WAR 05-27-2023-to-06-02-2023__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

Housecarl

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(294) 05-06-2023-to-05-12-2023__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

(295) 05-13-2023-to-05-19-2023__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

(296) 05-20-2023-to-05-26-2023__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****


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Foreign ministry dispels reports of Taiwan joining US nuclear umbrella​

Foreign minister nevertheless confirms there have been talks about nuclear umbrella​

524 Comments

By Kelvin Chen, Taiwan News, Staff Writer
2023/05/27 15:33

TAIPEI (Taiwan News) — The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) on Friday (May 26) hit back at media reports distorting Foreign Minister Joseph Wu’s (吳釗燮) statements about Taiwan and the U.S. nuclear umbrella.

On May 22, Wu confirmed there had been talks about whether the U.S. would include Taiwan under its nuclear umbrella, but did not go into further detail. The nuclear umbrella is a promise by a nuclear weapons state to provide security for a non-nuclear weapons state.

MOFA accused some media outlets of “misinterpreting the original intent and deliberately creating an impression of discord among government officials.”

“Their attempts to sow discord and undermine public confidence in the government from within are deeply regrettable,” it added.

The ministry said some media outlets have long disseminated misinformation without verification, intentionally distorting the public statements of Taiwanese and American security officials, and spreading false information. They consider U.S. assistance in strengthening Taiwan's self-defense capabilities as a provocation and view China's threats to Taiwan from Beijing’s perspective as a given, it said.

This cherry-picking of statements and malicious misinterpretation deliberately confuses public perception, damages Taiwan-U.S. relations and undermines the determination of the Taiwanese in their external affairs, MOFA said. It urged the public to put an effort into discerning right from wrong in media reports.

Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and NATO countries all fall under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. During the Cold War, Taiwan secretly launched its own research program to develop its own nuclear weapons. However, due to U.S. pressure, it ultimately halted all efforts.

Institute for National Defense and Security Research Director Su Tzu-yun (蘇紫雲) recently said that Taiwan's policy is to refrain from developing weapons of mass destruction or nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. However, if partner countries are willing to include Taiwan under a nuclear umbrella, it would serve as an extended form of deterrence, he said, adding that it would also greatly boost Taiwan's security and provide additional protection.
 

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TEMPTING TURMOIL IN SUDAN: HOW CHADIAN REBELS IN SUDAN’S CONFLICT WOULD FURTHER REGIONAL INSTABILITY​

ALEXANDRE BISH
MAY 25, 2023
COMMENTARY

Two years ago, Mahamat Mahadi Ali, better known as “Mahadi,” the rebel leader of the Front for Change and Concord in Chad, led a 600-mile incursion across the Sahara into Chadian territory from his oasis in southern Libya. Close to a thousand of his fighters braved the Sahara’s scorching sands with weapons and vehicles obtained as soldiers of fortune in Libya before their fateful encounter with the Chadian army. The battle that followed was as fierce as it was costly: hundreds of men died on both sides, including five Chadian generals and longstanding Chadian President Idriss Déby, who had personally joined the battlefield to rally his troops. After 10 grueling days of sporadic fighting and despite the loss of its chief commander, the Chadian military eventually repelled the assault. But the message to everyone watching was resoundingly clear: Chadian rebels were a force to be reckoned with, and they knew how to exploit regional instability to their advantage.

With the war in Sudan still raging, Chadian rebels are presented with a new opportunity to profit from conflict by engaging in the war economy. As these rebels grapple with how best to benefit from Sudan’s unrest, the Sahel faces the potential for even greater instability. The longer the conflict stretches on, the more likely it is these actors will be able to leverage it to their advantage. A peace agreement is urgently needed to avert further regional destabilization and humanitarian crises.

The Sahel’s Tempestuous Landscape

Sudan, Chad, and Libya share a history of political and social unrest, marked by civil wars and armed conflicts. These countries are all geographically positioned in the Sahel, a semi-arid region south of the Sahara that spans eight African countries from Senegal to Sudan and has become a hotbed for political instability, terrorism, and organized crime due to its harsh environment, porous borders, and weak governance.

The war that broke out in Sudan on April 15 served as a stark embodiment of this. The ongoing power struggle has seen the Sudanese army, under the command of General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, who is also the head of Sudan’s Transitional Military Council, fight his deputy, General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, also known as Hemeti, who leads the Rapid Support Forces. The disagreement primarily revolves around the integration and leadership structure of the Rapid Support Forces within the army, a challenge rooted in former Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir’s (ultimately failed) strategy of fragmenting security forces to prevent any potential overthrow.

The Rapid Support Forces originated as a counter-insurgency militia in Darfur and grew out of the predominantly Arab Janjaweed militia, accused of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity in the region since the early 2000s. Over time, the paramilitary group grew to become Bashir’s praetorian guard. When Bashir left power, the army and Rapid Support Forces formed a partnership to control the country, but disagreements arose due to Hemeti’s increasing influence. The crisis deepened after a coup in October 2021 and ensuing attempts at negotiating civilian rule. The conflict has now spread across the country, causing a humanitarian crisis and destabilizing the region, with no end in sight.

As the conflict rages on, the country’s immediate neighbors are also wrestling with instability. Chad, which lies directly to Sudan’s west, houses rebel and terrorist groups, including Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa Province militants in the Lake Chad region, and Libya has faced ongoing conflict in its post-Qaddafi era, which has helped provide Chadian rebels a base from which to prepare attacks against Chad.

