WAR 03-09-2024-to-03-15-2024__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

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(335) 02-17-2024-to-02-23-2024__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

(336) 02-24-2024-to-03-01-2024__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

(337) 03-02-2024-to-03-09-2024__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****


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Exclusive: US prepared ‘rigorously’ for potential Russian nuclear strike in Ukraine in late 2022, officials say​

By Jim Sciutto, CNN
8 minute read
Updated 10:06 AM EST, Sat March 9, 2024

CNN — In late 2022, the US began “preparing rigorously” for Russia potentially striking Ukraine with a nuclear weapon, in what would have been the first nuclear attack in war since the US dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki nearly eighty years before, two senior administration officials told CNN.

The Biden administration was specifically concerned Russia might use a tactical or battlefield nuclear weapon, the officials said.

I first reported US officials were worried about Russia using a tactical nuclear weapon in 2022, but in my new book, “The Return of Great Powers” publishing on March 12, I reveal exclusive details on the unprecedented level of contingency planning carried out as senior members of the Biden administration became increasingly alarmed by the situation.

“That’s what the conflict presented us, and so we believed and I think it’s our right to prepare rigorously and do everything possible to avoid that happening,” the first senior administration official told me.

What led the Biden administration to reach such a startling assessment was not one indicator, but a collection of developments, analysis, and – crucially - highly sensitive new intelligence.

The administration’s fear, a second senior administration official told me, “was not just hypothetical — it was also based on some information that we picked up.”

“We had to plan so that we were in the best possible position in case this no‑longer unthinkable event actually took place,” the same senior administration official told me.

During this period from late summer to fall 2022, the National Security Council convened a series of meetings to put contingency plans in place “in the event of either a very clear indication that they were about to do something, attack with a nuclear weapon, or if they just did, how we would respond, how we would try to preempt it, or deter it,” the first senior administration official told me.

“I don’t think many of us coming into our jobs expected to be spending significant amounts of time preparing for a scenario which a few years ago was believed to be from a bygone era,” this senior administration official told me.

Russians surrounded​

Late summer 2022 was proving a devastating period for Russian forces in Ukraine. Ukrainian forces were advancing on Russian-occupied Kherson in the south. The city had been Russia’s biggest prize since the invasion. Now, it was in danger of being lost to the Ukrainian counteroffensive. Crucially, as Ukrainian forces advanced, entire Russian units were in danger of being surrounded. The view inside the administration was that such a catastrophic loss could be a “potential trigger” for the use of nuclear weapons.

“If significant numbers of Russian forces were overrun — if their lives were shattered as such — that was a sort of precursor to a potential threat directly to Russian territory or the Russian state,” the first senior administration official said.

“In Kherson at that time there were increasing signs that Russian lines could collapse. Tens of thousands of Russian troops were potentially vulnerable.”

Russia was losing ground inside Ukrainian sovereign territory, not inside Russia. But US officials were concerned that Russian President Vladimir Putin saw it differently. He had told the Russian people that Kherson was now part of Russia itself, and, so, might perceive a devastating loss there as a direct threat to him and the Russian state.

“Our assessment had been for some time that one of the scenarios in which they would contemplate using nuclear weapons [included] things like existential threats to the Russian state, direct threats to Russian territory,” the first senior administration official said.

In such an assessment, Russia could view a tactical nuclear strike as a deterrent against further losses of Russian-held territory in Ukraine as well as any potential attack on Russia itself.

False Flag​

At the same time, Russia’s propaganda machine was circulating a new false flag story about a Ukrainian dirty bomb, which US officials feared could be intended as cover for a Russian nuclear attack.

In October 2022, Russia’s defense minister, Sergei Shoigu, made a series of phone calls to defense officials in the US, the UK, France and Turkey, telling them that the Kremlin was “concerned about possible provocations by Kyiv involving the use of a dirty bomb.”

US and other western officials rejected the Russian warnings. Still, Russia’s UN ambassador delivered a letter directly to the United Nations detailing the same alleged threat. Russian officials alleged Ukraine would build and detonate a dirty bomb against Russian forces and then blame the attack on Russia.

US officials dismissed the Russian warnings but feared the motivation behind them. “Russian public messaging came way out of the left field on the potential for Ukraine to use a dirty bomb, which we saw not grounded in reality,” the first senior administration official told me. “More concerning” to this official was that the Russians would say these things “either as a pretext for them to do something crazy or as a cover for something they themselves were looking at doing. So that was quite alarming.”

But there was one more piece that raised such concerns to a new level. Western intelligence agencies had received information that there were now communications among Russian officials explicitly discussing a nuclear strike.

As the first senior administration official described it to me, there were “indications that we were picking up through other means that this was at least something that lower levels of the Russian system were discussing.”

US access to Russian internal communications had proved capable before. In the run‑up to the Ukraine invasion, the US had intercepted Russian military commanders discussing preparations for the invasion, communications that formed part of the US intelligence assessment, later proved accurate, that an invasion was imminent.

“It’s never a cut-and-dry, black-and-white assessment,” the first senior administration official told me. “But the risk level seemed to be going up, beyond where it had been at any other point in time.”

Would the US know?​

At no time did the US detect intelligence indicating Russia was taking steps to mobilize its nuclear forces to carry out such an attack.

“We obviously placed a high priority on tracking and had some ability at least to track such movements of its nuclear forces,” this senior administration official told me. “And at no point did we ever see any indications of types of steps that we would’ve expected them to take if they were going down a path toward using nuclear weapons.”

However, US officials were not certain they would know if Russia was moving tactical nuclear weapons into place. Unlike strategic nuclear weapons, capable of destroying entire cities, tactical or battlefield nuclear weapons are small enough to be moved quietly and could be fired from conventional systems already deployed to the Ukrainian battlefield.

“If what they were going to do is use a tactical nuclear weapon, particularly a very low-yield tactical nuclear weapon and particularly if they were only going to use one or a very small number, it was not one hundred percent clear to us that we necessarily would have known,” this senior administration official continued.

Multiple senior administration officials took part in an urgent outreach. Secretary of State Antony Blinken communicated US concerns “very directly” with Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov, according to senior administration officials. Joint Chiefs Chairman General Mark Milley called his Russian counterpart, General Valery Gerasimov, chief of the general staff of the Russian Armed Forces. According to a senior US official, President Joe Biden sent CIA Director Bill Burns to speak to Sergey Naryshkin, the head of Russia’s foreign intelligence service, in Turkey to communicate US concerns about a nuclear strike taking place and gauge Russian intentions.

The US also worked closely with its allies both to develop contingency plans for a Russian nuclear attack and to communicate warnings to the Russian side about the consequences of such a strike.

“We conducted a number of quiet conversations with core allies to go through our thinking,” the first senior administration official told me. “That’s a hallmark of our entire approach— that we are better and stronger doing this stuff when we’re totally aligned with our allies.”

India and China​

In addition, the US sought to enlist the help of non-allies, in particular China and India, to discourage Russia from such an attack.

“One of the things we did was not only message them directly, but strongly urge, press, encourage other countries, to whom they might be more attentive, to do the same thing,” the second senior administration official told me.

US officials say that outreach and public statements from Chinese leader Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi helped avert a crisis.

“I think we believe showing the international community the concern about this, particularly the concern from key countries for Russia and the Global South, was also a helpful, persuasive factor and showed them what the cost of all this could be,” the first senior administration official said.

“I think the fact that we know China weighed in, India weighed in, others weighed in, may have had some effect on their thinking,” the second senior administration official told me. “I can’t demonstrate this positively, but I think that’s our assessment.”

In the time since the nuclear scare of late 2022, I have asked US and European officials if they have identified any similar threats. The danger diminished as the war entered a period of relative stalemate in the east. However, the US and its allies remain vigilant.

“We have been less concerned about the imminent prospect since that period, but it’s not something that is ever far from our minds,” a senior US official told me. “We continue to refine plans, and … it’s not beyond the realm of possibility that we could be confronting at least the rising risk of this again in the months ahead.”


Up next​


US has new intelligence on Russian nuclear capabilities in space
5 minute read

Russia used an advanced hypersonic missile for the first time in recent strike, Ukraine claims
4 minute read

Russia can sustain war effort ‘for another two or three years,’ say analysts
4 minute read
 

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Russian Weatherman Says Conditions 'Ideal' for Nuclear Strike on NATO​

Published Mar 09, 2024 at 12:17 PM EST Updated Mar 09, 2024 at 5:24 PM EST
By Rachel Dobkin
Weekend Reporter

Russian weatherman Evgeny Tishkovets recently told TV host and Kremlin-back propogandist Vladimir Solovyov that conditions are "ideal" for a nuclear strike on member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

It's been a little over two years since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. As NATO countries back the Eastern European nation, which is yet to be a member of the military organization, there has been growing concern that Russia may expand its war.

During Russian President Vladimir Putin's annual state of the nation address in late February, he warned that Ukraine's allies risk starting a nuclear war if they deepen their involvement in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict.

"They must realize that we also have weapons that can hit targets on their territory," the Russian leader said. "What they are now suggesting and scaring the world with—all that raises the real threat of a nuclear conflict that will mean the destruction of our civilization."

Journalist Julia Davis, creator of the Russian Media Monitor watchdog group, posted a clip of Solovyov talking with Tishkovets on his show about Moscow attacking NATO members on X, formerly Twitter, on Friday.

"Most importantly you should clearly say how our missiles can precisely strike NATO targets and that the weather won't get in their way. Despite the challenging meteorological conditions, the missiles reached their targets, the Avangard struck. Paris is on fire!" Solovyov said, according to a translation by Russian Media Monitor.

"Today, the weather is ideal for conducting nuclear strikes against NATO countries," Tishkovets said. "The air currents are directed in non-traditional ways, not from the west to the east, but the east to the west. The radioactive clouds with travel towards those countries that are sending arms and mercenaries to fight against our army."

