WAR Regional conflict brewing in the Mediterranean

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China, others to join military exercises in Russia

Chinese and Russian forces will take part in joint military exercises in southern Russia later this month along with troops from Armenia, Belarus, Iran, Myanmar, Pakistan and others


By The Associated Press
10 September 2020,

FILE - In this June 24, 2020 file photo, soldiers from China's People's Liberation Army march toward Red Square during the Victory Day military parade marking the 75th anniversary of the Nazi defeat in Red Square in Moscow, Russia. Chinese and Russia


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The Associated Press
FILE - In this June 24, 2020 file photo, soldiers from China's People's Liberation Army march toward Red Square during the Victory Day military parade marking the 75th anniversary of the Nazi defeat in Red Square in Moscow, Russia. Chinese and Russian forces will take part in joint military exercises in southern Russia later in September along with troops from Armenia, Belarus, Iran, Myanmar, Pakistan and others, China's defense ministry announced Thursday, Sept. 10, 2020. (AP Photo/Alexander Zemlianichenko, File)

BEIJING -- Chinese and Russian forces will take part in joint military exercises in southern Russia later this month along with troops from Armenia, Belarus, Iran, Myanmar, Pakistan and others, China’s defense ministry announced Thursday.

The “Caucuses 2020” drills will deploy wheeled vehicles and light weaponry to be flown to the drill location by China’s latest transport aircraft, the ministry said in a statement.

The exercises running September 21-26 will focus on defensive tactics, encirclement and battlefield control and command, the ministry said.

The exercises have special meaning for China-Russia ties “at this important moment when the whole world is fighting the pandemic,” it said.

China has reported no new domestic coronavirus cases in weeks, while Russia is continuing to see new cases and has reported more than 1 million people infected.

Since establishing a “comprehensive strategic partnership" two decades ago, China and Russia have cooperated increasingly closely on military matters and diplomacy, largely to counter U.S. influence. Their militaries regularly hold joint exercises and they back each other in the United Nations over issues including Syria and North Korea.

 

jward

passin' thru
Mediterranean leaders ready for EU sanctions on 'confrontational' Turkey

Issued on: 10/09/2020 - 23:07

French President Emmanuel Macron on September 10, 2020, in Ajaccio, Corsica.

French President Emmanuel Macron on September 10, 2020, in Ajaccio, Corsica. ©


4 min

Leaders of seven European countries on the Mediterranean said on Thursday they were ready to back EU sanctions against Turkey if Ankara shunned dialogue on escalating tensions in the sea.

French President Emmanuel Macron hosted the leaders of six other EU states, including Turkey's regional rival Greece, for a summit in Corsica in the hope of finding common ground ahead of the next EU summit this month.
Showing again his anger against Turkey under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Macron said before the summit that the NATO ally was no longer a partner in the eastern Mediterranean, and that its people "deserved something" different to the way the government currently behaved.

France has strongly backed Greece and Cyprus in a growing standoff with Turkey over hydrocarbon resources and naval influence in the eastern Mediterranean, which has sparked fears of more severe conflict.
After talks with the leaders of Italy, Malta, Portugal, Spain, Greece and Cyprus in the resort of Porticcio outside the local capital Ajaccio, Macron adopted a slightly milder tone, saying the leaders wanted to reengage in a dialogue with Turkey "in good faith".

But the final statement of the leaders made clear that sanctions were on the table if Turkey failed to end its "confrontational actions".
"We regret that Turkey has not responded to the repeated calls by the European Union to end its unilateral and illegal activities in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean Sea," the communique said.
"We maintain that in absence of progress in engaging Turkey into a dialogue and unless it ends its unilateral activities, the EU is ready to develop a list of further restrictive measures," the leaders said, adding these could be discussed at the European Council on 24-25 September

'No longer a partner'
The crisis has added to a growing list of tensions between Turkey and Europe, notably over Ankara's military intervention in Libya, its policy in Syria and a crackdown on opponents of Erdogan at home.
"We Europeans need to be clear and firm with the government of president Erdogan, which today is behaving in an unacceptable manner," Macron told reporters before the summit began.
He said that at the moment Turkey was "no longer a partner in the region" of the eastern Mediterranean due to its behaviour.

Pax Mediterranea !
— Emmanuel Macron (@EmmanuelMacron) September 10, 2020

Macron added that Turkey had "intensified provocations in a way that is not worthy of a great state. The Turkish people are a great people and deserve something else".
But in a strongly worded reply, the Turkish foreign ministry described Macron's comments as "arrogant" and a sign "of his own weakness and despair."
Erdogan's top press aide, Fahrettin Altun, took a swipe at Macron in a tweet, describing him as a "wannabe Napoleon" on a Mediterranean campaign.

'Refuses to listen'
The EuroMed 7 is an informal group of EU Mediterranean states, sometimes dubbed "Club Med," that held its first summit in 2016. Turkey is not a member.
Turkey has sought to join the EU for over half a century, though analysts say the growing rift between Erdogan and the bloc's leaders has made the prospect increasingly unlikely.
Turkey last month deployed an exploration vessel backed by military frigates in waters between Greece and Cyprus, prompting Athens to respond with naval exercises as a warning.
Another cause of tension between France, as well as its EU allies, and Turkey has been Libya, where Ankara has engaged militarily in support of the UN-recognised government in Tripoli.

"If Turkey refuses to listen to reason before then, I don't see any choice for my European colleagues except significant sanctions," Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis, who held talks with Macron before the summit, wrote in French daily Le Monde.

After the summit, Mitsotakis on Thursday urged the European Union to make the "migration crisis" a priority after the fire at the Moria migrant camp left thousands of asylum-seekers homeless.

"Europe must move from words of solidarity to a policy of acts of solidarity. We have to put the migration crisis at the heart of our discussions and be much more concrete," he said.

Greek media said the possible sale by France of Rafale fighter jets could be on the table, in a sign of the increasingly strong alliance between Paris and Athens. The issue was not mentioned at the press statement.

(AFP)

 

jward

passin' thru
Greece, France in “Complete Agreement” Regarding Turkey
By
Patricia Claus
-
Sep 10, 2020

119063821_785033735758366_8396542023680151216_n-1024x617.jpg
French President Emmanuel Macron and Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis. Credit: Greek Government
Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis and French President Emmanuel Macron said they were in “complete agreement” regarding the direction to take in response to Turkey’s repeated incursions and infractions in the Eastern Mediterranean, according to government sources in Athens.

The Greek and French leaders had a meeting in Corsica this afternoon and evening on how best to deal with Turkey’s recent provocations in the Mediterranean, which have included sending an oil and gas drilling vessel to the sea area between Crete and Cyprus, accompanied by Turkish naval vessels.
According to Reuters, President Macron and PM Mitsotakis were in “complete agreement” over what should be done next, namely that Turkey needs to face EU sanctions unless it withdraws its vessels from the area and agrees to de-escalization talks with Greece.

