic approach to resolving the armed conflict in Mexico and reviews options peacekeeping and conflict resolution, significant judicial reform, demilitarization of public security, removing thepunitive approaches, discrimination, impunity and, most importantly, the strengthening of CSOs. The author expresses optimism that Mexico will eventually advocate against the policies of the international prohibition regime and become a regional and international leader in developing new mechanisms for a pacifist agenda.

conclusion
The book is divided into two parts: the first two chapters analyze the history, civil-military relationship and the rise of the National Guard while the last two chapters examine in detail the democratic consequences of the militarization of security forces on public security , citizenship and Mexico. The four chapters highlight the problems of the current AMLO administration in granting too many privileges to military institutions and that, in fact, they do not represent any short, medium and long-term solution in the president's security strategy. It would have been good if the book compared the case of Mexico with other developing countries with fragile democracies, hybrid or authoritarian regimes.
Armed Forces, National Guard and Violence in Mexico could be of great value to academics, legislators, CSOs, activists, law enforcement officers and researchers who want to understand how the Mexican government's strategy has not worked during the last three six-year terms and to raise awareness of the dangers of the excessive militarization of public security. The last chapter of the text proposes holistic public policy solutions within political, economic, social and legal contexts. These policies could work for Mexico and especially for other Latin American countries.

Notes
[1] For context, see Azam Ahmed, "Former Mexican Defense Minister Salvador Cienfuegos Zepeda Arrested by US Officials." New York Times . October 16, 2020, Mexico’s Former Defense Minister Is Arrested in Los Angeles and Oscar Lopez, “Mexico Exonerates Ex-Defense Chief Who Was Freed by the US " New York Times . January 14, 2021,https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/15/world/americas/mexico-defense-ministe.
Categories: El Centro - SWJ Book Review

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About the Author (s)

Pedro Left
Pedro Izquierdo is a graduate student at George Mason University pursuing a master's of Public Policy with a focus on terrorism, transnational crime, and corruption. He earned his BA in International Studies with a minor in Spanish at Adelphi University where he attended the 2017 National Conference on Undergraduate Researchers and gave a presentation on Enrique Peña Nieto's failed anti-corruption policies. He is fluent in Spanish and English and his areas of interest are corruption, Latin American affairs, organized crime, drug trafficking, financial crimes, regional security challenges, and illicit trade.
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[Housecarl]

Hummm......

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The Real Failure is Pakistan

Aug 25, 2021 // WIth the stunning collapse of Afghanistan, most of the recrimination has focused on what has and has not been done in Afghanistan, but the real failure since September 2001 comes from Pakistan, writes Co-Director of the Global Commission for Post-Pandemic Policy Bill Emmott.

www.diplomaticourier.com

CENTRAL ASIA
SECURITY
THE REAL FAILURE IS PAKISTAN
BYBILL EMMOTT
.

AUGUST 25, 2021
With the stunning collapse of Afghanistan, most of the recrimination has focused on what has and has not been done in Afghanistan, but the real failure since September 2001 comes from Pakistan, writes Co-Director of the Global Commission for Post-Pandemic Policy Bill Emmott.
.

There is only one good thing about the fact that the 20th anniversary of the September 11, 2001, terror attacks will take place less than a month after the Taliban have re-established the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. It will serve as a reminder of why it was necessary to invade the country and topple the Taliban government two decades ago.

When nearly 3,000 people are slaughtered on your soil in an operation planned and ordered by a known terrorist group residing in a country whose government refuses to cooperate in bringing that group and its leader to justice, there are no good options. The retaliatory attack on Afghanistan was the only time Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, under which signatories agree to consider an attack on one as an attack on all, was invoked. The United States-led invasion was widely supported; unlike the invasion of Iraq two years later, only a few countries condemned or opposed it.

For these reasons, the 20th anniversary of 9/11 will be an even more somber occasion than usual. Alongside the terrible memories of that day will now stand a powerful sense of two decades of failure in Afghanistan, of the betrayal of all those Afghans who had become convinced that they could live in a freer and somewhat more prosperous country, and of a major blow to the international credibility of America, NATO, and President Joe Biden personally. But while most of the recrimination focuses on what has and has not been done in Afghanistan, the real failure since September 2001 has been regional. And that failure centers on Pakistan.

David Frum, who was writing President George W. Bush’s foreign-policy speeches in 2001-02, has commented that if the US-led invasion had achieved its primary goal of killing or capturing Osama bin Laden in December 2001, the story of America’s intervention in Afghanistan would have ended very differently: a faster withdrawal and handover to some sort of new Afghan government, and no long-term commitment. We can’t know whether this counterfactual is true, but his point does highlight an overlooked issue in the aftermath of the Afghanistan debacle.

For nearly a decade, until he was killed by US Special Forces in 2011, bin Laden hid in Pakistan, and not simply the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, where the government’s writ hardly ran. He was in Abbottabad, a mid-size city just 120 kilometers (75 miles) from the capital, Islamabad, and home to the Pakistan Military Academy.

Moreover, while some Taliban leaders decamped to Qatar after being driven from power, most based themselves in Pakistan, with the backing and apparent blessing of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency. The fact that the Taliban still existed as an opposition group with whom President Donald Trump’s administration negotiated its exit deal last year is largely due to Pakistani support.

The biggest failure in the aftermath of 9/11 was the failure to secure long-term support from the front-line states surrounding Afghanistan: Iran, China, Russia, Central Asia’s five “Stans,” and India, but above all Pakistan. To be sure, support would never have been forthcoming from some of them. But Pakistan had long been a recipient of American aid, military and otherwise, and was considered a US ally during the Cold War. The fact that it was also snuggling up to China, and that its nuclear-weapons program benefited from Chinese support and technology, ought to have been viewed as an indicator of its slight commitment to the American camp.

It would never have been easy for the US to achieve sufficient leverage over Pakistan after 2001 to stand a chance of securing long-term stability in Afghanistan, especially at a time when Pakistan and India were at military loggerheads, which in 2001-02 fueled plausible fears of nuclear war. Moreover, during this period, a major goal of US foreign policy was to establish a closer relationship with India (leading to the 2005 US-India Civil Nuclear Agreement), in large part to offset against China’s rising power in the Indo-Pacific. These ties are now the centerpiece of the Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy, through an enhanced role for the “Quad” countries (India, Japan, Australia, and the US).

With hindsight, we ought to see that the key mistake of the period lay in Bush’s 2002 State of the Union Address when, using Frum’s words, he described America’s enemies as an “axis of evil.” None of the three countries he accused of being state sponsors of terrorism – Iran, Iraq, and North Korea – is responsible for America’s failure in Afghanistan and for the return of the Taliban.

The blame for that lies largely with Pakistan and America’s inability to bring the country onside. Even if the US had not diverted its attention and resources to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, that failure would have doomed its policy in Afghanistan.

Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2021.

About
Bill Emmott
:
Bill Emmott, a former editor-in-chief of The Economist, is Co-Director of the Global Commission for Post-Pandemic Policy.
The views presented in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the views of any other organization.

 

[Housecarl]

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Iran’s Bet on Autonomous Weapons - War on the Rocks

Editor’s Note: Some links in this article lead to media sites and journals that are affiliated with the Iranian military. If access to such sites is

warontherocks.com

IRAN’S BET ON AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS
EVAN OMEED LISMAN
AUGUST 30, 2021
COMMENTARY

Editor’s Note: Some links in this article lead to media sites and journals that are affiliated with the Iranian military. If access to such sites is prohibited by your employer’s policy, please do not click links in this article from a work computer.



Attempting to pass off a child’s astronaut costume as an innovation of Iran’s space agency was bizarre but familiar. Shared online by Minister of Information and Communications Technology Azari Jahromi in February 2020, the fit-for-Halloween suit exemplified the Iranian government’s penchant for fabricating technical achievements, whether through farcical stealth fighter jets, fake space monkeys, or oil drum surface-to-air missiles.

Iran’s history of shameless exaggeration leaves plenty of reason for skepticism when the nation’s military unveils new capabilities or when Iranian officials announce ambitious technological goals, as they did earlier this year. In a widely publicized January exercise, the Iranian Army Ground Forces showcased what they said was the country’s first autonomous suicide drones, reportedly capable of detecting and destroying targets “using advanced image processing capabilities and artificial intelligence.” Not to be outdone, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps followed up with a demonstration of an explosive suicide drone, purportedly piloted with some level of AI. Later that month, Brig. Gen. Mohammad Hassan Nami — one of Jahromi’s predecessors as minister of information and communications technology — claimed that Iran would have fully autonomous systems on the battlefield by 2024.


Notwithstanding the well-founded reasons to avoid taking such claims at face-value, Iran’s pursuit of autonomous weapons is no fanciful moonshot. Buoyed by technically educated Iranians and unencumbered by the rigors of thorough weapons testing, Iranian forces have the resources necessary to follow through on their autonomous aspirations. Iranian military literature suggests that the country’s army, air force, and the revolutionary guard corps seek an early adopter advantage by deploying AI-guided systems to the battlefield as soon as viable, however rudimentary and unreliable they may be. If that happens, it could be particularly destabilizing given Iran’s proxy operations strategy, with autonomous systems potentially empowering Iranian-backed militants to conduct faster and deadlier attacks at greater range.

