GOV/MIL Minsk: something happening there
- Thread starter greysage
- Start date
samus79
Veteran Member
I just saw this on Twitter, I was thinking of starting a separate thread but I guess I’ll just keep an eye on it for now. I wonder if he’s really crazy enough to try invading Lithuania or Poland to distract from internal problems? Might just be closing the borders but it bears watching.
danielboon
TB Fanatic
Let's hope
northern watch
TB Fanatic
Belarus Warning Update: Multiple Russian Military Exercises Occurring in the Western Military District, Belarus, and Moldova
September 19, 2020, 7:00 pm EDT
Iswresearch.org
By George Barros
The Kremlin is conducting multiple preplanned and apparently snap exercises concurrently in multiple theaters and Russian military districts.
Russian military activity in the Western Military District (WMD) is unexpectedly high despite the Kavkaz-2020 exercises underway in the Southern Military District (SMD). The Russian Defense Ministry holds annual strategic exercises to test the readiness of Russia’s four main military districts. Each such annual exercise occurs in a different Russian military district in a rotating order and usually precipitates a decrease in military exercises in the other military districts not undertaking the strategic exercise. This year’s “Kavkaz-2020” exercises began on September 15 in the SMD.
ISW has observed a larger-than-anticipated number of unscheduled Russian exercises in the vicinity of Belarus. The Kremlin expanded its Slavic Brotherhood exercises in Belarus, conducted at least three other separate battalion-level exercises in the WMD, only one of which could be connected to preplanned exercises, and conducted likely unscheduled Baltic coast reconnaissance missions ostensibly aimed against NATO.
The Kremlin is using the Slavic Brotherhood exercise in Brest, Belarus, to practice integrating Belarusian and Russian units to form a single combined unit – such unit integration is likely a key component of the Kremlin’s desired Union State integration. Russia’s 234th Guards Airborne Assault Regiment – a subordinate unit of Russia’s 76th Guards Air Assault Division that fought and sustained losses in Donbas in August 2014 – has performed a series of exercises focusing on interoperability with Belarusian forces since September 17.[1] The 234th likely formed a joint Russian-Belarusian battalion-sized unit to execute these exercises.[2] This exercise can prepare Russian and Belarussian forces to form a single combined armed force after the completion of Union State integration. It could also prepare Russian forces to subsume elements of Belarusian combat units in the event of a Russian intervention against the will of the Belarusian government.
The Kremlin is misrepresenting new unplanned stages in the Russian-Belarusian Slavic Brotherhood exercises to avoid alarming NATO. The Kremlin said the Slavic Brotherhood exercises are pre-planned and should not cause any alarm on September 18.[3] This statement is inaccurate. The Kremlin extended the Slavic Brotherhood exercises from September 10-15 to September 24-25 on short notice.[4] Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko specified that the exercises would be extended further because of the ”acute situation” in Belarus.[5] The Kremlin similarly announced monthly recurring exercises with Belarus to begin in October.[6] The Kremlin will likely intensify efforts to downplay its growing and likely permanent military presence in Belarus.
The Kremlin is conducting at least three other separate battalion-level exercises in the Western Military District (WMD), only some of which are connected to preplanned exercises.
Russian forces are undertaking logistics operations in the Western Military District to support an upcoming motorized rifle battalion field exercise in Transnistria. An unspecified Russian motorized rifle battalion will conduct field exercises in Transnistria next week.[7] The Kremlin claims these exercises are preplanned.[8]
These exercises in Transnistria may relate to Moldova’s upcoming November 1 presidential election when Kremlin ally Igor Dodon will seek re-election. The Kremlin could also use these exercises to increase military pressure against Ukraine aimed at extracting political concessions from Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Kyiv’s stalled peace talks with the Kremlin’s proxies in Donbas.
Two Russian mechanized battalions held likely snap exercises in the WMD on September 19. A battalion of the Kantemir Tank Division of Russia’s First Tank Army held exercises in the Moscow region on September 19.[9] Troops drove armored combat vehicles though water obstacles and simulated operations in flooded vehicles.[10] The forces practiced using isolation gear to protect against chemical weapons.[11] There is no evidence this exercise was preplanned.
Russian forces in the WMD may be preparing to perform crowd control operations in Belarus or elsewhere. A motorized rifle battalion of the Taman Division of Russia’s First Tank Army held likely unplanned exercises in the Moscow region on September 19.[12] These exercises simulated an encirclement maneuver to compel the surrender of an unmechanized enemy infantry force without destroying said force. The intended target of these exercises may be Belarusian (or other) protesters, but there is no evidence to support that hypothesis other than the odd nature of the exercise.
The Kremlin may attempt to destabilize NATO with hybrid operations in the Baltics if the Kremlin achieves freedom of movement in Belarus. A Baltic Fleet sapper company conducted forced-entry preparation exercises on the Baltic Sea coast in Kaliningrad on September 19. The sappers performed anti-mine engineering reconnaissance on Baltic coast landing sites.[13] There is no evidence this exercise was preplanned.[14]
A Belarusian battalion-sized unit is participating in Russia’s Kavkaz-2020 exercises in the SMD.[15] Approximately 350 unspecified Belarusian personnel and approximately 30 Belarusian tanks arrived in Kapustin Yar, Astrakhan Oblast, in Russia’s SMD, on September 16 for preplanned Kavkaz 2020 exercises.[16] The Belarusian forces should return to Belarus after Kavkaz-2020 ends on September 26. The Kremlin, however, will very likely send additional Russian forces into Belarus after Kavkaz-2020 under the pretext of continuous monthly exercises.[17]
Lukashenko ostentatiously deployed armor in Grodno to intimidate Belarusian protesters there. Approximately 40 Belarusian armored combat vehicles drove though Grodno’s streets in the late night of September 18.[18] This movement was not part of any prescheduled Belarusian or Russian exercise. These units are likely from Belarus’ 6th Armored Brigade, which is based in Grodno.[19]
ISW will continue monitoring the situation and providing updates.
[1] https://structure.mil(.)ru/structure/forces/airborne/news/more.htm?id=12314645@egNews; https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12314964@egNews; https://www.fontanka(.)ru/2014/08/26/030/; https://novayagazeta(.)ru/news/2014/09/17/105597-lev-shlosberg-prosit-glavnogo-voennogo-prokurora-rassledovat-gibel-desantnikov-76-oy-pskovskoy-divizii-vdv; http://boevoe-bratstvo-onega(.)ru/novosti/161-doska-v-severoonezhske; https://informnapalm(.)org/47084-novaya-informaciya-ob-uchastii-234-go-desan/
[2] https://structure.mil(.)ru/structure/forces/airborne/news/more.htm?id=12314645@egNews; https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12314964@egNews
[3] https://iz(.)ru/1062494/2020-09-18/posol-rf-v-minske-zaiavil-o-planovom-kharaktere-rossiisko-belorusskikh-uchenii
[4] Belarus Warning Update: Putin Sends Airborne Troops to Belarus Exercise—and a Message to Lukashenko
[5] Belarus Warning Update: Russian Force Deployment to Belarus is Likely Imminent
[6] http://www.iswresearch.org/2020/09/belarus-warning-update-lukashenko-and.html; Belarus Warning Update: Russian Force Deployment to Belarus is Likely Imminent
[7] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12315028@egNews
[8] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12315028@egNews
[9] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12315039@egNews
[10] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12315039@egNews
[11] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12315039@egNews
[12] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12315037@egNews
[13] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12315043@egNews
[14] Warning: Moscow Sets Conditions for Kinetic Intervention in Belarus Through New Information Operation
[15] https://tvzvezda(.)ru/news/forces/content/20209191631-U8VWT.html?utm_source=tvzvezda&utm_medium=longpage&utm_campaign=longpage&utm_term=v1
[16]
View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=31&v=85Wk268n3Gg&feature=emb_logo;
Белоруссия направила танки и военных на учения «Кавказ-2020»
[17] Belarus Warning Update: Russian Force Deployment to Belarus is Likely Imminent
[18] https://tsn(.)ua/ru/svit/v-belarusi-kolonna-voennoy-tehniki-poehala-v-storonu-granicy-1628842.html
[19] https://grodnonews(.)by/news/bezopasnost/v_nashey_brigade_ne_tolko_tankisty-polkovnik-vadim-surov-rasskazal-o-novykh-armeyskikh-ritualakh-tankovom-biatlone-i-rozakh.html
www.iswresearch.org
September 19, 2020, 7:00 pm EDT
Iswresearch.org
By George Barros
The Kremlin is conducting multiple preplanned and apparently snap exercises concurrently in multiple theaters and Russian military districts.
Russian military activity in the Western Military District (WMD) is unexpectedly high despite the Kavkaz-2020 exercises underway in the Southern Military District (SMD). The Russian Defense Ministry holds annual strategic exercises to test the readiness of Russia’s four main military districts. Each such annual exercise occurs in a different Russian military district in a rotating order and usually precipitates a decrease in military exercises in the other military districts not undertaking the strategic exercise. This year’s “Kavkaz-2020” exercises began on September 15 in the SMD.
ISW has observed a larger-than-anticipated number of unscheduled Russian exercises in the vicinity of Belarus. The Kremlin expanded its Slavic Brotherhood exercises in Belarus, conducted at least three other separate battalion-level exercises in the WMD, only one of which could be connected to preplanned exercises, and conducted likely unscheduled Baltic coast reconnaissance missions ostensibly aimed against NATO.
The Kremlin is using the Slavic Brotherhood exercise in Brest, Belarus, to practice integrating Belarusian and Russian units to form a single combined unit – such unit integration is likely a key component of the Kremlin’s desired Union State integration. Russia’s 234th Guards Airborne Assault Regiment – a subordinate unit of Russia’s 76th Guards Air Assault Division that fought and sustained losses in Donbas in August 2014 – has performed a series of exercises focusing on interoperability with Belarusian forces since September 17.[1] The 234th likely formed a joint Russian-Belarusian battalion-sized unit to execute these exercises.[2] This exercise can prepare Russian and Belarussian forces to form a single combined armed force after the completion of Union State integration. It could also prepare Russian forces to subsume elements of Belarusian combat units in the event of a Russian intervention against the will of the Belarusian government.
The Kremlin is misrepresenting new unplanned stages in the Russian-Belarusian Slavic Brotherhood exercises to avoid alarming NATO. The Kremlin said the Slavic Brotherhood exercises are pre-planned and should not cause any alarm on September 18.[3] This statement is inaccurate. The Kremlin extended the Slavic Brotherhood exercises from September 10-15 to September 24-25 on short notice.[4] Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko specified that the exercises would be extended further because of the ”acute situation” in Belarus.[5] The Kremlin similarly announced monthly recurring exercises with Belarus to begin in October.[6] The Kremlin will likely intensify efforts to downplay its growing and likely permanent military presence in Belarus.
The Kremlin is conducting at least three other separate battalion-level exercises in the Western Military District (WMD), only some of which are connected to preplanned exercises.
Russian forces are undertaking logistics operations in the Western Military District to support an upcoming motorized rifle battalion field exercise in Transnistria. An unspecified Russian motorized rifle battalion will conduct field exercises in Transnistria next week.[7] The Kremlin claims these exercises are preplanned.[8]
These exercises in Transnistria may relate to Moldova’s upcoming November 1 presidential election when Kremlin ally Igor Dodon will seek re-election. The Kremlin could also use these exercises to increase military pressure against Ukraine aimed at extracting political concessions from Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Kyiv’s stalled peace talks with the Kremlin’s proxies in Donbas.
Two Russian mechanized battalions held likely snap exercises in the WMD on September 19. A battalion of the Kantemir Tank Division of Russia’s First Tank Army held exercises in the Moscow region on September 19.[9] Troops drove armored combat vehicles though water obstacles and simulated operations in flooded vehicles.[10] The forces practiced using isolation gear to protect against chemical weapons.[11] There is no evidence this exercise was preplanned.
Russian forces in the WMD may be preparing to perform crowd control operations in Belarus or elsewhere. A motorized rifle battalion of the Taman Division of Russia’s First Tank Army held likely unplanned exercises in the Moscow region on September 19.[12] These exercises simulated an encirclement maneuver to compel the surrender of an unmechanized enemy infantry force without destroying said force. The intended target of these exercises may be Belarusian (or other) protesters, but there is no evidence to support that hypothesis other than the odd nature of the exercise.
The Kremlin may attempt to destabilize NATO with hybrid operations in the Baltics if the Kremlin achieves freedom of movement in Belarus. A Baltic Fleet sapper company conducted forced-entry preparation exercises on the Baltic Sea coast in Kaliningrad on September 19. The sappers performed anti-mine engineering reconnaissance on Baltic coast landing sites.[13] There is no evidence this exercise was preplanned.[14]
A Belarusian battalion-sized unit is participating in Russia’s Kavkaz-2020 exercises in the SMD.[15] Approximately 350 unspecified Belarusian personnel and approximately 30 Belarusian tanks arrived in Kapustin Yar, Astrakhan Oblast, in Russia’s SMD, on September 16 for preplanned Kavkaz 2020 exercises.[16] The Belarusian forces should return to Belarus after Kavkaz-2020 ends on September 26. The Kremlin, however, will very likely send additional Russian forces into Belarus after Kavkaz-2020 under the pretext of continuous monthly exercises.[17]
Lukashenko ostentatiously deployed armor in Grodno to intimidate Belarusian protesters there. Approximately 40 Belarusian armored combat vehicles drove though Grodno’s streets in the late night of September 18.[18] This movement was not part of any prescheduled Belarusian or Russian exercise. These units are likely from Belarus’ 6th Armored Brigade, which is based in Grodno.[19]
ISW will continue monitoring the situation and providing updates.
[1] https://structure.mil(.)ru/structure/forces/airborne/news/more.htm?id=12314645@egNews; https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12314964@egNews; https://www.fontanka(.)ru/2014/08/26/030/; https://novayagazeta(.)ru/news/2014/09/17/105597-lev-shlosberg-prosit-glavnogo-voennogo-prokurora-rassledovat-gibel-desantnikov-76-oy-pskovskoy-divizii-vdv; http://boevoe-bratstvo-onega(.)ru/novosti/161-doska-v-severoonezhske; https://informnapalm(.)org/47084-novaya-informaciya-ob-uchastii-234-go-desan/
[2] https://structure.mil(.)ru/structure/forces/airborne/news/more.htm?id=12314645@egNews; https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12314964@egNews
[3] https://iz(.)ru/1062494/2020-09-18/posol-rf-v-minske-zaiavil-o-planovom-kharaktere-rossiisko-belorusskikh-uchenii
[4] Belarus Warning Update: Putin Sends Airborne Troops to Belarus Exercise—and a Message to Lukashenko
[5] Belarus Warning Update: Russian Force Deployment to Belarus is Likely Imminent
[6] http://www.iswresearch.org/2020/09/belarus-warning-update-lukashenko-and.html; Belarus Warning Update: Russian Force Deployment to Belarus is Likely Imminent
[7] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12315028@egNews
[8] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12315028@egNews
[9] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12315039@egNews
[10] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12315039@egNews
[11] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12315039@egNews
[12] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12315037@egNews
[13] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12315043@egNews
[14] Warning: Moscow Sets Conditions for Kinetic Intervention in Belarus Through New Information Operation
[15] https://tvzvezda(.)ru/news/forces/content/20209191631-U8VWT.html?utm_source=tvzvezda&utm_medium=longpage&utm_campaign=longpage&utm_term=v1
[16]
Белоруссия направила танки и военных на учения «Кавказ-2020»
[17] Belarus Warning Update: Russian Force Deployment to Belarus is Likely Imminent
[18] https://tsn(.)ua/ru/svit/v-belarusi-kolonna-voennoy-tehniki-poehala-v-storonu-granicy-1628842.html
[19] https://grodnonews(.)by/news/bezopasnost/v_nashey_brigade_ne_tolko_tankisty-polkovnik-vadim-surov-rasskazal-o-novykh-armeyskikh-ritualakh-tankovom-biatlone-i-rozakh.html
ISW Blog
Last edited:
northern watch
TB Fanatic
Iswresearch.org
September 19 2020
Russian and Belarusian airborne forces conducted parachute exercises as a single combat formation as part of the Slavic Brotherhood exercises. A battalion-sized force composed of units from Russia’s 234th Guards Airborne Assault Regiment and unknown Belarusian airborne forces – likely from Belarus’ 38th Air Assault Brigade – conducted parachute exercises “as a single combat formation” at the Sahara landing site in Brest, Belarus, on September 20.[9] Such unit integration is likely a key component of the Kremlin’s desired Union State integration and may prepare Russian forces to subsume elements of Belarusian combat units in the event of a Russian intervention against the will of the Belarusian government.[10]
A platoon-sized force from the 138th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade conducted reconnaissance and electronic weapons (EW) exercises with recon UAVs in Leningrad Oblast on September 20.[11] Forces launched eight reconnaissance UAVs to identify camouflaged command and control assets and fire batteries. Russian EW assets partially jammed the UAVs to simulate battlefield conditions. This exercise could prepare forces to operate in Syria, where ISW forecasts that a pro-regime offensive will begin soon.[12] It could also be preparation for operations in Belarus in various contingencies. It could also simply be normal activity, although it would be unusual to report a platoon-level exercise, and there is no evidence this exercise was preplanned.
Protesters in Brest are increasingly confrontational with security forces. Protesters in Brest locked arms, advanced upon a group of OMON, and yelled “go away” on September 20.[13] This action caused OMON personnel to retreat and regroup. Belarusian protesters previously only used swarm tactics to resist detentions and beatings.[14] Confrontations between protesters and security forces may escalate further – a risk ISW forecasted.[15]
Lukashenko’s campaign to expel and detain opposition leaders is likely degrading protests. Approximately 2000 protesters marched in the fifth weekly women’s march in Minsk on September 19, and tens of thousands marched in Minsk on September 20.[16] This is a significant decrease in protest size over the course of a week; tens of thousands of protesters marched in September 12 Minsk women’s march.[17] The Sunday march on September 20 seemingly had weaker attendance than that of September 13. Protest fatigue and colder weather will likely further degrade protest participation.
Belarusian authorities intensified their detention campaign on September 19. Police detained approximately 400 out of 2000 women’s march participants on September 19, whereas police detained only dozens out of tens of thousands of women’s march participants on September 13.[18]
ISW will continue monitoring the situation and providing updates.
________________________________________
[1] NEXTA published data on security services personnel’s full names, birthdays, cities of operation, departmental affiliations, and commanding officers. https://t(.)me/nexta_tv/4736; https://docs.google.com/spreadsheet...haring&pru=AAABdNAiddY*yYrNBFv3HbuprXfx2ZABWA
[2] https://t(.)me/nexta_tv/4736; https://docs.google.com/spreadsheet...haring&pru=AAABdNAiddY*yYrNBFv3HbuprXfx2ZABWA
[3] Warning: Russia and Belarus Launch Military Exercises
[4] Warning: Kremlin Begins Security Forces Support for Lukashenko Following Regional Security Service Defection
[5] https://t(.)me/nexta_tv/4736; https://docs.google.com/spreadsheet...haring&pru=AAABdNAiddY*yYrNBFv3HbuprXfx2ZABWA
[6] View: https://twitter.com/AlexKokcharov/status/1307715760005971970
[7] View: https://twitter.com/AlexKokcharov/status/1307715760005971970
[8] Belarus police detain hundreds of women at protest
[9] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12315135@egNews
[10] Belarus Warning Update: Multiple Russian Military Exercises Occurring in the Western Military District, Belarus, and Moldova
[11] https://structure.mil(.)ru/structure/okruga/west/news/more.htm?id=12315121@egNews
[12] http://www.iswresearch.org/2020/09/syria-warning-update-syrian-regime.html
[13] View: https://twitter.com/headwind512/status/1307692047676190721;
View: https://twitter.com/belteanews/status/1307690027489558534
[14] https://www.iswresearch.org/2020/09/warning-security-personnel-in-green.html
[15] https://www.iswresearch.org/2020/08/warning-militarization-of-lukashenkos.html
[16] https://iz(.)ru/1063017/2020-09-20/kolonna-iz-tysiach-demonstrantov-dvinulas-k-rezidentcii-lukashenko-v-minske; https://www.bbc.com/russian/news-54220125; https://www.pressherald.com/2020/09/19/more-than-200-women-detained-at-belarus-protest/; https://112.international/politics/...in-belarus-human-rights-activists-54872.html; View: https://twitter.com/nexta_tv/status/1307665542401097731;
View: https://twitter.com/nexta_tv/status/1307683161552420866;
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-...s-rallies-and-police-data-leak-idUSKCN26B09X; https://www.rferl.org/a/thousands-gather-again-in-belarus-to-march-against-lukashenka/30848518.html
[17] http://www.iswresearch.org/2020/09/belarus-warning-update-lukashenko-tries.html
[18] http://spring96(.)org/be/news/99601; https://www.rferl.org/a/police-make...ts-against-belarus-s-lukashenka/30835111.html
ISW Blog
northern watch
TB Fanatic
Warning: NEXTA Actively Encourages Belarusian Security Service Defections
September 20, 2020 4:30 EDT
Iswresearch.org
By George Barros
The NEXTA Telegram channel is actively encouraging Belarusian security service defections. Large scale defections would likely precipitate an overt Russian intervention into Belarus. NEXTA published personal information for 1000 security service personnel it claims are complicit in protester detentions on September 19.[1] NEXTA published security services personnel’s full names, birthdays, cities of operation, departmental affiliations, and commanding officers. NEXTA is expunging personnel from the list who confirm their resignation from security services, implying that those individuals have contacted it. NEXTA has expunged five such individuals as of this writing.[2] ISW cannot independently verify NEXTA’s information, which it claims it obtained from a third-party hack.
ISW forecasted the Kremlin might intervene in Belarus to prevent another revolution in the former Soviet Union if Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko loses control over his security services.[3] The Kremlin began its current media and security support to Lukashenko after regional security service elements in Grodno defected from Minsk on August 18.[4]
NEXTA may incite protester violence or Western sanctions against Belarusian security service personnel. NEXTA threatened to publish information on security personnel “on a massive scale” if protester detentions continue.[5] NEXTA critically did not publish email, address, or phone number targeting information for the identified security personnel. NEXTA did not instruct protesters to target the identified security personnel, which it could do if security service personnel continue to support Lukashenko. The West may use NEXTA’s information to shape targeted sanctions against Belarusian officials. These considerations could well cause vacillation and defections. NEXTA will likely intensify efforts to erode security services’ support for Lukashenko.
Security personnel in Belarus are undertaking efforts to anonymize themselves – a development which sets favorable conditions for a potential Russian hybrid intervention into Belarus. Belarusian riot police (OMON) in Brest removed their name tags on September 20 but continue to wear uniforms and insignia.[6] OMON in Brest previously operated with name tags. OMON personnel in Brest likely removed their name tags to preserve their anonymity given NEXTA’s effort to identity security service personnel.[7] The unidentified security personnel in green uniforms without insignia continue to operate in Belarus as of September 19.[8]
www.iswresearch.org
September 20, 2020 4:30 EDT
Iswresearch.org
By George Barros
The NEXTA Telegram channel is actively encouraging Belarusian security service defections. Large scale defections would likely precipitate an overt Russian intervention into Belarus. NEXTA published personal information for 1000 security service personnel it claims are complicit in protester detentions on September 19.[1] NEXTA published security services personnel’s full names, birthdays, cities of operation, departmental affiliations, and commanding officers. NEXTA is expunging personnel from the list who confirm their resignation from security services, implying that those individuals have contacted it. NEXTA has expunged five such individuals as of this writing.[2] ISW cannot independently verify NEXTA’s information, which it claims it obtained from a third-party hack.
ISW forecasted the Kremlin might intervene in Belarus to prevent another revolution in the former Soviet Union if Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko loses control over his security services.[3] The Kremlin began its current media and security support to Lukashenko after regional security service elements in Grodno defected from Minsk on August 18.[4]
NEXTA may incite protester violence or Western sanctions against Belarusian security service personnel. NEXTA threatened to publish information on security personnel “on a massive scale” if protester detentions continue.[5] NEXTA critically did not publish email, address, or phone number targeting information for the identified security personnel. NEXTA did not instruct protesters to target the identified security personnel, which it could do if security service personnel continue to support Lukashenko. The West may use NEXTA’s information to shape targeted sanctions against Belarusian officials. These considerations could well cause vacillation and defections. NEXTA will likely intensify efforts to erode security services’ support for Lukashenko.
Security personnel in Belarus are undertaking efforts to anonymize themselves – a development which sets favorable conditions for a potential Russian hybrid intervention into Belarus. Belarusian riot police (OMON) in Brest removed their name tags on September 20 but continue to wear uniforms and insignia.[6] OMON in Brest previously operated with name tags. OMON personnel in Brest likely removed their name tags to preserve their anonymity given NEXTA’s effort to identity security service personnel.[7] The unidentified security personnel in green uniforms without insignia continue to operate in Belarus as of September 19.[8]
ISW Blog
northern watch
TB Fanatic
If Belarus invades Lithuania or Poland, it needs a separate thread. For Belarus to invade Lithuania or Poland, a major war with NATO would result.
northern watch
TB Fanatic
From:
Belarus Warning Update: Multiple Russian Military Exercises Occurring in the Western Military District, Belarus, and Moldova
September 19, 2020, 7:00 pm EDT
Iswresearch.org
By George Barros
Lukashenko ostentatiously deployed armor in Grodno to intimidate Belarusian protesters there. Approximately 40 Belarusian armored combat vehicles drove though Grodno’s streets in the late night of September 18.[18] This movement was not part of any prescheduled Belarusian or Russian exercise. These units are likely from Belarus’ 6th Armored Brigade, which is based in Grodno.[19]
northern watch
TB Fanatic
northern watch
TB Fanatic
The Kremlin Deploys a Brigade-Sized Force to Belarus Near Polish Border
September 21, 2020, 6:15 EDT
Iswresearch.org
By George Barros
The Kremlin deployed a battalion tactical group from the Tula-based 106th Guards Airborne Division to Brest, Belarus, for Slavic Brotherhood’s second stage on September 21.[3] Forces from the 106th arrived in Belarus via railway on September 21. There are now elements of two different Russian airborne regiments from two different divisions in Brest.