He added: "The death of our guys shouldn't be the price of victory. We should move up to a higher level of escalation."

Newsweek reached out to the Russian government via online form and NATO press office via email for comment.

READ MORE
Solovyov previously suggested launching nuclear strikes on NATO countries.

Andrey Sidorov, deputy dean of world politics at the Moscow State University, told Solovyov on his show that the issue is "not whether or not to use nuclear weapons." He said: "The issue is against whom to use them. You often talk about France or Great Britain."

Solovyov responded: "That's right, France, Germany, Poland, Great Britain."

As Ukrainian forces continue to fight against the Russian military, support for the war-torn nation from the United States, one of Ukraine's largest backers, is dwindling. A $95 billion foreign aid package, which includes $61 billion for Ukraine passed in the Senate, but has stalled in the House of Representatives as Speaker Mike Johnson, a Louisiana Republican who is opposed to additional Ukrainian aid, has yet to put the bill on the floor.

Meanwhile, President Joe Biden, who has remained an ally to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, urged the House to "immediately" take up the aid package.

"I call on the speaker to let the full House speak its mind and not allow a minority of the most extreme voices in the House to block this bill even from being voted on," Biden said during a White House speech in February.
 

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3/9/24 NATIONAL SECURITY AND KOREAN NEWS AND COMMENTARY​

  1. Blog
Sat, 03/09/2024 - 12:43pm

Access National Security News HERE.
Access Korean News HERE.
National Security News Content:
1. U.S. Spy Agencies Know Your Secrets. They Bought Them.
2. US Army Special Forces To Be Deployed on Taiwanese Island Six Miles From Mainland China
3. Special ops expected to play key role in shaping future battlespaces in 'non-physical domains'
4. TikTok told users to contact their representatives. Lawmakers say what happened next shows why an ownership restructure is necessary.
5. The Vicious Cycle Driving Gaza’s North to Famine
6. Shield, sword, or symbol: Analyzing Xi Jinping’s “strategic deterrence”
7. Analysis: For women in Asia, motherhood is a complicated investment
8. ‘Useful expert' from US invents Pentagon's plan to evacuate Zelensky to Lviv
9. How the U.S. military will use a floating pier to deliver Gaza aid
10. China-Taiwan Weekly Update, March 7, 2024
11. What the war in Ukraine means for Asia
12. The Taliban once smashed TVs. Now it fosters YouTubers to promote its image.
13. China steps up grey-zone warfare to exhaust Taiwan, defence report says
14. Plan to Deliver Aid by Sea Faces Big Hurdles
15. We’re Slowly Learning About China’s Extensive Hacking Network
16. Fort Liberty Special Warfare Center and School to get new commander
Korean News Content:
1. N. Korean state media provides clues to actual conditions inside the country
2.N. Korea disrupts S. Korea-US drills with 3-day GPS jamming
3. north Korea: ‘I want to be myself, not someone’s mom.’
4. In response to U.S. and China claims of ‘increasing tensions’, “‘Shield of Freedom’ is defensive training”
5. North Korea responds to South Korea-U.S. war games with ‘silly’ firepower display
6. Ministry to Create New Unification Initiative, Increase Support for Defectors
7. N. Korean teenage thieves skip school to rob elderly vendors
8. What the war in Ukraine means for Asia
9. Balancing deterrence and restraint (Korea)
10. H.Res.1056 - Recognizing the importance of trilateral cooperation among the United States, Japan, and South Korea.
11. NK border sealing with China worsens human rights situation: report
12. Society That Respects Women: DPRK
13. On International Women's Day, the U.S. State Department says, “We will defend the rights of North Korean women.”
14. Yes, China Could Invade North Korea
15. 'Get out Yankee': A South Korean village's fight against the US military
16. Interview: Joy Sakurai says we need more women in the boardroom to foster gender equality
 

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Senior WA Liberal calls for Australia to become nuclear weapons power​

By Hamish Hastie

March 11, 2024 — 2.00am

A two-time WA Liberal candidate and party office bearer says Australia should have nuclear weapons.

Jim Seth made the argument at a Liberal Party state council meeting this month, saying nuclear weapons had made North Korea untouchable and suggested Australia should follow suit.

At the party’s March 2 meeting, details of which were leaked to WAtoday, Seth asked the question-and-answer panel:

“North Korea, a small country, has got nuclear fire, right? Nobody can do a mimicry [sic] on them, no neighbour can touch them, why we as first world country not nuclear react?”

Seth, who was a WA Liberals candidate for Bassendean in 2017 and for Morley in 2021 and is now the marketing committee chair and state executive member, furthered his point in a follow-up question about the Australian Navy’s capabilities to counter drone attacks.

“It was bad look for us in the world when [we] only have eight ships and they cannot counter drone attacks,” he said.

“We talk about safety, when [are] we going to be [a] nuclear power?”

Seth claimed $90 million was being paid every day to Canberra public servants to create federal policies and suggested this money could be better spent on making Australia a nuclear power.

“We could have spent that money into making Australia a nuclear power, so nobody can come and do mimicry [sic] on us,” he said.

In her response to Seth, WA Senator Michaelia Cash segued smoothly to nuclear energy.

“Just on nuclear, isn’t it fascinating where the polling is going on nuclear energy in Australia?” she said.

WAtoday contacted Seth to clarify whether he was talking about nuclear energy or weapons, and he said “as a patriotic Australian” he believed Australia should have nuclear weapons.

He did not respond to follow-up requests for comment.

Australia has since 1970 been a signatory to the United Nations Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which binds the country to an agreement not to acquire nuclear weapons.

According to the Department of Foreign Trade and Affairs Australia has been one of the treaty’s strongest supporters and was a key player in ensuring the treaty was extended indefinitely in 1995.

Seth’s comments alarmed Nuclear Free WA co-convener Mia Pepper who said nuclear weapons would make Australia a target, not safer.

“Nuclear weapons have no strategic utility and would not enhance Australia’s defence or security,” she said.

“In a time of growing conflict and uncertainty, Australia should be proliferating peace and diplomacy, not fuelling nuclear tensions and threat.”

A Liberal party spokesman said party members were entitled to ask questions of parliamentarians during State Council meetings and to express their own views on policy matters during meetings.

“The discussion referred to was not part of a formal debate within the Party to determine a policy position,” he said.
 

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RAF needs nuclear weapons as backup to Trident, expert says​

Recent test failure from a Royal Navy submarine highlights the risk of operating only one nuclear delivery mechanism

Dominic Nicholls, ASSOCIATE EDITOR (DEFENCE)10 March 2024 • 5:58pm


The RAF should be given nuclear weapons to guard against the failure of the Royal Navy’s Trident, an expert has said, amid calls by ministers for more investment in defence...........
 

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  • AMERICAN NEWS
  • Mar 10, 2024

One dead after Mexican cartel opens fire on illegal immigrants taking Uber across US border without their permission​

The altercation was likely due to the illegal immigrants attempting to cross the border without cartel permission.

Members of a Mexican cartel opened fire on illegal immigrants who were utilizing Uber rides to cross the into the US across southern border unlawfully, according to a report by the New York Post.

The incident occurred in Caborca, an area heavily under the control of Mexican cartels. The victims, all from Ecuador, were traveling in three separate Uber vehicles when they came under attack from the cartel. Tragically, one woman lost her life in the shooting, while four others sustained injuries.

According to an internal Border patrol memo leaked to the Post, Transnational Criminal Organizations are targeting migrants attempting to enter the US illegally. In the past several weeks there have been multiple deadly attacks on vehicles carrying individuals to the US/Mexico Border.

John Modlin, Chief of Border Patrol’s Tucson sector in Arizona, emphasized the grim reality faced by individuals attempting to cross the border in such areas, stating that they must seek the cartel's permission or risk severe consequences.

“No one does without. We have experienced when people try to, and we’ve seen them beaten for trying to cross without paying the fees,” Modlin said before the House Homeland Security Committee last July.

Cochise County Sheriff Mark Dannels echoed Modlin's sentiments, explaining to the Post the control that cartels hold over border crossings in this area.

“I see the intel reports, I’ve seen the control they have on people coming across the border, the fear they dominate with and it’s just reality," Dannels told the Post.


This news comes at a time when illegal border crossings have reached an all-time high under President Biden's leadership. Last December, UC Customs and Border Protection tallied over 80,000 arrests near Tucson, Arizona alone.

Republican officials have continued to blame Biden for being ineffective in combatting cartel violence near the southern border. Last month, Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton accused Biden of being in "partnership" with the Mexican cartels.

"Joe Biden is clearly in partnership, without saying it, without having a written contract, with the cartels… He has told them openly, bring as many people here as possible as fast as you can. You don’t have to hide from us anymore," Paxton said at CPAC 2024.
 

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The Debrief: Surprise MIRV Test Points India’s Nuclear Program In New Direction​

March 11, 2024

India said on March 11 that it has joined the exclusive club of nations with a successfully tested Multiple Independently Targetable Re-Entry Vehicle (MIRV) capability in its nuclear arsenal. The Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) completed Mission Divyastra, which launched an Agni...
 

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News|Nuclear Energy

India conducts first flight of missile that can carry multiple warheads​

Delhi has been developing its missile systems for years now, especially as its competition with China grows.

11 Mar 2024


India has completed the first flight test of a home-grown missile with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV) technology, India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi has said.

It is the latest development in India’s nuclear-capable Agni missile series, named after the Sanskrit word for “fire”, and part of a project launched in 1983.

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The technology delivers multiple warheads to different targets fired from the same missile on the Agni-V platform, which has a range of 5,000 km (3,100 miles), making it India’s sole contender for intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) long-range category.

