ALERT North Korea 'fires submarine-launched ballistic missile' - 23 April 2016

Housecarl

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For links see article source.....
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http://www.wsj.com/article_email/ja...-nuclear-1462738914-lMyQjAxMTE2MTAzOTIwMjk2Wj

Opinion | Commentary

Japan and South Korea May Soon Go Nuclear

The longtime status quo is crumbling and plutonium stockpiles are rising.

By Henry Sokolski
May 8, 2016 4:21 p.m. ET
66 COMMENTS

On Friday North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un praised his country’s recent hydrogen bomb test and satellite launch as “unprecedented” achievements that will “bring the final victory of the revolution.” Such rhetoric is nothing new, but North Korea’s nuclear-weapons program and a growing sense that security arrangements with the U.S. aren’t sufficient has eroded the Japanese taboo against nuclear weapons. On April 1, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s cabinet announced that Japan’s constitution did not ban his country from having or using nuclear arms.

Meanwhile, South Korea’s ruling-party leaders have urged President Park Geun-hye to stockpile “peaceful” plutonium as a military hedge against its neighbors. A Feb. 19 article in Seoul’s leading conservative daily, the Chosun Ilbo, went so far as to detail how South Korea could use its existing civilian nuclear facilities to build a bomb in 18 months.

Japan and South Korea are party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and Tokyo’s antinuclear-weapons stance dates to 1945 and the nuclear devastation the U.S. wreaked on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. But that won’t necessarily stop either country from joining the nuclear club—or at least positioning themselves to do so quickly—if they feel the U.S. “nuclear umbrella” is folding.

Japan already has stockpiled 11 tons of plutonium, separated from fuel used in its nuclear-power reactors. A bomb requires roughly five kilograms (or 1/200th of a ton). The old shibboleth, popular with the nuclear industry, that such “reactor-grade” plutonium is unsuitable for weapons, is essentially irrelevant for a technologically advanced country. Japan also has built—but not operated—a large reprocessing plant of French design that can separate about eight tons of plutonium a year.

The shutdown of Japan’s power reactors following the 2011 Fukushima disaster means there are no reactors online that can use this plutonium. But Japan says it will proceed with reprocessing anyway, putatively to keep open the distant possibility of fueling a new generation of so-called fast-breeder reactors. Japan’s nuclear cooperation agreement with Washington allows it to do this with U.S.-origin fuel. South Korea’s agreement prohibits this without U.S. approval, something Seoul chafes at. It sees itself the equal of Japan. Should Japan operate Rokkasho, as it plans to do late in 2018, it will be impossible politically to restrain South Korea from following suit.

China, meanwhile, is negotiating with France to build a reprocessing plant similar to Japan’s. One might discount the security significance of this; Beijing already has nuclear weapons. But a large reprocessing plant would allow it to expand its nuclear arsenal far beyond its present size. The Chinese are clearly aware of the military significance of nominally civilian plutonium. Consider their loud and repeated complaints about Japan’s plutonium stocks.

The Asian goal of stockpiling plutonium to launch a new generation of plutonium-fueled fast-breeder reactors is one shared with nuclear enthusiasts in the West. But fast reactors are so much more expensive than conventional uranium-burning reactors that they, and the reprocessing of spent fuel they require, have never made economic sense. In Tokyo, Seoul and Beijing there are government officials and advisers who understand this and the security risks of commercializing plutonium. But their concerns have been trumped by nationalistic demands not to fall behind in plutonium technology.

The obvious fix, which would be economically beneficial for Japan, South Korea and China, is a collective pause in the rush toward civil plutonium. For the U.S. to credibly broker this, Capitol Hill needs to support the Energy Department’s February decision to terminate the construction in South Carolina of a plutonium plant designed to fuel U.S. power reactors that is billions over budget and years behind schedule.

An Asian-U.S. plutonium pause has support within the administration and Congress. Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz recently told the Journal’s Beijing office: “We don’t support large-scale reprocessing.” He said a large commercial Chinese reprocessing plant “certainly isn’t a positive in terms of nonproliferation.”

At a March hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Sens. Bob Corker (R., Tenn.) and Ed Markey (D., Mass.), both backed a “time out” on East Asian plutonium recycling. Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Countryman agreed: “I would be very happy to see all countries get out of the plutonium reprocessing business.” In the House a plutonium timeout has been championed by Reps. Brad Sherman (D., Calif.), Jeff Fortenberry (R., Neb.) and Adam Schiff (D., Calif.).

They understand that a collective plutonium timeout would calm East Asia and save our Asian allies, China and the U.S. hundreds of billions of dollars. President Obama, with less than a year in office to make a lasting contribution to nuclear nonproliferation, should feel comfortable backing this proposal.

Mr. Sokolski is the executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center and the author of “Underestimated: Our Not So Peaceful Nuclear Future” (Strategic Studies Institute, 2016).
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.realcleardefense.com/art...h_the_north_korean_nuclear_threat_109346.html

May 9, 2016

Dealing with The North Korean Nuclear Threat

By John Carlson

North Korea’s ruler, Kim Jong-un, has outlined his country’s nuclear weapon policy. At the Workers’ Party Congress, now in session, he announced that 'as a responsible nuclear weapons state, our Republic will not use a nuclear weapon unless its sovereignty is encroached upon by any aggressive hostile forces with nukes'. He also said 'North Korea will faithfully fulfill its obligation for non-proliferation and strive for the global denuclearisation'.

This last statement is totally inconsistent with North Korea’s record. North Korea withdrew from the NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) in 2003. Subsequently it has conducted four nuclear tests, and a further nuclear testappears imminent. Mr Kim has posed on television with what was presented as a nuclear warhead. North Korea has test-fired a variety of ballistic missiles, including intercontinental and submarine-launched missiles. And North Korea has helped the nuclear proliferation efforts of other countries, the most spectacular example being the construction of a plutonium production reactor in Syria (bombed by Israel in 2007). Currently North Korea is believed to have enough plutonium for around a dozen nuclear weapons, and is also believed to be producing highly enriched uranium (HEU), though the quantity is not known.

Most experts consider that North Korea’s claims are exaggerated. To date its nuclear tests have been small-scale, its claims to have successfully tested a hydrogen bomb are discounted, and most of its missile tests are evident failures. Nonetheless, there is no doubt that over time, if nothing changes, North Korea’s capabilities will continue to improve. It could possibly have a missile, albeit of uncertain reliability, capable of reaching the US mainland with a nuclear warhead by the end of this decade.

South Korea and Japan are increasingly agitated about North Korean developments. In both countries there is public discussion of whether they should renounce their non-proliferation commitments and develop nuclear weapons of their own. China, supposedly North Korea’s ally, also has every reason to worry about the dangers of North Korea’s behaviour. It is imperative to find a circuit breaker before the situation escalates into a major regional crisis.

Sanctions not doing the job

What can be done? UN and national sanctions on North Korea have been toughened, but realistically sanctions are unlikely to change North Korea’s behaviour. The nuclear program has been given major political prominence, enshrined in the constitution and in party ideology. Moreover, sanctions are not being fully enforced (for example the border with China is notoriously leaky), and to date China has not been prepared to support sanctions that are strong enough to undermine the North Korean regime.

The only real prospect of persuading North Korea to change direction is by engaging with the regime on the issues that are driving it towards nuclear weapons, and to show that changing direction can bring substantial benefits. In other words, there is a need to return to negotiations and to discuss incentives as well as sanctions. The Six-Party Talks last met in 2008. There is a need to revive these talks or establish a similar process.

Realistically, could negotiations proceed in good faith? This really comes down to a question of what North Korea really wants. The only way to find out would be to start negotiations and see where they lead. While the central importance the North Korean leadership has given to the nuclear program seems to make negotiations pointless, there is room for flexibility if the leadership so chooses. Kim Jong-un has put forward the ideology of pyongjin. This calls for three objectives to be pursued simultaneously: economic development; nuclear technology for peaceful purposes; and nuclear technology for military purposes. The relative weight attached to each objective depends on the leadership.

North Korea has to understand that the international community will not accept it as a nuclear weapon state. Even North Korea’s longstanding friend, Iran, has made this clear: in his visit to Seoul last week President Rouhani stressed Iran’s opposition to any form of nuclear weapons development on the Korean peninsula. If North Korea is absolutely determined to be a nuclear weapon state then negotiations cannot succeed. On the other hand, it is unrealistic to demand that North Korea relinquishes its nuclear program in the near term. Engagement can start a process of building the trust needed for eventual denuclearization.

North Korea has made it clear for many years that it wants a peace settlement in place of the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement. The armistice, concluded between North Korea, the US and China, was to 'insure a complete cessation of hostilities and of all acts of armed force in Korea until a final peaceful settlement is achieved'. North Korea considers it needs a nuclear deterrent because until there is a final peaceful settlement the Korean War has not ended.

Is a peace treaty possible?

A starting point in addressing the nuclear program, therefore, should be to propose negotiation of a peace treaty. This would involve close collaboration between the US and China, which is the third party to the armistice and the country most able to influence North Korea. A complication is that North Korea and the US see a peace treaty differently. For the US, this would come at the end of negotiations covering a range of subjects, especially denuclearisation. For North Korea, a peace treaty would be a relatively simple agreement ending the armistice. This would be followed by negotiation of a comprehensive peace settlement, a process that would cover many aspects — including borders and conventional force reductions — and could take years to conclude. Denuclearisation could be considered only as part of this longer process. A particularly difficult issue is that North Korea sees denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula as including dissolution of the US/South Korean alliance arrangements and removal of the US 'nuclear umbrella'.

As this last issue shows, negotiation with North Korea won’t be easy. There is a massive lack of trust to be overcome, on both sides. For this reason effective verification and monitoring arrangements, both for the nuclear program and conventional force reductions, would be an essential part of any deal. The Six-Party Talks ended over failure to agree on verification arrangements. Getting North Korean acceptance of verification will be one of many challenges.

The immediate aim of negotiations would be to secure a freeze to North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, in exchange for a peace treaty ending the armistice. Initially there would have to be a commitment against any further nuclear weapon and nuclear-capable missile tests. As negotiations progress to the specifics of a broader peaceful settlement, the freeze would have to extend to a verified cessation of plutonium and HEU production. The broader settlement will have to include incentives sufficiently attractive for North Korea to maintain the freeze and, in time, to dismantle the nuclear and missile programs.

North Korea must be left in no doubt that if it is not prepared to enter into serious negotiations and to freeze its nuclear and missile programs, then the international community will have no choice but to take whatever action is necessary to stop these programs from becoming a greater threat. To this end, China must be persuaded that if North Korea rejects good faith efforts to find a negotiated outcome, China’s own national interest requires it to do everything it can to avoid an escalating crisis.

Negotiations with North Korea will require a sustained effort possibly over a period of years. At this stage in the life of the Obama Administration, and given the domestic political difficulties of engagement, it is likely this effort will be left to the next President. It must then be considered as a matter of the highest priority. We must hope that North Korea does nothing in the meantime to make engagement even harder.


This article originally appeared at the Lowy Institute Interpreter.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-congress-reporter-idUSKCN0Y00BF

World | Mon May 9, 2016 8:39am EDT
Related: World, North Korea

BBC correspondent expelled from North Korea over reporting

PYONGYANG | By James Pearson


North Korea expelled a BBC journalist on Monday over his reporting, the broadcaster and a North Korean official said, as a large group of foreign media members visited the isolated country to cover a rare ruling party congress.

Rupert Wingfield-Hayes was detained on Friday as he was about to leave the country and taken away for eight hours of questioning and "made to sign a statement", the network reported.

The British journalist, accompanied by a BBC producer and cameraman, arrived in Beijing on Monday evening after a flight from Pyongyang, the North Korean capital.

"We're obviously very glad to be out. We're going to go and talk to our bosses now. But just relieved to be out," Wingfield-Hayes told reporters at the airport before being driven off in a car, along with his colleagues.

Wingfield-Hayes had "distorted facts and realities" in his coverage, North Korean official O Ryong Il said in announcing that the reporter, who is based in Tokyo, was being expelled and would never be let in again.

"They were speaking very ill of the system, the leadership of the country," O, who is secretary general of a National Peace Committee, told reporters in Pyongyang, according to a video clip published by the Associated Press.

Another BBC correspondent in Pyongyang, John Sudworth, said in a broadcast report there was "disagreement, a concern over the content of Rupert's reporting", including questioning the authenticity of a hospital.

In his report of a visit to the children's hospital in Pyongyang, Wingfield-Hayes said the patients looked "remarkably well" and there was not a real doctor on duty.

"Everything we see looks like a set-up" he said.

In another report, Wingfield-Hayes noted that his official minders were "rather upset with us" over trying to do a report in front of a statute of founding leader Kim Il Sung.

"They clearly felt we said stuff that was not respectful," of Kim, he said in his report.

"Now, we are in trouble," he said, adding that the BBC team had been told to delete its footage.

Sudworth said in his report Wingfield-Hayes had been prevented from leaving on Friday and taken away.

"(He) was separated from the rest of his team, prevented from boarding that flight, taken to a hotel and interrogated by the security bureau here in Pyongyang before being made to sign a statement and then released, eventually allowed to rejoin us here in this hotel," Sudworth said.


CLOSELY WATCHED

A BBC spokesman said four BBC staff remained in the country and he expected they would be allowed to stay.

"We are very disappointed that our reporter Rupert Wingfield-Hayes and his team have been deported from North Korea after the government took offense at material he had filed," the spokesman said.

The eight-hour interrogation was conducted by a man who introduced himself to Wingfield-Hayes as the person who prosecuted Kenneth Bae, an American missionary who had been held by the North for two years for crimes against the state, said another BBC correspondent in Pyongyang, Stephen Evans.

Bae was released in November 2014.

North Korea granted visas to an unusually large group of 128 journalists from 12 countries to coincide with the Workers' Party congress.

Their movements are closely managed and their only access to the proceedings of the congress, which began on Friday, was on Monday, when a group of about 30 was let into the venue for a brief visit, following nearly three hours of security checks.

Otherwise, they were taken to showcase sites, such as a maternity hospital, an electric cable plant and a children's center.

On Monday, visiting media were taken to a textile factory named after Kim Jong Suk, the grandmother of the country's young leader.

The North Korean government, which owns and operates all domestic news media organizations, maintains tight control over foreign reporters, with government "minders" accompanying visiting journalists as they report.

Wingfield-Hayes had been in town ahead of the congress to cover the visit of a group of Nobel laureates.

North Korea said it would strengthen self-defensive nuclear weapons capability in a decision adopted at the congress, its KCNA news agency reported on Monday, in defiance of U.N. resolutions.


(Additional reporting by Ju-min Park and Jack Kim in Seoul, Ben Blanchard in Beijing and Guy Faulconbridge in London; Editing by Tony Munroe and Clarence Fernandez)
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Expect another test in the very near future.....

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-36253681

North Korea holds rally to mark end of party congress

1 hour ago

Hundreds of thousands of North Koreans have joined a rally marking the end of the Workers' Party Congress, the first in 36 years.

The congress cemented the position of leader Kim Jong-un, elevating him to the role of party chairman.

On Tuesday, state media announced that Mr Kim' sister, Kim Yo-jong, had been elected to the ruling committee.

The Congress also endorsed the national policy of building nuclear capability alongside economic development.

On Monday, three BBC journalists were expelled from the country for reporting which had angered the authorities.

Correspondent Rupert Wingfield-Hayes was detained on Friday and interrogated for eight hours, before being made to sign a statement of apology. He and his colleagues left on Monday.

The BBC said it was disappointed by North Korea's decision.

At the rally in Pyongyang on Tuesday, Mr Kim was seen waving to the crowds and chatting with military and party officials.

Hundreds of thousands of people marched through the square waving pink paper flowers, coloured balloons and red party flags. Floats were also moved through the square, some of them carrying mock-ups of missiles.


At the scene: Stephen Evans, BBC News, Pyongyang

Numbers at the rally are hard to estimate but I counted blocks of marchers 50 people wide and 50-plus people long passing for an hour, some goose-stepping holding red banners.

There were tightly choreographed displays of flag waving. Others were in civilian clothes, the women in traditional Korean dress and the men in suits with a collar and tie.

These did not march but leapt and bounded along the square, cheering ecstatically and gazing up at the balcony behind which Kim Jong-un sat or stood.

We asked them why they were so ecstatic. The answer invariably was that they were so happy to see the elevation of Marshal Kim Jong-un to the chairmanship of the Workers Party.

It's very hard to know what people think. It may be a mixture. I watched unobtrusively the faces of some North Koreans I know and their ecstasy seemed genuine. But that doesn't mean the people aren't also oppressed: numerous accounts by defectors and the absence of meaningful elections indicate they are.

The confirmation of a new title for Mr Kim's sister had been widely expected. .

She is already influential as vice-director of the Propaganda and Agitation Department, but her elevation to the central committee is seen as a further consolidation of power around her brother.

More than 100 foreign reporters have been granted visas to cover the congress, although only a few were, briefly, allowed in to watch the meeting.

The congress, which began on Friday, also launched a new five-year plan for the economy, which has been hit by some of its strongest sanctions yet after the country's recent nuclear and rocket tests.

Mr Kim also used a speech to say the North would not use its nuclear weapons unless its sovereignty was threatened.

China has sent a message of congratulations to the North Korean leader on his new position, though it declined to send a representative to the gathering.

Analysts suggested this may be because of unhappiness with recent indications Pyongyang is preparing to conduct its fifth nuclear test.



More on this story

Video Inside North Korea Congress after BBC reporter expelled
9 May 2016

What we learned in North Korea this week
6 May 2016

North Korea Congress: Kim Jong-un and the Workers Party
30 April 2016

Profile: Kim Jong-un, North Korea's supreme commander
6 January 2016

North Korea country profile
6 May 2016
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
(And of course they could just use Li-6 and add an additional neutron source/generator...)

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1201373/producing-tritium-in-north-korea/

Producing tritium in North Korea

by Andreas Persbo | May 10, 2016 | No Comments

Jeffrey has asked me to post a blog written by Hugh Chalmers, who works with me here in London. It covers possible ways in which North Korea could produce tritium for its nuclear weapons programme. It first appeared in Trust & Verify, which is our centre’s quarterly publication.

I’m not going to plug Trust & Verify too much, but if you’re interested in signing up for e-mail delivery, you can do so here. Our next edition, scheduled for July, will continue to feature lead articles on conventional arms control, with an emphasis on Open Skies.