The Kremlin deployed a senior general with extensive combat experience in Syria to "participate in” operations in Belarus. The Kremlin deployed Commander Colonel General Andrei Serdyukov, commander of the Russian Airborne Forces (VDV), to Belarus for Slavic Brotherhood exercises on September 21.[4] Serdyukov commanded the Russian military operation in Syria during the peak of the Assad regime’s Idlib offensive in April-September 2019. Serdyukov’s arrival indicates Russian President Vladimir Putin is actively prioritizing military operations in Belarus, since Russian Airborne Forces are also participating in the Kavkaz 2020 exercises, which should in principle have a higher profile as the premier annual multinational exercise.
The Kremlin will likely downplay this substantial change in its force presence in Belarus. The second stage was unplanned and was only announced on September 17.[5] Slavic Brotherhood originally was scheduled to end on September 15.[6] All Russian forces in Belarus should, in principle, return to Russia after the exercises end on September 25. The Kremlin, however, will very likely send additional forces to Belarus under the pretext of continuous monthly exercises.[7]
The Kremlin may be preparing additional units in the WMD for deployment to Belarus or elsewhere.
Brigade-sized elements of a combined arms army, presumably the 6th Combined Arms Army in Leningrad Oblast’, began command and control exercises in the Western Military District (WMD) on September 21. The brigade-sized force will conduct mechanized command and control exercises over the course of a week in the St. Petersburg region.[8] The forces will practice defense against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) threats. There is no evidence this exercise was preplanned.
A Russian mechanized battalion held likely snap exercises in the WMD on September 21. A battalion of the Kantemir Tank Division of Russia’s First Tank Army held mechanized combat exercises at the Mulino training ground in the Nizhny Novgorod region on September 21.[9] These exercises had not been previously announced. A battalion of the Kantemir Tank Division of Russia’s First Tank Army held mechanized exercises in the Moscow region at the Golovenki training ground on September 19.[10] These are very likely two different battalions, as the training areas are far away from one another. The 6th Separate Tank Brigade is headquartered near the Mulino training area, whereas the organic tank units of the Kantemir Tank Division are based near Naro-Fominsk.[11]
The Kremlin is advancing Union State formalization. State Secretary of the Union State Grigory Rapota – a Russian national – said Minsk and Moscow “reached an understanding” on the need to further develop Union State integration roadmaps on September 20.[12] Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko’s ability to resist Moscow’s efforts to further formalize the Union State is likely degraded.
The Kremlin will likely continue pushing for Belarusian constitutional amendments to formalize the Union State. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov reiterated Moscow’s support for Belarusian constitutional reforms without providing specific details on September 20.[13] The Kremlin will likely continue leveraging Lukashenko’s vulnerability to integrate Belarus into Russia as ISW assessed.
ISW will continue monitoring the situation and providing updates.
[1] https://rg(.)ru/2020/09/21/v-belarusi-gotoviatsia-ko-vtoromu-etapu-ucheniia-slavianskoe-bratstvo-2020.html
[2] ISW assessed a roughly company-sized force from Russia’s 234th Guards Airborne Assault Regiment likely formed a joint Russian-Belarusian battalion-sized unit to perform Slavic Brotherhood exercises. http://www.iswresearch.org/2020/09/warning-nexta-actively-encourages.html; Belarus Warning Update: Multiple Russian Military Exercises Occurring in the Western Military District, Belarus, and Moldova
[3] https://tvzvezda(.)ru/news/forces/content/20209211750-msIkj.html?utm_source=tvzvezda&utm_medium=longpage&utm_campaign=longpage&utm_term=v1
[4] https://www.mil(.)by/ru/news/106283/
[5] Belarus Warning Update: Russian Force Deployment to Belarus is Likely Imminent
[6] Belarus Warning Update: Multiple Russian Military Exercises Occurring in the Western Military District, Belarus, and Moldova
[7] Belarus Warning Update: Russian Force Deployment to Belarus is Likely Imminent
[8] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12315440@egNews
[9] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12315418@egNews
[10] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12315039@egNews
[11] http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian Ground Forces OOB_ISW CTP_0.pdf
[12] https://www.tvr(.)by/news/politika/grigoriy_rapota_o_dorozhnykh_kartakh_neftyanykh_voprosakh_i_otmene_rouminga/?sphrase_id=1801379
[13] https://news.tut(.)by/economics/701109.html
www.iswresearch.org
September 21, 2020, 6:15 EDT
Iswresearch.org
By George Barros
The Kremlin significantly expanded its military presence in Belarus to facilitate a brigade-sized “tactical exercise” as part of the Slavic Brotherhood exercise’s “second stage” for September 21-25.[1] Russian forces’ size was at the battalion level during Slavic Brotherhood’s first stage from September 14-21.[2]The Kremlin deployed a battalion tactical group from the Tula-based 106th Guards Airborne Division to Brest, Belarus, for Slavic Brotherhood’s second stage on September 21.[3] Forces from the 106th arrived in Belarus via railway on September 21. There are now elements of two different Russian airborne regiments from two different divisions in Brest.
The Kremlin deployed a senior general with extensive combat experience in Syria to "participate in” operations in Belarus. The Kremlin deployed Commander Colonel General Andrei Serdyukov, commander of the Russian Airborne Forces (VDV), to Belarus for Slavic Brotherhood exercises on September 21.[4] Serdyukov commanded the Russian military operation in Syria during the peak of the Assad regime’s Idlib offensive in April-September 2019. Serdyukov’s arrival indicates Russian President Vladimir Putin is actively prioritizing military operations in Belarus, since Russian Airborne Forces are also participating in the Kavkaz 2020 exercises, which should in principle have a higher profile as the premier annual multinational exercise.
The Kremlin will likely downplay this substantial change in its force presence in Belarus. The second stage was unplanned and was only announced on September 17.[5] Slavic Brotherhood originally was scheduled to end on September 15.[6] All Russian forces in Belarus should, in principle, return to Russia after the exercises end on September 25. The Kremlin, however, will very likely send additional forces to Belarus under the pretext of continuous monthly exercises.[7]
The Kremlin may be preparing additional units in the WMD for deployment to Belarus or elsewhere.
Brigade-sized elements of a combined arms army, presumably the 6th Combined Arms Army in Leningrad Oblast’, began command and control exercises in the Western Military District (WMD) on September 21. The brigade-sized force will conduct mechanized command and control exercises over the course of a week in the St. Petersburg region.[8] The forces will practice defense against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) threats. There is no evidence this exercise was preplanned.
A Russian mechanized battalion held likely snap exercises in the WMD on September 21. A battalion of the Kantemir Tank Division of Russia’s First Tank Army held mechanized combat exercises at the Mulino training ground in the Nizhny Novgorod region on September 21.[9] These exercises had not been previously announced. A battalion of the Kantemir Tank Division of Russia’s First Tank Army held mechanized exercises in the Moscow region at the Golovenki training ground on September 19.[10] These are very likely two different battalions, as the training areas are far away from one another. The 6th Separate Tank Brigade is headquartered near the Mulino training area, whereas the organic tank units of the Kantemir Tank Division are based near Naro-Fominsk.[11]
The Kremlin is advancing Union State formalization. State Secretary of the Union State Grigory Rapota – a Russian national – said Minsk and Moscow “reached an understanding” on the need to further develop Union State integration roadmaps on September 20.[12] Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko’s ability to resist Moscow’s efforts to further formalize the Union State is likely degraded.
The Kremlin will likely continue pushing for Belarusian constitutional amendments to formalize the Union State. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov reiterated Moscow’s support for Belarusian constitutional reforms without providing specific details on September 20.[13] The Kremlin will likely continue leveraging Lukashenko’s vulnerability to integrate Belarus into Russia as ISW assessed.
ISW will continue monitoring the situation and providing updates.
[1] https://rg(.)ru/2020/09/21/v-belarusi-gotoviatsia-ko-vtoromu-etapu-ucheniia-slavianskoe-bratstvo-2020.html
[2] ISW assessed a roughly company-sized force from Russia’s 234th Guards Airborne Assault Regiment likely formed a joint Russian-Belarusian battalion-sized unit to perform Slavic Brotherhood exercises. http://www.iswresearch.org/2020/09/warning-nexta-actively-encourages.html; Belarus Warning Update: Multiple Russian Military Exercises Occurring in the Western Military District, Belarus, and Moldova
[3] https://tvzvezda(.)ru/news/forces/content/20209211750-msIkj.html?utm_source=tvzvezda&utm_medium=longpage&utm_campaign=longpage&utm_term=v1
[4] https://www.mil(.)by/ru/news/106283/
[5] Belarus Warning Update: Russian Force Deployment to Belarus is Likely Imminent
[6] Belarus Warning Update: Multiple Russian Military Exercises Occurring in the Western Military District, Belarus, and Moldova
[7] Belarus Warning Update: Russian Force Deployment to Belarus is Likely Imminent
[8] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12315440@egNews
[9] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12315418@egNews
[10] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12315039@egNews
[11] http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian Ground Forces OOB_ISW CTP_0.pdf
[12] https://www.tvr(.)by/news/politika/grigoriy_rapota_o_dorozhnykh_kartakh_neftyanykh_voprosakh_i_otmene_rouminga/?sphrase_id=1801379
[13] https://news.tut(.)by/economics/701109.html
ISW Blog
northern watch
TB Fanatic
Putin Remains Dissatisfied with Lukashenko’s Concessions
Iswresearch.org
September 23, 2020, 6:30 pm EDT
By George Barros
Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko has not fully capitulated to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s desired Union State integration demands in Belarus – yet.
Lukashenko held an unannounced reinauguration ceremony to surprise the Kremlin on September 23. Lukashenko reinaugurated himself in an unannounced small ceremony in Minsk on September 23.[1] Kremlin Spokesman Dmitry Peskov did not have a prepared statement on the inauguration. When questioned Peskov stated he did not know about the inauguration in advance and reluctantly stated Lukashenko made an “absolutely sovereign” decision. Peskov refused to make further comments.[2] Peskov normally has prepared statements for such developments.
Lukashenko surprised the Kremlin likely to set conditions for himself to rule another full presidential term – potentially against Putin’s plans. The Kremlin has repeatedly expressed desires for constitutional reforms.[3] Kremlin-linked opposition leaders and a Kremlin-linked Belarusian presidential candidate Lukashenko jailed have called for constitutional reforms.[4] The continued absence of a Kremlin endorsement for another Lukashenko term may indicate the Kremlin is maintaining the option to broker a transition of power from Lukashenko to a different actor, potentially though Belarusian constitutional amendments.
Russia will likely increase pressure against Lukashenko to achieve its desired concessions in Belarus. The Kremlin seeks to establish suzerainty over Belarus by formalizing the Union State and integrating Belarusian political and military structures with those of Russia. Putin deployed a regiment-sized force to Belarus under the rubric of the Slavic Brotherhood exercises and likely secured additional military and economic Union State integration concessions from Lukashenko at their meeting in Sochi on September 14.[5] Lukashenko’s decision to surprise the Kremlin with his reinauguration indicates that Lukashenko believed Moscow would not support it. The lukewarm Russian response supports that view. Lukashenko’s actions and Moscow’s caution indicates that Putin still has unmet demands of Lukashenko, which is concerning considering how much ground Lukashenko has already ceded to the Kremlin.
The Kremlin flew more long-range bombers toward NATO airspace as part of the Slavic Brotherhood exercises on September 23. Six long-range supersonic Tu-22 bombers from the Shaikovka airfield in Tver flew across Belarus, and struck targets on the Ruzhansky firing range in Baranovichi, Brest, on September 23.[6] This flight– like that of two Tu-160M nuclear-capable supersonic strategic bombers on September 22 – was likely meant as a message to NATO.
Click here to expand the map.
Russia’s battalion tactical group from the 217th Airborne regiment of the Ivanovo-based 98th Guards Airborne Division is operating in Brest as of September 23.[10] This element’s area of operation in Belarus was previously unclear.
Regiment-sized elements of a Combined Arms Army, presumably the 6th Combined Arms Army (CAA), concluded exercises in the WMD on September 23. A force of approximately 1,200 personnel used multiple launch rocket systems, self-propelled howitzers, and anti-tank missile systems to destroy full-sized targets of enemy armored vehicles at firing ranges in Smolensk and Ryazan.[11] The fire elements used radar, optical-electronic, and artillery sound ranging to hit targets. Approximately 5,000 personnel of the 6th CAA began a week-long command and control exercises in the WMD on September 21 – these exercises in Smolensk and Ryazan were likely a component of the larger exercises that began on September 23.[12] The Kremlin could intend these exercises as a message to Lukashenko, or preparations for potential Russian military undertakings in various contingencies. ISW does not yet have a basis to assess the command echelon at which these exercises are being held; 5,000 troops is likely more than a single regiment or brigade, but could reflect a regiment‘s worth of combat forces with higher-echelon command, control, and support troops.
Russian bot networks may be targeting NEXTA on Twitter. Twitter temporarily restricted the NEXTA Telegram channel’s English-language Twitter account for less than an hour without providing a reason on September 23.[13] A Twitter algorithm may have automatically restricted NEXTA’s account in response to Russian bot networks mass-reporting NEXTA’s Twitter account. This incident could be an indicator of a Kremlin effort to degrade NEXTA’s ability to share information about Belarusian protests with Western audiences. Russian botnets have previously triggered such Twitter actions. Russian bot networks abused Twitter features to mass-report and suspended Ukrainian activists’ Twitter accounts in 2016, for example.[14]
ISW will continue monitoring the situation and providing updates.
[2] https://ria(.)ru/20200923/inauguratsiya-1577647316.html; https://russian.rt(.)com/ussr/news/786031-kreml-inauguraciya-lukashenko
[3] Warning: Lukashenko Expels Opposition Leaders to Support Kremlin Information Operation
[4] Warning: Kremlin-linked Belarusian Opposition Leadership Threaten to Further Fragment Opposition Unity
[5] http://www.iswresearch.org/2020/09/the-kremlin-deploys-brigade-sized-force.html; Belarus Warning Update: Russian Force Deployment to Belarus is Likely Imminent
[6] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12315812@egNews
[7] View: https://twitter.com/galandecZP/status/1308514468247285760;
View: https://twitter.com/galandecZP/status/1308534192691712000
[8] error
[9] https://apnews.com/63cab1968318c9afda316a5680c99028; https://112(.)international/russia/russias-aircraft-violates-estonias-airspace-44969.html; https://apnews.com/c26f31956ed949eb800dbe632f3c52f0; Russian military plane enters Lithuanian airspace due to bad weather Russian military aircraft violates the Estonian air space https://apnews.com/7a51b7029c1e45b8...2nd-air-violation-by-Russian-plane-this-week; https://news.err.ee/847171/two-russian-aircraft-violate-estonian-airspace-near-vaindloo-island; https://www.rferl.org/a/estonia-russian-plane-violates-airspace/29310815.html; https://www.rferl.org/a/estonia-russia-plane-airspace-violation-ii-76/29094949.html; https://lithuaniatribune.com/two-ru...ing to it, two Russian,in the evening of Sept
[10] https://www.belta(.)by/society/view/v-aktivnoj-faze-uchenija-slavjanskoe-bratstvo-2020-primut-uchastie-bolee-900-rossijskih-voennyh-407928-2020; https://tass(.)ru/armiya-i-opk/9528617
[11] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12315767@egNews
[12] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12315440@egNews
[13] View: https://twitter.com/AlexKokcharov/status/1308840310395502592;
View: https://twitter.com/Miguel_L71/status/1308841922870620168;
View: https://twitter.com/GlasnostGone/status/1308839926826446850
[14] https://24tv(.)ua/twitter_masovo_zablokuvav_ukrayinski_akaunti_n646639; https://www.0564(.)ua/news/1083564/iz-za-ataki-rossijskih-botov-twitter-massovo-blokiruet-ukrainskie-akkaunty
www.iswresearch.org
Iswresearch.org
September 23, 2020, 6:30 pm EDT
By George Barros
Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko has not fully capitulated to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s desired Union State integration demands in Belarus – yet.
Lukashenko held an unannounced reinauguration ceremony to surprise the Kremlin on September 23. Lukashenko reinaugurated himself in an unannounced small ceremony in Minsk on September 23.[1] Kremlin Spokesman Dmitry Peskov did not have a prepared statement on the inauguration. When questioned Peskov stated he did not know about the inauguration in advance and reluctantly stated Lukashenko made an “absolutely sovereign” decision. Peskov refused to make further comments.[2] Peskov normally has prepared statements for such developments.
Lukashenko surprised the Kremlin likely to set conditions for himself to rule another full presidential term – potentially against Putin’s plans. The Kremlin has repeatedly expressed desires for constitutional reforms.[3] Kremlin-linked opposition leaders and a Kremlin-linked Belarusian presidential candidate Lukashenko jailed have called for constitutional reforms.[4] The continued absence of a Kremlin endorsement for another Lukashenko term may indicate the Kremlin is maintaining the option to broker a transition of power from Lukashenko to a different actor, potentially though Belarusian constitutional amendments.
Russia will likely increase pressure against Lukashenko to achieve its desired concessions in Belarus. The Kremlin seeks to establish suzerainty over Belarus by formalizing the Union State and integrating Belarusian political and military structures with those of Russia. Putin deployed a regiment-sized force to Belarus under the rubric of the Slavic Brotherhood exercises and likely secured additional military and economic Union State integration concessions from Lukashenko at their meeting in Sochi on September 14.[5] Lukashenko’s decision to surprise the Kremlin with his reinauguration indicates that Lukashenko believed Moscow would not support it. The lukewarm Russian response supports that view. Lukashenko’s actions and Moscow’s caution indicates that Putin still has unmet demands of Lukashenko, which is concerning considering how much ground Lukashenko has already ceded to the Kremlin.
The Kremlin flew more long-range bombers toward NATO airspace as part of the Slavic Brotherhood exercises on September 23. Six long-range supersonic Tu-22 bombers from the Shaikovka airfield in Tver flew across Belarus, and struck targets on the Ruzhansky firing range in Baranovichi, Brest, on September 23.[6] This flight– like that of two Tu-160M nuclear-capable supersonic strategic bombers on September 22 – was likely meant as a message to NATO.
Click here to expand the map.
Caption: See endnotes for flight path sourcing.[7]
The Russian Air Force may violate sovereign NATO airspace in Poland or Lithuania. Russian forces have been executing airborne and flyover operations in Belarus immediately next to the Polish border since September 21. These activities all have Russian combat or transport aircraft flying from bases in Russia and Belarus directly toward the Polish border and ending close to it. Russian aircraft periodically violate the airspace of other European states, including NATO members. Russian military aircraft last violated NATO airspace over Denmark on August 28.[8] Russian military and civilian aircraft have violated NATO sovereign airspace in Lithuania and Estonia no fewer than 12 times since 2017.[9] The most recent exercises may presage similar violations of Polish airspace from Belarus in the future.
Russia’s battalion tactical group from the 217th Airborne regiment of the Ivanovo-based 98th Guards Airborne Division is operating in Brest as of September 23.[10] This element’s area of operation in Belarus was previously unclear.
Regiment-sized elements of a Combined Arms Army, presumably the 6th Combined Arms Army (CAA), concluded exercises in the WMD on September 23. A force of approximately 1,200 personnel used multiple launch rocket systems, self-propelled howitzers, and anti-tank missile systems to destroy full-sized targets of enemy armored vehicles at firing ranges in Smolensk and Ryazan.[11] The fire elements used radar, optical-electronic, and artillery sound ranging to hit targets. Approximately 5,000 personnel of the 6th CAA began a week-long command and control exercises in the WMD on September 21 – these exercises in Smolensk and Ryazan were likely a component of the larger exercises that began on September 23.[12] The Kremlin could intend these exercises as a message to Lukashenko, or preparations for potential Russian military undertakings in various contingencies. ISW does not yet have a basis to assess the command echelon at which these exercises are being held; 5,000 troops is likely more than a single regiment or brigade, but could reflect a regiment‘s worth of combat forces with higher-echelon command, control, and support troops.
Russian bot networks may be targeting NEXTA on Twitter. Twitter temporarily restricted the NEXTA Telegram channel’s English-language Twitter account for less than an hour without providing a reason on September 23.[13] A Twitter algorithm may have automatically restricted NEXTA’s account in response to Russian bot networks mass-reporting NEXTA’s Twitter account. This incident could be an indicator of a Kremlin effort to degrade NEXTA’s ability to share information about Belarusian protests with Western audiences. Russian botnets have previously triggered such Twitter actions. Russian bot networks abused Twitter features to mass-report and suspended Ukrainian activists’ Twitter accounts in 2016, for example.[14]
ISW will continue monitoring the situation and providing updates.
[1] Belarus: Mass protests after Lukashenko secretly sworn in[2] https://ria(.)ru/20200923/inauguratsiya-1577647316.html; https://russian.rt(.)com/ussr/news/786031-kreml-inauguraciya-lukashenko
[3] Warning: Lukashenko Expels Opposition Leaders to Support Kremlin Information Operation
[4] Warning: Kremlin-linked Belarusian Opposition Leadership Threaten to Further Fragment Opposition Unity
[5] http://www.iswresearch.org/2020/09/the-kremlin-deploys-brigade-sized-force.html; Belarus Warning Update: Russian Force Deployment to Belarus is Likely Imminent
[6] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12315812@egNews
[7] View: https://twitter.com/galandecZP/status/1308514468247285760;
View: https://twitter.com/galandecZP/status/1308534192691712000
[8] error
[9] https://apnews.com/63cab1968318c9afda316a5680c99028; https://112(.)international/russia/russias-aircraft-violates-estonias-airspace-44969.html; https://apnews.com/c26f31956ed949eb800dbe632f3c52f0; Russian military plane enters Lithuanian airspace due to bad weather Russian military aircraft violates the Estonian air space https://apnews.com/7a51b7029c1e45b8...2nd-air-violation-by-Russian-plane-this-week; https://news.err.ee/847171/two-russian-aircraft-violate-estonian-airspace-near-vaindloo-island; https://www.rferl.org/a/estonia-russian-plane-violates-airspace/29310815.html; https://www.rferl.org/a/estonia-russia-plane-airspace-violation-ii-76/29094949.html; https://lithuaniatribune.com/two-ru...ing to it, two Russian,in the evening of Sept
[10] https://www.belta(.)by/society/view/v-aktivnoj-faze-uchenija-slavjanskoe-bratstvo-2020-primut-uchastie-bolee-900-rossijskih-voennyh-407928-2020; https://tass(.)ru/armiya-i-opk/9528617
[11] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12315767@egNews
[12] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12315440@egNews
[13] View: https://twitter.com/AlexKokcharov/status/1308840310395502592;
View: https://twitter.com/Miguel_L71/status/1308841922870620168;
View: https://twitter.com/GlasnostGone/status/1308839926826446850
[14] https://24tv(.)ua/twitter_masovo_zablokuvav_ukrayinski_akaunti_n646639; https://www.0564(.)ua/news/1083564/iz-za-ataki-rossijskih-botov-twitter-massovo-blokiruet-ukrainskie-akkaunty
ISW Blog
northern watch
TB Fanatic
What Is Belarusian Telegram Channel NEXTA?
Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 17 Issue: 132
By: Alla Hurska
Jamestown.org
September 23, 2020 04:47 PM Age: 15 hours
For years, the issue of freedom of the press and censorship in Belarus has remained an extremely complicated issue. Most domestic newspapers and TV channels are largely controlled and closely supervised by the government. Apart from that, temporary internet shutdowns in Belarus had become regular government practice since September 9, 2001, when the authorities blocked dozens of web outlets covering the presidential elections (Charter 97, September 11, 2008).
The government once again turned to sharp censorship on August 9, 2020, during and immediately following the latest Belarusian presidential elections. From August 9 to 12, online access (including mobile networks) was significantly disrupted (see Commentaries, August 14). According to one journalist investigation of the days-long blackout, technology and equipment bought from a United States company helped the Belarusian authorities block much of the internet and restricted communication on instant messengers and social networks, such as Facebook, Twitter and WhatsApp, during the disputed presidential election (Moskovsky Komsomolets, September 13). Telegram, an application that was already popular among Belarusians, proved to be most resistant to these government disruptions. When all of Belarus went nearly completely offline, the messenger still worked, thanks to its built-in blocking-bypass mechanism and additional proxy servers connected specifically for Belarus. According to Pavel Durov, the founder of Telegram, anti-censorship tools were enabled for Belarus so that Telegram would always remain accessible for most users (Twitter.com/durov, August 10). The messenger is among the most popular Android applications downloaded by users from Belarus, along with other services to bypass state censorship. Without exaggeration, during the mid-August internet shutdown, Telegram became the country’s sole source of information (Pravda.com.ua, August 19).
