WAR Regional conflict brewing in the Mediterranean

H

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Posted for fair use.....
southfront.org

Turkey Is Still Deploying Syrian Mercenaries In Libya: Monitoring Group

Turkey is still transporting Syrian mercenaries back and forth from Libya, the London-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) reported...
southfront.org southfront.org

#LIBYA#MAPS 23.01.2021 - 418 views
5 (1 votes)


Turkey Is Still Deploying Syrian Mercenaries In Libya: Monitoring Group


Donate
Turkey is still transporting Syrian mercenaries back and forth from Libya, the London-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) reported on January 23.
More than 18,000 Syrian militants have been deployed by Turkey in Libya to support the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA) since late 2019. Thousands have so far returned to their country. However, many others are still deployed there.

“The returning group often consists of 100 to 250 mercenaries, and similar numbers are going to Libya,” the SOHR said in a report.
Click to expand...
According to the monitoring group, some Syrian mercenaries are fleeing Turkish bases in Libya. Others are attempting to reach Europe through Italy.

Turkey’s support and Syrian mercenaries allowed GNA forces to repel a large-scale attack by the Libyan National Army on Tripoli last year. GNA forces also secured a number of areas in the northwestern part of the country and around the capital.

The situation in Libya has been calm for almost a year now. The intra-Libyan talks are advancing. Yet, Turkey is not withdrawing its proxies from the country.
Turkey Is Still Deploying Syrian Mercenaries In Libya: Monitoring Group
Click to see full-size map
  • On January 22, Russian forces in Syria trained 50 Syrian fighters from Suwayda to send them to Libya, pro-GNA sources claim.
  • On January 22, Russian military contractors allegedly built 70 km trench extending from Sirte to Jufra, according to CNN reports.
  • On January 22, Libyan coast guard intercepted more than 80 Europe-bound migrants in the Mediterranean Sea.
  • As of January 23, all foreign fighters were set to leave Libya. Nonetheless, Turkish forces and their proxies remain in the country.
Turkey is using Syrian militants as a pawn to further its interests in Libya. Ankara is planning to stay in the war-torn country for the long term.
MORE ON THIS TOPIC:
 
H

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Posted for fair use.....
moderndiplomacy.eu

The Proxy War of Libya: Unravelling the Complexities

The African continent has been infamous for its desolate conditions and impoverished lifestyle for years. The violence has not spared the region either since the extremely unstable Middle-East has set the vendetta throughout the region, verging Africa in the east. Whether it comes to the...
moderndiplomacy.eu moderndiplomacy.eu

The Proxy War of Libya: Unravelling the Complexities

Published 5 hours ago on January 25, 2021
By Syed Zain Abbas Rizvi

The African continent has been infamous for its desolate conditions and impoverished lifestyle for years. The violence has not spared the region either since the extremely unstable Middle-East has set the vendetta throughout the region, verging Africa in the east. Whether it comes to the spreading influence of ISIS under the flag of Boko Haram; a terrorist organisation operating in Chad and North-eastern Nigeria, or the rampant corruption scandals and ream of military cops in Zimbabwe, the region rivals the instability of its eastern neighbour. However, one conflict stands out in Northern Africa, in terms of high-stake involvement of foreign powers and policies that have riven the country, not unlike Syria in the Middle-East. Libya is one instance in Africa that has faced the civil war for almost a decade yet involves not only local powers but is also a focal point that has caused the NATO powers to be at odds.

Libya, officially recognised as the ‘State of Libya’, is a war-torn country in the Northern periphery of the African continent. The country is bordered by the Mediterranean Sea in the North, Egypt lies to its East and Sudan and Tunisia border in the Southeast and Northwest respectively. Apparent from the topography, Libya stands as an epicentre to the countries ridden with conflicts, stands the ground that was the central root of the infamous Arab Spring uprisings taking a rebellious storm right off its borders in Tunisia back in 2011. While the NATO-led campaign garnered success in overthrowing the notorious dictator, Muammar Gaddafi, and thus bringing the draconian regime to an end, it failed to account for the brewing rebels and militias in pockets throughout the state of Libya.

Over the following years, weaponry and ammunition was widely pervaded across the region in spite of strict embargo placed. The pilling artillery and unregulated rebels cycled the instability in the country leading to the successive governments to fail and eventually split the country in two dominant positions: The UN-recognised Government National Accord (GNA), led by Tripoli-based leader and prime minister Fayez Al-Sarraj, and the Libyan National Army (LNA), led by the tailing ally and successor to Gaddafi, General Khalifa Haftar.

While both GNA and LNA vied for the control on Libya, foreign powers involved rather similar to the labyrinth of stakes in Syria, each state split over the side supporting their part of the story and ultimately serving their arching purpose of interference in the region. Despite of the ruling regime of Al-Sarraj since the controversial election win of GNA in 2016, Haftar-led LNA controls an expansive territory and has been launching offensive attacks against the GNA alliance. GNA enjoys the support of US, Turkey, Qatar and Italy; each serving either ideological support or military backing to secure the elected government of Libya. Meanwhile, LNA is backed by Russia, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and France. While the western powers see GNA as an economically stabilising solution to the Libyan crisis, Russia and France eye Haftar as a key ally to expand influence in the African region and reap control of the oil-rich resources under control of Haftar’s troops in the oil-crescent territory.