AI as Iran’s Force Multiplier

The Iranian military’s interest in AI and autonomous systems is best understood in the context of its long pursuit of force-multiplying, asymmetric capabilities. Similar to constructing a network of loyal proxy militias and terrorist organizations across the region, employing a small army of the nation’s many educated computer engineers is feasible and scalable. A 2016 World Economic Forum study reported that Iranian universities graduated some 335,000 science, technology, engineering, and mathematics students annually — ranking the country the fifth highest in the world based on that metric. Yet, Iran’s Ministry of Science, Research, and Technology found that 41 percent of the nation’s computer science Ph.D. graduates were unemployed in 2018. While modern hardware and processors remain difficult to acquire, the nation’s public and private sectors have put some of this skilled labor to work in developing rudimentary AI tools for various purposes, from space-based agricultural monitoring to seminary research in Islamic sciences. Determined to compensate for the nation’s material weakness, Iranian military thinkers see immense value in employing this abundance of talent to integrate AI into the nation’s drone fleet, air defense network, and command systems.

Iranian military officials envisage AI tools as helping them to overcome persistent challenges, such as undertaking aerial navigation and precision targeting without domestic global positioning system infrastructure. AI could allow drones to fly on autopilot to predetermined locations and then conduct targeting based on image recognition technology. Networks of autonomous reconnaissance drones, armed with Iran’s improving compact radar and imaging sensors, could also feed volumes of surveillance data into a centralized, intelligent data processor, improving broader situational awareness. For example, a 2019 article in the Journal of Military Science and Technology, which is affiliated with Iran’s army, explored possible applications of the “Internet of Things” to the Iranian air force and urged the development of integrated data processing platforms to help guide everything from high-level military decisions to fleet management.

In April, the Research and Self-Sufficiency Jihad Organization of the Army Ground Force — which is responsible for producing and mainstreaming innovations — presented a stationary model of an autonomous drone swarm featuring one large drone and a cadre of smaller suicide drones at a technology exhibition. Tasnim News, an outlet with links to the revolutionary guard, reported that the new drones can operate either with ground control or using AI based on predetermined information stored in the “mother” drone. The self-sufficiency organization’s display signals an intent to produce and deploy such autonomous suicide drones and to use them in swarms, although a static hardware exhibition does not prove operability of the necessary software. Regardless, Tasnim described the new system as “perhaps the edge of unmanned control and operation technology in the world.”

The Iranian army’s handiwork has been more conspicuous than that of the revolutionary guard, which remains tight-lipped about its internal development efforts and stands to gain the most from the rise of Iranian autonomous systems. Enjoying a vast budget, political dominance, and control over much of the nation’s industrial base, the guard corps not only inherits the army’s innovations but can also independently develop capabilities for their more advanced drone hardware. And the Quds Force, the revolutionary guard’s external operations branch, will ultimately deploy and distribute new capabilities to Iran’s proxy forces across the region.

On the sidelines of the Great Prophet 15 exercise in January, the commander of the guard corps’ Aerospace Force, Amir Hajizadeh, told media that the combination of new missile capabilities, drone operations, and AI technology has “born new possibilities and power into the IRGC.” Hajizadeh’s statement suggests that the Aerospace Force harbors broader multi-platform ambitions for militarized AI. For example, autonomous drones could collect, interpret, and relay data, in real-time, to aid the delivery of precision-targeted missiles.

While drones are the area in which Iran’s autonomous efforts are most advanced, they may not be the only benefactors of the nation’s investment in AI. Iranian officials claim that the Mobin, a cruise missile first displayed in 2019 at an air show in Russia, uses digital scene matching area correlation guidance, a type of AI developed in the 1980s capable of helping cruise missiles autonomously navigate to a target. Iran is also signaling ambitions for armed, remote-controlled ground robots, apparently with plans to link them in an autonomous network. If Iran can translate these ambitions into reality, armed surface robots could integrate with aerial intelligence to help sweep battlefields or patrol urban areas. And the potential applications don’t end on Earth’s surface. Last May, Iran revealed its latest foray into underwater vehicles: an unmanned midget submarine. Ramshackle as the submarine may appear, an intelligent command system could allow it to operate in networked packs, possibly lying in wait for adversaries beyond communications range. Nothing in the publicly available Iranian literature suggests that the country’s military has started exploring such underwater autonomy or possesses the necessary sensing equipment, but technical carryover from drones could speed progress. If Iran developed and deployed autonomous underwater loitering capabilities, even if they came with severe technical limitations, it could have major implications for maritime security in the Persian Gulf and beyond.

Detailed Iranian military science articles also suggest that the country’s technologists are contemplating AI-enhanced air defense systems capable of taking action without human input. As Iran brings online new indigenous radar and missile systems — including their improved copy of the S-300 — the army’s Khatam al-Anbia Joint Air Defense Base is emerging as a powerful hub of national command and control in a previously disaggregated system. The base has increased cooperation with the revolutionary guard corps’ separate air defense systems, including by hosting recent joint command exercises. This centralization will allow Iranian forces to more easily integrate AI tools into their command systems. If successful, Iran could use decision-making algorithms to augment its defense capabilities, possibly avoiding catastrophic human errors of the type that led the Aerospace Force to mistakenly shoot down a Ukrainian passenger plane in January 2020. However, Iran would need to develop sophisticated systems that can negate human mistakes to avoid repeating such deadly negligence across its own military networks and those of its proxy forces.

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[Housecarl]

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The final frontier of Iran’s AI goals lies in strategic integration across platforms with a central command and control system to speed decision-making. In a 2018 journal article, an author at the armed forces’ elite University and Institute of National Defense and Strategic Research extoled the virtues of centralized, intelligent battlefield management, especially the way it would enable the processing of intelligence from hundreds of sources and the command of weapon systems in real-time across numerous commands. Iran is far from achieving such synergistic integration — its divided military forces create structural barriers to doing so — but it is investing in the necessary computing capabilities to solve these problems.

Learning from Others

In seeking guidance for their work on autonomous capabilities, Iranian media and strategic thinkers have looked to U.S. discourse surrounding these systems. Iranian popular media has translated and reported on remarks by U.S. officials calling AI the key to future military superiority and has closely followed AI-related efforts at America’s Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. Media outlets in Iran noted that the final report of the U.S. National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence endorsed strategic investment in AI to compete with China. Ignoring the report’s accompanying discussion of escalatory and ethical risks, Iranian thinkers have evidently taken away two messages: The rapid development of AI-enabled tools is critical to future competition, and efforts to limit this pursuit should be resisted.

Iranian thinkers are also learning through careful observation of other drone powers. In an article titled “Artificial Intelligence in the Armenia-Azerbaijan Air and Missile War,” the editorial board of the Iranian Journal of International Relations attributed Azerbaijan’s gains in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war to its skilled use of coordinated drone warfare. While it is not clear that Azerbaijan actually employed AI in its operations — it is possible given the autonomous offerings of the Turkish arms firm STM — the authors argued that the conflict showed how “the synchronization of new weapons makes the modern battlefield deadlier.” They also emphasized that Azerbaijan’s military faced little opposition to its successful use of coordinated drone strikes.

A concerning lack of domestic debate in Iran suggests that legal and ethical concerns about autonomous systems, if they exist, will not challenge the military’s ambitions. A 2017 article is the only one to address lethal autonomous weapons and international humanitarian law in Iran’s International Law Journal, the country’s preeminent journal on international legal issues. Likewise, the only relevant article in the Iranian journal Islamic Law examines civil liability for AI-enabled autonomous robots yet entirely ignores autonomous machines designed to cause harm. Meanwhile, Iran’s popular media and civil society organizations have produced limited coverage and discussion about the potential implications of developing AI-enabled military capabilities. One rare exception was a 2018 Fars News translation of Michael Klare’s essay “Alexa, Launch Our Nukes!” that emphasized the dangers of creating nuclear command and control systems devoid of human input.

The Potential for Destabilizing Effects

The United States, Russia, China, and even Turkey far exceed Iran’s capacity for the development of AI systems. But the Iranian military’s pursuit of such technology is especially dangerous because of its propensity for rapidly deploying novel technologies, often through unpredictable proxies. In the hands of non-state groups, even simplistic autonomous weapons systems will enable unprecedented aerial operations and could carry risks of dangerous malfunction.

Some experts have called for classifying swarms of autonomous, armed drones — such as the Foji swarming drones that the Iranian army claims it successfully used during the January exercise — as weapons of mass destruction. Through decentralized and adaptable command, swarms of such drones could overwhelm air defense systems in order to deliver explosives or rocket fire, all with rapid speed and adaptability. In 2018, rebel forces used 13 highly rudimentary and reportedly pre-programmed drones operating in a swarm to damage two Russian military bases in Syria. Those explosive-laden drones lacked advanced sensors or AI, but the incident was a harbinger of the type of destructive power that could be delivered by autonomous drones in the future.

Armed with such capabilities, Iranian proxy forces may find themselves benefiting from remarkable improvements in the speed, precision, and, critically, range of lethal aerial operations. While militant groups have not yet used conventional drone arsenals for strategic bombing, it’s possible that autonomous systems may embolden them and allow militants to pursue more destructive objectives. Not only could these advantages make the sort of militant attacks plaguing U.S. forces in Iraq deadlier, but they could also facilitate coordinated strikes against targets far beyond their territories of control.

The 2019 attack on Saudi Aramco facilities serves as a potential warning of what may lie ahead. While the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen claimed credit for that drone and cruise missile strike, U.S. intelligence suggests that the drones — composed of Iranian components — came from the north, not the south. Whether Iran itself or its proxies in Iraq launched those drones remains uncertain. But the event was suggestive of future potential dangers: With autonomous weapons in hand, Iran-backed militants could work in concert with other groups or Iranian forces themselves to orchestrate multi-system strikes, emanating from several locales, on distant, high-value targets.