Telegram features so-called “channels”—individual, separately named information streams, run by one or more individuals. Since the Belarusian election and subsequent emergence of a mass street protest movement, NEXTA (meaning “someone” in Belarusian), physically based out of Warsaw, Poland, has become the leading platform covering and coordinating the opposition demonstrations. NEXTA maintains three telegram channels: NEXTA, NEXTA Live, and LUXTA. The content of the first two channels (anonymous photos, videos and news from mainstream Belarusian media) is similar and often shared between them. LUXTA mostly posts political satire (112.ua, August 12). In a country with a population of 9.485 million, NEXTA Live was able to attract over 1.7 million subscribers during the first few days of the protests. As such, a Warsaw-based platform is now the biggest Russian-language Telegram-channel in the world. Today, the total reachable audience of one post from NEXTA regularly surpasses 825,000 people (Tgstat.com, accessed September 17). By August 24, NEXTA Live received one billion views (Twitter.com, August 24).
NEXTA is not a brand-new platform. In 2015, Stsyapan Putsila (alias Svetlov), a Belarusian blogger whose father is a journalist at the Polish-sponsored free-to-air satellite TV channel Belsat, set up a YouTube channel. From 2018, Stsyapan, who now lives in Poland, shifted his NEXTA YouTube channel to Telegram. At that point, the channel started to publish investigations about corruption and up-to-date information about social and political life in Belarus (Charter 97, April 11, 2019). In 2019, NEXTA published a documentary on President Alyaksandr Lukashenka, titled “Lukashenka: Criminal Materials,” which a state expert commission qualified as extremist. The government also attempted to initiate a criminal case against Putsila. The film received almost three million views on YouTube (BBC News—Ukrainian service, August 13, 2020). In 2019, journalist Roman Protasevich, who previously worked for European Radio and other large Belarusian media outlets, joined NEXTA as its editor-in-chief. According to Protasevich himself, he has years of experience covering political events and protests. In 2014, he visited the EuroMaidan in Kyiv and, later, worked as a freelance journalist in the so-called Anti-Terrorist Operation Zone in Ukrainian Donbas (YouTube, September 17).
Following the 2020 presidential elections, NEXTA quickly transformed from a reporting tool and mouthpiece of the opposition into a de facto coordinator of the protests. Calls for help, police maps, contacts between lawyers and human rights activists, political appeals, and instructions for protesters began to regularly appear on the channel. Reportedly, a small team of NEXTA employees processed up for 10,000 messages per hour. NEXTA also published its strategy—the “Victory Plan.” The main demands include Lukashenka’s removal, new free elections, the release of all political prisoners, and fair trials for security personnel who abused Belarusians. NEXTA has called for activists to open six “fronts” against Lukashenka: protest, economic, information, political, judicial and international (T.me/nexta_tv, August 28). NEXTA successfully uses the so-called “deanon” strategy—de-anonymizing and exposing the identities of political and security officials. On September 19, NEXTA Live published the personal data (provided by the hacktivist group Belarusian Cyber Partisans) of 1,003 employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Mediazona.by, September 19).
According to Roman Protasevich the level of commercialization of NEXTA has increased dramatically recently. They received an offer to sell the channel for $7.5 million, but NEXTA’s leaders claim they are not interested in profits (Znak.com, August 20). According to Protasevich, the Telegram channel is funded entirely by advertising revenues. An advertisement post costs up to $6,000. Yet, NEXTA also receives donations from individuals. For example, in August, they collected $47,000 in donations. The average monthly salary of its employees was reportedly €1,500 ($1,750) (YouTube, September 17).
Some Russian experts believe that Telegram protests and “cyber bullying” in Belarus provide a useful case study for Russian political strategists (Ura.news, August 21) because Belarus today could become Russia in 2024 (Znak.com, September 14). The Russian authorities are most likely thinking the same way as they explore new methods to retain their power. On September 21, the Ministry of Digital Development, Communications and Mass Media of the Russian Federation prepared a bill prohibiting websites from using the latest encryption technologies (TLS 1.3, ESNI, DNS over HTTPS and DNS over TLS). The law will make it easier for Russia’s federal censor, Roskomnadzor, to block access to RuNet resources for apps (including Telegram) that use the most advanced encryption technologies (Meduza.io, September 21).
It is hard to predict how Belarus’s protest movement will develop. However, one aspect is difficult to ignore: social media and popular encrypted messaging apps, like Telegram, are playing an increasingly visible role even in countries where the government has a major say in the realm of information/cyber security. These mediums amplify the voices of disgruntled and unsatisfied citizens and have a huge mobilization potential. What is happening in Belarus now—and NEXTA serves as a good example—is being closely monitored by Moscow, since a comparable scenario might also materialize, albeit on an even larger scale, in Russia closer to 2024.
jamestown.org
Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 17 Issue: 132
By: Alla Hurska
Jamestown.org
September 23, 2020 04:47 PM Age: 15 hours
For years, the issue of freedom of the press and censorship in Belarus has remained an extremely complicated issue. Most domestic newspapers and TV channels are largely controlled and closely supervised by the government. Apart from that, temporary internet shutdowns in Belarus had become regular government practice since September 9, 2001, when the authorities blocked dozens of web outlets covering the presidential elections (Charter 97, September 11, 2008).
The government once again turned to sharp censorship on August 9, 2020, during and immediately following the latest Belarusian presidential elections. From August 9 to 12, online access (including mobile networks) was significantly disrupted (see Commentaries, August 14). According to one journalist investigation of the days-long blackout, technology and equipment bought from a United States company helped the Belarusian authorities block much of the internet and restricted communication on instant messengers and social networks, such as Facebook, Twitter and WhatsApp, during the disputed presidential election (Moskovsky Komsomolets, September 13). Telegram, an application that was already popular among Belarusians, proved to be most resistant to these government disruptions. When all of Belarus went nearly completely offline, the messenger still worked, thanks to its built-in blocking-bypass mechanism and additional proxy servers connected specifically for Belarus. According to Pavel Durov, the founder of Telegram, anti-censorship tools were enabled for Belarus so that Telegram would always remain accessible for most users (Twitter.com/durov, August 10). The messenger is among the most popular Android applications downloaded by users from Belarus, along with other services to bypass state censorship. Without exaggeration, during the mid-August internet shutdown, Telegram became the country’s sole source of information (Pravda.com.ua, August 19).
Telegram features so-called “channels”—individual, separately named information streams, run by one or more individuals. Since the Belarusian election and subsequent emergence of a mass street protest movement, NEXTA (meaning “someone” in Belarusian), physically based out of Warsaw, Poland, has become the leading platform covering and coordinating the opposition demonstrations. NEXTA maintains three telegram channels: NEXTA, NEXTA Live, and LUXTA. The content of the first two channels (anonymous photos, videos and news from mainstream Belarusian media) is similar and often shared between them. LUXTA mostly posts political satire (112.ua, August 12). In a country with a population of 9.485 million, NEXTA Live was able to attract over 1.7 million subscribers during the first few days of the protests. As such, a Warsaw-based platform is now the biggest Russian-language Telegram-channel in the world. Today, the total reachable audience of one post from NEXTA regularly surpasses 825,000 people (Tgstat.com, accessed September 17). By August 24, NEXTA Live received one billion views (Twitter.com, August 24).
NEXTA is not a brand-new platform. In 2015, Stsyapan Putsila (alias Svetlov), a Belarusian blogger whose father is a journalist at the Polish-sponsored free-to-air satellite TV channel Belsat, set up a YouTube channel. From 2018, Stsyapan, who now lives in Poland, shifted his NEXTA YouTube channel to Telegram. At that point, the channel started to publish investigations about corruption and up-to-date information about social and political life in Belarus (Charter 97, April 11, 2019). In 2019, NEXTA published a documentary on President Alyaksandr Lukashenka, titled “Lukashenka: Criminal Materials,” which a state expert commission qualified as extremist. The government also attempted to initiate a criminal case against Putsila. The film received almost three million views on YouTube (BBC News—Ukrainian service, August 13, 2020). In 2019, journalist Roman Protasevich, who previously worked for European Radio and other large Belarusian media outlets, joined NEXTA as its editor-in-chief. According to Protasevich himself, he has years of experience covering political events and protests. In 2014, he visited the EuroMaidan in Kyiv and, later, worked as a freelance journalist in the so-called Anti-Terrorist Operation Zone in Ukrainian Donbas (YouTube, September 17).
Following the 2020 presidential elections, NEXTA quickly transformed from a reporting tool and mouthpiece of the opposition into a de facto coordinator of the protests. Calls for help, police maps, contacts between lawyers and human rights activists, political appeals, and instructions for protesters began to regularly appear on the channel. Reportedly, a small team of NEXTA employees processed up for 10,000 messages per hour. NEXTA also published its strategy—the “Victory Plan.” The main demands include Lukashenka’s removal, new free elections, the release of all political prisoners, and fair trials for security personnel who abused Belarusians. NEXTA has called for activists to open six “fronts” against Lukashenka: protest, economic, information, political, judicial and international (T.me/nexta_tv, August 28). NEXTA successfully uses the so-called “deanon” strategy—de-anonymizing and exposing the identities of political and security officials. On September 19, NEXTA Live published the personal data (provided by the hacktivist group Belarusian Cyber Partisans) of 1,003 employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Mediazona.by, September 19).
According to Roman Protasevich the level of commercialization of NEXTA has increased dramatically recently. They received an offer to sell the channel for $7.5 million, but NEXTA’s leaders claim they are not interested in profits (Znak.com, August 20). According to Protasevich, the Telegram channel is funded entirely by advertising revenues. An advertisement post costs up to $6,000. Yet, NEXTA also receives donations from individuals. For example, in August, they collected $47,000 in donations. The average monthly salary of its employees was reportedly €1,500 ($1,750) (YouTube, September 17).
Some Russian experts believe that Telegram protests and “cyber bullying” in Belarus provide a useful case study for Russian political strategists (Ura.news, August 21) because Belarus today could become Russia in 2024 (Znak.com, September 14). The Russian authorities are most likely thinking the same way as they explore new methods to retain their power. On September 21, the Ministry of Digital Development, Communications and Mass Media of the Russian Federation prepared a bill prohibiting websites from using the latest encryption technologies (TLS 1.3, ESNI, DNS over HTTPS and DNS over TLS). The law will make it easier for Russia’s federal censor, Roskomnadzor, to block access to RuNet resources for apps (including Telegram) that use the most advanced encryption technologies (Meduza.io, September 21).
It is hard to predict how Belarus’s protest movement will develop. However, one aspect is difficult to ignore: social media and popular encrypted messaging apps, like Telegram, are playing an increasingly visible role even in countries where the government has a major say in the realm of information/cyber security. These mediums amplify the voices of disgruntled and unsatisfied citizens and have a huge mobilization potential. What is happening in Belarus now—and NEXTA serves as a good example—is being closely monitored by Moscow, since a comparable scenario might also materialize, albeit on an even larger scale, in Russia closer to 2024.
What Is Belarusian Telegram Channel NEXTA?
For years, the issue of freedom of the press and censorship in Belarus has remained an extremely complicated issue. Most domestic newspapers and TV channels are largely controlled and closely supervised by the government. Apart from that, temporary internet shutdowns in Belarus had become...
northern watch
TB Fanatic
EU says Lukashenko is not legitimate Belarus president
By Robin Emmott
September 24, 20203:44 AMUpdated 3 hours ago
BRUSSELS (Reuters) - President Alexander Lukashenko is not the legitimate president of Belarus, the European Union said on Thursday, saying his abrupt swearing-in on Wednesday went directly against the will of the people.
The ceremony accelerated EU plans to boycott Lukashenko following the disputed August 9 election, as the European Parliament had earlier decided not to recognise the veteran leader from November, when his term as president was due to end.
“The so-called ‘inauguration’ ... and the new mandate claimed by Aleksander Lukashenko lack any democratic legitimacy,” the EU’s 27 states said in a statement.
“This ‘inauguration’ directly contradicts the will of large parts of the Belarusian population, as expressed in numerous, unprecedented and peaceful protests since the elections, and serves to only further deepen the political crisis in Belarus.”
The EU, a large financial donor to Belarus, also said it was “reviewing its relations” with the country, meaning the bloc would seek to cut off direct funding to Lukashenko’s government, channelling it to aid groups and hospitals instead.
Before the election, the EU had committed to spend 135 million euros on projects in Belarus and has also pledged 53 million euros for the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic.
Opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya discussed with EU foreign ministers on Monday in Brussels how to bypass state administration to support doctors and hospitals.
“I asked Europe not to support financially the regime. All the money Mr.Lukashenko can get now will not go to support the Belarusian people but will go for those repressions,” she told reporters, referring to the pro-democracy crackdown.
Reporting by Robin Emmott; Editing by Toby Chopra, William Maclean
uk.reuters.com
By Robin Emmott
September 24, 20203:44 AMUpdated 3 hours ago
BRUSSELS (Reuters) - President Alexander Lukashenko is not the legitimate president of Belarus, the European Union said on Thursday, saying his abrupt swearing-in on Wednesday went directly against the will of the people.
The ceremony accelerated EU plans to boycott Lukashenko following the disputed August 9 election, as the European Parliament had earlier decided not to recognise the veteran leader from November, when his term as president was due to end.
“The so-called ‘inauguration’ ... and the new mandate claimed by Aleksander Lukashenko lack any democratic legitimacy,” the EU’s 27 states said in a statement.
“This ‘inauguration’ directly contradicts the will of large parts of the Belarusian population, as expressed in numerous, unprecedented and peaceful protests since the elections, and serves to only further deepen the political crisis in Belarus.”
The EU, a large financial donor to Belarus, also said it was “reviewing its relations” with the country, meaning the bloc would seek to cut off direct funding to Lukashenko’s government, channelling it to aid groups and hospitals instead.
Before the election, the EU had committed to spend 135 million euros on projects in Belarus and has also pledged 53 million euros for the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic.
Opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya discussed with EU foreign ministers on Monday in Brussels how to bypass state administration to support doctors and hospitals.
“I asked Europe not to support financially the regime. All the money Mr.Lukashenko can get now will not go to support the Belarusian people but will go for those repressions,” she told reporters, referring to the pro-democracy crackdown.
Reporting by Robin Emmott; Editing by Toby Chopra, William Maclean
Reuters | Breaking International News & Views
Find latest news from every corner of the globe at Reuters.com, your online source for breaking international news coverage.
uk.reuters.com
northern watch
TB Fanatic
Belarus Warning Update: Putin is Setting Conditions for a Long-term Continuous Russian Military Presence in Belarus
September 24, 2020 6:30 PM EDT
Iswresearch.org
By George Barros
Russian President Vladimir Putin is setting conditions for the long-term continuous presence of Russian conventional ground forces in Belarus.
Russia’s military activity in the Western Military District (WMD) is anomalously high during ongoing Kavkaz-2020 exercises in the Southern Military District. ISW has observed a larger-than-anticipated number of unscheduled Russian exercises in the vicinity of Belarus and throughout the WMD. The Russian Defense Ministry holds annual strategic exercises to test the readiness of Russia’s four main military districts. Each such annual exercise occurs in a different military district in a rotating order and usually precipitates a decrease in military exercises in the other military districts. This year’s “Kavkaz-2020” exercises began on September 15 in the SMD and should have coincided with a decrease in Russian military activity in the WMD.
Russian forces in the WMD are instead exercising on a larger scale than they did during the last annual exercise in that military district, Zapad-2017. Approximately 7500 Russian military personnel have conducted exercises in Belarus and the WMD since Slavic Brotherhood 2020 began on September 15.[ii] Approximately 7,200 Russian military personnel participated in Zapad-2017 exercises in all.[iii]
Russian forces likely have greater freedom of movement in Belarus during Slavic Brotherhood 2020 than they did during Zapad-2017. In 2017 elements of the Pskov-based 76th, Ivanovo-based 98th, and Tula-based 106th Airborne Divisions conducted exercises in the WMD but never deployed into Belarus for Zapad-2017 exercises.[iv] Three battalion tactical groups from these divisions deployed to Belarus and are operating in Brest and Grodno near the Polish and Lithuanian borders this week.[v]
Belarusian support units are likely preparing for the next Russian deployment to Belarus in October. Unspecified Belarusian signals elements, including elements of Belarus’ 1st Field Communications Center, began command and control signals exercises in Belarus on September 21.[vi] The Belarusian Ministry of Defense stated these exercises are preparations for upcoming exercises in October.[vii]
A regiment-sized force of the of the Pskov-based 76th Guards Air assault Division is likely preparing for a deployment, likely to Belarus. A regiment-sized force (1,500 personnel) of the 76th began snap exercises in Pskov on September 24.[viii] The exercises practice transferring subunits in a combined way, the mass landing of personnel and military equipment from transport aircraft, and maneuvers into new areas while overcoming water obstacles, and establishing a lodgment.[ix] The regiment-sized force is likely preparing to deploy to Belarus under the rubric of monthly exercises, though that has not been announced.
Russian military activity in the Western Military District will continue. Brigade-sized elements of a tank army, presumably the Moscow-based First Tank Army, will conduct exercises at the Mulino training ground in Nizhny Novgorod from September 28 through October 4.[x]
The Kremlin may be targeting NATO in the cyber domain. Likely Russian-backed cyber actors sent emails from an address imitating Lithuanian officials’ official email addresses to send fake information claiming that Lithuania and Poland called on the European Union to create European peacekeeping forces and to deploy it to Belarus on September 24.[xi] Kremlin-backed hackers may have conducted this disinformation operation to set conditions for a Russian force deployment to Belarus under the pretext of defending against Poland and Lithuania. The Kremlin and Lukashenko have repeatedly falsely accused Poland and Lithuania of planning to partition Belarus.[xii] Kremlin-backed cyber actors have used similar email imitation techniques in Ukraine before.[xiii]
The Kremlin flew long-range nuclear-capable supersonic bombers toward NATO airspace as part of the Slavic Brotherhood exercises for a third consecutive day on September 24. Two Russian Tu-160M nuclear-capable supersonic strategic bombers departed from the Engels-2 airbase in Saratov, Russia, and flew along the Belarusian border with NATO on September 24.[xiv] Two Tu-160Ms conducted a similar flight on September 22.[xv] Six long-range supersonic Tu-22 bombers from the Shaikovka airfield in Tver flew across Belarus, and struck targets on the Ruzhansky firing range in Baranovichi, Brest, on September 23.[xvi] The Kremlin will likely continue to conduct similar flights as Russia’s military presence in Belarus persists or increases.
Forecast: Russian airborne troops currently in Belarus will likely return to Russia as scheduled on September 25, but fresh troops—likely airborne but possibly including motorized rifle forces from the WMD—will likely return to Belarus in October for the next round of now-monthly exercises. Putin likely intends to desensitize NATO to the nearly-continuous presence of Russian troops in Belarus under the pretext of exercises, shifting to a continuous presence within a few months.
Timebomb 2000 Belarus Warning Update: Multiple Russian Military Exercises Occurring in the Western Military District, Belarus, and Moldova
[ii] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12315037@egNews; https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12315039@egNews; https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12315039@egNews; https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12315037@egNews; https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12315043@egNews; http://www.understandingwar.org/bac...ploys-third-battalion-tactical-group-belarus; https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12315028@egNews; http://www.iswresearch.org/2020/09/belarus-warning-update-multiple-russian.html; The Kremlin Deploys a Brigade-Sized Force to Belarus Near Polish Border
[iii] http://eng.mil(.)ru/en/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12142199@egNews
[iv] Unknown elements of the Moscow-based 1st Tank Army deployed to an unknown training range in Belarus for Zapad-2017, however. https://www.ng(.)ru/politics/2017-08-11/2_7049_vdv.html; https://regnum(.)ru/news/polit/2321907.html; http://eng.mil(.)ru/en/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12142236@egNews
[v] Belarus Warning Update: Russia Deploys a Third Battalion Tactical Group to Belarus
[vi] https://www.mil(.)by/ru/news/106477/
[vii] https://www.mil(.)by/ru/news/106477/
[viii] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12315956@egNews; Belarus Warning Update: Russia Deploys a Third Battalion Tactical Group to Belarus
[ix] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12315956@egNews
[x] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12316020@egNews
[xi] View: https://twitter.com/LT_MFA_Stratcom/status/1308779237147541505
[xii] Belarus Warning Update: Russian Force Deployment to Belarus is Likely Imminent
[xiii] Viral Disinformation: The Kremlin’s Coronavirus Information Operation in Ukraine
[xiv] https://www.rbc(.)ru/rbcfreenews/5f6ca5439a794783bafb9ff4; https://www.mk(.)ru/politics/2020/09/24/rossiyskie-samolety-tu160-proleteli-vdol-zapadnykh-granic-belorussii.html; https://tsargrad(.)tv/news/dvojka-russkih-tu-160-podoshla-k-granicam-nato-ih-prikryvali-belorusskie-istrebiteli_283581
[xv] Putin Remains Dissatisfied with Lukashenko’s Concessions
[xvi] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12315812@egNews
www.iswresearch.org
September 24, 2020 6:30 PM EDT
Iswresearch.org
By George Barros
Russian President Vladimir Putin is setting conditions for the long-term continuous presence of Russian conventional ground forces in Belarus.
Russia’s military activity in the Western Military District (WMD) is anomalously high during ongoing Kavkaz-2020 exercises in the Southern Military District. ISW has observed a larger-than-anticipated number of unscheduled Russian exercises in the vicinity of Belarus and throughout the WMD. The Russian Defense Ministry holds annual strategic exercises to test the readiness of Russia’s four main military districts. Each such annual exercise occurs in a different military district in a rotating order and usually precipitates a decrease in military exercises in the other military districts. This year’s “Kavkaz-2020” exercises began on September 15 in the SMD and should have coincided with a decrease in Russian military activity in the WMD.
Russian forces in the WMD are instead exercising on a larger scale than they did during the last annual exercise in that military district, Zapad-2017. Approximately 7500 Russian military personnel have conducted exercises in Belarus and the WMD since Slavic Brotherhood 2020 began on September 15.[ii] Approximately 7,200 Russian military personnel participated in Zapad-2017 exercises in all.[iii]
Russian forces likely have greater freedom of movement in Belarus during Slavic Brotherhood 2020 than they did during Zapad-2017. In 2017 elements of the Pskov-based 76th, Ivanovo-based 98th, and Tula-based 106th Airborne Divisions conducted exercises in the WMD but never deployed into Belarus for Zapad-2017 exercises.[iv] Three battalion tactical groups from these divisions deployed to Belarus and are operating in Brest and Grodno near the Polish and Lithuanian borders this week.[v]
Belarusian support units are likely preparing for the next Russian deployment to Belarus in October. Unspecified Belarusian signals elements, including elements of Belarus’ 1st Field Communications Center, began command and control signals exercises in Belarus on September 21.[vi] The Belarusian Ministry of Defense stated these exercises are preparations for upcoming exercises in October.[vii]
A regiment-sized force of the of the Pskov-based 76th Guards Air assault Division is likely preparing for a deployment, likely to Belarus. A regiment-sized force (1,500 personnel) of the 76th began snap exercises in Pskov on September 24.[viii] The exercises practice transferring subunits in a combined way, the mass landing of personnel and military equipment from transport aircraft, and maneuvers into new areas while overcoming water obstacles, and establishing a lodgment.[ix] The regiment-sized force is likely preparing to deploy to Belarus under the rubric of monthly exercises, though that has not been announced.
Russian military activity in the Western Military District will continue. Brigade-sized elements of a tank army, presumably the Moscow-based First Tank Army, will conduct exercises at the Mulino training ground in Nizhny Novgorod from September 28 through October 4.[x]
The Kremlin may be targeting NATO in the cyber domain. Likely Russian-backed cyber actors sent emails from an address imitating Lithuanian officials’ official email addresses to send fake information claiming that Lithuania and Poland called on the European Union to create European peacekeeping forces and to deploy it to Belarus on September 24.[xi] Kremlin-backed hackers may have conducted this disinformation operation to set conditions for a Russian force deployment to Belarus under the pretext of defending against Poland and Lithuania. The Kremlin and Lukashenko have repeatedly falsely accused Poland and Lithuania of planning to partition Belarus.[xii] Kremlin-backed cyber actors have used similar email imitation techniques in Ukraine before.[xiii]
The Kremlin flew long-range nuclear-capable supersonic bombers toward NATO airspace as part of the Slavic Brotherhood exercises for a third consecutive day on September 24. Two Russian Tu-160M nuclear-capable supersonic strategic bombers departed from the Engels-2 airbase in Saratov, Russia, and flew along the Belarusian border with NATO on September 24.[xiv] Two Tu-160Ms conducted a similar flight on September 22.[xv] Six long-range supersonic Tu-22 bombers from the Shaikovka airfield in Tver flew across Belarus, and struck targets on the Ruzhansky firing range in Baranovichi, Brest, on September 23.[xvi] The Kremlin will likely continue to conduct similar flights as Russia’s military presence in Belarus persists or increases.
Forecast: Russian airborne troops currently in Belarus will likely return to Russia as scheduled on September 25, but fresh troops—likely airborne but possibly including motorized rifle forces from the WMD—will likely return to Belarus in October for the next round of now-monthly exercises. Putin likely intends to desensitize NATO to the nearly-continuous presence of Russian troops in Belarus under the pretext of exercises, shifting to a continuous presence within a few months.