Modi said on Monday that he was “proud” that the launch of “the first flight test of indigenously developed Agni-5 missile with Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) technology”, in comments on social media platform X.

Minister of Defence Rajnath Singh said on X that India had “joined the select group of nations” capable of the missile technology.

The United States, United Kingdom, France, China and Russia are among the countries that already use MIRV missiles, while Pakistan tested the technology in 2017, according to Washington-based non-profit advocacy group, the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation.

The Indian missile was developed by the country’s military research arm, the Defence Research and Development Organisation.

Delhi has been developing its medium and long-range missile systems since the 1990s, especially as its competition with China grows.

In 2021, India successfully tested Agni-V, a nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missile that is believed to be able to target nearly all of China. India is also capable of striking anywhere in neighbouring Pakistan, its archrival with which it has fought three wars since the two countries gained independence from British colonialists in 1947.

In recent years, India has deepened its defence cooperation with Western countries, including in the Quad alliance with the US, Japan and Australia.
 

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Agni-5 missile can now deliver multiple nuclear warheads, announces PM Modi​

ByRahul Singh, Rezaul H Laskar
Mar 11, 2024 08:56 PM IST

India successfully carried out the maiden flight test of the locally developed Agni-5 missile with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle technology​

Prime Minister Narendra Modi on Monday announced that India successfully carried out the maiden flight test of the locally developed Agni-5 missile with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) technology, with the new capability allowing the weapon system to deliver multiple nuclear warheads against different targets spreads across hundreds of kilometres, and further strengthening the country’s strategic deterrence capability.

The PM also revealed the codename for the historic test, Mission Divyastra (divine weapon), which has propelled India into an exclusive league of countries that have the capability to deploy MIRV missile systems, including the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia and China.

Hindustan Times - your fastest source for breaking news! Read now.
“Proud of our DRDO (Defence Research and Development Organisation) scientists for Mission Divyastra, the first flight test of indigenously developed Agni-5 missile with Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) technology,” the PM wrote on X.

“Various telemetry and radar stations tracked and monitored multiple re-entry vehicles. The mission accomplished the designed parameters,” the defence ministry said in a statement, calling it a complex mission. The test was carried out from Dr APJ Abdul Kalam Island off the Odisha coast.

The first indication of the country’s intention to carry out a long-range missile test came last week when it issued a notice for a no-fly zone over the Bay of Bengal and a stretch of the eastern Indian Ocean region.

China may have been tracking the missile test after India issued the no-fly zone notification, Hindustan Times has learnt.

The Agni-5 missile, which uses a three-stage solid fuelled engine, has a range of more than 5,000 km. MIRVs can cause more destruction than traditional missiles that carry a single warhead. The other variants of the Agni missiles developed by DRDO include the 700-km range Agni-1, the 2,000-km Agni-2, the 3,000-km Agni-3, and 4,000-km range Agni-4.

The Agni-5 MIRV system is equipped with indigenous avionics systems and high accuracy sensor packages, which ensured that the reentry vehicles reached the target points within the desired accuracy, officials aware of the matter said, asking not to be named.

“The capability demonstrates India’s growing technological prowess,” said one of the officials cited above.

“We are often critical of DRDO, but one area where they have shown great progress is in missile technology. We are also seeing China modernising and increasing nuclear warheads in its arsenal. For continued strategic deterrence, we must ensure we do not fall behind,” said strategic affairs expert Lieutenant General DS Hooda (retd).

The project was steered by a woman scientist of DRDO, and it involved other women scientists too, said a second official, linking the maiden test to the country’s growing Nari Shakti (woman power). To be sure, DRDO’s women scientists have been associated with several critical missile tests.

Defence minister Rajnath Singh also took to X to highlight India’s new capability.

“India today successfully tested Mission Divyastra - the first flight test of indigenously developed Agni-5 missile with Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) technology and joined the select group of nations who have MIRV. Congratulations to our @DRDO_India scientists and the entire team for this exceptional success. India is proud of them!”

There was no official word on how many warheads the MIRV version of Agni-5 can carry, though military scientists tracking the project pegged the number at four to five.

India’s nuclear doctrine, promulgated in 2003, commits to a ‘no first use’ posture, with weapons to be used only in retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian territory or Indian forces. In a stand that reflects the capabilities India has built over the years, the doctrine states nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage.

Retaliatory attacks can only be authorised by the civilian political leadership through the Nuclear Command Authority consisting of a political council and executive council. The Prime Minister chairs the political council, while the national security advisor chairs the executive council.

The country can carry out nuclear strikes with fighter planes, land-launched missiles and from the sea. India completed its nuclear trial in 2018 when the indigenous nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine, INS Arihant, successfully completed its first deterrence patrol.

The latest test came at a time when two so-called Chinese research and survey vessels are operating in the waters around India, including the Xiang Yang Hong 01 that is in the Bay of Bengal, somewhere between the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and Sri Lanka. The ship was likely monitoring the Indian test, people aware of the matter said.

The other Chinese vessel, Xiang Yang Hong 03, is a 4,500-tonne ship that docked in the Maldives in February, ostensibly for replenishment and rotation of personnel.

The Xiang Yang Hong 03 went to the Maldives after it was unable to dock in Sri Lanka, which in January declared a 12-month moratorium on allowing foreign vessels to carry out research in the country’s territorial waters. The moratorium was largely the result of pressure on Sri Lanka from India and the US not to allow Chinese spy vessels and warships to dock at Colombo or Chinese-controlled Hambantota port.

The Xiang Yang Hong 03 is now conducting research in waters of the Indian Ocean located between Sri Lanka and the Maldives. There was no word from Indian officials on the development. But people familiar with the matter said on condition of anonymity that the Indian side carefully monitors all developments that affect the country’s security and economic interests and will take all measures to safeguard these interests.

Chinese officials have contended that the vessels are conducting legitimate research and berthing in other countries for replenishment. However, the people cited above said the equipment on these vessels, including powerful sonar systems and sensors, allow them to gather up invaluable data for both submarine and anti-submarine operations.

During hydrographic and hydrological surveys, these vessels can collect data on matters such as ocean temperatures and the seabed that can be used for submarine operations. Their presence in waters around India at a time when the country was planning the missile test suggests they were monitoring and tracking the launch, the people said.

Damien Symon, a geo-intelligence researcher at The Intel Lab, said: “The Indian Ocean’s growing geopolitical significance has, over the years, drawn attention from China, which is evident through its increase in maritime research in the region.”

“Oceanographic research, under the guise of scientific and commercial endeavours, assumes a pivotal role in bolstering the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy’s capabilities with essential data that can enhance submarine warfare tactics as the navigation of submarines rests heavily on the knowledge of complex undersea conditions. Operating in waters around India, these Chinese vessels could also gather insights on possible subsurface routes exploited by the Indian Navy, presenting a challenge to Indian submarines in the region, threatening their covert operational abilities,” he said.

The current operations of the two Chinese vessels follow the docking of the Yuan Wang 5, a vessel used by China to track satellites and ballistic missiles, at Hambantota port in 2022, and the docking of the PLA Navy’s Hai Yang 24 Hao, known to have surveillance capabilities, at Colombo port last year. India and the US had protested to Sri Lanka against the activities of these Chinese vessels.

It is understood that India and the US also worked with other members of the Quad, which also includes Australia and Japan, to take up this issue with Sri Lanka, leading to the moratorium on visits by foreign vessels earlier this year.

THE MIRV PUNCH

The Agni-5 missile, which uses a three-stage solid fuelled engine, has a range of more than 5,000 km

MIRVs can cause more destruction than traditional missiles that carry a single warhead

The new capability will allow the Agni-5 missile system to deliver multiple nuclear warheads against different targets spread across hundreds of kilometres

India completed its nuclear trial in 2018 when the nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine, INS Arihant, completed its first deterrence patrol

India’s nuclear doctrine, promulgated in 2003, commits to a ‘no first use’ posture, with weapons to be used only in retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian territory or Indian forces.

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ASIA DEFENSE | SECURITY | SOUTH ASIA

Strategic Shifts: India’s MIRV Milestone and Nuclear Policy Dynamics​

Exploring the technical aspects and strategic implications of India’s MIRV breakthrough – and the impact on nuclear doctrine.

By Rahul Wankhede
March 14, 2024

In a pivotal moment for India’s national security landscape, recent developments in the country’s missile program signaled a significant leap in technological prowess. The successful testing of Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) technology on the Agni-V ballistic missile has not only bolstered India’s strategic capabilities but also raised questions about the potential impact on its nuclear doctrine.

This article delves into the different dimensions of India’s MIRV advancements, exploring the technical aspects, strategic implications, and the interplay with India’s established nuclear doctrine.

Recent Developments in India’s Missile Program

India recently conducted a successful test of MIRV technology, using the Agni-V ballistic missile. While the Agni-V intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) was chosen as the test platform for this technology due to its long range (over 5,000 kilometers), in the future MIRVs can be installed on India’s other ballistic missiles as well. Eligible candidates include the surface-launched Agni missile series and the submarine-launched K15 Sagarika and K4 missiles.

As per a former Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) scientist, the MIRV tested by India can carry three to four warheads inside the nose-cone of the missile. While the MIRV test would have been carried out with dummy warheads, India is now in a position to store and/or deploy ICBMs with multiple actual warheads.

Generally, any missile carries only a single warhead. MIRV technology enables a single missile to carry and launch multiple warheads over the target area. These multiple warheads can attack either a single target location or multiple target locations. This, in turn, reduces the number of missiles and launch facilities required for a given destruction level. With single-warhead missiles, one missile must be launched for each target. By contrast, with a MIRV warhead, a single ICBM can disperse multiple warheads on the target area.