Producing tritium in North Korea
By Hugh Chalmers

2016 has been a busy year for North Korea’s nuclear weapon programme. Having started it off with a bang on 6th January with a fourth nuclear weapon test, the programme has since rattled through a successful test of the Unha space launch vehicle, static tests of both liquid and solid rocket boosters, a static re-entry vehicle test, a few unsuccessful KN-08 flight tests, and a slightly more successful KN-11 flight test (at last count).

While Kim Jong Un has defied expectations and taken his finger off the test button during the Seventh Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea, its not clear how long he will keep it off. It isn’t easy to predict when North Korea is going to test, and despite North Korea’s newfound love for revealing photographs it still isn’t easy to give precise assessments of North Korea’s current nuclear capabilities.

However, it is easier to guess where their programme is heading. Pyongyang’s claims to have tested a ‘miniaturised hydrogen bomb’ in January are a clear statement of intent. The regime aims to develop an arsenal of sophisticated nuclear weapons that draw upon nuclear fusion to some extent, even if they may have exaggerated their successes to date. To do this, it will need a reliable supply of tritium. Before Kim Jong Un presses another button, now seems like a useful moment of calm to post some (very) wonkish thoughts on North Korea’s tritium supplies (originally published in VERTIC’s Trust & Verify) for discussion here.

About tritium
Tritium is an isotope of hydrogen and a key fuel for nuclear fusion – the process underpinning all ‘hydrogen’ bombs. Like fission, fusion produces a large burst of energy distributed between electromagnetic radiation, subatomic particles, and product nuclei. However, unlike fission, nuclear fusion does not happen spontaneously: atomic nuclei contain positively charged protons that, like identical ends of a magnet, repel rather than attract each other. Light nuclei have to be forced into fusion by heating them to extreme temperatures, such as those found inside an exploding fission weapon.

While some light atomic nuclei can fuse in the correct conditions, one combination of nuclei seems particularly suitable for developing hydrogen bombs. If a deuterium nucleus (consisting of one proton and one neutron) can be made to fuse with a tritium nucleus (consisting of one proton and two neutrons), this ‘DT’ reaction generates a powerful burst of electromagnetic energy along with a highly energetic neutron and a helium-4 (He-4) nucleus.

Once a mixture of deuterium and tritium is brought above a certain threshold temperature, nuclei can fuse at such a rate that the energy released can keep the fuel hot enough to keep the fusion reaction burning. Importantly, this threshold temperature and density can be easily achieved in the core of a fission weapon.

Deuterium is relatively simple to acquire. It is safe to assume that North Korea can extract deuterium from seawater domestically by electrolysis or distillation. Tritium is a different matter. Natural tritium is almost impossible to come by: it is produced very rarely by spontaneous fission of uranium, or by the indirect interaction of cosmic rays and nitrogen. Tritium is also radioactive, decaying into helium-3 at such a rate that any stockpile is reduced by approximately 5.5% every year. North Korea cannot rely on any one-off acquisition of tritium: it needs a reliable and repeatable source of tritium to sustain a boosted arsenal of nuclear weapons.

Importing tritium
North Korea might try to import tritium, which has a number of civilian applications. Pakistan managed to get its hands on tritium and tritium handling facilities via a German company back in the late 1980s, but thankfully the international approach to nuclear trade control has changed significantly since then. The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) have placed tritium and tritium-producing equipment or technologies on its trigger lists. Any transfers of tritium-producing equipment, or anything more than a few milligrams of tritium, should not be authorised without credible assurance that such transfers will not contribute to nuclear proliferation. Thanks to UNSCR 1718, this restriction equates to a blanket ban on all such exports to North Korea.

While North Korea would struggle to acquire tritium from the major commercial exporters in Canada, Switzerland, the US, and France, it might have better luck from noncommercial sources. While Pakistan was illegally importing tritium from Germany, it also reportedly received tritium directly from China. Israel also transferred tritium to South Africa in exchange for Pretoria looking the other way while their yellowcake was used to generate weapons-grade plutonium in Dimona.

(Aside: Nic von Wielligh’s fascinating book The Bomb: South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Programme explains how South Africa smuggled four five-gram cylinders of tritium from Israel in a tea chest, packed away in hand luggage on a South African Airways commercial flight. What was left of this smuggled stockpile – which South Africa’s programme didn’t even need at the time – was eventually declared to the IAEA in the 1990s and used to make numbers for cinema seats that glow in the dark.)

I find it hard to imagine which country would be both willing and able to export tritium to North Korea. China is a member of the NSG, and seems to be cracking down on sanctioned exports to its neighbour. Any exports of tritium to North Korea are probably a thing of the past. The same could be said for Pakistan, whose bid for recognition with the NSG would be ruined if any past or present tritium exports to North Korea came to light. It is far more likely that North Korea is looking internally for a reliable source of tritium.

Breeding tritium in situ
The most direct method for injecting tritium into a fission weapon is to breed it within the nuclear weapon itself. Lithium-6 deuteride can easily be incorporated into the fissile material core of a nuclear weapon, where it would break down into tritium and helium-4 under the bombardment of neutrons generated by the weapon’s fission reaction. The tritium and deuterium can then fuse, releasing neutrons that can boost fission in the surrounding layers of fissile fuel while simultaneously breeding more tritium from the remaining pockets of lithium-6 deuteride.

This ‘layer cake’/’alarm clock’ approach to hydrogen bombs was explored by current nuclear weapon states as a simple and robust way of incorporating fusion reactions into a fission weapon. However, none of these states settled upon this design as a permanent solution to boosting nuclear weapons. Instead, lithium-6 is reserved only for the second reservoir of fusion fuel in two-stage nuclear weapons. This may be because each atom of tritium bred from lithium consumes a neutron that could otherwise go on to prompt fission. Speed is everything in the detonation of a nuclear weapon, and if neutron consumption by lithium-6 delays the cascading fission reaction, it may cancel out many of the benefits of boosting – such as the opportunity to shed heavy tampers and neutron reflectors from the core.

Given North Korea’s claim that it has ‘proudly joined the ranks of nuclear weapon states’ possessing hydrogen bombs, it seems unlikely that they would settle for an obsolete design eventually discarded by all nuclear weapons states. It seems more likely that North Korea will have to turn to its nuclear reactors to generate tritium.

Tritium breeding in nuclear reactors

Tritium production in the 5MWe gas-graphite reactor
The 5MWe gas-graphite reactor at Yongbyon is the source of nearly all of North Korea’s weapons-usable plutonium, and it may also be the primary source of its tritium too. The UK used a similar type of reactor (the Chapelcross MAGNOX reactor) to generate tritium for its nuclear weapon programme, and it is possible that North Korea is doing the same.

Lithium-6 again plays a central role here. The US currently maintains its tritium stockpile by loading lithium-filled ‘Tritium Producing Burnable Absorber’ (TPBAR) rods into the fuel channels of a commercial pressurised water reactor (PWR) at Watts Bar in Tennessee. TPBARs are removed after an 18-month irradiation cycle, and subsequently broken down in a dedicated handling facility to extract tritium produced by the Li-6 + n → T + He-4 reaction. According to an article in Science & Global Security, a PWR could conceivably generate between one and five kilograms of tritium each year per gigawatt of thermal power, if it was optimised purely for tritium production. If the lithium load were reduced so that the reactor can operate normally, this generation rate would drop to between 30 and 70 grams.

These figures probably don’t apply to gas-graphite reactors, and without more information on how North Korea might construct, load, irradiate, and process any tritium-producing fuel rod substitutes it is hard to estimate how much tritium they could generate. If one assumes that the gas-graphite reactor (with a thermal power of only 20 megawatts) can generate a few grams extractable of tritium per year without interrupting normal reactor operations, North Korea could have generated around ten grams of tritium between 2003 and the 2007 shutdown. 38 per cent of this would have decayed by now.

Tritium production at the IRT reactor
With this in mind, North Korea is likely to look to its pool-type research reactor to bolster its tritium stockpile. The Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) recently reported that this reactor might be operational, fuelled by domestically enriched and fabricated uranium fuel. If this is correct, the IRT reactor will be an attractive source of tritium. After all, it is designed to irradiate material samples with moderated neutrons to generate medical isotopes.

The IAEA research reactor database suggests that if the IRT is refuelled at its former enrichment level (80% enriched uranium), it can generate a maximum flux of around 8 trillion (8×1012) neutrons per second, over one square centimetre. One cubic centimetre target of lithium-6 (with a density of 0.535 grams per cubic centimetre) could generate four nanograms of tritium for each second it is exposed to this maximum flux. According to ISIS, this reactor typically operates only 60-70% of the year. Over an eight-month operating cycle, this cubic centimetre target of lithium-6 could generate about 80 milligrams of tritium. To generate three grams of tritium (an approximate amount used in modern boosted weapons), North Korea would therefore have to irradiate approximately nineteen grams of lithium-6 over an eight-month operational cycle.

It is important to note here that these estimates do not take into account a number of important factors. First, it is not clear exactly how much lithium North Korea can access, and how much it could load into its reactors. Lithium reacts strongly with water, and any protective alloys (along with space in the channels to keep it cool) will limit the amount of lithium that can be irradiated.

Second, the available flux of neutrons will vary along the different experimental channels, and the reactor may not always be operated at full power. Not all of the IRT’s irradiation channels will pass through the core (where the neutron flux is highest). The IRT-2000 reactor in Bulgaria is similar to the one in North Korea, and only four of its twelve vertical experimental channels pass directly through the reactor core.

Finally, it is not easy to extract tritium once it has been generated. The US tritium production programme had trouble tackling the permeation of tritium from TPBARs, with each tritium-producing rod losing approximately 4.2% of its generated tritium into the reactor. Similar fractions may also be lost when targets are broken down for tritium extraction in hot cell facilities – that North Korea may or may not currently have.

Final thoughts
Nevertheless, the IRT reactor can conceivably generate a significant amount of tritium for North Korea’s nuclear programme. A single target containing nineteen grams of lithium-6 (equivalent to a slug roughly 3cm in diameter and 5cm in length) could potentially generate enough tritium for a single nuclear weapon in one yearly operational cycle.

Assuming that only four of the IRT’s experimental channels are located within the reactor’s core, North Korea would be able to generate enough tritium for twenty ‘DT’ boosted nuclear weapons per year by irradiating five such slugs in each channel. While fuelling the IRT reactor for tritium production would unavoidably divert enriched uranium that could otherwise contribute directly to North Korea’s arsenals, ISIS suggests that the IRT would only require 7.5 kilograms of highly enriched uranium each year to operate such a cycle.

All this is to say that North Korea is not lacking options for generating a sustainable domestic supply of tritium to support an arsenal of DT boosted weapons. While any fifth test might provide a more potent demonstration of their domestic supply of tritium, the rough calculations above suggest that the world might have to get used to hearing a lot more about North Korea’s ‘H-bomb of justice’.
 
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Heliobas Disciple

TB Fanatic
http://www.manilatimes.net/five-things-we-learned-from-north-koreas-party-congress/261291/
(fair use applies)

Five things we learned from North Korea’s party congress
May 10, 2016 8:52 pm

North Korea has wrapped up its first ruling party congress in nearly four decades.

Here are five things we learned from the four-day gathering of the isolated, nuclear-armed state’s top decision-making body.

The party’s back

The congress sealed the political comeback of the Workers’ Party of Korea which had been forced to cede decision-making influence to the military during the rule of late leader Kim Jong-Il from 1994-2011.

Kim’s “songun,” or military-first policy shifted the power the party had enjoyed during the rule of his father Kim Il-Sung to the generals. He never convened a single party congress during his 17 years in charge.

Since current leader Kim Jong-Un took over following his father’s death in 2011, the party has regained lost ground, as he replaced scores of powerful military commanders and forged alliances with influential party officials.

The congress reasserted the party leadership as the top decision-making body, its supremacy supported by the election of Kim Jong-Un as party chairman.

Nuclear weapons program in high gear

Just in case anyone still had the slightest doubt, the congress underlined that North Korea intends to push full steam ahead with its nuclear weapons program in defiance of UN sanctions and near universal condemnation.

Kim Jong-Un praised the “magnificent and exhilarating sound” of the North’s last nuclear test in January, and delegates adopted Kim’s report calling for an improved and expanded nuclear arsenal.

Kim’s promises to pursue a policy of non-proliferation — North Korea withdrew from the global Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2003 — and to push for global denuclearization were largely dismissed as token nods to his insistence that North Korea was a “responsible” nuclear weapons state.

While the congress was a comeback for the party, Kim went to great lengths to stress the prime role of the nuclear-armed military in guaranteeing the country’s survival.

Titles matter

If being supreme leader of a one-party state wasn’t enough, Kim Jong-Un was formally elected to the position of Workers’ Party chairman by the congress delegates.

The post adds to Kim’s already impressive list of high-ranking titles, including chairman of the central military commission, chairman of the national defence commission and supreme commander of the Korean People’s Army.

But titles are important in North Korea and the party chairmanship carries a strong symbolic resonance as it was last held by Kim’s grandfather, the country’s revered founder leader Kim Il-Sung.

Kim Jong-Un has played up his physical likeness to his grandfather, and the post of chairman suggests he wants to rule like him as well.

Man with a plan

Kim Jong-Un unveiled a five-year economic plan, the first such document for decades.

Few details of the plan were provided, beyond a general ambition to boost output and efficiency across every key economic sector.

But the fact that it was presented by Kim was seen as significant, with the young leader assuming personal responsibility for an economy that had been driven into the ground by his father.

In his very first public address, at a military parade in April 2012, Kim had said he was determined that North Koreans would “never have to tighten their belts again.”

The need to raise living standards has been a constant refrain of his annual New Year addresses, although analysts note that, so far, they have been largely devoid of any specific policy initiatives.

Foreign media control

North Korea tightly controls reporting in the country and is second from last (after Eritrea) on the World Press Freedom Index.

Around 130 foreign reporters were invited to cover the congress, but were only given access to the actual event on the very last day — for five minutes.

For the rest of the time they were carefully marshaled by groups of minders, with all movement outside their island hotel subject to tight restrictions.

A BBC journalist whose reports were deemed disrespectful was detained and eventually expelled from the country after being questioned for eight hours and forced to sign a statement apologizing for coverage that officials described as “speaking very ill of the system and the leadership of the country.”
 

Housecarl

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For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/05/11/is-there-a-secret-deal-to-end-the-korean-war.html

World
05.10.16 10:00 PM ET

Is There a Secret Deal to End the Korean War?

A formal peace treaty with North Korea at this time could lead, in fact, to a new war. But that doesn’t stop the Obama administration from talking about it.
Gordon C. Chang


South Korean and American officials are now denying reports that China and the United States have been engaged in “behind-the-scenes discussions” to freeze North Korea’s nuclear weapon program in return for, among other things, a peace treaty formally ending the Korean War.

The rumors of peace talks, going back to February, were fueled recently by comments from John Kerry. “We have made it clear that we are prepared to negotiate a peace treaty on the peninsula,” the secretary of state said in April.

In addition to the denials from South Korean and American officials, Kim Jong Un, the North Korean leader, seemed to scotch the rumors when he took his nuclear weapons off the bargaining table, declaring he would not stop building them. His promise to “boost” the nuclear arsenal “in quality and quantity” came during the 7th Workers’ Party Congress, the once-in-a-generation gathering that concluded Monday in Pyongyang.

A peace treaty has eluded everyone for decades. Fighting in the Korean War, which started when North Korea invaded the South in June 1950, ended with the July 1953 truce agreement, which drew a new boundary between the two Koreas and established the 160-mile-long, 2.5-mile-wide Demilitarized Zone to keep their armies apart.

There has been no lasting progress in the intervening six decades to formalize the temporary deal into a treaty, a “permanent peace regime” as it is sometimes called.

In fact, as dangerous as the Korean peninsula is these days, a formal end to the Korean War at this time is unlikely to advance the cause of peace—and could even lead to the next war there.

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has, especially since the 1970s, sought a peace treaty, and it has been especially persistent in calling for one since the beginning of this year. Some analysts think Pyongyang’s “peace offensive” of recent months is a ruse to distract the international community, to prevent countries from imposing and enforcing sanctions for its latest series of provocations. The North began this year’s run of provocations with the January 6 detonation of its fourth nuclear device.

China this year immediately joined in the call for treaty negotiations in tandem with a resumption of the Six-Party Talks. Those discussions fell apart in 2009, when Pyongyang walked away from the “denuclearization” discussions initiated by Washington and hosted by Beijing.

The American position on a treaty has evolved in recent months. As Bonnie Glaser of the Center for Strategic and International Studies told The Daily Beast, Washington earlier this year thought it was, in her words, “premature” to start treaty talks.

American officials had long maintained that the “denuclearization” of North Korea was a precondition to the initiation of peace talks.

Now, the view has softened. “U.S. officials’ discussion with North Korea on a peace treaty or peace agreement is contingent upon North Korea denuclearization being part of the dialogue,” Keith Luse of the National Committee on North Korea told me in April, commenting on the State Department’s latest position on the issue.

The U.S., therefore, is willing to talk on a dual track with Pyongyang about both formalizing the end of the Korean War and terminating its nuclear weapons program.

So why is Washington willing to talk about a treaty now?

There’s a one-word answer: China.

NK News, published in Washington with correspondents on the Korean peninsula, says China is considered “a necessary partner for the U.S. and South Korea to maintain the stability of the region,” and as Robert Kelly at Pusan National University told the news site, Kerry is probably just telling the Chinese what they want to hear.

Dennis Halpin of the U.S.-Korea Institute told The Daily Beast that Kerry is hoping to get China on board, to “entice Beijing into more strictly enforcing the strengthened sanctions in UN Security Council Resolution 2270.” Those measures, adopted March 2, will become just another dead letter if Chinese officials don’t treat them any more seriously than they have treated the previous four sets of unanimously adopted UN sanctions on Pyongyang for its nuclear weapons program.

Mere talk of a peace deal at a time North Korea threatens war, however, can unnerve the region. It is not a lack of a formal treaty that makes the Korean peninsula one of the most dangerous spots on earth. It is a hostile and dangerous regime in Pyongyang that has, over a period spanning eight decades, used violence to destabilize its region.

“What one seldom hears are that peace treaties or non-aggression pacts are often a historical canard, that whereas in the 60-year period leading up to the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 there were four major wars in and around the Korean peninsula, there has not been a single war since the armistice was signed in 1953,” Sung-Yoon Lee of the Fletcher School told The Daily Beast. As he points out, “the de facto peace in Korea over the past six decades was ensured by the credible military deterrence of the U.S. rather than any bilateral or multilateral agreements.”