Timebomb 2000 Belarus Warning Update: Multiple Russian Military Exercises Occurring in the Western Military District, Belarus, and Moldova
[ii] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12315037@egNews; https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12315039@egNews; https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12315039@egNews; https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12315037@egNews; https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12315043@egNews; http://www.understandingwar.org/bac...ploys-third-battalion-tactical-group-belarus; https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12315028@egNews; http://www.iswresearch.org/2020/09/belarus-warning-update-multiple-russian.html; The Kremlin Deploys a Brigade-Sized Force to Belarus Near Polish Border
[iii] http://eng.mil(.)ru/en/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12142199@egNews
[iv] Unknown elements of the Moscow-based 1st Tank Army deployed to an unknown training range in Belarus for Zapad-2017, however. https://www.ng(.)ru/politics/2017-08-11/2_7049_vdv.html; https://regnum(.)ru/news/polit/2321907.html; http://eng.mil(.)ru/en/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12142236@egNews
[v] Belarus Warning Update: Russia Deploys a Third Battalion Tactical Group to Belarus
[vi] https://www.mil(.)by/ru/news/106477/
[vii] https://www.mil(.)by/ru/news/106477/
[viii] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12315956@egNews; Belarus Warning Update: Russia Deploys a Third Battalion Tactical Group to Belarus
[ix] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12315956@egNews
[x] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12316020@egNews
[xi] View: https://twitter.com/LT_MFA_Stratcom/status/1308779237147541505
[xii] Belarus Warning Update: Russian Force Deployment to Belarus is Likely Imminent
[xiii] Viral Disinformation: The Kremlin’s Coronavirus Information Operation in Ukraine
[xiv] https://www.rbc(.)ru/rbcfreenews/5f6ca5439a794783bafb9ff4; https://www.mk(.)ru/politics/2020/09/24/rossiyskie-samolety-tu160-proleteli-vdol-zapadnykh-granic-belorussii.html; https://tsargrad(.)tv/news/dvojka-russkih-tu-160-podoshla-k-granicam-nato-ih-prikryvali-belorusskie-istrebiteli_283581
[xv] Putin Remains Dissatisfied with Lukashenko’s Concessions
[xvi] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12315812@egNews
ISW Blog
AlfaMan
Has No Life - Lives on TB
Belarus Warning Update: Putin is Setting Conditions for a Long-term Continuous Russian Military Presence in Belarus
September 24, 2020 6:30 PM EDT
Iswresearch.org
By George Barros
Russian President Vladimir Putin is setting conditions for the long-term continuous presence of Russian conventional ground forces in Belarus.
Russia’s military activity in the Western Military District (WMD) is anomalously high during ongoing Kavkaz-2020 exercises in the Southern Military District. ISW has observed a larger-than-anticipated number of unscheduled Russian exercises in the vicinity of Belarus and throughout the WMD. The Russian Defense Ministry holds annual strategic exercises to test the readiness of Russia’s four main military districts. Each such annual exercise occurs in a different military district in a rotating order and usually precipitates a decrease in military exercises in the other military districts. This year’s “Kavkaz-2020” exercises began on September 15 in the SMD and should have coincided with a decrease in Russian military activity in the WMD.
Russian forces in the WMD are instead exercising on a larger scale than they did during the last annual exercise in that military district, Zapad-2017. Approximately 7500 Russian military personnel have conducted exercises in Belarus and the WMD since Slavic Brotherhood 2020 began on September 15.[ii] Approximately 7,200 Russian military personnel participated in Zapad-2017 exercises in all.[iii]
Russian forces likely have greater freedom of movement in Belarus during Slavic Brotherhood 2020 than they did during Zapad-2017. In 2017 elements of the Pskov-based 76th, Ivanovo-based 98th, and Tula-based 106th Airborne Divisions conducted exercises in the WMD but never deployed into Belarus for Zapad-2017 exercises.[iv] Three battalion tactical groups from these divisions deployed to Belarus and are operating in Brest and Grodno near the Polish and Lithuanian borders this week.[v]
Belarusian support units are likely preparing for the next Russian deployment to Belarus in October. Unspecified Belarusian signals elements, including elements of Belarus’ 1st Field Communications Center, began command and control signals exercises in Belarus on September 21.[vi] The Belarusian Ministry of Defense stated these exercises are preparations for upcoming exercises in October.[vii]
A regiment-sized force of the of the Pskov-based 76th Guards Air assault Division is likely preparing for a deployment, likely to Belarus. A regiment-sized force (1,500 personnel) of the 76th began snap exercises in Pskov on September 24.[viii] The exercises practice transferring subunits in a combined way, the mass landing of personnel and military equipment from transport aircraft, and maneuvers into new areas while overcoming water obstacles, and establishing a lodgment.[ix] The regiment-sized force is likely preparing to deploy to Belarus under the rubric of monthly exercises, though that has not been announced.
Russian military activity in the Western Military District will continue. Brigade-sized elements of a tank army, presumably the Moscow-based First Tank Army, will conduct exercises at the Mulino training ground in Nizhny Novgorod from September 28 through October 4.[x]
The Kremlin may be targeting NATO in the cyber domain. Likely Russian-backed cyber actors sent emails from an address imitating Lithuanian officials’ official email addresses to send fake information claiming that Lithuania and Poland called on the European Union to create European peacekeeping forces and to deploy it to Belarus on September 24.[xi] Kremlin-backed hackers may have conducted this disinformation operation to set conditions for a Russian force deployment to Belarus under the pretext of defending against Poland and Lithuania. The Kremlin and Lukashenko have repeatedly falsely accused Poland and Lithuania of planning to partition Belarus.[xii] Kremlin-backed cyber actors have used similar email imitation techniques in Ukraine before.[xiii]
The Kremlin flew long-range nuclear-capable supersonic bombers toward NATO airspace as part of the Slavic Brotherhood exercises for a third consecutive day on September 24. Two Russian Tu-160M nuclear-capable supersonic strategic bombers departed from the Engels-2 airbase in Saratov, Russia, and flew along the Belarusian border with NATO on September 24.[xiv] Two Tu-160Ms conducted a similar flight on September 22.[xv] Six long-range supersonic Tu-22 bombers from the Shaikovka airfield in Tver flew across Belarus, and struck targets on the Ruzhansky firing range in Baranovichi, Brest, on September 23.[xvi] The Kremlin will likely continue to conduct similar flights as Russia’s military presence in Belarus persists or increases.
Forecast: Russian airborne troops currently in Belarus will likely return to Russia as scheduled on September 25, but fresh troops—likely airborne but possibly including motorized rifle forces from the WMD—will likely return to Belarus in October for the next round of now-monthly exercises. Putin likely intends to desensitize NATO to the nearly-continuous presence of Russian troops in Belarus under the pretext of exercises, shifting to a continuous presence within a few months.
Timebomb 2000 Belarus Warning Update: Multiple Russian Military Exercises Occurring in the Western Military District, Belarus, and Moldova
[ii] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12315037@egNews; https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12315039@egNews; https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12315039@egNews; https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12315037@egNews; https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12315043@egNews; http://www.understandingwar.org/bac...ploys-third-battalion-tactical-group-belarus; https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12315028@egNews; http://www.iswresearch.org/2020/09/belarus-warning-update-multiple-russian.html; The Kremlin Deploys a Brigade-Sized Force to Belarus Near Polish Border
[iii] http://eng.mil(.)ru/en/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12142199@egNews
[iv] Unknown elements of the Moscow-based 1st Tank Army deployed to an unknown training range in Belarus for Zapad-2017, however. https://www.ng(.)ru/politics/2017-08-11/2_7049_vdv.html; https://regnum(.)ru/news/polit/2321907.html; http://eng.mil(.)ru/en/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12142236@egNews
[v] Belarus Warning Update: Russia Deploys a Third Battalion Tactical Group to Belarus
[vi] https://www.mil(.)by/ru/news/106477/
[vii] https://www.mil(.)by/ru/news/106477/
[viii] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12315956@egNews; Belarus Warning Update: Russia Deploys a Third Battalion Tactical Group to Belarus
[ix] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12315956@egNews
[x] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12316020@egNews
[xi] View: https://twitter.com/LT_MFA_Stratcom/status/1308779237147541505
[xii] Belarus Warning Update: Russian Force Deployment to Belarus is Likely Imminent
[xiii] Viral Disinformation: The Kremlin’s Coronavirus Information Operation in Ukraine
[xiv] https://www.rbc(.)ru/rbcfreenews/5f6ca5439a794783bafb9ff4; https://www.mk(.)ru/politics/2020/09/24/rossiyskie-samolety-tu160-proleteli-vdol-zapadnykh-granic-belorussii.html; https://tsargrad(.)tv/news/dvojka-russkih-tu-160-podoshla-k-granicam-nato-ih-prikryvali-belorusskie-istrebiteli_283581
[xv] Putin Remains Dissatisfied with Lukashenko’s Concessions
[xvi] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12315812@egNews
ISW Blog
Interesting read!
northern watch
TB Fanatic
intothatgoodnight
. . .
Sez WHO? Trump? Pompeo? Pentagon brass? Intel bunch? NATO? EU?
intothegoodnight
Last edited:
northern watch
TB Fanatic
Belarus Warning Update: Russia and Belarus Prepare for October Exercises in Belarus
Iswresearch.org
September 25, 2020 5:30 EDT
by George Barros
Russia’s Western Military District (WMD) is likely preparing for more exercises in Belarus. Unspecified Russian signals elements of the Moscow-based First Guards Tank Army performed over 300 special command and control and warning signals transmission exercises in the WMD in late September. Signal elements practiced transmitting targeting information, deploying concealed field command posts in blackout conditions, and defending command and control infrastructure against weapons of mass destruction.
These exercises may be part of a larger WMD logistical undertaking to sustain a continuous or near-continuous conventional Russian military presence in Belarus. Belarusian signals elements began conducting similar field exercises in Belarus on September 21 to prepare for upcoming October exercises in Belarus.[ii]
The Russian brigade tactical group (BTG) of the Ivano-based 98th Airborne Assault Division began to depart Brest, Belarus, via rail after Slavic Brotherhood exercises ended on September 25.[iii] The Kremlin continues to claim all Russian forces that participated in Slavic Brotherhood will return to Russia now that Slavic brotherhood exercises ended. Russia has offered no visual evidence that the two BTGs from the Pskov-based 76th and Tula-based 106th Airborne Assault Divisions are preparing to leave Belarus. ISW assesses that they likely will leave within a few days, and that different units will return for the announced October exercises.
Regiment-sized elements of the Kantemir Tank Division – likely elements of the 6th Separate Tank Brigade – concluded exercises at the Mulino training ground in Nizhny Novgorod on September 25.[iv] These likely snap exercises began on September 21.[v]
Russian military activity in the Western Military District will continue. Regiment-sized elements of a tank army, presumably the Moscow-based First Tank Army, will conduct exercises at the Mulino training ground from September 28 through October 4.[vi]
Belarusian authorities claimed Belarusian civilians are asking the government to use lethal force to restore order for the first time. The Belarusian Ministry of Internal Affairs claimed Minsk residents are demanding Belarusian authorities use lethal force to neutralize protests on September 24.[vii] Such public communication may be an early indicator that Belarusian authorities intend to intensify applied force against protesters. Belarusian authorities intensified their detention campaign on September 19.[viii] Belarusian authorities likely seek to create the impression amongst the Belarusian population that protesting is a dangerous activity which most Belarusians do not support.
Belarus will likely become more economically dependent on Russia. Self-proclaimed president Alexander Lukashenko proposed to build a joint Russian-Belarusian seaport trade terminal – using Russian loans granted to Belarus – in Leningrad Oblast on September 25.[ix] Lukashenko’s leverage to resist Russian and Belarusian economic integration is likely degraded.
ISW will continue monitoring the situation and providing updates.
https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12316185@egNews
[ii] https://www.mil(.)by/ru/news/106477/
[iii] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12316195@egNews; https://tvzvezda(.)ru/news/forces/content/20209251246-SsbUH.html?utm_source=tvzvezda&utm_medium=longpage&utm_campaign=longpage&utm_term=v1
[iv] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12316176@egNews
[v] The Kremlin Deploys a Brigade-Sized Force to Belarus Near Polish Border
[vi] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12316020@egNews
[vii] https://www.mvd.gov(.)by/ru/news/7423
[viii] Police detained approximately 400 out of 2000 women’s march participants on September 19, whereas police detained only dozens out of tens of thousands of women’s march participants on September 13. http://www.iswresearch.org/2020/09/warning-nexta-actively-encourages.html; http://spring96(.)org/be/news/99601; Police Arrest Dozens In Minsk As Women Keep Up Protests Against Belarus's Lukashenka
[ix] https://eng.belta(.)by/president/view/lukashenko-invites-leningrad-oblast-to-build-joint-seaport-133770-2020/
www.iswresearch.org
Iswresearch.org
September 25, 2020 5:30 EDT
by George Barros
Russia’s Western Military District (WMD) is likely preparing for more exercises in Belarus. Unspecified Russian signals elements of the Moscow-based First Guards Tank Army performed over 300 special command and control and warning signals transmission exercises in the WMD in late September. Signal elements practiced transmitting targeting information, deploying concealed field command posts in blackout conditions, and defending command and control infrastructure against weapons of mass destruction.
These exercises may be part of a larger WMD logistical undertaking to sustain a continuous or near-continuous conventional Russian military presence in Belarus. Belarusian signals elements began conducting similar field exercises in Belarus on September 21 to prepare for upcoming October exercises in Belarus.[ii]
The Russian brigade tactical group (BTG) of the Ivano-based 98th Airborne Assault Division began to depart Brest, Belarus, via rail after Slavic Brotherhood exercises ended on September 25.[iii] The Kremlin continues to claim all Russian forces that participated in Slavic Brotherhood will return to Russia now that Slavic brotherhood exercises ended. Russia has offered no visual evidence that the two BTGs from the Pskov-based 76th and Tula-based 106th Airborne Assault Divisions are preparing to leave Belarus. ISW assesses that they likely will leave within a few days, and that different units will return for the announced October exercises.
Regiment-sized elements of the Kantemir Tank Division – likely elements of the 6th Separate Tank Brigade – concluded exercises at the Mulino training ground in Nizhny Novgorod on September 25.[iv] These likely snap exercises began on September 21.[v]
Russian military activity in the Western Military District will continue. Regiment-sized elements of a tank army, presumably the Moscow-based First Tank Army, will conduct exercises at the Mulino training ground from September 28 through October 4.[vi]
Belarusian authorities claimed Belarusian civilians are asking the government to use lethal force to restore order for the first time. The Belarusian Ministry of Internal Affairs claimed Minsk residents are demanding Belarusian authorities use lethal force to neutralize protests on September 24.[vii] Such public communication may be an early indicator that Belarusian authorities intend to intensify applied force against protesters. Belarusian authorities intensified their detention campaign on September 19.[viii] Belarusian authorities likely seek to create the impression amongst the Belarusian population that protesting is a dangerous activity which most Belarusians do not support.
Belarus will likely become more economically dependent on Russia. Self-proclaimed president Alexander Lukashenko proposed to build a joint Russian-Belarusian seaport trade terminal – using Russian loans granted to Belarus – in Leningrad Oblast on September 25.[ix] Lukashenko’s leverage to resist Russian and Belarusian economic integration is likely degraded.
ISW will continue monitoring the situation and providing updates.
https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12316185@egNews
[ii] https://www.mil(.)by/ru/news/106477/
[iii] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12316195@egNews; https://tvzvezda(.)ru/news/forces/content/20209251246-SsbUH.html?utm_source=tvzvezda&utm_medium=longpage&utm_campaign=longpage&utm_term=v1
[iv] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12316176@egNews
[v] The Kremlin Deploys a Brigade-Sized Force to Belarus Near Polish Border
[vi] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12316020@egNews
[vii] https://www.mvd.gov(.)by/ru/news/7423
[viii] Police detained approximately 400 out of 2000 women’s march participants on September 19, whereas police detained only dozens out of tens of thousands of women’s march participants on September 13. http://www.iswresearch.org/2020/09/warning-nexta-actively-encourages.html; http://spring96(.)org/be/news/99601; Police Arrest Dozens In Minsk As Women Keep Up Protests Against Belarus's Lukashenka
[ix] https://eng.belta(.)by/president/view/lukashenko-invites-leningrad-oblast-to-build-joint-seaport-133770-2020/
ISW Blog
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TB Fanatic
Will Russia Take Over Belarusian Oil Product Transshipment?
Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 17 Issue: 130
By: Mateusz Kubiak
September 21, 2020 05:07 PM Age: 4 days
Jamestown.org
Russian Energy Minister Alexander Novak announced, on September 7, that Russia and Belarus are negotiating conditions for shifting Belarusian oil product exports from the Lithuanian port of Klaipeda to Russian transshipment terminals on the Baltic Sea, with an agreement expected in the next several weeks (1prime.ru, September 7). He added that the potential volume of fuel to be diverted might reach as high as 3 million–4 million tons per year and assured that Russian rail and port infrastructure would be sufficient to handle these amounts. The news was confirmed by Belarus’s state oil refiner Belneftekhim (Interfax, September 7). The next day, Lithuanian Transport Minister Jaroslavas Narkevičius stated that the government in Vilnius has undertaken active dialogue with the administrative leaderships of both the Klaipeda seaport and Lithuanian Railways regarding the ongoing developments (Lrt.lt, September 8). To date, however, the Lithuanians have not observed any signs of disruptions or halting of Belarusian oil product exports through their territory.
The idea of redirecting Belarusian transit freight from the Lithuanian ports to terminals in other countries was floated by President Alyaksandr Lukashenka on August 28, in response to Lithuania’s calls to impose sanctions on Belarusian officials (Belta.by, August 28; see EDM, September 11). Lukashenka stated then that he had already instructed his government to prepare to divert all cargoes (not only oil products). He did not, however, reveal where the Belarusian goods could be handled instead.
Lukashenka’s threat to take revenge on Vilnius at first glance looks like a mere bluff, especially considering his misstatement that Belarusian cargo funds 30 percent of Lithuania’s state budget (in fact, Belarusian freight represents only 30 percent of all of the cargo handled by the Klaipeda port) (Lrt.lt, August 28). However, the idea of redirecting Belarus’s oil product transit was quickly picked up and amplified by Moscow, which has been unsuccessfully pushing Minsk to do so for many years already. As a result, the topic ended up on the agenda of a high-level intergovernmental meeting a few days later, when a Russian ministerial delegation visited Minsk on September 3 (TASS, September 3).
Vladimir Putin and Alyaksandr Lukashenka had debated the possibility of redirecting Belarusian trade to Russia’s Baltic ports as early as 2005 (Naviny.by, August 2, 2005). But despite numerous public statements on this topic from politicians in both countries, nothing of the sort ever materialized. That said, the idea of shifting Belarusian oil product exports to transshipment terminals in northwestern Russia gained greater urgency after 2016. At that point, Russia, which had already been withdrawing its own cargoes from the ports of the Baltic States, began more forcefully pushing the authorities in Minsk to follow suit. Moscow had been working on reducing its own reliance on Baltic States ports since 2014, when it faced European sanctions for its aggression against Ukraine. As such, it has invested in building up its own port facilities on the Baltic Sea as well as expanding rail line connectivity to them. Those investments have had an effect: in 2019, cargo handled at the Russian ports of Russian ports at Primorsk, Ust-Luga, Vysotsk and St. Petersburg grew year-on-year by 16.7, 7.3, 5.3 and 1.7 percent, respectively; whereas, most Baltic ports experienced drops in trade of between 5 and 10 percent. This has compelled the Baltics to seek economic cooperation with China and/or Belarus if the reduced handling of Russian cargoes cannot be reversed (see EDM, December 5, 2019).
Back in 2016, as an incentive to Belarus, Russia’s Transneft proposed to cut duty-free crude supplies to Belarusian refineries if the latter would agree to redirect their export volumes to the Russian Baltic terminals (RBC, September 27, 2016). Additionally, Russian Railways presented 25 percent transit discounts for the Belarusians in exchange for the cargo redirection (Kommersant, October 18, 2016). Yet, even when Russian Railways subsequently doubled its above-mentioned tariff reduction promises to 50 percent (belta.by, April 11, 2017), the Belarusian suppliers nevertheless remained unwilling to change up their exports logistics.
Since that time, only limited Belarusian oil product cargoes have been handled by Russian transshipment terminals; the vast majority of Belarus’s transit has continued to go through ports in the Baltic States. In 2019, Belarusian companies exported around 1.4 million tons of fuel through Lithuania, around 3.2 million tons through Latvia, and around 1.4 million tons through Estonia. In comparison, only a modest 200,000 tons were handled at Russia’s Baltic Sea ports (Belchemoil.by, November 12, 2019).
Therefore, is it possible that the situation could change now?
On the one hand, it appears rather obvious that Belarusian oil product exports through Russia’s ports of Ust-Luga, Vysotsk or St. Petersburg are still not economically competitive with the Baltic States’ ports. According to one estimate, even with the above-mentioned Russian Railways discount (valid until 2025), the Ust-Luga option would be around $10/ton more expensive for Belarusian oil product exporters than transshipment via Lithuania’s Klaipeda terminal (Energybase.ru, September 4, 2020). Moreover, it is worth underscoring that Belarus would be abandoning $30 million worth of investment for 30 percent of the Biriu Kroviniu Terminalas (BKT) shipping terminal at Klaipeda it has made since 2013 (see EDM, September 11; Baltnews.lt, September 3).
On the other hand, the authorities in Minsk are currently standing with their back against the wall in talks with their Russian counterparts on future economic cooperation. Thus, it should not be ruled out that Belarus may ultimately publicly agree to a step-by-step diversion of its oil cargo to the Russian ports. Yet, any such promise will surely be premised on securing additional compensation or discounts from the Kremlin, and it may never wholly materialize in reality as Minsk continues to stall or feign compliance with the possible agreement.
jamestown.org
Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 17 Issue: 130
By: Mateusz Kubiak
September 21, 2020 05:07 PM Age: 4 days
Jamestown.org
Russian Energy Minister Alexander Novak announced, on September 7, that Russia and Belarus are negotiating conditions for shifting Belarusian oil product exports from the Lithuanian port of Klaipeda to Russian transshipment terminals on the Baltic Sea, with an agreement expected in the next several weeks (1prime.ru, September 7). He added that the potential volume of fuel to be diverted might reach as high as 3 million–4 million tons per year and assured that Russian rail and port infrastructure would be sufficient to handle these amounts. The news was confirmed by Belarus’s state oil refiner Belneftekhim (Interfax, September 7). The next day, Lithuanian Transport Minister Jaroslavas Narkevičius stated that the government in Vilnius has undertaken active dialogue with the administrative leaderships of both the Klaipeda seaport and Lithuanian Railways regarding the ongoing developments (Lrt.lt, September 8). To date, however, the Lithuanians have not observed any signs of disruptions or halting of Belarusian oil product exports through their territory.
The idea of redirecting Belarusian transit freight from the Lithuanian ports to terminals in other countries was floated by President Alyaksandr Lukashenka on August 28, in response to Lithuania’s calls to impose sanctions on Belarusian officials (Belta.by, August 28; see EDM, September 11). Lukashenka stated then that he had already instructed his government to prepare to divert all cargoes (not only oil products). He did not, however, reveal where the Belarusian goods could be handled instead.
Lukashenka’s threat to take revenge on Vilnius at first glance looks like a mere bluff, especially considering his misstatement that Belarusian cargo funds 30 percent of Lithuania’s state budget (in fact, Belarusian freight represents only 30 percent of all of the cargo handled by the Klaipeda port) (Lrt.lt, August 28). However, the idea of redirecting Belarus’s oil product transit was quickly picked up and amplified by Moscow, which has been unsuccessfully pushing Minsk to do so for many years already. As a result, the topic ended up on the agenda of a high-level intergovernmental meeting a few days later, when a Russian ministerial delegation visited Minsk on September 3 (TASS, September 3).
Vladimir Putin and Alyaksandr Lukashenka had debated the possibility of redirecting Belarusian trade to Russia’s Baltic ports as early as 2005 (Naviny.by, August 2, 2005). But despite numerous public statements on this topic from politicians in both countries, nothing of the sort ever materialized. That said, the idea of shifting Belarusian oil product exports to transshipment terminals in northwestern Russia gained greater urgency after 2016. At that point, Russia, which had already been withdrawing its own cargoes from the ports of the Baltic States, began more forcefully pushing the authorities in Minsk to follow suit. Moscow had been working on reducing its own reliance on Baltic States ports since 2014, when it faced European sanctions for its aggression against Ukraine. As such, it has invested in building up its own port facilities on the Baltic Sea as well as expanding rail line connectivity to them. Those investments have had an effect: in 2019, cargo handled at the Russian ports of Russian ports at Primorsk, Ust-Luga, Vysotsk and St. Petersburg grew year-on-year by 16.7, 7.3, 5.3 and 1.7 percent, respectively; whereas, most Baltic ports experienced drops in trade of between 5 and 10 percent. This has compelled the Baltics to seek economic cooperation with China and/or Belarus if the reduced handling of Russian cargoes cannot be reversed (see EDM, December 5, 2019).