The trade-off here is between weight and numbers – more warheads mean each individual warhead will have reduced weight. The smaller power of the warheads will have to be offset by increasing the accuracy of the system. Improved designs allow smaller warheads to achieve a given yield, while better electronics and guidance systems allow greater accuracy.

ICBMs carrying these warheads travel at hypersonic speeds and can potentially dodge ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems that are deployed to counter incoming enemy missiles. A MIRV-equipped missile can also be used to deploy fake or dummy warheads to distract the enemy’s BMD systems. Thus, due to high velocity, low probability of detection and less time window to react, ballistic missiles, especially those equipped with MIRVs, are a very potent platform.

The technology being quite complicated and costly, only few nations have been able to make it on their own. This elite group includes: the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, and now India. Israel is suspected to possess or be in the process of developing MIRVs.

This capability boost is significant for two reasons. First, India has developed these technologies indigenously, joining an exclusive club. Second, MIRV technology will have implications for India’s nuclear doctrine and the regional balance of power.

India’s Nuclear Doctrine and MIRV Advancement

India’s nuclear doctrine clearly states that:

  1. India will maintain a credible minimum deterrent.
  2. It will use nuclear weapons only in response to a nuclear first strike on Indian territory or Indian forces anywhere, and this retaliation will be massive; applicable in case of a biological or chemical attack.
Let’s analyze the recent development of MIRV technology in the context of this doctrine.

MIRV capabilities enhance the efficiency of a nuclear arsenal, since it allows the attacker to overwhelm any conceivable BMD system without increasing the size of the attacker’s own missile fleet. India’s successful test potentially strengthens India’s deterrent posture, and thus changes the strategic balance.

Previously, any increase in missile fleet by the enemy could be countered by a similar increase in BMD interceptors. With MIRVs, to counter a single incoming enemy missile, multiple interceptors would have to be built, meaning that it is much less expensive to increase offensive versus defensive capability. Thus the cost-exchange ratio is so heavily biased toward the attacker that the concept of mutually assured destruction would now have to be re-factored in India’s strategic planning.

While India maintains a NFU policy, MIRV technology introduces a nuanced dimension. The ability to deploy multiple warheads may provide more flexibility in responding to a nuclear attack, thus increasing the retaliatory nature of India’s nuclear strategy. Likewise, an adversary would have to rethink its decision of using a chemical and/or biological weapon to attack Indian forces and/or territory.

Also, the breakthrough creates space for revisiting India’s nuclear doctrine and the very existence of the NFU policy. Previously on some occasions, Indian politicians have made statements regarding the same – at that time, however, the capability to support the rhetoric did not exist. Now it’s a reality. From a deterrence perspective, MIRVs can thus increase the urge of a nuclear first strike – a country may opt to attack its adversary by MIRVs equipped with nuclear warheads and obliterate the enemy totally.

India’s current nuclear doctrine emphasizes massive retaliation in response to a nuclear first strike. MIRV technology aligns with this objective. If MIRVs strike a single location or area, complete destruction of the target is guaranteed. If it rains down on multiple targets at the same time or at different times, it can have a cascading effect on the enemy’s counter-attack capabilities. Moreover, MIRVs increase the threats to counter-force as well as counter-value targeting.

India possessing the MIRV technology has certainly raised the bar, and Pakistan and China would now be compelled to improve their ballistic missile defenses. China is known to have MIRVs as well as a good BMD program. Pakistan has also claimed to possess MIRV technology; however, whether Pakistan has a well-developed BMD program is not yet known well in the public domain.

Installing MIRVs on Indian ballistic missiles will also require more nuclear warheads to be produced. Since jet aircrafts cannot carry a ballistic missile, naturally these would be installed either on surface-launched or submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Open source data says that Pakistan and China have more nuclear warheads than India. Thus, India will have to develop more warheads to realize the full potential of the MIRV tech it has developed.

On the flip side, in an actual war scenario, finding out and eliminating Indian missiles equipped with MIRVs would be a high priority task for India’s enemies.

Command and Control Issues

The civilian political leadership, through the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA), retains exclusive authorization for nuclear weapon use. The successful MIRV test may prompt a reassessment of the NCA’s decision-making processes and the role of technological advancements in shaping those decisions. The fact that the prime minister himself chose to inform the nation about this test highlights its significance for the national strategic community.

But this test has once again brought to fore a point previously highlighted by some scholars regarding the command and control of India’s nuclear assets: How will the command chain be impacted when India has fully deployed submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs)? SLBMs cannot be put inside the submarine in a de-mated form; they will be there always in a ready-to-fire posture.

In a worst case scenario, would the government delegate some authority to the submarine crew to make their own decisions, or would they stick to the officially stated doctrine? How would the command and control chain function when a single missile inside the submarine will have multiple nuclear warheads?

That is something the Indian leadership now needs to think about. This new development will have to be factored into any future amendment that happens in the Indian nuclear doctrine, whether publicly announced, or otherwise.

Conclusion

In conclusion, India’s successful testing of MIRV technology not only signifies a remarkable technological feat but also introduces complexities that demand careful consideration within the context of its existing nuclear doctrine. The integration of MIRV capabilities into India’s missile program enhances its strategic flexibility, providing new dimensions to its deterrent posture.

While affirming its commitment to global disarmament, India must navigate the delicate balance between technological advancements, regional power dynamics, and international perceptions. As the nation stands at the forefront of MIRV-capable nations, the road ahead calls for strategic foresight, diplomatic acumen, and a steadfast commitment to maintaining a stable and secure global order.
 

Housecarl

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ASIA DEFENSE | SECURITY | SOUTH ASIA

Maiden Test for India’s Agni-5 MIRV Missile​

MIRV capability is a complex technology and India’s test this week puts India among a small group of countries – the U.S., U.K., Russia, France, and China — that have developed it.
Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan


By Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan
March 15, 2024

On March 11, the Indian Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) undertook the maiden test of its indigenously developed Agni-V MIRV (Multiple Independently Targetable Re-Entry Vehicle) missile.

According to a Ministry of Defense press release, the flight test, named Mission Divyastra, was launched from a missile launch site on Abdul Kalam Island off the coast of Odisha in the eastern part of India. The launch was tracked and monitored by different telemetry and radar stations, and it was concluded that the mission “accomplished the designed parameters.” Prime Minister Narendra Modi and other senior leaders including Defense Minister Rajnath Singh congratulated the DRDO scientists on the successful undertaking of the MIRV missile launch.

MIRV capability is a complex technology and India’s test this week puts India among a small group of countries – the United States, United Kingdom, Russia, France, and China – that have developed it. With MIRV technology a single intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) can carry and deliver multiple warheads at different locations several hundred kilometers apart. The Agni-V, which currently has an officially claimed range of 5,000 km technically qualifies only as an intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM), and not an ICBM because ICBMs are missiles with ranges over 5,500 km. But the official claim of 5,000 km probably understates the range of the missile, with many reports claiming it is a true ICBM with an 8,000 km range.

Most analysts suggest that the MIRVed Agni-V will be able to carry four to six warheads, although Air Marshal Anil Chopra stated in an article that Agni-V can carry 10-12 warheads. Another Indian media story quoted Dr. Avinash Chander, former head of the DRDO and a key person behind the Agni missile program, as having said in 2007 that the next variant of the Agni missile “would be a multiple warhead missile with a capacity to carry four to 12 warheads.” MIRVed missiles can also carry decoys, making identification of actual warheads a lot more challenging for the adversary and reducing the effectiveness of missile defense systems.

MIRV capability is generally considered to enhance India’s nuclear deterrence capability. But experts argue that it will involve “several additional tests to complete the development of an operational MIRV capability for the Agni-V.”

Prior to the launch, as per India’s commitments under the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC), India had to inform countries such as Australia and Indonesia as well as air and maritime traffic in the test area about the impending test. A media report also noted that there were Indian Navy warships with DRDO scientists as well as tracking and monitoring systems that were deployed in the southern Indian Ocean, which was the impact point of the missile test.

The Agni-V missile has gone through various tests since 2012. In December 2022, the Indian Strategic Forces Command undertook the first night trial of the Agni-V. Following the test, defense officials spoke to India Today TV and claimed that the DRDO has done significant weight reduction on the Agni-V missile so that it can strike targets beyond 7,000 km. Defense officials reportedly claimed, “The weight reduction that has been achieved in the missile system is beyond 20 percent and if the government wants, the nuclear-capable strategic missile can go beyond 7,000 km.” Reportedly, the weight of the missile can be reduced by replacing its steel content with composite materials. Similar weight modifications were done earlier on Agni-III missiles with the same goal of extending the range of the strategic missiles.

Ajai Shukla, an Indian military analyst wrote that the Agni-V missile could be made a lot lighter by “replacing older, heavier sub-systems with lighter, more reliable ones, including components made with lightweight composite materials.” Also, the “replacement of hydraulic actuators in the Agni-V’s giant first stage with the state-of-the-art, electro-mechanical actuators that already equip Stage 2 and Stage 3” are useful in reducing the weight of the missile, which can then enhance its range. He argued that in addition to the benefit of weight reduction, shifting from hydraulic to electro-mechanical actuators is helpful in addressing possible problems such as oil storage and leakage. Finally, electro-mechanical actuators are considered “more reliable and easy to maintain.”

But, of course, there are challenges associated with MIRV technology too. Miniaturization of nuclear warheads, developing advanced guidance and navigation control systems, and ensuring the reliability of individual re-entry vehicles are all issues in general with MIRVed missiles. An Indian media report quoting anonymous highly placed sources noted that the MIRV system has “indigenous avionics systems and high-precision sensor packages, ensuring the re-entry vehicles precisely hit their target points.”