Autonomous reconnaissance drones provided to an Iranian proxy group could also give Quds Force commanders access to unprecedented intelligence and speed their decision-making in relation to regional operations. No longer tied to commanding or operating drones locally, the Quds Force could program proxy-launched autonomous systems from the comfort of Iran, reducing their ground presence on foreign battlefields. Of course, an Iranian-built drone would be exposed as such by its Iranian components in the event it was downed, but a proxy group could still claim responsibility for any attacks. Proving otherwise and attributing a drone’s code to its Iranian authors will be extremely difficult.

Adapting to a Dangerous Future

American officials, and their counterparts in allied and partner nations, should closely monitor Iranian progress in relation to autonomous weapons and begin to craft a response. In the near term, Iran’s targets should invest in technologies to jam and disrupt emerging aerial systems while carefully considering the risks that these tools may provoke unpredictable malfunctions in Iranian systems. Recent reports of looming U.S. sanctions on Iran’s drone component procurement networks may slow the country’s advances. But such steps won’t overcome the Iranian military’s intense desire for autonomous weapons. Iran’s targets will ultimately need to adapt to a future of potentially rapid escalation enabled by networked, intelligent weapons.

In formulating a strategy to deter attacks conducted using Iranian-built autonomous weapons, the United States and others will find themselves grappling with complex considerations of escalatory risk and holding Iranian-backed proxies accountable. Responding to small-scale attacks on U.S. bases in Iraq is only the beginning of this challenge. Israel’s recent shootdown of a single armed Iranian drone at the Jordanian border was a small step toward denying Iran the ability to wield its burgeoning airpower, although one that failed to deter Iran’s deadly suicide drone attack on an Israeli-operated tanker off the coast of Oman. But the big policy challenge that lies ahead is how to deter Iran and its proxies from using autonomous systems to launch more destructive attacks on high-value targets. Among the means to do so, American officials should consider ways to credibly threaten the imposition of clear and decisive costs on not only Iran-backed proxies that launch any such attacks, but also on the Iranian forces supplying the weapons and programming the targets. Most critically, Iran’s potential targets should not risk emboldening Iranian military officials by allowing them to develop a sense of AI-enabled impunity.



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Evan Omeed Lisman is a research associate at the Center for Global Security Research at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, where he uses Persian-language materials to assess military technology programs in Iran, and a J.D. candidate at Yale Law School. He holds a B.A. in Middle Eastern studies from the University of California, Berkeley. The views and opinions of the author expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the U.S. government or Lawrence Livermore National Security, Inc.

Image: Defense Department (Photo by EJ Hersom)

• Commentary
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[jward]

U.S. Pacific Fleet
@USPacificFleet

BREAKING: An MH-60S helicopter embarked aboard USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72) crashed into the sea while conducting routine flight operations approximately 60 nautical miles off the coast of San Diego at 4:30 p.m. PST, Aug. 31. (1/2)

Search and rescue operations are ongoing with multiple Coast Guard and Navy air and surface assets. More information will be posted as it becomes available.

9:48 PM · Aug 31, 2021·Twitter Web App

UPDATE:
U.S. Pacific Fleet
@USPacificFleet

UPDATE 1: Currently, one crewmember has been rescued and search efforts continue for the other crewmembers of an MH-60S helicopter embarked aboard USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72) that crashed into the sea off the coast of San Diego, Aug. 31: http://go.usa.gov/xM37b
Search and rescue operations are ongoing with multiple Coast Guard and Navy air and surface assets. Abraham Lincoln is homeported in San Diego. (2/2)

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1432930344148160514

View: https://twitter.com/USPacificFleet/status/1432930344148160514?s=20

 

[jward]

China’s Nuclear Build-Up Could Make for a More Dangerous Future
Miles A. Pomper, David Santoro Monday, Aug. 30, 2021​

Satellite photos recently obtained by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, the Federation of American Scientists, and others appear to show that China is building vast fields of new missile silos in its sparsely populated western region. That has prompted fears that Beijing may be well on its way to possessing a much larger nuclear arsenal than anyone had expected and aspiring to rival the United States and Russia, the two countries that have traditionally dominated the global nuclear order. If this comes to pass, tripolarity will for the first time become the primary feature of that order, with concerning implications for nuclear stability. What’s more, in the current security environment characterized by heightened U.S. competition with both Beijing and Moscow, tripolarity would be especially bad news for Washington.

China first became a nuclear-armed state in the late 1960s, after it successfully tested its first nuclear device in 1964. Against all expectations, however, Beijing stuck to a quite limited nuclear posture thereafter, as Chinese leaders believed that nuclear weapons had limited utility. Their thinking rested on the belief that these weapons served only to prevent coercion and nuclear attack. So, Beijing adhered to an approach that called for possessing the “minimum means of reprisal,” or just enough weapons to provide some retaliatory capacity after suffering a nuclear attack.
Unlike the two Cold War-era nuclear superpowers, then, Beijing did not integrate nuclear strategy with conventional military strategy or pursue any form of nuclear warfighting. It developed a nuclear force based on missiles rather than gravity bombs, because missiles are more appropriate for counterstrike purposes; did not mate nuclear warheads to missiles in peacetime; pledged not to conduct a nuclear strike before suffering a nuclear attack; and promised not to attack non-nuclear-armed countries.

The Chinese leadership also wanted to maintain full control over the weapons, an objective easier met by maintaining a small nuclear arsenal and refusing to engage in arms races with the United States and the Soviet Union. Unlike some other nuclear-armed states, Beijing never delegated authority over nuclear strikes to senior military officers. It also gave the Second Artillery Force—the unit of the People’s Liberation Army, now renamed the Rocket Force, that was created in 1966 to control Chinese nuclear weapons—the sole mission of conducting a nuclear counterstrike.

Starting in the early 2000s, as tensions increased in U.S.-China relations and as the Chinese economy grew rapidly, Beijing began to modernize and grow its nuclear arsenal—albeit at a slow pace. During this period, its stockpile of weapons grew modestly in size while Beijing prioritized qualitative improvement, seemingly to ensure that it kept pace with technological developments in the U.S. and could still mount a retaliatory attack against its main rival. Accordingly, China improved the mobility of its forces to make it difficult for the U.S. to locate and destroy them. It also diversified its platforms, notably by investing in a sea-based deterrent, because submarines are less predictable launch locations; extended the range of its missiles to target the US homeland; and invested in multiple independent reentry vehicles to increase its chances of penetrating U.S. missile defenses.

The silo news now appears to indicate that China may finally be in catch-up mode with the U.S. and Russia, and, therefore, that a new nuclear order characterized by tripolarity could be in the offing.

Yet after Xi Jinping’s ascension to power in 2012, and in the context of mounting tensions with Washington, Beijing ramped up its modernization efforts and began to embrace new missions for its arsenal, including tactical nuclear strikes and nuclear warfighting. It developed and deployed intermediate-range systems like the DF-26, which is a dual system and has what military analysts call “hot swapping” capability, meaning it can rapidly shift between launching nuclear and conventional warheads, in addition to being accurate and having a sufficiently long range to reach Guam, a U.S. territory and key military outpost. Beijing, in other words, seemingly became interested in developing a first-strike capability against U.S. nuclear and conventional forces, as opposed to just possessing retaliatory second-strike options.

In recent years, reports also surfaced that China was modernizing its nuclear command-and-control systems and conducting exercises to improve force readiness, including by mating warheads to missiles and possibly moving to a posture allowing Beijing to launch a retaliatory strike upon detection of an incoming enemy attack on its territory, known as “launch-on-warning.” Finally, China made no secret of its investments in cyber and space capabilities, and of its adoption of a deterrence posture that relies increasingly on assets from different domains, not just nuclear. Beijing has worked hard to integrate these capabilities, notably through the establishment of a new Strategic Support Force in 2015.

The recent discovery of the new missile silo fields suggests that, in addition to perfecting its technology, China may now also be in the process of massively increasing the size of its arsenal. In hindsight, Xi had suggested that a build-up was coming. Since taking power, he has systematically emphasized the importance of the Rocket Force and, in 2017, as U.S.-China relations became more overtly competitive, he stated that China would have “the dominant position” in the world by 2049. It was not surprising, then, to hear him call for the military to “accelerate the construction of advanced strategic deterrent” capabilities in March, just a few months before the new missile silos were discovered. Behind this decision seems to be the belief that China can only truly dominate its rivals if it comes close to, reaches parity with, or even surpasses American and Russian nuclear stockpiles.

For years, U.S. government officials and experts speculated whether (or when) China would abandon minimum deterrence and build up its nuclear arsenal. In recent years, several analysts have explained that China already de facto transitioned from minimum deterrence to limited deterrence due to the qualitative improvement of its arsenal and the new missions Beijing seemed to have embraced. While some observers have advanced alternative explanations, the silo news now appears to indicate that China may finally be in catch-up mode with the U.S. and Russia, and, therefore, that a new nuclear order characterized by tripolarity could be in the offing.

Such a tripolar order would have many important implications. At the macro level, nuclear instability would likely increase. Scholars have long suggested that triangular interactions between states are generally unstable and prone to conflict. The late international relations professor Martin Wight, for instance, explained that “triangles tend to be mobile figures of shifting alliances and negotiations,” adding that “like duels, [they] are relationships of conflict, and are resolved by war.” Other research has reached similar conclusions.

Such a tripolar nuclear order would be particularly problematic for the U.S. because it would likely get the short end of the stick. Washington is increasingly competing with both Moscow and Beijing, yet the latter two are expanding and deepening their strategic cooperation to counter the United States. To be sure, Russia and China are not nuclear allies, and that is unlikely to change in the near term, whereas the United States has nuclear alliances with France, the United Kingdom and NATO. Still, a major nuclear build-up by China would almost certainly put the United States in a less advantageous position than today.