Back in 2016, as an incentive to Belarus, Russia’s Transneft proposed to cut duty-free crude supplies to Belarusian refineries if the latter would agree to redirect their export volumes to the Russian Baltic terminals (RBC, September 27, 2016). Additionally, Russian Railways presented 25 percent transit discounts for the Belarusians in exchange for the cargo redirection (Kommersant, October 18, 2016). Yet, even when Russian Railways subsequently doubled its above-mentioned tariff reduction promises to 50 percent (belta.by, April 11, 2017), the Belarusian suppliers nevertheless remained unwilling to change up their exports logistics.
Since that time, only limited Belarusian oil product cargoes have been handled by Russian transshipment terminals; the vast majority of Belarus’s transit has continued to go through ports in the Baltic States. In 2019, Belarusian companies exported around 1.4 million tons of fuel through Lithuania, around 3.2 million tons through Latvia, and around 1.4 million tons through Estonia. In comparison, only a modest 200,000 tons were handled at Russia’s Baltic Sea ports (Belchemoil.by, November 12, 2019).
Therefore, is it possible that the situation could change now?
On the one hand, it appears rather obvious that Belarusian oil product exports through Russia’s ports of Ust-Luga, Vysotsk or St. Petersburg are still not economically competitive with the Baltic States’ ports. According to one estimate, even with the above-mentioned Russian Railways discount (valid until 2025), the Ust-Luga option would be around $10/ton more expensive for Belarusian oil product exporters than transshipment via Lithuania’s Klaipeda terminal (Energybase.ru, September 4, 2020). Moreover, it is worth underscoring that Belarus would be abandoning $30 million worth of investment for 30 percent of the Biriu Kroviniu Terminalas (BKT) shipping terminal at Klaipeda it has made since 2013 (see EDM, September 11; Baltnews.lt, September 3).
On the other hand, the authorities in Minsk are currently standing with their back against the wall in talks with their Russian counterparts on future economic cooperation. Thus, it should not be ruled out that Belarus may ultimately publicly agree to a step-by-step diversion of its oil cargo to the Russian ports. Yet, any such promise will surely be premised on securing additional compensation or discounts from the Kremlin, and it may never wholly materialize in reality as Minsk continues to stall or feign compliance with the possible agreement.
Will Russia Take Over Belarusian Oil Product Transshipment?
Russian Energy Minister Alexander Novak announced, on September 7, that Russia and Belarus are negotiating conditions for shifting Belarusian oil product exports from the Lithuanian port of Klaipeda to Russian transshipment terminals on the Baltic Sea, with an agreement expected in the next...
northern watch
TB Fanatic
northern watch
TB Fanatic
Belarus Warning Update: The Kremlin May Have Used Kavkaz 2020 Exercises in Part to Prepare for a Conventional Russian Military Deployment to Belarus
The Kremlin may have used its annual joint strategic command exercise in the Southern Military District in part to prepare for a deployment of elements of Russia’s Voronezh-based 20th Combined Arms Army (CAA) to Belarus.
Regiment-sized motor rifle elements of Belarus’ Zaslonovo-based 19th Guards Mechanized Brigade and unspecified elements of the 20th CAA conducted joint combat exercises as part of the Kavkaz 2020 exercises in Kapustin Yar, Astrakhan, on September 25.[1] Zaslonovo is located about 75 miles from Belarus’ eastern border with Russia. There is no indication of which 20th CAA units interoperated with the Belarusian elements, though they were likely tank or motorized rifle units, given the 20th CAA’s composition, the nature of the exercises in Kapustin Yar, and the Belarusian elements’ motorized rifle designation.
The participation of elements not organic to the Russian military district hosting the annual joint strategic command exercises is not unprecedented. Units organic to the Eastern Military District participated in the Center 2019 exercise in the Central Military District in 2019, for example.[2]
Elements of a Guards Combined Arms Army (CAA) – likely the 20th CAA, which is the only combined arms army with the “guards” designation in the Western Military District – began final stages of a readiness check emphasizing combat readiness, unit cohesion, and command and control effectiveness on September 26.[3] Approximately 10 unspecified regiment-and-below-sized units are participating.[4] It is unclear when this check’s first stage began. These checks may be part of a larger Western Military District logistical undertaking to sustain a continuous or near-continuous conventional Russian military presence in Belarus. The 20th CAA consists of two motorized rifle divisions with a total of two motorized rifle and two tank regiments.[5] Two of the motorized rifle regiments are based at Klintsy, about 30 miles from the southern Belarusian border with Russia.[6] Two more and one tank regiment are to the east on the northern border of Ukraine.[7] The last tank regiment is near Smolensk.[8] There is no indication of which units are participating in this exercise.
Russia has not offered visual evidence that all its Slavic Brotherhood exercises participants have left Belarus. The Kremlin claimed all Russian elements would leave Belarus after Slavic Brotherhood exercises ended on September 25.[9] Russia provided visual evidence that the battalion tactical group (BTG) from the Ivanovo-based 98th Airborne Assault Division began leaving Belarus on September 25 but has not provided similar evidence for two other BTGs of the Pskov-based 76th and Tula-based 106th Airborne Assault Divisions leaving as of this writing.[10] ISW assesses these elements will likely leave within a few days and that different units will return to Belarus for the announced October exercises.
The Warsaw-based NEXTA Telegram channel continues to align behind Lithuania-based Belarusian opposition leader Svitlana Tikhanouskaya for Sunday marches. NEXTA in a September 24 post called on Belarusians to take to the streets in Minsk and regional cities for a “people’s inauguration” of Tikhanouskaya for Sunday September 27.[11] This planned protest is a rejection of self-proclaimed president Alexander Lukashenko’s unscheduled inauguration on September 23.[12]
Tikhanouskaya actively encouraged street protests in Belarus for the first time. Tikhanouskaya praised NEXTA’s initiative and proactively thanked Belarusians who take to the streets for her “people’s inauguration” on Sunday.[13] Tikhanouskaya previously generally supported protesters but did not actively encourage street action. Tikhanouskaya may seek to expand her leadership in marshalling street protests in Belarus – a function NEXTA still dominates.
Conflict between Belarusian protesters and security personnel police may escalate. A Belarusian IT specialist from Los Angeles developed software that identifies masked Belarusian security personnel on September 24.[14] The opposition's intensified effort to de-anonymize Belarusian security personnel will likely clash against recent security personnel efforts to further anonymize themselves.[15]
Lukashenko continues to target opposition leaders in Belarus. Belarusian authorities detained Lyudmila Kazak – a lawyer of Belarusian opposition leader Maria Kolesnikova – on September 24, fined her, and released her on September 25.[16] Belarusian authorities have detained Kolesnikova since September 7 and charged her with calls to incite a coup d’etat on September 9.[17] Lukashenko will likely continue targeted detentions to steadily erode protester will.
Lukashenko’s intensified detention campaign – among other factors – is likely degrading participation in the weekly Saturday women’s march. Approximately 2000 protesters marched in the six weekly women’s march in Minsk on September 26.[18] Belarusian authorities detained no fewer than 106 women’s march participants on September 26.[19]
Significantly fewer protesters participated in the September 19 and 26 women’s marches than that of September 12, where participation was in the tens of thousands.[20] Women’s march participation decreased likely due to Belarusian authorities’ intensified detention campaign, which began on September 19.[21] Protest fatigue and colder weather will likely further degrade protest participation.
ISW will continue monitoring the situation and providing updates.
[2] Russia in Review: Military Exercises as Geopolitical Tools
[3] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12316324@egNews
[4] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12316324@egNews
[5] http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian Ground Forces OOB_ISW CTP_0.pdf
[6] http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian Ground Forces OOB_ISW CTP_0.pdf
[7] http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian Ground Forces OOB_ISW CTP_0.pdf
[8] http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian Ground Forces OOB_ISW CTP_0.pdf
[9] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12314021@egNews
[10] Belarus Warning Update: Russia and Belarus Prepare for October Exercises in Belarus
[11] https://t(.)me/nexta_tv/5250
[12] Putin Remains Dissatisfied with Lukashenko’s Concessions
[13] https://t(.)me/pulpervoi/163
[14]
View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FAJIrnphTFg&feature=emb_title&ab_channel=AndrewMaximov
[15] Warning: NEXTA Actively Encourages Belarusian Security Service Defections
[16] https://www.dw(.)com/ru/belarus-hronika-advokat-kolesnikovoj-ljudmila-kazak-osvobozhdena/a-54984805
[17] https://www.iswresearch.org/2020/09/warning-belarusian-security-forces_7.html; Warning: Lukashenko Begins Targeting the Kremlin Ahead of Meeting Putin
[18] https://charter97(.)org/en/news/2020/9/26/394667/; View: https://twitter.com/franakviacorka/status/1309842779120558080
[19] https://spring96(.)org/be/news/99703
[20] Warning: NEXTA Actively Encourages Belarusian Security Service Defections
[21] Police detained approximately 400 out of 2000 women’s march participants on September 19, whereas police detained only dozens out of tens of thousands of women’s march participants on September 13. http://www.iswresearch.org/2020/09/warning-nexta-actively-encourages.html; http://spring96(.)org/be/news/99601; Police Arrest Dozens In Minsk As Women Keep Up Protests Against Belarus's Lukashenka
ISW Blog
September 26, 2020 6:25 pm EDT
Iswresearch.orgBy George Barros
The Kremlin may have used its annual joint strategic command exercise in the Southern Military District in part to prepare for a deployment of elements of Russia’s Voronezh-based 20th Combined Arms Army (CAA) to Belarus.
Regiment-sized motor rifle elements of Belarus’ Zaslonovo-based 19th Guards Mechanized Brigade and unspecified elements of the 20th CAA conducted joint combat exercises as part of the Kavkaz 2020 exercises in Kapustin Yar, Astrakhan, on September 25.[1] Zaslonovo is located about 75 miles from Belarus’ eastern border with Russia. There is no indication of which 20th CAA units interoperated with the Belarusian elements, though they were likely tank or motorized rifle units, given the 20th CAA’s composition, the nature of the exercises in Kapustin Yar, and the Belarusian elements’ motorized rifle designation.
The participation of elements not organic to the Russian military district hosting the annual joint strategic command exercises is not unprecedented. Units organic to the Eastern Military District participated in the Center 2019 exercise in the Central Military District in 2019, for example.[2]
Elements of a Guards Combined Arms Army (CAA) – likely the 20th CAA, which is the only combined arms army with the “guards” designation in the Western Military District – began final stages of a readiness check emphasizing combat readiness, unit cohesion, and command and control effectiveness on September 26.[3] Approximately 10 unspecified regiment-and-below-sized units are participating.[4] It is unclear when this check’s first stage began. These checks may be part of a larger Western Military District logistical undertaking to sustain a continuous or near-continuous conventional Russian military presence in Belarus. The 20th CAA consists of two motorized rifle divisions with a total of two motorized rifle and two tank regiments.[5] Two of the motorized rifle regiments are based at Klintsy, about 30 miles from the southern Belarusian border with Russia.[6] Two more and one tank regiment are to the east on the northern border of Ukraine.[7] The last tank regiment is near Smolensk.[8] There is no indication of which units are participating in this exercise.
Russia has not offered visual evidence that all its Slavic Brotherhood exercises participants have left Belarus. The Kremlin claimed all Russian elements would leave Belarus after Slavic Brotherhood exercises ended on September 25.[9] Russia provided visual evidence that the battalion tactical group (BTG) from the Ivanovo-based 98th Airborne Assault Division began leaving Belarus on September 25 but has not provided similar evidence for two other BTGs of the Pskov-based 76th and Tula-based 106th Airborne Assault Divisions leaving as of this writing.[10] ISW assesses these elements will likely leave within a few days and that different units will return to Belarus for the announced October exercises.
The Warsaw-based NEXTA Telegram channel continues to align behind Lithuania-based Belarusian opposition leader Svitlana Tikhanouskaya for Sunday marches. NEXTA in a September 24 post called on Belarusians to take to the streets in Minsk and regional cities for a “people’s inauguration” of Tikhanouskaya for Sunday September 27.[11] This planned protest is a rejection of self-proclaimed president Alexander Lukashenko’s unscheduled inauguration on September 23.[12]
Tikhanouskaya actively encouraged street protests in Belarus for the first time. Tikhanouskaya praised NEXTA’s initiative and proactively thanked Belarusians who take to the streets for her “people’s inauguration” on Sunday.[13] Tikhanouskaya previously generally supported protesters but did not actively encourage street action. Tikhanouskaya may seek to expand her leadership in marshalling street protests in Belarus – a function NEXTA still dominates.
Conflict between Belarusian protesters and security personnel police may escalate. A Belarusian IT specialist from Los Angeles developed software that identifies masked Belarusian security personnel on September 24.[14] The opposition's intensified effort to de-anonymize Belarusian security personnel will likely clash against recent security personnel efforts to further anonymize themselves.[15]
Lukashenko continues to target opposition leaders in Belarus. Belarusian authorities detained Lyudmila Kazak – a lawyer of Belarusian opposition leader Maria Kolesnikova – on September 24, fined her, and released her on September 25.[16] Belarusian authorities have detained Kolesnikova since September 7 and charged her with calls to incite a coup d’etat on September 9.[17] Lukashenko will likely continue targeted detentions to steadily erode protester will.
Lukashenko’s intensified detention campaign – among other factors – is likely degrading participation in the weekly Saturday women’s march. Approximately 2000 protesters marched in the six weekly women’s march in Minsk on September 26.[18] Belarusian authorities detained no fewer than 106 women’s march participants on September 26.[19]
Significantly fewer protesters participated in the September 19 and 26 women’s marches than that of September 12, where participation was in the tens of thousands.[20] Women’s march participation decreased likely due to Belarusian authorities’ intensified detention campaign, which began on September 19.[21] Protest fatigue and colder weather will likely further degrade protest participation.
ISW will continue monitoring the situation and providing updates.
[1] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12316107@egNews; https://www.mil(.)by/ru/news/106155/; https://www.mil(.)by/ru/news/106224/; https://www.mil(.)by/ru/news/106363/[2] Russia in Review: Military Exercises as Geopolitical Tools
[3] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12316324@egNews
[4] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12316324@egNews
[5] http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian Ground Forces OOB_ISW CTP_0.pdf
[6] http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian Ground Forces OOB_ISW CTP_0.pdf
[7] http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian Ground Forces OOB_ISW CTP_0.pdf
[8] http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian Ground Forces OOB_ISW CTP_0.pdf
[9] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12314021@egNews
[10] Belarus Warning Update: Russia and Belarus Prepare for October Exercises in Belarus
[11] https://t(.)me/nexta_tv/5250
[12] Putin Remains Dissatisfied with Lukashenko’s Concessions
[13] https://t(.)me/pulpervoi/163
[14]
[15] Warning: NEXTA Actively Encourages Belarusian Security Service Defections
[16] https://www.dw(.)com/ru/belarus-hronika-advokat-kolesnikovoj-ljudmila-kazak-osvobozhdena/a-54984805
[17] https://www.iswresearch.org/2020/09/warning-belarusian-security-forces_7.html; Warning: Lukashenko Begins Targeting the Kremlin Ahead of Meeting Putin
[18] https://charter97(.)org/en/news/2020/9/26/394667/; View: https://twitter.com/franakviacorka/status/1309842779120558080
[19] https://spring96(.)org/be/news/99703
[20] Warning: NEXTA Actively Encourages Belarusian Security Service Defections
[21] Police detained approximately 400 out of 2000 women’s march participants on September 19, whereas police detained only dozens out of tens of thousands of women’s march participants on September 13. http://www.iswresearch.org/2020/09/warning-nexta-actively-encourages.html; http://spring96(.)org/be/news/99601; Police Arrest Dozens In Minsk As Women Keep Up Protests Against Belarus's Lukashenka
ISW Blog
northern watch
TB Fanatic
Hummmm......I guess why bother with the "little green men" when you have these guys on tap?.......
Posted for fair use.....
jamestown.org
Belarusian Cossacks—An Option for Putin?
Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 17 Issue: 136
By: Richard Arnold
September 30, 2020 05:04 PM Age: 1 hour
Due to certain superficial similarities between the ongoing post-election demonstrations in Belarus and the EuroMaidan protests in Kyiv in 2013–2014, some commentators have speculated about the possibility of “another Crimea” in Minsk. President Vladimir Putin’s annexation of Ukrainian territory six and a half years ago temporarily boosted his popularity in Russia and arguably delayed the integration of Ukraine into the Euro-Atlantic security community. And now, the argument goes, facing extended anti-Kremlin protests in the Russian Far East and general popular dissatisfaction with the direction of the country (see EDM, August 3, September 14), Putin might want to repeat such a move in Belarus, which would ostensibly have the added benefit of preventing Minsk from moving into the Western orbit. Numerous important differences exist between Russia’s two East Slavic neighbors, which make any sort of Belarusian Crimea scenario highly unlikely (see EDM, September 10). And yet, a little-known factor common to Ukraine and Belarus—namely the existence of Cossack groups in both countries—suggests that the hypothetical annexation threat should not be entirely dismissed out of hand.
Is worth remembering that the Cossacks played an important role in the annexation of Crimea and remain a force for destabilizing Ukraine even today (see EDM, March 18, April 16, June 30). In Crimea, the presence of supposedly “native” Cossack forces was sufficient grounds for Moscow to sneak in Cossacks from neighboring Krasnodar to provide civil and military assistance to Russian forces. Kuban Cossack Ataman (head) Nikolai Doluda later described how his group had operated “on the front lines,” and he noted Putin’s praise of Cossack irregulars (Kuban24.tv, March 18, 2019).
Historically, Cossacks originated in the southern lands of the Russian Empire, but imperial expansion, modernization, and industrialization dispersed them throughout the entire territory of the latter Soviet Union and beyond its borders. As a result, Cossack organizations now exist in the Russian Far East, the Middle Volga region, the North Caucasus, Ukraine, Serbia and even diaspora communities in the United States. Notably, there are also such organizations in culturally and geographically proximate Belarus, so it is worth asking whether they might play a similar role in that country as they did in parts of Ukraine leading up to the spring of 2014.
At first blush, the distinction in Russia between Kazaki and Kazachestvo looks to be replicated in Belarus. Kazaki might loosely be identified as ethnic or “authentic” movements, whereas Kazachestvo is a kind of stylized version of Cossackry. In Russia, movements of Kazaks have agitated on occasion for greater autonomy from Moscow (see EDM, August 9, 2018), whereas Kazachestvo units have been drafted into the service of the Kremlin. In Ukraine, the image of Kazaki is a source of motivation for those on the front lines in Donbas and a great source of national pride. In Belarus, Kazaki, almost by definition, lack an organized structure, and so it is difficult to find information on them. Still, at least one Belarusian Cossack website, Kazaki.by, presents itself as “a social information portal for activities of Cossacks in the Republic of Belarus and Belarusian Kazachestvo, independently of their belonging to a genuine host and different social organizations.” The portal goes on to carry a statement from leading local Cossacks declaring, “Today, the whole world is shocked, united in horror at the cruelty and hatred of the actions of the Belarusian tyrant and in sympathy and compassion for ordinary Belarusian citizens against whom this ‘Batka’ [‘Father’—a nickname heretofore frequently applied to President Alyaksandr Lukashenka] employs such monstrous violence, which, on its massive use alone, deprives Lukashenka of any moral right to lead this country” (Kazaki.by, accessed September 22, 2020). This Kazak entity is thus on the side of the protesters and joins the chorus of moral outrage.
On the other hand, Kazachestvo organizations—which feature links to both the Belarusian authorities and, indirectly, Russia—for now appear to be staying mostly quiet regarding the political drama in Minsk. The organization Belorusskoe Kazachestvo maintains close connections with the exarchate (subordinated to Moscow) Belarusian Orthodox Church. Indeed, as in Russia, there is an entire department within the Belarusian Church devoted to “interconnections with Cossacks.” The organization has also called for allowing Cossacks to serve in the army under their own uniforms and stressed the importance of defending the Belarusian state and its territory (Belkazak.by, accessed September 22). Following the outbreak of war in eastern Ukraine in 2014, the Belorusskoe Kazachestvo started hosting “big circle [krug]” meetings with Cossacks from across Belarus. It is also worth pointing out that, in 2015, Supreme Ataman Nikolai Yerkovich dropped his support for the presidential candidacy of Ataman Mikalau Ulakhovich and urged Belorusskoe Kazachestvo members to vote for incumbent President Lukashenka instead (Naviny.by, October 5 2015). It seems reasonable to infer that someone or some group had put pressure on the supreme ataman not to endorse an opposition candidate. Ulakhovich has been the leader of the pro-regime Belarusian Patriotic Party since 1999 and, following his failed 2015 presidential bid, became a parliamentary deputy and a member of the committee for ecology in 2016 (House.gov.by, accessed September 23, 2020). As a prominent Cossack in Belarus, Ulakhovich may well be someone to watch as political events in the country continue to develop.
Investigative reporting by the German news outlet Deutsche Welle in the aftermath of the Crimean annexation found a similar division between individual imitators of Cossack historical tradition and more explicit Kazachestvo formations agitating for the creation of military units that could receive government support. At that time, the investigation suggested that Belarusian Cossacks could become a “fifth column” in the context of instability in Belarus. And although Belarus’s Cossacks do not openly show their affiliation with Russian Cossack organizations, Mikalau Ulakhovich has notably gone on record to say that “the Russian World does not need to be brought to us, it is already in the souls of believing Belarusians” (Deutsche Welle—Russian service, February 16, 2015). Belief in the triune nature of the Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian people—a claim with dubious historical roots but one frequently repeated by the Kremlin (see EDM, August 4, 2015 and November 8, 2017)—is a central tenet promoted by Belarusian Kazachestvo organizations. It is unclear to what degree Cossack movements in Belarus are willing and able to impact the turbulent political situation inside the country. But as the Ukrainian case shows, these groups certainly have the potential to serve as a possible cover for incoming Russian irregulars. Whether Putin tries to activate this seemingly cultivated base of support represented by Belarussian Kazachestvo deserves to be watched closely.
Posted for fair use.....
Belarusian Cossacks—An Option for Putin?
Due to certain superficial similarities between the ongoing post-election demonstrations in Belarus and the EuroMaidan protests in Kyiv in 2013–2014, some commentators have speculated about the possibility of “another Crimea” in Minsk. President Vladimir Putin’s annexation of Ukrainian territory...
Belarusian Cossacks—An Option for Putin?
Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 17 Issue: 136
By: Richard Arnold
September 30, 2020 05:04 PM Age: 1 hour
Due to certain superficial similarities between the ongoing post-election demonstrations in Belarus and the EuroMaidan protests in Kyiv in 2013–2014, some commentators have speculated about the possibility of “another Crimea” in Minsk. President Vladimir Putin’s annexation of Ukrainian territory six and a half years ago temporarily boosted his popularity in Russia and arguably delayed the integration of Ukraine into the Euro-Atlantic security community. And now, the argument goes, facing extended anti-Kremlin protests in the Russian Far East and general popular dissatisfaction with the direction of the country (see EDM, August 3, September 14), Putin might want to repeat such a move in Belarus, which would ostensibly have the added benefit of preventing Minsk from moving into the Western orbit. Numerous important differences exist between Russia’s two East Slavic neighbors, which make any sort of Belarusian Crimea scenario highly unlikely (see EDM, September 10). And yet, a little-known factor common to Ukraine and Belarus—namely the existence of Cossack groups in both countries—suggests that the hypothetical annexation threat should not be entirely dismissed out of hand.
Is worth remembering that the Cossacks played an important role in the annexation of Crimea and remain a force for destabilizing Ukraine even today (see EDM, March 18, April 16, June 30). In Crimea, the presence of supposedly “native” Cossack forces was sufficient grounds for Moscow to sneak in Cossacks from neighboring Krasnodar to provide civil and military assistance to Russian forces. Kuban Cossack Ataman (head) Nikolai Doluda later described how his group had operated “on the front lines,” and he noted Putin’s praise of Cossack irregulars (Kuban24.tv, March 18, 2019).
Historically, Cossacks originated in the southern lands of the Russian Empire, but imperial expansion, modernization, and industrialization dispersed them throughout the entire territory of the latter Soviet Union and beyond its borders. As a result, Cossack organizations now exist in the Russian Far East, the Middle Volga region, the North Caucasus, Ukraine, Serbia and even diaspora communities in the United States. Notably, there are also such organizations in culturally and geographically proximate Belarus, so it is worth asking whether they might play a similar role in that country as they did in parts of Ukraine leading up to the spring of 2014.
At first blush, the distinction in Russia between Kazaki and Kazachestvo looks to be replicated in Belarus. Kazaki might loosely be identified as ethnic or “authentic” movements, whereas Kazachestvo is a kind of stylized version of Cossackry. In Russia, movements of Kazaks have agitated on occasion for greater autonomy from Moscow (see EDM, August 9, 2018), whereas Kazachestvo units have been drafted into the service of the Kremlin. In Ukraine, the image of Kazaki is a source of motivation for those on the front lines in Donbas and a great source of national pride. In Belarus, Kazaki, almost by definition, lack an organized structure, and so it is difficult to find information on them. Still, at least one Belarusian Cossack website, Kazaki.by, presents itself as “a social information portal for activities of Cossacks in the Republic of Belarus and Belarusian Kazachestvo, independently of their belonging to a genuine host and different social organizations.” The portal goes on to carry a statement from leading local Cossacks declaring, “Today, the whole world is shocked, united in horror at the cruelty and hatred of the actions of the Belarusian tyrant and in sympathy and compassion for ordinary Belarusian citizens against whom this ‘Batka’ [‘Father’—a nickname heretofore frequently applied to President Alyaksandr Lukashenka] employs such monstrous violence, which, on its massive use alone, deprives Lukashenka of any moral right to lead this country” (Kazaki.by, accessed September 22, 2020). This Kazak entity is thus on the side of the protesters and joins the chorus of moral outrage.