Pyongyang, after the inking of a peace treaty, would undoubtedly press the U.S. to remove its forces from the peninsula “due to the impression that peace is at hand,” as veteran Pentagon advisor Robert Collins told The Daily Beast. The North would then, in short order, urge Seoul to break its alliance with America and, once that was accomplished, would intimidate its exposed neighbor into submission. Or invade it. Kim family rulers have never abandoned their plan to absorb the South, their overarching goal and the core of their legitimacy.

Force is never out of the question when it comes to North Korea, and a military contest between the two halves of the Korean nation would surely embroil East Asia. As Collins notes, China, Russia, and Japan “may well intervene to some degree,” and of course the United States would almost certainly be drawn into hostilities, as it was in 1950.

No piece of paper will now deter an increasingly troubled North Korea. Only the forces of the U.S. and South Korea, bound together in strong alliance, can prevent the Kim regime from once again moving its army south, seeking final victory in a struggle that has never really ended.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20160511000883

China media calls N. Korea's nuclear ambitions 'poison'

Published : 2016-05-11 15:32
Updated : 2016-05-11 15:32

The policy of pursuing nuclear weapons in tandem with economic development by North Korean leader Kim Jong-un is doomed to fail, a state-run Chinese newspaper said Wednesday, calling the North's nuclear ambitions a "poison" for its economy.

North Korea's just-concluded party congress officially endorsed Kim's "byeongjin" policy of simultaneously pursing both nuclear and economic development, dashing hopes that Kim may chart a different course on its nuclear weapons program.

In an editorial, the state-run China Daily newspaper said Kim's policy "does signify a step forward from songun," or the military-first policy by his late father, Kim Jong-il.

"But it is simply beyond Pyongyang's competence to pursue the twin goals at once. The country's limited resources can't support both. Nor will the international community allow its nuclearization," the editorial reads.

The Chinese paper said Kim "appears unaware that his nuclear ambitions are poison for his country's economy."

"They will not only exhaust his country's very limited resources but will further isolate his country from the rest of the world, politically and economically," it said.

North Korea has conducted four nuclear tests since 2006. The latest nuclear test in January prompted China to back tougher U.N. sanctions against the traditional ally.

Further consolidating his grip on power, Kim was elected chairman of North Korea's ruling Workers' Party during the party conclave, which was held for the first time in 36 years.

Chinese President Xi Jinping sent a congratulatory message on Monday to Kim on his promotion, hoping to steadily develop the friendship between the allies. (Yonhap)
 

Housecarl

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Posted for fair use.....
http://www.jns.org/latest-articles/...st-threat-landscape-experts-say#.VzszVRL5PIU=

North Korea an overlooked player in Mideast threat landscape, experts say

Posted on May 17, 2016 by JNS.org and filed under News, World.
By Maayan Jaffe-Hoffman/JNS.org

North Korea has provided the technology or weapons for Hamas’s cross-border attack tunnels from Gaza to Israel, Hezbollah’s Scud-D missile stockpile in Lebanon, and Iran’s Fordow nuclear facility. Yet the totalitarian state in East Asia doesn’t seem to frequently enter the Western public discourse on Middle East threats.

With the January 2016 North Korean nuclear test, which represented a significant advance in North Korea’s strike capability and the fourth time the nation has exploded a nuclear device, analysts such as Dr. Bruch E. Bechtol—the author of four books on North Korea and a political science professor at Angelo State University in Texas—say it is time for the United States to pay closer attention to the rogue state’s military proliferation in the Middle East.

Bechtol explained that North Korea has played a key role in the buildup of Iranian and Syrian forces, as well as the forces of the Iranian-funded Lebanese terror group Hezbollah. The five-year-long and ongoing Syrian civil war has meant a huge loss of military equipment for President Bashar al-Assad’s regime, and North Korea has filled the void with T-55 tanks, trucks, rock-propelled grenades, and shoulder-fired missiles.

“The Assad regime has fired lots of Scuds…and chemical weapons. All of these came from North Korea,” Bechtol told JNS.org.

Regarding the terror tunnels that Gaza-ruling Hamas has dug in order to carry out attacks inside of Israel, Bechtol said the tunnels’ “concrete reinforcements” resemble the characteristics of North Korean structures.

The fear now is that North Korea will transfer its nuclear-enrichment technology to Iran, and will hand over its bomb designs to the Islamic Republic or tell Iran how to fit a bomb on the delivery mechanism of a ballistic missile, said Simon Henderson, the Baker fellow at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy and director of the institute’s Gulf and Energy Policy Program.

North Korea might even train Iranian nuclear scientists and engineers, and test an Iranian weapon design on the Islamic Republic’s behalf, Henderson told JNS.org.

According to Bechtol, Iran and North Korea have been closely collaborating since as early as the 1980s. North Korea supplied Iran with Scud B-missiles, artillery, tanks, and trucks during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War.

Since then, he said, North Korea has sold Iran Scud-B, Scud-C, and Scud-D missiles, as well as extended-range scuds. According to Bechtol’s research—a combination of media reports, U.S. intelligence, government sources, the work of other academics, and testimony from North Korean defectors—North Korea helped Iran build the Safir two-stage missile and the Sejil solid-fuel missile. He said that between 2014 and today, at least two North Koren shipments of long-range missile parts arrived in Iran.

In March, Iran test-fired multiple ballistic missiles, which Bechtol said are based on Pyongyang’s Nodong missile prototype.

Bechtol pointed to a 2015 testimony by Dr. Larry Niksch, a 43-year veteran with the Congressional Research Service, before a U.S. House of Representatives committee hearing on the Iranian-North Korean strategic alliance. Niksch told the committee that since 2011, he has seen a “reverse flow” from Iran into North Korea, expanding Iranian investment of both personnel and funds in North Korea’s domestic nuclear and missile programs.

“Iranian money appears to be the lubricant for North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs,” Niksch told the committee.

Additionally, North Korea expert Gordon Chang told The Daily Beast in January that several top Iranian officials went to witness North Korea’s nuclear test that month.

“One has to be able to connect the dots,” Bechtol told JNS.org.

With Iran standing to gain up to $150 billion in sanctions relief from the nuclear deal it signed with world powers last year, Bechtol said Iran could use the surplus funds to outsource its nuclear program to North Korea—a loophole that would help Iran advance its nuclear program without violating the nuclear deal.

“[U.S. Secretary of State John] Kerry and crew left a loophole a mile wide when they effectively allowed Iran to conduct all the illicit work it wants outside of Iran, in countries like North Korea or perhaps Sudan,” Michael Rubin, an analyst at the American Enterprise Institute, told The Washington Times in September 2015.

Bechtol said that the Iranians are also seeking to put a nuclear missile on the Shahab-3, a medium-range ballistic missile, with the goal of targeting Israel.

“Israel already knows, understands the threat that Iran presents. It knows the threat North Korea presents. The U.S. needs to take these threats more seriously,” he said.

Bechtol noted that because the governments of North Korea and Iran actually “don’t get along well,” their partnership is practical rather than ideological in nature. The combination of illegal weapons proliferation and other illicit sales of items such as cigarettes and drugs make up as much as 40 percent of North Korea’s economy. Therefore, Bechtol believes that targeting Pyongyang’s “dirty money” in several Asian banks—rather than going after North Korean weapons shipments—is the solution to the nuclear issue.

“If no U.S. banks will do business with these banks, North Korea will have to go elsewhere for the money and that will be a real crick,” said Bechtol, noting that similar American sanctions were effective in 2005.

“It snowballed all over Asia [in 2005], and the North Korean diplomats were carrying suitcases of cash to Mongolia to launder the money.…This is what will slow down nuclear proliferation in the Middle East,” he said.
 

Housecarl

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For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/us-japan-south-korea-military-drills-1.3583746

U.S., Japan, South Korea to hold military drills to help detect North Korea threats

Drills will not include missile interception training, according to official

The Associated Press Posted: May 16, 2016 1:48 AM ET| Last Updated: May 16, 2016 2:05 AM ET

South Korea, the United States and Japan will hold their first joint military training next month focused on co-operating to detect signs of missile launches from North Korea and trace missile trajectories, a Seoul defence official said Monday.

The drills set for around June 28 will be held on the sidelines of biennial multinational naval exercises scheduled for waters of Hawaii from June to August, which the three countries regularly attend, the official said requesting anonymity citing department rules.

The trilateral drills will involve ships from each country equipped with the Aegis weapons system, but they will not involve missile-interception training, the official said. The three countries have held joint search-and-rescue drills in the past.

The training follows the 2014 intelligence-gathering pact among the three countries designed to better cope with North Korea's increasing nuclear and missile threats. It was the first such agreement among the three countries. An international standoff over North Korea has recently deepened after Pyongyang carried out its fourth nuclear test In January and a long-range rocket launch in February.

Washington regularly holds military drills with South Korea and Japan — which together host about 80,000 American troops — and share intelligence with them on a bilateral level. But Seoul and Tokyo don't, largely a result of lingering public resentments in South Korea against Japan over its 1910-1945 colonial rule of the Korean Peninsula.

The Korean Peninsula was divided into a U.S.-backed South Korea and a Soviet-supported, socialist North Korea at the end of the Japanese occupation. The two Koreas fought a devastating three-year war in the early 1950, which ended with an armistice, not a peace treaty.

© The Associated Press, 2016
 

Housecarl

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For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-N...ainers-to-Congo-UN-report-says/6711463159099/

North Korea sent arms and military trainers to Congo, U.N. report says

North Korea-made firearms were used during peacekeeping operations, according to the report.

By Elizabeth Shim Contact the Author | May 13, 2016 at 1:27 PM

SEOUL, May 13 (UPI) -- North Korea sent firearms and 30 military instructors to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, according to a U.N. report.

The United Nations Security Council Sanctions Committee Concerning Democratic Republic of Congo told the media those were some of the findings from a panel of experts, Kyodo News reported.

Experts said the Congolese troops were supplied with North Korean-made pistols and other weapons, and that the Congolese soldiers carried the firearms with them during U.N. peacekeeping operations.

Pyongyang also supplied the central African country's armed forces with personnel, the Sankei Shimbun reported Friday.

North Korean military instructors, 30 in total, were employed to train special forces in the Congo and instruct the Congolese president's bodyguards.

North Korea is prohibited from exporting weapons under Security Council sanctions resolutions.

Congo, in turn, is obligated to notify the U.N. if it imports weapons from Pyongyang. The African state is technically in violation of U.N. sanctions resolutions.

The report also contained details of how Congolese authorities were able to procure North Korea-made guns, beginning in the first half of 2014, at the chief seaport of Matadi.

North Korea first exported arms to the Congo in December 2009, U.N. records show. In January of that year, Congolese officers investigated a North Korea cargo ship at the port, where they stumbled upon weapons and ammunition.
 

Housecarl

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For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://38north.org/2016/05/sinpo051716/

Camouflage Netting Spotted on North Korea’s Ballistic Missile Submarine

By 38 North
17 May 2016

A 38 North exclusive with analysis by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr.

Recent commercial satellite imagery from May 8 of the Sinpo South Shipyard supports previous reports that North Korea is continuing to actively pursue development of both a ballistic missile submarine and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM). Camouflage netting, intended to conceal ongoing activity and first seen in January 2016, is again present on the deck of the submarine. The submersible test stand barge has been moved from its position along the northern secondary dock back to the main dock and a support vessel is now tied up alongside. A large shipping container is positioned dockside. Whether this was a shipping container for the Bukkeukseong-1 SLBM is unclear.

Camouflage Netting on GORAE-Class Submarine

Commercial satellite imagery from May 8, 2016, shows netting has once again been suspended over the deck of the submarine. This netting was first seen in imagery of December 26, 2015 and on several occasions since. The purpose of this netting is to conceal ongoing activity. Netting for concealment purposes has also been observed at other submarine bases during the past five years.

A shipping container observed dockside of the submarine in an image from April 28 is no longer present. Whether this container was for the Bukkeukseong-1 SLBM is unclear.

Figure 1. Camouflage covering the GORAE-class submarine.

Image © 2016 DigitalGlobe, Inc. All rights reserved. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Image © 2016 DigitalGlobe, Inc. All rights reserved. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.

Test Stand Barge Moved and Shipping Container Spotted Nearby

The submersible test stand barge, used previously to conduct SLBM tests, has been moved from its position along the northern secondary dock back to the main dock. Similarly, a support vessel—believed to have been used to both tow the submersible test stand barge and support the submarine during tests—is now tied up alongside the barge, suggesting that work is being undertaken to repair or modify the barge. Additionally, a large shipping container similar to the one previously present near the submarine (approximately 9.5 meters by 1.5 meters) is present adjacent to the barge.

Figure 2. Test stand barge in main dock, with shipping container nearby.

Image © 2016 DigitalGlobe, Inc. All rights reserved. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Image © 2016 DigitalGlobe, Inc. All rights reserved. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.

Also present in the secure boat basin are two “mother ships”—one 32-meters-long and the other 40-meters-long. These are specialized craft used to transport intelligence agents and special operations troops on infiltration missions against South Korea and Japan. They are maintained by the facilities at the Sinpo South Shipyard.

Figure 3. Two “mother ships” present.

Image © 2016 DigitalGlobe, Inc. All rights reserved. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Image © 2016 DigitalGlobe, Inc. All rights reserved. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.

No New Developments at Other Key Areas

As noted in the previous 38 North analysis, construction of the expanded way (i.e., ramp) in front of the construction halls continues and is in its final stages. When this and the internal construction of the halls are complete, the North will be able to build and launch new submarines much larger than the GORAE-class, including a new class of ballistic missile submarines.

Figure 4. Construction continues on an expanded way.

Image © 2016 DigitalGlobe, Inc. All rights reserved. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Image © 2016 DigitalGlobe, Inc. All rights reserved. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.

At the test stand used in the past by the SLBM and ballistic missile submarine development programs for launch tube and pop-up testing, little has changed. The removable tower used to support the test remains in place and a small vehicle or container is present on the test stand pad.

Also visible in the May 8 image is the entrance to an underground facility 100-meters south of the test stand, first associated with test stand activity in November 2012.

Figure 5. Little change at the test stand.

Image © 2016 DigitalGlobe, Inc. All rights reserved. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
Image © 2016 DigitalGlobe, Inc. All rights reserved. For media licensing options, please contact thirtyeightnorth@gmail.com.
 

Heliobas Disciple

TB Fanatic
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-trump-exclusive-idUSKCN0Y82JO
(fair use applies)

EXCERPT

Exclusive: Trump would talk to North Korea's Kim, wants to renegotiate climate accord
NEW YORK | By Steve Holland and Emily Flitter
Wed May 18, 2016 6:10am EDT

Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump said on Tuesday he is willing to talk to North Korean leader Kim Jong Un to try to stop Pyongyang's nuclear program, proposing a major shift in U.S. policy toward the isolated nation.

In a wide-ranging interview with Reuters, Trump also called for a renegotiation of the Paris climate accord, said he disapproved of Russian President Vladimir Putin's actions in eastern Ukraine, and said he would seek to dismantle most of the U.S. Dodd-Frank financial regulations if he is elected president.

The presumptive Republican nominee declined to share details of his plans to deal with North Korea, but said he was open to talking to its leader.

"I would speak to him, I would have no problem speaking to him," he said.

Asked whether he would try to talk some sense into the North Korean leader, Trump replied, "Absolutely."

North Korea's mission to the United Nations did not immediately respond to a request for comment on Trump's remarks.

Trump, 69, also said he would press China, Pyongyang's only major diplomatic and economic supporter, to help find a solution.

"I would put a lot of pressure on China because economically we have tremendous power over China," he said in the interview in his office on the 26th floor of Trump Tower in Manhattan. "China can solve that problem with one meeting or one phone call."

A Chinese official said dialogue was needed to resolve issues on the Korean peninsula.

“China supports direct talks and communication between the United States and North Korea. We believe this is beneficial,” Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei told reporters.

Trump's preparedness to talk directly with Kim contrasts with President Barack Obama's policy of relying on senior U.S. officials to talk to senior North Korean officials.

Obama has not engaged personally with Kim, but he has pushed for new diplomatic overtures to Iran and Cuba that produced a nuclear deal with Tehran and improved ties with Havana.

[... snip.... remainder of article is on other topics]
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
^
At this point, there really isn't anything to loose with direct talks with Pyongyang. That being said, North Korea is so far down the rabbit hole I doubt anything of substance would come from it other than being able to say we tried and it didn't work.
 

Heliobas Disciple

TB Fanatic
^
At this point, there really isn't anything to loose with direct talks with Pyongyang. That being said, North Korea is so far down the rabbit hole I doubt anything of substance would come from it other than being able to say we tried and it didn't work.

I like it. It's what the better experts have been recommending (HC, I know you've seen/posted those article; for anyone else if those articles aren't on this thread they are on the earlier ones). There is nothing to lose with direct talks and everything to gain. 0bama won't do it because he's a stubborn narcissist who is acting like a petulant 5 year old. Trump has balls, he doesn't have to be afraid of 'appearing weak'. He can never appear weak, it's not an issue for him.

HD
 

Housecarl

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Posted for fair use.....
http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-N...aking-North-Korea-SLBM-secrets/7441463762824/

Military official sentenced for leaking North Korea SLBM secrets

By Elizabeth Shim Contact the Author | May 20, 2016 at 12:59 PM

SEOUL, May 20 (UPI) -- A South Korean military official has been sentenced to 1 year and 6 months in prison for leaking classified government information on North Korea's submarine-launched ballistic missile program.

The South Korean army captain identified as "A" by local press was charged with violating laws on military secrets, Yonhap reported.

The defendant allegedly leaked military secrets related to North Korea's SLBMs between Nov. 3 and Dec. 15, including "Level 2" classified information, Newsis reported.

South Korea's defense ministry investigations into the matter revealed the defendant began sharing the information with a reporter, including documents on North Korea's ground troop movements.

The reporter had asked for information related to North Korea's missile launches, according to press reports.

The defense ministry's prosecutor's office said the actions are a violation of military protocol.

The defendant was charged in February.

South Korea has been on alert since North Korea launched a series of projectiles in April. Pyongyang has also contributed to tensions with a fourth nuclear test on Jan. 6, and a satellite launch in February – actions that have led to tougher sanctions against the country.

Seoul's defense minister has previously said South Korea may not have enough time to respond to an incoming SLBM.

North Korea launched a SLBM in late April that traveled 20 miles before exploding in midair, and Pyongyang is making "advancements" in its nuclear capabilities, Han Min-koo has said.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-southkorea-ships-idUSKCN0YI00S

World | Fri May 27, 2016 10:06am EDT
Related: World, United Nations, South Korea, North Korea

North Korea threatens retaliation after South Korean warning shots


North Korea threatened retaliation on Friday after South Korea fired what it said were warning shots when a patrol boat and fishing boat from the North crossed the disputed sea border off the west coast of the Korean peninsula.