At the Corsican summit, attended by leaders of the Mediterranean nations who are part of the EU, the two leaders expressed their solidarity in the face of the continued Turkish aggression.
Just before the summit, and in unusually blunt language, French President Macron had flatly announced to reporters that “Turkey is no longer a partner in this region.”
The Associated Press reported that Macron stated “We Europeans need to be clear and firm” with Turkish government about what he called its “inadmissible behavior.”
Athens sources told Reuters that Prime Minister Mitsotakis will soon disclose more details regarding today’s tete à tete with President Macron. The meeting, taking place on the sidelines of the summit, reportedly included talks regarding a “strategic partnership” which may be announced with France as part of an address the Greek leader will be giving this weekend.
After the summit, the Med 7 leaders issued a joint statement, reproduced below, which mentions that the next summit will be held in Greece:

Ajaccio declaration after the 7th Summit of the southern EU countries
1- We, the Heads of State and Government of Cyprus, France, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal and Spain, met on 10 September in Ajaccio for the seventh summit of the southern countries of the European Union (Med7).
2- In the face of the unprecedented crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic which has profoundly affected the populations and economies of our countries, the multiplication of regional crises and the escalation of tensions in the Mediterranean, it is more essential than ever for us to build a united and solidary Europe, that is able to meet all the challenges it faces and to defend the interests, the sovereignty and the sovereign rights of the European Union and its Member States with strength and determination.

For a renewed Mediterranean policy
3- We highlight the strategic importance of the Southern Neighborhood for Europe. 25 years after the launch of the Barcelona Process and more than ten years after the establishment of the Union for the Mediterranean, we propose to give a new impetus to a holistic European policy in the Mediterranean, with the aim of strengthening the capacity of the EU and its Member States to respond collectively to the various challenges of the region. In this perspective, and having in mind the ongoing work in the European Institutions, we propose to renew the Southern Partnership between the European Union, its Member States and our southern neighbours. We look forward to the Union for the Mediterranean Regional Forum on the 27th November, marking the 25th anniversary of the Barcelona Declaration, preceded by an EU-Southern Neighborhood meeting, in Spain, that will mark the first steps of this renewed Mediterranean policy.

4- This renewed Southern Partnership should aim at further strengthening the euro-Mediterranean relationship, including by strengthening the Union for the Mediterranean, consolidating the 5+5 Dialogue and promoting the achievements of the Summit of The Two Shores of the Western Mediterranean. It should be based on a positive political agenda, focused on the development of concrete cooperations on topics of common interest defined jointly with our southern partners: reforms, democratic governance, resilience of civil society, climate and environment, green transition, trade and investment, energy, culture and heritage protection, migration and mobility, youth empowerment and digital agenda. Taking into account that insecurity in the Sahel-Saharan area has a direct impact on the security situation in the Mediterranean, special attention will have to be paid to this region, especially regarding fight against terrorism and human trafficking and smuggling that contribute to irregular migration.

5- This renewed partnership should also allow us to find creative and constructive ways to manage euro-Mediterranean common goods and address issues of common interest, including access and sustainable management of natural resources. Joint commitments to protect biodiversity in the Mediterranean could thus be made at the “One Planet Summit” in Marseille in January 2021 and the Union for the Mediterranean’s Ministerial Conference on Sustainable Blue Economy later in 2021. In the context of the promotion of the Blue Economy in the Mediterranean basin, we remain committed to further develop, also engaging with our southern partners, the use of Copernicus services for the monitoring and management of coastal areas. The initiative for the Sustainable Development of the Blue Economy in the Western Mediterranean (WestMED Initiative) could provide a valuable example for the whole basin of a balanced North – South cooperation. Efforts should also be scaled up to achieve ambitious results at UNFCCC COP 26 and its events taking place in Italy, included the “Youth4Climate” Conference in Milan that will offer young people the opportunity to give a concrete contribution to the climate action. Similarly, the meeting of Heads of State/Government that will take place in Greece, in due course, on the protection of cultural and natural heritage from climate change impacts, will be another opportunity for close cooperation. The Generation Equality Forum which will take place in France in the first half of 2021 will also be an opportunity to engage civil societies on both sides of the Mediterranean towards a greater common ambition in terms of equality between women and men.

Peace and stability in the Mediterranean
6- We reiterate our full support and solidarity with Cyprus and Greece in the face of the repeated infringements on their sovereignty and sovereign rights, as well as confrontational actions by Turkey. We call upon all the countries in the region to abide by international law, in particular international law of the sea, and encourage all parties to resolve their disputes through dialogue and negotiation. In this respect, we welcome the mediation efforts of the HR/VP and Germany in order to achieve a resumption of the dialogue between Greece and Turkey on the maritime zone issue. In addition, we welcome the invitation by the Government of Cyprus to negotiate with Turkey, noting that delimitation of exclusive economic zones and continental shelf should be addressed through dialogue and negotiation in good faith, in full respect of international law and in accordance with the principle of good neighbourly relations. In line with recent European Council and EU Council conclusions, we regret that Turkey has not responded to the repeated calls by the European Union to end its unilateral and illegal activities in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean Sea. We reaffirm our determination to use all adequate means at the disposal of the European Union in response to these confrontational actions. In line with the latest Informal Meeting of EU Foreign Ministers (Gymnich), we agree to speed up work on the additional listings based on the proposals tabled so far, with a view to its rapid adoption. We maintain that in absence of progress in engaging Turkey into a dialogue and unless it ends its unilateral activities, the EU is ready to develop a list of further restrictive measures that could be discussed at the European Council on 24-25 September 2020.

7- The volatile situation in Libya represents a threat to the stability of the country and of the entire region, including the European Union, and contributes to the aggravation of the terrorist threat and to human trafficking and smuggling. We recall the need for the EU to do its utmost to contribute to efforts to stabilize Libya. Capacity building is key for the Libyan authorities to acquire control over the land and sea borders and to combat transit and smuggling activities. We welcome the announcements issued on August 21 by the Heads of the Presidential Council and of the House of Representatives of the State of Libya that established founding principles for a shared path to overcome the current stalemate. It is a positive step in the right direction that must be developed. There is no military solution to the crisis: we urge all parties to agree to a ceasefire and to recommit themselves to the political dialogue under the aegis of the United Nations and the parameters agreed upon in the Berlin Conference. We also call for the immediate resumption of the oil production throughout the country, while also working to establish mechanisms to ensure an equitable and transparent distribution of oil revenues.

We reiterate our opposition to all foreign interference in this conflict, wherever it may come from, and remain determined to enforce the UN arms embargo, including through Operation Irini, whose violations exacerbated the current military escalation in Libya. We also remain ready to adopt sanctions against those involved in violating the embargo and human rights as well as those who oppose the political process.

8- The explosion in Beirut on 4 August, which struck the city in its heart, was a shock to the Lebanese people as well as to all of Lebanon’s friends and partners, first and foremost the European Union. This tragedy has hit a country already weakened by the very deep political and economic crisis that it has been experiencing for several months and which continues to worsen. In these difficult times, we stand by the Lebanese people and we will continue to do our utmost to meet the country’s most pressing needs and accompany it on its way to economic adjustment. We reiterate that priority must be given to the swift formation of a government that can implement the reforms that the Lebanese people have been waiting for too long.