It is tempting, in these circumstances, to consider arms control as the solution. Following the extension of the U.S.-Russia New START agreement earlier this year, and in the context of ongoing strategic stability talks between American and Russian diplomats, it is possible to conceptualize various arms control arrangements that would involve China, be they trilateral or multilateral. An alternative could be to jump-start a separate U.S.-China negotiating track. The challenge, however, will be to get Chinese buy-in. Beijing has rejected any form of engagement on nuclear issues, including on crisis management, and so far, neither inducement nor pressure has worked to change its mind. So, unless there is a breakthrough, expect a bumpy, perhaps even dangerous nuclear future.

David Santoro is president and CEO of the Honolulu-based Pacific Forum. He is the editor of a new volume, “U.S.-China Nuclear Relations: The Impact of Strategic Triangles” (Lynne Rienner, May 2021). Follow him on Twitter @DavidSantoro1.
Miles Pomper is a senior fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies.

China’s Nuclear Build-Up Could Make for a More Dangerous Future

China’s nuclear weapons buildup could create a tripolar security order, with concerning implications for nuclear stability.

www.worldpoliticsreview.com

 

[Housecarl]

HJummm......

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Do Not Forget U.S. Missile Defense Gaps in This Year’s NDAA

The United States is facing one of the most complex security environments in our history, and at the forefront of threats we face is the increasingly sophisticated missile capabilities of our adversar

www.realcleardefense.com

Do Not Forget U.S. Missile Defense Gaps in This Year’s NDAA
https://www.realcleardefense.com/ar...his_years_ndaa_792370.html#comments-container
By Elise Stefanik & Mike Turner
August 31, 2021

The United States is facing one of the most complex security environments in our history, and at the forefront of threats we face is the increasingly sophisticated missile capabilities of our adversaries.

While the U.S. nuclear triad has atrophied in the last twenty years, our adversaries have diligently sought to exceed our nuclear capabilities. We know China has made significant advancements in ballistic, cruise, and hypersonics missiles, and just recently, it has been publicly reported they are constructing dozens of Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) silos. And in Russia, Vladimir Putin has pursued a host of strategic weapons that are either unaddressed by, or in violation of, international arms control agreements.


However, we face threats from not just near-peer adversaries but from rogue states as well. For example, North Korea has achieved nuclear capability, along with an increasingly sophisticated ballistic missile arsenal. In Iran's military, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps has been tasked with administering their 'civilian' space rocket program. What is more alarming is that Iran recently declared its capability to enrich uranium to 90% purity—which is weapons-grade. Equally ominous is the U.N.-reported resumption of missile cooperation between North Korea and Iran, both of whom clearly pose a threat to the U.S. homeland. It is imperative our homeland missile defense capabilities stay ahead of these threats.

Despite these increasing threats, the United States has been slow to develop a homeland missile defense architecture to defend our homeland against our adversaries' growing capabilities. Just recently, the Pentagon finally awarded a contract to upgrade our ground-based ballistic missile defense system. This long-overdue step would establish the Next Generation Interceptor (NGI), equipped with multiple kill vehicles, to modernize our capability to intercept new, sophisticated ICBM threats.

However, we must expand our missile defense architecture to include another missile defense site on the East Coast to defend against a future ICBM from Iran. In addition, this mid-range system would provide defense capability against our adversaries’ increasingly modernized subsurface sea-based missile capabilities, which could threaten us from somewhere in the Atlantic.

This is not theoretical. While in office, President Obama said the United States would establish a third continental interceptor site on the East Coast if the threats increased. As many Pentagon officials admitted in recent congressional testimony, the threat environment has grown significantly. In 2019, the Department of Defense had even gone so far as to designate Fort Drum in upstate New York as the preferred location for a future East Coast missile defense site.

Unfortunately, doubters of homeland missile defense—including President Biden—have argued missile defense is too expensive or view improved missile defense capabilities as provocative. Neither argument is logical nor based in reality. In this year’s war between Israel and Hamas, Israel’s Iron Dome proved missile defense is a cost-effective investment and reliable and effective against rogue missile attacks. Likewise, Israel’s effective missile defense was not provocative but rather deterred continued missile attacks. With that in mind, advocates for cost-effective defense spending should clearly defend missile defense investments—a tiny fraction of annual GDP—to those Americans vulnerable to a rogue attack from Iran or any other fanatical regime.

Since taking office, the Biden Administration has appointed lifelong skeptics of homeland missile defense to prominent Pentagon positions. Further, the Administration has been painstakingly vague on planned Missile Defense and Nuclear Posture reviews and has slow-rolled the discussion on certain components of homeland missile defense. Under Section 1648 of last year’s National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), the Pentagon was required to submit a report to Congress on a layered homeland missile defense system by March 1, 2021. Unfortunately, after repeated delays, Congress still awaits this report. All of this has happened in concert with a Biden budget for missile defense that is recklessly 15% lower than last year’s budget. The Biden Administration’s aversion towards missile defense constitutes a dereliction of the federal government’s duty to provide for the common defense and general welfare of the American people.

While we await future NGIs to fill additional empty silos in Alaska, we should expeditiously establish an East Coast missile defense site, with an underlayer capability—at the least—to counter the missile threats we are facing today. The proposed layered missile defense system, which would complement NGIs with regional systems like the Aegis Ashore missile defense system—which has already successfully intercepted an ICBM with the SM-3 Block IIA missile—or the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, would offer a critical "shoot, assess, shoot" capability in the event of an initial intercept failure. Additionally, establishing an East Coast missile defense site has an associated lag time that fails to account for the continued advancement of adversary capabilities.

As the annual NDAA is drafted, it is vital for Congress to support and properly fund our nation's missile defense platforms. By failing to address missile defense gaps and defend our homeland against our adversaries' advanced missile capabilities, we leave the United States vulnerable and embolden rogue nations to threaten us with nuclear blackmail. As we move through the NDAA process, we urge our colleagues to properly support homeland missile defense platforms to protect the American people from the proliferating threats posed by our adversaries' advanced missile capabilities.

Rep. Elise Stefanik and Rep. Mike Turner both are both members of the House Armed Services Committee. Turner serves as Ranking Member of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces.

 

[Housecarl]

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After Withdrawal: How China, Turkey, and Russia Will Respond to the Taliban - War on the Rocks

An old proverb says that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend,” but the success of Taliban forces in wresting control over most of Afghanistan from the

warontherocks.com

AFTER WITHDRAWAL: HOW CHINA, TURKEY, AND RUSSIA WILL RESPOND TO THE TALIBAN

MICHAEL KOFMAN, AARON STEIN, AND YUN SUN
AUGUST 31, 2021
COMMENTARY

An old proverb says that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend,” but the success of Taliban forces in wresting control over most of Afghanistan from the government of President Ashraf Ghani may complicate matters for three countries whose relationship with the United States is always fraught, and often antagonistic. Leaders in Beijing, Ankara, and Moscow likely shed no tears while watching Ghani’s American- and NATO-backed regime crumble, taking with it any lingering hope that the two-decade mission in Afghanistan could create in the troubled country a durable regime sympathetic to America and the West. But the rise of the Taliban creates its own set of challenges for leaders in China, Turkey, and Russia, each of which see themselves as important regional powerbrokers.

China and the Taliban: A Match Made Under Heaven?

Having cultivated a good relationship with the Taliban for the past decade, and with a recent high-profile official visit by a Taliban delegation led by the group’s number two leader Abdul Ghani Baradar on July 28, Beijing sees itself as having finally bet on the right horse in Afghanistan. Since the Taliban’s takeover of the country, China has demonstrated an unprecedented level of positive reception, political endorsement, and diplomatic support of the Taliban. However, there are ferocious debates ongoing in China as to what the best strategy is moving forward vis-à-vis its poor, unstable, and destabilizing neighbor.

Having proclaimed the Afghan Taliban a “critical military and political force in Afghanistan,” China’s abandonment of the former Ghani government, and of its balancing diplomacy, was swift despite high-level engagement with both parties as recently as July. Beijing has not moved to recognize the Taliban, or the Taliban-led regime, yet. However, such recognition is implied in the many messages Beijing has sent. On Aug. 18, the Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson subtly commented that recognition of a government must wait until after the government is established, implying that, after the Taliban establishes its government, China’s recognition will ensue. One day later, the foreign ministry complimented the Taliban’s “good, positive and pragmatic behaviors” and called for the international community to abandon its stereotyped perceptions of the organization.

Beijing appears to have concluded two preliminary assessments about the future. The first is about the Taliban’s victory and its sustainability. There may be pockets of territory and opposition forces that remain outside the Taliban’s control, but Beijing doesn’t see them as posing critical challenges, especially now that America’s withdrawal appears irreversible. The second concerns the Taliban’s improved behavior. China sees the Taliban as becoming more rational and pragmatic, based on the group’s recent outreach to neighboring countries and the policies it has announced so far, including its vow to respect women’s rights. The implication of the two assessments is that Chinese leaders believe the Taliban is here to stay and is no longer as radical and extremist as it was 20 years ago. Translating this belief into practical policies, Beijing will likely give the Taliban the benefit of the doubt and endorse the group as long as it does not repeat anything outrageous, especially regarding its support for terrorist groups. Indeed, terrorist threats are the most significant concerns Chinese leaders have in Afghanistan. The fact that other countries, such as Russia, share similar views about the Taliban reinforces China’s position.

The U.S. failure and messy withdrawal are quite significant in China’s playbook. On the one hand, China has left no stone unturned in its efforts to undermine Washington and the democratic model it tried to implant in Afghanistan. For China, the failure of the “Western model” once again proves that Western democracy is not a universal value, let alone a successful one. This is critical for China as an important validation of its argument for an alternative system. On the other hand, China also perceives the failure of the United States as an opportunity for China to demonstrate that its own agnostic approach to political systems and governance, as well as its preference for building peace through economic development, might be a better approach toward failed states than the militarized nation-building the West has attempted. In Beijing’s view, if China could rebuild and stabilize Afghanistan, the China model would be proved superior and, consequently, China would be proved superior to the United States as a global leader.