On the other hand, Kazachestvo organizations—which feature links to both the Belarusian authorities and, indirectly, Russia—for now appear to be staying mostly quiet regarding the political drama in Minsk. The organization Belorusskoe Kazachestvo maintains close connections with the exarchate (subordinated to Moscow) Belarusian Orthodox Church. Indeed, as in Russia, there is an entire department within the Belarusian Church devoted to “interconnections with Cossacks.” The organization has also called for allowing Cossacks to serve in the army under their own uniforms and stressed the importance of defending the Belarusian state and its territory (Belkazak.by, accessed September 22). Following the outbreak of war in eastern Ukraine in 2014, the Belorusskoe Kazachestvo started hosting “big circle [krug]” meetings with Cossacks from across Belarus. It is also worth pointing out that, in 2015, Supreme Ataman Nikolai Yerkovich dropped his support for the presidential candidacy of Ataman Mikalau Ulakhovich and urged Belorusskoe Kazachestvo members to vote for incumbent President Lukashenka instead (Naviny.by, October 5 2015). It seems reasonable to infer that someone or some group had put pressure on the supreme ataman not to endorse an opposition candidate. Ulakhovich has been the leader of the pro-regime Belarusian Patriotic Party since 1999 and, following his failed 2015 presidential bid, became a parliamentary deputy and a member of the committee for ecology in 2016 (House.gov.by, accessed September 23, 2020). As a prominent Cossack in Belarus, Ulakhovich may well be someone to watch as political events in the country continue to develop.
Investigative reporting by the German news outlet Deutsche Welle in the aftermath of the Crimean annexation found a similar division between individual imitators of Cossack historical tradition and more explicit Kazachestvo formations agitating for the creation of military units that could receive government support. At that time, the investigation suggested that Belarusian Cossacks could become a “fifth column” in the context of instability in Belarus. And although Belarus’s Cossacks do not openly show their affiliation with Russian Cossack organizations, Mikalau Ulakhovich has notably gone on record to say that “the Russian World does not need to be brought to us, it is already in the souls of believing Belarusians” (Deutsche Welle—Russian service, February 16, 2015). Belief in the triune nature of the Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian people—a claim with dubious historical roots but one frequently repeated by the Kremlin (see EDM, August 4, 2015 and November 8, 2017)—is a central tenet promoted by Belarusian Kazachestvo organizations. It is unclear to what degree Cossack movements in Belarus are willing and able to impact the turbulent political situation inside the country. But as the Ukrainian case shows, these groups certainly have the potential to serve as a possible cover for incoming Russian irregulars. Whether Putin tries to activate this seemingly cultivated base of support represented by Belarussian Kazachestvo deserves to be watched closely.
northern watch
TB Fanatic
Belarus Warning Update: Russia’s Western Military District Prepares for October Exercises in Belarus
October 2, 2020, 5:45pm EDT
Iswresearch.org
By George Barros
Russia’s Western Military District (WMD) continues to conduct command and control exercises—activities necessary for a sustained Russian deployment to Belarus. Brigade-sized (3,500 personnel) elements—including tank, motorized rifle, artillery, army aviation, and reconnaissance units—of the Moscow-based First Tank Army began exercises emphasizing unit cohesion and command and control effectiveness at the Mulino training ground in Nizhny Novgorod on September 28.[1]
An unspecified sub-battalion-sized (200 personnel) element of the First Tank Army conducted exercises to defend a command post’s communication systems against sabotage on September 29.[2] Unspecified combat crews practiced organizing command and control systems, logistics, occupying and concealing positions, and air defense on September 29.[3] Rocket artillery and other fire elements conducted live fire exercises with UAV support on September 30 and October 2.[4] These exercises at Mulino will continue until October 4.[5]
The Kremlin will likely use the upcoming Unbreakable Brotherhood exercises in Belarus to practice tasks necessary for reconstituting a multinational Soviet-style military organization. ISW assesses the exercises in Nizhny Novgorod, like other recent WMD exercises, are preparations for the upcoming Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) Unbreakable Brotherhood command-staff exercises planned for October 12-16 at the Losvido training ground in Vitebsk, Belarus.[6] The Kremlin will likely use Unbreakable Brotherhood exercises to continue testing battalion and regiment-level interoperability amongst combat units of several former Soviet states, including Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.[7]
The Kremlin may attempt to destabilize NATO with hybrid operations in the Baltics if Russia achieves freedom of movement in Belarus. An unspecified company-sized (100 personnel) naval infantry element of the Baltic Fleet conducted exercises emphasizing military equipment storage area protection in Sovetsk, Kaliningrad, on September 30.[8] An unspecified battalion-sized (500 personnel) naval infantry element of the Baltic Fleet conducted exercises with amphibious beach landings, ground movements of 120 kilometers, and camouflaging positions at the Pavenkovo training ground in Kaliningrad on October 1.[9]
The Kremlin and Belarus cooperated to issue retaliatory travel ban sanctions against European Union (EU) leaders on October 2.[10] The EU initially issued travel ban sanctions against 40 members of self-proclaimed president Alexander Lukashenko’s inner circle, though not Lukashenko himself, on October 2.[11] Moscow and Minsk likely will intensify diplomatic cooperation given their joint efforts in the international information space to frame the West as conducting an intensifying hybrid war against the Union State.
The US Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) levied targeted economic sanctions against eight Belarusian officials involved in Lukashenko’s electoral malfeasance or human rights abuses against protesters on October 2.[12] Lukashenko may intensify anti-US rhetoric or issue retaliatory sanctions in response.
Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to pressure Lukashenko for Union State integration. Putin called Lukashenko on October 2 to discuss implementing unspecified Union State agreements—likely military and economic integration agreements—that Lukashenko agreed to during their meeting in Sochi on September 14.[13]
ISW will continue monitoring the situation and providing updates.
[2] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12316783@egNews; https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12316791@egNews
[3] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12316783@egNews; https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12316791@egNews
[4] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12316951@egNews; https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12316948@egNews; https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12317316@egNews
[5] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12316020@egNews
[6] http://www.iswresearch.org/2020/09/belarus-warning-update-kremlin-is.html;
[7] Belarus Warning Update: The Kremlin is Planning an October Multinational Command Staff Exercise in Belarus
[8] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12316907@egNews
[9] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12317129@egNews
[10] https://www.mid(.)ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/4366068
[11] https://www.euronews(.)com/2020/10/02/belarus-eu-agrees-sanctions-on-40-officials-but-not-lukashenko; https://www.aljazeera(.)com/news/2020/10/2/eu-breaks-deadlock-to-impose-belarus-sanctions-turkey-on-notice
[12] Treasury Sanctions Belarus Officials for Undermining Democracy | U.S. Department of the Treasury
[13] http://president.gov(.)by/ru/news_ru/view/telefonnyj-razgovor-s-prezidentom-rossii-vladimirom-putinym-24638/; http://kremlin(.)ru/events/president/news/64145
www.iswresearch.org
October 2, 2020, 5:45pm EDT
Iswresearch.org
By George Barros
Russia’s Western Military District (WMD) continues to conduct command and control exercises—activities necessary for a sustained Russian deployment to Belarus. Brigade-sized (3,500 personnel) elements—including tank, motorized rifle, artillery, army aviation, and reconnaissance units—of the Moscow-based First Tank Army began exercises emphasizing unit cohesion and command and control effectiveness at the Mulino training ground in Nizhny Novgorod on September 28.[1]
An unspecified sub-battalion-sized (200 personnel) element of the First Tank Army conducted exercises to defend a command post’s communication systems against sabotage on September 29.[2] Unspecified combat crews practiced organizing command and control systems, logistics, occupying and concealing positions, and air defense on September 29.[3] Rocket artillery and other fire elements conducted live fire exercises with UAV support on September 30 and October 2.[4] These exercises at Mulino will continue until October 4.[5]
The Kremlin will likely use the upcoming Unbreakable Brotherhood exercises in Belarus to practice tasks necessary for reconstituting a multinational Soviet-style military organization. ISW assesses the exercises in Nizhny Novgorod, like other recent WMD exercises, are preparations for the upcoming Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) Unbreakable Brotherhood command-staff exercises planned for October 12-16 at the Losvido training ground in Vitebsk, Belarus.[6] The Kremlin will likely use Unbreakable Brotherhood exercises to continue testing battalion and regiment-level interoperability amongst combat units of several former Soviet states, including Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.[7]
The Kremlin may attempt to destabilize NATO with hybrid operations in the Baltics if Russia achieves freedom of movement in Belarus. An unspecified company-sized (100 personnel) naval infantry element of the Baltic Fleet conducted exercises emphasizing military equipment storage area protection in Sovetsk, Kaliningrad, on September 30.[8] An unspecified battalion-sized (500 personnel) naval infantry element of the Baltic Fleet conducted exercises with amphibious beach landings, ground movements of 120 kilometers, and camouflaging positions at the Pavenkovo training ground in Kaliningrad on October 1.[9]
The Kremlin and Belarus cooperated to issue retaliatory travel ban sanctions against European Union (EU) leaders on October 2.[10] The EU initially issued travel ban sanctions against 40 members of self-proclaimed president Alexander Lukashenko’s inner circle, though not Lukashenko himself, on October 2.[11] Moscow and Minsk likely will intensify diplomatic cooperation given their joint efforts in the international information space to frame the West as conducting an intensifying hybrid war against the Union State.
The US Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) levied targeted economic sanctions against eight Belarusian officials involved in Lukashenko’s electoral malfeasance or human rights abuses against protesters on October 2.[12] Lukashenko may intensify anti-US rhetoric or issue retaliatory sanctions in response.
Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to pressure Lukashenko for Union State integration. Putin called Lukashenko on October 2 to discuss implementing unspecified Union State agreements—likely military and economic integration agreements—that Lukashenko agreed to during their meeting in Sochi on September 14.[13]
ISW will continue monitoring the situation and providing updates.
[1] https://tvzvezda(.)ru/news/forces/content/2020929455-W5iBE.html; https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12316519@egNews; https://tvzvezda(.)ru/news/forces/content/2020101429-uXItM.html?utm_source=tvzvezda&utm_medium=longpage&utm_campaign=longpage&utm_term=v1[2] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12316783@egNews; https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12316791@egNews
[3] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12316783@egNews; https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12316791@egNews
[4] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12316951@egNews; https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12316948@egNews; https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12317316@egNews
[5] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12316020@egNews
[6] http://www.iswresearch.org/2020/09/belarus-warning-update-kremlin-is.html;
[7] Belarus Warning Update: The Kremlin is Planning an October Multinational Command Staff Exercise in Belarus
[8] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12316907@egNews
[9] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12317129@egNews
[10] https://www.mid(.)ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/4366068
[11] https://www.euronews(.)com/2020/10/02/belarus-eu-agrees-sanctions-on-40-officials-but-not-lukashenko; https://www.aljazeera(.)com/news/2020/10/2/eu-breaks-deadlock-to-impose-belarus-sanctions-turkey-on-notice
[12] Treasury Sanctions Belarus Officials for Undermining Democracy | U.S. Department of the Treasury
[13] http://president.gov(.)by/ru/news_ru/view/telefonnyj-razgovor-s-prezidentom-rossii-vladimirom-putinym-24638/; http://kremlin(.)ru/events/president/news/64145
ISW Blog
northern watch
TB Fanatic
northern watch
TB Fanatic
Belarus Warning Update: Russia Likely Began Preparing Logistics Supply Lines to Belarus
October 5, 2020, 4:00 pm EDT
Iswresearch.org
By George Barros
Russia’s Western Military District (WMD) is intensifying efforts likely intended to establish the logistical infrastructure necessary to sustain a near-continuous Russian conventional military presence in Belarus. ISW assesses recent WMD exercises are preparations for the upcoming Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) Unbreakable Brotherhood command-staff exercises planned for October 12-16 at the Losvido training ground in Vitebsk, Belarus.[1]
WMD logistics units are conducting exercises to transport ammunition and fuel closer to Belarus—activities which would be necessary to support a lasting deployment. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated on October 4 that regiment-sized elements (1,000 personnel)—including unspecified motorized rifle, tank, reconnaissance, engineering, artillery, and logistics and signals units—of Russia’s Voronezh-based 20th Combined Arms Army (CAA) will conduct exercises in Voronezh, Belgorod, Kursk, Bryansk, and Smolensk at an unspecified time in the future.[2] The MoD emphasized that logistics and engineering support units worked out transporting ammunition and fuel over “several kilometers” to combat units for these exercises.[3] Russia’s Smolensk and Bryansk regions border eastern Belarus and would host supply lines to Belarus in the event of a sustained Russian military presence there.[4]
WMD units continue emphasizing command and control activities consistent with establishing supply lines to Belarus. The MoD stated on October 4 that a company-sized (100 personnel) signals element of the 95th Command Brigade of the Leningrad-based 6th CAA will conduct exercises using multi-purpose mobile communications systems to practice deploying and concealing integrated field command and control network nodes at an unspecified time in the future.[5]
ISW will continue monitoring the situation and providing updates.
[1] Belarus Warning Update: The Kremlin is Planning an October Multinational Command Staff Exercise in Belarus
[2] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12317582@egNews
[3] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12317582@egNews
[4] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12317582@egNews
[5] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12317604@egNews
www.iswresearch.org
October 5, 2020, 4:00 pm EDT
Iswresearch.org
By George Barros
Russia’s Western Military District (WMD) is intensifying efforts likely intended to establish the logistical infrastructure necessary to sustain a near-continuous Russian conventional military presence in Belarus. ISW assesses recent WMD exercises are preparations for the upcoming Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) Unbreakable Brotherhood command-staff exercises planned for October 12-16 at the Losvido training ground in Vitebsk, Belarus.[1]
WMD logistics units are conducting exercises to transport ammunition and fuel closer to Belarus—activities which would be necessary to support a lasting deployment. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) stated on October 4 that regiment-sized elements (1,000 personnel)—including unspecified motorized rifle, tank, reconnaissance, engineering, artillery, and logistics and signals units—of Russia’s Voronezh-based 20th Combined Arms Army (CAA) will conduct exercises in Voronezh, Belgorod, Kursk, Bryansk, and Smolensk at an unspecified time in the future.[2] The MoD emphasized that logistics and engineering support units worked out transporting ammunition and fuel over “several kilometers” to combat units for these exercises.[3] Russia’s Smolensk and Bryansk regions border eastern Belarus and would host supply lines to Belarus in the event of a sustained Russian military presence there.[4]
WMD units continue emphasizing command and control activities consistent with establishing supply lines to Belarus. The MoD stated on October 4 that a company-sized (100 personnel) signals element of the 95th Command Brigade of the Leningrad-based 6th CAA will conduct exercises using multi-purpose mobile communications systems to practice deploying and concealing integrated field command and control network nodes at an unspecified time in the future.[5]
ISW will continue monitoring the situation and providing updates.
[1] Belarus Warning Update: The Kremlin is Planning an October Multinational Command Staff Exercise in Belarus
[2] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12317582@egNews
[3] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12317582@egNews
[4] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12317582@egNews
[5] https://function.mil(.)ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12317604@egNews
ISW Blog
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TB Fanatic
Belarus Warning Update: Putin Seeks Belarus’ Integration with Russia via Belarusian Constitutional Amendments
October 5, 2020, 4:20 pm EDT
Iswresearch.org
By George Barros
Self-declared Belarusian president Alexander Lukashenko is adopting tactics for passing constitutional amendments similar to those that Russian President Vladimir Putin used to pass Russian constitutional amendments in early 2020.[1] The Lukashenko regime began soliciting constitutional amendment proposals from Belarusian citizens on October 3 with a deadline to submit all proposals by October 25.[2] Lukashenko likely seeks to create the impression among Belarusian citizens that they possess political agency. Lukashenko, however, likely has predetermined which constitutional amendments to adopt.
Putin is likely pressuring Lukashenko to adopt constitutional amendments to formalize the Union State. The Kremlin and Kremlin-linked Belarusian opposition leaders have repeatedly expressed a desire for Belarusian constitutional reforms, framing amendments as a way to solve issues between the disgruntled Belarusian people and Lukashenko.[3] Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on August 31 that the Kremlin is prepared to help Belarus by sharing the Kremlin’s “experience” in writing constitutional amendments—a reference to the Kremlin’s changes to the Russian constitution in July 2020.[4] Putin will push for the amendments to formalize Belarusian integration with Russia via the Union State mechanism. Lukashenko may continue efforts to stall or weaken that process. Lukashenko will insist, for his part, that any reduction in his power or control over Belarus be cosmetic.[5] Putin and his allies or proxies may push for more dramatic weakening of Lukashenko’s dictatorial hold either as leverage to drive him to accept integration or to create future openings to manipulate the political situation in Belarus.
Lukashenko is tightening control over the international media space over Belarus. Belarus' Ministry of Foreign Affairs canceled all foreign journalist accreditations on October 2.[6] Lukashenko is likely setting conditions to intensify his censorship campaign.
Lukashenko’s intensified detention campaign likely degraded participation in the weekly Saturday women’s march. A few hundred protesters participated in the weekly Saturday women’s march on October 3—a significant decrease from the last women’s march, which had approximately 2,000 participants.[7] Protesters did not march as a single mass but marched in a dispersed manner throughout Minsk as individuals or small groups of two to six people.[8] Women’s march participation has steeply declined for the past three weeks and will likely continue to decrease as winter approaches.[9]
Protesters and police in the Sunday march were slightly more aggressive than in recent weeks. Approximately 100,000 protesters marched in Minsk in the weekly Sunday march on October 4.[10] Protesters unsuccessfully attempted to dismantle a police mobile water cannon truck for the first time.[11] Belarusian riot police more actively detained protesters during the march; police previously arrested isolated groups of protesters before and after most protesters congregated.[12] Police detained no fewer than 317 people, including at least 17 Belarusian journalists.[13] Conflict between riot police and protesters may intensify further in future Sunday marches.
ISW will continue monitoring the situation and providing updates.
[1] http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/vladimir-putins-staged-power-play; Russia in Review: Putin Deploys New Authoritarian Controls during the COVID-19 Pandemic
[2] https://www.b-g(.)by/news/deputatyi-predlozhili-belorusam-do-25-oktyabrya-prisyilat-svoi-predlozheniya-po-obnovleniyu-konstitucii/; https://news.tut(.)by/economics/702688.html
[3] https://www.iswresearch.org/2020/09/putin-remains-dissatisfied-with.html; https://www.iswresearch.org/2020/09/warning-kremlin-linked-belarusian.html; https://www.iswresearch.org/2020/09/warning-lukashenko-deports-opposition.html; Warning: Kremlin-linked Belarusian Opposition Leadership Threaten to Further Fragment Opposition Unity
[4] Warning: Kremlin Information Operations Intensify Condition Setting for Intervention in Belarus
[5] https://www.b-g(.)by/news/deputatyi-predlozhili-belorusam-do-25-oktyabrya-prisyilat-svoi-predlozheniya-po-obnovleniyu-konstitucii/; https://news.tut(.)by/economics/702688.html
[6] https://www.mfa.gov(.)by/press/news_mfa/edfd3a91aec30891.html
[7] https://www.currenttime.tv/a/belarus/30871847.html; Belarus Warning Update: The Kremlin May Have Used Kavkaz 2020 Exercises in Part to Prepare for a Conventional Russian Military Deployment to Belarus
[8] https://people.onliner(.)by/2020/10/03/zhenshhiny-s-cvetami; http://belapan(.)com/archive/2020/10/03/ru_1062429/; Сотни женщин с цветами вышли на улицы Минска
[9] Belarus Warning Update: The Kremlin May Have Used Kavkaz 2020 Exercises in Part to Prepare for a Conventional Russian Military Deployment to Belarus
[10] Thousands Take to Streets of Minsk in Ongoing Protests
[11] View: https://twitter.com/BFreeTheatre/status/1312735056960589824;
View: https://twitter.com/NowBelarus/status/1313095122100289537/photo/1
[12] View: https://twitter.com/Den_2042/status/1312774556596219904
[13] https://naviny(.)media/new/20201005/1601895745-mvd-v-voskresene-akciyah-protesta-byli-zaderzhany-317-grazhdan; View: https://twitter.com/HannaLiubakova/status/1313005310320218112
www.iswresearch.org
October 5, 2020, 4:20 pm EDT
Iswresearch.org
By George Barros
Self-declared Belarusian president Alexander Lukashenko is adopting tactics for passing constitutional amendments similar to those that Russian President Vladimir Putin used to pass Russian constitutional amendments in early 2020.[1] The Lukashenko regime began soliciting constitutional amendment proposals from Belarusian citizens on October 3 with a deadline to submit all proposals by October 25.[2] Lukashenko likely seeks to create the impression among Belarusian citizens that they possess political agency. Lukashenko, however, likely has predetermined which constitutional amendments to adopt.
Putin is likely pressuring Lukashenko to adopt constitutional amendments to formalize the Union State. The Kremlin and Kremlin-linked Belarusian opposition leaders have repeatedly expressed a desire for Belarusian constitutional reforms, framing amendments as a way to solve issues between the disgruntled Belarusian people and Lukashenko.[3] Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated on August 31 that the Kremlin is prepared to help Belarus by sharing the Kremlin’s “experience” in writing constitutional amendments—a reference to the Kremlin’s changes to the Russian constitution in July 2020.[4] Putin will push for the amendments to formalize Belarusian integration with Russia via the Union State mechanism. Lukashenko may continue efforts to stall or weaken that process. Lukashenko will insist, for his part, that any reduction in his power or control over Belarus be cosmetic.[5] Putin and his allies or proxies may push for more dramatic weakening of Lukashenko’s dictatorial hold either as leverage to drive him to accept integration or to create future openings to manipulate the political situation in Belarus.
Lukashenko is tightening control over the international media space over Belarus. Belarus' Ministry of Foreign Affairs canceled all foreign journalist accreditations on October 2.[6] Lukashenko is likely setting conditions to intensify his censorship campaign.
Lukashenko’s intensified detention campaign likely degraded participation in the weekly Saturday women’s march. A few hundred protesters participated in the weekly Saturday women’s march on October 3—a significant decrease from the last women’s march, which had approximately 2,000 participants.[7] Protesters did not march as a single mass but marched in a dispersed manner throughout Minsk as individuals or small groups of two to six people.[8] Women’s march participation has steeply declined for the past three weeks and will likely continue to decrease as winter approaches.[9]
Protesters and police in the Sunday march were slightly more aggressive than in recent weeks. Approximately 100,000 protesters marched in Minsk in the weekly Sunday march on October 4.[10] Protesters unsuccessfully attempted to dismantle a police mobile water cannon truck for the first time.[11] Belarusian riot police more actively detained protesters during the march; police previously arrested isolated groups of protesters before and after most protesters congregated.[12] Police detained no fewer than 317 people, including at least 17 Belarusian journalists.[13] Conflict between riot police and protesters may intensify further in future Sunday marches.
ISW will continue monitoring the situation and providing updates.
[1] http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/vladimir-putins-staged-power-play; Russia in Review: Putin Deploys New Authoritarian Controls during the COVID-19 Pandemic
[2] https://www.b-g(.)by/news/deputatyi-predlozhili-belorusam-do-25-oktyabrya-prisyilat-svoi-predlozheniya-po-obnovleniyu-konstitucii/; https://news.tut(.)by/economics/702688.html
[3] https://www.iswresearch.org/2020/09/putin-remains-dissatisfied-with.html; https://www.iswresearch.org/2020/09/warning-kremlin-linked-belarusian.html; https://www.iswresearch.org/2020/09/warning-lukashenko-deports-opposition.html; Warning: Kremlin-linked Belarusian Opposition Leadership Threaten to Further Fragment Opposition Unity
[4] Warning: Kremlin Information Operations Intensify Condition Setting for Intervention in Belarus
[5] https://www.b-g(.)by/news/deputatyi-predlozhili-belorusam-do-25-oktyabrya-prisyilat-svoi-predlozheniya-po-obnovleniyu-konstitucii/; https://news.tut(.)by/economics/702688.html
[6] https://www.mfa.gov(.)by/press/news_mfa/edfd3a91aec30891.html
[7] https://www.currenttime.tv/a/belarus/30871847.html; Belarus Warning Update: The Kremlin May Have Used Kavkaz 2020 Exercises in Part to Prepare for a Conventional Russian Military Deployment to Belarus
[8] https://people.onliner(.)by/2020/10/03/zhenshhiny-s-cvetami; http://belapan(.)com/archive/2020/10/03/ru_1062429/; Сотни женщин с цветами вышли на улицы Минска
[9] Belarus Warning Update: The Kremlin May Have Used Kavkaz 2020 Exercises in Part to Prepare for a Conventional Russian Military Deployment to Belarus
[10] Thousands Take to Streets of Minsk in Ongoing Protests
[11] View: https://twitter.com/BFreeTheatre/status/1312735056960589824;
View: https://twitter.com/NowBelarus/status/1313095122100289537/photo/1
[12] View: https://twitter.com/Den_2042/status/1312774556596219904
[13] https://naviny(.)media/new/20201005/1601895745-mvd-v-voskresene-akciyah-protesta-byli-zaderzhany-317-grazhdan; View: https://twitter.com/HannaLiubakova/status/1313005310320218112
ISW Blog
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TB Fanatic
Lithuania, Poland recall more diplomats from Belarus
Lithuania and Poland are recalling some of their diplomats from Minsk, saying Belarus has demanded that they scale down their missions
By The Associated Press
9 October 2020, 14:34
VILNIUS, Lithuania -- Lithuania and Poland announced Friday they were recalling some of their diplomats from Minsk, saying Belarus has demanded that they scale down their missions.
