WAR 05-06-2023-to-05-12-2023__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment

(291) 04-15-2023-to-04-21-2023__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

(292) 04-22-2023-to-04-28-2023__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

(293) 04-29-2023-to-05-05-2023__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****


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Iran Now Has Enough Enriched Uranium To Produce 5 Nuclear Weapons: Israeli Defense Minister​

By Ryan Saavedra

May 6, 2023 DailyWire.com

The Islamic Republic of Iran reportedly has enough enriched uranium to produce five nuclear weapons, a top Israeli official warned this week.

The news comes as President Joe Biden’s administration has failed to secure a new nuclear agreement with Iran and has failed to stop Iran from continuing to develop its nuclear program.

Israel Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said during a trip to Greece on Thursday that Iran would “not be satisfied by a single nuclear bomb.”

“It has already accumulated enough enriched uranium at the 20% and 60% levels for five nuclear bombs,” he said. “If Iran enriches to the 90% weaponized level, it would be a great error and the price would be heavy, and there would be consequences which could inflame the Middle East.”

Uranium found in nature only contains 0.7% uranium-235 (U-235), which is needed to create the chain reaction that causes a nuclear explosion, the remaining 99.3% is uranium-238 (U-238). Scientists use centrifuges to separate the two isotopes and the remaining U-235 is taken and then further enriched to either be used for energy production, medical purposes, or nuclear weapons.

To make a nuclear weapon, scientists need to enrich uranium to 90%, however, enriching uranium to just 20% represents a major threat because “enriching uranium to 20% represents about 90% of the effort needed to produce weapons grade fissile material,” said the Center For Arms Control And Non-Proliferation. “Once a proliferator reaches this threshold, it could be ready to weaponize in a relatively short time.”

Israel Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu also said on Thursday that a nuclear Iran could fundamentally change geopolitics forever.

“To have Iran being able to threaten every city in the United States with nuclear blackmail is a changing of history,” Netanyahu told a bipartisan group of U.S. lawmakers. “Iran is 50 North Koreas. It is not merely a neighborhood bully like the dynasty that rules North Korea.”

“This is an ideological force that views us, Israel, as the small Satan and views you as the Great Satan,” Netanyahu told U.S. lawmakers.

U.S. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan claimed this week that despite the Biden administration’s failures on Iran, the administration “made clear to Iran that it can never be permitted to obtain a nuclear weapon.”

“As President [Joe] Biden has repeatedly reaffirmed, he will take the actions necessary to stand by this statement, including by recognizing Israel’s freedom of action,” Sullivan said. “This is an issue that occupies the president’s attention, my attention, on a daily basis. Iran’s program has advanced considerably. It is a genuine danger to regional security and to global security, and, indeed, to the United States of America. And we are going to continue to take action to, yes, deter Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, and then to seek a diplomatic solution that puts this on a long-term pathway of stability.”
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
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Russia Confirms Highly Enriched Uranium Supply To China; US Fears Beijing Could Triple Its Nuclear Warheads By 2035​



By Ashish Dangwal

May 6, 2023

Russia has confirmed supplying highly enriched uranium to two Chinese nuclear reactors, prompting concerns about the deepening collaboration between the two nations in the nuclear energy sector.

TVEL, a key player in the nuclear fuel industry and a subsidiary of the state-owned Rosatom, has secured permission to supply China with nuclear fuel for the next three years, reported SCMP, citing Russian media.

The fuel will be delivered to China’s CFR-600 power plant, located in the southeastern province of Fujian. This advanced facility boasts two fast-neutron reactors, each capable of generating 600 megawatts of power.

The first reactor is set to connect to the grid later this year, marking a significant milestone in China’s nuclear power ambitions.

The news of Russia supplying highly enriched uranium to China’s nuclear reactors comes when Washington has expressed growing concerns about the cooperation between Beijing and Moscow in the nuclear energy sector.

The concerns have also not gone unnoticed by US policymakers. In March, leading Republicans in Congress sent a letter to US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan, describing the cooperation as “a direct threat to US security” and calling on the Biden administration to take action to halt it.

According to a report by World Nuclear News in January, TVEL has already transported three shipments of nuclear fuel to the CFR-600 power plant since September 2022.