While most Chinese policy wonks applaud the failure of the United States in Afghanistan and see the potential for China’s constructive role in the country, there is a large variation in the degree of proposed Chinese involvement. Interestingly, a sharp difference of outlook exists between strategists and country/regional experts. Strategists see Afghanistan as a golden opportunity for China to expand its influence and replace the United States as a responsible and effective leader to help the country. As argued by Zhou Bo, a retired People’s Liberation Army senior colonel, China is ready to step in to fill the void left by the United States and exploit Afghanistan’s natural resources and critical location for the Belt and Road Initiative. In this blueprint, if China treads carefully and supports the Taliban at this opportune moment, there is a potential for China to engineer and create useful loyalty in Afghanistan as a strategic asset.

However, many country and regional experts have major reservations over this bold proposal. Having long witnessed the endless conflicts, ferocious tribal politics, religious and ethnic divisions, and economic difficulties of Afghanistan, they advocate for a sober understanding of Afghanistan’s fame as a “graveyard for empires” and a much more cautious attitude toward any hasty adventures. Mei Xinyu, a prominent economist from the Ministry of Commerce, has argued that, after the Taliban takeover, China should not rejoice over the post-U.S. Afghan economy and should refrain from large equity investment. Ye Hailin, a veteran South Asia expert at the China Academy of Social Sciences, quickly questioned the Taliban’s ability to absorb the consequences of its easy and swift military success. Most people in this group advocate for China’s “constructive involvement” in Afghanistan, but with a thoughtful approach against hasty decisions to rush into the country.

Given the hostility between China and the United States today, China’s eagerness to use Afghanistan, a U.S. sore spot, for a sense of superiority and leverage is evident, as Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s Aug. 29 phone call with Secretary of State Antony Blinken attests. During the phone call, Wang lectured on “the need to engage Taliban and lead it in a positive direction.”

However, the translation of that eagerness into real and significant actions remains to be seen. China might move faster than Western countries to embrace a Taliban regime, but major investments, political and economic, will depend on the emergence of sustainable stability and the true colors the Taliban reveals.

Turkey: The Middle Man of Europe?

The Turkish government has adapted to changing events in Afghanistan and is prepared to de facto recognize the Taliban and engage with the new leadership in Kabul to advance its own interests. Before the rapid collapse of the Afghan army and the Ghani government, Turkey had sought to formalize its presence in a post-American Afghanistan. To do so, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan sought to walk a fine line of engagement with the United States and NATO, on the one hand, and seeking Taliban acquiesce to a long-term Turkish role on the other.

Turkey’s engagement with Washington revolved around a request for the Turkish military to retain a non-combat presence at the Hamid Karzai International Airport, where it has had soldiers based for more than a decade. These soldiers would help the post-U.S. withdrawal Afghan government run the airport, including to help oversee flight operations at the only international airport in the country. From the outset of these negotiations, the Turkish government demanded financial compensation from NATO and the United States to subsidize the mission and requested that a contingent of American combat forces remain at the base to protect it from external attacks. Ankara had also requested a European presence, approaching both Hungary and Georgia to deploy forces, according to interviews with NATO officials.

Ankara also sought to negotiate with the Taliban, working with its two allies, Qatar and Pakistan, to win support from the group before finalizing the agreement to take over airport operations. Turkey’s engagement with the Taliban before the fall of Kabul foreshadowed Ankara’s policy decisions following the Taliban’s takeover of the country. Since the fall of Kabul, the Turkish-NATO agreement to run the airport after the completion of the withdrawal has collapsed. Ankara, however, has proposed a similar agreement to the Taliban, offering to operate the airport and provide technical support if the Taliban leadership expresses interest in working with Ankara. The Taliban turned down Ankara’s offers to retain troops at the base, and Turkish forces began their withdrawal on Aug. 25. Despite the withdrawal, the Turkish leadership has retained an interest in retaining a civilian presence in the country and is continuing to negotiate with the Taliban about retaining a presence at the airport, with some international support.

Erdoğan’s de facto recognition of the Taliban is part of a broader strategy linked to longstanding Turkish foreign policy and tethered to negative domestic feelings about irregular migration. Since taking power, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) has sought to deepen its links with Muslim-majority nations. The current national security elite is comfortable working with deeply religious entities, ranging from Hayat Tahrir al-Sham in Syria to different affiliates of the Muslim Brotherhood throughout the Middle East. The AKP’s support for the Brotherhood has engendered considerable antipathy from the Gulf states, which view Turkish interference in Arab affairs as a national security threat. Ankara, however, has retained closer ties with non-Arab Muslim states, like Pakistan, that have cordial ties with the Taliban, and with Azerbaijan, which had troops deployed in Kabul under Turkish command.

Turkey’s policy has, almost accidentally, allowed for Ankara to “fence-sit” and be in a position to be of benefit to both its Western allies and to the Taliban. For Erdogan, the broader challenge he faces stems from rising domestic dissatisfaction with his rule, owing to a serious economic downturn linked to his own mismanagement. Turkish political elites have channeled their anger about the economy toward refugees. The AKP is often lauded as being welcoming of refugees, given a pre-2015 open-door policy for Syrians fleeing the civil war. This policy has shifted over the past half-decade, and the ruling party’s policies have become more xenophobic since it allied with the far-right nationalist party, the Nationalist Movement Party, to govern.

The collapse of the Ghani government has also stoked concerns that refugees will flee to Turkey via Iran. Images showing Afghans crossing the Iranian-Turkish border are common in Turkish media. The opposition has blasted Erdoğan for his handling of the issue and has falsely accused him of being a lackey of the Americans and of selling out his country in a secret deal with President Joe Biden to host Afghan refugees. The accusation is false, but the narrative is pervasive. The accusation is linked to Turkey’s handling of the Syrian civil war. In 2018, Erdoğan reached an agreement with the European Union to host Syrian refugees, in return for 6 billion euros ($7.1 billion) in aid. This small price has been weaponized, with opposition politicians pointing to the agreement — and Erdoğan’s own opulent lifestyle — as proof that he will sell out the country and allow for migrants to continue undermining Turkish workers.

The AKP has rapidly begun to build a wall along its border with Iran, matching the wall it has built on its border with Syria, and has signaled to European and Russian leaders that it will not serve as a way station for Afghan migrants. The new media is awash with scripted photos of the Turkish military now patrolling Turkey’s eastern border, and the coverage is omnipresent on Turkish television. Erdoğan, then, has an incentive to show that he is securing his borders and, in so doing, standing up to world leaders that would have Turkey bear the burden of refugees.

Continued.....

 

[Housecarl]

Continued.....

Despite these domestic considerations, a majority of the Turkish public would like to see the Turkish military withdraw its forces from Afghanistan. Erdoğan, however, appears set on exploring deepening links with the Taliban and using economic incentives to try and induce stability in the capital. This approach is rooted in his comfort with the group but is also part of an effort to appease Turkish firms eager to compete for construction contracts in the country. This core AKP constituency has been hit hard by the economic downturn, and building contracts in third countries, where Ankara has carved out ties, is a key part of their business model.

The Turkish government is clearly adapting to the new reality in Kabul. Ankara is unlikely to follow in lock-step with the United States moving forward and, instead, will seek to carve out its own relationship with the Taliban. The domestic factors in Turkey incentivize this policy, as does Erdoğan’s own conception of Turkish national interests. This reality mirrors the expected actions of other regional countries, all but ensuring that the Taliban will be less isolated than when previously in power, and the United States will have less leverage than it did before the invasion.

A Dual Track Approach From Moscow: Containment and Engagement

With the recent Taliban takeover of Afghanistan, Russia finds itself in somewhat familiar historical territory. Moscow is no stranger to Afghanistan, having fought its own bloody war there for 10 years, from 1979 to 1989. Yet, from a Russian perspective, this Taliban conquest is markedly different from when Taliban forces took over the country in the mid-1990s. Russia’s ambassador to Afghanistan reported from a recent meeting with the Taliban that they see relations with Russia as very friendly and have taken up guard outside of the Russian embassy. A Taliban spokesperson claimed that they have “very good relations with Russia.” The contrast with Western reactions, seeing the Taliban’s ascendance as a marker of defeat in the conflict, places Russia’s strategy in stark relief.

After an initially calm and somewhat welcoming response to the Taliban takeover, Russia has sent several transport aircraft to evacuate more than 500 people out of Afghanistan. Moscow is not panicking, but Russian confidence in the safety of its citizens and embassy staff appears to be deteriorating. Russia does not gain tremendously from U.S. withdrawal, beyond a palpable degree of schadenfreude and the visible dent to U.S. international prestige. The messy U.S. withdrawal casts the painful history of Soviet defeat in perspective. After the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, Mohammad Najibullah’s forces fought for another three years, even winning early battles. His regime collapsed in large part because the Soviet Union itself dissolved in late 1991, and Russian support was no longer forthcoming. In contrast, Afghan National Defense and Security Forces units folded rapidly without logistical and political support from Kabul, while Ghani’s government melted away faster than most anticipated.

Some American allies have raised questions about U.S. credibility, engendering a circular firing squad exercise. In the zero-sum nature of today’s confrontation, this may seem a boon to Russia, but Moscow has also inherited significant long-term challenges, as well as regional instability depending on how Afghanistan unfolds. Any Russian glee will be short-lived. Moscow has been making inroads with the Taliban for years in preparation for its potential victory and appears to have chosen a policy of selective engagement together with containment. In brief, the Russian approach is characterized by betting on the prospect of being able to build a working relationship with the Taliban, while at the same time hedging against the possibility that the Taliban can’t or won’t stick to the terms.