The Turkish regime, on the other hand, eye Libya as a direct answer to the Russian influence in the Syrian war that has been pushing the Kurdish alliance stronger along and within the southern borders of Turkey. This has led to recent clashes and direct escalation in the proxy war waged in Syria. Turkey plans to incentivise the leveraging position against Russia in Libya by deploying military advisory to Tripoli to strengthen their position against the Russian-backed Haftar to ultimately deter the alliance from spreading far in the African region.

The power split in Libya was exacerbated in 2017 following the Gulf crisis that led to the boycott of Qatar by the Arab quartet led by Saudi Arabia. Libya stood as a battle ground for both strategic and military positions to one up the other alliance in external power games while the internal matters of Libya are long forgotten and population left clueless and desperate for welfare. Since then, the vested interests in Libya have side-lined yet the peace process has been encouraged by both UN and Merkel-led ‘Berlin process’ in support to the UN efforts to restore peace in Libya. However, the strained relations and foreign demarcation is still apparent even though no escalation has been in action for months.

Now the ceasefires have been in talks for a while and except for a few skirmishes, the powers have been curbed since June 2020. The silence could imply room for diplomatic efforts to push a much-awaited resolve to this complex proxy war. With the recent turn of events in the global political canvas, wheels of the betterment might turn in favour of Libya. Saudi Arabia has recently joined hands with Qatar, opening all borders to the estranged ally and resuming diplomatic relations. Turkey is eying the coveted spot in the European Union since the UK exit. The US in redefining its policies under the revitalising administration of Joseph Biden while Russia deals with the tensed relations with the Gulf since the oil price war shattered the mutual understanding shared for years. The core players of the Libyan Proxy war are dormant and may remain passive due to external complexities to handle. Yet, with regional powers like Egypt threatening invasions in Libya and both GNA and LNA showing no interest in negotiation, a conclusive end to the Libyan crisis is still farfetched.
 
N

northern watch

TB Fanatic
H

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Posted for fair use.....
www.thedrive.com

Russia Is Extending One Of The Runways At Its Syrian Airbase

The extended runway at Khmeimim could help accommodate heavy airlifters carrying more cargo or other large aircraft, including possibly bombers.
www.thedrive.com www.thedrive.com

What Does Russia Have Planned For Its Lengthened Runway At Its Air Base In Syria?
The extended runway at Khmeimim could help accommodate heavy airlifters carrying more cargo or other large aircraft, including possibly bombers.
By Joseph Trevithick February 5, 2021


Side-by-side satellite images of Khmeimim air base in Syria.
PHOTO © 2021 PLANET LABS INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. REPRINTED BY PERMISSION / Google Earth
SHARE



Joseph Trevithick View Joseph Trevithick's Articles

@FranticGoat







Satellite imagery that The War Zone has obtained of Russia's Khmeimim air base outpost in Syria shows work ongoing to extend one of its two main runways by around 1,000 feet. The extension would allow the base to support more regular deployments of larger and more heavily-laden aircraft, including heavy airlifters and even potentially bombers.
Khmeimim, situated in Syria's coastal Latakia governorate, has been a major hub for the Kremlin's military intervention in that country, which began in 2015. Two years later, the Russian government signed a new long-term lease for the base with Syrian authorities, as part of a larger deal that also saw Russia extend its access to port facilities at Tartus, further to the south, for at least another 49 years. This arrangement came after Russian forces, especially combat airpower, had been instrumental in preventing the collapse of the regime of Syrian dictator Bashar Al Assad.



message-editor%2F1612556023019-su-24-takeoff.jpg

TASS

A Russian Su-24 Fencer combat jet takes off from Khmeimim.




At the same time, the base also presents a strategically valuable airfield outside of Russia that can support broader military activities, especially in the Middle East, North Africa, and the Eastern Mediterranean Sea. For instance, the base provided a useful intermediate staging point for MiG-29 Fulcrum fighters and Su-24 Fencer combat jets that Russia sent to Libya to bolster forces aligned with rogue General Khalifa Haftar, which is engaged in a civil conflict with the country's United Nations-recognized and predominantly Turkish-backed government. You can read more about that in these past War Zone stories.
The base, which has two parallel runways that run north-south, has already seen major expansions and additions since Russian forces first arrived there in significant numbers six years ago. Starting in 2015, substantial portions of the installation have been effectively rebuilt or otherwise substantially improved, including expanded helicopter facilities, support infrastructure, and defenses.
This included the addition of an approximately 819,000-square-foot ramp with direct access to the eastern runway that was completed in 2016, as well as a row of hardened aircraft shelters at the northwest corner of the facility that was built between 2018 and 2019 in response to the threat of drone attacks and other indirect fire weapons. Between New Year's Eve 2017 and the end of the first week of January 2018, the base was subjected to at least two mass drone attacks, that killed multiple personnel and damaged or destroyed a number of aircraft.



message-editor%2F1612556091309-khmeimim-overview.jpg

PHOTO © 2021 PLANET LABS INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. REPRINTED BY PERMISSION

A satellite image of Khmeimim as of Dec. 14, 2020.