The latest report reveals that the nuclear fuel supplied by TVEL to the CFR-600 power plant in China is highly enriched uranium, with a concentration of just over 30% of uranium-235.

This is a significantly higher concentration than what is typically found in naturally occurring uranium, which is usually less than 1%.


Fast reactors, such as the ones used in the CFR-600 power plant, typically require a concentration of over 20% of uranium-235. This level of enrichment is significantly lower than what is used in nuclear weapons (which usually contain around 90% uranium-235 and plutonium).

China’s Growing Nuclear Buildup

China’s plan to develop a closed nuclear fuel cycle involves fast reactors reprocessing the remaining uranium and plutonium isotopes in spent fuel. This aims to reduce the risk of shortages and is part of a larger strategy to transition to more sustainable and reliable energy sources.

In March, during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Russia, Rosatom and China’s Atomic Energy Authority signed a long-term cooperation agreement on developing fast-neutron reactors and closed nuclear fuel cycles.

Fast reactors use uranium-238, the most commonly found isotope, to generate plutonium-239, which can be used as nuclear fuel or in nuclear weapons.

According to Tian Li, the vice president of the nuclear power branch of the China Electric Power Promotion Council, there are potential risks associated with the use of liquid sodium as a reactor coolant in the fast reactors at the Fujian power plant.

Liquid sodium can easily catch fire in the air and water and is prone to leakage. However, Tian Li also emphasized that the reactor at Fujian is intended solely for generating electricity and is not designed for military purposes.

Despite these assurances, concerns over the safety and security implications of nuclear energy cooperation between China and Russia continue to concern US policymakers and experts.

According to an annual report released by the Pentagon in November 2022, China is expected to triple its nuclear warhead stockpile to 1,500 by 2035.

Chinese military leaders are reportedly building their nuclear arsenal to deter American forces from intervening in potential crises, such as those in the South China Sea or Taiwan.

John Plumb, the Pentagon’s assistant secretary for space policy, expressed his worries about the collaboration between Russia and China in the nuclear energy sector during a hearing in March.

The Chinese government has previously stated that its nuclear cooperation with Russia is limited to civilian purposes and adheres to international obligations.

Nevertheless, as tensions continue to escalate between the US and China, experts warn that the risk of a nuclear confrontation could become increasingly likely.

 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Merde......

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U.S. State Department officials speak at same conference as dangerous Iran-backed Iraqi terrorist

BY BILL ROGGIO | May 4, 2023 | admin@longwarjournal.org | @billroggio

Senior U.S. State Department officials spoke at the same conference as Qais al Khazali, a known Shia terrorist who is responsible for arming, training and forming the deadly Iranian-backed militias that are known to have killed hundreds of U.S. troops in Iraq. Khazali is listed by the U.S. State Department as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist, and his group, Asiab Ahl al Haq or the League of the Righteous, is listed as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.

Instead of boycotting the event, Alina Romanowski, the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, and Barbara Leaf, the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, attended and spoke at the Iraq Forum, which Khazali participated as a “keynote speaker,” according to Iraqi Qahwa. Romanowski and Leaf were photographed smiling with three other women as the the logo of the Iraq Forum is in the background.

View: https://twitter.com/IraqiQahwa/status/1654181772106629126?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1654181772106629126%7Ctwgr%5Efc99996367ebf9bea9b3b2e24a220e0f42bc484e%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.longwarjournal.org%2Farchives%2F2023%2F05%2Fu-s-state-department-officials-speak-at-same-conference-as-dangerous-iran-backed-iraqi-terrorist.php


Khazali: an Iranian proxy

Khazali has a long history of supporting and directing the Iranian-backed Shia militias. Before Khazali and his brother, Laith, along with a senior Hezbollah military commander known as Musa Ali Daqduq, were captured by British forces in March 2007 and transferred into U.S. custody, they played a significant role in forming what U.S. military commanders called the Mahdi Army Special Groups.

Daqduq, who had served as the commander of Hezbollah’s special forces, was tasked by Quds Force to organize, train, and advise the Mahdi Army Special Groups. These Special Groups were established as an analogue to Lebanese Hezbollah, Iran’s premier proxy in the Middle East. Daqduq worked closely with the Khazali brothers.