It appears that MIRV capability is spreading, and more countries may be pursuing this technology. A Federation of American Scientists (FAS) report said that India’s pursuit is a follow up to China’s operationalization of MIRVs on some of its DF-5 ICBMs and possible development of MIRVs by Pakistan for its Ababeel medium-range missile. The report noted that North Korea may also be developing a MIRV capability.

As China expands and modernizes its nuclear wherewithal, India could feel compelled to keep pace with China, but that will also create a possible reaction in Pakistan. It could potentially lead to an expensive and spiraling arms race in South Asia. Moreover, China’s nuclear expansion and modernization could trigger responses in the East Asian neighborhood as well, resulting in a much wider arms buildup.

Therefore, a lot hinges on China’s strategic capability development and its behavior. Unfortunately, at least under Xi Jinping’s leadership, China has not demonstrated the kind of prudence and care that makes anyone confident that Beijing will make the right choices.
 

jward

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defense.gov


NORAD Commander: Incursions by Unmanned Aircraft Systems on Southern Border Likely Exceed​


By Matthew Olay​

There are likely more than 1,000 incursions by unmanned aircraft systems along the U.S.-Mexico border each month, said the U.S. Northern Command's top general during testimony today at a Senate Armed Services Committee posture hearing.

"I don't know the actual number — I don't think anybody does — but it's in the thousands," said Air Force Gen. Gregory M. Guillot in response to one senator's query.
When asked about the period of time that it takes to reach that number of incursions, Guillot responded, "I would say in probably over a month. We... probably have over 1,000 a month."
Though the exact number of UAS incursions along the border remains unknown, Guillot, who took over as commander of Northcom and the North American Aerospace Defense Command on Feb. 5, said he learned the approximate number recently while talking to officials with U.S. Customs and Border Protection and the Department of Justice.
"The number of incursions was something that was alarming to me as I took command last month," Guillot said.

When asked if such incursions present a defense threat to the homeland, Guillot said he hasn't seen any of the incursions "manifest in a threat to the level of national defense," but he said he does "see the potential only growing."
In recent years, members of Congress have shown a growing, bipartisan concern about dangerous UAS activity, including activity linked to drug and human traffickers who have used UAS technology to facilitate their illegal operations.
As a command being primarily tasked with continuously providing "worldwide detection, validation and warning of a ballistic missile attack on North America," NORAD is also charged with providing "continental detection, validation, warning and aerospace control" of airborne threats to North America, including unmanned aircraft systems, according to the NORAD website.

Committee members also asked Guillot if DOD has a system in place for base commanders to deal with UAS incursions over U.S. military installations.

"The services do have authorities, but work remains to be done to ensure that … we have standardized operating procedures to address those threats," he said.
Guillot added that he will recommend to the Defense Department, the joint force, and Congress ways NORAD and Northcom can play a role in standardizing procedures once he has completed the 90-day assessment of NORAD and Northcom, which he began last month.
Guillot assured the committee he was able to get a grasp of the size and scope of the UAS issue early on.
"Shortly after taking command and beginning my 90-day assessment, I realized that the challenge of the large increase in the number of incursions by UASs was something that was going to drive and change probably the direction of my first year in command because of that acute number."

Beyond conventional, human-operated unmanned aircraft systems, Guillot also addressed what lessons NORAD learned from the high-altitude, Chinese balloon incursion over North American airspace in early 2023.
Guillot said that NORAD has since adjusted the sensitivity of its radars. "And that has allowed us to have better domain awareness in that regime," he said.
Today's hearing took place as part of Congress' review of DOD's authorization request for fiscal year 2025.


NORAD Commander: Incursions by Unmanned Aircraft Systems on Southern Border Likely Exceed
 

jward

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defenseone.com
US should accelerate hypersonic defenses, NORTHCOM head says




The U.S. should act quickly on developing hypersonic defenses, to stay ahead of “the consistently growing capabilities of our adversaries,” the head of U.S. Northern Command and NORAD told lawmakers Thursday.

Gen. Gregory Guillot and other officials testified this week about the rapid pace of China and Russia’s work in highly maneuverable hypersonics, just days after the Pentagon submitted a budget request that would cut funding for one of the programs to defend against such missiles.

Guillot did not comment directly on the proposed cut, but he told Congress he supports moving the development of those defensive capabilities “as far left as possible”—i.e., speeding it up.

Earlier in the week, a broad group of missile defense officials outlined the speed of China and Russia’s hypersonic development to the House Armed Services Committee.

“China has demonstrated a high pace of flight testing for its hypersonic systems. This emphasis is enabling China to deploy weapons, including the DF-17 that has an estimated range of at least 1,600 kilometers, enabling it to reach U.S. military bases and fleet assets in the western Pacific. Since 2014, China has conducted several tests in pursuit of an intercontinental range hypersonic glide vehicle,” Jeff McCormick, a senior intelligence analyst at the National Air and Space Intelligence Center, told lawmakers.

A hypersonic glide vehicle is one of two types of highly maneuverable hypersonic missiles that rises to a high altitude and then uses gravity to go as fast as five times the speed of sound, but unlike a regular ballistic missile, it also uses advanced propulsion to achieve an unpredictable path to the target, making it very difficult to intercept.

The Missile Defense Agency is working on an interceptor for glide-phase hypersonic weapons, but the fiscal 2025 budget request released this week trims the program from $209 million in the FY 2024 request to $182 million. Sen. Deb Fischer, R-NE, said Thursday that the Missile Defense Agency has pushed delivery of an interceptor until 2035. But last year’s National Defense Authorization Act “requires the Missile Defense Agency to achieve an initial operational capability of that program by December 31, 2029,” she said.

Guillot is pleased with “some” of the efforts MDA is undertaking to adapt conventional missiles like the SM-6 to possibly intercept hypersonics, as well as efforts to deploy hypersonic missile-tracking satellites. But “my response is that I view hypersonics as perhaps the most destabilizing threat that we have out there, because of the fast speed and more than that, the maneuverability and the unpredictability on where it will impact as opposed to a ballistic missile, which is fairly predictable,” he said.

And that’s hardly the only missile threat NORTHCOM is facing. Guilliot said that while NORTHCOM had been making some key improvements in defenses against various types of more conventional missile threats, mostly by adjusting radar settings, “We’re right on the edge… we can’t pause at all. The adversaries are growing” their capabilities.
 

Housecarl

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When Iran Goes Nuclear​

The Islamic Republic will be even more aggressive toward Israel and improve its standing with Russia and China.

By Eric S. Edelman, Reuel Marc Gerecht and Ray Takeyh
Mar 12, 2024

Since the October 7 Hamas assault on Israel, Iran’s allied militias and proxies have launched missiles and drones at international shipping and U.S. troops. Hezbollah, the crown jewel in the Islamic Republic’s “ring of fire” around the Jewish state, has dueled with the Israeli Defense Forces, driving nearly 100,000 Israelis from their homes. The Biden administration has responded with two aircraft-carrier groups on patrol (one has now departed), missile barrages and bombing runs against Iranian proxies, and a lot of peripatetic diplomacy, including multiple trips by Secretary of State Antony Blinken and envoys Amos Hochstein, Brett McGurk, and CIA Director William Burns.* All this activity has obscured the fact that Tehran is moving deliberately toward nuclear breakout. Based on International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) documents, Reuters reported late last year that “Iran has enough uranium enriched to up to 60% purity, close to weapons-grade, for three atom bombs … and is still stonewalling the agency on key issues.” The clerical regime’s large stockpile of 20 percent uranium, which can quickly be spun up by advanced centrifuges, keeps increasing.

The Islamic Republic’s unconstrained progress toward nuclear-weapons capability and its continuing stonewalling of the IAEA raises the question of whether a nuclear-armed Iran would be more aggressive and prone to take risks that might ignite an escalatory spiral engulfing much of the Middle East. There is a theory that proliferation can ultimately lead to a relatively benign state of deterrence through fear of “mutual assured destruction.” The late Robert Jervis argued in his enormously influential book, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution, that “crises will be rare, neither side will be eager to press bargaining advantages to the limit, the status quo will be relatively easy to maintain, and political outcomes will not be closely related to either the nuclear or conventional balance” once states have accepted the notion of mutual vulnerability.

This happy ending to nuclear proliferation rests on the idea, first articulated during the Cold War by political scientist Joseph Nye, that “nuclear learning” goes on among policymakers. Nye argued in his seminal 1987 article “Nuclear learning and U.S.-Soviet security regimes” that the “initial beliefs and definitions of interest” of both U.S. and Soviet leaders were “altered as a result of new information and experience.” This process of learning contributed to “crisis stability” even if the impact on “arms race stability” was less easy to discern.

Scholars of nuclear proliferation have adopted and refined this idea to deal with emergent atomic powers suggesting that there is a good news-bad news story here. The good news: The Cold War suggests that nuclear learning happens. The bad news: Nuclear learning needs to take hold fast enough to foreclose the possibility of catastrophic escalation.

There are several reasons to wonder whether this self-soothing narrative will apply to the Islamic Republic. At the core, Western politicians and analysts have failed to appreciate the importance of ideology to successive generations of clerical leaders. The Islamists in charge do not wish to move on or abandon their patrimony for the sake of commerce. The clerical regime has seen its legitimacy collapse at home; it explicitly seeks it abroad by creating and supporting radical Islamic groups.

The saying goes that every revolution contains the seeds of its own destruction. After a spasm of overreach, the revolutionaries yield to the temptations of pragmatism. Like the French Revolution, all subsequent regimes have their Thermidorian Reaction. No nation can live on ideology alone, and the imperative of governance compels militants to soften their edges.

The Islamic Republic has, so far, defied this pattern. Internally, it is more oppressive today than in the 1990s, when so many thought Thermidor was underway. In its willingness to torture and kill young women, the clerical regime may be more wicked than it was in the 1980s when revolutionary zealotry and conspiracies radiating from the Iran-Iraq war were white hot.