A fascinating yet often overlooked player straddles the borders of all three countries and the dynamics that bind them: Chadian rebels based in Libya. Throughout their history, these fighters have profited from the refuge and resources offered by instability in the Sahel to further their goals and launch attacks against the Chadian government, initially from war-torn Darfur and later from post-Qaddafi Libya. Now, as a result of the conflict in Sudan, these groups, especially the Front for Change and Concord in Chad, may shift their base from Libya to Darfur, exploiting regional instability to forge new alliances, exploit lucrative illicit markets, and potentially intensify conflict dynamics, thereby straining the fragile peace between Sudan and Chad that has held since 2010.

A History of Rebellion

Several Chadian rebel groups are active in Libya and the Sahel today, primarily composed of Goran fighters, an ethnic group stretching from western to northeastern Chad, as well as Arab fighters. The Chadian government had limited successes in placating some rebel groups through nationwide talks held last year. These were perceived by many rebels as merely a show, with no genuine commitment from the government to address their underlying grievances.

Rebel groups have played a crucial role in shaping Chad’s political landscape throughout the country’s history. Most of the country’s leadership transitions since it gained independence from France in 1960 were the result of coups or rebel attacks, mostly on Chad’s capital, N’Djamena. Hissène Habré, a key figure in Chadian history who served as president from 1982 to 1990, was himself a former rebel leader. Habré came to power after his forces overthrew the government of his predecessor — another former rebel, Goukouni Oueddei. Habré’s rule, however, was marked by widespread human rights abuses, and he was later convicted for crimes against humanity, war crimes, and torture. Idriss Déby, who ousted Habré in 1990 and served as president until his death in 2021, was also a former rebel. Déby was a military advisor to Habré but later led a rebellion against him, ultimately landing in power.

These transitions, motivated by not only personal ambition but also grievances against bad governance, nepotism, and widespread poverty, highlight the challenges that Chad continues to face. Despite its substantial natural resources and relatively small population of around 17 million people, Chad persistently ranks among the lowest three countries globally on the United Nations Human Development Index. These socio-economic conditions, which have served as an impetus for Chadian rebels, reflect deep-rooted issues within the country’s socio-political fabric.

Today, Chadian fighters in the Sahel are primarily composed of veterans from the 2005–2010 Chadian rebellion, a turbulent period of armed rebellion and civil unrest in Chad sparked by widespread dissatisfaction with President Idriss Déby’s rule. They also include ex-Chadian army officers and new recruits from Chad and southern Libya who engage in violence in three main ways: as politically motivated rebels against the Chadian government, as members of apolitical armed groups involved in mercenary work or illicit activities, or as paid soldiers of fortune within existing Libyan armed structures. The boundaries between these groups are fluid, with many fighters switching groups based on living conditions and fund distribution within the groups. Their roles can also change, often alternating between combat, smuggling, banditry, and gold mining as a means to self-finance. The fluctuating roles, regular casualties, and ongoing recruitment make it challenging to accurately quantify the number of Chadian fighters. However, multiple sources suggest it to be under 7,000 men, mostly in southern Libya but also scattered across Niger, Chad, and Sudan.

The most active and menacing group today is the Front for Change and Concord in Chad, which Mahadi founded in Libya in 2016 and whose incursion in 2021 was the most serious rebel challenge to Chad’s government in over 13 years. The vehicles and weapons used in the attack were accumulated through years of mercenary work in Libya. Based in Jufra, in central Libya, Mahadi’s rebels fought alongside the Libyan Arab Armed Forces, a military faction led by warlord Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar, during his campaign on Tripoli between 2019 and 2020. This affiliation allowed the rebel group to gain training and armament, as well as communication lines — and, potentially, support — from forces affiliated with Haftar. These forces include the Wagner Group, a Kremlin-backed private military company known not only for its operations in Ukraine but also for spearheading Russia’s covert military expansion in Africa, which also had a presence in Jufra. They also include the United Arab Emirates, which has been very active in the war in Libya and supplied armaments to the Jufra military airbase under the control of Mahadi’s forces. A plane belonging to the notorious Blackwater private military company was also spotted in the Chadian rebel-controlled airbase. Blackwater is led by Erik Prince, a prominent supporter of Donald Trump who orchestrated an unsuccessful $80 million military operation for Haftar in Libya.

Continued.....
 

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Continued.....

Since their offensive two years ago, Mahadi and his rebel forces have managed to rearm and regroup into a force of approximately 800–900 fighters, according to sources within the rebellion. A portion of the Chadian fighters are fresh recruits drawn from the region’s goldfields. As many as 150,000 young Chadian men have emigrated from across Chad to the Libyan border in search of gold amid a gold rush that started over a decade ago, fueled by soaring gold prices.

While the number of fighters may seem small, groups of this size have represented the most significant threats in Chad’s recent history. The April 2021 incursion culminating in Déby’s death was carried out by a similar number of fighters. Timane Erdimi, the leader of the rebel Union of Resistance Forces, told me, following his own group’s February 2019 incursion into eastern Chad from Libya, that his operation involved fewer than 1,000 men and 40 to 50 pickup trucks. It ultimately took France’s Mirage 2000 aircraft over three days to halt his fighters, 300 miles into Chadian territory, following earlier unsuccessful efforts by the Chadian army.

Shifting from Libya to Sudan

Like Libya, Sudan also plays a critical role in the complex dynamics of the Chadian rebellion. Rebel groups already have a well-established footprint in Sudan’s western region of Darfur, a conflict-ridden area long plagued by ethnic tensions and violence. Before creating his rebel group, Mahadi was the secretary general of the Union of Forces for Democracy and Development, another rebel group based in Darfur before its relocation to Libya in 2010. In February 2008, with the financial and material support of now-ousted president Omar al-Bashir, this group launched one of the most significant incursions in Chad’s history, reaching the capital, N’Djamena. They were only stopped with French intervention.