The satellite imagery that The War Zone obtained from Planet Labs, which is dated Dec. 14, 2020, shows that extensions are being added to both ends of the western runway, bringing it from its previous length of approximately 9,500 feet, as it had been since 2015, to around 10,500 feet. A taxiway also appears to be being constructed to link the northern ends of the base's two runways.
It's possible that the full length of the runway will ultimately be even longer given what could be preparations for a further additional section across what is now a road at the northern end of the base. If this is indeed the full planned length of the runway, it could add around another 750 feet.



message-editor%2F1612556606929-khmeimim-north.jpg

PHOTO © 2021 PLANET LABS INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. REPRINTED BY PERMISSION

A view of ongoing construction work to extend the northern end of Khmeimim's western runway, as of Dec. 14, 2020, including what could be preparations for a further addition on the other side of a road. Also visible at the lower left-hand corner are some of the hardened aircraft shelters Russia built at the base between 2018 and 2019. The alert pad, seen attached to the northern end of the eastern runway to the right, with three Russian Flanker fighter jets present, was among the additions built shortly after Russian forces arrived in 2015.

message-editor%2F1612556875719-khmeimim-south.jpg

PHOTO © 2021 PLANET LABS INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. REPRINTED BY PERMISSION

Extension work visible at the southern end of the western runway in the satellite imagery from Dec. 14, 2020.


The extensions appear to be outgrowths of resurfacing work that began in 2017, which looks now to be close to completion. Runway improvement efforts over the years have also included the construction of three new taxiways linking the base's two runways together at various points.



message-editor%2F1612557138352-resurface.jpg

Google Earth

Runway resurfacing work seen underway in satellite imagery of Khmeimim from December 2019. The subsequent extension work had not yet begun at this time, though the same kind of concrete tiling is now being used for the additions.

message-editor%2F1612557427689-taxiways.jpg

Google Earth

These three taxiways linking Khmeimim's two runways were added as part of runway improvement efforts between 2015 and 2017

Continues.....
 
H

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Continued.....

The western runway, as a whole, has been ostensibly closed to flight operations since 2016, with "X" markings appearing at either end that year, though satellite imagery has shown aircraft on it since then. When it formally opens in its extended form, it will represent a significant expansion of the overall base's capabilities.



message-editor%2F1612557037435-il-76.jpg

Google Earth

An Il-76 cargo aircraft seen on Khmeimim's ostensibly closed western runway in satellite imagery from May 2018.


Russia's larger airlifters, including massive An-124s, have already made many trips to Khmeimim, but the longer runway could allow them to fly in and out of the base at greater gross weights, especially during hotter times of the year. This means that these aircraft will be able to bring in more cargo and passengers on each flight, streamlining routine operations to the base, which serves as an important logistical conduit for Russian forces throughout Syria. The extra runway would also provide better safety margins for rejected takeoff situations.







Close-Up Images Emerge Of Unmarked MiG-29 Fighters At Russia's Air Base In Syria By Joseph Trevithick Posted in The War Zone

MiG-29 Fighters Were At Russia's Air Base In Syria Just Before Showing Up In Libya (Updated) By Tyler Rogoway Posted in The War Zone

Russia's Air Base In Syria Seems To Be Under Regular Attack Now By Tyler Rogoway Posted in The War Zone

Russian Tu-22M3 Backfire Bombers Deploy To Western Iran: Report By Tyler Rogoway Posted in The War Zone

Image Shows Russia Extending Runway At Arctic Base, Could Support Fighter Jets, Bombers By Joseph Trevithick and Tyler Rogoway Posted in The War Zone


An extended runway would also enable individual cargo aircraft to bring in larger payloads on short notice to support planned surges in operational activity or respond to sudden changes in fighting in the country. It could also provide a useful intermediate staging point for heavily-laden Russian airlifters, none of which are aerial refueling capable, headed for other countries in the region, such as Libya, and beyond.


Russia Express: #Russian #AirForce Antonov-124 continues to land in #Syria, #Hmeimim airbase, #Latakia. pic.twitter.com/Qu70OEYzsI
— ImageSat Intl. (@ImageSatIntl) October 8, 2018​
Click to expand...


The extension and rehabilitation of the western runway at Khmeimim could also be envisioned as a way to better accommodate any of Russia's current trio of bombers, the Tu-22M3, the Tu-95MS, and Tu-160. Russia has employed bombers over Syria in the past, but has done so through long-range strike or cruise missile launch sorties that see them fly circuitous round trip routes from its own territory. In 2016, it also deployed Tu-22M bombers to a base in Iran to support its Syrian campaign.



message-editor%2F1612559037569-tu-22m3-iran.jpg

AP

Tu-22M3 bombers at Hamadan Air Base in Iran in 2016.



View: https://youtu.be/I4IKAqeEzgw




Having the ability to stage bombers at Khmeimim, even on short-duration employments, would offer a much less politically complex basing alternative for employing these aircraft in the ongoing fighting in Syria. At the same time, routine bomber deployments to the base would also provide valuable strategic power projection.