Despite unending adversity (or perhaps because of it), the ruling clergy has remained loyal to the ideology of the founder of the revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who foresaw and ardently tried to abet the expansion of Islamic militancy beyond Iran’s borders. Both traditional and radical Islamic political thought recognizes no perimeter restricting God’s writ. Khomeini’s disciples, particularly his successor, Ali Khamenei, divide the globe into two competing entities: states whose priorities are defined by Western conventions and Iran, whose purpose is to serve as an Islamic lodestar and paladin.

Iran’s Islamist internationalism mandates a Western antagonist, a foil against which the Islamic Republic can define itself. Iran’s theocratic elite sees Western powers—especially the United States—as rapacious imperialists determined to exploit the Muslim world’s wealth for their own aggrandizement. But Iranian Islamism sees a Christian-turned-secular West as seeking to subjugate believers by imposing its culture in the name of modernity and “universal” values. Most offensively, the Jewish state has displaced Muslims from their land, and its extinction is a religious obligation. In this worldview, Arab monarchies and military-led republics are usually treasonous accomplices. Iranian Islamists want to emancipate the Middle East from all this Westernizing wickedness.

To do so, the Islamic Republic has constructed a multinational auxiliary force that it dubs the “Axis of Resistance.” This amalgam of militias has been remarkably successful, from helping to evict America from Iraq to sustaining the Assad regime in Syria, to Hamas’ daring attack on israel on October 7. If Hamas, a Sunni organization that blends militant Islamism and Palestinian nationalism, rises from the rubble, tying down a significant number of Israeli soldiers in Gaza for an indefinite period, Iran will reap benefits from its ally surviving.

Which brings up the question of what added advantage Iran might glean from a nuclear weapon. Best guess: The bomb would likely make the Islamic Republic even more aggressive toward Israel and improve the regime’s standing with Russia and China, granting Tehran perhaps more freedom of action in the Persian Gulf, especially against Saudi Arabia. For example, the Houthis in Yemen haven’t fired a missile at their northern neighbor since China brokered a deal restoring relations between Iran and the Saudis. An Iranian nuke would no doubt give Tehran more clout with its great-power patrons.

It’s hard to imagine a scenario, however, where Tehran would desire a nuclear exchange with Jerusalem. Israel has too many nuclear weapons (arms-control advocates often put it at 100, with at least another hundred possible) long-range missiles, and fighter-bombers that can successfully penetrate Iran’s airspace. Tehran has repeatedly avoided escalating directly against Israel even though Jerusalem has been killing, continuously, senior Revolutionary Guard commanders in Syria.

Khamenei has stayed his hand even though Iran likely has enough ballistic-missile capacity to do real damage to Tel Aviv, at least temporarily. He may fear that Israel’s conventional strength is just too punishing, especially to a nuclear program that may not yet be sufficiently protected against aerial bombardment. Plus, the supreme leader is old enough that discussions about his succession are finally getting serious. So it would be unsurprising if Khamenei would rather not test Israel now: Israel’s devastation of Gaza reinforces the perception that Jews can go biblical in their wrath.

Whether Tehran has ever pulled its punches, either directly or through its proxies because it feared Israel’s nukes, is unclear. The bomb might well change Iranian calculations, just as, on a smaller scale, Tehran’s ever-increasing ballistic missile capacity has. Iran’s “ring of fire” strategy grew out of its impressive accomplishments in developing a wide array of ever-improving missiles and drones. While the West largely ignored or just sanctioned (Barack Obama’s nuclear deal didn’t cover ballistic missiles) those efforts, Hezbollah’s huge stockpile of Iranian-supplied missilery has certainly affected Israeli policy on how to respond to the group’s provocations.

An Iranian nuke likely would make Tehran less fearful of Israeli escalation. The clerical regime could test the limits of what’s possible through longer-range missiles fired from Lebanon and Syria, provided Iran can get those missiles into the Levant and Washington removes its forces near the Iraqi border. Donald Trump wanted those forces removed; only disobedient, obfuscating underlings kept them in place. If Trump wins in November, the odds are good he won’t again let his subordinates deter him.

Yet it still seems unlikely that Tehran will seek a potentially catastrophic confrontation. Iranian Islamists haven’t been nihilists since the early Iran-Iraq war, when tens of thousands of death-wish believers sought to martyr themselves upon the battlefield. That searing experience left the Islamic revolution intact, even fortified. But the Islamic Republic’s ruling elite became more cautious and surreptitious about how to defeat its enemies.

Rather, a nuclear weapon is more likely to change Israeli and American calculations than it is to make Iran more aggressive. With an Iranian nuke aimed at Tel Aviv, Israeli leadership is bound to become more cautious. The low-intensity duel with Hezbollah, which would permanently depopulate the northern borderlands, could become acceptable since the likely alternative, a massive Israeli offensive, including ground troops penetrating deep into Lebanon, may become just too dicey given the possibility of Iranian nuclear escalation. As the former Iranian clerical major domo, Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, once half-joked, just one nuclear weapon on Tel Aviv could destroy the Jewish state. Israeli volition to strike Iran directly, which certainly appears already to have been checked by Tehran’s and Hezbollah’s missile stockpiles, would evaporate. A doctrine of mutually assured destruction works to the clerical regime’s advantage: Israel bleeds and the most Jerusalem will do in response is to martyr Iran’s Arab proxies.

Iranian nukes shouldn’t fundamentally affect American calculations given the U.S.’s overwhelming conventional and nuclear firepower. But the Iranian capacity to destroy Tel Aviv would. Under both Republicans and Democrats, Washington has for years been losing steam against the Iranian challenge. The increased use of sanctions under Trump and the assassination of Qassem Suleimani don’t really negate that trend given Trump’s constant rhetoric about “forever wars” and his unwillingness to intercede directly against Iran when it attacked shipping in the Persian Gulf and Saudi oil facilities.

To put it simply: The Middle East matters more to the Iranian theocracy than it does to Washington’s foreign policy set and the populists and progressives who are very close to transforming the foreign priorities of both parties. The clerical regime is willing to kill and die for the cause; we seem unwilling to kill in sufficient numbers to make deterrence credible. To have clout in the Middle East now, Washington needs to duel, to escalate whenever and wherever necessary for as long as necessary until its enemies are either defeated or deterred. If Tehran adds a nuke to this equation, it’s a certainty in Washington that the voices of retrenchment and caution will gain strength.

Non-proliferation was once a sacred, bipartisan religion in Washington. It’s crystal clear that creed no longer has much, if any, hard power behind it. However, our Middle Eastern enemies, who grew to adulthood on conspiracies revolving round American power, aren’t educationally inert. We shouldn’t be surprised when they show us what they’ve learned.

*Correction, March 12: This article initially misspelled Antony Blinken’s first name.

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Housecarl

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Shabaab retakes territory as the U.S. sanctions one of its money laundering networks

BY CALEB WEISS | March 13, 2024 | @Caleb_Weiss7

Shabaab, al-Qaeda’s branch in East Africa, is steadily undoing progress made by Somali security services in its nearly two year old counter-offensive against the group. Over the last few days, the group has recaptured several important areas in central Somalia that the federal government in Mogadishu previously touted as successes in the campaign to weaken the jihadist insurgency.

At the same time, the United States has both sanctioned a far-reaching money laundering network of the group and launched new airstrikes in Somalia. Even with the recent sanctions and military operations against Shabaab, the U.S. continues to estimate that Shabaab rakes in nearly $100 million a year while the drone strikes have done little to stymie the group’s advances against the Somali military.

Retaking Ground
Central Somalia, particularly the regions of Galguduud, Hiraan, and Mudug, have been at the forefront of the aforementioned counter-offensive against Shabaab since those operations were launched in mid-2022. The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) in Mogadishu has often touted the capture of Shabaab-held areas in those regions as signs of success in the counter-offensive.

Over the last several months, however, the offensive(s) in those regions have largely stalled and Shabaab has made a concerted effort to take advantage of the halted progress – particularly as seen with the devastating attack on a Somali military base in Oswein, Galguduud, in late Aug. 2023. Since then, Shabaab has exploited the weakness of the Somali military in the region to retake some of its previously lost territory.

In the last week, however, Shabaab has made its most dramatic gains yet. For instance, in Mudug, Shabaab recaptured Caad, Camara, and allegedly Bacadweyn, though the local police chief has disputed this latter claim. All three areas saw intense fighting between Shabaab, Somali troops, and Macawisely, or local clan militias allied with the Somali National Army (SNA).

The confirmed recapture of Caad and Camara also came after Shabaab launched large-scale attacks on those localities in Jan. 2024 and Dec. 2023, respectively. According to local media, the al-Qaeda branch was able to recapture the areas in recent days after Somali troops withdrew.

Further still in Mudug, Shabaab also reportedly recaptured Laasgacamey and Sirgo, while advancing on Xarardheere, one of the biggest locales retaken from Shabaab during the counter-offensive. And much like in Caad and Camara, SNA troops also reportedly withdrew from Laasgacamey and Sirgo before Shabaab’s recapture.

And though entirely unconfirmed (as of the time of publishing), there are claims of Masagaway, a town in Galguduud, also being recaptured by Shabaab. If true, this comes just a few months after Masagaway was captured by Somali forces.

The SNA prematurely withdrawing from strategic areas has been an issue for years and is a primary way Shabaab retakes territory. As the army advanced in central Somalia during the current counter-offensive, the SNA was theoretically meant to rely on the Macawisely for these holding operations.

Shabaab taking advantage of the slowed-to-stalled counter-offensive against it is something FDD’s Long War Journal has warned about for many months. For example, in July 2023, we noted the slowing of the offensive, and thus weakening the pressure against it, allowed Shabaab to conduct a series of attacks both in Mogadishu and against remaining African Union forces.