Poland was pulling back 30 diplomats, chiefly from the consular section, and Lithuania five. The moves come amid a diplomatic tug-of-war over the recent presidential election in Belarus that is widely seen as having been rigged to give authoritarian President Alexander Lukashenko a sixth term.
Last week, Lithuania and Poland recalled their ambassadors to neighboring Belarus for consultations under pressure from Minsk, and Belarus did the same for its ambassadors to the two nations. In a tit-for-tat move, Minsk also demanded that the two countries reduce their diplomatic staff in Minsk.
“Belarus has made categorical demands to reduce the number of accredited Lithuanian diplomats drastically,” Rasa Jakilaitiene, spokeswoman for the Lithuanian foreign minister, said in a statement. “Together with Poland, we have decided to recall our ambassadors for consultations in order to reduce tensions and to preserve a possibility to maintain diplomatic relations."
“We hope that this measure will be sufficient to maintain possibilities of dialogue," she said about the move to recall five more diplomats.
In Poland, Deputy Foreign Minister Marcin Przydacz said Minsk's demand for scaling down of its mission was a “hostile move that Poland will respond to in due time and due form.”
Lithuania and Poland have have been strong critics of the political turmoil in Belarus.
Lithuania has granted shelter to Belarus opposition figure Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, who fled her country after unsuccessfully challenging Lukashenko in the country’s Aug. 9 presidential vote. Officials said Lukashenko won a sixth term in office but opposition members say the election was riddled with fraud and are holding large protests to call for a repeat vote.
Together with the two other Baltic states, Estonia and Latvia, Lithuania and Poland swiftly imposed sanctions against Belarusian leaders, and the 27-nation European Union — which includes the three Baltic nations — eventually followed suit with sanctions. Belarus is not an EU member.
———
Follow all AP stories on developments in Belarus at Belarus.
abcnews.go.com
Lithuania and Poland are recalling some of their diplomats from Minsk, saying Belarus has demanded that they scale down their missions
By The Associated Press
9 October 2020, 14:34
VILNIUS, Lithuania -- Lithuania and Poland announced Friday they were recalling some of their diplomats from Minsk, saying Belarus has demanded that they scale down their missions.
Poland was pulling back 30 diplomats, chiefly from the consular section, and Lithuania five. The moves come amid a diplomatic tug-of-war over the recent presidential election in Belarus that is widely seen as having been rigged to give authoritarian President Alexander Lukashenko a sixth term.
Last week, Lithuania and Poland recalled their ambassadors to neighboring Belarus for consultations under pressure from Minsk, and Belarus did the same for its ambassadors to the two nations. In a tit-for-tat move, Minsk also demanded that the two countries reduce their diplomatic staff in Minsk.
“Belarus has made categorical demands to reduce the number of accredited Lithuanian diplomats drastically,” Rasa Jakilaitiene, spokeswoman for the Lithuanian foreign minister, said in a statement. “Together with Poland, we have decided to recall our ambassadors for consultations in order to reduce tensions and to preserve a possibility to maintain diplomatic relations."
“We hope that this measure will be sufficient to maintain possibilities of dialogue," she said about the move to recall five more diplomats.
In Poland, Deputy Foreign Minister Marcin Przydacz said Minsk's demand for scaling down of its mission was a “hostile move that Poland will respond to in due time and due form.”
Lithuania and Poland have have been strong critics of the political turmoil in Belarus.
Lithuania has granted shelter to Belarus opposition figure Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, who fled her country after unsuccessfully challenging Lukashenko in the country’s Aug. 9 presidential vote. Officials said Lukashenko won a sixth term in office but opposition members say the election was riddled with fraud and are holding large protests to call for a repeat vote.
Together with the two other Baltic states, Estonia and Latvia, Lithuania and Poland swiftly imposed sanctions against Belarusian leaders, and the 27-nation European Union — which includes the three Baltic nations — eventually followed suit with sanctions. Belarus is not an EU member.
———
Follow all AP stories on developments in Belarus at Belarus.
Lithuania, Poland recall more diplomats from Belarus
Lithuania and Poland are recalling some of their diplomats from Minsk, saying Belarus has demanded that they scale down their missions
abcnews.go.com
northern watch
TB Fanatic
Belarus Warning Update: The Kremlin Will Likely Use October Military Exercises to Advance its Hybrid War in Belarus
October 8, 2020, 5:00 EDT
By George Barros and Mason Clark
Iswresearch.org
The Kremlin is orienting its Unbreakable Brotherhood 2020 military exercises on peacekeeping operations as part of its hybrid war in Belarus.[1] The Kremlin-dominated Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) stated on October 7 that approximately 700 CSTO personnel will participate in annual Unbreakable Brotherhood exercises in Vitebsk, Belarus, from October 12-16.[2] The CSTO stated the exercise is intended to enhance the CSTO’s capability to conduct multinational peacekeeping operations by practicing monitoring ceasefire compliance, restoring “peaceful life,” maintaining checkpoint security, and riot control.[3] The Russian military considers deploying conventional forces under the cover of “peacekeeping” to be a key means within hybrid war.[4] The Kremlin considers its ongoing campaign in Belarus to be a hybrid war and is likely using CSTO exercises to advance its campaign.[5]
The Kremlin will likely use Unbreakable Brotherhood to expand its information operations in Belarus. Retired Russian Colonel Viktor Baranets, who often speaks on behalf of the Russian military, stated that Unbreakable Brotherhood will emphasize political propaganda techniques and influence operations in a sensitive information environment rather than “the power of arms.”[6] Baranets additionally stated Unbreakable Brotherhood will send a “message to those [implied to be NATO-backed protesters] in Belarus who want to operate outside the law and do much to cause the situation in Belarus to go out of control,” in line with the Kremlin’s false framing of Belarusian protests as part of a NATO hybrid war against Belarus and Russia.[7]
Russia is leveraging the participation of Western international observers in Unbreakable Brotherhood 2020 in part to legitimize Russia’s military presence in Belarus. Observers from the International Committee of the Red Cross will participate in the Unbreakable Brotherhood exercises.[8] Russian President Vladimir Putin likely seeks to frame Russian deployments to Belarus as legitimate and internationally accepted despite his intensified efforts to undermine Belarus’ sovereignty.[9] The Kremlin prioritizes leveraging international institutions to justify its malign actions.[10]
The Kremlin will likely use Unbreakable Brotherhood in part to develop interoperability with CSTO forces to enable Russia’s hybrid war capabilities. Unbreakable Brotherhood's stated learning objectives include increasing interoperability between CSTO commanders, planning staffs, and combat subunits.[11] A Russian-dominated deployment of CSTO forces into Belarus will advance the Kremlin’s likely effort to establish a near-permanent contingent of forces in Belarus. The Kremlin additionally seeks to integrate the CSTO and other international structures into its own hybrid campaigns.[12]
Unbreakable Brotherhood will likely be smaller than ISW forecasted, but the Kremlin demonstrated the ability to rapidly adjust preplanned exercises in September 2020. ISW initially assessed Unbreakable Brotherhood 2020 would be larger than the 2019 iteration given the exercises’ historic growth pattern.[13] Armenia’s October 5 withdrawal from Unbreakable Brotherhood 2020 and an increasingly likely Kyrgyz withdrawal are undermining the exercises’ likely goal of integrating CSTO members into Russia’s ongoing hybrid operations in Belarus.
Putin may modify the size and focus of the Unbreakable Brotherhood exercises as he likely did with Slavic Brotherhood exercises in Belarus in September, however.[14] Russia may also simultaneously exercise Western Military District forces on a large scale nominally independently as it did during the Slavic Brotherhood and Kavkaz 2020 exercises.[15]
Russian security services began conducting negotiations for deeper cooperation with Belarus’ principal law enforcement agency on October 6. The Kremlin instructed the Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia), Federal Security Service (FSB), Ministry of Internal Affairs, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs to conduct negotiations with the Belarusian Ministry of Internal affairs for deeper cooperation on October 6.[16] The first news about this development did not surface until October 8. Putin is likely setting conditions for a Russian law enforcement personnel deployment to Belarus or deeper Russian integration with Belarusian law enforcement.[17]
ISW will continue monitoring the situation and providing updates.
[1] http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Putin's Offset The Kremlin's Geopolitical Adaptations Since 2014.pdf; http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian Hybrid Warfare ISW Report 2020.pdf
[2] The CSTO is a collective defense military alliance that the Kremlin uses to exercise military influence in former Soviet states. Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan are CSTO members. https://odkb-csto dot org/news/news_odkb/komandno-shtabnoe-uchenie-s-mirotvorcheskimi-silami-odkb-nerushimoe-bratstvo-2020-proydet-v-respubli/
[3] https://odkb-csto dot org/news/news_odkb/komandno-shtabnoe-uchenie-s-mirotvorcheskimi-silami-odkb-nerushimoe-bratstvo-2020-proydet-v-respubli/; http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian Hybrid Warfare ISW Report 2020.pdf
[4] http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian Hybrid Warfare ISW Report 2020.pdf
[5] http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian Hybrid Warfare ISW Report 2020.pdf
[6] https://m.sputnik dot by/radio/20201008/1045853160/Baranets-ucheniya-Nerushimoe-bratstvo-v-Belarusi-proydut-po-osoboy-tekhnologii.html
[7] https://m.sputnik dot by/radio/20201008/1045853160/Baranets-ucheniya-Nerushimoe-bratstvo-v-Belarusi-proydut-po-osoboy-tekhnologii.html
[8] https://odkb-csto dot org/news/news_odkb/komandno-shtabnoe-uchenie-s-mirotvorcheskimi-silami-odkb-nerushimoe-bratstvo-2020-proydet-v-respubli/
[9] Belarus Warning Update: Multiple Russian Military Exercises Occurring in the Western Military District, Belarus, and Moldova
[10] http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Putin's Offset The Kremlin's Geopolitical Adaptations Since 2014.pdf; http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian Hybrid Warfare ISW Report 2020.pdf
[11] https://odkb-csto dot org/news/news_odkb/komandno-shtabnoe-uchenie-s-mirotvorcheskimi-silami-odkb-nerushimoe-bratstvo-2020-proydet-v-respubli/; http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian Hybrid Warfare ISW Report 2020.pdf; http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Putin's Offset The Kremlin's Geopolitical Adaptations Since 2014.pdf
[12] http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Putin's Offset The Kremlin's Geopolitical Adaptations Since 2014.pdf
[13] Approximately 3,500 CSTO personnel participated in Unbreakable Brotherhood 2019 in Tajikistan. Belarus Warning Update: The Kremlin is Planning an October Multinational Command Staff Exercise in Belarus
[14] http://www.understandingwar.org/bac...ilitary-exercises-occurring-western-military; Belarus Warning Update: Multiple Russian Military Exercises Occurring in the Western Military District, Belarus, and Moldova
[15] http://www.iswresearch.org/2020/09/belarus-warning-update-russia-and.html; http://www.iswresearch.org/2020/09/warning-russias-kavkaz-2020-military.html; Belarus Warning Update: Putin is Setting Conditions for a Long-term Continuous Russian Military Presence in Belarus
[16] https://rg dot ru/2020/10/08/rosgvardiia-pomozhet-kollegam-iz-belarusi.html
[17] Belarus Warning Update: Kremlin Announces Reserve Force is Prepared to Intervene in Belarus
www.iswresearch.org
October 8, 2020, 5:00 EDT
By George Barros and Mason Clark
Iswresearch.org
The Kremlin is orienting its Unbreakable Brotherhood 2020 military exercises on peacekeeping operations as part of its hybrid war in Belarus.[1] The Kremlin-dominated Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) stated on October 7 that approximately 700 CSTO personnel will participate in annual Unbreakable Brotherhood exercises in Vitebsk, Belarus, from October 12-16.[2] The CSTO stated the exercise is intended to enhance the CSTO’s capability to conduct multinational peacekeeping operations by practicing monitoring ceasefire compliance, restoring “peaceful life,” maintaining checkpoint security, and riot control.[3] The Russian military considers deploying conventional forces under the cover of “peacekeeping” to be a key means within hybrid war.[4] The Kremlin considers its ongoing campaign in Belarus to be a hybrid war and is likely using CSTO exercises to advance its campaign.[5]
The Kremlin will likely use Unbreakable Brotherhood to expand its information operations in Belarus. Retired Russian Colonel Viktor Baranets, who often speaks on behalf of the Russian military, stated that Unbreakable Brotherhood will emphasize political propaganda techniques and influence operations in a sensitive information environment rather than “the power of arms.”[6] Baranets additionally stated Unbreakable Brotherhood will send a “message to those [implied to be NATO-backed protesters] in Belarus who want to operate outside the law and do much to cause the situation in Belarus to go out of control,” in line with the Kremlin’s false framing of Belarusian protests as part of a NATO hybrid war against Belarus and Russia.[7]
Russia is leveraging the participation of Western international observers in Unbreakable Brotherhood 2020 in part to legitimize Russia’s military presence in Belarus. Observers from the International Committee of the Red Cross will participate in the Unbreakable Brotherhood exercises.[8] Russian President Vladimir Putin likely seeks to frame Russian deployments to Belarus as legitimate and internationally accepted despite his intensified efforts to undermine Belarus’ sovereignty.[9] The Kremlin prioritizes leveraging international institutions to justify its malign actions.[10]
The Kremlin will likely use Unbreakable Brotherhood in part to develop interoperability with CSTO forces to enable Russia’s hybrid war capabilities. Unbreakable Brotherhood's stated learning objectives include increasing interoperability between CSTO commanders, planning staffs, and combat subunits.[11] A Russian-dominated deployment of CSTO forces into Belarus will advance the Kremlin’s likely effort to establish a near-permanent contingent of forces in Belarus. The Kremlin additionally seeks to integrate the CSTO and other international structures into its own hybrid campaigns.[12]
Unbreakable Brotherhood will likely be smaller than ISW forecasted, but the Kremlin demonstrated the ability to rapidly adjust preplanned exercises in September 2020. ISW initially assessed Unbreakable Brotherhood 2020 would be larger than the 2019 iteration given the exercises’ historic growth pattern.[13] Armenia’s October 5 withdrawal from Unbreakable Brotherhood 2020 and an increasingly likely Kyrgyz withdrawal are undermining the exercises’ likely goal of integrating CSTO members into Russia’s ongoing hybrid operations in Belarus.
Putin may modify the size and focus of the Unbreakable Brotherhood exercises as he likely did with Slavic Brotherhood exercises in Belarus in September, however.[14] Russia may also simultaneously exercise Western Military District forces on a large scale nominally independently as it did during the Slavic Brotherhood and Kavkaz 2020 exercises.[15]
Russian security services began conducting negotiations for deeper cooperation with Belarus’ principal law enforcement agency on October 6. The Kremlin instructed the Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia), Federal Security Service (FSB), Ministry of Internal Affairs, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs to conduct negotiations with the Belarusian Ministry of Internal affairs for deeper cooperation on October 6.[16] The first news about this development did not surface until October 8. Putin is likely setting conditions for a Russian law enforcement personnel deployment to Belarus or deeper Russian integration with Belarusian law enforcement.[17]
ISW will continue monitoring the situation and providing updates.
[1] http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Putin's Offset The Kremlin's Geopolitical Adaptations Since 2014.pdf; http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian Hybrid Warfare ISW Report 2020.pdf
[2] The CSTO is a collective defense military alliance that the Kremlin uses to exercise military influence in former Soviet states. Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan are CSTO members. https://odkb-csto dot org/news/news_odkb/komandno-shtabnoe-uchenie-s-mirotvorcheskimi-silami-odkb-nerushimoe-bratstvo-2020-proydet-v-respubli/
[3] https://odkb-csto dot org/news/news_odkb/komandno-shtabnoe-uchenie-s-mirotvorcheskimi-silami-odkb-nerushimoe-bratstvo-2020-proydet-v-respubli/; http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian Hybrid Warfare ISW Report 2020.pdf
[4] http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian Hybrid Warfare ISW Report 2020.pdf
[5] http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian Hybrid Warfare ISW Report 2020.pdf
[6] https://m.sputnik dot by/radio/20201008/1045853160/Baranets-ucheniya-Nerushimoe-bratstvo-v-Belarusi-proydut-po-osoboy-tekhnologii.html
[7] https://m.sputnik dot by/radio/20201008/1045853160/Baranets-ucheniya-Nerushimoe-bratstvo-v-Belarusi-proydut-po-osoboy-tekhnologii.html
[8] https://odkb-csto dot org/news/news_odkb/komandno-shtabnoe-uchenie-s-mirotvorcheskimi-silami-odkb-nerushimoe-bratstvo-2020-proydet-v-respubli/
[9] Belarus Warning Update: Multiple Russian Military Exercises Occurring in the Western Military District, Belarus, and Moldova
[10] http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Putin's Offset The Kremlin's Geopolitical Adaptations Since 2014.pdf; http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian Hybrid Warfare ISW Report 2020.pdf
[11] https://odkb-csto dot org/news/news_odkb/komandno-shtabnoe-uchenie-s-mirotvorcheskimi-silami-odkb-nerushimoe-bratstvo-2020-proydet-v-respubli/; http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian Hybrid Warfare ISW Report 2020.pdf; http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Putin's Offset The Kremlin's Geopolitical Adaptations Since 2014.pdf
[12] http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Putin's Offset The Kremlin's Geopolitical Adaptations Since 2014.pdf
[13] Approximately 3,500 CSTO personnel participated in Unbreakable Brotherhood 2019 in Tajikistan. Belarus Warning Update: The Kremlin is Planning an October Multinational Command Staff Exercise in Belarus
[14] http://www.understandingwar.org/bac...ilitary-exercises-occurring-western-military; Belarus Warning Update: Multiple Russian Military Exercises Occurring in the Western Military District, Belarus, and Moldova
[15] http://www.iswresearch.org/2020/09/belarus-warning-update-russia-and.html; http://www.iswresearch.org/2020/09/warning-russias-kavkaz-2020-military.html; Belarus Warning Update: Putin is Setting Conditions for a Long-term Continuous Russian Military Presence in Belarus
[16] https://rg dot ru/2020/10/08/rosgvardiia-pomozhet-kollegam-iz-belarusi.html
[17] Belarus Warning Update: Kremlin Announces Reserve Force is Prepared to Intervene in Belarus
ISW Blog
northern watch
TB Fanatic
Belarus Warning Update: Lukashenko Begins Campaign For “Information Sovereignty” to De-escalate Protests in Belarus
October 9, 2020, 4:30 pm EDT
Iswresearch.org
By George Barros
Self-declared Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko announced plans to establish his direct control over the Belarusian information space. Lukashenko said his administration should control major Belarusian media outlets to defend Belarus’ “information sovereignty” and that Belarusian authorities should wage a “more persistent” internet information campaign on October 9.[1] Lukashenko likely seeks to consolidate control over the Belarusian information space to degrade protester will. Lukashenko likely additionally seeks to regain control of the Belarusian information space from the Kremlin as part of his ongoing efforts to resist Russian integration pressure.
Ongoing protests in Kyrgyzstan are likely increasing Russian President Vladimir Putin and Lukashenko’s urgency to end protests in Belarus. Lukashenko said it is inappropriate to draw parallels between the “successful coup” in Kyrgyzstan and the failed color revolution in Belarus on October 9.[2] Protesters in Kyrgyzstan are significantly more violent than those in Belarus, having occupied government buildings and attempted to assassinate a former Kyrgyz president on October 9.[3] Lukashenko likely seeks to suppress the protests in Belarus lest Kyrgyz protesters inspire Belarusian protesters to adopt more radical tactics and to dissuade Belarusian protesters from adopting Kyrgyz tactics.[4] Lukashenko additionally likely seeks to control any potential escalation in Belarusian protests to mitigate the risk of a Kremlin intervention.[5] Putin has used information operations to set conditions for a Russian conventional military deployment to Belarus by framing the protests as a NATO-backed color revolution.[6]
The NEXTA Telegram channel is trying to resuscitate the weekly Saturday women’s march. NEXTA released directions on October 8 for mass attendance at the weekly women’s march planned for October 10 and instructed protesters to watch for additional directions on Saturday.[7] NEXTA did not release directions for the Saturday women’s march last week. Saturday Women’s march participation has steeply declined for the past three weeks, with only a few hundred participants on October 3.[8] NEXTA will likely continue to attempt to intensify protests against Lukashenko’s efforts to suppress them. NEXTA has explicitly praised the Kyrgyz protests by providing favorable coverage and extolling Kyrgyz protesters’ achievement of “revolution in one day.”[9]
ISW will continue monitoring the situation and providing updates.
[2] https://www.belta dot by/president/view/ne-nado-zdes-provodit-paralleli-lukashenko-vyskazalsja-o-sravnenii-sobytij-v-belarusi-i-kyrgyzstane-410268-2020/; https://www.rt dot com/russia/498734-belarus-color-revolution-foreign-meddling/
[3] https://www.reuters.com/article/instant-article/idUSKBN26U1J0; https://www.washingtonpost.com/worl...49bc9e-07b1-11eb-8719-0df159d14794_story.html
[4] Belarus Warning Update: Protests in Kyrgyzstan May Fuel Intensified Kremlin Action in Belarus
[5] Belarus Warning Update: Protests in Kyrgyzstan May Fuel Intensified Kremlin Action in Belarus
[6] https://www.iswresearch.org/2020/08/warning-kremlin-information-operations.html; https://www.iswresearch.org/2020/09/warning-lukashenko-deports-opposition.html; Warning: Moscow Sets Conditions for Kinetic Intervention in Belarus Through New Information Operation
[7] https://t dot me/nexta_live/11616
[8] Belarus Warning Update: Putin Seeks Belarus’ Integration with Russia via Belarusian Constitutional Amendments
[9] Belarus Warning Update: Protests in Kyrgyzstan May Fuel Intensified Kremlin Action in Belarus
www.iswresearch.org
October 9, 2020, 4:30 pm EDT
Iswresearch.org
By George Barros
Self-declared Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko announced plans to establish his direct control over the Belarusian information space. Lukashenko said his administration should control major Belarusian media outlets to defend Belarus’ “information sovereignty” and that Belarusian authorities should wage a “more persistent” internet information campaign on October 9.[1] Lukashenko likely seeks to consolidate control over the Belarusian information space to degrade protester will. Lukashenko likely additionally seeks to regain control of the Belarusian information space from the Kremlin as part of his ongoing efforts to resist Russian integration pressure.
Ongoing protests in Kyrgyzstan are likely increasing Russian President Vladimir Putin and Lukashenko’s urgency to end protests in Belarus. Lukashenko said it is inappropriate to draw parallels between the “successful coup” in Kyrgyzstan and the failed color revolution in Belarus on October 9.[2] Protesters in Kyrgyzstan are significantly more violent than those in Belarus, having occupied government buildings and attempted to assassinate a former Kyrgyz president on October 9.[3] Lukashenko likely seeks to suppress the protests in Belarus lest Kyrgyz protesters inspire Belarusian protesters to adopt more radical tactics and to dissuade Belarusian protesters from adopting Kyrgyz tactics.[4] Lukashenko additionally likely seeks to control any potential escalation in Belarusian protests to mitigate the risk of a Kremlin intervention.[5] Putin has used information operations to set conditions for a Russian conventional military deployment to Belarus by framing the protests as a NATO-backed color revolution.[6]
The NEXTA Telegram channel is trying to resuscitate the weekly Saturday women’s march. NEXTA released directions on October 8 for mass attendance at the weekly women’s march planned for October 10 and instructed protesters to watch for additional directions on Saturday.[7] NEXTA did not release directions for the Saturday women’s march last week. Saturday Women’s march participation has steeply declined for the past three weeks, with only a few hundred participants on October 3.[8] NEXTA will likely continue to attempt to intensify protests against Lukashenko’s efforts to suppress them. NEXTA has explicitly praised the Kyrgyz protests by providing favorable coverage and extolling Kyrgyz protesters’ achievement of “revolution in one day.”[9]
ISW will continue monitoring the situation and providing updates.