9- In Syria, the situation continues to deteriorate and the country is sinking into a cycle of lasting instability. Through our assistance to the Syrian people and refugees, through our determined action against terrorism within the International Coalition Against Daech, we seek to mitigate the effects of this tragedy. Our objective remains that of relaunching the political process and creating the conditions for the voluntary, safe and dignified return of refugees. The search for a negotiated political solution under the aegis of the United Nations is the only possible way out of the Syrian crisis. In this spirit, and while the Syrian regime continues its obstruction of any political change, we will continue to make the financing of Syria’s reconstruction and the normalization of relations with Damascus conditional on the implementation of a credible and lasting political solution.

10- In Cyprus, recognizing that the status quo is not a viable alternative for the country, we fully support the declared commitment of the UN Secretary General to maintain his efforts for resuming negotiations from they were left off at Crans Montana Conference in 2017, leading to a viable comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem on the basis of a bicommunal, bizonal federation with political equality, as set out in the relevant UNSC resolutions and in line with the EU acquis, values and principles. We call all parties to commit and contribute to such a settlement, including its external aspects.

11- Regarding the Middle East peace process, only a negotiated solution for the establishment of two States living in peace and security along secure and recognized borders, and based on agreed parameters and international law, can lead to a just and lasting peace in the region. We welcome the announcement on 14 August of the normalization of relations between Israel and the United Arab Emirates. Israel’s commitment to suspend the annexation of Palestinian territories is a positive step, which must become definitive. As the European Union has pointed out on several occasions, any annexation of any kind would constitute a serious violation of international law. Any unilateral measure that could jeopardize the two-State solution and the prospect of the resumption of negotiations must be avoided.

European agenda
12- We welcome the agreement reached on Next Generation EU in Brussels on 21 July, which will be the instrument for a coordinated European recovery in response to the COVID-19 crisis. This agreement, unimaginable just a few months ago, is an unprecedented and innovative development, one of the most important since the creation of the euro zone. It is a strong signal, that of a Europe of solidarity and future-oriented by supporting the digital, environmental and climate priorities. This agreement is also a new step towards greater economic and social convergence between Member States and between regions, and thus greater economic stability on the continent. In this context, we stress the importance of the social dimension of Europe’s recovery and reaffirm our commitment towards the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights.

13- It is now important to fully implement this agreement by rapidly adopting the texts enabling it to become operational on 1 January 2021. We must also work towards effective reform of the own resources system, taking into consideration the proposals which the Commission will put forward in the first semester of 2021 regarding the introduction of a carbon border adjustment mechanism and a European digital levy with a view to their introduction at the latest by 1 January 2023.

14- The agreement on the multiannual financial framework and the recovery plan will make it possible to accompany the European Union and its territories in their transition to carbon neutrality. We are determined to adopt as soon as possible and at the latest before the end of the year our new objective of reducing emissions by 2030, which should reflect the highest possible degree of ambition. We commit to strengthen our climate diplomacy efforts by COP26, in order to secure revised upward commitments from the world’s largest emitters. We also commit to advance in the process aimed at the possible designation of the Mediterranean Basin, as whole, as a Sulphur Emission Control Area (SECA) according to the decisions of the 21st Conference of the Parties of the Barcelona Convention (COP 21) held in Naples in December 2019.

15- The cooperation in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic regions is important for the completion of the Energy Union and for a fully integrated and interconnected European energy market, also with a view to putting an end to any isolation of Member States and islands from European gas and electricity networks. The Commission’s future offshore renewable energy strategy should envisage cooperation to promote all sources of renewable and clean energy, including a thorough assessment of their potentials, and instruments that support all marine energies, such as the financing of industrial scale demonstration projects.

16- The new European Pact on Migration and Asylum to be presented shortly by the Commission will have to be based on shared responsibility and solidarity. It will have to enable the Union to deal with exceptional situations at external borders as well as with structural flows and to address issues of concern for all Member States, from front-line States to those affected by secondary movements. Such a system of shared responsibility would be coessential to the establishment of an authentically European system for management of returns. This unique opportunity to overcome the differences between Member States should be used to rebuild an effective and fair common European asylum system and to reinforce cooperation with third countries of origin and transit. It is also an opportunity to strengthen the functioning of the Schengen area. Concrete support to third countries, particularly North African countries, needs to be ensured to provide for sufficient operational capacity to manage migrations flows. Moreover, the new European Pact on Migration and Asylum will have to establish a solidarity mechanism, including those rescued through search and rescue operations. Together we will continue to seek permanent and predictable solutions.

17- In the negotiations on the future of the partnership with the United Kingdom, our ambition remains to reach a comprehensive, fair and balanced agreement before the end of the transition period, that reflects the United Kingdom’s status as a third country and ensures a balance of rights and obligations. In accordance with the negotiating directives approved by the Council, the MED7 countries will pay particular attention to ensuring that the future partnership guarantees stable access to fisheries resources and robust level playing field provisions. To reach an agreement, it is essential that the United Kingdom makes real commitments in these areas. We will also remain vigilant on the effective implementation of the Withdrawal Agreement and of its three Protocols. At the same time, we stand ready for the inevitable changes that will occur at the end of the transition period, considering all possible scenarios, including the absence of agreement on the future partnership.

18- In the same spirit as the Schuman Declaration, adopted 70 years ago, meeting these historic challenges will require more European sovereignty, more concrete results and more real solidarity through coordination and action. If we want to succeed, European citizens must be closely involved in this reflection: this is why we support the ongoing work on the Conference on the Future of Europe. We welcome the adoption of the negotiating mandate in the Council, and now hope that we will quickly reach an interinstitutional agreement so that we can formally launch the Conference as soon as possible.

19- We agree to hold the next summit in Greece.



posted for fair use
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Hummm........

Posted for fair use.....

The autonomous military groups in Libya

Published 1 day ago on September 10, 2020
By Giancarlo Elia Valori

With a view to currently understanding what is happening in the critical relationship between the Libyan military groups, we need – first and foremost – to look at the role played by the United Arab Emirates.

In Yemen, for example, the UAEs, which are primary players in the whole Arab context of the post-“democratic revolutions”, i.e. the “colour revolutions” developed by a U.S. model born in the Balkans, have placed both the Special Forces of the Presidential Guard and the traditional support to the local anti-Houthi militias on the ground.

In Yemen, the UAEs operate from the Assab base. In 2016 they reconquered Mukhallah, another very important base, and they finally recovered Al Mokha.

In Libya, the Emirates’ strategy, which is still essential to understand what is happening there, was different: clear support to Khalifa Haftar, certainly, but also direct actions by the UAE forces in favour of the forces of Benghazi’s Libyan National Accord: in the year between April 2019 and 2020 alone, there were as many as 850 drone launches and air attacks with advanced aircrafts on GNA’s Tripolitania, probably with Emirates’ pilots.

As to air attacks alone, the UAEs leave from the baseof al-Khadim, 65 miles east of Benghazi, which they have restructured. It is from this base that also the supplies for Haftar came, sent from al-Sweihan, Abu Dhabi, as well as from Assab, Eritrea, the maritime base from which the Italian colonisation of the Horn of Africa – which would be currently very useful – left in the 19th century.

With specific reference to operations in Libya, the mediation between the Emirates and the local fighting tribes is often mediated on the spot by Egypt, with strong financial, technological and informational support, as already happened in the operations towards Tripoli carried out by Saudi Arabia in 2017.