Bombers, as well as long-range Tu-142 maritime patrol aircraft, which are based on the same design as the Tu-95MS bomber, flying sorties out into the Mediterranean, especially, could present new challenges for NATO on its southern flank. Russian bombers, flying from Khmeimim and armed with cruise missiles would be able to hold targets in Europe at risk from an entirely new southern vector and could also engage naval assets in the Mediterranean during any potential conflict. Those aircraft would also be better postured to respond to crises and contingencies in the Middle East and North Africa. Russia has already demonstrated an interest in being able to push bombers beyond its borders in recent years, including to other locations with strategic significance, notably Venezuela, to the chagrin of the United States.

There are certainly questions about the ability of Khmeimim's other facilities to handle any massive additional influx of bigger aircraft, whether they be cargo planes or bombers. The eastern ramp is presently the primary place where any sort of larger aircraft, also including A-50U airborne early warning and control aircraft and Il-20 spy planes, park now. Older satellite imagery shows that even after that ramp was built, An-124s still used the closed western runway to unload cargo, before the resurfacing work appeared to put an end to that, as well.



message-editor%2F1612559288789-khmeimim-ramps.jpg

PHOTO © 2021 PLANET LABS INC. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. REPRINTED BY PERMISSION

A view of the eastern ramp at Khmeimim on Dec. 14, 2020, showing three white Il-76 airlifters, a gray A-50U airborne early warning and control aircraft with its radar dome clearly visible, and what appears to be an Il-20 turboprop spy plane at the top right corner. Another Il-76 is visible on a separate ramp that larger aircraft sometimes use to left.

message-editor%2F1612559875283-an-124.jpg

Google Earth

An An-124 aircraft unloads its cargo on the western runway in October 2016. At that time the runway was marked as closed for flight operations and the large eastern ramp had been completed and was in use.


At the same time, the extension of the western runway could very well be followed by a similar improvement project for the eastern runway, as well as other construction elsewhere on the base. There is certainly space for development with the base's existing perimeter, though the entire facility is situated within a populated area and it could be more difficult to enlarge its overall size.

Regardless, the ongoing construction that is visible now only underscores the continued importance of Khmeimim to Russia, both for its ongoing efforts in Syria and beyond. The runway extension and any other subsequent efforts to expand the base would only help grow its overall strategic significance for the Kremlin.

There are already indications that, while fighting is certainly still going on in Syria, that the Russian presence in Latakia has become steadily more regularized over the past six years. This could further point to a long-term vision on the Kremlin's part that sees Khmeimim continue to evolve into a more general-purpose Russian military outpost abroad.

"At this spot where we are now there was only an impenetrable thicket and these white concrete lego-like modular houses. Here, on an asphalt square, we began to deploy the food battalion and the lunchroom," Igor Tsaryov, the Russian Deputy Chief of Staff for Khmeimim's material and logistics services, said in an interview with state-run media outlet TASS last fall. "You can see the stark contrast. Today, it's a flourishing garden."

"The flights are not as intensive as before. Flying today is much easier," a Russian pilot identified only as Ivan also told TASS for the same piece.

All told, it's long been clear that the Kremlin has every intention of staying at Khmeimim for decades to come, but the new construction also indicates that plans are afoot to significantly expand its role in Russian military operations in the region and beyond, which could cause increasing concern for Moscow's NATO foes.

Contact the author: joe@thedrive.com
 
jward

jward

passin' thru

Tarek Megerisi

@Tmegrisi


Today #Libya's UN process careened over the line producing a new authority which frankly nobody would have expected when the #LPDF first met last November.

Abdul-Hamid Dbeiba will be the PM & Mohammed al-Mnefi the new President

A short thread on the new lay of the land

Firstly this vote can be read as a vote against the favourites: Fathi Bashagha and Aguileh Salah

Their union was always politically foolish given their bases are diametrically opposed. The addition of a military officer to their ticket simply made them too abrasive to too many

It takes a lot to fail at a process that was engineered for you. But it's the result of a focus on appeasing politicians rather than constituencies

The resistance to their ticket could be seen across social media and from armed groups preparing to violently reject them.

Dbeiba's ticket, contrarily, seems increasingly politically astute. It has an eastern President with no ties to Aguileh or Haftar, who in-turn has a western deputy that was part of the breakaway Tripoli HoR who tried to reconstitute the parliament in Ghadames (remember that?)

Dbeiba enters into this with *a lot* of baggage, it's a family name synonymous with the corruption of Qaddafi's era, but it's also one without ideological baggage which is perhaps more important in this day & age.

The closed ranks in support of the #LPDF from the international community as an extension of the #BerlinProcess means no one wants to be frozen out and because Dbeiba is *not* ideological it means that pragmatic options for a deal remain alive

So, an immediate war is less likely

This extends internationally too, following Haftar's failure, a new war against a UN birthed government is suicidal and less tolerated under President Biden, so the instinct is to look for a deal.

Here, #Egypt's response to deal or not to deal will be key

And that's because #Ankara will be feeling comfortable right now.

The new Prime Minister is from Misrata a city fully opposed to Haftar and in roaring trade with Turkey

The new President was the ambassador Greece unceremoniously expelled after Turkey's MoU with the GNA in 2019

Quick and strong statements of support for the process and the new government from Bashagha, and the Minister of Defence suggests they expect their work alongisde Turkey to continue.