The two vessels from the North retreated about eight minutes after the South Korean navy fired five 40 mm artillery shots at around 7:30 a.m. local time, South Korean officials told Reuters.

The North Korean boats had crossed the Northern Limit Line, a border that the North disputes, near the South Korean border island of Yeonpyeong, according to the South Korean military.

North Korea accused the South Korean navy of intruding into its waters and said the South fired at its ships in a "grave provocative act," the Supreme Command of the North's Korean People's Army was quoted as saying by the official KCNA news agency late on Friday.

"The provocation-makers are going to regret for ever how horrible the aftermath of their reckless firing first will be," it was quoted as saying.

North Korea frequently makes threatening statements against the South. Tensions have been high since the North conducted a nuclear test in January and a space rocket launch in February, prompting a United Nations Security Council resolution in March tightening sanctions against the isolated state.

North Korean fishing boats occasionally stray into South Korean waters. Over the years, navy vessels from both sides have traded fire in sometimes deadly incidents.

In 2010, 46 South Korean sailors were killed when their ship sank in what the South says was a torpedo attack by the North. North Korea has denied responsibility.

The two countries remain in a technical state of war since their 1950-53 conflict ended in a truce, not a peace treaty.

Pyongyang recently proposed military talks with Seoul, but the South dismissed the offer as "a bogus peace offensive" because it lacks a plan to end the North's nuclear program.


(Reporting by Ju-min Park; Editing by Tony Munroe and Mark Trevelyan)
 

Housecarl

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Here we go again.....

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missile-idUSKCN0YL10J

Business | Mon May 30, 2016 5:54pm EDT
Related: World, Japan, South Korea, North Korea

Japan puts military on alert for possible North Korea missile launch

Japan put its military on alert on Monday for a possible North Korean ballistic missile firing, while South Korea also said it had detected evidence of launch preparations, officials from Japan and South Korea said.

Tension in the region has been high since North Korea conducted its fourth nuclear test in January and followed that with a satellite launch and test launches of various missiles.

Japan ordered naval destroyers and Patriot anti-ballistic missile batteries to be ready to shoot down any projectile heading for the country, state broadcaster NHK said.

A Japanese official, who declined to be identified as he is not authorized to speak to the media, confirmed the order. A spokesmen for Japan's defense ministry declined to comment.

The missile tubes on a Patriot missile battery on the grounds of Japan's Ministry of Defense were elevated to a firing position.

The South Korean defense official declined to comment on what type of missile might be launched, but South Korea's Yonhap News Agency said officials believe it would be an intermediate-range Musudan missile.

"We've detected a sign and are tracking that. We are fully prepared," said the South Korean official, who also declined to be identified.


Related Coverage
› South Korea detects sign of possible planned North Korea missile launch

A Pentagon spokesman, U.S. Navy Commander Gary Ross, said: "We are closely monitoring the situation on the Korean Peninsula in coordination with our regional allies. We urge North Korea to refrain from provocative actions that aggravate tensions and instead focus on fulfilling its international obligations and commitments."

Ross said he would not discuss U.S. intelligence assessments. The White House declined to comment.

North Korea tried unsuccessfully to test launch the Musudan three times in April, according to U.S. and South Korean officials.

Japan has put its anti-ballistic missile forces on alert at least twice this year after detecting signs of launches by North Korea.

North Korea's nuclear and missile tests this year triggered new U.N. sanctions. But it seems determined to press ahead with its weapons programs, despite the sanctions and the disapproval of its sole main ally, China.

Last Friday, leaders of the Group of Seven industrialized nations, including Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and U.S. President Barack Obama, met in Japan and demanded that North Korea comply with a U.N. Security Council resolution to stop all nuclear and missile tests and refrain from provocative action.

On the same day, North Korea threatened to retaliate against South Korea after it fired what it said were warning shots when boats from the North crossed the disputed sea border off the west coast of the Korean peninsula.

Japan has advanced Aegis vessels in the Sea of Japan that are able to track multiple targets and are armed with SM-3 missiles designed to destroy incoming warheads in space before they re-enter the atmosphere.

Patriot PAC-3 missile batteries, designed to hit warheads near the ground, are deployed around Tokyo and other sites as a second and final line of defense.


(Reporting by Tim Kelly and Nobuhiro Kubo in TOKYO and Ju-min Park in SEOUL; Additional reporting by Lisa Lambert and Jeff Mason in Washington; Editing by Robert Birsel and Dan Grebler)
 

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http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missile-fail-idUSKCN0YM015

Business | Tue May 31, 2016 1:32am EDT
Related: World, South Korea, North Korea, Aerospace & Defense

Attempted North Korea missile launch fails: South Korea

SEOUL | By Ju-min Park


North Korea attempted to fire a missile from its east coast early on Tuesday but the launch appears to have failed, South Korean officials said, in what would be the latest in a string of unsuccessful ballistic missile tests by the isolated country.

The launch attempt took place at around 5:20 a.m. Seoul time (04:20 p.m. EDT), said the officials, who asked not to be identified, without elaborating.

Tension in Northeast Asia has been high since North Korea conducted its fourth nuclear test in January and followed that with a satellite launch and test launches of various missiles.

Japan put its military alert on Monday for a possible North Korean ballistic missile launch.

"We have no reports of any damage in Japan. We are gathering and analyzing data. The defense ministry is prepared to respond to any situation," Japanese Minister of Defence Gen Nakatani told a media briefing.

"North Korea shows no sign of abandoning the development of nuclear missiles and so we will continue to work closely with the U.S. and South Korea in response and maintain a close watch on North Korea," Nakatani said.

South Korea's Yonhap News Agency said it appeared North Korea had attempted to launch an intermediate-range Musudan missile. North Korea attempted three test launches of the Musudan in April, all of which failed, U.S. and South Korean officials have said.

Yonhap quoted a South Korean government source as saying the missile was likely to have exploded at about the time it lifted off from a mobile launcher.

The flurry of weapons technology tests this year came in the run-up to the first congress in 36 years of North Korea's ruling Workers' Party early this month, where young leader Kim Jong Un further consolidated his control.

Tuesday's attempted launch appears to have been its first missile test since then, and experts have said it was unusual to test-fire a missile so soon after a previous failure.

The South Korean military said Pyongyang's continuous missile launches could stem from Kim's order in March for further tests of nuclear warheads and ballistic missiles.

"They must've been in a rush. Maybe Kim Jong Un was very upset about the failures," said Lee Choon-geun, senior research fellow at South Korea's state-run Science and Technology Policy Institute.


REPEATED FAILURES

North Korea has never had a successful launch of the Musudan missile, which theoretically has the range to reach any part of Japan and the U.S. territory of Guam.

North Korea is believed to have roughly 20 to 30 Musudan missiles, according to South Korean media, which officials said were first deployed in around 2007.

"It could have cracks and something wrong with the welding," Lee said of possible causes for the latest failure. "But deployment before test-firing these to complete development seems unusual."

The attempted launch took place near the east coast city of Wonson, one of the South Korean officials said, the same area where previous Musudan tests had taken place.

Separately, Japan's Kyodo news agency reported on Tuesday that career diplomat Ri Su Yong, one of North Korea's highest-profile officials, would visit China on Tuesday.

There was no indication of any link between the latest failed missile launch and Ri's visit to China.

China is reclusive North Korea's only major ally but has been angered by Pyongyang's nuclear and missile tests and signed up to tough UN sanctions against the reclusive country.

Ri was North Korea's foreign minister until he was named a member of the politburo during the recent Workers' Party congress.


(Additional reporting by Vincent Lee in SEOUL, Tim Kelly in TOKYO and Ben Blanchard in BEIJING; Writing by Tony Munroe; Editing by Paul Tait)
 

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http://38north.org/2016/05/cyang052516/

Why German Unification Is Not a Model for Korean Unification

By Chang-Seok Yang
25 May 2016
Comments 6

For decades, many Koreans have viewed German unification as a model for the future of a divided Korean peninsula. However, there are differences between the two that need to be understood, both to inform current policy and provide valuable lessons for the future.

German unification has been a success story that Koreans interested in unification often aspire to emulate. The process was peaceful and democratic—reflecting the wishes of the East German people—and it resulted in the establishment of a free state based on a market economy. Today’s united Germany is a leading economic, security and humanitarian player in Europe. But South Korea is not West Germany and North Korea is not East Germany. That reality may mean that Korean unification under the German model would be nearly impossible to achieve given the current circumstances.

Lessons from German Unification

1. Win Hearts and Minds Within the Competing Nation

In 1969, then-Chancellor Willy Brandt of West Germany’s Social Democratic Party (SPD) started a policy of seeking “change through contacts” (Wandel druch Annaehrung) toward the East. Egon Bahr, Brandt’s Berlin spokesman and later his chancellery’s secretary of state, said that “unification is not a single action but a process with many steps and stops.”[1] In particular, he stressed that seeking to isolate or contain East Germany would not bring about the regime’s collapse, but only increase the suffering of its people and deepen the chasm of division. Therefore, West Germany aimed to improve East German living conditions and achieve the greatest number of contacts between the countries that East Germany would allow. Successive liberal and conservative governments pursued this policy, which East Germany welcomed. Ultimately, the strategy increased East Germany’s dependence on West Germany while boosting the West’s leverage against its socialist counterpart.

The years prior to unification were marked by active exchanges and cooperation not only between the two German governments, but also between their people. They could send mail and gifts by post, and in the late 1980s, Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s conservative government persuaded the East German regime to allow more of its people to visit West Germany. As a result, East Germans discovered the West’s higher living standards and began to complain about conditions under socialism: their regime suppressed dissent while failing to deliver daily necessities, clean air and adequate transportation.

Meanwhile, decades of high-level contacts between the two Germanys aided in negotiations to resolve the 1989-1990 crisis that ended in unification. By this point, the two sides had held ministerial or vice-ministerial exchanges in 22 areas, including transportation, legal cooperation and the economy. In August 1989, Chancellor Kohl and East German leader Erich Honecker exchanged letters concerning the massive exodus of East Germans then taking place. The written correspondence was followed by ministerial discussions, and a December 1989 summit meeting in Dresden. This informed the international community, including the four victorious powers of World War II, that the two Germanys were trying to peacefully resolve the East German crisis and could achieve unification based on self-determination.

In short, an unwavering engagement policy allowed West Germany to win the hearts of elite and ordinary East Germans. When a window of opportunity opened to the East German people in 1989, they decided to “shift their loyalties, expectation, and political activities” to West Germany.[2] East Germany held its first free general election in March 1990, and about 48 percent of East German voters supported the Alliance for Germany, which was committed to a rapid unification with West Germany. On August 23, 1990, the newly elected parliament passed a resolution declaring that the five East German states would enter the effective area of the Basic Law (Beitritt zum Geltungsbereich des Grundgesetzes) of the Federal Republic of Germany on October 3, 1990. Thus, the East Germans played a key role in Germany’s democratic and peaceful unification.

2. Maximize Backing for Unification Among the Major Powers

As West Germany improved relations with East Germany and other socialist countries, it maintained a rock-solid alliance with the US-led Western bloc that later helped to facilitate the unification process.

This stance sometimes required prioritizing relations with Western powers over its growing ties with East Germany. One such case arose in the late 1970s, as the Soviet Union deployed tactical nuclear missiles in East Germany and elsewhere in Eastern Europe. In December 1979, Chancellor Schmidt’s liberal SPD government stood with the West by backing NATO’s Double-Track Decision: the alliance would seek to negotiate mutual limits on medium- and intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe while threatening to deploy US Pershing II missiles in Western Europe should the negotiations fail. The talks ultimately did not gain traction, and deployment of the US missiles began in 1983 under Kohl, Schmidt’s successor. Kohl recalled, “Without the deployment, U.S.-German relations would have been hurt badly, probably putting NATO alliance at risk.”[3]

As the East German regime neared collapse in 1989 and unification began to appear possible, Kohl reaffirmed West Germany’s relationship with the Western powers by insisting that any united Germany would remain within NATO. The position, which he took in defiance of strong East German and Soviet opposition, earned strong US backing that proved crucial to the unification effort’s success. The administration of US President George H.W. Bush extended its full support, senior US and West German officials consulted closely on strategy for the two-plus-four talks on external issues involving unification, and President Bush and Secretary of State James Baker persuaded their Soviet counterparts to support Kohl’s unification efforts.

Why the German Model Will Not Work on the Korean Peninsula

West Germany and South Korea share several features that would benefit a potential unification bid by Seoul: both were free and democratic states with market economies, both were much stronger than their competitors and both were allied with the United States and other Western democratic states. But several crucial factors distinguish the Koreas from Germany.

1. Korea’s Fratricidal Past

Little historically rooted enmity existed between East and West Germany prior to unification. A united Germany fought in World War II, and after Stalin’s death in 1953 East Germans staged a revolt that their country’s Soviet occupiers had to put down by force. When Soviet troops did not similarly intervene in the massive urban demonstrations of October 1989, East Germans were emboldened to fight their communist dictators, and their military refused to confront the demonstrators with force.

By contrast, the Korean War generated a level of enmity that persists across the peninsula to this day. North Korea has stoked hostility toward the South among generations of its citizens by insisting that Seoul initiated the 1950-1953 conflict. The DPRK’s military appears steadfastly loyal to the Kim regime, and it is unlikely to exercise the restraint of the East German army during a domestic revolt or incursion by any foreign force, including troops from the South. North Korean soldiers have been trained and indoctrinated to defend their commander-in-chief, Kim Jong Un, with all available means, even risking their lives. It is not clear how the general populations will react in event of a people’s revolution. In the beginning they would fear possible military crackdown, but as balances tip for the revolution, people might act differently.

2. South Korean Policy Divides

Throughout the Korean War, ideological adversaries killed each other in vast numbers. The enduring legacy of this bloodshed is a deep-seated suspicion of opposing ideologies. Liberal and conservative South Korean leaders fail to engage with North Korean officials in a consistent manner, and political circles are so fractured by region, blood and schools that consensus or compromise can hardly be achieved in the country’s legislature.

West Germany’s political culture was friendlier toward the prospect of unification. Its political parties were more open to compromise and less ideological than their South Korean counterparts. This has much to do with different history and political systems, including their election systems. In Germany, it is almost impossible for a party to win a majority of seats in the Lansdestag or Bundestag election, and a winning party must compromise with other parties to form a coalition government. In Korea, however, a party can dominate all seats in an electoral district. In the recent April parliamentary election, a conservative party won all seats in North Kyungsang province, while a liberal party won all seats in Kwangju city. The Korean election system has not been conducive for overcoming regional conflict or animosity.

3. North Korean Information Restrictions

By the crisis of the late 1980s, West Germany’s decades-old policy of engaging the East had achieved significant gains. More than 80 percent of East Germans watched West German television—one could say jokingly that Germany had already been united during evening prime time—and East Germans frequently traveled to West Germany and neighboring socialist countries.

North Koreans have far less access to information that may contradict their regime’s propaganda claims. Typical North Koreans rarely travel to Pyongyang, let alone foreign countries, and North Korea restricts television broadcasts to a few state channels. While its people can obtain imported films and dramas through black markets, they must do so at significant personal risk. Modern technology offers little help: North Koreans cannot open websites outside their national intranet, and their cell phones cannot access social networking services that would help them to organize.

4. China’s Reservations Over Korean Unification

While a Korean unification effort would not require the blessing of the four victorious World War II powers as in Germany, it would still need diplomatic and financial support from key outsiders.[4] Most notably, such an effort would face a significant challenge in securing Chinese support, given Beijing’s national interest in maintaining buffer countries along its borders. Aside from the danger of an influx of North Korean refugees, more important to Beijing will be preventing the movement of US forces up to its border and the establishment of a united Korea allied to Washington on its border.

Policy Recommendations

The differences described above suggest not only that Korean unification will be more difficult to achieve than in Germany, but also that the German experience may not be a relevant model unless South Korea recognizes these differences and alters its course. South Korea’s current emphasis on unification over the development of inter-Korean relations can be compared to laying bridge panels without building supporting columns below. For now, South Korea must focus more on strengthening its internal and inter-Korean capabilities to achieve unification than on pursuing diplomatic efforts intended to achieve such an end directly. Recognizing these differences, steps Seoul might take in the future could include the following.

1. Establish a Consistent South Korean Unification Policy

South Korean governments have consistently endorsed the “national commonwealth” unification formula announced by President Roh Tae-woo in September 1989, following consultations with ruling and opposition party leaders. However, liberal and conservative administrations have implemented unification policy inconsistently by pivoting repeatedly between emphases on outreach and pressure.

Their differing strategies have been based, in part, on different views of North Korea’s future. Working from the possibility that the regime’s collapse was imminent, ROK Presidents Kim Young-sam and Lee Myung-bak emphasized preparation for unification rather than the development of inter-Korean relations. On the other hand, presidents Roh Tae-woo, Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun believed that North Korea would change gradually, ideally following the Chinese or Vietnamese models. Thus, their policies focused on improving inter-Korean relations in a manner they hoped would create a favorable atmosphere for North Korea to change its system, increasing chances of eventual unification. A peace mechanism and a range of agreements and cooperation between the North and South, they believed, would ultimately amount to a de facto unification.

These differing approaches are also partly a result of partisan political interests in South Korea. Conservatives support pressure and containment as means to rally their political base and marginalize liberal adversaries, while liberals tend to argue that such policies kowtow to a US policy of isolating North Korea and heighten inter-Korean tension for domestic political gain.

To move toward a consistent, bipartisan unification policy, South Korea could establish a “unification-friendly” political system through reforms to promote consensus and conciliation. The current “winner takes all” system gives rise to a zero-sum game in politics, and that situation could be remedied by revising elections to prevent the domination of electoral districts by single parties. South Korea should seriously consider introducing a German-type electoral system in which parties rarely win district majorities and generally must govern as coalitions.

Agreement on a new election system is a tall order for South Korea’s political parties, of course, and both lawmakers and the government should redouble efforts under the current political system to formulate a durable unification policy. One option is to achieve backing within the National Assembly for a proposed five-year plan and implementation program for developing ties with North Korea, steps prescribed but never successfully executed under the 2005 Inter-Korean Relations Act.

All of South Korea’s political parties feasibly could support a plan containing at least three basic elements: sustained dialogue, humanitarian assistance and a strong alliance with the United States. If future South Korean governments pursue a coherent policy promoting these elements, mutual trust and a sense of community will be enhanced between the two Koreas, ultimately increasing the likelihood of a democratic and peaceful unification.