In 2010, Chad and Sudan struck a peace deal that created a joint border force to eliminate rebels from the area. Both countries also agreed to stop funding rebels fighting each other’s governments, which meant that Chadian rebel groups lost their safe haven and funding streams in Sudan. Conveniently, the 2011 Libyan revolution broke out the following year, and the ensuing war in Libya offered these groups opportunities to fight as mercenaries in that conflict. Over the past decade, Chadian rebel groups have made Libya their new home.

Libya, however, has begun to lose its appeal for these fighters just as the conflict and chaos in Sudan have created the possibility for them to relocate their operations there. Chadian rebels have had reduced incentives to stay in Libya since the October 2020 Libyan cease-fire agreement, which ultimately lowered opportunities for mercenary work. One of the key features of the peace agreement was — in the words of the then-acting head of the UN mission in Libya — “the departure of all mercenaries and foreign fighters from Libyan territory, air, land, and seas.”

As a result, Chadian fighters have increased their involvement in Sahelian criminal economies, including drugs, arms, and car smuggling. Chadian fighters are often described by locals in southern Libya, where they are now based, as “bandits.” Given the cease-fire agreement and ongoing competition over resources and territorial control, local militias in southern Libya are likely to adopt policing roles to gain legitimacy locally by chasing out Chadian rebel groups.

The Lure of Darfur

Meanwhile, Darfur is becoming ever more attractive for these groups. In Sudan, they could gain a potential new alliance and funding stream, similar to the one that rebels had with former Sudanese president Bashir. Ethnically Goran and Arab Chadian rebels, including those within the Front for Change and Concord in Chad, are likely to align themselves with General Hemeti’s Arab-dominated Rapid Support Forces, one of the two main belligerents in Sudan’s ongoing power struggle. Rebels from the Front for Change and Concord in Chad also have experience fighting alongside Darfurian fighters in Libya, which could also facilitate their relocation. Alliances, however, are never set in stone. In Libya, Chadian fighters crossed battle lines, aligning with rival factions for the right price.

While Hemeti’s current focus is primarily on consolidating his power in Khartoum rather than on supporting his family in Chad — Hemeti’s cousin is a senior Chadian presidential advisor — his interests in Darfur coincide with those of the Goran and Arab Chadian rebels. They have common adversaries, including the Zaghawa rebel groups who share a common ethnicity with Chad’s ruling Déby family and most of the Chadian army. They also share allies, including Haftar’s Libyan Arab Armed Forces and the Russian Wagner group. As Hemeti deploys more soldiers from Darfur to Khartoum, Chadian rebels could help secure his operational bases in Darfur and receive financial compensation and battlefield loot, including weapons and armored vehicles, in a similar arrangement to the one they had with Haftar in Libya. Hemeti would make a valuable ally for these groups, and the rebels could potentially permanently relocate to Sudan should he triumph.

Darfur is also particularly attractive due to its proximity to Chad’s capital, N’Djamena — a two-day drive, compared to the five-day drive from Libya. This proximity could facilitate both potential incursions and access to lucrative illicit markets linking Libya, Chad, and Sudan, similar to those Chadian fighters have already exploited in Libya over the past decade. The region is a key transit hub for arms, drugs, fuel, and car smuggling, and El Radoom region in south Darfur is also an important producer of cannabis that is trafficked across the region. Darfur is also home to several important goldfields, which have already been exploited by the Wagner Group and the Rapid Support Forces. Chadian fighters could participate in these economies, either through direct involvement, protection, or by preying upon them, including through hijacking convoys or attacking traffickers. Arms smuggling along well-established corridors linking Sudan to Libya and Chad is especially expected to experience a boon with the intensification of the conflict. The porous nature of the Sahel’s borders means this will be felt not only in Sudan, Libya, and Chad, but also as far as Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Nigeria. These weapons could fall into the hands of violent extremists who are disputing territories in those countries as well.

A Troubled Road Ahead

Chadian rebel involvement in Sudan would also likely result in an intensification of the conflict in Darfur, which could have dire humanitarian consequences. An increase in flows of asylum seekers and refugees into neighboring countries, including Chad, Niger, and Libya, would further exacerbate the existing refugee crisis in the Sahel region, which would in turn strain resources, create tensions between host communities and refugees, and pose challenges to the countries receiving the displaced populations. With millions of people already displaced across the region, further displacement could exacerbate an already volatile situation.

The intensified conflict in Sudan is also complicating the relatively peaceful coexistence between Sudan and Chad since 2010. Hemeti and General Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno, president of Chad’s Transitional Military Council — the governing body established following his father’s death — are likely to approach their alliances with caution given the potential for conflict reescalation. They must form effective alliances that maximize available war actors, including these rebel groups, without sparking a larger-scale conflict, as any alliance with the other’s adversaries could be seen as a declaration of war. Despite having ties to both sides of the conflict in Sudan, Déby’s government has chosen not to declare allegiance to either one. Instead, the Chadian government is attempting to position itself as a mediator in the conflict — at least officially.

However, the conflict in Sudan could lead Hemeti into alliances that could challenge his relationship with the Chadian leader, Déby. Recently leaked U.S. intelligence documents alleged that the Wagner Group, suspected of collaborating with Hemeti, also attempted to recruit Chadian rebels and create a training facility in the neighboring Central African Republic, with the objective of overthrowing the Chadian government. If true, the Wagner Group could similarly attempt to exploit the Front for Change and Concord in Chad or another rebel group to promote an incursion into Chad from the eastern flank, as part of its regional strategy of destabilizing Sahelian countries. Hemeti’s alliance with the paramilitary organization could be seen as a direct threat to Deby’s government.

It is important to consider, however, the role of the Chadian authorities in this complex landscape. Historically, N’Djamena has a track record of leveraging security threats to attract increased Western support. This strategy helps to bolster their international position, despite their shortcomings in governance and human rights practices. Any international assistance in combating rebel and foreign influences in Chad, therefore, should not be an open-ended commitment, but should happen under clearly defined conditions.