What is Russia looking for specifically? No spread of instability from Afghanistan to bordering Central Asian states, no terrorist attacks against Russia from groups based in Afghanistan, and no support for radicalism in Russia. As the takeover appeared imminent, a Taliban delegation visited Moscow in July to assuage Russian concerns on these grounds. At the meeting, Russia’s envoy Zamir Kabulov emphasized the importance of tensions not “spreading beyond the country’s borders” and claimed he had received assurances from the Taliban that they wouldn’t violate the borders of Central Asian states or allow the use of their territory for attacks against Russia. Moscow would also like to see an inclusive government formed, but, in truth, it cares less about the internal workings of Afghanistan and has few interests in the country. An inclusive government would make the Taliban regime less of a pariah state, render it easier to engage, and perhaps present other opportunities. Russia would also like to see a reduction in drug trafficking headed north, but this is a tertiary goal.

At the moment, Russia is in no rush to recognize the Taliban as a legitimate government (the Taliban are still designated as a terrorist group in Russia), but Russian leadership has made it plain that its policy is one of engagement. At a recent press conference with Angela Merkel, Vladimir Putin said, “The Taliban movement currently controls virtually the entire territory of the country, including its capital. These are realities.” He added, “we should act based on these very realities, not allowing the Afghan state’s breakup.” It appears that Moscow prefers that Afghanistan remain a unitary state and is unlikely to support opposition groups. Russia has zero love lost for the now deposed Ghani government. Moscow’s special envoy for Afghanistan, Zamir Kabulov, has said on television “If you compare the capacity to make agreements of colleagues and partners, then the Taliban have long seemed to me far more capable than the Kabul puppet government.”

Moscow had opened channels with the Taliban as far back as 2015 and has held multiple rounds of inter-Afghan talks in the capital since 2018. While Russia had justified this reengagement based on a common goal, the fight against the metastasizing Islamic State-Khorasan Province, it was also hedging against the Afghan government, assuming it might fall whenever U.S. forces withdrew. These ties only grew more visible and stronger in recent years, though Russia is unlikely to have much trust in Afghanistan’s new rulers. The Russian government did not care for the U.S.-backed regime, but significantly, Russia also has no alternative options to dealing with the Taliban. Ironically, the Taliban came back quite stronger in 2021 than it ever was in 2001. Forces opposed to the Taliban in the Panjshir valley are now mounting a resistance, but Ahmad Massoud, son of the famed mujahedeen fighter Ahmad Shah Massoud, is not a serious challenger to Taliban control of the country. The prospects for a resistance holding out in the Panjshir are slim. Therefore, Russia has few options for contesting Taliban rule and, as Putin has suggested, does not want to see the fragmentation of Afghanistan, which perhaps carries even greater potential for engendering instability.

Russia also seeks to deter further Taliban encroachment, containing their movement to Afghanistan. Moscow held several recent military exercises in Central Asia, including a joint exercise with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan on the Afghan border. The message to the Taliban is for them to not overplay their hand and pursue any ambitions beyond the Afghan border, which Moscow has signaled will be fiercely defended. Across the way is the 201st Russian military base, a sizable force responsible for backstopping Tajikistan’s security forces. Hence, Russian forces are forward deployed in the region and can facilitate the arrival of further troops from its Central Military District, or supporting airborne units. Russia has substantial capacity for power projection in the region, exercises with Central Asian states regularly, and could respond quickly to a military crisis, perhaps in collaboration with China.

Nearby Turkmenistan is a well-armed hermit kingdom, featuring a personalized authoritarian regime, and it has amicable relations with the Taliban. Here Russia’s task is made easier in terms of local capacity. Central Asia today is not composed of newly independent states, or weak teetering regimes, but rather authoritarian governments that have proven capable of maintaining independence and securing their own interests among intervening external actors. Some have undergone power transfers, and the region as a whole is more stable and consolidated than it was in the 1990s. As Alex Cooley writes, “far from a political vacuum, there is a patchwork of structures that Central Asian actors are increasingly convinced they should use to govern the region.”

Consequently, the Russian bet is that Central Asian states like Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan can hold their own, while Russian forces fortify Tajikistan. This thesis will soon be tested, as Uzbekistan prepares for an influx of cross-border refuges, and as Tajikistan has called on its allies as part of the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization. Moscow’s challenge will be to reconcile divergent regional responses to the Taliban takeover, helping to corral a common approach. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan made inroads with the Taliban, maintaining ties, whereas Tajikistan’s longtime autocrat seems unprepared and overtly hostile to the Taliban’s takeover. This presents new challenges and opportunities for Moscow, which seeks to avoid being sucked in by the security needs of Central Asian states while, at the same time, trying to leverage the situation to improve security ties and its influence in the region. Russia will continue to see these states as buffers against any further spread of instability or radicalization from a Taliban-ruled Afghanistan.

Russia has lost economic influence in Central Asia, chiefly to China, but it remains the principal security guarantor in the region, with the most experienced and best-positioned military. Maintaining good working relations with Central Asian states, Turkey, Iran, and China, Moscow is well situated to coordinate a regional response to the Taliban and will likely attempt to don this role. In Beijing, Russia will find a sympathetic party with a common cause, and it will expect China to step up and help maintain regional stability. Russia and China are liable to coordinate their approach to the Taliban, shutting out the United States and positioning themselves as the arbiters of the group’s broader international legitimacy (perhaps along with Turkey). They hold the keys to regional organizations, and both states are likely to attempt constructive engagement, while also seeking to contain Afghanistan’s new rulers.

Conclusion

All three countries are adopting certain hedging strategies. Among the three, China appears most eager to venture into Afghanistan, followed closely by Turkish eagerness to retain a presence at the airport. Turkey, it appears, is the only one of the three eager to have a military presence in the country. However, Chinese enthusiasm is still subject to strong calls for caution. There is a similar dynamic in Turkey, where the population is concerned about an open-ended military deployment to support the airport but is also determined to stem illegal migration. If the Taliban’s victory proves unsustainable, China and Russia will most likely join hands to develop a common security strategy to seal off any spillover effect from Afghanistan. Recent proposals of building a buffer zone in Tajikistan reflect preparations in this direction. The Turkish strategy is not necessarily in tension with those of China and Russia, but it is more focused on cultivating economic links and retaining control over the airport. Between China and Turkey, policy consultations are likely, but cooperative actions do not appear imminent. Moscow won’t be returning anytime soon, with the 1989 Soviet withdrawal still fresh in the collective memory of its political leadership. Engagement and containment characterize Russia’s approach, with Moscow well-positioned to coordinate a regional security response.



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Michael Kofman serves as director of the Russia Studies Program at the Center for Naval Analyses, and as a senior adjunct fellow at the Center for New American Security. Previously he served as a research fellow at the National Defense University and as a non-resident fellow at the Modern War Institute at West Point. The views expressed here are his own.

Aaron Stein is the director of research at the Foreign Policy Research Institute and the author of the forthcoming book The US War Against ISIS: How America and its Allies Defeated the Caliphate.

Yun Sun is the director of the China Program at the Stimson Center.

 

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The Eternal Jihad

Although August 15, 2021, will forever live in infamy as the date the Taliban reconquered Afghanistan, for over 13 centuries that date was famous for another event -- Constantinople’s defeat of the caliphate, August 15, 718. While th...

www.americanthinker.com

August 31, 2021
The Eternal Jihad
By Raymond Ibrahim

Although August 15, 2021, will forever live in infamy as the date the Taliban reconquered Afghanistan, for over 13 centuries that date was famous for another event -- Constantinople’s defeat of the caliphate, August 15, 718. While these two events separated by exactly 1,303 years are vastly different in nature -- not least that in 718 Islam lost, while in 2021 it won -- they both confirm one irresistible point that the confident West should take to heart: the tenacity of Islamic jihad -- this relentless snake of war that always bides its time, even if by remaining coiled for many centuries, before striking.

Consider the first event. In 718, the Eastern Roman Empire (“Byzantium”) repulsed, in dramatic fashion, the Arabs. It was such a spectacular victory, and Muslim losses were so bad, that, for many centuries, the caliphates never dared make another attempt against the walls of Constantinople.

Put differently, for many centuries after the year 718, anyone living in Constantinople would have thought -- and would have apparently been justified for thinking -- that the Islamic threat, whatever it was elsewhere, was well behind them.

And yet, in the early 1400s -- 700 years after the people of Constantinople had thought they’d seen the last of jihad -- it was back again besieging them, with the city finally falling to Islam on May 29, 1453.

More significantly, those who besieged and conquered Constantinople in 1453 had little to do with those who besieged it in the eighth century. The latter were Arabs, under the Umayyad caliphate centered in Damascus. Those who actually conquered Constantinople were Turks, whose capital was Adrianople (now Edirne).

On the surface, there is no connection or continuity between those who in the eighth century tried to conquer, and those who in the fifteenth century did conquer, Constantinople -- except, of course, for one thing: both were Muslims, and both articulated their hostility for and need to conquer Constantinople in distinctly jihadist terms: like every other infidel, the Christian kingdom had two choices before it: submit to Islam -- which it rejected -- or fight.

Thus, while the jihad was down in the eighth century, it was never out for the final count. It bided its time, even as empires rose and fell, and finally manifested itself again in the guise of the latest newcomers to the stage of world conquest, the Turks (who, even more ironically, were greater devotees and practitioners of jihad than even their Arab predecessors).