Meanwhile Dbeiba's reputation & lack of partisanship means Tripoli's cartel is not as worried.

The rejection to this new order will take familiar forms and come from familiar sources.

Already claims of an Islamist takeover are emerging as both the federalist and the Haftar camps come to terms with their loss. Aguileh is certain to do all he can to spoil

This is why Egypt's position is key. If they go against this government & process they'll find ideological allies in the UAE and opportunistic allies in Russia to deepen existing divides

Here, the security and economic tracks take on new importance as additional carrots & sticks

The rejection by Aguileh and others will probably come through attacks on the integrity of the process, and accusations of vote buying which emerged during the LPDF's initial convening in November.

Dbeiba was heavily implicated and the UN promised an investigation.

Regardless Libya has a new President, a new PM & a new goal - elections in December

Those who prioritise that goal should now try to include as many as practical in the new order, protect it & pressure it to honour its commitment - as per my recent brief


Spoiler alert: How Europe can save diplomacy in Libya Europeans should provide stabilisation, technical, and diplomatic support to strengthen Libya’s governance and accountability mechanisms to ensure a new government can successfully hold elections in … Spoiler alert: How Europe can save diplomacy in Libya
 
jward

jward

passin' thru
Evan Kohlmann
@IntelTweet

Iraqi Shiite militia Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba has issued a communique warning Turkey not to invade Iraq's Nineveh Province on a hunt for Kurdish rebels and threatening that Turkey will face "incalculable consequences" for undertaking such a move.
 
jward

jward

passin' thru





Ragıp Soylu
@ragipsoylu
21m

PKK executes 13 Turkish hostages, presumably former soldiers and police, during a Turkish military operation in Iraq’s Gara region. Turkey also lost three Turkish soldiers during the operation. This map shows the cave base of PKK, which had several rooms
https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1360863847964438529
View: https://twitter.com/ragipsoylu/status/1360863847964438529?s=20

Turkish military says it has killed 48 PKK militants and captured two others. The operation has taken place 25km inside Iraq at a size of 75km area, one the largest in military’s history
 
jward

jward

passin' thru
TurkishFacts4u
@TurkishFacts4U
7m

BREAKING: #Turkey says it will continue its military operations in #Syria & #Iraq until the #PKK threat is neutralised irrespective of whether these countries approve or not. If they do not approve then they tacitly approve these terror attacks & will also be viewed as a foe.
BREAKING: #Turkey says it will begin assasinating senior #PKK/#YPG/#SDF Terrorists and their "deaths won't be ordinary". Interior Minister Soylu stated that the locations of the terrorists are all well known & they are tracked in real-time. (1)
These statements show that Turkey will be using novel assasination methods to neutralise these terrorists. Will it be poison? Will it be large vacuum bombs deployed into their Mountain HQ's?
 
H

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
jward said:
TurkishFacts4u
@TurkishFacts4U
7m

BREAKING: #Turkey says it will continue its military operations in #Syria & #Iraq until the #PKK threat is neutralised irrespective of whether these countries approve or not. If they do not approve then they tacitly approve these terror attacks & will also be viewed as a foe.
BREAKING: #Turkey says it will begin assasinating senior #PKK/#YPG/#SDF Terrorists and their "deaths won't be ordinary". Interior Minister Soylu stated that the locations of the terrorists are all well known & they are tracked in real-time. (1)
These statements show that Turkey will be using novel assasination methods to neutralise these terrorists. Will it be poison? Will it be large vacuum bombs deployed into their Mountain HQ's?
Click to expand...

The Pandora's Box associated with this one is plain ugly......
 
jward

jward

passin' thru
Will China Become More Active in Libya?

Will shifts in Libya’s political sphere change China’s approach to the country?



By Guy Burton

February 19, 2021
Will China Become More Active in Libya?

Credit: Wikimedia Commons/Moaid Hadida
China’s response to the recent changes in Libya has been cautious, but positive. But will it herald a more substantive shift in its own relationship with the country? For now, the answer seems to be no. Instead, what seems more likely is that Beijing will continue to watch from afar and wait for a more definitive outcome in terms of a final political settlement and peace. Should that happen, then a more active Chinese presence may well take shape.

2020 was one of the more dynamic years in recent Libyan history. The country has been split since the defeat of the Gaddafi regime in 2011. But the current national division between the Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli and the eastern-based House of Representatives (HOR) and its military partner, General Khalifa Haftar and his armed forces, dates back to 2014.

The GNA-HOR/Haftar rivalry has acquired important outside support. In 2019 Haftar began his most recent military offensive against Tripoli. Backing him were Russia, Egypt, and the UAE. With Haftar on the verge of taking the country’s capital, the GNA upgraded its relations with Turkey. From the start of 2020 that paid off in Turkish assistance, which led to a GNA pushback and stalemate by the middle of the year. That deadlock opened the door to talks.

In October 2020 a ceasefire was signed. Then in November, the U.N.-assisted Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF) began meeting, bringing together 75 representatives from across the country. The LPDF agreed to hold national elections in December 2021 and to set up a new interim government to oversee that process.