A sustainable peace process is critical to stopping the conflict in Sudan from spilling throughout the region, and international partners should step in and act decisively to help achieve this. There are several tools that can be used — in addition to diplomacy — to deny the legitimacy of key military figures like Hemeti and Burhan, whose roles and actions are destabilizing the country. First, concerted efforts to disrupt war financing are vital. The United States, the European Union, and its member states should leverage their knowledge of the financial systems in play to target the networks and structures that fund the warring factions. Imposing targeted sanctions and freezing assets are crucial to dismantling the economic networks that fuel the war effort, both now and in the future. Moreover, these partners should use influence held over the generals’ regional allies — including in Libya, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia — to take tangible actions, like cutting weapons and fuel supplies, which could compel these generals’ forces to retreat. The longer the international community fails to act, and the longer the conflict in Sudan is allowed to drag on, the more likely it is that actors like the Chadian rebels and Russian mercenaries will benefit from it. By employing these strategic measures, the international community can change the military factions’ calculus and bring about a genuine negotiation for peace to help slow the renewed humanitarian crisis already unfolding.



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Alexandre Bish has followed security dynamics in Chad and the Sahel for the past seven years. He is the author of several publications on the Chadian rebellion, including Soldiers of Fortune: The Future of Chadian Fighters After the Libyan Ceasefire. He is currently a visiting scholar at Yale University and an PhD candidate at University College London. He has worked for the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, the European Union and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.
 

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French military intelligence office reorganizing post-Ukraine, with ‘360 degree’ threat analysis

French Maj. Gen. Cyril Carcy told Breaking Defense that his intelligence office can "no longer focus on a 60-degree angle between Western Africa and the Middle-East dictated by the fight against terrorism."​

By MURIELLE DELAPORTE on May 26, 2023 at 12:06 PM

PARIS — In the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, France’s military intelligence agency is undergoing a series of reforms to try and close coordination gaps and stay ahead of future military activities, whether in Europe or elsewhere in the world, a top officer tells Breaking Defense.

French Maj. Gen. Cyril Carcy is a former Defense Attaché to the embassy in Washington and now serves as Deputy Director of the French Military Intelligence Directorate (DRM for “Direction du renseignement militaire”). He told Breaking Defense in a recent interview that the Ukraine conflict has forced a broadening of his office’s focus areas.

“Reinforced since February 24th, 2022, we no longer focus on a 60-degree angle between Western Africa and the Middle-East dictated by the fight against terrorism, but we constantly look around with a 360-degree spectrum, not only geographically-speaking, but also with the integration of space, cyber and underwater domains,” Carcy said.


Preparing for Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) means being able to provide multi-domain anticipation and connectivity. “Producing upgraded intelligence of military interest” in the fastest and most accurate way possible is the goal of the DRM, Carcy said, which is helping drive a series of reforms in the agency.

In addition to the above-mentioned change of focus, one major shift is connecting collection experts and data-miners on the one hand, and analysts on the other hand, into “intelligence fusion cells” that should provide a more organic intelligence assessment. Until a few months ago, those two categories of personnel were geographically split between the Air Force base of Creil outside Paris (for the dataminers) and the Ministry of the Armed forces located in Balard in the center of the capital (for the analysts).


There are still a lot of challenges associated with the reform — such as human resources restructuring and IT system modernization — but results are already being felt in terms of the quality and speed of delivery of the intelligence provided and its impact on the success of operations.

Change is driven by the DRM’s belief that one of the biggest lessons from the Ukraine conflict is the importance of good intelligence for efficient Command and Control (C2) for accurate targeting as well as strategic communication — both part of deterrence and useful for de-escalation purposes. avoiding escalation.




Carcy highlighted the fact that Ukraine’s success so far has been reliant on a structured C2 and incredible agility, in addition to Western long-range equipment (such as the U.S. HIMARS and the French Caesars) and Western intelligence. Russia, on the other hand, has suffered from the outset from a lack of precision targeting and an inability to anticipate.

“If Russia has a genuine strategic depth on its own, especially crucial as far as the regeneration of its military equipment and troops is concerned, Ukraine has been benefitting from the strategic depth the support of some fifty-plus states brings to the battlefield,” Carcy said.

The future will tell, but the 2022 Ukrainian campaign might serve for Russian military planners as a wake up call for having good and reliable intelligence — a lesson the French took away from the first Gulf War. Indeed, it was a lack of both large-scale operations and joint organization the French armed forces experienced in that conflict that prompted the creation of the DRM in 1992, as well as the massive investments made since then in space-based capabilities.

In the past thirty years, the ability to exploit the information gathered from a wide variety of sources — or “strategic sensors,” as Carcy calls pathways like ELINT, SIGINT, IMINT/GEOMINT and HUMINT) — in order to provide reliable and verifiable intelligence changed the dynamic of operations, as well as the relations of the French military with its allies, especially with the United States. While France is not part of the Five Eyes intelligence sharing pact, bilateral exchanges of information at the highest classified level now occur between Paris and Washington on a regular basis via the Lafayette Committee created in the aftermath of the Bataclan terrorist attacks in 2015.

Bundeswehr erhält 18 neue Leopard 2-Panzer
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Germany buys 18 Leopard 2A8 main battle tanks to replace those sent to Ukraine

The contract includes an option for an addition 105 tanks, in what would reportedly be a $3.2 billion purchase should the government proceed with the whole lot.
By TIM MARTIN


“Western allies are particularly attentive to the high intensity war occurring in Ukraine. This accurate observation will undeniably lead to an update of the TTPs [Tactics, Training and Procedures] accordingly to favor more flexibility, more agility, more C2 decentralization, more redundancy, more stocks, more mass — indeed, as the famous saying attributed to Joseph Stalin goes ‘quantity has a quality all its own’ — and so on,” Carcy said.