Much more recently in Sept. 2023, which was Somalia’s worst month on record for suicide bombings taking place within its territory, we noted this was only possible in part due to the counter-offensive stalling.

The more Somalia’s counter-offensive against Shabaab continues to be stalled the more likely it will be that Shabaab continues to find opportunities to further undo any progress made against it.

All of this is currently compounded by the African Union troops, which provide for a much needed security buffer in many areas, drawing down for a full withdrawal by the end of the year.

Sanctions and Drone Strikes
As Shabaab was making these advances, the United States sanctioned a geographically disparate money laundering network helping to finance the al-Qaeda branch. Two drone strikes, neither of which were located in central Somalia, were also reported by the U.S. Military’s Africa Command (AFRICOM).

On Monday, the U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned 16 entities and individuals, ranging from locations in Somalia, Kenya, Uganda, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Finland, and Cyprus, all operating as part of a cohesive network to help finance Shabaab.

Many of the entities and individuals are related to the Haleel Group and its subsidiaries, which operate in all the aforementioned countries by members of the Somali diaspora. Two additional businesses, Qemat Al Najah General Trading in the UAE, and Crown Bus Services in Kenya, were also sanctioned for their connections to the Haleel Group.

Treasury makes a specific note of this network’s activities inside Uganda, noting that all of the directors of Haleel Group’s Uganda branch are involved in this financing scheme.

Shabaab’s activities in Uganda, though receiving less attention than its activities in Kenya, remain steady. Though it does not conduct attacks inside Uganda like it does inside Kenya, the recent U.S. sanctions makes clear that Shabaab continues to find fertile ground at least for logistical support. In recent years, Shabaab’s recurring recruitment of Ugandans have also come to light.

Additionally, AFRICOM has noted that it has conducted at least two new drone strikes against Shabaab in southern Somalia. On March 2, it stated it killed two Shabaab members in a so-called “collective self-defense strike” not far from the southern city of Kismayo. And on March 10, it killed an additional three Shabaab fighters in a drone strike near Ugunji in the Lower Shabelle region.

This brings the total number of U.S. drone strikes in Somalia so far this year to six. Last year, AFRICOM conducted 18 drone strikes and one special operations raid inside Somalia. Since taking office in Jan. 2021, the Biden Administration has conducted a total of at least 43 drone strikes inside Somalia according to data kept by FDD’s Long War Journal.

However, drone strikes over the last year have done little to stop Shabaab from taking advantage of a counter-offensive on pause and weakened security as African Union troops continue to draw down.

Caleb Weiss is an editor of FDD's Long War Journal and a senior analyst at the Bridgeway Foundation, where he focuses on the spread of the Islamic State in Central Africa.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Posted for fair use......

Tue, 02/27/2024 - 8:41am
“Crippled At The Starting Gate”
America’s Achilles Heel In Future Conflict
By Martin Stanton
INTRODUCTION
I recently finished Kurt Schlicter’s excellent book THE ATTACK which is written as a retrospective on a massed October 7th style terrorist attack on the United States that occurs in the late summer of 2024. Schlicter’s book is a page turner, both easy to read and compelling. The premise of THE ATTACK is simple: Large numbers of terrorists’ infiltrate across our open southern border (past our distracted, improperly focused, and politically hamstrung law enforcement and intelligence agencies) amidst the current flood of illegal aliens. They assume hiding positions within the US and wait for the “GO” order. Their attacks happen over several days and cause mass casualties and crippling economic damage. THE ATTACK captures the savagery of Oct 7, 2023, and transfers it to an American setting on a far broader scale. Schlicter’s descriptions of the atrocities committed by the attackers are not for the faint of heart but are basically taken directly from both testimony of Israelis who survived the Hamas attack on October 7 and the captured Hamas footage of what happened to those who did not. The balance of the book is about the various reactions to the attack across America.
Schlicter makes no secret of his political leanings, but no one can deny the plausibility of his scenario. THE ATTACK is a well written and thought-provoking book. It certainly caused me to freshly consider my own community and how it would react to such an event. It also got me thinking about how vulnerable the US is; not just to non-state actor “terrorist” attacks, but to attacks by conventional and special operations forces of enemy nations in the event of hostilities with the US.
IT NOT WW2 ANYMORE – THE OCEANS NO LONGER PROTECT US
The United States has almost no living memory of an attack by the forces of an enemy nation on our mainland. The closest we have left are the few 90–100-year-olds, who can recall the handful of Japanese submarine gun attacks on the Pacific coast and the ferocious U-boat campaign off our Atlantic shores in early 1942. The last time we faced an enemy capable of stopping our maritime traffic and projecting power into the continental United States was in the war of 1812. None of our modern enemies in the 20th century had the capability to conventionally attack military targets on the US mainland in any meaningful way. America was too far and their ability to project power too limited.
In the 21st century this is no longer the case. We have long lived under the “Mutually Assured Destruction” (MAD) deterrent when it comes to nuclear threats to the US; but MAD has no counterpart in conventional war. There’s no “Cosmic Law” against conventionally attacking the continental United States. In almost every plausible major war scenario the US faces today WE will be bombing potential enemies on their respective mainland’s. It’s only reasonable to assume they will look at ways to respond (or to pre-empt). The combined impacts of vastly improved and expanded international transportation, massive amounts of commerce that defy comprehensive inspection, the miniaturization of weapons, emergent military drone technologies, cruise and ballistic missile proliferation and launch system diversification, unchecked mass migration and open borders makes the US vulnerable in ways we have not previously seen in our history. Our adversaries are starting to wake up to this.
AMERICA’S POWER LIES IN ITS ABILITY TO PROJECT ITS FORCES
Excluding its considerable arsenal of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, what makes America powerful is not only it’s highly trained conventional forces but its ability to project those forces rapidly (relatively speaking – more quickly than our adversaries) anywhere in the world. We maintain some forces in certain theaters (CENTCOM, EUCOM, PACOM) but even there, were war to break out these would have to be reinforced by considerable forces from the Continental United States (CONUS). All the ground forces will deploy from a relative handful of Ports Of Embarkation (Air and Sea -APOE and SPOE) on either coast. The air forces are more flexible but depend heavily on static air bases and the tanker fleet for quick strategic mobility. Naval forces too rely on a small number of large bases on each coast.
Putting my “Red Team” hat on, if you’re going to fight America, attacking our ability to project forces and sustainment is job # 1. This will especially be true in scenarios such as Taiwan or Korea where even a delay of a few days or weeks in America’s force flow can tip the scales in the outcome of a campaign.
A SMORGASBORD OF POSSIBILITIES FOR OUR ENEMIES
An enemy nation that wishes to attack our power projection capabilities and facilities in the continental US can avail themselves of an embarrassingly diverse set of options when it comes to striking us. We’re vulnerable to just about anything. To keep this essay small, I will focus merely on kinetic options and not include the dazzling array of cyber and information operations options available to our enemies. Here’s a few of the bigger ones.
  1. Direct Special Operations attack against key facilities/ assets:
Kurt Schlicter’s book THE ATTACK outlines in agonizing detail how our open borders and inadequate immigration and customs enforcement made the US vulnerable to a massed Oct 7th terrorist attack. This same open border and lack of immigration enforcement / accountability makes us extremely vulnerable to the infiltration of special operations teams from other countries. Unlike the terrorists described in Schlicter’s book they wouldn’t have to come in huge numbers. A high three digit or low four-digit number broken into smaller teams with specific assignments is all they’d really need. These special operations soldiers would join the millions of illegal aliens that have flooded across our border since early 2021 – perhaps they’re already here. They would live as individuals and keep a low profile but would assemble and arm at the appropriate signal (being careful to don the uniform of their country and mark their vehicles appropriately) and conduct attacks designated targets.
Those targets would be the primary APOEs and SPOEs in our deployment infrastructure as well as key assets such as airlift (C5’s and C-17s) Air refuelers (Tankers) and fast sealift ships. Platoon sized groups could easily defeat the gate guards at most installations in early morning attacks (likely through some Trojan horse subterfuge – I.E a mini-van weaving up to the gate at 2 AM with its music blasting like a drunk driver). If they can secure the gate and the barrier system without raising the alarm, other vehicles can be quickly called forward. Within a few minutes they’ll be destroying aircraft on the flightline or sabotaging key facilities before any additional security forces could likely react. Then, having accomplished their various missions, they could simply surrender. This is the big difference between enemy nation soldiers and terrorists. Except for those special operations teams with missions to assassinate key leaders or attack Command and Control (C2) facilities, the number of casualties they inflict is incidental to the mission. Unlike terrorists they’re not out to cause civilian mass casualties. They are instead uniformed soldiers who have used a valid ruse of war to attack legitimate military targets. They’re squeaky clean as legal combatants under the Geneva Convention and will be repatriated to their country at the end of hostilities. In the meantime, we’re down critical force projection assets that cannot be replaced during the conflict (KC-135s, C-17s, Key sealift ships) or have suffered debilitating damage to key installations.
  1. Drone Attacks
It gets even worse. With many targets – particularly key aircraft on a flightline-there isn’t even a need to penetrate the perimeter of an installation. As both the Ukraine war and the ongoing conflict with the Houthis in Yemen have shown us, drone technology is revolutionizing warfare. Look at any of the aircraft parked closely on the flight line at any AFB. A commercial drone carrying an incendiary device (like a thermite grenade) landing near the wing root would be sufficient to either outright destroy the aircraft or make it non mission capable (NMC) for an extended period. Middle of the night drone attacks at the outset of hostilities could cost us whole squadrons of critical aircraft.
Nor do drone attacks have to be short range commercial drones flown from relative proximity to their targets. The Houthis have shown the world that they can strike Israel, Saudi Arabia and the UAE from Yemen with drones. The Russians are using the same drones for long-range strikes in Ukraine. The Iranian model drones they use are low tech, easily assembled and pretty accurate. A dozen disassembled drones of this nature could easily fit in a shipping container. When you take the range fans of the Houthi drone strikes on Israel and superimpose them on the West Coast you find that pretty much every APOE and SPOE on the west coast is within range of the Sonoran Desert in Mexico. Smuggling shipping containers into Mexico is easily doable. Northern Mexico is effectively a Narco-state where Chinese money already wields significant influence. Many parts of it are sparsely populated and no one asks questions if they know what’s good for them. It’s one big launch basket.
  1. Cruise and Ballistic Missile attacks
US bases in the Pacific as far as Guam are within range of conventionally armed ballistic missiles launched from China and North Korea. The Chinese and North Koreans also possess submarines that can fire ballistic missiles that can attack Hawaii or CONUS. The sub launched ballistic missile threat is not huge because it would require retrofitting a primary nuclear deliver system for a conventional attack, but it is possible. Of course, they could always just shoot the nukes at us. But that makes it a different kind of war.