Hence who are the UAEs supporting in Libya? The Salafists, who often have the primary aim of fighting against the Muslim Brotherhood; many of the former fighters of Saleh’s “National Resistance Forces”; the old Republican Guard or the “Giants Brigades”, a Salafist group.

It should be recalled that in 2013 they were delegated to the government of Misrata, the “martyr city” and the centre of many revolutionary “katibe“. The city government was the prerogative of Ansaral-Sharia, a group affiliated to al Qaeda and arisen within the February 17thMartyrs Brigade, about which we will talk later on.

Hence many factions and “revolutionary brigades”, as well as much real immobility and immutability of the Libyan picture, where no one can win over the other, due to katibe and factions in government. This can be seen as a “guarantee” for silly or lazy Westerners, who think of stabilizing Libya by simply leaving it to its now very evident role of failed state.

In their heart the Emirates would like to have an al-Sisi-style shift towards authoritarianism, but in Libya there are even the Sudanese forces that also support General Haftar and collaborate closely and directly with those of the Emirates. We have already discussed Turkey’s role in Tripolitania in other articles.

Let us see, however, how the still many militarized factions operating in Libya were born and why.

Obviously the fault for all this lies with those who foolishly preached the war “against the tyrant” thinking that the Libya nor Maghreb political culture should be that of downtown Boston or London clubs.

Or of some ignorant French mythomaniacs who, in 1968, supported the pure Khmer Rouges criminals.

A global strategy for unsatisfied ladies in salons and social gatherings, a foreign policy of Mormon preachers who have their Bible “stuck in their heads”, as Voltaire used to say.

The West looks only at itself. It has an inward-looking attitude and can only think of its own silly categories. Therefore, it can no longer understand the others and hence it does not even understand itself.

The insurgency in Cyrenaica in 2011, organized mainly by French intelligence agents, was staged there because of the traditional marginalization of the East Libyan region during Gaddafi’s leadership and of the persistent ideological and organizational presence of the Senussian network, which has always had excellent relations with the Muslim Brotherhood and other groups of the Salafist tradition.

The Senussian sect has an esoteric and sometimes heterodox tradition which, over the years, has come closer to the Wahabi radicalism and literalist sectarianism of some Saudi and Egyptian traditions of Islam. As a scholar of ancient wisdom, I can say that this is a case to be studied carefully.

Hence a mix of local elites from Cyrenaica, superficial foreign agents, but often of local origin, as well as defectors from Gaddafi’s apparata, quickly organised a National Transitional Council(NTC) with French ships a few miles from the coast and even closer French submarines, as well as the advanced weapons supplied to them by the French Intelligence Services.

The NTC did mainly foreign policy, especially in the United States and the E.U. and especially contra Italiam, since Sarkozy’s dream was to have ENI bought by Total, with related presidential bribe, but it did not take care of hierarchically organizing all the various “revolutionary” groups that arose like mushrooms. Westerners paid well, and the “stuff” – as Machiavelli called it – was there for the most violent one.

We could also glimpse – very clearly – a Western campaign of simple and rough defamation against the “tyrant” Gaddafi and of progressive military support, especially in terms of air protection, to favour the “rebels”, all turned into “democrats”, with the magic of the aforesaid dull Western propaganda.

The Italians, forced by a series of subtle but very clear threats, were forced to participate in the anti-Gaddafi operation and, with this silly choice, they marked their progressive cancellation from the Mediterranean.

What about Mohammed bin Salman? Andal-Sisi? And the King of Jordan, a great and enlightened statesman? Are they “democratic” only because they are liked by the sloppy and superficial Westerners, who in the Middle East operate like the classic bull in a China shop? Was only Gaddafi the “villain” of this B western movie or were also the others there?

So let us forget the propaganda nonsense often orchestrated – as is the case with France – by enfantsgâtés who were trained – as I said above – among Pol Pot worshippers. After 1968, a path from De Gaulle’s enemies to U.S. propaganda men. A linear path, but the 1968 protesters did not know it.

As is well-known, the so-called Islamic revolution in Libya, but supported by Westerners, ended in August 2011, when the “democratic” Salafists and the Islamic Brothers took Sirte and Bani Walid, the last areas under Gaddafi’s control.

Tripoli’s Government of National Accord (GNA) has long had limited internal support, despite its being backed at international level with all the useless fanfares.

No one will ever know the formula of the spell that has enabled Tripoli’s GNA to receive the so-called “international legitimacy”.

The Presidential Council has been established in Tripoli since March 30, 2016. Led by Fayez al-Sarraj, former member of the Tobruk Parliament, where he represented Tripoli, it originated from a Libyan Political Agreement supported by the United Nations and signed on December 17, 2015, i.e. the Shkirat agreement, which was a pact between the two main factions to achieve a unitary national government between Tripoli’s GNA and Tobruk’s Parliament. Ninety Tobruk MPs signed the written agreements at the “Mohammed VI Centre” in the Moroccan city. Also the 27 Tripoli MPs signed it, but they had the “proxies to vote” of other 42 MPs living in the capital city who did not leave to vote. At the time the Presidential Committee was made up of 6 personalities, all designated by the United Nations. Later 3 other politicians were added, two representing Fezzan and one representing Cyrenaica. It was that Presidential Committee that drew up the list of Ministers of the unitary government. We know how it ended up. The legal-political fact is that the Tobruk Parliament accepted the 2015 agreement, but refused to sign Article 8 of the Shkirat text, which would force Tripoli’s government to control the autonomous forces of Cyrenaica.

Furthermore, at the time, the Tobruk Parliament did not accept the names proposed for the future, but impossible Libyan national government. A great and definitive chaos.

However, who is Fayez al-Sarraj? He graduated in Architecture and Town Planning from the University of Tripoli in 1982. He had secondary, but not negligible roles in Gaddafi’s regime and then inevitably joined the “revolution”.

It should be recalled, however, that the Presidential Council was the real Libyan “Head of State”.

But why did the Security Council vote unanimously the Political Agreement of December 2015? In fact, the aforementioned Shkirat agreement of 2015 was defined mainly to resolve the dispute between the regularly elected House of Representatives operating in Tobruk-Al Bayda, the General National Congress of Tripoli and the other centripetal forces that had already been formed. The latter won the fight against two weak governments depending on “others’ weapons”.

Continued.....
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Continued.....

The idea in the Shkirat pact was good in principle, but, without deciding who should be entrusted with “sovereignty”, disputes are bound to last forever.

Tripoli’s Presidential Council, currently led by al-Serraj – when, as you may recall, the current leader of Tripolitania had to arrive by sea because he knew that, if he arrived at the airport of Mitiga, he would be killed- was born, however, to create a unitary government with all “Parliaments” in Libya, not to operate alone.

The funny result is that the United Nations and all the sheep-like and spineless EU member States keep on looking the other way pretending nothing happened and treating the GNA as the only “legitimate” government. Moving forward almost by inertia, we could say. A heritage of the negative Western experiences in Iraq – but the brain is made to be used and not to project one’s own petty bourgeois preconceived ideas onto the Arab world, which is much more complex than we might think.

The United States has always fully supported the Government of National Accord (GNA), but Egypt, the Emirates, Russia and also, indirectly, China argue that a “national and unitary Libyan army” is particularly needed and therefore they support – first and foremost – KhalifaHaftar, especially in an anti-Islamistic and anti-jihadist function.