Ultimately, however, Carcy came back to the idea his department needs a “360 degree” view of the world — and that includes not getting locked just on Ukraine, as important as that ongoing conflict is.

“The concern is of course that the longer this war of attrition lasts, the more it will benefit Moscow, while the undermining of the global order and balance exacerbates conquering prospects and temptations by competitive players on the international scene, endangering not only our homelands, but also our overseas territories” he said. “This is why it is absolutely essential to ‘zoom out’ from Ukraine, so we are not overtaken by surprise.”

Among the issues DRM is keeping track of: “the Wagner Group’s predation strategy in Central Africa and in Mali; Russia’s circumvention of western sanctions; Russia’s efforts to find suppliers of artillery ammunition [and] Russian military activity outside Ukraine,” Carcy said.
 

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Radical or Ridiculous? | T-14 Armata | Tank Chats #171

RT 19:59
View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MfCG0bNxVL4&ab_channel=TheTankMuseum


246,451 views May 26, 2023
In this Tank Chat, David Willey takes a detailed look at a vehicle that has garnered significant interest and controversy - The Russian T-14 Armata. David explores why this vehicle draws so much attention, and how it has taken a radical departure from previous Soviet design philosophy.

Support The Tank Museum & Get great perks:
► Patreon: The Tank Museum | Creating tank videos and other tank history related digital cont | Patreon
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00:00 | Intro
00:47 | Soviet Tank History
09:58 | Armata Family
11:17 | T-14 Features
15:27 | Production

#tankmuseum #t14armata #armata #davidwilley
 

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US Confident in Its Nuclear Stockpile, White House Official Says​

June 02, 2023 3:08 PM
WASHINGTON —
The United States says it does not plan on building more nuclear weapons to counter threats from Russia, China and a growing number of adversaries who have or who could soon have nuclear capabilities.

Instead, Washington plans to modernize its existing nuclear arsenal and continue to invest in cutting-edge technologies to keep adversaries in check, according to White House national security adviser Jake Sullivan. He said the administration also would keep open the possibility of talks to prevent a new nuclear arms race.

"The United States does not need to increase our nuclear forces to outnumber the combined total of our competitors in order to successfully deter them," Sullivan told an audience in Washington on Friday.

“Effective deterrence means that we have a better approach, not a more approach,” he said during a speech to the Arms Control Association. "We believe in the current context we have the number and type of capabilities today that we need.”

Sullivan’s comments came as both Russia and China have either rejected or ignored calls for arms control and nuclear talks despite growing tensions.

Russian President Vladimir Putin announced in February that he was suspending Moscow’s participation in the New START treaty, calling the deal absurd given U.S. and Western military aid to Ukraine. None of that aid has involved nuclear weapons.

The deal, signed in 2010, limits the U.S. and Russia to 1,550 deployed nuclear warheads each while providing for each country to inspect the other’s nuclear sites.

FILE - Russian President Vladimir Putin at a meeting in Moscow on Jan. 5, 2023. Putin announced this week he will suspend Russia's participation in the New START treaty, which limits the number of warheads deployed by Russia and the United States.
SEE ALSO:

Nuclear Arms Race Fears as Russia Suspends Treaty​


The U.S. military, meanwhile, estimates China has more than 400 nuclear warheads and is poised to have 1,500 warheads by 2035.

FILE - In this photo from Xinhua News Agency, aircraft of the Eastern Theater Command of the Chinese People's Liberation Army train near Taiwan Island, Aug. 7, 2022. A Pentagon report says China has increased unsafe military behavior toward the U.S. and its allies.
SEE ALSO:

China Owns 400 Nuclear Warheads, According to Pentagon Report​


U.S. officials have also raised concerns about Beijing’s refusal to agree to arms control talks.

Sullivan, however, said the U.S. holds out some hope that such talks are possible, and that Washington was ready to talk separately to both Moscow and Beijing “without preconditions.”

He also noted that while Russia suspended its participation in the New START treaty, it has also said it is willing to abide by some of the treaty’s key tenets, “indicating a potential willingness to continue limiting strategic nuclear forces through 2026.”

And Sullivan said there is precedent for such talks despite tensions and conflicts elsewhere, such as in Ukraine.

“I can't predict exactly what Vladimir Putin will do,” he said. “But there is a track record of our two countries being capable of engaging in these kinds of discussions in a way that serves our respective national interest and the broader common interests.”

As for China, Sullivan urged leaders in Beijing to engage with the U.S. on arms control.

“The very first thing that is necessary is for us to get this conversation going in a real way,” he said. “The PRC could make the bold decision to engage directly with the United States in discussions of strategic stability and nuclear risk, and that it would be the responsible thing to do for the benefit of our two countries and, as I said before, for the benefit of the wider world.”

But whether Chinese leaders will see the need for such discussions remains to be seen.

"They've not been willing to talk," John Kirby, the National Security Council coordinator for strategic communications, said in a press call Friday in response to a question from VOA.

"They've not been willing to engage in a meaningful way with arms control,” he added. “That doesn't mean that we're not going to continue to make the case that it's important.”

China’s military, in particular, has repeatedly ignored or denied requests for calls by U.S. defense officials, though other high-level meetings have taken place.

Sullivan met with a senior Chinese official in Vienna in early May, with the U.S. describing the discussion as “candid, substantive and constructive.”

New: White House Nat'l Security Adviser
@JakeSullivan46
met w/#China's Wang Yi, director of the Office of the Foreign Affairs Commission, in #Vienna "The two sides had candid, substantive, and constructive discussions on key issues" per readout, including on #Russia-#Ukraine


Image

7:08 AM · May 11, 2023
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There were also high-level talks last month between U.S. and Chinese intelligence officials, with CIA Director William Burns traveling to Beijing.