[1] https://www.belta dot by/president/view/lukashenko-belorusy-golosovali-za-mir-i-porjadok-v-strane-i-my-objazany-vypolnit-etot-nakaz-naroda-410224-2020/[2] https://www.belta dot by/president/view/ne-nado-zdes-provodit-paralleli-lukashenko-vyskazalsja-o-sravnenii-sobytij-v-belarusi-i-kyrgyzstane-410268-2020/; https://www.rt dot com/russia/498734-belarus-color-revolution-foreign-meddling/
[3] https://www.reuters.com/article/instant-article/idUSKBN26U1J0; https://www.washingtonpost.com/worl...49bc9e-07b1-11eb-8719-0df159d14794_story.html
[4] Belarus Warning Update: Protests in Kyrgyzstan May Fuel Intensified Kremlin Action in Belarus
[5] Belarus Warning Update: Protests in Kyrgyzstan May Fuel Intensified Kremlin Action in Belarus
[6] https://www.iswresearch.org/2020/08/warning-kremlin-information-operations.html; https://www.iswresearch.org/2020/09/warning-lukashenko-deports-opposition.html; Warning: Moscow Sets Conditions for Kinetic Intervention in Belarus Through New Information Operation
[7] https://t dot me/nexta_live/11616
[8] Belarus Warning Update: Putin Seeks Belarus’ Integration with Russia via Belarusian Constitutional Amendments
[9] Belarus Warning Update: Protests in Kyrgyzstan May Fuel Intensified Kremlin Action in Belarus
ISW Blog
northern watch
TB Fanatic
Belarus Warning Update: Police Detain Demonstrators as Protests Escalate
October 13, 2020, 7:30 EDT
By George Barros
Iswresearch.org/
Belarusian authorities continued their new phase of violent escalation against protesters on October 11. Belarusian police detained at least 713 protesters on October 11, the highest single-day arrest total to date.[1]
At least one thousand protesters marched in Minsk on Monday, October 12, a higher number than most Monday protests have seen.[2] Belarusian police cracked down on these marchers with stun grenades and tear gas, detained at least 186, and flew five to six Mi-8 transport helicopters over Minsk.[3]
Some Belarusian protesters began adopting aggressive barricade tactics evocative of the 2014 Ukrainian Euromaidan for the first time on October 12 although on a much smaller scale. Several dozen protesters created street barricades with burning tires, plastic traffic barriers, and human chains to block traffic in several Minsk neighborhoods the evening of October 12.[4] Riot police dispersed and detained these protesters and dismantled barricades.[5] This escalation will likely prompt self-declared Belarusian president Alexander Lukashenko to further accelerate efforts to end protests before they can become more serious.[6]
Belarusian authorities warned they are prepared to use lethal force to suppress protests “if necessary” on October 12. Belarusian police reiterated they will not back down and claimed that protests in Minsk have become “organized and extremely radical” due to extremists seeking a color revolution. [7] Authorities likely seek to persuade protesters to stop demonstrating rather than facing more forceful security force crackdowns.
Lithuania-based Belarusian opposition leader Svitlana Tikhanouskaya demanded Lukashenko’s resignation by October 25 on October 13. Tikhanouskaya also demanded that Lukashenko free political prisoners and end police violence by October 25.[8] She threatened that protesters will take to the streets en masse to block roads and that employees of all state-owned enterprises will strike if Lukashenko does not comply.[9] Lukashenko and Russian President Vladimir Putin will likely ignore Tikhanouskaya’s demands.[10] It is unclear that Tikhanouskaya can successfully marshal mass protests and strikes after October 25 given Lukashenko’s successful efforts to control protests and strikes so far.[11]
The Kremlin suffered setbacks in the information operation surrounding its military exercises in Belarus.
Three planned participants withdrew from the Unbreakable Brotherhood Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) exercises in Belarus.[12] Armenia withdrew its participation on October 5 likely due to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.[13] Kyrgyzstan withdrew its participation on October 12 for unspecified reasons likely related to ongoing protests in Bishkek.[14] Kazakhstan downgraded its participation in the exercises by sending only seven military officers as observers.[15]
It is unclear how many foreign military personnel deployed to Belarus given last-minute Kyrgyz and Kazakh withdrawals.[16] The CSTO stated on October 7 that approximately 700 CSTO personnel would participate in Unbreakable Brotherhood after Armenia withdrew on October 5.[17] The Russian Ministry of Defense stated on October 12 approximately 140 Russian personnel – likely elements of the Samara-based Second Combined Arms Army – from Russia’s Central Military District deployed to Belarus via military transport aviation at an unspecified “earlier” time.[18] Russia similarly deployed armored vehicles, command and control, and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense (CBRN), and mine-clearing equipment to Belarus via rail at an unspecified earlier time.[19]
Putin likely meant for Unbreakable Brotherhood to demonstrate his ability to marshal many former Soviet states into a cohesive military effort. It will instead likely be a smaller-scale version of the bilateral Russia-Belarus exercises held in September—a serious setback in Russia’s hybrid efforts.
The European Union added Lukashenko to its list of sanctioned Belarusian officials on October 12.[20]
ISW will continue monitoring the situation and providing updates.
[1] https://t dot me/nexta_tv/6442; https://www.vedomosti dot ru/society/news/2020/10/12/842876-v-belorussii-aktsiyah-protesta-11-oktyabrya-zaderzhali-713-chelovek; https://www.belta dot by/incident/view/mvd-za-narushenie-zakonodatelstva-o-massovyh-meroprijatijah-11-oktjabrja-zaderzhany-713-chelovek-410572-2020/; https://t dot me/nashaniva/18395; Belarus Warning Update: Lukashenko Escalates Crackdown in Likely Response to Increased Risk of Kremlin Intervention
[2] https://ratel dot; kz/perimeter/protesty_v_belarusi_marsh_pensionerov_massovye_zaderzhanija_i_intervju_tihanovskoj; https://news.tut dot by/society/703887.html; https://news.tut dot by/society/703831.html
[3] https://news.liga dot net/world/news/siloviki-v-belarusi-razgonyali-marsh-pensionerov-s-pomoschyu-svetoshumovyh-granat-i-gaza-video; https://t dot me/nexta_tv/6438; https://t dot me/nashaniva/18395
[4] https://www.bbc.com/russian/news-54507898; https://news.liga dot net/world/news/v-minske-jgli-pokryshki-i-stroili-barrikady-siloviki-jestko-razgonyali-demonstrantov-video
[5] https://news.liga dot net/world/news/v-minske-jgli-pokryshki-i-stroili-barrikady-siloviki-jestko-razgonyali-demonstrantov-video
[6] Belarus Warning Update: Lukashenko Escalates Crackdown in Likely Response to Increased Risk of Kremlin Intervention
[7]
View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=snEieUhSTfU&feature=youtu.be;
View: https://twitter.com/franakviacorka/status/1315648487967645696;
https://t(.)me/nexta_tv/6473
[8] https://t dot me/tsikhanouskaya/261; https://meduza dot io/news/2020/10/13/svetlana-tihanovskaya-ob-yavila-vlastyam-belarusi-narodnyy-ultimatum
[9] https://t dot me/tsikhanouskaya/261; https://meduza dot io/news/2020/10/13/svetlana-tihanovskaya-ob-yavila-vlastyam-belarusi-narodnyy-ultimatum
[10] Belarus Warning Update: Protests in Kyrgyzstan May Fuel Intensified Kremlin Action in Belarus
[11] https://www.iswresearch.org/2020/10/belarus-warning-update-putin-seeks.html; Warning: Kremlin Information Operations Intensify Condition Setting for Intervention in Belarus
[12] https://function.mil dot ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12318949@egNews
[13] Belarus Warning Update: The Kremlin Will Likely Use October Military Exercises to Advance its Hybrid War in Belarus
[14] https://ru.sputnik dot kg/society/20201012/1050026946/kyrgyzstan-genshtab-odkb-ucheniya-voennosluzhaschie.html
[15] https://www.tvr dot by/news/obshchestvo/na_poligone_losvido_prodolzhaetsya_pervyy_etap_ucheniya_nerushimoe_bratstvo_2020_/; https://www.ktk dot kz/ru/newsfeed/article/2020/10/12/161398/
[16] The Kremlin-dominated Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) stated on October 7 that approximately 700 CSTO personnel will participate in annual Unbreakable Brotherhood exercises in Vitebsk, Belarus, from October 12-16. Belarus Warning Update: The Kremlin Will Likely Use October Military Exercises to Advance its Hybrid War in Belarus
[17] Belarus Warning Update: The Kremlin Will Likely Use October Military Exercises to Advance its Hybrid War in Belarus
[18] https://function.mil dot ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12318949@egNews
[19] https://function.mil dot ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12318949@egNews
[20] Belarus: EU adopts conclusions
www.iswresearch.org
October 13, 2020, 7:30 EDT
By George Barros
Iswresearch.org/
Belarusian authorities continued their new phase of violent escalation against protesters on October 11. Belarusian police detained at least 713 protesters on October 11, the highest single-day arrest total to date.[1]
At least one thousand protesters marched in Minsk on Monday, October 12, a higher number than most Monday protests have seen.[2] Belarusian police cracked down on these marchers with stun grenades and tear gas, detained at least 186, and flew five to six Mi-8 transport helicopters over Minsk.[3]
Some Belarusian protesters began adopting aggressive barricade tactics evocative of the 2014 Ukrainian Euromaidan for the first time on October 12 although on a much smaller scale. Several dozen protesters created street barricades with burning tires, plastic traffic barriers, and human chains to block traffic in several Minsk neighborhoods the evening of October 12.[4] Riot police dispersed and detained these protesters and dismantled barricades.[5] This escalation will likely prompt self-declared Belarusian president Alexander Lukashenko to further accelerate efforts to end protests before they can become more serious.[6]
Belarusian authorities warned they are prepared to use lethal force to suppress protests “if necessary” on October 12. Belarusian police reiterated they will not back down and claimed that protests in Minsk have become “organized and extremely radical” due to extremists seeking a color revolution. [7] Authorities likely seek to persuade protesters to stop demonstrating rather than facing more forceful security force crackdowns.
Lithuania-based Belarusian opposition leader Svitlana Tikhanouskaya demanded Lukashenko’s resignation by October 25 on October 13. Tikhanouskaya also demanded that Lukashenko free political prisoners and end police violence by October 25.[8] She threatened that protesters will take to the streets en masse to block roads and that employees of all state-owned enterprises will strike if Lukashenko does not comply.[9] Lukashenko and Russian President Vladimir Putin will likely ignore Tikhanouskaya’s demands.[10] It is unclear that Tikhanouskaya can successfully marshal mass protests and strikes after October 25 given Lukashenko’s successful efforts to control protests and strikes so far.[11]
The Kremlin suffered setbacks in the information operation surrounding its military exercises in Belarus.
Three planned participants withdrew from the Unbreakable Brotherhood Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) exercises in Belarus.[12] Armenia withdrew its participation on October 5 likely due to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.[13] Kyrgyzstan withdrew its participation on October 12 for unspecified reasons likely related to ongoing protests in Bishkek.[14] Kazakhstan downgraded its participation in the exercises by sending only seven military officers as observers.[15]
It is unclear how many foreign military personnel deployed to Belarus given last-minute Kyrgyz and Kazakh withdrawals.[16] The CSTO stated on October 7 that approximately 700 CSTO personnel would participate in Unbreakable Brotherhood after Armenia withdrew on October 5.[17] The Russian Ministry of Defense stated on October 12 approximately 140 Russian personnel – likely elements of the Samara-based Second Combined Arms Army – from Russia’s Central Military District deployed to Belarus via military transport aviation at an unspecified “earlier” time.[18] Russia similarly deployed armored vehicles, command and control, and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense (CBRN), and mine-clearing equipment to Belarus via rail at an unspecified earlier time.[19]
Putin likely meant for Unbreakable Brotherhood to demonstrate his ability to marshal many former Soviet states into a cohesive military effort. It will instead likely be a smaller-scale version of the bilateral Russia-Belarus exercises held in September—a serious setback in Russia’s hybrid efforts.
The European Union added Lukashenko to its list of sanctioned Belarusian officials on October 12.[20]
ISW will continue monitoring the situation and providing updates.
[1] https://t dot me/nexta_tv/6442; https://www.vedomosti dot ru/society/news/2020/10/12/842876-v-belorussii-aktsiyah-protesta-11-oktyabrya-zaderzhali-713-chelovek; https://www.belta dot by/incident/view/mvd-za-narushenie-zakonodatelstva-o-massovyh-meroprijatijah-11-oktjabrja-zaderzhany-713-chelovek-410572-2020/; https://t dot me/nashaniva/18395; Belarus Warning Update: Lukashenko Escalates Crackdown in Likely Response to Increased Risk of Kremlin Intervention
[2] https://ratel dot; kz/perimeter/protesty_v_belarusi_marsh_pensionerov_massovye_zaderzhanija_i_intervju_tihanovskoj; https://news.tut dot by/society/703887.html; https://news.tut dot by/society/703831.html
[3] https://news.liga dot net/world/news/siloviki-v-belarusi-razgonyali-marsh-pensionerov-s-pomoschyu-svetoshumovyh-granat-i-gaza-video; https://t dot me/nexta_tv/6438; https://t dot me/nashaniva/18395
[4] https://www.bbc.com/russian/news-54507898; https://news.liga dot net/world/news/v-minske-jgli-pokryshki-i-stroili-barrikady-siloviki-jestko-razgonyali-demonstrantov-video
[5] https://news.liga dot net/world/news/v-minske-jgli-pokryshki-i-stroili-barrikady-siloviki-jestko-razgonyali-demonstrantov-video
[6] Belarus Warning Update: Lukashenko Escalates Crackdown in Likely Response to Increased Risk of Kremlin Intervention
[7]
View: https://twitter.com/franakviacorka/status/1315648487967645696;
https://t(.)me/nexta_tv/6473
[8] https://t dot me/tsikhanouskaya/261; https://meduza dot io/news/2020/10/13/svetlana-tihanovskaya-ob-yavila-vlastyam-belarusi-narodnyy-ultimatum
[9] https://t dot me/tsikhanouskaya/261; https://meduza dot io/news/2020/10/13/svetlana-tihanovskaya-ob-yavila-vlastyam-belarusi-narodnyy-ultimatum
[10] Belarus Warning Update: Protests in Kyrgyzstan May Fuel Intensified Kremlin Action in Belarus
[11] https://www.iswresearch.org/2020/10/belarus-warning-update-putin-seeks.html; Warning: Kremlin Information Operations Intensify Condition Setting for Intervention in Belarus
[12] https://function.mil dot ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12318949@egNews
[13] Belarus Warning Update: The Kremlin Will Likely Use October Military Exercises to Advance its Hybrid War in Belarus
[14] https://ru.sputnik dot kg/society/20201012/1050026946/kyrgyzstan-genshtab-odkb-ucheniya-voennosluzhaschie.html
[15] https://www.tvr dot by/news/obshchestvo/na_poligone_losvido_prodolzhaetsya_pervyy_etap_ucheniya_nerushimoe_bratstvo_2020_/; https://www.ktk dot kz/ru/newsfeed/article/2020/10/12/161398/
[16] The Kremlin-dominated Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) stated on October 7 that approximately 700 CSTO personnel will participate in annual Unbreakable Brotherhood exercises in Vitebsk, Belarus, from October 12-16. Belarus Warning Update: The Kremlin Will Likely Use October Military Exercises to Advance its Hybrid War in Belarus
[17] Belarus Warning Update: The Kremlin Will Likely Use October Military Exercises to Advance its Hybrid War in Belarus
[18] https://function.mil dot ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12318949@egNews
[19] https://function.mil dot ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12318949@egNews
[20] Belarus: EU adopts conclusions
ISW Blog
northern watch
TB Fanatic
Belarus Warning Update: Putin Intensifies Russian-Belarusian Military Integration
October 27, 2020, 3:15 pm EDT
Iswresearch.org
By George Barros
Russian President Vladimir Putin achieved a major milestone in his pressure campaign to subordinate Belarus’ military to Russia. Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu and Belarusian Defense Minister Viktor Khrenin adopted a common military doctrine and announced the completed formation of Russian-Belarusian “regional grouping of forces” on October 27.[1] The formation of a Russian-Belarusian regional grouping of forces is a major achievement in Putin’s larger campaign to subordinate former Soviet states’ militaries to Russian-dominated structures.[2] The Russian State Duma first ratified the agreement to create a regional grouping of forces with Belarus in 2017.[3]
Russia is pressuring Belarus to create a unified advanced air defense system. Shoigu also stated Russia and Belarus are planning to create a “unified regional air defense system.”[4] ISW warned Putin likely seeks to deploy and control Russian anti-access/area denial weapon systems in Belarus in September.[5]
Putin will likely intensify Russian conventional military deployments to Belarus over the next year. The ministers also agreed to jointly conduct Russia’s next annual capstone strategic readiness exercise – Zapad 2021 – and signed resolutions on conducting “joint special exercises” to prepare for this exercise.[6] Russia’s Western Military District will likely conduct Zapad 2021 in western Russia and Belarus in September 2021.[7] Conventional Russian forces likely will deploy to Belarus for Zapad 2021 on a significantly larger scale than they did for Zapad 2017. Russian-Belarusian joint exercises will likely intensify in the immediate future as ISW forecasted.[8] The Kremlin has not yet announced the next Russian-Belarusian monthly exercise for November 2020.
Kremlin information operations are intensifying efforts targeting NATO. Shoigu used his meeting with Khrenin to intensify the Kremlin’s existing information operation falsely portraying the Belarusian protest movement as a NATO-backed hybrid war. Shoigu claimed the situation on Belarus’ western borders is “still turbulent” and falsely accused NATO of creating a “forward presence” and supply lines for combat operations near Belarus.[9] Shoigu also falsely accused the West of using protests to derail Russia’s and Belarus’ integration.[10]
Self-declared Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko will likely take action to defuse protests at an upcoming national Belarusian assembly. Lukashenko said on October 27 Belarusians from “all strata of society” will consider constitutional reforms and solve other problems hindering Belarus’ development at the upcoming Sixth All-Belarusian People's Assembly. Lukashenko has not announced the date for the assembly. Lukashenko likely seeks to use the assembly to conduct a putative intra-Belarusian dialogue during which Lukashenko will announce constitutional amendments or different concessions to placate protesters.[11] The Kremlin will likely intervene to prevent a solution to the protests that does not include Belarus’ deeper integration with Russia.[12]
Ultimatum protests in Minsk are decreasing. Street protests in Minsk on October 27 are significantly smaller than those of October 26.[13] Factory managers are firing striking workers and threatening to cancel their bonuses.[14] Significant numbers of students are not participating in strikes.[15] Police arrested at least 39 protesters on October 27 as of this writing.[16] Lukashenko seemingly is succeeding in suppressing ultimatum protests as ISW forecasted.[17] Lukashenko will likely replicate successes in suppressing protests barring major changes in the opposition’s strategy or tactics.
ISW will continue monitoring the situation and providing updates.
[1] https://tvzvezda dot ru/news/forces/content/202010271131-qRRUg.html
[2] http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Putin's Offset The Kremlin's Geopolitical Adaptations Since 2014.pdf
[3] https://ria dot ru/20171020/1507225598.html
[4] https://tvzvezda dot ru/news/forces/content/202010271131-qRRUg.html
[5] https://www.iswresearch.org/2020/09/belarus-warning-update-lukashenko-and.html; Warning: Lukashenko’s Security Forces Detain Belarusian Opposition Leaders
[6] https://reform dot by/175035-hrenin-nazval-uchenija-zapad-2021-glavnym-meroprijatiem-sledujushhego-goda
[7] Russia’s annual strategic joint-staff exercise usually occurs in September.
[8] https://www.iswresearch.org/2020/09/belarus-warning-update-multiple-russian.html; Russia’s Unprecedentedly Expansive Military Exercises in Fall 2020 Seek to Recreate Soviet-Style Multinational Army Without Alerting NATO
[9] https://tvzvezda dot ru/news/forces/content/202010271118-8c1LE.html
[10] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/27/10/2020/5f97ea9d9a79472722d10df4
[11] Belarus Warning Update: Putin Likely Disrupts Lukashenko’s Plan for Defusing Protests
[12] Belarus Warning Update: Putin Likely Disrupts Lukashenko’s Plan for Defusing Protests
[13] Belarus Warning Update: Lukashenko Will Likely Outlast Ultimatum Protests
[14] https://finance.tut dot by/news705528.html
[15] View: https://twitter.com/bel_fayette/status/1321047483653476352
[16] http://spring96 dot org/ru/news/100121
[17] https://www.rbc dot ru/society/27/10/2020/5f9800179a794735397f2e23; Belarus Warning Update: Lukashenko Will Likely Outlast Ultimatum Protests
www.iswresearch.org
October 27, 2020, 3:15 pm EDT
Iswresearch.org
By George Barros
Russian President Vladimir Putin achieved a major milestone in his pressure campaign to subordinate Belarus’ military to Russia. Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu and Belarusian Defense Minister Viktor Khrenin adopted a common military doctrine and announced the completed formation of Russian-Belarusian “regional grouping of forces” on October 27.[1] The formation of a Russian-Belarusian regional grouping of forces is a major achievement in Putin’s larger campaign to subordinate former Soviet states’ militaries to Russian-dominated structures.[2] The Russian State Duma first ratified the agreement to create a regional grouping of forces with Belarus in 2017.[3]
Russia is pressuring Belarus to create a unified advanced air defense system. Shoigu also stated Russia and Belarus are planning to create a “unified regional air defense system.”[4] ISW warned Putin likely seeks to deploy and control Russian anti-access/area denial weapon systems in Belarus in September.[5]
Putin will likely intensify Russian conventional military deployments to Belarus over the next year. The ministers also agreed to jointly conduct Russia’s next annual capstone strategic readiness exercise – Zapad 2021 – and signed resolutions on conducting “joint special exercises” to prepare for this exercise.[6] Russia’s Western Military District will likely conduct Zapad 2021 in western Russia and Belarus in September 2021.[7] Conventional Russian forces likely will deploy to Belarus for Zapad 2021 on a significantly larger scale than they did for Zapad 2017. Russian-Belarusian joint exercises will likely intensify in the immediate future as ISW forecasted.[8] The Kremlin has not yet announced the next Russian-Belarusian monthly exercise for November 2020.
Kremlin information operations are intensifying efforts targeting NATO. Shoigu used his meeting with Khrenin to intensify the Kremlin’s existing information operation falsely portraying the Belarusian protest movement as a NATO-backed hybrid war. Shoigu claimed the situation on Belarus’ western borders is “still turbulent” and falsely accused NATO of creating a “forward presence” and supply lines for combat operations near Belarus.[9] Shoigu also falsely accused the West of using protests to derail Russia’s and Belarus’ integration.[10]
Self-declared Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko will likely take action to defuse protests at an upcoming national Belarusian assembly. Lukashenko said on October 27 Belarusians from “all strata of society” will consider constitutional reforms and solve other problems hindering Belarus’ development at the upcoming Sixth All-Belarusian People's Assembly. Lukashenko has not announced the date for the assembly. Lukashenko likely seeks to use the assembly to conduct a putative intra-Belarusian dialogue during which Lukashenko will announce constitutional amendments or different concessions to placate protesters.[11] The Kremlin will likely intervene to prevent a solution to the protests that does not include Belarus’ deeper integration with Russia.[12]
Ultimatum protests in Minsk are decreasing. Street protests in Minsk on October 27 are significantly smaller than those of October 26.[13] Factory managers are firing striking workers and threatening to cancel their bonuses.[14] Significant numbers of students are not participating in strikes.[15] Police arrested at least 39 protesters on October 27 as of this writing.[16] Lukashenko seemingly is succeeding in suppressing ultimatum protests as ISW forecasted.[17] Lukashenko will likely replicate successes in suppressing protests barring major changes in the opposition’s strategy or tactics.
ISW will continue monitoring the situation and providing updates.
[1] https://tvzvezda dot ru/news/forces/content/202010271131-qRRUg.html
[2] http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Putin's Offset The Kremlin's Geopolitical Adaptations Since 2014.pdf
[3] https://ria dot ru/20171020/1507225598.html
[4] https://tvzvezda dot ru/news/forces/content/202010271131-qRRUg.html
[5] https://www.iswresearch.org/2020/09/belarus-warning-update-lukashenko-and.html; Warning: Lukashenko’s Security Forces Detain Belarusian Opposition Leaders
[6] https://reform dot by/175035-hrenin-nazval-uchenija-zapad-2021-glavnym-meroprijatiem-sledujushhego-goda
[7] Russia’s annual strategic joint-staff exercise usually occurs in September.
[8] https://www.iswresearch.org/2020/09/belarus-warning-update-multiple-russian.html; Russia’s Unprecedentedly Expansive Military Exercises in Fall 2020 Seek to Recreate Soviet-Style Multinational Army Without Alerting NATO
[9] https://tvzvezda dot ru/news/forces/content/202010271118-8c1LE.html
[10] https://www.rbc dot ru/politics/27/10/2020/5f97ea9d9a79472722d10df4
[11] Belarus Warning Update: Putin Likely Disrupts Lukashenko’s Plan for Defusing Protests
[12] Belarus Warning Update: Putin Likely Disrupts Lukashenko’s Plan for Defusing Protests
[13] Belarus Warning Update: Lukashenko Will Likely Outlast Ultimatum Protests
[14] https://finance.tut dot by/news705528.html
[15] View: https://twitter.com/bel_fayette/status/1321047483653476352
[16] http://spring96 dot org/ru/news/100121
[17] https://www.rbc dot ru/society/27/10/2020/5f9800179a794735397f2e23; Belarus Warning Update: Lukashenko Will Likely Outlast Ultimatum Protests
ISW Blog
northern watch
TB Fanatic
mzkitty
I give up.
WTF is this ???? It looks like they're rounding people up like cattle. 3 little videos at link.
Video - then look at the other two below it:
View: https://twitter.com/breakinglv/status/1322900750159237129
Video - then look at the other two below it:
View: https://twitter.com/breakinglv/status/1322900750159237129