Reverting to the official structures of the now inevitably fragmented Libya – just now, when we need it well united – there is also Khalifa Gwell’s government, based on the now remote authority of a General National Congress, which had its moment of glory during the 2012 Parliamentary elections.

The “Parliament of Tripoli”, which has nothing to do with al-Sarraj, largely moved to the High Council of State, a body chaired by the leader of Misrata, Abdul Rahaman Sweli. Later, however, the Tobruk Parliament began to support the government of Abdullah Al-Thinni operating directly from Al-Bayda.

All the revolutionary groups participating in the easy insurgency against Gaddafi, the thuwar, as they are generically called in Libya, did not want – from the beginning – the continuity of the Armed Forces and the Libyan police. Quite the reverse, they strongly contested that assumption.

All of them had developed the vague concept of “revolutionary legitimacy” and it was precisely the first non-Gaddafi government, led by Abd Al Rahim al Kib (which lasted from November 2011 to November 2012) which actually appointed “guerrillas” from Zintan and Misrata, as well as Salafists and many jihadists, to Ministerial posts, at least to rebalance the distribution of presences in the “revolution” between Colonel’s old loyalists and new “Islamic revolutionaries”.

As was obvious, those jihadists and most of the thuwar, be they Salafists or not, did not accept at all the presence of the old men of Gaddafi’s regime in other areas of the Libyan government. In their opinion, their “revolutionary legitimacy” allowed them to have a right of control and expulsion – often “immediate” – for the old elements of Gaddafi’s “regime”.

Another factor not to be neglected in the analysis of the Libyan structural crisis is the scarce conceptualization and official regulation of military power and security.

Some roles in the Intelligence Services were abolished by the anti-Gaddafi revolution, based on the idea – we all know in Italy, but which remains silly anyway – that certain qualifications recalled sad moments (but only for them).

Even the Defence Ministry was abolished and the new laws for the intelligence sector made the Services a semi-private function, so to speak.

The laws adopted by the NTC and the National General Congress were always ambiguous and badly drafted, just like the Italian ones. Therefore any political players had the possibility of favouring their own military faction to the detriment of the others.

Therefore, first and foremost, the lack of clear and unambiguous rules and the intentional ambiguity of security laws mainly favoured the so-called “revolutionary legitimacy” of the thuwar against the professionalism of former Gaddafi’s supporters or even of the men that the West – always foolishly and carelessly – chose to lead the “new Libya”.

The ultimate aim of the insurgency was the destruction of Gaddafi’s family, who reasoned by clans and tribes. That held true for all the thuwar, although they had nothing in common.

Hence all of them and their katibe could not seriously control the Libyan territory and the concept of State power and unitary control of the territory did not even exist. We could define it a “federalism of civil war”.

95% of the small katibe, the “battalions” of the thuwar, were composed of less than 1,000 elements – little more than extended families, like the mafia gangs in the South of Italy – and in the Libyan West they organized themselves mainly through “Military Councils”, while in Eastern Cyrenaica through rather loose coalitions of “fighting groups”.

By Darwinian natural selection, two large reference organisations soon emerged for all the small katibe: the “17th February Coalition” and the “Coalition of Revolutionary Organisations”.

The “17th February Coalition” soon divided into two other sections.

The first one was called “Preventive Security Apparatus” and performed mainly counter-espionage and border control activities, also to counter the many elements still linked to Gaddafi.

The second one was called the “Libya Shield Force” and was composed of small groups that had operated mainly in Brega and operated mainly in the oil-rich Tripolitania.

In Misrata a brigade was formed, led by a defector of Gaddafi’s forces, Salim Joha, but made up of groups of trained civilians, with a size ranging from 1,000 men up to even 10-20 that, however, soon reached the size of as many as 236katibe.

Almost all of them were battalions specialised in one single task or function. Most of them enrolled – so to speak – in the “Misrata Union of Revolutionaries” or even in the “Misrata Military Council”.

In November 2011, at its best, the Union had 40,000 militiamen.

In the West, in the region generically defined as Tripolitania, there was a clear differentiation among the contact people of the countries that had carried out the (illegitimate) attack on Gaddafi – a differentiation that referred to military groups, policy lines and even areas of influence.

In Zintan there were 6,000 “revolutionaries” divided into eight brigades, while in Nalut there were 5,000 divided into six brigades.

The katibe of Jadu, Zawiya, Zuwara and the other small centres were mainly linked to the Border Guards, to the forces for controlling oil wells or even to those for Vital Installations.

Moreover, in Tripoli as many as 17 “revolutionary councils” were created, mainly fuelled by the 16,000 common criminals that Gaddafi had freed shortly before his fall. None of the groups was completely autonomous nor could control acceptable parts of territory. Many of them were involved in drug dealing with drugs stolen from the warehouses of the security apparata or operated in the “black market” and in the private protection sector.

There were also “revolutionary” groups that were created, but later, in the regions where Gaddafi’s power had lasted longer: in BaniWalid, Tarhouna and in the Warshafana area.

Those groups were a mix of old Gaddafians, orphans of their leader but always and absolutely part of the same tribe, and also of new “revolutionaries” who imitated the exploits of the katibe operating in the major centres.

Most of those groups later returned to the ranks of the Oil Guards that paid better than others.

Nevertheless, Gaddafi was also to blame for that chaos. He had created a State security structure that did not report only and directly to the Chief of Staff, but to two different and clearly separate bodies: the “Temporary General Committee on Defence” (initially led by Abu Bakr YunisJabr) and the “Standing Committee on Defence”, led by various figures but, actually, by Gaddafi himself.

The safety net of Gaddafi’s regime was also very complex: there was the “32ndBrigade”, led by Khamis Gaddafi, as well as the Mohammed al Maqariaf, Sahban, Fadhil Abu Omar, Faris, Hamza, Suqur, Abu Minyar and finally the Maghawir brigades.
In Gaddafi’s organization of State security, also the other military forces were divided into two. Only the Eastern units immediately defected, while the others remained loyal to the Colonel.

A part of the Saeqa battalion joined the “revolutionaries” of Eastern Cyrenaica to form the “Zawiya’s Martyrs Brigade” but, as the advance of jihadists and Westerners from the East proceeded, many officers – albeit fewer we may think – began to defect also in Tripolitania.

Nevertheless, many of the military units stationed in the South and in the West remained loyal to Gaddafi almost until the end.

After the death of the Sirte Colonel, the units of the West and of the South met with the “revolutionary councils” in the regions where the regular Armed Forces were strong while the revolutionary katibe were weak. This happened mainly in Gharyan, Khums, Sabha, Surman and Tarhouna, the city where a former director of our “external” intelligence Services was born. A hybridization of the political-military forces that make us reflect and is very characteristic of the Libyan anti-Gaddafi insurgency.

Instability obviously grew, while the Westerners, who foolishly caused it, washed their hands of it, probably waiting for the Holy Spirit of some invariably rigged election.
There was also the strengthening of some institutions which, however, were already very fragmented: the “Libya Shield Force”, the “Preventive Security Apparatus”, the “Lybyan National Guard”, a structure initially created by Khalid al Sharif, former leader of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, a network that was already born in the run-up to the 2011 insurgency.