Burns “emphasized the importance of maintaining open lines of communication in intelligence channels," a U.S. official told VOA, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss the spy chief’s travel.

Burns’ trip was first reported by the Financial Times.

VOA White House Bureau Chief Patsy Widakuswara contributed to this report.
 

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PROVE IT BEFORE YOU USE IT: NUCLEAR RETALIATION UNDER UNCERTAINTY​

JOHNATHAN FALCONE, JONATHAN RODRIGUEZ CEFALU, MICHAEL KNEESHAW, AND MAARTEN BOS
JUNE 1, 2023
COMMENTARY

It is 2028, and the United States Space Force’s early warning radar modernization is complete. Technical Sergeant Jack Nichols works at Buckley Space Force Base operating systems that detect and assess ballistic missile threats against the United States and Canada. Since arriving at the Colorado base, Nichols has experienced his share of false alarms. However, these are no ordinary false alarms; the system Nichols watches provides early warning that the United States is under ballistic missile attack. While these existential alerts would distress most, he maintains an “old school” validation protocol: He evaluates the warning against his sensor’s input settings and raw data output, resolving any concerns.

But today, the warning that flashed across his screen was different. Recent modernization efforts introduced next-generation sensors and machine learning–powered tools to manage the increased flow of information. These purported improvements made the raw data inaccessible to Tech Sgt. Nichols. The system had identified an incoming missile, but he couldn’t help but wonder: What if this was a mistake? What if the system had been hacked or had malfunctioned? And, just as unsettling, what if the newly implemented algorithm had made a decision based on flawed or biased data?

To some extent, his concerns do not matter. His training dictates that he has less than two minutes to evaluate and report the warning. This expediency ensures the president maintains the option to launch a retaliatory nuclear strike before an adversary’s weapon — if a first-strike weapon is, in fact, inbound — strikes the American homeland. Nichols understood that the president’s decision to retaliate requires balancing the inherent limitations of early warning accuracy with the concern that presidential control may be lost if the warning turns out to be true. But, he wondered, could the pressure from this uncertainty be alleviated if the president could issue a delayed order?

A New Nuclear Era

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s threats to deploy tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine as well as North Korea’s provocative ballistic missile testing have renewed concerns about the possibility of nuclear escalation. Meanwhile, China’s burgeoning submarine-launched deterrent capability and Iran’s rebuilding of its nuclear capability have provided additional reasons for concern.

This unease is exacerbated by the advanced offensive capabilities in cyberspace demonstrated by these same actors. U.S. adversaries, such as Russia and China, have targeted critical national infrastructure, including electrical grids and nuclear facilities. Perhaps what is most destabilizing is that these adversaries are incentivized to hide their capabilities until they are ready to be used, so the true extent of the cyber-nuclear threat is unknown.

Given this security environment, the Biden administration continues the push to modernize the nation’s nuclear deterrent. This modernization effort includes investing in the capacity and hardening of the nuclear command, control, and communications architecture. Furthermore, it potentially entails the integration of machine learning systems and other emerging technologies — despite objections from experts writing in these virtual pages — as outlined in the Nuclear Posture Review.

However, as the hypothetical vignette in our introduction illustrates, modernizing equipment and systems may not be enough to achieve the administration’s goals of “non-use and to reduce the risk of a nuclear war.” President Biden — and any future U.S. leader — still retains the “launch-under-attack” option. In this approach, when early warning sensor data indicates a “medium or high confidence” of a threat, the White House is alerted, and the president and their advisors convene. At this emergency conference, the president will be briefed their options and decide whether or not to launch nuclear weapons, even if the warning’s legitimacy is not conclusively determined.

This approach is a remnant of the Cold War. We argue it is inadequate in today’s strategic landscape, given the proliferation of nuclear weapons and cyber capabilities, as well as the technical limitations and human biases associated with the use of automated and machine learning systems. Instead, we argue that this administration should break from its predecessors and adopt a “decide-under-attack” posture. This action would shift the retaliation posture from a time-constrained decision in the fog of war to deliberate action based on evidence of an attack.

Cold War Posture Endures

In the 1970s, the United States was concerned that the Soviet Union could launch a surprise attack using thousands of land-based missiles against then-vulnerable Minuteman missiles and command and control nodes. The concern was that after this attack, the United States would be unable to retaliate with nuclear weapons. To deter this threat and maximize response options, a launch-under-attack posture was adopted in 1979. Under this posture, Minuteman missiles were required to launch within 30 minutes of receiving reliable warning that the United States was under attack. Later, in the 1980s, submarine-launched ballistic missiles were also configured to this posture.

This policy was extended even after the fall of the Soviet Union. Planners determined that an effective counterstrike required, at minimum, a five-minute launch sequence. This left the remaining 25 minutes for satellite and radar detection, operator assessment, communication to the president, and a nuclear-use decision. These time constraints encouraged successive U.S. administrations to maintain the launch-under-attack policy.

However, simulations by Massachusetts Institute of Technology researchers have demonstrated that hundreds of silo-based Minuteman missiles would likely survive a first strike. In fact, according to recent analysis published on this platform, the United States would maintain “more warheads per retaliatory target than before the Russian strike,” weakening the primary rationale for the posture. This somewhat puzzling result is due to the survivability of U.S. silo-based missiles and the fact that there will be fewer military targets remaining, since many Russian missile silos will be empty after a first strike.