These groups received training, funds, weapons, intelligence and other key aid from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Qods Force (IRGC-QF or Qods Force). During his detention, Khazali admitted to playing a key role in the Special Group’s formation and subsequent attacks on U.S., Coalition, and Iraqi forces. [See LWJ report, Iraqi militant Qayis Khazali warned us about Iran. We ignored him.]

The League of the Righteous is responsible for thousands of attacks on U.S. forces. However, its assault on the Karbala Provincial Joint Communications Center in 2006 was particularly brazen and significant. The operation was plotted with the help of Qods Force. The League of the Righteous fighters who carried out the attack trained in an Iranian mock up facility. The plan was to bring captive American soldiers to Iran. Khazali issued the order to kidnap the American soldiers, but when the operation hit a roadblock, five American soldiers were executed in cold blood.

Despite their involvement in the deadly Shia insurgency in Iraq and their complicity in kiling hundreds of American troops, the U.S. military freed Khazali and his brother, Laith over the course of 2009. More than 100 League of the Righteous commanders and fighters were also freed. Daqduq was handed over to the Iraqi government in 2011, and freed shortly afterward. State listed Daqduq as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist in late 2012.

The U.S. military released the Khazalis and their men because it believed then that they the League of the Righteous would lay down their arms and join the political process. They did no such thing. Upon his return, Qais retook control of the League of the Righteous, and serves as its Secretary General to this day. The League of the Righteous remains one of the premier Iranian-backed militias in Iraq and has expanded its activities into Syria under the banner of Harakat al Nujaba.

Designation of Khazali and the League of the Righteous

In March 2020, the U.S. State Department added the League of the Righteous to its list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations. Additionally, the Khazali brothers were added to the list of Specially Designated Global Terrorists. [See LWJ report, State designates Iran-backed League of the Righteous as Foreign Terrorist Organization.]

The League of the Righteous “and its leaders are violent proxies of the Islamic Republic of Iran,” former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said in the press release that announced the designations. “Acting on behalf of their masters in Tehran, they use violence and terror to further the Iranian regime’s efforts to undermine Iraqi sovereignty.”

State’s designation acknowledged the League of the Righteous “is extensively funded and trained by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Qods Force.”

According to State, the League of the Righteous “has claimed responsibility for more than 6,000 attacks against U.S. and Coalitions forces since its creation in 2006. AAH has carried out highly sophisticated operations, including mortar attacks on an American base, the downing of a British helicopter, and an attack on the Karbala Provincial Headquarters that resulted in the capture and murder of five American soldiers.”

Khazali’s designation as well as his position as the leader of a Foreign Terrorist Organization should have at the minimum precluded the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq and the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs from attending and speaking at the Iraq Forum.

Bill Roggio is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Editor of FDD's Long War Journal.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
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Israeli firm reveals unmanned submarine BlueWhale​

By Seth J. Frantzman
May 5, 06:58 AM

JERUSALEM — Israel Aerospace Industries has developed a new unmanned submarine, the BlueWhale, designed for covert intelligence-gathering operations, the company said May 4.

The underwater vehicle is almost 11 meters long and just over 1 meter in diameter. Coming in at 5.5 tons (11,000 pounds), the platform can fit in a 40-foot shipping container for transport by land, sea or air. The size of the vessel is similar to deep-submergence vehicles or so-called crewed midget submarines.

It can travel at up to 7 knots underwater, and using electrical power, the submarine can operate for two to four weeks, depending on the mission, the company said.

Its range, at an average speed of 7 knots for 10 days, would be more than 1,600 nautical miles (1,841 miles).

The platform can detect submarines and gather acoustic intelligence using radar and electro-optical technology, according to the company. It has a mast, like larger crewed submarines, and a telescope to help detect targets at sea and on the coast, the company added in a statement.

“It is also equipped with dedicated sonars to enable the detection of both manned and unmanned submarines, and map mines on the seabed,” IAI noted, as well as “a special sensor suite [that] ensures safe transit for the submarine both below and in the proximity of the sea surface.”