2. Maintain Inter-Korean Diplomatic Channels

To extract assistance or political concessions from South Korea and other countries, Pyongyang usually sets preconditions for participating in talks or proposes them after creating a crisis or another source of tension. For this reason, South Korean opponents of dialogue often gain the upper hand by arguing that there should be “no talks for talks’ sake.” Nevertheless, South Korea should maintain open dialogue channels in public or in secret, particularly as the situation in North Korea grows foggy and unpredictable. In the words of Lothar de Maiziere, East Germany’s last prime minister, “Even sworn enemies would not shoot each other while they are talking.”

3. Provide Unconditional Humanitarian Assistance to North Korea

Humanitarian assistance should aim to facilitate future democratic unification. Seoul’s North Korea policy, just as West Germany’s policy, should be geared to win the hearts of the North Koreans in order to lay the groundwork for the future. If unification becomes possible, it will only happen if North Korean citizens decide to be unified with South Korea when given the chance. The North Korean regime has spared no effort to encourage hostility toward South Korea and the United States among its citizens, but by providing consistent humanitarian aid, Seoul can help to transform such hostility into affinity. North Koreans will grow less hostile toward the South Korean government, and they may interpret the high quality of South Korean products as yet more evidence that South Koreans enjoy a higher standard of living.

Lee Myung-bak’s administration discontinued large-scale rice and fertilizer assistance in 2008, allegedly over concerns that such aid might be diverted to feed the military and consequently to prop up the Kim regime. Furthermore, the Lee government raised the bar for humanitarian assistance by South Korean NGOs, which were allowed to deliver only selected items for even vulnerable portions of the population, including children. This is largely due to concerns about possible diversion to the military, which can hardly be confirmed.[5]

4. Strengthen International Support for Unification

South Korea must strengthen its traditional alliances with the United States and Japan, while improving relations with China and Russia. No one would deny that the friendliest ally in support of unification is the United States. Some experts suggest South Korea should seek balances in its relations with the US and China, but I disagree. Without strong support from the US, it would not be easy to gain support from China either.

It is no less important to persuade neighboring countries that Korean unification would satisfy their national interests. To this end, it would be beneficial to increase public diplomacy by creating an advisory group for unification, either multilateral or bilateral, composed of former senior officials or celebrities from the abovementioned four powers.

Conclusion

Conditions in East and West Germany differed significantly from those on today’s Korean peninsula, a reality with ramifications for any effort to unify the two Koreas. While replicating the German experience would be extremely difficult without the recommended actions, these steps alone would be very hard to implement in South Korea’s current political environment. And they represent only a beginning in emulating the German model.

In assessing Seoul’s options, one cannot overstate the importance of China’s interest in maintaining the North Korean state as a bulwark against potentially hostile foreign forces in the South. As long as China provides North Korea with the necessities to sustain it, the North Korean regime will not collapse, despite the wishes of South Korean conservatives. Because containment policies will not change Pyongyang’s behavior without Chinese support, South Korea’s only realistic option is to stress engagement with North Korea through sustained dialogue and humanitarian assistance.



_______________

[1] Egon Bahr, “Wandel durch Annaeherung,” Speech, Tutzing Christian Academy, July 15, 1963, http://web.ev-akademie-tutzing.de/cms/index.php?id=53.

[2] Earnst Haas defined political integration as a “process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations, and political activities toward a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the preexisting national states.” Dougherty, James and Robert Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Theories of International Cooperation and Integration, 5th ed. (New York: Harper & Row Publisher, 1990), p. 510.

[3] Helmut Kohl, Ich Wollte Deutschlands Einheit, trans. Kim Joo Il, (Seoul: Haenaem, 1998), 26-27.

[4] The four victorious powers, the US, Soviet Union, Great Britain and France reserved rights and responsibilities with regard to entire Germany and Berlin, including unification of Germany and a peace treaty. The two Koreas can accomplish unification when they agree to it, while the two Germany could not decide on their own. Diplomatically, Korea is in much better position than Germany.

[5] Moreover, it should be noted that Article 3 of South Korea’s Constitution gives the South Korean government the legal responsibility for feeding the North since it claims sole representation over the North Korean population. Thus, the North Korean people should be treated as South Korean nationals.

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Reader Feedback

6 Responses to “Why German Unification Is Not a Model for Korean Unification”


1. Whiskey Jung says:

May 31, 2016 at 1:43 am

Thanks for your insightful article. However, Germany is the onle close enough case of reunification for South Korea. You pointed out a few differences between them that I completely agree, but to me there are more similarities, such as the division forced by outsiders, ideological conflict, economic differences of each party, and so on than the differences. Those similarites must and will serve as a guiding light for South Korea.

At the same time, your suggestions make perfect sense even with those differences. No South Korean supporting unification should be asking an easy and free ride to ultimate goal but brace for long and painful path with many huddles, even another round of provocations and sometime betrayal.


2. Max says:

May 27, 2016 at 2:48 am

keve said: “Much of the information provided by North and South Korea to their population is negative propaganda, and US in part plays and promotes the negative propaganda.”

I am quite surprised at keve’s claim since his statement is completely unrealistic and untrue for South Korea. The problem in South Korea is the opposite: too much information, domestic and international, flows free in the public domain, as anyone who has visited South Korea lately can tell.

Are you living in North Korea, keve? Have you lived in the U.S. or South Korea ever?


3. o.m. says:

May 27, 2016 at 1:56 am

Possibly there are two more differences to consider:

Chancellor Kohl told the voters in the FRG that the integration of the GDR into the FRG economy would be cheap, short, and painless. It wasn’t, but the FRG was able to foot the bill. Also, the relative economic strength was so that many people in the new federal states did stay in the east until they were modernized. Many young people left, but the eastern states remained viable.

Can the ROK pay for the economic rehabilitation of the DPRK to prevent a mass exodus?

The German Grundgesetz (constitution) envisioned an eventual reunification. That provision was NOT used. Instead they used the same law that was used to admit the small Saarland in ’57. The GDR joined the FRG and the FRG had very little choice under their own laws, §23 GG said so.

Will there be a similar automatism if a new DPRK government says so?


4. keve says:

May 26, 2016 at 3:33 pm

There are still many Koreans in North and South remembering the Korean War. They are mostly in their 60’s 70’s and their hatred is real because of the war. Time will be the answer, in next 20 or 30 years from now, when new generations are the only political majority who do not remember the Korea War and do not see the North or South as the enemy, but as fellow countrymen; unification will be real and more obtainable.

Lack of political maturity and lack of political independence are main obstacle for many older generation politicians to achieve grand political challenges of unification. Blocking good information and censorship in both South and North Korea provide ground for immature politics, and depending on another nation for national security show lack of political independence. Much of the information provided by North and South Korea to their population is negative propaganda, and US in part plays and promotes the negative propaganda. Censorship to brainwash the population create environment that lack reality and often lead to wrong judgments, based on selective information provided by obedient media echoing politicians.

In completeness, South Koreans do not know REAL North Korea, and North Koreans do not know the REAL South Korea, neither US population know the REAL North Korea. But only negative views are allowed to promote hatred, thus division. It is funny, because of the level of ignorance and arrogance… when anyone make a judgment on the other with little to no complete real information, but media educated with politicians blessing.

On the bright side, enforcing peace, time is on the side of the Korean people for larger and stronger United-Korea; and this is what all Koreans want for their future generations. …Enforce peace and let those speak of military action stay limited within politics.


5. Max says:

May 25, 2016 at 10:08 pm

The qualitative difference between the Korean and German cases is critical and, IMHO, without resolving it first, no South Korean policy for unification will be successful. The author’s proposed recommendation “by providing consistent humanitarian aid, Seoul can help to transform such hostility into affinity” is just a rephrase of the failed Sunshine policy that has already proved wrong and dysfunctional.

The biggest difference of Korea and Germany is that while the Germans had fought WWII together, the Koreans killed each other during the Korean War, and that the same (hereditary) regime that instigated the Korean War has continued to rule North Korea to date and has never changed its political and military goals towards its South neighbors. Thus, anyone or any nation serious about unification of the two Koreas should understand that regime change in North Korea is a prerequisite for any meaningful unification effort.

Why is regime change important? Only people with different visions, goals, and agenda can take North Korea to different directions and begin meaningful negotiations with the neighbors. China hoped for a regime change under Jang Song Thaek but the opportunity evaporated when he and his aides were cracked down and executed. North Korea went back to its old Stalinist state, to which even China has shown hostile reactions. Insofar as the current regime believes that only a nuclear-armed North Korea can fulfil its 1950 goal of military unification of the Koreas by subduing South Korea and the U.S. forces under nuclear threats, there will be no meaningful unification talk of any kind.

Total control of information about the outside world is the current regime’s explicit policy towards its own citizens. We need to understand that only a regime change in North Korea will open the door to the outside world and enable peaceful engagement with the South.


6. Walter L. Keats says:

May 25, 2016 at 5:02 pm

Excellent presentation of the differences between the Korean and the German situations.

Certainly eventual unification would benefit from a consistent policy of engagement with the North by both the South and the U.S., not policies that change from year to year, or administration to administration.
 

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http://www.reuters.com/article/us-north-korea-nuclear-commentary-idUSKCN0YM2I7

Tue May 31, 2016 3:56pm EDT

Commentary: How long before North Korea can nuke a U.S. city?

By Peter Apps

It’s the near future, and North Korea’s regime is on the brink of collapse. As rumors swirl of palace coups, forces on both sides of the world’s most militarized border are on heightened alert. The U.S. military faces a much bigger problem. Somewhere in the Pacific, a North Korean submarine is believed to be carrying nuclear warheads and the missiles to deliver them. And nobody knows where it is.

It sounds like the plot of a “Hunt for Red October”-style technothriller. But if Pyongyang’s technicians continue at their current pace, experts say it is becoming ever more likely.

One thing is certain: North Korea is plowing considerable resources into building its nuclear capability. And it is clearly making progress – even if Tuesday’s failed missile test shows it still has a long way to go.

Japanese officials said what appeared to be a conventional Musudan rocket, which theoretically has the ability to reach Japan and the U.S. territory and military base of Guam, exploded either as or shortly after it left its launcher. North Korea is estimated to have some 20 to 30 of the missiles – first deployed in 2007, but yet to be launched successfully.

What North Korean leader Kim Jong Un wants, most analysts believe, is simple – a rocket that can fire a nuclear warhead at least to regional targets. His ultimate ambition, however, is to be able to hit U.S. cities on the West Coast, most likely from a submarine that could hide itself at sea.

North Korea has been steadily improving its rockets – which can also carry conventional explosives – for decades. It detonated its first nuclear device in 2006 but most experts believe it has yet to build one small enough to be placed on a missile. Having the credible ability to do all of that and get the missiles to sea could take well over a decade, perhaps considerably more.

Once it happens, however, it will be a strategic game changer. At worst, U.S. cities on the West Coast would have to deal with the prospect, however remote, that they might be struck by a North Korean atomic weapon. At the very least, a North Korea armed with nuclear submarines would hugely complicate the calculus for any U.S. president handling a crisis on the Korean peninsula itself.

That, of course, is exactly the plan.

The fact that Pyongyang has conducted so many tests this year, some experts believe, suggests Kim is pushing his scientists harder than ever to deliver working rockets and warheads. North Korea is believed to have tagged the expertise of Russian Cold War-era scientists, and while its capabilities on both fronts lag well behind established nuclear states such as Russia and China, it is already believed to be well ahead of Iran.

In April, South Korean and U.S. officials said a North Korean submarine successfully launched a ballistic missile that traveled some 18 miles -- a major step forward.

Technical experts say TV footage appeared to show a solid fuel rocket successfully launching from underwater, essentially the same system used by Western forces to achieve the same goal.

When she testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee in April, the incoming head of the U.S. Northern Command – responsible for defending the mainland United States – delivered a stark warning.

"The North Korean threat is real," U.S. Air Force General Lori Robinson – previously head of U.S. air forces in the Pacific – told lawmakers. "For now, it's a medium range but they are trying very hard to be able to hit the homeland."

It’s impossible to know exactly how much money and expertise the North Koreans are expending. The scale of the effort, however, is seen as large – in many ways, the same level of commitment the United States gave to the Manhattan Project to build the world’s first atomic bomb during World War Two. Pyongyang’s reason is clear: building that kind of credible ability to strike is seen as central to the long-term survival of the Kim dynasty and its ruling party.

Earlier this month, at the first meeting of its ruling party in 36 years, Kim said North Korea was a responsible nuclear weapons state and would never use its weapons – unless it were threatened. That seemed a clear warning to outside powers, particularly Washington, to steer clear of any attempts to destabilize or attack the regime.

Getting a submarine-based deterrent would be a very big deal – and not just because it might allow the North Koreans to move the launch point much closer to the target. Submarines are central to what nuclear weapons states call a “second strike” capability, the ability to launch missiles even in the aftermath of an overwhelming and perhaps surprise preemptive attack.

The United States, Russia, Britain and France all retain what they call a “continuous at sea deterrent,” at least one submarine offshore at all times ready to fight back even if the homeland and all other military forces are completely taken out. Israel is also believed to have the ability to mount nuclear cruise missiles on its Dolphin-class conventional submarines, while China is now moving quickly towards new ballistic missile submarines for its own at sea deterrent.

This technology isn’t new – the United States and Russia developed it in the late 1950s based in part on plans originally developed to hit Nazi German U-boats in the dying days of World War Two. There is no good reason it should not eventually work for North Korea, too.

If and when it does, Pyongyang is likely to try to keep its submarines very close to its coasts—and its home defenses--at first. Still, once the first nuclear-armed submarine exists, Japan and the United States might feel political pressure to destroy it.

That would come with considerable risks. The North is known to have huge volumes of conventional artillery based along the South Korean border, much of it in range of Seoul and its 10 million residents. The risk of those weapons inflicting massive casualties is one of the key factors that has deterred multiple U.S. administrations from considering the kind of preemptive strike on Pyongyang’s weapons programs that the United States has threatened against Iran.

The Korean War – frozen by its 1953 cease-fire but never otherwise resolved – may not be over yet.



(Peter Apps is Reuters global affairs columnist, writing about international affairs, globalization, conflict and other issues. He is also founder and executive director of the Project for Study of the 21st Century; PS21; a non-national, non-partisan, non-ideological think tank operating in London, New York and Washington. Before that, he spent 12 years as a reporter for Reuters covering defense, political risk and emerging markets. Since 2016, he has also been an officer in the British Army Reserve. Follow Peter Apps on Twitter)
 

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World | Wed Jun 1, 2016 7:13am EDT
Related: World, China, North Korea

After failed missile test, China calls for Korean calm

BEIJING | By Ben Blanchard


China hopes all parties on the Korean peninsula will remain calm and exercise restraint, President Xi Jinping told a senior visiting North Korean envoy on Wednesday, after the isolated state rattled nerves with a failed missile test.

The rare meeting in Beijing between Xi and one of North Korea's highest-profile officials, career diplomat Ri Su Yong, follows a flurry of weapons tests in the run-up to the first congress in 36 years of North Korea's ruling Workers' Party in May, when young leader Kim Jong Un consolidated his control.

China is reclusive North Korea's only major ally but has been angered by its nuclear and missile programs.

China signed up to harsh new U.N. sanctions against North Korea in March in response to its fourth nuclear test in January and a satellite launch in February.

Xi told Ri that China attached great store to the friendly relationship between the two countries, and was willing to work with North Korea to consolidate that friendship, China's Foreign Ministry said.

"China's position on the peninsula issue is clear and consistent. We hope all sides remain calm and exercise restraint, increase communication and dialogue and maintain regional peace and stability," the ministry cited Xi as saying.

There was no direct mention of Tuesday's failed missile test, the latest in a string of unsuccessful ballistic missile tests by North Korea.

Ri passed on a verbal message to Xi from Kim, the ministry said, in which Kim expressed a desire to work hard with China to maintain peace and stability on the peninsula and across northeast Asia.

Xi welcomed Ri's visit to report on the North Korean party congress, which Xi said showed the importance Kim attached to ties with China, the ministry added.

Xi said he hoped North Korea could achieve even greater achievements in improving its economy and people's livelihoods, the ministry said.

Kim has yet to visit China since assuming office after his father died in 2011.

Chinese state television showed pictures of the two men meeting in Beijing's Great Hall of the People.

The United States plans to use high-level Sino-U.S. talks in Beijing next week to discuss ways to bring greater pressure to bear on North Korea to abandon its nuclear ambitions, a senior U.S. official said on Tuesday.

But China has been reluctant to take tougher action, such as completely shutting its border with North Korea, for fear that North Korea could collapse in chaos.


(Reporting by Ben Blanchard; Editing by Clarence Fernandez, Robert Birsel)
 

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Three (or Four) Strikes for the Musudan?

By John Schilling
01 June 2016

North Korea has reportedly tried and failed to launch a Musudan missile for a third time in two months. It is not surprising that a new missile would fail on its first test, but previous North Korean practice has been to stand down for several months to a year before another attempt. Repeating a failed test again and again with no more than a month for analysis and troubleshooting will almost guarantee repeated failure. One of the tests apparently involved two simultaneous launches, and launching two copies of an unproven design just meant a double failure while learning nothing new. Whether this unrealistic tempo is driven by impatience or desperation, it may mark the end of the Musudan program—whose military utility is in any case increasingly questionable as North Korea’s other programs advance.

KCNA_Musudan-WPK-65th.jpg

http://38north.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/KCNA_Musudan-WPK-65th.jpg
(Photo: KCNA)

The South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) reported on May 30 that North Korea had attempted and failed to launch a Musudan intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) from a mobile launcher. This follows similar reported failures on April 15 and April 28, with the latter possibly involving two missiles. We have no confirmation that these were Musudan missiles. Still, that is the only possibility that really makes sense here—the only other missiles the North Koreans could launch from a mobile platform are the proven Scud, Nodong and Toksa designs. Those usually work, and there would be little value in a test or demonstration. The Musudan desperately needs a successful test and such a success would have made for good propaganda.

A little background: The Musudan ballistic missile was seen in North Korea in 2003, but until this year had probably never been flown. The missile appears to be based on an early Soviet submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) called the R-27 “Zyb” or the SS-N-6 “Serb” in the West that was first produced in the mid-1960s and retired by the late 1980s. Some of the missile’s designers are known to have made their way to North Korea in the immediate post-Cold War era and incomplete records suggest that some of the surplus hardware may have wound up there as well. But the subsequent development of the Musudan has been extremely slow, to the point that some people had suggested it might be little more than a hoax or a bluff.

The last thing a poker player will do in a bluff is reveal his cards when he doesn’t have to. The North Koreans didn’t have to do any of these tests so they’re clearly not bluffing. At least up until yesterday, they thought they had a working missile. Maybe they still do.