Ubioccidentalia, ibijihadismus, and forgive me for the inevitable mistakes in Latin.
There were even other organizations of Gaddafi State that absorbed elements of the katibe to stay in power and have some kind of operational base. To survive and do business or just to stay alive. The economic crisis caused by the fall of the regime in 2011 bit immediately.

Oil accounted for 97% of Tripoli’s revenues at the time of the Colonel. The Libyan oil was processed and exported by ENI, French Total, German Wintershall, Russian Gazprom and Spanish Repsol. With many Italian managers inside them. Obviously Westerners were waiting for the capital of the Libyan Investment Authority to be mobilized – 67 billion in late 2012 – but the political issues arising from the factionalism of the katibe and governments were endless, as it was easy to predict. There were also the General Electricity Company of Libya (GECOL), the Libyan Iron and Steel Company (LISCO), the Economic and Social Development Fund (ESDF), the Office of Development or Administrative Complex (ODAC), the free port area of Misrata. Since Gaddafi’s time, an economy that, before the 2011 insurgency, had already been largely privatized but that the “revolutionaries” could not interpret and were not able to control.

Also the institutions fell into chaos, often applying Westernist models to a very different situation: for years the position of “Supreme Leader of the Armed Forces” remained not legally clear, but fluctuated within the GNC, as a result of power struggles, and was often harshly contested by the many “little bosses” of the katibe.

Before the governments split into two, there was also the often immature conflict between the Defence and the Interior Ministries and the government itself which led, even in the midst of an uncertain and always personalistic management of oil transactions, to an administrative, social and political stalemate – which, in turn, led to an increase in mass poverty.

That added to the Baroque and elaborate structure of institutions, pursued almost exclusively to avoid command and responsibility: the above mentioned Supreme Defence Committee in Tripoli (where also the Salafist and jihadist influences were more evident than in other regions),also divided throughout Libya into 54 regional sectors, had as many as 16,000 guerrillas available only in the old Gaddafi’s capital.

As already recalled, again at the Libyan post-national level, there were 54 local sectors of the Supreme Defence Committee, as well as 23 anti-crime committees, 45 units supporting defence activities, the Ėlite Forces and the Special Deterrence Forces.

It should also be noted that the Forces that had sought the support of the various factions of the Supreme Defence Committee -often succeeding in obtaining it – even included pro-Gaddafi katibe or even mere common criminals, in addition to elements already classifiable as Qaedist jihadists.

In Ben Ashur, for example, the members of the anti-crime brigades were all ex-convicts.
Until the dissolution of the Supreme Defence Committee, this was the mechanism of Libya’s post-Gaddafi “security”. We will talk about this matter again in other articles.
 

northern watch

TB Fanatic
Azerbaijani President Rebukes Putin Over Russian Military Cargo Deliveries to Armenia

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 17 Issue: 125
By: Rahim Rahimov

Jamestown.org
September 11, 2020 04:59 PM Age: 9 hours

Azerbaijani-Foreign-Minister-Jeyhun-Bayramov-and-Sergei-Lavrov-640x426.jpg
Azerbaijani-Foreign-Minister-Jeyhun-Bayramov-and-Sergei-Lavrov-640x426.jpg

Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov and his Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov (Source: mid.ru)

The Kremlin’s website reported, on August 12, that Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev had initiated a phone call to congratulate Vladimir Putin on the Russian vaccine against COVID-19 and to discuss bilateral issues. The next day, however, in a wholly unprecedented move, Aliyev’s press service sharply refuted the Russian version: “[T]he main purpose of the phone call was to clarify this issue” concerning “the intensity of delivery of military cargo from Russia to Armenia” since July 17, amidst the border clashes between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The volume of the military cargo exceeded 400 tons and was transported via the airspaces of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Iran. Neither government offered any indication as to what Putin’s response to Aliyev’s expressed concerns may have been (Kremlin.ru, August 12; President.az, August 13).

On August 25, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu visited Baku, where he claimed that the flights had been airlifting “construction materials used in large-scale construction work carried out at the 102nd Russian military base in this country [Armenia],” as well as rotating military personnel. Shoigu’s response was met with derision in Azerbaijan (Mod.gov.az, August 25; Turan.az, August 27; Trend.az, August 29).

In turn, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov pointedly declared that the catalyst for the July escalation was “the Armenian side’s decision to reanimate an old border checkpoint located 15 kilometers from Azerbaijani [oil and natural gas] export pipelines,” thus essentially echoing Azerbaijan’s narrative that Armenia had provoked the clash. Nonetheless, for Baku, Shoigu’s and Lavrov’s statements represented another Russian attempt to appease Azerbaijan with words but without matching deeds. Indeed, the observed military deliveries to Armenia continued, exceeding 510 tons even after Baku raised its objections with Moscow (Mid.ru, August 21; Musavat.az, August 24).

Azerbaijani media outlets, parliamentarians, experts and state officials jumped on the bandwagon to denounce Russia’s behavior in relation to the Karabakh conflict in unusually explicit terms. Some expressed appreciation for Tbilisi’s refusal to allow for the transit, hence compelling Moscow to take a more circuitous, 2,000-kilometer-long route, rather than a more direct, 500-kilometer route flying over Georgian territory. But the countries that allowed the Russian overflights were largely ignored. The military aircraft also made trips between Yerevan and Kuwait/Syria. The Syrian flights sparked particular uproar in Baku, leading to claims they were being conducted to engage in illegal arms sales and the resettlement of Middle Eastern Armenians in Karabakh. Other Azerbaijani commentators, however, argued that the ethnic-Armenian refugees would not have been interested in relocation from one conflict zone to another. Therefore, some suggested that Syria’s and Lebanon’s Armenians were being transferred to join the Armenian Armed Forces as the country suffers from demographic decline and a related shortage of soldiers. This claim drew inspiration from Yerevan’s recent draft law to form a 100,000-strong voluntary army as well as the Armenian government’s actual policy to resettle Lebanese-based and other Armenians in the country (Aztv.az, Kommersant, Jam-news.net, September 1; Trend.az, September 2 EurasiaNet, September 3; Day.az, August 7; Baku.ws, Qafqazinfo.az, August 14; Tert.am, August 25).

In response, the popular Russian newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta published an article titled “Syrian Fighters in Azerbaijan Prepare for Blitzkrieg Against Armenia,” full of allegations against Baku (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, September 1). Such mutual accusations symptomize the seriousness of the current tensions between Baku and Moscow, which also reverberated in exchanged remarks between the Azerbaijani and Russian foreign ministers in Moscow on August 26.

Namely, Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov called on Russia to press Armenia to live up to its obligations under the United Nations Security Council resolutions and de-occupy Azerbaijani territories. But Lavrov deflected by asserting that the “immediate task” of those UN resolutions had been “to stop the war then.” He also stated that the Minsk Group co-chairs will not write a scenario for the conflict settlement but only facilitate a positive atmosphere for the negotiations, leaving it to Armenia and Azerbaijan to settle their differences on mutually agreed terms (Mid.ru, August 26). Russian expert Stanislav Tarasov termed Lavrov’s remarks a “diplomatic attack” against Baku. Though, Russian scholar Sergey Markedonov clarifies that the Kremlin is not interested in actively “push[ing] Baku” unless Azerbaijan chooses “Euro-Atlantic solidarity” or “escape from Russia” (Regnum, September 1; Carnegie.ru, July 21).