Continued......
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Continued......

The cruise missile threat, however, is huge. Unlike ballistic missiles, almost any seagoing vessel can be outfitted to launch cruise missiles. Cruise missiles launch cannisters can fit easily into modified shipping containers and it is not hard to envision a massive containership leaving a Chinese port with the entire top level of containers carrying cruise missiles in a new and devastating twist on the old WW2 Q-Ship/armed merchant cruiser theme. Cruise missiles can also be launched from modified commercial aircraft. At the outset of hostilities, a strike of several hundred cruise missiles on key US facilities could eliminate a good portion of our already too small Navy as well as have devastating consequences for our ability to project power. In terms of impact on our war effort the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 would pale in comparison. This threat will only get worse over time as cruise missile technology further extends range and increases accuracy. Intercontinental cruise missiles will likely become a thing.

  1. Naval Special Operations Threat
If the Ukraine war and the Houthis in Yemen have shown us anything in the past year its that you don’t need a Navy to project power in littoral warfare. Their successful use of drone attack boats is re-writing tactical doctrine for the Navy in real time. These attack drones are small, long-range, easily transported and pack a ship disabling wallop. Imagine dozens being launched from a mother ship (or a beach in Mexico) hundreds of miles from a US port or naval base. These drones have been successful against warships at sea defending themselves. Their probability of hitting the target during a surprise attack in port will be much higher. Add to this the old stand-by of block-ships (merchantmen deliberately scuttled to impede traffic in key channels) and naval special operators who have infiltrated the US attaching limpet mines to vessels in ports and it’s easy to conclude the threat to the maritime aspect of US power projection is as bad (or worse) than that enjoyed by the air components.
THE IMPACT OF SUCH AN ATTACK
An initiation of hostilities that began with attacks on US installations and organizations in CONUS using some or all, of the methods described here would have a major impact on a short duration campaign (less than 6 months) such as Taiwan and Korea and a significant one on a longer war. Every Tanker, C-17, C5 or maritime deployment platform destroyed or badly damaged would not be replaced during the duration of the conflict. This isn’t the 1940’s anymore, our Air Force transports, and sealift platforms aren’t as replaceable as C-47s and Liberty Ships. Neither are our Naval vessels, fighters, or bombers for that matter. Gone are the shipyards and factories that churned out the mass that gave us victory 80 years ago. In fact, an enemy envisioning a long war with the US (vice one to establish a quick “fait-accompli” on the ground) would probably attack our few key production facilities as well as our SPOEs, APOEs and existing deployment assets.
SO, WHAT CAN WE DO?
The only good news in this essay is that, as late as it is, we still have time to fix or mitigate quite a few of these vulnerabilities. It will take political will though and shifting priorities. Here are a few things we can be doing.
  1. Recognize that illegal immigration is a Strategic Threat to US security: No nation can long survive with a border situation such as the one that exists today in the US. Unfortunately, the failure of our political leadership has moved us past the point where this issue can be resolved easily. Fixing this is going to be ugly but its got to be done. The solution has two broad components:

    1. Illegal Immigration - Plug the leaks: Our nation needs to build a border wall with Mexico that looks like the one between Gaza and Egypt. It needs to man the border with soldiers until this is accomplished. Zero people come in through anything that is not an authorized point of entry. Next build something less draconian but just as effective on the Canadian border (less volume there). Adequately resource and staff border patrol customs and immigration officials. Make provisions to reinforce with federal Marshals and federal troops as required.
    2. Illegal immigration – Bail the boat: Deporting the millions of illegal aliens that have poured across our border since 2021 will be a massive undertaking, but it must be done. Declare a national state of emergency and suspend immigration law that pertains to asylum or allows illegal aliens to remain in-country. Task the military to set up deportation camps and control the logistics of deportation. Use federal law enforcement to roundup illegal aliens and prosecute anyone who employs them. Deny federal funding to states or municipalities who declare themselves “sanctuaries” and defund / prosecute NGO that facilitate illegal immigration. Lincoln suspended Habeas Corpus during the Civil War citing national emergency; such extreme measures are equally warranted here to combat the illegal alien invasion and the potential deadly threat they pose from both a terrorist and a conventional war perspective.

  1. Refocus the Intelligence Community and Federal Law Enforcement: The Intelligence Community and Federal law enforcement need to re-focus their internal security priorities towards terrorist and foreign agent infiltration amongst the millions of illegal aliens who have crossed our border. We have wasted too much time and too many assets chasing cos-play white supremacists and other politically correct bugbears while real threats pass unnoticed under our nose. We have no idea who has entered our country. We need to start getting a handle on it. Start with the immediate environs (30-mile radius) of priority bases and installations – working closely with military counterintelligence.
Similarly, we need to refocus intelligence collection on the areas immediately outside our borders and on the shipping lanes that come within strike proximity of our key bases and installations. In particular, we need to recognize that northern Mexico is essentially an ungoverned space where anyone with money and imagination can operate freely. This refocusing of collection priorities is going to mean hard choices at the national level in the dedication of ISR assets until more assets can be acquired.
It also means that there needs to be a quick clearing house for the cross leveling of information and reports and algorithms for data analysis so that no key report is lost in the volume. Much of the Homeland Security apparatus will have to be repurposed and many of its performative (but expensive) functions – such as TSA will have to be either discontinued or significantly downsized to pay for the necessary changes.
  1. Establish defenses at key SPOEs, APOEs and high value target installations: The massive coastal artillery forts of the Endicott Period of 1890-1920 (whose ruins still overlook key harbors in CONUS) and the Nike Hercules Batteries around major installations and population centers from the late 1950s to the early 1970s never fired a shot in anger. I doubt we will be so fortunate in the future. The US needs to establish defenses at our key installations in CONUS.

    1. What’s a key installation? This is a hard question because virtually everything in the US is vulnerable to the threats I’ve described. Currently we exist in a topsy turvy situation where the first things we should protect are installations and assets that have direct OPERATIONAL impact on the execution of an overseas campaign – APOEs, SPOEs, Air and Maritime mobility assets as well as major naval and air combatants that cannot be replaced. STRATEGIC ASSETS (production facilities, refineries, key internal transportation nodes...etc.) will have to be a secondary priority. If we can’t get the forces we have to theater without disruption, in most cases what we can produce for a long conflict won’t matter – because it won’t be a long conflict.

    1. Force structure and acquisition implications: The force structure of the Army in WW2 gives a hint as to the scope of the issue. While most popular histories dwell on the expanded number of maneuver divisions in the Army, what’s often neglected is the role the Army units played in defending key SPOEs in CONUS and bases along the Lines of Communication (LOCs) as well as Sea Ports Of Debarkation (SPODs) in theater. The unit and manpower intensive defense of Antwerp as an SPOD from German cruise missiles (V-1s) in the fall-winter of 1944/45 is a good example of how costly this kind of effort can be. The potential for attack against our CONUS Bases/SPOE/APOE, Theater Service Area, Communications Zone (COMZ),LOCs and SPODs is even greater now than it was in WW2 and in potential conflict against peer competitors / regional threats we won’t have the luxury of years to build the necessary force structure (the units that defended Antwerp in 1944 didn’t exist in 1942).
We will have to build a military now that can fulfill its role in defending our power projection from day-1 of any conflict. For the Army this means developing hybrid air defense units that can protect assets across the spectrum of air threat from small drones to ballistic missiles. For the Air Force it means increasing base security and developing hardened dispersal sites to avoid the close parked “Wheeler-Field-1941” syndrome so prevalent on many of today’s Air Force Bases. For the Naval forces and Coast Guard it means re-evaluating naval bases and SPOEs for updated Naval Special operations threats and acquiring/ configuring their defenses accordingly. This is going to be a big bill. It’s an uncomfortable thought to consider having to defend places like San Diego SPOE and Travis AFB in California or Hickam AFB in Hawaii from conventional enemy cruise/ballistic missile, drone, or UW attacks over three dimensions (land, sea and air), but that’s the world we live in now.
SUMMARY
Due to the decisions of our elected leadership America of 2024 is more vulnerable to outside conventional and unconventional attack than it has been in over 200 years. We’re also in a position where the possibility of conflict with nations who can conventionally and unconventionally attack us grows greater with each passing year. Our open borders, inattention to the illegal alien invasion and inability to monitor our own Western Hemisphere neighbors effectively could cost us hugely, both as open highway for terrorists to attack us and an open flank for enemy nations to exploit. We (the US) need to fix this, fast.

About the Author(s)​

Martin Stanton
Martin Stanton is a retired Army officer currently residing in Florida. The opinions expressed are his own and do not reflect any official DOD or USG position.
 
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