“Launch-Under-Attack” in a Complex World

A launch-under-attack posture exposes the United States to an increased risk of accidental or mistaken launch in the modern nuclear era. To be available as an option, launch-under-attack relies on accurate warning data and a viable launch capability. The follow-on corollary is that to be effective in its deterrence role, adversaries must believe that a first strike would be detected and retaliatory weapons would be employed. Underpinning these capabilities is the nuclear command, control, and communications architecture. But unlike during much of the Cold War, modernized command and control systems are more reliant on computers and thus are susceptible to cyber exploitation. This is a significant risk when combined with an outdated retaliatory option, as it impacts incentives for preemptive or retaliatory nuclear launch decision-making.

Two cyber risks are routinely discussed in policy circles. First, critical hardware and software components may be compromised in supply chains. Adversaries can introduce malware or malicious code to digital and automation components to infiltrate both networked and non-networked elements of communications systems. If U.S. nuclear systems were compromised by a supply chain attack, it could either undermine the national command authority’s confidence in its second-strike capability or, from the adversary’s perspective, reduce the risk of a retaliatory strike.

The second cyber risk is spoofing, which involves the injection of false data into key computer-mediated systems. Spoofing can take two forms in early warning systems: hiding actual inbound missiles or creating fake signals of inbound missiles. The former is more likely to originate from a nuclear peer in an effort to further compress Washington’s decision-making window by obfuscating early warning data in hopes of increasing the effectiveness of a first strike. The latter, on the other hand, is more likely to be injected by a non-peer or terrorist group aiming to manipulate global perceptions of American brinkmanship or trigger catalytic nuclear war between two or more powers.

During a crisis, cyber vulnerabilities can increase the risk of a preemptive strike or a mistaken launch. This is because cyber attacks can disrupt critical systems, which can reduce trust in early warning and second-strike capabilities. Additionally, such attacks can create confusion and make it difficult to distinguish between a genuine attack and a false alarm, potentially resulting in a mistaken launch from the side that thinks it is under nuclear attack. The launch-under-attack posture exacerbates this problem because it requires a decision to be made. Even if the president opts for nonretaliatory measures, this is still a deliberate choice amidst the prevailing uncertainty.

The rationale for this posture has also been challenged by proliferation, which has driven increased demands on technical systems. When the launch-under-attack posture was first implemented, there were only two major nuclear powers. This is not the case today. The 2022 Nuclear Posture Review recognizes both Russia and China as major nuclear powers and strategic competitors. In the absence of strategic intelligence suggesting an imminent first strike, the already short decision timeline is further compressed by the need to collate early warning system detection with ever-growing sets of radar and intelligence data. Command, control, and communications systems — particularly early warning system components — that are modernized and integrate machine learning will help alleviate some of this information-induced pressure. However, technical limitations and human biases introduce additional risks.

Fundamental to machine learning systems are the data and algorithms that train the system. Data, which is used to train algorithms, can be poisoned or biased, while the algorithms themselves may produce results of indeterminable quality. Moreover, training machine learning systems based on infrequent occurrences is challenging. In the case of implementing machine learning tools for early warning systems, the infrequency of missile launches poses a unique challenge for training these systems. And in the absence of real-world data, simulations will be used to generate the necessary data sets. Effective simulation data will rely on intelligence about adversary delivery capabilities. Inaccurate intelligence risks creating bias in the system’s training, and there may be insufficient opportunities to validate the models using real-world events.

Continued.....
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Continued.....

Accurately assessing nuclear capabilities is a challenge because intelligence is fallible, and open source data reveals only so much. But these assessments and the follow-on technical challenges may be more pronounced in a scenario where the primary nuclear threat is temporarily a non-peer, like North Korea. If a machine learning system is overtrained on particular data, it can make inaccurate predictions when presented with new information. For example, if early warning systems are overtrained on data from known Russian and Chinese capabilities, the model may misclassify sensor data from a new North Korean capability. More generally, proliferation — to include both new states developing nuclear weapons and existing powers expanding capabilities — generates greater uncertainty in model outputs. This uncertainty may make it more difficult for decision-makers to assess a threat.

Compounding these technical weaknesses is an operator’s tendency to overestimate the system’s accuracy, particularly as operators are further removed from the original data. For instance, when an operator interprets radar data, they will determine whether a missile is there or not. When an algorithm performs this interpretation, it may simply output whether an attack is in progress or not. Again, because actual events are infrequent, a system will frequently and correctly evaluate “no attack,” convincing operators and decision-makers that the system is more accurate than it is. This can lead to an overconfidence dubbed automation bias, and it is especially prevalent in military settings due to training and organizational trust. The human-machine interaction at the operator level, combined with the launch-under-attack option for the president, are conducive to facilitating a positive launch decision, even without certainty of a threat.

Building Resiliency Through Policy

The Swiss cheese model of accident causation is a risk management tool used in a variety of industries. The model uses a slice of cheese to represent individual safeguards. Each safeguard has inherent weaknesses, which are portrayed by the holes in each slice. In the visual analogy, by stacking multiple slices of cheese together, the likelihood of an unwanted outcome is reduced. Ideally, enough cheese slices are stacked so that the holes do not align, and threats are thwarted.

In the U.S. nuclear architecture, multiple safeguards are stacked to prevent weaknesses in each component from aligning. However, the launch-under-attack posture creates an opportunity for system weaknesses to align by creating incentives to overly trust early warning systems, which is where the nuclear-use decision chain begins. Even as just an option, the president will face a “premium on haste in a crisis” to launch from a high confidence warning, or otherwise face the strategic and political repercussions of indecision. Thus, the posture’s mere availability paradoxically constrains the president’s decision-making process, which is informed by vulnerable machine-produced data in a time-compressed, high-stress environment.

Decide-Under-Attack in the Electronic Environment

The current retaliatory posture must consider two factors: first, the inherent and increasing vulnerability of systems that inform decision-making, and second, the fundamental importance of presidential control in U.S. nuclear policy. It is crucial for a retaliatory posture to ensure the availability of weapons and command and control from the use decision to execution.