Several possible contributing factors explain the present diplomatic downturn along the Moscow-Baku axis. These factors are interrelated and not mutually exclusive. First and foremost, Turkey and Azerbaijan held massive military exercises in response to Russian-Armenian drills following the July clashes (see EDM, August 14). And those exercises were followed by pronouncements and rallies in Baku urging the Turkish military to create permanent bases in the country, worrying Moscow. Second, Russia’s arms sales to the South Caucasus’s largest importer, Azerbaijan, have decreased in recent years, in favor of purchases from Israel and Turkey. Ankara’s share is set to continue to rise due to the Russian-made equipment’s reported ineffectiveness, in Syria and Libya, against “game-changing” Turkish drones and electronic warfare technology. Third, Azerbaijan has overtaken Russia as the top gas supplier to the Turkish market (see EDM, July 6). This competition with Gazprom will soon be extended to Southeastern Europe with the looming inauguration of the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline, the final segment of the Southern Gas Corridor (see EDM, January 30, 2017 and July 22, 2020; Wilsoncenter.org, September 3; Pressklub.az, August 28; Sipri.org, March 9). Fourth, Baku is frustrated with Moscow’s de facto lack of neutrality regarding the Karabakh conflict. Azerbaijan had, perhaps naively, expected a more even-handed Russian approach because of the perception that the Kremlin holds antipathy toward Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and his Velvet Revolution. And fifth, recent Azerbaijani cabinet reshuffles dismissed the head of the presidential administration, Ramiz Mehdiyev, widely depicted as “the leader of pro-Russian forces” in Baku, along with other figures in his circle (see EDM, September 18, 2018 and December 11, 2019; Qafqazinfo.az, September 2; Science.gov.az, August 25).

Moscow is well aware that the newly appointed Azerbaijani minister of foreign affairs and presidential aide on foreign policy were tasked by Aliyev with more forcefully communicating the country’s positions (APA, July 15; TASS, August 25; Kommersant, August 27). And as such, the Russian side considers these top Azerbaijani diplomats to be acting more as high-level messengers than foreign policy chiefs in their own right. It remains to be seen whether Baku’s hardened rhetoric vis-à-vis the Kremlin foreshadows a qualitative change in Azerbaijani foreign policy or if it epitomizes another episodic, reactive and tactical shift in its dealings with Moscow. For now, the latter scenario looks more likely, if for no other reason than that the former would require the adoption of an entirely new long-term strategy.

 

northern watch

TB Fanatic
Azerbaijan, Turkey Hold Large-Scale Military Drills Amidst Escalation of Tensions With Armenia

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 17 Issue: 121
By: Vasif Huseynov

Jamestown.org
August 14, 2020 03:19 PM Age: 4 weeks

Azerbaijan-Turkey-military-drills-640x391.jpeg
Azerbaijan-Turkey-military-drills-640x391.jpeg

(Source: APA)

On July 29, Azerbaijan and Turkey launched a two-week long round of joint military exercises with the participation of ground and air forces from both countries. The military drills involving land forces were held from August 1 to 5, in Baku and Nakhchivan; while the exercises with the participation of military aviation occurred between July 29 and August 10, in Baku, Nakhchivan, Ganja, Kurdamir and Yevlakh (Mod.gov.az, July 27, 30). The goal of these maneuvers was to test the combat readiness of Azerbaijani and Turkish troops to fulfill joint operations, their ability to act quickly in certain situations, to clarify issues of cooperation between the staffs, and to conduct fire management exercises (Azeridefence.com, August 2).

The recently concluded bilateral exercises were held under the legal framework established by the 2010 Agreement on Strategic Partnership and Mutual Support (ASPMS) between Turkey and Azerbaijan. This agreement includes, among others, the casus foederis principle, which obligates both parties, in line with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, to cooperate when either country faces aggression from a third state or group of states (E-qanun.az, December 21, 2010). In accordance with the ASPMS—which is expected to be renewed for another ten years this month—the two allies have held increasingly more intensive and numerous military drills each year. For instance, up to 13 exercises involving the armed forces of both countries were organized in 2019, while there were only 7 such joint drills in 2018 (see EDM, July 11, 2019).

Compared to previous years, however, the latest joint exercises took place against the background of an exceptional regional situation caused by the sudden flare-up on the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan on July 12 (see EDM, July 14). Moreover, on the heels of the clashes between the two South Caucasus rivals, Russia held its own large-scale snap combat readiness checks of the troops of the Southern and Western military districts on July 17–22. Moscow’s impromptu maneuvers were officially declared to be a “major part of preparations for the Kavkaz 2020 [Caucasus 2020] strategic command and staff exercise,” planned for early fall, and ostensibly to have no connection to the Armenian-Azerbaijani border clashes (TASS, July 18; see EDM, July 23).

The day after Russia’s military drills ended, on July 23, the Armenian Ministry of Defense reported that it was holding military exercises together with Russia involving the commanders of the Russo-Armenian air-defense system, separate anti-aircraft units of the Armenian army as well as air force officers from both countries. According to the ministry, the particular objective of the exercises was to develop new ways of fighting against unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), which were intensively employed in both the Armenian-Azerbaijani April 2016 “Four-Days War” and the July fighting this year (Asbarez, July 24).

Against this background of strained tensions in the region, on July 16, Azerbaijani deputy minister of defense and the commander of the Air Force, Lieutenant General Ramiz Tahirov, as well as the army commander of the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic, Kerem Mustafayev, paid a visit to Turkey and met with top Turkish military brass (Defence.az, July 16). Reportedly, the sides discussed the situation between Armenia and Azerbaijan, military cooperation between the two Turkic states, and probably also joint military exercises (Anadoly Agency, Defence.az, July 17). Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Defense stated that the exercises would be held “according to the annual plan” of the ASPMS, but did not explicitly deny its relation with the July 12 border clashes in Tovuz province (Mod.gov.az, July 27).

Turkey appears ready to transfer to Azerbaijan the experience it has accumulated in the use of attack drones, multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS) and air-defense systems over the last several years. Moreover, Ankara seems determined to broaden the geography of its rise as an influential regional player (Yeni Safak, August 4; Nezavisimaya Gazeta, July 28). Its 13-day military exercises with Azerbaijan, involving military personnel, armored vehicles, artillery mounts, and mortars, as well as military aviation and air-defense equipment, are the largest of its kind in the recent history of military cooperation between the two countries.

The Azerbaijani media reported that up to 11,000 military service members of the Turkish army arrived in Azerbaijan to attend the drills, but there has been no official confirmation about the true size of the Turkish contingent (Modern.az, August 1). Russia’s Nezavisimaya Gazeta reports that no more than a Turkish battalion tactical group of up to 1,000 service members can be concentrated in the garrisons of the Nakhchivan Separate Combined Arms Army. Though, the Russian daily adds that, according to tactical standards, these troops can be reinforced with MLRS and strike aircraft, which are capable of hitting any targets in Armenia (Nezavsimaya Gazeta, July 28).