Diplomat Brief
Weekly Newsletter
N
Get briefed on the story of the week, and developing stories to watch across the Asia-Pacific.
Get the Newsletter

The election of the new interim government took place on February 5. The result was a surprise. Instead of the joint GNA-HOR slate of candidates winning, the new prime minister will be Abdul Hamid Dabaiba and the president of the presidential council will be Mohamed Menfi.

Enjoying this article? Click here to subscribe for full access. Just $5 a month.

Three days later, China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Wang Wenbin, provided an official response. He welcomed the government’s election and stated China’s hope that a political settlement would be found, saying Beijing would support international efforts to that end. Meanwhile, other Chinese observers, like Professor Fan Hongda at the Middle East Studies Institute at Shanghai International Studies University, noted that while the election was “commendable,” the new government will face big challenges “to bridge the divisions within Libya and minimize foreign interference in Libyan affairs.”

Delivering that may turn out to be beyond the new government. Rather than being a force for change, it now seems that Dabaiba and Menfi will offer continuity. Both have links to the past – Dabaiba oversaw many of the country’s largest public works projects before 2011 and Menfi has ties to Haftar – but their victory is also being treated as unproblematic by Russia and Turkey.

The lack of Russian or Turkish worry signals they have little to fear from the new government. A condition of the ceasefire was for external parties to leave by the end of January. That has not happened and it is unlikely the new government will be able to enforce it. In addition, the government will only have a short time in office. That means Dabaiba and Menfi will also not have enough time to deliver on other parts of the ceasefire, especially the creation of security zones and a full demobilization of armed groups.

In sum then, Libya’s recent advances may be less than they seemed at first. Because of that, observers like Jalel Harchaoui, a Libya specialist at the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime, and Oxford University’s Samuel Ramani think that it is unlikely that China will shift course from its current hedging strategy.

According to Ramani, “China supports the GNA and is involved in reconstruction contracts with it. But on the other hand, it is aware of Haftar’s influence in the east and control over the oil fields there.” In short, China seeks “strategic non-alignment” in Libya, a position it has held for much of the past decade and which Ramani has himself written about for this publication.

Harchaoui agrees, saying that “So long as it’s a mess, it has meant China didn’t take sides. It has stayed outside [the conflict] to have all options open to it. China remained on cordial terms with the GNA, but also spoke to the eastern government as well – even though it knew it didn’t have things like a central bank or foreign reserves.”

Harchaoui also thinks that Chinese hedging is visible at the international level as well. Whereas the West sees Russia and Turkey locked in confrontation with each other in Libya, Harchaoui says that “From China’s perspective, it sees two actors who are anti-liberal, who have been snubbed by the West. They have more in common with each other than against each other,” including their support for authoritarian figures in Libya.

Chinese hedging is also helped by the relative unimportance of the country in Beijing’s thinking. Although there were important Chinese business interests in Libya before 2011, the uprising led to an exodus of both capital and labor. The fighting since then has not only diminished Libya’s position in the global economy, but also marginalized it from China. The distance between the two countries is apparent in the absence of a partnership between them.

Ramani believes Libya is likely to remain a secondary concern for China. China will prioritize relations in the Gulf and with Israel, where it has substantial diplomatic and commercial ties. In addition, he thinks that Chinese interests in reconstruction are focused less on Libya than in Iraq, where several Chinese firms have acquired important contracts.

Against this, Ramani does concede there could be greater Chinese involvement if the circumstances are right. “If the conflict continues to de-escalate, that would improve things for China. But if the conflict becomes active and heated again, then they will withdraw.”

Enjoying this article? Click here to subscribe for full access. Just $5 a month.

If the years of war are indeed coming to an end, then China is well placed to take advantage. “If the government launches new projects, such as a large free-trade zone in Sirte, Chinese companies are very unlikely to stand idly by. They will want a piece of it,” says Harchaoui

Such a prospect could be on the cards given the lack of public investment and infrastructure in Libya in recent years. According to Harchaoui, the presence and character of Dabaiba in the new government may lead to internal pressure to open the taps. Society may also demand more as well.

Harchaoui also believes that Libya is better placed to respond to such demands, especially when compared to other conflict-affected countries in the region like Syria and Yemen. Libya has the resources to pay for new projects. Although its share of oil production has been low recently, it has capacity to ramp it up substantially. Finally, Libya also has other sources of revenue it can dip into, from minerals to a sovereign wealth fund that could be worth up to $65 billion.

thediplomat.com

Will China Become More Active in Libya?

Will shifts in Libya’s political sphere change China’s approach to the country?
thediplomat.com
 
jward

jward

passin' thru





EHA News

@eha_news
1m

CEO of #Turkishdefence company
@Baykar_Savunma
@haluk
Bayraktar:

"The effect of #Russia|n electronic warfare systems on Bayraktar TB2 didn't last even one hour.""Many countries are requesting our TB2 UAVs. There are also requests from Europe."