The company also said the sub can conduct acoustic intelligence as well as search for and detect naval mines on the seabed. Mine detection is conducted with dedicated synthetic aperture sonar, attached to the sides of the vessel.

“By using a satellite communications antenna on the mast, the gathered data can be transferred in real-time to command posts, anywhere in the world, at sea or on land. Submarine detection and acoustic intelligence-gathering data is enabled using a sonar, several tens of meters long, towed by the BlueWhale, and by flank array sonar with receiver arrays attached to both sides of the platform,” IAI said in the statement.

The company added that BlueWhale has “undergone thousands of autonomous operation hours, including intelligence-gathering for both maritime and coastal targets, acoustic intelligence, and identifying the presence of naval mines.” It also noted the platform can perform a portion of operations performed by crewed subs and can operate for several weeks at a time at “minimal cost and maintenance, without the need for operators on board.”

The BlueWhale has a sensor suite to help ensure its safe transit underwater or near the surface. In recent years, a number of international patents were registered regarding development of the system, the company said.

IAI did not elaborate on the cost of the system.

Navies around the world are seeking more unmanned solutions at sea, particularly the U.S. Navy, which wants to field more unmanned vessels and is running a program in the Gulf region to test unmanned surface units. In 2021, IAI partnered with Emirati conglomerate Edge Group to develop unmanned surface vessels.

Underwater threats, such as the destruction of the Nord Stream pipeline, which several countries have blamed on sabotage, are driving these efforts.

About Seth J. Frantzman
Seth J. Frantzman is the Israel correspondent for Defense News. He has covered conflict in the Mideast since 2010 for different publications. He has experience covering the international coalition against the Islamic State group in Iraq and Syria, and he is a co-founder and executive director of the Middle East Center for Reporting and Analysis.
 

TammyinWI

Talk is cheap

My tweet storm this morning targeting the health authorities​

I went on a bit of a rampage this morning on Twitter against the health authorities.​


STEVE KIRSCH - MAY 6, 2023

I went on a bit of a rampage this morning against the health authorities (the CDC and the California Department of Public Health)

I’ve collected the tweets here for your convenience.

Click the image to go to the tweet and give it a like and retweet.

https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F1cfee38f-4201-4fa7-b60e-3016758676da_542x725.png




https%3A%2F%2Fsubstack-post-media.s3.amazonaws.com%2Fpublic%2Fimages%2F4550aa6c-f3d6-4159-8a49-9cd5239d6c07_540x801.png








My favorite comment was on my Turtles book tweet:



UPenn Professor Jeffrey Morris engaged on my VAERS excess death post, but he’s not accepting my Twitter Spaces challenge for some reason. Someone is afraid of being embarrassed it seems.

And I want to preserve for you one more tweet that you are simply not going to believe



And Dr. Barrett sends this as his reply:



In other words, Dr. Barrett truly believes that masks, vaccines, and other mitigation measures can drop the flu cases from 38M a year to just 1,675 in 2020-2021.

This is astonishing that anyone could believe this. He should really turn in his license to practice medicine in my opinion.

He’s an embarrassment to the entire medical community and every doctor in America should be calling him out on this. But they’ll just stay silent.

Poll​

(at link)

Summary
If you think these tweets are informative and worth spreading, have a look and hit the retweet button on the ones you like and/or add your comments.​

You can also comment below on what you thought of this article.

Thanks!

 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Well here's a "DOT" that got missed.....Merde, if this is 'actually" the case......

Posted for fair use......

Washington says Israel has freedom of action against Iranian threat​

All Israel News Staff | May 7, 2023

U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan recently clarified that the U.S. Biden administration gives Israel freedom of action against the Iranian nuclear threat.

The Biden administration previously stated it prefers a diplomatic solution to the Iranian threat. However, at the same time, Sullivan repeated Biden’s pledge that the ayatollah regime will not be permitted to acquire a nuclear bomb.

“We have made clear to Iran that it can never be permitted to obtain a nuclear weapon,” said Sullivan on Thursday during an address to the Washington Institute, a think tank located in the U.S. capital.