We know the North has a working engine. North Korean television released images of an engine test in early April that we assessed as a pair of Isayev 4D10 engines from the R-27 missile coupled to form an ICBM-class power plant. As these were only still images, we couldn’t be sure the test had been fully successful. But satellite images show no indication that the test stand had been damaged by an explosion, and if this ground test had failed in some other respect then presumably the North Koreans would not have been so eager to launch a missile using the same engine.

It would seem that a missile with a proven design and a proven engine simply ought to work. And maybe the reason the North Koreans hadn’t tested the system before now is that they were so confident it would work that they didn’t need to test it. So much for that theory. Engines that work on the ground don’t always work in flight, as the missile’s acceleration can produce instabilities in the propellant feed. The structure could collapse under flight loads. There are always surprises the first time a new system is flown no matter how much ground testing is done.

And working from old Soviet designs, even using old Soviet hardware, is no guarantee of success. The design has been visibly modified, at a minimum stretching the propellant tanks by 2-3 meters for additional range. That might not have been done right. Even the parts of the design that haven’t changed will have been based on the implicit assumption of Russian parts, Russian raw materials and Russian technicians reading blueprints to Russian conventions. This author has seen rocket engines fail simply because the manufacturing site was moved from England to Ireland[1]—how many more opportunities for failure must there be between Russia and North Korea? As for any tested, proven Russian hardware the North Koreans might have obtained, such hardware will by now be at least 40 years old and perhaps not properly cared for given all that time. In short, there is no substitute for flight-testing to see if an engine still works.

Or more accurately, to find out why it doesn’t work and fix it. North Korea’s rockets almost never work on the first try. The first Nodong apparently blew up on the pad just like the most recent Musudan. The Taepodong 1 and 2 rockets, the Unha, and now the KN-11 SLBM, all failed on their first flight. To be fair, this is literally rocket science. It isn’t supposed to be easy, and even NASA failed on its first satellite launch attempt. Like NASA, North Korea has shown the ability to persevere, fix the problems, and eventually succeed.

The North Koreans have also, in the past, shown patience. This is critical. When a rocket fails, it takes at a minimum several months to figure out why it failed and fix it. Trying to repeat a failed test without taking that time almost guarantees additional failures. NASA understands this, but when the first Vanguard satellite launch attempt failed at a time of intense political pressure, it attempted a second launch a little more than a month later, which also failed. Ultimately, six launches were conducted at roughly one-month intervals, with only a single success. Modern space programs, facing less pressure, will usually stand down for a year or more after a failed test. Just a few weeks before the North Korean failures, an American Atlas rocket suffered a minor anomaly that forced an early engine shutdown. The mission was successfully completed but further Atlas launches have been postponed to give the engineers at least three months for troubleshooting.

The North Koreans have traditionally followed this approach. Yet after the April 15 failure they conducted a second test less than two weeks later, possibly involving two simultaneous launches. With embarrassing failure the almost certain outcome, why was the attempt made? At the time, we had speculated that the upcoming Party Congress was putting extreme pressure on the schedule, but the Congress is over and done with, and now we have yet another test that was probably doomed from the start. There has been speculation that the test was intended to send a message to China, as a senior North Korean official visited Beijing and met with the Chinese leader. But what kind of message was intended?

Another possibility is that this is driven by pressure from the top. While the test failures were not highly publicized, they were probably an embarrassment to a Kim Jong Un who was expecting success. He may still be impatiently demanding that success. If true, this does not bode well for the engineers on the project. If they can’t convince the Party leadership, even now that the Party Congress is done, to back off and give them the time they need to find and solve the Musudan’s problems, they will keep failing. How many failures will Kim tolerate, and what happens when he runs out of patience?

The other possibility is that the Musudan, and the people behind it, may be struggling for relevance. The Musudan is a missile with a single mission—to deliver nuclear or perhaps chemical weapons to the island of Guam. It could also reach targets in Japan or South Korea, but the DPRK’s more reliable Nodong and Scud missiles can do that as well. Guam is certainly an important target for North Korea—the only sovereign US territory it can reach without developing a true ICBM, and a critical logistical base for any US operations against North Korea. But with limited economic resources and with several ambitious new rocket and missile programs, is it worth the cost to develop a troublesome system devoted to a single target? Maybe the senior leadership has decided to leave Guam to the more capable and versatile KN-08 and KN-14 missiles now under development, or the GORAE-class ballistic missile submarine, and the Musudan engineers are desperately trying to prove their own worth.

In any case, these failures may mark the end of the Musudan program. If there are continued test attempts at the current rate, whether driven by impatience from above or desperation at the bottom, there will likely be continued failures. Eventually, patience and resources will run out, and a team of North Korean rocket engineers will find themselves unemployed. If, instead, there is a real commitment to make the Musudan work, we would expect to see anywhere from three months to a year or more of ground testing before any further launch attempts. Only time will tell.



_______________

[1] To be fair, the Irish engineers got the system working properly – largely because they took the time to do it right.
 

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World | Mon Jun 6, 2016 1:04pm EDT
Related: World, North Korea

North Korea apparently reopened plant to produce plutonium: IAEA


North Korea appears to have reopened a plant to produce plutonium from spent fuel of a reactor central to its atomic weapons drive, the U.N. nuclear watchdog said on Monday, suggesting the country's arms effort is widening.

Pyongyang vowed in 2013 to restart all nuclear facilities, including the main reactor at its Yongbyon site that had been shut down and has been at the heart of its weapons program.

It said in September that Yongbyon was operating and that it was working to improve the "quality and quantity" of its nuclear weapons. It has since carried out what is widely believed to have been a nuclear test.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which has no access to North Korea and mainly monitors its activities by satellite, said last year it had seen signs of a resumption of activity at Yongbyon, including at the main reactor.

"Resumption of the activities of the 5 megawatt reactor, the expansion of centrifuge-related facility, reprocessing, these are some of the examples of the areas (of activity indicated at Yongbyon)," IAEA chief Yukiya Amano told a news conference during a quarterly IAEA Board of Governors meeting.

Centrifuges are machines that enrich uranium, a process that can purify the element to the level needed for use in the core of a nuclear weapon. Reprocessing involves obtaining plutonium from spent reactor fuel, the other main route to a bomb.

"There are indications the reprocessing plant at Yongbyon has been reactivated," an IAEA spokesman said later on Monday. "It is possible that it is reprocessing spent fuel."

Little is known about the quantities of weapons-grade uranium or plutonium that North Korea possesses, or its ability to produce either, though plutonium from spent fuel at Yongbyon is widely believed to have been used in its nuclear bombs.

North Korea has come under tightening international pressure over its nuclear weapons program, including tougher U.N. sanctions adopted in March backed by its lone major ally China, following its most recent nuclear test in January.

The website 38 North reported in April that exhaust plumes had been detected on two or three occasions in recent weeks from the thermal plant at Yongbyon's Radiochemical Laboratory, the site's main reprocessing installation.

The U.S. national intelligence director said in February that North Korea could be weeks away from recovering plutonium from Yongbyon, telling the Senate Armed Services Committee that it had also expanded its uranium enrichment facility there.


(Reporting by Francois Murphy; Editing by Tom Heneghan)
 

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N. Korea vows to develop more nuclear weapons

Published : 2016-06-07 17:09
Updated : 2016-06-07 17:09

North Korea pledged Tuesday to develop more nuclear weapons as its existing arsenal has helped raise the country's strategic leverage in dealing with external relations, the North's state media said.

North Korea plans to actively pursue diplomatic policy commensurate with its enhanced global status which has been earned thanks to its nuclear weapons program, according to Rodong Sinmun, the North's main newspaper.

The country has conducted four nuclear tests since 2006 with outside observers believing the North has a small stockpile of nuclear weapons.

"We will produce more modern and diverse nuclear weapons," the newspaper said. "The weapons are not aimed at posing a threat to peace. We will not use nuclear weapons if aggressors do not attack us with nukes," it said.

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has referred to his country as a "responsible" nuclear state at the congress of the ruling Workers' Party of Korea held in early May.

Kim made it clear that he will "permanently" defend the pursuit of his signature policy of developing nuclear weapons in tandem with boosting the country's moribund economy, commonly known as the "byeongjin" policy.

The North claims that it has succeeded in making a nuclear warhead small enough to fit on a ballistic missile, but Seoul and Washington said that Pyongyang's miniaturization technology has not been fully achieved.

The newspaper report came as North Korea is engaged in a flurry of diplomacy apparently to drive a wedge in united fronts for imposing sanctions over the communist country's nuclear test and long-range rocket launch early this year.

Ri Su-yong, a vice chairman of the ruling Workers' Party, made a rare visit to China last week in an apparent bid to improve strained ties with Beijing following Pyongyang's nuclear tests.

North Korea's ceremonial head of state, Kim Yong-nam, also visited Equatorial Guinea last month to attend the inauguration ceremony of the president of the African country. (Yonhap)
 

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Asia & Pacific

North Korea’s military buildup isn’t limited to its nukes

By Anna Fifield June 7 
Comments 6

TOKYO — North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons technology has been well demonstrated so far this year, with January’s nuclear test and numerous launches of missiles designed to deliver such weapons.

But even as Kim Jong Un’s regime presses ahead with its nuclear program, it is investing considerable resources in upgrading its conventional facilities, according to satellite imagery.

“Lots of people say that if they have a nuclear deterrent, they won’t need conventional weapons,” said Curtis Melvin, a researcher at the U.S.-Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins University who has an encyclopedic knowledge of North Korea’s geography. “But under the Kim Jong Un era, there has been a big increase in spending on the economic and conventional military side.”

Kim, who took over the running of the state after his father’s death at the end of 2011, has promoted a “byungjin,” or “simultaneous push,” policy of pursuing nuclear weapons advancement and economic growth at the same time.

This year’s nuclear test and the emphasis on the economy suggest that this policy is still very much the priority. But this doesn’t mean that North Korea is taking its foot off the conventional-weapons pedal.

“When the Respected Leader Kim Jong Un came here last year, he said that we should continue to build munitions with our bare hands,” Ryang Ae Kyong, a guide at the Pyongchon revolutionary site, a former munitions factory, told journalists visiting Pyongyang last month. (She also told them that Kim Jong Il, the current leader’s father, shot three bull’s eyes there the first time he fired a rifle.)

Using satellite images, Melvin has spotted significant construction work at the October 3 shipyard near Wonsan, a port city on North Korea’s east coast, with land being extended and a bridge being built between a Korean People’s Army naval base and the shipyard. It appeared that the bridge will carry a new railway line, he said.

Last year Kim visited the dockyard, which was built in 1947 under his grandfather, Kim Il Sung, as North Korea’s first base for warship repair. “He stressed the need for the dockyard to update its production processes in line with the requirement of the age of knowledge-based economy so as to successfully carry out the task of repairing warships and contribute to the modernization of warships,” state media reported about Kim’s visit.

[ North Korea leader hails nuclear and missile advances ]

There are signs that air-force runways are being resurfaced and new airfields are being built, although many of these are private airfields for Kim, who pilots his own light aircraft.

Melvin has also spotted a new driver-training facility, apparently for special forces, at Iha-ri, not far from the western border with South Korea.

Joseph S. Bermudez, an expert on North Korea’s military capabilities who also monitors satellite imagery, said that most of the changes he’s seen involve rebuilding bases at new or current locations. Still, there is evidence of considerable investment.


“There is no indication that North Korea is reducing the size of its conventional armed forces,” Bermudez said. “I think they’re pushing ahead on both fronts.”

This has been combined with noticeable personnel changes that emphasize competence over political flunkyism.

“I get a sense that when Kim Jong Un came to power, he looked around and said, ‘We have all these old guys running things who haven’t been in the field for 15 or 20 years. We need people who know what they’re talking about,’ ” said Bermudez.

Over the past year, younger people with relevant experience have been elevated to run conventional military units, he said.

“I don’t want to say it’s a meritocracy — it’s not — but there appears to be a push towards more competent people,” Bermudez said. “Before, you had leaders of special forces who couldn’t run a mile. Now, we see artillery division commanders that actually have an artillery background.”

[ North Korea announces five-year economic plan, its first since the 1980s ]

While moving personnel around might be easy, large-scale infrastructure projects are not, especially for a country under increasingly tight international sanctions.

South Korea’s central bank has estimated that the North’s economy is growing by 1 or 2 percent a year, a level too low for the amount of spending that is taking place.

“There’s no way they can be doing all of this on 1 percent growth,” said Melvin, who runs the North Korea Economy Watch blog. “There’s been a massive increase in public spending on both the economic side — like factories and entertainment facilities — and on the military side.”

That’s without mentioning the efforts to develop nuclear weapons and longer-range ballistic missiles.

Still, even as it has developed nuclear weapons, Pyongyang has for decades kept a conventional insurance policy against the high-tech firepower of the United States and its ally in South Korea: heavy artillery lined up along the demilitarized zone that separates North and South Korea, giving it the ability to devastate Seoul, just 30 miles away, if an invasion were to occur.

The Defense Department’s latest report on North Korea’s military capabilities noted Pyongyang’s calculated moves on the non-nuclear side.

“North Korea is making efforts to upgrade select elements of its large arsenal of mostly outdated conventional weapons,” the report said. “It has reinforced long-range artillery forces near the DMZ and has a substantial number of mobile ballistic missiles that could strike a variety of targets in [South Korea] and Japan.”

Read more

North Korea’s one-percenters savor life in ‘Pyonghattan’

I went to North Korea and was told I ask too many questions

A model farm — with few farmers — in North Korea
 

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Needle in a Haystack: How North Korea Could Fight a Nuclear War

By Garth McLennan
13 June 2016

Since its January 6 test of what was claimed to be a hydrogen bomb and a follow-up satellite launch on February 7, North Korea’s nuclear weapons program has received a considerable amount of attention. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) unanimously passed Resolution 2270 at the beginning of March[1] in what has been widely viewed as one of the most sweeping sets of economic sanctions on Pyongyang to date. In addition, American officials have pressed their reluctant Chinese counterparts for greater cooperation in checking Pyongyang, South Korea closed down the Kaesong Industrial Zone it operates with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), and Washington has refocused attention on the possibility of deploying the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system to the Republic of Korea (ROK).

Much less coverage and attention has been paid to how the North Korean leadership might actually use nuclear weapons in a live, operational setting. The avoidance of discussion on this issue is hardly surprising; analysis of nuclear combat theory and doctrine is somewhat of a taboo in the strategic community,[2] almost certainly borne of the ideas of mutually-assured-destruction (MAD) and measurements in megadeaths (a morbid metric defining nuclear combat deaths of at least one million) that were derived from the conclusions reached by Cold War thinkers and analysts.

However, this avoidance needs to change. Undoubtedly it is uncomfortable to contemplate scenarios involving violence on such a grand scale, but the reality is that the global nuclear weapons landscape has fundamentally changed in the quarter century since the Soviet Union crumbled, and has brought about a strategic environment in which it can no longer be assumed that such weapons will never be used. Topics of discussion related to nuclear weapons need to extend beyond nonproliferation or attempts at containing burgeoning powers on the hunt for the bomb.

More than a decade of punishing sanctions have thus far not had the desired effect on North Korean behavior and the new ones implemented in accordance with UNSCR Resolution 2270 are unlikely to be more effective. Kim Jong Un’s regime, like its predecessor, sees nuclear weapons as the ultimate guarantor of state survival. Taken from the perspective of a dictator, it isn’t difficult to imagine the Kim regime looking to the fate of toppled Libyan strongman Muammar Gaddafi, who cooperated with the United States on the surrender of his own WMD stockpiles yet was deposed and ultimately killed by opposition rebels backed by Washington in 2011, and opting for another course.[3]

This is just one example that helps explain the North Korean calculus. Since the imposition of the new Security Council sanctions and amid the near global condemnation that has followed its latest round of nuclear testing, Pyongyang has issued a steady stream of increasingly volatile and threatening statements, including a threat to launch nuclear strikes at New York.[4] After the additional sanctions were levied, the DPRK publicized that Kim had given the order for the nation’s nuclear forces to be put on high alert.[5] While such language is often treated as something of a joke among western audiences, talk of the sort emanating out of Pyongyang may signify that the DPRK leadership views its nuclear weapons as “inherently usable.”[6] At the Workers’ Party of Korea’s 7th Congress last month, Kim shed greater light on what sort of scenario could trigger a DPRK nuclear strike. He stated that North Korean sovereignty would have to be threatened by “invasive hostile forces with nuclear weapons.” Given the regime’s behavior, however, this should hardly be taken as gospel. Just what exactly would constitute a violation of DPRK sovereignty is unclear, as is how Pyongyang might classify the terms “hostile” and “invasive.”

In a sense, this is reminiscent of Russia’s “escalate to deescalate” concept – the nuclear posture Moscow adopted in the wake of NATO’s 1999 intervention in Yugoslavia. The doctrine essentially revolves around the premise that Russia reserves the option to execute a first-strike nuclear attack in a limited fashion against an opponent that has overwhelmed its conventional capacities, but it does not specify the kind of live setting that would fall within the doctrine’s framework. Unlike Russia, however, the North Korean nuclear posture is not particularly diversified. Asymmetric escalation options for the DPRK leadership are somewhat limited; North Korea has not concentrated on advanced tactical nuclear weapons and that in turn limits how it might actually fight a nuclear war.

At the same time, and against the backdrop of the largest ever joint US-ROK military exercises that took place throughout March, which were said to focus on Special Forces-led decapitation strikes aimed at the DPRK leadership,[7] North Korea also unveiled its new multiple launch rocket system (MLRS), not seen since Pyongyang’s military parade last October.[8] Although Pyongyang has not released any information pertaining to the system’s capabilities other than photos it is believed to be able to fire a number of rockets at one time, presenting challenging obstacles for anti-missile systems. Jeffrey Lewis has pointed out the similarities North Korea’s new MLRS’s rocket bears to the Pakistani Hatf-IX/Nasr 300mm rocket,[9] which Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division has publicly said has the capability to be armed with nuclear warheads.[10]

Pyongyang has also made the notable shift to solid-fuelled submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) testing from its previous liquid-fuel designs. The last test, conducted in April, featured a range of just 30 km, after four failed tests.[11] This, along with an examination of the DPRK’s offensive nuclear posture, quite possibly sheds some light on North Korean strategy should conflict ever escalate to the nuclear sphere.