"The AKINCI heavy armed UAV will be in our inventory in just months."
"It has a mission radius of 2,500 km with smart ammunition."
"In reconnaissance missions, its mission radius is 5,000 km."
1614515539675.png
 
jward

jward

passin' thru
jward

jward

passin' thru
Ragıp Soylu
@ragipsoylu
3m

More Egypt signalling from Turkey: Defense Minister Akar welcomes Egypt’s silent recognition of Turkey’s continental shelf claims in the East Med “We have joint historical, cultural values with Egypt. There might be important developments in the future with their activation”
 
jward

jward

passin' thru
jward

jward

passin' thru
Turkey’s nuclear power dilemma
Turkey’s first Russia-backed nuclear plant has raised issues around its safety and potential for use in building nuclear weapons.
Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdogan attend a groundbreaking ceremony of the Akkuyu nuclear power plant in 2018 [Mikhail Klimentyev/Kremlin via Reuters]

Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdogan attend a groundbreaking ceremony of the Akkuyu nuclear power plant in 2018 [Mikhail Klimentyev/Kremlin via Reuters]
By
Sinem Koseoglu
10 Mar 2021

Istanbul, Turkey – Turkish and Russian officials laid the foundation for the third reactor of Turkey’s first nuclear power plant Akkuyu in the southern coastal city of Mersin on Wednesday.
The plant’s first reactor unit is expected to be operational in 2023, the centenary of the Turkish Republic, and the remaining units in 2026.
Keep reading
Erdogan: Turkey’s common interests with US outweigh differencesTurkey sentences 5 people to life over Russian envoy’s killingMilitary helicopter crash in southeast Turkey kills 11The Uighur and Syrian refugees making a home together in Turkey
The co-construction of the Akkuyu plant started in April 2018, eight years after the two countries signed an intergovernmental agreement.
The project is owned by the Russian energy company Rosatom while the Turkish Akkuyu is the license owner and the local operator.
Once completed, the plant is expected to produce 35 billion kilowatt-hours (kWh) of electricity annually, about 10 percent of Turkey’s total electricity supply. The service life will last 50 years.
The facility will launch Turkey into the ”league of nuclear energy countries”, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said, hailing it as a “symbol of Turkish-Russian cooperation”.
Russian President Vladimir Putin, who spoke at the event via video-conference from Moscow, called it a “truly flagship project”.
Akkuyu is the only nuclear power facility under construction in Turkey but a second project in the Black Sea province of Sinop is expected to kick off this year, reports suggest, if Ankara can find a new partner after Japan’s Mitsubishi pulled out last year.
The project was agreed on by the Japanese and Turkish governments in 2013. A consortium led by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries conducted a feasibility study until March for the construction of a 4,500-megawatt plant in Sinop.
A senior energy official, speaking on condition of anonymity, told Al Jazeera the Turkish government is also considering a third nuclear plant with four reactors in the country’s northwest. Turkey’s ultimate goal is not building a nuclear weapon but diversity in energy resources, he said.

Russian dependency?
Since the Akkuyu project was signed, proponents of nuclear energy in Turkey have argued it would limit Turkey’s dependency on foreign energy suppliers. They also underline it is clean energy.

However, some international experts think differently.
Henry D Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center in Washington, DC, said Akkuyu’s financing model could further Ankara’s dependency on Russia, a major energy provider to Turkey. The project is fully financed by Moscow.
Sokolski said it is an intensive capital investment and questioned why Turkey frontloads such debt while alternative and cheaper energy resources are coming down the pipeline.




Could Akkutu be a target?
Turkey is not the only country seeking nuclear energy in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia and Jordan are still considering establishing nuclear power plants. Egypt and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are in on it, while Israel is long believed to have a stockpile of nuclear weapons and Iran has the capacity to develop them.
Sokolski warned Turkey about the regional challenges of entering the fray. “Your neighbourhood is dangerous. People are fighting. Nuclear reactors in a shooting war can be targets.”
He said missiles and drones could knock out critical electrical supply lines to a reactor and destroy emergency generators, nuclear control rooms, reactor containment buildings, and spent reactor fuel buildings.
“These kinds of strikes can make people more anxious and result in radiological releases, like Chernobyl or worse,” said Sokolski.
Turkey has waged a war against the PKK, the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party listed as a “terrorist” organisation by the United States, the European Union, and Turkey, for decades in a conflict that has killed an estimated 40,000 people.
News reports have suggested the armed group has camps in northern Iraq where armed drones are being developed.
Turkey is also embroiled in conflicts in Syria and the eastern Mediterranean, while the Iran-aligned Houthi rebels in Yemen have targetted Saudi and Emirati targets with its missiles and drones. Armed groups such as the Syrian National Defence Forces, which is supportive of President Bashar al-Assad’s government, could mimic such attacks, said Sokolski.

Is it feasible?
The $20bn Akkuyu nuclear power plant has also raised other concerns. Its location has been controversial since the deal was signed with Russia as it is in an earthquake-prone area, while some critics highlight environmental concerns.
But some analysts support the project.
“You can never round off nuclear accident risks,” said Sinan Ulgen, director of the Istanbul-based Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies. “What is important is to look at successful examples and what is being built in Turkey is a new-generation, high-technology compound.”