“As President (Joe) Biden has repeatedly reaffirmed, he will take the actions necessary to stand by his statement, including by recognizing Israel’s freedom of action,” stressed the senior U.S. security official.

While the Biden administration has been highly reluctant to use military force against Iran, Sullivan’s comments indicate that Washington is not ruling out a potential Israeli military strike against Iran if diplomacy fails to prevent Tehran’s race toward the nuclear bomb.

“This is an issue that occupies the president’s attention, my attention, on a daily basis,” reassured Sullivan.

“Iran’s program has advanced considerably. It is a genuine danger to regional security and to global security, and to the United States of America. And we are going to continue to take action to, yes, deter Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, and then to seek a diplomatic solution that puts this on a long-term pathway of stability,” said the senior Biden security official.

“The best way to stop Iran from getting a nuclear weapon is an effective agreement,” concluded Sullivan.

While the Biden administration clearly prefers a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear crisis, it is keeping a potential military solution on the table. By giving the green light for a potential Israeli military strike against Iran’s nuclear sites, Washington is signaling to the ayatollah regime that it will pay a high price if it fails to reach a diplomatic agreement with the international community.

Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant recently warned that the Iranian regime has enriched a sufficient amount of material for five nuclear bombs.

"Make no mistake – Iran will not be satisfied by a single nuclear bomb. So far, Iran has gained material enriched to 20% and 60% for five nuclear bombs," said Gallant.

Gallant stressed that the Jewish state would use all assets at its disposal to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons capability.

“Israel will use all means at its disposal to prevent a nuclear Iran, and the same is expected from the international community," vowed Gallant.

Sullivan arrived in Saudi Arabia on Saturday in an effort by Washington to mend its frosty diplomatic ties with Saudi Arabia, which has traditionally been one of Washington’s most important allies in the Middle East region. However, the Biden administration has blasted Saudi Arabia for its autocratic rule and severe human rights violations. In recent months, the Saudis have consequently signaled their readiness to form alliances with Russia and China if Washington does not soften its policy toward Saudi Arabia.

At the same time, relations between Washington and Jerusalem have deteriorated amid the ongoing controversial judicial overhaul plans in Israel.

Former Israeli National Security Advisor Yaakov Amidror recently warned in an interview on The Tikvah Podcast that the strained relations between the Biden administration and the Netanyahu government are making Iran stronger in the already combustible Middle East region.

“Of course, the fact that the leader of Israel hasn't been invited by the White House by now [shows that] the Americans decided to take a side in the domestic crisis in Israel. This also influenced countries in the Middle East. They say if America is not going side by side with Israel, then what can we, the Arab countries, say about our relations with America? How can America be trusted in this situation? Everything is connected. It's weakening the position of America. It's making Iran stronger,” said Amidror.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
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Air Force Looking to Build More Accurate, More Lethal Nuclear Warhead Reentry Vehicle​

Christopher Plain·
Breaking News Defense Space · May 10, 2023

The United States Air Force has sent out a request for information (RIF) to industry partners with the goal of building a next-generation reentry vehicle (NGRV) to carry its intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) nuclear warheads.

Because most intermediate and long-range ICBMs leave Earth’s atmosphere on the way to their targets, the vehicle that carries the warheads through the atmosphere and back to Earth is critical for success.

Currently, the country’s aging fleet of ICBMs carries the MK21 reentry vehicle atop the Minuteman III missile, which is already being upgraded by manufacturer Lockheed Martin to a new MK21A. If taken all the way from concept to construction, the newly proposed NGRV is expected to begin full-scale development in the fiscal year 2026.


Aging Reentry Vehicle Design is Ready for an Upgrade


In 2019, the U.S. Air Force asked its partner Lockheed-Martin to begin upgrading their aging nuclear weapons fleet with the goal of transitioning the entire lot of the country’s ICBMs to the new MK21A reentry vehicle by 2029. That reentry vehicle, which is designed to carry the new Ground Based Strategic Deterrent’s W87-1 warhead, underwent its first real-world tests in 2022. Unfortunately, the test ended in failure after only 11 seconds when the warhead exploded in the atmosphere.