While the North has conducted four nuclear tests since 2006, the exact size of its arsenal is largely unknown, and it has not been yet proven to have a secure, second-strike retaliatory capability of the kind that acts as a lynchpin for larger nuclear powers. It does, however, possess large quantities of ballistic missiles, something the regime has been anything but shy in displaying of late. On March 9, Kim visited an unnamed factory, believed to be Chamjin Missile Factory near Pyongyang, where he posed behind what appeared to be a globe model of a miniaturized nuclear device.[12] Also included in the photograph were two KN-08 ballistic missiles, the as-yet-untested intercontinental-ballistic missile (ICBM) feared by some as being able to reach US shores. The accompanying release issued from North Korean state news agencies claimed that the DPRK had succeeded in mating miniaturized nuclear warheads to its ballistic missiles, which, if accurate, would represent a major breakthrough. On March 14, Kim publicly pondered future nuclear and missile tests, saying that North Korean scientists had deciphered how to shield a warhead mounted on a ballistic missile from the heat of re-entry.[13]

While the speed of North Korean nuclear advancements, and the persistent absence of independent or outside verification of such achievements, is certainly a cause for concern, a very large ballistic missile inventory of varying ranges, along with a much smaller but growing nuclear arsenal estimated to contain between 10-16 weapons[14] today appears likely. This raises the frightening possibility of so-called haystacking in the event of actual nuclear war.

In this scenario, Pyongyang would attempt to saturate a given battlefield with conventionally armed ballistic missiles; the catch comes in that a small number of these missiles would be armed with nuclear warheads. Such a strategy would greatly challenge American and South Korean missile defense networks while also comporting with the DPRK’s wider nuclear posture; in lieu of reliable intelligence as to which incoming missiles have nuclear capabilities and which do not, anti-missile batteries would be forced to shoot down as many as possible, greatly lowering the efficiency and effectiveness of any possible defense.

Such a dispersed strategy would address the serious deficiencies North Korea faces in opposition to advanced American and allied missile defense systems, but it would also result in efforts to stiffen those systems. Indeed, the near-constant talk surrounding the possible deployment of THAAD anti-missile batteries to South Korea already suggests such an endeavour is being openly contemplated, to the great annoyance of Beijing.[15] The THAAD system is built to defend against short and intermediate-ranged ballistic missiles.[16] And while the ROK already has formidable missile defense capabilities, including a large arsenal of Patriot-2 short-range missiles that are to be upgraded to the Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-3s, the same kind recently installed on the home isles by Japan) interceptor sometime in the next year or two,[17] the addition of one or more THAAD units would no doubt provide South Korea with a more layered defensive posture.

THAAD would not, however, serve as an effective tool in countering a North Korean nuclear strike if such an attack were haystacked among a barrage of conventional warheads. The THAAD system is a powerful anti-missile tool, one that forms a central part of defending America’s military base in Guam, but in this case, it would not serve as a bulletproof measure against a North Korean nuclear attack. At present, such a system does not exist.

If THAAD were deployed to the Korean peninsula, it would hardly be a stretch for Pyongyang to immediately and aggressively increase their production of ballistic missiles and their assorted delivery systems. THAAD, for all it can do, has limits that can be overcome by high volume missile stockpiles and SLBM capabilities.[18]

The ROK’s current ability to counter a saturation-based ballistic missile attack from the DPRK is limited. The Patriot radars currently employed by South Korea have the ability to track between 40-50 incoming projectiles. The doctrine attached to missile interception calls for a two-to-one ratio for every missile fired; if Pyongyang were to launch a haystacked barrage, it would almost immediately tax Seoul’s capacity to repel it. At the same time, nuclear-armed ballistic missiles would almost certainly confront the ROK with the problem of leakage in any attempt to intercept them.

An unorthodox nuclear doctrine like haystacking may be the most suitable doctrinal framework for Pyongyang, but such an approach would greatly increase the risks of nuclear combat becoming a reality considering the close geographic proximity of Pyongyang to all of its likely enemies and the forward-deployed missile posture that results from that, it would not take too much of a stretch of the imagination to see that the number of nuclear-related crises could rise. Such an absence of distance could, as the DPRK has already alluded to, lead to higher states of alert and warning, less time to fully discern the nature of an incoming projectile and develop an appropriate response, and more devolved structures of command-and-control.[19]

The biggest takeaway from this developing scenario is a lowering of the nuclear threshold, where the chances of a triggering incident escalate dramatically. It also stands in stark contrast to the accepted strategic balance that existed throughout much of the Cold War. While truly terrifying moments in which both Washington and Moscow were pushed to the nuclear brink have occurred, they were relatively few and far between. Even if command of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal remains tightly controlled by the central leadership, the danger of a lowered threshold will increase. If command-and-control of nuclear assets are given to North Korean generals at or near the battlefield because of fears of decapitation, every incident of dispute could see its stakes raised immediately.

With a stated North Korean doctrine for the use of nuclear weapons that hardly inspires confidence for stability, an escalatory scenario could arise quickly if tensions ratchet up. This should not be viewed as impossible. Moreover, the expected continued growth of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal, both in terms of numbers and possibly sophistication, along with the possible expansion of its ballistic missile delivery force, will only heighten the danger. The contemplation of how Pyongyang could put its nuclear arsenal into action requires the realization that there is no magic-bullet solution to the problem while also thinking beyond early air-atomic theory and the horrors of MAD through scenario-based analysis that is fully cognizant of the above factors.

__________

[1] “Adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2270 on North Korea,” U.S. Department of State, March 2, 2016, accessed June 13, 2016, http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2016/03/253877.htm.

[2] Jeffrey Lewis, “Donald Trump Is an Idiot Savant on Nuclear Policy,” Foreign Policy, March 7, 2016, accessed June 13, 2016, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/07/donald-trump-is-an-idiot-savant-on-nuclear-policy/.

[3] Rodger Baker, “North Korea, the Outlier in U.S. Policy,” Stratfor Global Intelligence, January 19, 2016, accessed June 13, 2016, https://www.stratfor.com/weekly/north-korea-outlier-us-policy.

[4] Anna Fifield, “North Korea claims it could wipe out Manhattan with a hydrogen bomb,” The Washington Post, March 13, 2016, accessed June 13, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/worl...34cd54-e919-11e5-b0fd-073d5930a7b7_story.html.

[5] Ankit Panda, “Yes, North Korea’s Very Upset About New UN Security Council Sanctions,” The Diplomat, March 4, 2016, accessed June 13, 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/yes-north-koreas-very-upset-about-new-un-security-council-sanctions/.

[6] Van Jackson, “Nukes They Can Use? The Danger of North Korea Going Tactical,” 38 North, March 15, 2016, accessed June 13, 2016, http://38north.org/2016/03/vjackson031516/.

[7] Franz-Stefan Gady, “Largest Ever US-Korea Military Drill Focuses on Striking North Korea’s Leadership”, The Diplomat, March 8, 2016, accessed June 13, 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/larg...-focuses-on-striking-north-koreas-leadership/.

[8] Ankit Panda, “Meet North Korea’s New Multiple Launch Rocket System,” The Diplomat, March 7, 2015, accessed June 13, 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/meet-north-koreas-new-multiple-launch-rocket-system/

[9] Jeffrey Lewis, Twitter post, March 5, 2016, 7:38 p.m., https://twitter.com/ArmsControlWonk/status/706323004557373440.

[10] Strategic Plans Division Pakistan, Facebook post, August 24, 2015, 11:54 a.m., https://www.facebook.com/StrategicPlansDivisionPakistan/posts/487320088103190.

[11] John Schilling, “A New Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile for North Korea,” 38 North, April 25, 2016, accessed June 13, 2016, http://38north.org/2016/04/jschilling042516/

[12] Jeffrey Lewis, “Five Things You Need to Know about Kim Jong Un’s Photo Op with the Bomb,” 38 North, March 11, 2016, accessed June 13, 2016, http://38north.org/2016/03/jlewis031116/.

[13] Alastair Gale, “North Korea Threatens Nuclear Warhead, Ballistic Missile Tests,” The Wall Street Journal, March 14, 2016, accessed June 13, 2016, http://www.wsj.com/articles/north-korea-threatens-nuclear-warhead-ballistic-missile-tests-1458002582.

[14] Joel S. Wit & Sun Young Ahn, “North Korea’s Nuclear Futures: Technology and Strategy,” February, 2015, accessed June 13, 2016, 38 North, http://38north.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/NKNF_NK-Nuclear-Futures.pdf

[15] Shannon Tiezzi, “It’s Official: US, South Korea Begin Talks on THAAD,” The Diplomat, March 5, 2016, accessed June 13, 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/its-official-us-south-korea-begin-talks-on-thaad/

[16] “THAAD: Terminal High Altitude Area Defense,” Lockheed Martin, accessed June 13, 2016, http://www.lockheedmartin.com.au/us/products/thaad.html.

[17] Rod Lyon, “The Hard Truth About THAAD, South Korea and China,” The National Interest, February 23, 2016, accessed June 13, 2016, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/th...al&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer

[18] Michael Elleman & Michael J. Zagurek Jr., “THAAD: What It Can and Can’t Do,” 38 North, March 10, 2016, http://38north.org/2016/03/thaad031016/

[19] Andrew Krepinevich & Jacob Cohn, “Rethinking the Apocalypse: Time for Bold Thinking About the Second Nuclear Age,” War on the Rocks, March 1, 2016, accessed June 13, 2016, http://warontherocks.com/2016/03/re...r-bold-thinking-about-the-second-nuclear-age/
 

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Preparing for Korean Unification?

By Georgy Toloraya
09 June 2016
Comments 9

A growing number of policymakers and experts in South Korea, the United States and other countries now presume that the best solution in principle for the North Korean nuclear problem and the larger “Korean issue” is unification, implying a peaceful takeover of the North by the South. This has been especially true in the latter half of Park Geun-hye’s presidency; where since her Dresden speech, this issue has been at the forefront of government and public discussion. Some commentators in Seoul have concluded that unification is not only desirable but also quickly achievable, as evidenced by indications that the North Korean regime is about to collapse. Though I see no signs of brewing instability as I write this in Pyongyang, South Korea’s only reasonable course of action is to prepare for the possibility that international pressure will someday bring the North to its knees, as analysts assess the plausibility and desirability of such a scenario.

Expert predictions about unification belie the inevitable complexities that the process would entail. Pundits argue that the international community could locate North Korea’s nuclear weapons and materials, and a nuclear power—likely the United States—or a multilateral organization such as the International Atomic Energy Agency[1] would take charge of the assets with the ultimate aim of destroying them. They suggest that North Korea’s population would welcome South Koreans—including the flood of South Korean soldiers who would arrive first—and North Koreans would eagerly adapt to their new reality (though they would likely have limited freedom to move to South Korea or elsewhere). In a matter of years, natural resource development and labor-intensive production facilities would help to integrate North Korea into the larger Korean economy, giving a tremendous boost to the undivided country’s economic performance in the global market. The international status of the unified Korea would become qualitatively different, probably making it a new Asian power center. At the same time, such a development would benefit Asian security by removing a major military threat, eliminating the proliferation danger and helping all parties to generally feel safer.

The Korean people’s dream to unify their country is understood and supported around the world, but the above scenario appears unlikely. Negative fallout from even a “peaceful” regime collapse[2] could be significant, far outweighing any benefits and potentially exceeding the burdens that the global community has endured from regime change in Iraq and Libya. This preliminary analysis will consider several caveats that planners must take into account.

The consequences of Korean unification may include, but are not limited to, the following:
◾One or more rogue countries or non-state actors could illicitly obtain North Korean-origin weapons of mass destruction (WMD), missiles or related production technologies. An exodus of fighters and refugees may facilitate a massive, uncontrolled outflow of conventional arms.
◾A civil conflict or even a guerilla war may take place in the North, with subversive activities spreading to the South and supporting countries. It is naïve to expect that North Korea’s entire population would welcome the “liberation from tyranny” that unification offers; such an expectation is simply not based on a sober analysis of what North Korea’s existing social strata would gain or lose from the arrival of South Korean governance. The elite and the middle class—possibly about 1 million people or roughly 5% of the population, including members of the party, security apparatus, military and a considerable portion of their brainwashed supporters and families—would have no exit strategy and no place in a South-dominated Korea. Moreover, they could reasonably expect repercussions for their roles in the previous regime. If even a portion of this group (including trained personnel) resorted to armed resistance, the results could be disastrous. This is not just speculation: the regime has spent decades preparing for a guerilla war, and it likely has a network of well-equipped bases concealed throughout its territory for use by dedicated fighters.
◾A possible massive refugee exodus, especially in the event of a prolonged simmering conflict, could extend not only to neighboring China and Russia but also to other countries along sea routes. In addition to the humanitarian catastrophe that may follow, longer-term consequences from a mass refugee migration could include the appearance of transnational organized crime rings with North Korean connections. Such organizations could pursue business in areas such as arms sales, human trafficking, drug smuggling and counterfeit currency production.
◾If significant civil conflict ended quickly or were completely avoided (which is doubtful), new social tensions would emerge from a growing sense of inequality. North Koreans would likely come to be seen as second-rate citizens, or as “servants” to their South Korean “masters” (or, at best, as “pupils” to their South Korean “teachers”). The present “haves” in North Korea would be relegated to the lowest social status if not direct prosecution, fueling resentment and opposition. Even members of North Korea’s working class might in time grow dissatisfied with their subservient position and their inequality to South Koreans.
◾South Korea would suffer a huge drain on its resources as it reformed the North Korean economy, virtually building it anew. Meanwhile, North Korea’s population would face a difficult period of adaptation to new market realities. (To understand the magnitude of this adjustment, consider the difficulties that past North Korean refugees have encountered after voluntarily immigrating to the South.) These economic and cultural transitions would likely slow any increase in productivity from the introduction of modern technology and management practices.
◾The collateral damage to South Korea’s economy may be significant enough to reduce its international competiveness. A unified Korea could prove less attractive to foreign investors, and it would face the impossibility of swiftly re-educating the North Korean labor force. As a result, Korea could cede its place in global value chains to newly emerging economies in Asia and elsewhere. The resulting change of fortune for South Koreans may in turn lead to a growing social dissatisfaction in the South and contribute to a political crisis.
◾The DPRK’s spontaneous submission to the ROK could severely damage or disrupt the existing system of international security governance, with the supposed central role of the UN Security Council (UNSC). It is difficult to imagine that China and Russia, with their respective geopolitical interests and roles in implementing international law as permanent UNSC members, would approve the de facto, involuntary takeover of one sovereign state and UN member by another. While the ROK Constitution considers the whole Korean peninsula to be ROK territory,[3] that view does not correspond with international law. The UNSC would set a dangerous precedent if it approved South Korea’s annexation of the North,[4] but a lack of international approval would cause the new state to be “illegal” for at least some time.
◾In the unlikely event that China allowed such a takeover, Beijing would face a transformed geopolitical situation. Korea’s unification under the ROK would likely result in the deployment of allied US troops close to its border with China, a development that would be seen in China as a major strategic defeat. “Giving away” its former ally, for which thousands of Chinese soldiers sacrificed their lives during the Korean War, would be widely perceived in Asia as a sign of China’s weakness and indecisiveness. It would undermine China’s position not only in Asia, but also as an emerging superpower.
◾In addition, this outcome may produce a totally new stage of confrontation between China and the United States. Beijing would have to upgrade its military in Northeast China in order to counter the grave challenge to its military-security interests. It could act in response to a perceived US strategy of “encirclement,” similar to Russia’s post-Cold War behavior in Europe.
◾In an alternate scenario, China could react to an impeding unification by taking preventive measures, potentially seizing North Korean border territories and/or installing a pro-Chinese government in Pyongyang. Such steps would generate a tremendous geopolitical shift, leading to a lasting geopolitical confrontation between “continental” and “maritime” powers. The ensuing militarization of China and deepening conflict with the United States would encourage arms buildups throughout the region in response to the threat that many countries would see in an increase in Chinese capabilities. An arms race with new blocs could result, causing inconceivable damage to the global economy.

In short, the strategy of bringing down North Korea’s regime could backfire to the world’s ultimate detriment, no matter how much nuisance the country’s WMD programs currently pose. A comprehensive analysis is necessary before any application of more sanctions, which in fact are meant to suffocate the Pyongyang regime, not change its behavior. A new US administration should conduct a fundamental policy review of this nature.

Koreans may well have to wait to pursue unification until more opportune times, when new generations can reconcile on mutually agreeable terms and seek out an eventual national convergence of one form or another.

[1] The International Atomic Energy Agency currently has no capacity to support such an endeavor.

[2] This discussion does not refer to an open military conflict, which might include the use of nuclear weapons. Rather, it specifically addresses “peaceful scenarios” that might include turmoil resulting from leadership strife, a “people’s uprising” launched in reaction to economic troubles from sanctions or a government crackdown brutal enough to invite South Korean or international intervention.

[3] Notably, the DPRK Constitution does not include such a provision.

[4] One reason for China and Russia to oppose such a scenario in the absence of a proper procedure (i.e., a referendum) is its potential to raise questions about the results of World War II in the Pacific. It could open a Pandora’s box of mutual territorial and other claims in Asia and beyond.
 

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(LEAD) N. Korea vows to bolster nuclear deterrent to cope with U.S. threat

2016/06/15 23:03

ATTN: UPDATES with N. Korea's letter to U.N.; ADDS comment by U.S. military official)

SEOUL, June 15 (Yonhap) -- North Korea threatened Wednesday to strengthen its nuclear deterrent as it accused the United States of plotting a preemptive strike against Pyongyang.

"We will further bolster up in quality and quantity the nuclear deterrence for self-defense in face of the U.S. reckless war moves," an unidentified spokesman of North Korea's Foreign Ministry said in English-language comments carried by the North's official Korean Central News Agency.

He also warned that North Korea will "foil any slightest military provocation of the enemies with the Korean-style mode of merciless counteraction."

North Korea has long used the term, "nuclear deterrent," to refer to its nuclear arsenal. North Korea has so far conducted four nuclear tests, including the recent one in January.

The latest warning came in response to what the spokesman says is a provocative report on the North Korea's nuclear issue by a U.S. strategic information consulting company.

The report envisages a "precision air raid operation" against nuclear and military facilities in North Korea to destroy its nuclear capabilities, the KCNA said, without naming the U.S. firm.

The spokesman also claimed that the report is clear proof of the fact that "the surprise preemptive attack and armed invasion against North Korea are in the full-dress process of examination and preparation."

North Korea has frequently accused the U.S. of harboring a hostile policy toward Pyongyang and plotting with South Korea to invade the North, a charge denied by Washington.

Tensions persist on the Korean Peninsula over North Korea's missile and nuclear weapons programs.

Separately, the North's Foreign Ministry sent a letter to the U.N. Secretariat earlier this week and said that the U.N. should not put pressure on North Korea.