Ulgen said Akkuyu was designed based on risk analyses and believes improvised drones cannot harm such a facility.
However, he expressed concern about the governance of the project. Rosatom is a state-owned company and if any problem occurs in nuclear regulation, it has the potential to become a serious bilateral issue.
The senior Turkish energy official said when Ankara decided to build the nuclear facility, a fully Russia-financed model was the only feasible option.

Atomic weapon suspicions
Despite Turkey’s claims the plant will only be used to diversify energy resources, some have suggested Ankara may have plans to enrich uranium.
Turkey and nuclear-armed Pakistan have long had military cooperation agreements that were recently intensified, with some news reports suggesting Islamabad may be covertly supporting a nuclear weapons programme.
Military cooperation deals have been signed earlier this year with Kazakhstan, a country providing at least 35 percent of the world’s uranium.
Asked about possible nuclear cooperation with Pakistan, the senior energy official in Ankara said during meetings in Vienna there have been talks about possible cooperation on peaceful use, under IAEA control, especially in radiation technologies and cancer treatment.
Turkey is a party to all international nonproliferation instruments and export control regimes, including the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).
Turkey is also among the signatories of the binding International Code of Conduct against the proliferation of ballistic missiles and other anti-weapons pledges.





Source : Al Jazeera

Related
Turkey has been calling on Washington to end its support for the Kurdish-led People's Protection Units in Syria [File: AP]
Erdogan: Turkey’s common interests with US outweigh differences
Turkish president seeks improvement in ties between the two NATO allies that have been strained over a host of issues.
21 Feb 2021
Taufeeq, 55, a Syrian refugee, serves hot black tea to his Uighur neighbour outside his home in Kayseri, Turkey, as his son Moaaz and other children return after playing football [Ahmer Khan/Al Jazeera]
The Uighur and Syrian refugees making a home together in Turkey
United by shared hardships, a small community is building a place of support, solidarity and safety.
4 Mar 2021
Rescue workers, soldiers and civilians walk around the wreckage of a military helicopter that crashed near the Turkish eastern city of Bitlis [AFP]
Military helicopter crash in southeast Turkey kills 11
A lieutenant general among the dead in army helicopter crash in southeast Turkey that left two others wounded.
4 Mar 2021
Mevlut Mert Altintas shouts after shooting Russian Ambassador to Turkey Andrei Karlov, right, at an art gallery in Ankara in December 2016 [File: Burhan Ozbilici/AP Photo]
Turkey sentences 5 people to life over Russian envoy’s killing
Andrei Karlov was shot dead by an off-duty policeman while speaking at a photo exhibition opening in Ankara in 2016.
9 Mar 2021
More from News
Australia to subsidise airfares as part of $928m tourism boost
Qantas, which is cutting at least 8,500 jobs, lost about 11 billion Australian dollars ($8.5bn) in revenue to the pandemic last year alone [File: Brendon Thorne/Bloomberg]
Investors turn up heat on HSBC to phase out fossil fuel funding
HSBC's announcement reinforces how the world's biggest financial firms are bowing to mounting pressure to join the battle against climate change [File: Brendan McDermid/REUTERS]
China risks COVID ‘immunity gap’ amid slow vaccine uptake
A woman in Huaian in eastern China's Jiangsu province receives her vaccine in January. China's success at tackling COVID-19 means people see little urgency to getting the jab [File: Stringer/AFP]
Japan honours victims of 2011 earthquake, tsunami and nuclear disaster
Mariko Odawara places flowers to mourn the victims of the earthquake and tsunami that killed thousands and triggered the worst nuclear accident since Chernobyl, during its 10th anniversary, in Iwaki, Fukushima prefecture, Japan March 11, 2021 [Kim Kyung-Hoon/ Reuters]
Most Read
How Portugal silenced ‘centuries of violence and trauma’
A map published for Portugal’s 1934 Colonial Exhibition, held in Porto. It is entitled: “Portugal is not a small country” and shows the size of Portugal’s empire at the time as if super-imposed over a map of Europe [Courtesy of Paulo Moreira]
Myanmar’s military on ‘killing spree’ against protesters: Amnesty
Riot police hold their firearms as they face-off with protesters in the capital, Naypyidaw on Monday [Stringer/AFP]
Tanzanian opposition demands answers on Magufuli’s health
After months of denying the presence of the virus, Magufuli revealed in February that some of his aides and family members had contracted COVID-19 but they recovered [File: Ericky Boniphace/AFP]
UN condemns Myanmar violence as US sanctions general’s children
The military response to now-daily protests has become increasingly violent with at least 60 people thought to have been killed in the crackdowns and nearly 2,000 arrested [Reuters]

www.aljazeera.com

Turkey’s nuclear power dilemma

Turkey’s first nuclear plant has raised concerns around its safety and potential for use in building nuclear weapons.
www.aljazeera.com www.aljazeera.com
 
jward

jward

passin' thru
The Cavell Group
@TCG_CrisisRisks
1h

Libya: Heavy small arms fire reported this morning in eastern Tripoli where its reported rival militias are clashing.
Libya: Reports these clashes are a spill over from a kidnapping incident. It seems Al-Dhaman militia members are clashing with the Lions of Tajoura militia with reports it’s related to a militia Kidnapping.
 
You must log in or register to reply here.
Top