Now, it appears the military branch, which is responsible for the bulk of the country’s ICBM arsenal, is looking to push beyond the upgrades of the MK21A by soliciting a newer, specially designed reentry vehicle with at least a few notable features.

Details on the Classified NGRV are Sparse


At this point, very little is known about the proposed project as most of the details are classified. However, in the recently published RIF, the Air Force stipulated that they are looking for an NGRV that boasts “enhancements in accuracy, lethality, and survivability.”

While the current MK21A upgrade is designed to carry a single warhead on each ICBM, there is some speculation that the NGRV being sought may include a design with multiple independent warheads, often referred to as a Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicle or MIRV.


Similarly, the new NGRV may include a single warhead model that offers increased maneuverability once it reenters the Earth’s atmosphere. Sometimes referred to as a Maneuverable Reentry Vehicle, or MARV, such a warhead design would meet the publically acknowledged goal of “enhanced accuracy.”

More Lethal Reentry Vehicle Expected to Begin Advanced Design Phase in 2026

While little unclassified information is available about the viability of the new reentry vehicle, the RIF offers a few more insights. For example, they state that “any RV performance attributes, goals, or requirements listed in the RFI are intended to solicit initial interest, capabilities, and background from the industrial base to determine viability.”

This is not an uncommon practice when the government is looking into advanced concepts and wants to determine how viable they are for their primary contractors to design, build and produce. In fact, the request for information makes sure to point out that the Air Force is specifically not accepting any full-blown proposals for its NGRV system and is only looking for information at this time.

In that same RIF, they go even further, noting that “Responders are advised that the U.S. Government will not pay for any information or administrative costs incurred in response to this RFI; all costs associated with responding to this RFI will be solely at the interested party’s expense.”

Finally, the RIF also notes that the government “intends to award a contract(s) in FY26 (Fiscal Year).” So one way or another, it looks like a new, more accurate, and more lethal nuclear warhead reentry vehicle is not too far away.

Christopher Plain is a Science Fiction and Fantasy novelist and Head Science Writer at The Debrief. Follow and connect with him on Twitter, learn about his books at plainfiction.com, or email him directly at christopher@thedebrief.org.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Hummm.....

Posted for fair use.....

Albo and the nukes – the demise of Labor’s disarmament policy​

by Philip Dorling | May 12, 2023 | Comment & Analysis, Latest Posts

A new nuclear arms race is accelerating, but Australia won’t be doing much about this threat to global survival. This week’s budget confirms the death of Labor’s nuclear disarmament diplomacy. Former diplomat Philip Dorling explains.

At his AUKUS submarine announcement on 14 March 2023, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese spoke of Australia’s “proud record of leadership” in nuclear non-proliferation. On 17 April Foreign Minister Penny Wong trumpeted Labor’s “proud history” of championing practical disarmament efforts”.

Labor does have a history of disarmament and non-proliferation leadership. In the 1990s Foreign Minister Gareth Evans was an outstanding diplomatic activist with Australia playing important roles in negotiation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Evans argued before the International Court of Justice that the use and threat of nuclear weapons is illegal. The Canberra Commission produced a landmark report charting steps to achieve the elimination of nuclear arsenals.

Dollars for diplomacy​

Foreign Minister Wong is the latest custodian of Labor’s tradition of middle power disarmament diplomacy. But what are Labor’s priorities now? Well, at the end of the day, money talks and in Tuesday’s Federal Budget the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) picked up an extra $74.6m for nuclear diplomacy.

Of that, $52.7m is for DFAT to provide “international policy advice and diplomatic support for the nuclear-powered submarine program.” Another $21.9m will go to the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office (ASNO) to support the establishment of safeguard arrangements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the AUKUS project.

All the new money is to support AUKUS.

AUKUS safeguards​

For the AUKUS project to proceed within the framework of Australia’s non-proliferation obligations, Australia must negotiate a special arrangement with the IAEA to allow the use of highly enriched uranium in submarine reactors. We already have a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) with the IAEA that covers civilian nuclear activities. Article 14 of the CSA allows for negotiation of an arrangement with the IAEA to oversee the use of nuclear material for non-explosive military purposes, i.e. nuclear naval propulsion.