Seen this way, Constantinople’s mortal enemy was never really the Arabs or Turks; it was Islam, which, while experiencing highs and lows in the intervening centuries, still transformed its adherents, first Arabs then Turks, into existential enemies devoted to the slaughter and subjugation of infidels, whenever possible.

Now consider how this “ancient” and “distant” history applies to recent events. At the height of U.S. victory in Afghanistan in 2005, when both al-Qaeda and the Taliban had been all but rooted out, Ayman al-Zawahiri (current leader of al-Qaeda) was asked about the statuses of those two organizations’ leaders, who were missing in action. His response, which follows, has, in the aftermath of August 15, 2021, proven true:

Jihad in the path of Allah is greater than any individual or organization. It is a struggle between Truth and Falsehood, until Allah Almighty inherits the earth and those who live in it. Mullah Muhammad Omar and Sheikh Osama bin Laden -- may Allah protect them from all evil -- are merely two soldiers of Islam in the journey of jihad, while the struggle between Truth [Islam] and Falsehood [non-Islam] transcends time (Al Qaeda Reader, p.182; emphasis added).

Similarly, consider what Muhammad Arif Mustafa, a Taliban commander, said recently:

One day mujahedeen will have victory and Islamic law will come not just to Afghanistan, but all over the world. We are not in a hurry. We believe it will come one day. Jihad will not end until the last day [emphasis added].

When one considers the state of the world, the current military and economic dominance of the West, and the general weakness of the Muslim world, surely such claims sound laughable. As seen, however, time has a way of switching the tables, making what once seemed impossible imminent.

In short, as long as Islam exists, the jihad may be down but it is never out for the count. It may take years, decades, and centuries; its name and guise may morph and change from eighth-century Arab caliphates to fifteenth-century Turkish sultanates to the twenty-first century’s loose amalgam of ISIS, al-Qaeda, Taliban, Hamas, Hezb'allah, Boko Haram, al-Shabaab, etc. -- but it is always there, often lying dormant, yes, though ever ready to strike at the first opportunity.

What will it be called, what guise will it take, and what new inroads will it have made in the decades and centuries to come?

Raymond Ibrahim, author of Sword and Scimitar, is a Shillman Fellow at the David Horowitz Freedom Center; a Judith Rosen Friedman Fellow at the Middle East Forum; and a Distinguished Senior Fellow at the Gatestone Institute.

 

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The Zetas’ Model of Organized Crime is Leaving Mexico in Ruins

It was, around 12:30 p.m. when a caravan of three vehicles loaded with well-armed men and at least one woman began a violent rampage through Reynosa.

insightcrime.org

The Zetas’ Model of Organized Crime is Leaving Mexico in Ruins

GULF CARTEL/30 AUG 2021
BY STEVEN DUDLEY

It was a Saturday, around 12:30 p.m. local time, when a caravan of three vehicles loaded with well-armed men and at least one woman began a violent rampage through Reynosa, a Mexican city of about 700,000 people that borders McAllen, Texas, and serves as an important hub for numerous criminal groups.

According to a detailed account by the local news outlet Elefante Blanco, the caravan began in the eastern part of the city, stopped and robbed a car, then continued to a neighborhood near the city center where the carnage began in earnest.

They first shot and killed seven men inside a house. Then they traveled to another neighborhood and shot and killed two more men. A short distance away, they shot and killed two other men. Seconds later, they shot and killed two women and a man from the same family and stole the vehicle they were driving.

An hour and 15 minutes after the rampage began, local authorities finally confronted at least part of the caravan near the Pharr-Reynosa International Bridge, connecting the city to the United States. Shots were fired. One of the attackers was killed and another captured. Inside one of the cars, authorities found two women bound and gagged.

Several other alleged assailants fled. Authorities caught up to them again some six hours later. Authorities said more gunfire was exchanged; four of the alleged attackers, one of whom was a woman, were killed.

SEE ALSO: The Next Generation of Criminal Groups Driving Violence in Mexico

However, the other victims were civilians, according to Elefante Blanco, citing interviews and social media posts from neighbors, politicians, and colleagues of the dead. They included a nursing student, a person who worked at a local maquila, a shop owner and another person in that shop.

Indeed, the rampage seemed designed to inflict maximum civilian casualties. In all, at least 14 of those killed had no criminal ties, and the state governor later lamented the massacre of “civilians.” Shortly after, authorities touted the arrests of more than a dozen suspects, including the alleged Gulf Cartel boss in the city of Rio Brazo, known as “La Vaca,” who officials said they’d been after for more than two years.

The timely captures by a troubled special operations group were curious, especially since relatives of two of those captured said they had been kidnapped in April. And the explanations for the massacre were even less forthcoming. Was it a fight between factions of what is left of the once-vaunted Gulf Cartel? Perhaps it was an effort by a faction of what is left from the Zetas to displace their rivals? In either case, the armed group had sent a message: no one is safe.

‘So You Learn to Respect Us’
In 2006, when the Zetas were but a speck in the constellation of criminal organizations, they captured a couple of police in Acapulco, cut off their heads and left a message that read: “So you learn to respect us.”

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Description automatically generated"]https://lh4.googleusercontent.com/D...QT6IG28ZbRVtsAkijbcYB3BRMWW9ltg5q79w=s0[/IMG]
Later, the words “Para que aprendan a respetar” appeared on flag-like logos circulating on the internet. It was impossible to know if the Zetas had promulgated the expression or the internet logo, but it stuck, and for good reason.

The core of the Zetas model was fear. Formed by several Mexican Special Forces deserters in the late 1990s, they operated first as the enforcement arm for the Gulf Cartel’s leader, Osiel Cárdenas. The Gulf Cartel’s birthplace was the stretch of land between Reynosa and Matamoros, a key corridor for drug trafficking, contraband, human smuggling, human trafficking, kidnapping and extortion.

Cárdenas was from Matamoros, but he was not satisfied with just that territory, so in the mid-2000s, after he’d used the Zetas to secure important sections of the northeastern border with the United States, he sent them to places like the southern state of Guerrero – where Acapulco is, and where rivals had long operated – and Michoacán, a perennial epicenter of drug production and trafficking. Eventually, the Zetas’ leaders would find a seat at the table, trafficking drugs with the Gulf Cartel’s upper echelon.

The Zetas soon began to mold other organizations and make their own name, not just with spectacular beheadings of police and ominous messages, but with a new way of operating. The model was based on control of physical space, for which the Zetas were built. Using a combination of sophisticated technology, military tactics and brutal violence, the group exerted their will over wide swaths of territory where they collected rent from all illegal and legal enterprises in those areas.

They did not necessarily run these businesses. They simply taxed them. These included everything from contraband liquor to prostitution, local drug peddling, theft and retail. They also kidnapped migrants and extorted local businesses. The difference between them and the traditional cartels was stark. They won territory first, then usurped every business in that space. The underworld refrain that it is best not to calentar la plaza (heat up the plaza) to keep authorities away did not apply. There were no negotiations, no alliances, and no mercy for those who disobeyed. They lived by another refrain: Para que aprendan a respetar.

While the Zetas’ top leaders began to partake in some of the international drug trafficking activities of the Gulf Cartel, as illustrated in this 2009 US indictment, the lower echelons made money from the extraction of these rents and predatory criminal activities. The model served the Gulf Cartel, since it made it easier to finance their mini-army and their expansion into places like Guerrero and Michoacán.

It worked. According to a Harvard study, between 1998 and 2010, the Zetas expanded to 33 new municipalities per year, the most of any criminal group; the Gulf Cartel was second during that time period, expanding to just under 20 per year. But, as the Gulf leaders and others would find out, this expansion came with a heavy price.

When Mexican authorities captured Cárdenas in 2003, the Zetas began a process of excising themselves from the Gulf Cartel. Part of this impetus came from their varied criminal portfolio, afforded to them because of their new criminal model. Part of it came from ambition. As the Dallas Morning News reported, part of it came from a sense of betrayal, specifically that Cárdenas himself was turning state’s evidence against them after he was extradited to the United States in 2007. He pleaded guilty in 2009 and was sentenced to 25 years in prison.

War followed. Fighting was particularly intense along the northeast corridor where both had operated for so many years. Few knew, but it was the beginning of a process that would eventually lead to the chaotic June 2021 massacre in Reynosa and many more like it across Mexico over the last decade.

Derivatives of Derivatives
While the schism between the Zetas and the Gulf Cartel was growing, other similar criminal organizations emerged. The most notable of them was the Familia Michoacana. Although it took its name from its home state of Michoacán, it followed at least part of the Zetas’ model: international drug trafficking at the top; territorial control, extraction of rent, extortion and kidnapping at the bottom. It differed in the way it sought more regular local political connections.

And for a while, as it did with the Zetas, the Familia Michoacana strategy worked. It expanded. But soon, the Familia Michoacana was also splitting at the seams. It now forms part of a pantheon of groups operating in Michoacán, Jalisco and the state of Mexico.

SEE ALSO: Coverage of the Zetas

The same process was playing out in other areas. In Tijuana, what was left of the various factions of the Tijuana Cartel were fighting for local, as well as international, markets. In Juárez, numerous groups began fighting for local criminal markets at the same time as the Juárez and Sinaloa cartels sought control of the important international trafficking corridor. In Acapulco, numerous former elements of the Beltrán Leyva Organization sought control of the local drug market and parts of the international market.

But none of these multilayered battles played out as brutally as the one for the northeast corridor. It’s not exactly clear why, but it certainly did not help that the Zetas and the Gulf Cartel were both born in the area and knew each other intimately. By 2012, the Zetas themselves split, unable to corral their own members who had entered into local criminal markets. There are now at least four different factions, according to InSight Crime’s last count. The Gulf Cartel suffered its own schisms, splitting into at least three factions, at least two of whom appeared to be involved in the battle on June 19.