Earlier this year, Azerbaijan’s defense ministry featured a video showing Turkish-manufactured MLRS batteries, including the latest variant of the 300-millimeter TRG-300 Kaplan (Tiger), stationed in Nakhchivan (see EDM, May 18). On July 31, Turkish F-16 jets were also brought to Azerbaijan to take part in an aviation exercise named TurAz Eagle 2020 (Mod.gov.az, July 31).

The Azerbaijani-Turkish drills caused considerable anxiety in Armenia. Meeting with the ambassadors of France and Russia as well as Iran’s newly appointed envoy to Yerevan, Armenia’s Defense Minister David Tonoyan said that his government would be monitoring the scheduled military drills by Turkey and Azerbaijan (Asbarez, July 29). While praising the military partnership between Armenia and Russia and organizing joint military exercises with the Russian army, Tonoyan described Azerbaijan’s military drills with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member Turkey as “destabilizing” for the region (Asbarez, July 29).

It is not known yet how the military drills will affect the balance of power in the region, and especially the three-decade-old conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan that started in the early 1990s. The failure of negotiations brokered by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s (OSCE) Minsk Group, co-chaired by Russia, France and the United States, is widely perceived as an important factor in the further intensification of the conflict. And the implications extend far beyond the region since “information warfare” linked to July’s border clashes has already spilled over to the diasporas in third countries (APA, July 21; Lragir.am, July 23; Contact.az, July 31).

 

jward

passin' thru
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Turkey's 3rd drillship Kanuni ready for East Med departure
View: https://twitter.com/EndGameWW3/status/1304971702007468032?s=20

Turkey's 3rd drillship Kanuni ready for East Med departure
by DAILY SABAH
ISTANBUL Energy

Sep 11, 2020 12:52 pm GMT+3



Turkey's third drillship Kanuni docked at the NATO port in Incekum in the Silifke district of Mersin province, southern Turkey, Sept. 11, 2020. (DHA Photo)

Turkey's third drillship Kanuni docked at the NATO port in Incekum in the Silifke district of Mersin province, southern Turkey, Sept. 11, 2020. (DHA Photo)






Turkey’s third oil and natural gas exploration and drillship, Kanuni, is counting the last days before it departs for the Eastern Mediterranean.
Having been docked at the NATO port in Incekum in the Silifke district of Mersin province in southern Turkey since March 15, Kanuni has been painted in the national colors, red and white, and a Turkish flag was placed on it.
Its maintenance, upgrade and development works are said to be almost complete and the vessel will soon be ready to set sail for its Eastern Mediterranean mission, according to Demirören News Agency (DHA). It will join the duo of Fatih and Yavuz to boost Turkey’s seismic explorations.
Prior to Turkey’s procurement, the drillship had been sitting idle at a Welsh port town for nearly two years. It has an estimated market value of $120 million (over TL 896 million). Turkey reportedly bought the drillship for nearly $40 million.
The sixth-generation ultra drillship was built by South Korea's Samsung Heavy Industries and used by Brazil's Petrobras between 2012 and 2015.



The drillship is 227 meters (744 feet) long, 42 meters wide and has a draft of 12 meters. Its equipment can reach up to 11,400 meters below sea level and drill to a depth of 3,000 meters below the seabed.
The name Kanuni, which means the "lawgiver" in Turkish, stems from Suleiman I, also known as Suleiman the Magnificent. Suleiman I was one of the greatest sultans that ever ruled the Ottoman Empire. He was the 10th and longest-reigning sultan of the Ottoman Empire, ruling from 1520 until his death in 1566.

 

jward

passin' thru
Secretary Michael R. Pompeo at the Cyprus Center for Land, Open-seas, and Port Security Memorandum of Understanding Signing Ceremony


Remarks

Michael R. Pompeo, Secretary of State

Presidential Palace

Nicosia, Republic of Cyprus

September 12, 2020


SECRETARY POMPEO: Thank you. Thank you and good evening. Happy Saturday evening to everyone. President Anastasiades, we had a great meeting. Thank you so much for hosting me. Our conversations reflected a robust, growing diplomatic, security, and economic partnership between the United States of America and the Republic of Cyprus. We’re proud to cultivate ties with nations that share our values.
I daresay that our relationship has never been better, and I am proud of that. As just one example, security cooperation between our two countries is growing. On September 1st I announced the decision to temporarily waive export controls on direct commercial sales of non-lethal defense articles and services for the Republic of Cyprus, and in July we invited Cyprus to participate in our military training program known as IMET. That’s a big deal and it’s great. We’ll welcome your service members.

Today the foreign minister and I just signed an MOU to create a new training center to be funded by the United States and built here in Cyprus. It will provide expertise for the rest of the region on border security and nonproliferation. It will be known as the Cyprus Center for Land, Open-seas, and Port Security, or CYCLOPS. Well done, very clever.
Security cooperation matters all the more as we see nations which don’t share our values trying to obtain new footholds in the region. To that end, I raised the United States concern over Russia’s money-laundering activities and its regular port calls here. We know that all the Russian military vessels that stop in Cypriot ports are not conducting humanitarian missions in Syria, and we asked to consider – we asked Cyprus and the president to consider our concerns.

Of course, I also heard from the president the Republic of Cyprus’ perspective on challenges in the Eastern Mediterranean related to energy exploration and development, which he spoke of just a minute ago. I reiterated that President Trump has spoken with both President Erdogan and with Prime Minister Mitsotakis already.
Countries in the region need to resolve disagreements – including on security and energy, resource and maritime issues – diplomatically and peacefully. Increased military tensions help no one but adversaries who would like to see division in transatlantic unity. Energy in the Eastern Mediterranean has an ability to bring states together. Regional cooperation is absolutely necessary for durable energy security, the creation of new markets, and economic prosperity in the Eastern Mediterranean.

We remain deeply concerned by Turkey’s ongoing operations surveying for natural resources in areas over which Greece and Cyprus assert jurisdiction in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Republic of Cyprus has the right to exploit its natural resources, including the right to hydrocarbons found in its territorial sea and its economic – exclusive economic zone.
We also believe that the resources of Cyprus should be shared equitably among the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots communities.
Finally, the United States continues to support a comprehensive settlement to reunify the island as a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation which would benefit all Cypriots as well as the wider region.
Mr. President, thank you for hosting me. God bless you. I hope you have a wonderful rest of your Saturday night.
 

jward

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LIVE: Turkey’s Defence Minister Hulusi Akar speaks after visiting seaside town of Kas, located across Meis(Kastellorizo) island of Greecehttps://twitter.com/eha_news/status/1305116944593498112?s=20


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#BREAKING Turkish Defence Minister Hulusi Akar: "We're in favour of the dialogue. We hope that our issues would be resolved through peaceful methods with political solutions."
#BREAKING Turkish defense minister Akar says #Greece is violating agreements, escalating tension and sabotaging dialogue by arming 18 islands.
#Turkey's Defence Minister Akar says French President Macron's policy, based on supporting #Greece against Turkey, has fallen apa

"Greek people should not follow Macron-led initiatives, forming part of French president's schemes to save himself"




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Turkish Defence Minister Akar on #NATO talks with Greece

"We're ready to host a fourth meeting. We don't shy away from a meeting" .

"We support efforts for negotiations aimed at finding political solutions"
 
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