It’s challenging to combine the safeguards transparency with the secret world of nuclear submarines; but the Australian Government and IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi appear confident an arrangement can be agreed to enable the IAEA to provide credible assurances that submarine fuel is not being used to manufacture nuclear weapons.

The Government has already affirmed that Australia will be provided with complete, sealed reactor units from which the removal of any nuclear material would be extremely difficult. The reactor fuel will “not be in a form that can be directly used in nuclear weapons without further chemical reprocessing, requiring facilities that Australia does not have and will not seek”. Australia’s wider non-proliferation obligations, including acceptance of IAEA inspections anywhere, anytime will remain in place.

A few days before the 14 March AUKUS announcement, Albanese and Wong wrote to Grossi to open formal negotiations. ASNO Director General Geoff Shaw also forwarded “preliminary design information” to the IAEA.

Diplomatic dogfight​

However despite what DFAT describes as Australia’s “impeccable non-proliferation credentials”, the negotiations are already politically contentious with China claiming AUKUS “poses serious nuclear proliferation risks”. Beijing alleges Australia is “coercing the IAEA Secretariat into endorsement on the safeguards issue”. Chinese diplomats are demanding an “intergovernmental process” involving all IAEA members with any new arrangement “jointly discussed and decided by the international community”.

Australia doesn’t want AUKUS derailed. We’re relying on advice from the IAEA in 1978 that states an Article 14 arrangement can be negotiated with the IAEA Secretariat before being provided to the IAEA Board of Governors for “appropriate action”. Australia would like Grossi to simply submit the negotiated arrangement to the Board as information. However the Board may insist on subjecting the arrangement to its approval. China and Russia will demand that, and they’ll likely vote against any arrangement regardless of its terms. IAEA Board approval is by no means assured. Even if the Board does approve, China won’t leave the matter there. A fractious dispute could drag on for years.

That’s why $74.6m has been committed to AUKUS diplomacy. This large and complex campaign will involve negotiation with the IAEA Secretariat and engagement with the 35 countries on the IAEA Board, indeed with all 176 members. Australia will be funding plenty of IAEA projects, seminars and workshops. In terms of diplomatic effort it’s equivalent to running for election to a seat on the United Nations Security Council, only more controversial and already actively opposed by China and Russia.
All this comes with big opportunity costs.

A new nuclear arms race​

The international situation is deeply worrying. Tension between China and the United States over Taiwan continues to rise. There’s already a naval arms race of which AUKUS is a small part, but the bigger strategic shift is manifest with China’s expansion of its nuclear forces. Construction of hundreds of new silos for a greatly expanded strategic missile force raises the prospect that Beijing is seeking an arsenal much closer to parity with the US.

At the same time, Russia has suspended the New START nuclear arms treaty which will expire in 2026. Moscow’s development of new and potentially destabilising delivery systems makes the future strategic calculus more uncertain. In turn, the prospect of three way nuclear arms competition with China and Russia has led to calls in the US Congress for an expansion of US nuclear forces.

Australian diplomats express concern about “the opaque nuclear arsenal build up in our region”. Others are less coy about the nuclear danger. Veteran foreign policy analyst Professor Joseph Siracusa recently warned that “We are literally on the eve of destruction …

The demise of Labor’s disarmament diplomacy​

Labor’s national platform commits the government to move to join the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), a recent agreement produced under UN auspices to advance nuclear disarmament. Albanese championed Labor’s 2018 commitment to sign the TPNW. In June last year a large group of former Australian Ambassadors and High Commissioners urged the new government to follow through and join the TPNW as demonstration of “a principled foreign policy … that advances the global common good”.

The United States has no enthusiasm for the TPNW and DFAT worried that the new Labor Government would be receptive to something that could complicate AUKUS, especially ensuring bipartisan support in the US Congress.

They needn’t have been concerned. Labor’s pledge to join the TPNW was a dead letter the moment Labor’s leadership signed up to the nuclear submarine project. DFAT submissions released under FOI show Wong agrees that TPNW isn’t a priority. She massaged Labor rank and file concerns by sending Labor backbencher Susan Templeman as an observer to the first TPNW states parties meeting in Vienna in June 2022. But as DFAT noted, “our attendance as an observer did not represent a decision to join the TPNW.”