It was, in many ways, inevitable. The Zetas proved that via fearsome messaging and brutal tactics, you could control territory and thus secure numerous local criminal rents, even while you vied for action in the international market. Most of these factions now do the same, focusing on local criminal markets where the bar for entering is far lower than for international markets than seeking a seat at the table with the international players. In the process, they too suffer their own schisms.

Over time, these derivatives of derivatives have become even more primitive than the Zetas once were, which leads us to the June massacre in Reynosa. In late July, three groups along the Reynosa-Matamoros corridor left messages in various public places that they had reached a peace agreement.

"We have families, too," one part read.

Still, few believe the peace will hold, and in early August, the Attorney General’s Office captured another five suspects they linked to the case. Authorities also pointed to two derivatives of the Gulf Cartel as the culprits: the Ciclones (Cyclones) and Escorpiones (Scorpions), who may have teamed up to battle the Metros, another Gulf derivative.

 

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Italian police raid drone maker over alleged Chinese takeover

An Italy-based defense firm that has supplied small drones to the country’s special forces was quietly and illegally purchased by Chinese state companies, Italian investigators claim.

www.defensenews.com

Unmanned
Italian police raid drone maker over alleged Chinese takeover
By Tom Kington

Sep 3, 06:11 AM

ROME — An Italy-based defense firm that has supplied small drones to the country’s special forces was quietly and illegally purchased by Chinese state companies, Italian investigators have alleged.

On Thursday, Italian financial crimes police raided the company, which one official named as Alpi Aviation.

Alpi Aviation produces the Strix UAV at its facility in Pordenone, northern Italy. The Italian Air Force has used the UAV in Afghanistan. It weighs 10 kilograms, has a 3-meter wingspan, and can relay video and infrared imagery in real time. It takes 8 minutes to set up, and then it can be launched by catapult. It’s equipped with a parachute for landing.

Investigators said a a Hong Kong-based company in 2018 purchased a 75 percent share in the firm at an inflated price. They also allege the Hong Kong-based company was controlled by a series of corporate holdings.

Working their way through the tiers of ownership, police said they discovered the real owners of Alpi Aviaton were “two important government-owned companies in the People’s Republic of China.”

The statement said the sale violated Italy’s so-called Golden Power law, under which defense firms, as well as strategic companies in critical sectors like energy and telecommunications, can only be sold outside Italy with specific permission from the government.

Alpi Aviation was listed by Italy’s Defence Ministry as one of its suppliers, and thus it was covered by the law, said Col. Stefano Commentucci of Italy’s tax police.

A police statement said the firm failed to notify the Italian government of the 2018 change in ownership, a transaction it described as “opaque” and designed to conceal the new non-Italian ownership.

The takeover was only communicated to the Defence Ministry two years later after inquiries were made by ministry officials, the statement added.

The firm also broke Italian law on defense exports by failing to inform the government when it temporarily exported a drone for display at a 2019 Shanghai trade fair, police said. By listing the UAV as a “model aircraft,” the firm avoided limitations on exports set down by the law, the statement added.

Lawyers for the firm denied the allegations on Thursday, claiming managers at Alpi Aviation had not violated the Golden Power law, nor had the company broken rules on arms exports. The lawyers said the change of ownership was “transparent” and reflected the “real value of the company.”

Alpi Aviation undertakes joint research into military drones with Leonardo, the Italian state-controlled defense company, a police official said.

In its statement, the police said Alpi Aviation had been bought not as an investment but “exclusively for the acquisition of its technological and production know-how, including military,” with plans allegedly underway to transfer production facilities to the eastern Chinese city of Wuxi.

 

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Pakistan's duplicitous strategy in Afghanistan and elsewhere

Analysts have been digging up assessments of varying nature on the likely course the situation in Afghanistan would take in the coming days. There is a high degree of uncertainty on the manner in which the government would ensure a safe and secure Afghanistan.

www.dtnext.in

Pakistan's duplicitous strategy in Afghanistan and elsewhere

Published: Sep 03,2021
11:38 PM by IANS

Analysts have been digging up assessments of varying nature on the likely course the situation in Afghanistan would take in the coming days. There is a high degree of uncertainty on the manner in which the government would ensure a safe and secure Afghanistan.

Kabul:
The situation in Afghanistan today has the global community concerned and anxious about developments in the region and the likely negative fall-out of the same.

Analysts have been digging up assessments of varying nature on the likely course the situation in Afghanistan would take in the coming days. There is a high degree of uncertainty on the manner in which the government would ensure a safe and secure Afghanistan.

In such situations, there is a tendency for the global community to forget those responsible for creating such crises outsmarting all stakeholders. In the case of Afghanistan, finding the true perpetrators of the creation of today's Afghanistan is the big question.

Pakistan has been quick enough to portray itself as the lone player left in the field to deal with the Afghan mess while the US abandoned the complex situation in the country. Pakistan has also been building on the sympathy narrative that it remains at the forefront of defending the world from the spread of terrorism - a line it intends to sustain in order to win the support of the larger international community. It projects itself as the savior of the world by being on the frontline of the war against terrorism and calibrating the Taliban to ensure peace and stability.

While Pakistan does not want to be seen as associated with the Taliban, at the same time it has no choice but to portray its linkages with the Taliban so as to uphold the mantle of ensuring security in Afghanistan.

The fact, however, remains that Pakistan has been solely responsible for creating the prevailing volatile situation in Afghanistan over the years as part of its policy of seeking strategic depth in Afghanistan. It has consistently indulged in extending support to US operations in Afghanistan while, at the same time, remaining deeply involved with the Taliban.

This duplicitous game of Pakistan was well known to the US from the very beginning but the US was focused on their targets on the ground in Afghanistan to which they could not gain access without the assistance of Pakistan.

Ironically, while Pakistan played along with the Americans in Afghanistan to ensure a constant flow of aid and other forms of support, at the same time, they provided resources and logistical support base for the Taliban.

Pakistan has also mastered well the art of psychological warfare as one saw a flurry of activities involving Pakistani officials and ministers feverishly engaging critical foreign contacts soon after the takeover of Kabul by the Taliban, ostensibly to ensure that there is no adverse fallout of the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan impacting Pakistan's international image.

In fact, on the contrary, Pakistan went on a PR overdrive all across using their Ambassadors and critical contacts abroad to project themselves as being left in the lurch and having to defend itself and the world against any volatile situation being created in Afghanistan. They would thus vie for aid and assistance from international organizations and western countries building on this narrative.

A number of American politicians have rightly claimed that the war in Afghanistan would have ended long ago if Pakistan denied safe havens to the Taliban.

While sheltering and hosting the Taliban, Pakistan has ignored the fact that with a strong radical Islamic undercurrent prevailing in the country and political instability being endemic, the possibility of hardcore radical elements supported by the Taliban taking over the reins of the country in Islamabad cannot be ruled out.

The Central Asian state of Tajikistan went through a 5 year period of civil war from 1992 to 1997 due to the involvement of Taliban cadres in the internal political conflict in Tajikistan.

Strengthening the hands of the Taliban could lead to the possibility of radical groups in Pakistan taking over control of the government and eventually, nuclear weapons. While this may or may not become a reality, but Pakistan has also been using this narrative to put the fear among western nations to draw support in the form of resources and financial aid.

Then-President Pervez Musharraf was able to convince the larger global community that Al Qaeda was a threat to Pakistan's stability. From time to time, Pakistan's security officials have also played the narrative that hijacking Pakistan's nuclear weapons by terrorists were their worst nightmare. The terror-nuclear axis has thus been played well by Pakistan.

Over a period of time, Pakistan has thus managed to successfully play this manipulative game attracting significant assistance from the West. Between 2002 to 2020, playing on the "war on terror" narrative, Pakistan elicited around $ 33 billion in US assistance.

Steve Cole, in his book "Directorate S", describes the Coalition Support Funds (CSF) - essentially reimbursements to Pakistan - as "legal bribery" of the general. A US Committee heard the story of how Pakistan presented bills for $70 million on road and bunker construction without any evidence that it was ever done, $19,000 for use of each naval vehicle, and $55 million spent for the maintenance of helicopters which remained in total disrepair.

A lot of that went into various pockets. At the institutional level, CSF funds were used to buy conventional weapons for use against India, with the State Department classifying even the F-16 as counter-terrorism weaponry.

On a separate note, a number of incidents have taken place with Pakistani nationals carrying out attacks in different locations across the world but this never led to pressure from the international community on the Pakistani administration because of the inter-dependability of aid and security.

As far as the use of dubious means and tactics used by Pakistan is concerned, one cannot forget how Pakistan managed to create its nuclear weapons through covert channels. Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan even catered uranium centrifuge to Iran besides training Iranian scientists in multiple areas.

While the world today tries to deal with the Iranian nuclear program, which poses a threat to the West, Pakistan's complicity in critical contribution towards the project seems to have gone unnoticed.

Pakistan has thus escaped strong retribution due ironically to its own instability, with terrorists becoming the currency of exchange and barter. Its nuclear weapons have also been turned into a source of currency, while it used all the blackmail and double-dealing to back one apparent ally at the expense of another, and all of this for more than 20 years.

The US military and security establishment are well aware of the extent to which Pakistan has been responsible for causing damage to the US military in Afghanistan and intentionally bringing a bad name to the US compelling it to withdraw fast from Afghanistan.

One cannot forget the shock of 9/11 when US officials threatened to bomb Pakistan back into the "stone age" and which led to Pakistani Army "advisors" speedily exiting Afghanistan. The part of the war did actually end in a week. It restarted again, as the US turned to Iraq, and left the war to Pakistan