Retired Adm. James Winnefeld, former commander of North American Aerospace Defense Command, proposed an approach that better balances deterrence and safety. This posture, called “decide-under-attack,” introduces a delayed response option to reduce the time pressure inflicted by launch-under-attack.

Ultimately, an attack warning will prove to be real or false. But the president will decide whether to launch weapons or not without knowing if it is the former or latter. Among the four possible scenarios, two outcomes must be avoided. The first would be that the president fails to launch when an attack warning is real. The second would be an irretrievable retaliatory strike even though the warning is false. The cyber- and system-based vulnerabilities highlight the uncertainty inherent in the information that feeds this decision-making process. And due to the induced time constraints, a launch-under-attack posture increases the likelihood of these unwanted outcomes.

Decide-under-attack improves upon launch-under-attack by allowing the president to opt for a delayed response. This option extends the reach of command and control and reduces the pressure caused by uncertainty and time constraints. Upon receiving a warning, the president can choose to order specific or all components of the nuclear triad to execute a delayed attack. For example, the president may decide to ready the submarine- and land-launched components while keeping the long-range bombers grounded to minimize the potential for escalation if the warning proves false.

In a scenario where the president has a higher degree of confidence that the warning is real and is concerned about the survivability of the land and sea components, they may also order the strategic aircraft to take flight. Even if it is a real warning and the president becomes incapacitated (or communications are lost), weapons would be available and the command and control concept would be intact, enabling a retaliatory strike.

However, if the warning proves false, the president can cancel the strike. The risk of a premature decision is reduced because the president knows that the order could still be carried out even in the event of their death or disrupted communications. Decide-under-attack effectively addresses the risk of mistaken launch in today’s posture by pivoting the retaliation decision from time-constrained to proof-based.

Furthermore, the proposed posture serves as a deterrent to adversaries with cyber capabilities. A strategic adversary could launch a real strike and use cyber-based tactics to induce additional uncertainty. This heightened uncertainty may overwhelm the president, making it difficult to initiate a retaliatory response. Consequently, this situation may create incentives for adversaries to launch a first strike. However, if adversaries believe that a delayed retaliatory response is likely, the incentive to launch such a cyber-nuclear attack is reduced.

Other actors, namely terrorists with cyber capabilities, may try to provoke a preemptive launch by fabricating a false signal. The decide-under-attack posture addresses this by delaying the response until there is greater evidence, such as additional sensor correlation or confirmation of weapons impact. A potential weakness of this approach would be if an adversary could convincingly deliver a false signal across multiple systems to provoke a launch order and then disrupt communications. However, the time delay, combined with the availability of alternative communications methods (since the warning was false), adds layers of resilience to prevent a mistaken launch.

Moreover, this approach accounts for system and human biases that could potentially lead to actions based on a false warning, which have been the sources of near-accidental or mistaken launches. As such, the decide-under-attack option builds resiliency by expanding the decision space. That space can be used to recall an order, modify an order to achieve a proportional response, or validate the inbound weapon’s origin. This posture not only increases the credibility of Washington’s retaliatory capability but also accounts for false nuclear alarms caused by anything from equipment malfunction and algorithmic error to deliberate spoofing and human fallibility.

Conclusion

Returning to the scene at Buckley Space Force Base: Tech Sgt. Nichols stared at the warning on his console. For a moment he wondered if this was his Colonel Petrov moment, a Soviet officer credited with “saving the world” when he deliberately failed to act on an erroneous report of an incoming American strike. But unlike the dilemma facing the Soviet colonel, Nichols knew that modern nuclear brinkmanship was more complex than ever before, with many different nuclear actors and the constant threat of terrorism. And although he knew that advanced systems were imperfect, who was he to question the machine?

Fortunately, Tech Sgt. Nichols had been briefed on a new launch policy. The president had abandoned the old launch-under-attack posture for a decide-under-attack approach. This meant that before any nuclear exchange began, the retaliatory decision would give greater weight to proof than “time to impact” of an inbound threat. He was assured that he could report the notification and then take additional time to verify its origin, validity, and accuracy without fear that it would be too late to alter his original report. This renewed his confidence in the systems, both machine and human, that are responsible for the world’s safety.



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Johnathan Falcone is an active-duty U.S. Navy officer currently serving as a chief engineer in the Littoral Combat Ship program. He was awarded the 2022 Alfred Thayer Mahan Literary Award by the Navy League of the United States and is a graduate of the Princeton School of Public and International Affairs and Yale University. @jdfalc1

Jonathan Rodriguez Cefalu is the founder and Chairman of Preamble, Inc., a company on a mission to provide ethical guardrails for AI systems. Jonathan holds a computer science degree, with honors, from Stanford University. He created the Snapchat Spectacles augmented reality glasses when his first startup Vergence Labs was acquired by Snap Inc. in 2014.

Michael Kneeshaw is a bioinformatics scientist and researcher with a focus on machine learning and simulations. He is currently leading the development of a wargame simulator called SIMC4, which is special-built for simulating catalytic nuclear war scenarios. The project is funded by the
Preamble Windfall Foundation, a 501(c)(3).

Maarten Bos is a quantitative experimental behavioral researcher, with expertise in decision science, persuasion, and human-technology interaction. He has worked in academia and industry research laboratories, and his work has been published in journals including Science, Psychological Science, and the Review of Economic Studies. His work has been covered by the Wall Street Journal, Harvard Business Review, NPR, and the New York Times. Maarten received his Ph.D. in the Netherlands and postdoc training at Harvard Business School.

All vignettes are fictitious and have been developed from open source information. The authors’ opinions are their own and do not reflect the official stance of the U.S. Navy or other (previous) affiliations.
 
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