The U.N. has imposed the toughest sanctions ever on North Korea over its fourth nuclear test and its long-range rocket launch earlier this year.

The ministry also said the U.N. should exercise its influence on the U.S. so that Washington may give up its hostile policy against Pyongyang.

"We hope that leading figures of the U.N. Secretariat including the Secretary-General would be recorded ... for their positive contribution to easing tension on the Korean peninsula," according to the letter carried by KCNA.

In late May, U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon urged North Korea to halt provocative actions after Pyongyang carried out an intermediate-range ballistic missile test in violation of U.N. resolutions.

In Honolulu, Rear Adm. Mark Montgomery, director for operations at the U.S Pacific Command, said North Korea has demonstrated the level of missile and rocket engine technology with which it could launch a projectile into space.

He made the comments when asked by a South Korean reporter about the threat posed by North Korea's missile capabilities.

entropy@yna.co.kr

(END)
 

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North Korea accuses U.S. of planning precision strike

By Elizabeth Shim Contact the Author | June 15, 2016 at 9:20 PM


SEOUL, June 15 (UPI) -- North Korea's foreign ministry spokesman said he has information on precision strike operations the United States is planning as part of its "blatant war of aggression" against the country.

Pyongyang's state-controlled news agency KCNA reported the spokesman has evidence Washington is openly discussing air strikes against North Korea's nuclear facilities.

"The fact that the United States is openly discussing 'precision strike operations' is a sign it is on the brink of taking an extremely reckless step," the spokesman said. "The fact the operation was made public ahead of the U.S.-South Korea joint military exercise, that dangerous 'scenario of war' taking place in August, cannot be overlooked."

The spokesman added the alleged U.S. policy justifies Pyongyang's policy of "Byungjin," or pursuing economic development alongside the development of nuclear weapons.

North Korea did not provide additional details on the report.

A South Korean analyst had said on Tuesday North Korea might conduct a fifth nuclear test during the months leading up to the U.S. presidential elections.

Pyongyang's possession of nuclear weapons has been presented to the world as a "fait accompli" and will be used to develop its foreign policy, said Lee Su-seok.

North Korea's underlying motives include a desire to use the talks to gain recognition, and prove to the international community the implementation of sanctions isn't having the intended effect, the analyst said.

Washington has said it is open to dialogue with Pyongyang but only on the condition it is willing to give up its nuclear weapons, a growing stockpile, according to the Institute for Science and International Security in Washington, D.C.

In the last 18 months, Pyongyang has added four to six nuclear weapons, analysts said.
 

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S. Korea holds navy drill near disputed border with North

AFP
5 hrs ago

South Korea on Thursday kicked off a live-fire naval exercise near its disputed sea border with North Korea -- a move likely to fan already elevated military tensions with Pyongyang.

The three-day exercise in the Yellow Sea is aimed at practising responses to simulated incursions by North Korean vessels and aircraft, the South's navy said in a statement.

The manoeuvres will involve 20 naval ships, including an Aegis destroyer, as well as 10 aircraft including anti-submarine helicopters.

"If the enemy commits provocative acts again in the Yellow Sea, we are prepared to act swiftly, precisely and sufficiently in order to turn the site of provocation into their own tombs," the navy statement said.

The two Koreas fought bloody naval battles near the sea border known as the Northern Limit Line (NLL) in 1999, 2002 and 2009.

The North refuses to recognise the NLL, which was drawn unilaterally by the US-led United Nations Command at the end of the 1950-53 Korean War.

In 2010, South Korea blamed North Korea for the sinking of one of its warships near the Yellow Sea border, in which 46 sailors died.

Live-fire drills in the area invariably spark an angry reaction from the North.

Cross-border tensions have been running high ever since North Korea conducted its fourth nuclear test in January and a long-range rocket launch the following month.
 

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N.K. nuclear program top 'blinking-red' problems: CIA chief

2016/06/17 04:06

WASHINGTON, June 16 (Yonhap) -- North Korea's nuclear program is one of the top "blinking-red" problems that should be highlighted at an intelligence briefing for the next U.S. president, along with cyberthreats and terrorism, the CIA chief said Thursday.

"Proliferation is something that we cannot forget about, which is brought into stark relief by the activities of North Korea and Kim Jong-un, and the continued development of his nuclear program and ballistic missile capability," CIA Director John Brennan said at a Senate Intelligence Committee hearing.

Speaking in response to a question about the key issues that should be highlighted for the next president, Brennan also picked cyberthreats, terrorism and instability across the Middle East and Africa as other pressing problems.

North Korea conducted its fourth nuclear test in January and a long-range rocket launch the following month. The communist nation is also believed to have recently started reprocessing spent nuclear fuel to harvest plutonium for nuclear weapons.

Earlier this week, the Washington-based think tank Institute for Science and International Security said that the North is believed to have produced an additional four to six nuclear weapons since late 2014 and its total arsenal is now estimated at between 13-21 weapons.

"I have never seen a time when our country faced such a wide variety of threats to our national security. If you run your fingers along almost any portion of the map, from Asia Pacific to North Africa, you will quickly find a flashpoint with global implications," Brennan said.

"China is modernizing its military and extending its reach in the South China Sea. North Korea is expanding its nuclear weapons program. Russia is threatening its neighbors and aggressively reasserting itself on the global stage," he said. "And then there is the cyber domain, where states and sub-national actors are threatening financial systems, transportation networks and organizations of every stripe inside government and out."

Asked about the North's cyber capabilities, Brennan said it is what the U.S. should be concerned about.

"I think that the North Koreans have developed a cyber capability, as we've seen some recent incidents over the last year or two, where it has been employed," he said. "I think it is something that we need to be concerned about, given Kim Jong-un's penchant to use whatever capabilities he might have to cause problems."

jschang@yna.co.kr

(END)
 

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Posted : 2016-06-17 18:27
Updated : 2016-06-17 22:11

NK may have 50 nuclear weapons by 2020

By Rachel Lee

North Korea's nuclear stockpile could grow to 50 weapons by 2020, according to a U.S. analyst.

David Albright, president of the nonprofit Institute for Science and International Security, claimed that Pyongyang could amass a nuclear arsenal of around 50 weapons in four years time based on recent research, the Voice of America reported, Friday.

Last year, the American expert warned that North Korea could have around 100 nuclear weapons, following a one-year joint project with the U.S.-Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies and the National Defense University to predict possibilities of Pyongyang's nuclear programs for the next five years.

Albright also said the Institute for Science and International Security has been making efforts to locate nuclear weapons facilities in the North.

Leakage of information from North Korea and the growing ability of satellites to identify ever-smaller objects, have made it easier to find the locations, he said, adding that there are already a few spots assumed to have centrifuge plants.

There could be more nuclear installations that have yet to be discovered, but the stockpile of available nuclear weapons would not increase significantly, the American expert said, adding that the number of weapons may increase by 2 to 5, or even go down, considering other possible factors.

On Tuesday, the institute estimated Pyongyang's current nuclear stockpile to be between 13 to 21, including approximately four or more weapons made over the last 18 months.

rachel@ktimes.com
 

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Business | Tue Jun 21, 2016 4:09am EDT
Related: World, United Nations, Japan, North Korea

Japan military on alert for possible North Korean ballistic missile launch


Japan's military was on alert for a possible North Korean ballistic missile launch, a government source said on Tuesday, with media reporting its navy and anti-missile Patriot batteries have been told to shoot down any projectile heading for Japan.

North Korea appeared to have moved an intermediate-range missile to its east coast, but there were no signs of an imminent launch, South Korea's Yonhap News Agency reported, citing an unnamed government source.

A South Korean defense ministry official said it could not confirm the Yonhap report and said the military was watching the North's missile activities closely.

Tension in the region has been high since isolated North Korea conducted its fourth nuclear test in January and followed that with a satellite launch and test launches of various missiles.

Japan has put its anti-ballistic missile forces on alert several times this year after detecting signs of missile launches.

The Japanese government source said there were again signs North Korea might be preparing a launch of the intermediate-range Musudan missile, the same missile it attempted to launch in May, prompting the order for the military to go on alert.

South Korea's Foreign Ministry said if the North goes ahead with a launch it would again be in violation of U.N. resolutions and defying repeated warnings by the international community.

"It will further isolate the North from the international community," ministry spokesman Cho June-hyuck told a briefing.

The United Nations Security Council in March imposed tightened sanctions against North Korea over its pursuit of nuclear weapons.

North Korea has failed in all four attempts to launch the Musudan, which theoretically has the range to reach any part of Japan and the U.S. territory of Guam.

North Korea tried unsuccessfully to test launch the Musudan three times in April, according to U.S. and South Korean officials, while a May attempt failed a day after Japan put its military on alert.

North Korea is believed to have up to 30 Musudan missiles, according to South Korean media, which officials said were first deployed in around 2007, although the North had never attempted to test-fire them until this year.


(Reporting by Nobuhiro Kubo and Elaine Lies in Tokyo, Ju-min Park, Jee Heun Kahng, James Pearson in Seoul; Editing by Michael Perry)
 

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Diplomacy

North Korea losing African, South American allies

South Korea is waging a diplomatic campaign to wean nations in far-flung parts of the world off their alliances with North Korea. Julian Ryall reports from Tokyo.

Date 21.06.2016
Author Julian Ryall, Tokyo

South Korean President Park Geun-hye visited East Africa in late May and held talks with the leaders of Uganda, Ethiopia and Kenya. The details would have been worked out in advance, but Park walked away from a meeting with Yoweri Museveni, the Ugandan president, with an agreement that he would cut all military ties with North Korea.

Within days, the Ugandan government had asked around 60 North Korean military advisers and state security officials to leave the country.

It is not clear what South Korea has pledged to provide in return for this switch in Uganda's allegiance, but a Ugandan military intelligence official visited Seoul in June, and the African nation's defense minister is scheduled to attend the Seoul Defense Dialogue in September.

Severing contacts

"The government is making concerted efforts to cut North Korea's contacts to some of these rather remote parts of Africa, as well as Cuba," said Rah Jong-yil, a former South Korean ambassador to London and Tokyo.

"And because of South Korea's economic power, we have much more to offer than the North, which is appealing to a country like Cuba that is just beginning to open up and is very keen to access foreign capital," he told DW.

Even before the most recent United Nations sanctions - imposed earlier this year after Pyongyang carried out its fourth underground nuclear test and the launch of a rocket - North Korea had very few international allies, but it sought to obtain as much as it could from those that were friendly. The money that it earned was presumably sunk into its nuclear weapons and missile programs.

"For African countries, the trade was primarily in weapons for hard currency or resources," said Rah. "Those arms transactions had to be done undercover because of earlier sanctions, but the weapons that the North supplied are a major cause of the instabilities that have affected the region."

Pyongyang also has a track record of providing military training to African regimes, including teaching martial arts to troops.

Uranium mines

Another of Pyongyang's allies in Africa is Zimbabwe, which also has a poor human rights record and, in Robert Mugabe, a long-serving dictator at the helm.

As recently as 2013, Zimbabwe signed an agreement to export yellowcake from its uranium mines in Kanyemba to North Korea. In return, Pyongyang agreed to provide weapons.

Zimbabwe's notorious Fifth Brigade was trained by North Korean Special Forces in the 1980s but was disbanded over allegations of brutality and the murder of 20,000 civilians during its occupation of Matabeleland in 1988.

In the mid-1980s, Mugabe personally ordered that wild animals be sent to the North Korean capital as a gift. Two endangered rhinos died shortly after arriving in Pyongyang, while subsequent plans to ship giraffes, zebras and baby elephants to North Korea were only cancelled after international pressure was brought to bear.

The North Korean football team also trained in Zimbabwe ahead of the 2010 World Cup in South Africa, while Zimbabwe paid North Korea $5 million (4.4 million euros) in early 2014 for two bronze statues - the largest one standing more than nine meters tall - to mark Mugabe's 90th birthday.

Cuba appears to be the next target in South Korea's campaign. Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se told a session of the National Assembly in Havana that he hoped to normalize relations between the two countries.

Havana has been a close ally of Pyongyang for many years; in August 2013, Panamanian officials stopped and boarded the North Korean cargo ship Chong Chon Gang shortly after it had left a Cuban port and found 240 tons of Cuban-made weapons, radar for missile systems, 15 aircraft engines, live munitions and two disassembled Mig-21 fighter aircraft.

"Historically, there was a rivalry between North and South over how many nations recognized their regimes, but that has long since passed and its alliances primarily became a way for Pyongyang to earn hard currency," said Robert Dujarric, director of the Institute of Contemporary Asian Studies at the Tokyo campus of Temple University.

Keeping cash flowing

"North Korea has slowly been cut off from its sources of hard currency so selling low-tech weapons to Uganda was a good way of keeping the cash flowing," said Dujarric. "And when one considers however many millions the Ugandans might have been paying them, to have that taken away is probably quite a significant blow to a poor nation like North Korea.

"South Korea is really trying to hit the North where it hurts and they're almost certainly telling these countries that South Korea has more money, more trade to offer and is not an international pariah, and in that way they are ticking Pyongyang's allies off one by one," he said.

North Korea remains defiant, however, with state media this week issuing a statement condemning "the foolish moves of the US to block economic exchange and cooperation between the DPRK and African countries."

Clearly seeing Washington's hand behind Seoul's diplomatic maneuvers, the Korea Central News Agency said the campaign is "No more than a clumsy trick that the US seeks to tarnish the image of the DPRK and sow discord between the DPRK and African countries through all sorts of paradoxes and estrangement moves."

In a parting shot, the North Koreans claimed their advisers had only left Uganda because the contract had expired. For the US to say otherwise, state-run media said, "is indeed ridiculous."
 

China Connection

TB Fanatic
Well, war inSyria first up and war in Korea, no longer than the end of January.


As the pope said we have seen our last Christmas as we know Christmas.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Again?...WTF are those guys doing?.....

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.foxnews.com/world/2016/0...-north-korea-fires-new-mid-range-missile.html

North Korea

South Korean military says latest North Korean missile launch fails

Published June 21, 2016
· Associated Press

SEOUL, South Korea – North Korea fired a suspected powerful new Musudan mid-range missile on Wednesday from its east coast, but the launch is believed to have failed, the South Korean military said.

A statement from South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff gave no further details on the launch from near the east coast city of Wonsan.

A U.S. official also said the launch appeared to be another failure, adding that the U.S. was assessing exactly what had happened. The official wasn't authorized to comment publicly and requested anonymity.

Four earlier attempts to fire suspected Musudan missiles ended in failure in recent months. The intermediate-range Musudan missile has raised concerns because its potential 3,500-kilometer (2,180-mile) range puts U.S. military bases in Asia and the Pacific within its striking range.

In April, North Korea attempted unsuccessfully to launch three suspected Musudan missiles. All exploded in midair or crashed, according to South Korean defense officials. Earlier this month, North Korea had another missile launch failure. South Korean officials didn't identify the type of missile launched on June 1, but South Korea's Yonhap news agency said it was also a Musudan.

Before April's suspected launches, North Korea had never flight-tested a Musudan missile, although one was displayed during a military parade in 2010 in Pyongyang, its capital.

The launches appear linked to North Korean leader Kim Jong Un's order in March for nuclear and ballistic missile tests. The order was an apparent response to springtime U.S.-South Korean military drills, which North Korea views as an invasion rehearsal.

Despite the repeated failures, the launch attempts show the North is pushing hard to upgrade its missile capability in defiance of U.S.-led international pressure. The North was slapped with the strongest U.N. sanctions in two decades after it conducted a fourth nuclear test and a long-range rocket launch earlier this year. Earlier Tuesday, at a Washington briefing, Pentagon spokesman Peter Cook said that if North Korea were to conduct another missile test, it "would be another violation of U.N. resolutions."

"It would be another provocative action. So we certainly would urge North Korea to refrain from doing that sort of thing," Cook said.

North Korea has recently claimed a series of key breakthroughs in its push to build a long-range nuclear missile that can strike the American mainland. But South Korean officials said the North doesn't yet possess such a weapon.

The North has already deployed a variety of missiles that can reach most targets in South Korea and Japan, including American military bases in the two countries.

The Korean Peninsula remains in a technical state of war because the 1950-53 Korean War ended with an armistice, not a peace treaty. About 28,500 U.S. soldiers are stationed in South Korea to deter possible aggression from North Korea.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.todayonline.com/world/north-korea-fires-missile-believed-be-intermediate-range-yonhap

World

North Korea fires second missile after first launch fails: South Korea

Published: 5:55 AM, June 22, 2016
Updated: 8:15 AM, June 22, 2016


SEOUL - North Korea launched what appeared to be a second intermediate-range Musudan missile on Wednesday morning after another launch hours earlier failed, South Korea's military said.

It was not immediately clear if the second launch, about two hours after the first, was successful.

The first missile was launched from the east coast city of Wonsan, a South Korean official said, the same area where previous tests of intermediate-range missiles were conducted, possibly using mobile launchers.

The launches were in continued defiance of international warnings and a series of U.N. Security Council resolutions that ban the North from using ballistic missile technology, which Pyongyang rejects as an infringement of its sovereignty.

Japan said after the first launch that it would protest strongly because it violated a United Nations resolution, Kyodo news agency reported, citing a government statement.

Japanese Defense Minister Gen Nakatani told reporters after the launch that there had been no effect on Japan's security. The Kyodo news agency separately quoted Nakatani as saying it was a “grave provocative action".

The U.S. military detected a missile launch from North Korea, Navy Commander Dave Benham, a spokesman from the U.S. military's Pacific Command, told Reuters in Washington on Tuesday after the first launch without providing details.

The first missile failed in flight over the sea between the Korean peninsula's east coast and Japan, according to initial indications after the launch, said another U.S. official who also said it was likely to have been another Musudan.

The failure, if confirmed, would be the fifth straight unsuccessful attempt in the past two months to launch a missile that is designed to fly more than 3,000 km (1,800 miles) and could theoretically reach any part of Japan and the U.S. territory of Guam.

Japan put its military on alert on Tuesday for a possible North Korean ballistic missile launch and South Korea's Yonhap News Agency, citing an unidentified government source, said the North was seen to be moving an intermediate-range missile to its east coast.

North Korea is believed to have up to 30 Musudan missiles, according to South Korean media, which officials said were first deployed around 2007, although the North had never attempted to test-fire them until April.

The U.N. Security Council, backed by the North's main diplomatic ally, China, imposed tough new sanctions in March after the isolated state conducted its fourth nuclear test in January and launched a long-range rocket that put an object into space orbit.

North Korea has conducted a series of tests since then that it claimed showed progress in nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missile capabilities, including new rocket engines and simulated atmospheric re-entry. REUTERS
 
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