Questioned in March by independent MP Zoe Daniel about the backflip, Albanese again referenced Labor’s “proud history” of disarmament efforts, but wouldn’t commit to joining the TRNW.

Lost opportunity​

Australia could be working with TPNW countries to put an international spotlight on the dangers of a new nuclear arms race. Realistic and practical measures that could be pursued include those proposed by former ASNO Director General John Carlson; pressing nuclear weapon states for “no first use” commitments, a cap on existing arsenals, no modernisation or new weapons and a draw down towards minimum deterrence capabilities.

However with AUKUS dominating the agenda, there isn’t any room for the middle power diplomacy once practiced by Gareth Evans. Instead, Australian diplomats are busy defending our nuclear submarine pact. At a recent meeting in Geneva on nuclear risks, Australian spent nearly as much time and effort rebutting Chinese allegations about AUKUS as what was devoted to substantive issues.

The Government’s budget allocation to DFAT shows they know they have a long diplomatic fight on their hands. It will suck the life out of Australian disarmament diplomacy. We’ll be talking ad nauseam about AUKUS while a nuclear arms build-up makes the world much less safe.

Labor’s disarmament activism is dead, cannibalised by AUKUS.

Philip Dorling

Philip Dorling has some thirty years of experience of high-level political, public policy and media work, much of that at the Australian Parliament.
He has worked in the Australian political environment from most angles, in both the national and state levels of government including as a senior executive; as a senior policy adviser for the Federal Labor Opposition and for cross bench Senators; and as an award-winning journalist in the Federal Parliamentary Press Gallery.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Posted for fair use.....

WORLD

Rising Military Power Japan Warns of Nuclear Threats Before G7 in Hiroshima​

BY TOM O'CONNOR ON 5/11/23 AT 3:12 PM EDT

As Japan prepares to host a powerful group of Western democracies next week, Tokyo is pursuing its largest military build-up since World War II. The resurgent Asian power wants to use the summit as an opportunity to discuss threats to global security in the region and beyond.

"I think it's a unique moment in history, I think it's a turning point in several ways," one Japanese official told Newsweek of the context surrounding the Group of Seven (G7) gathering to be held in the Japanese city of Hiroshima from May 19-21.

The meeting will bring Japan together with fellow G7 members Canada, the European Union, France, Germany, Italy, the United States and the United Kingdom, alongside African Union chair Comoros, Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) chair Indonesia, G20 chair India, as well as Australia, Brazil, South Korea and Vietnam.

But perhaps even more significant than the impressive list of participants is the location itself.

Hiroshima was the first city, and one of only two in history alongside Nagasaki, to be ravaged by atomic warfare as the U.S. brought a fiery end to World War II in August 1945. The Japanese official recalled this "tragic history," saying the summit now serves as "a reminder that the world and the people have been wise enough not to use nuclear weapons for the 77 years since Hiroshima."

"We want to keep it that way," the Japanese official added.

This streak is far from guaranteed, however, and the Japanese official pointed specifically to the conflict in Ukraine, where "Russia's aggression, actually, in my opinion, it's worsening, playing the rhetoric of nuclear usage."

At a time when Moscow has continued to enjoy robust relations with a number of countries across Asia, Tokyo has increasingly voiced its condemnation of the war launched by Russia in Ukraine in February 2022. Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio made a surprise trip to Kyiv this past March to demonstrate solidarity with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.

The Japanese official described the Russian war effort as "fundamentally against" the concept of an international rules-based order, often touted by the U.S. and its allies as the cornerstone of the global vision championed by Western powers since the end of World War II.

Japan and the U.S. have long overcome their past-century feud to forge a robust alliance, but the world's deadliest conflict to date lives on for Moscow and Tokyo, as they have yet to sign a peace treaty due to a disputed set of northern Pacific islands under Russian administration.

And while the Russia-Ukraine war has demonstrated how clashes over rival Cold War-era perceptions of the world order continue to play out to deadly effect in Europe, Japan has also welcomed a greater U.S. focus closer to home in the Asia-Pacific region.

It was former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo who helped bring the term "Indo-Pacific" to use back in 2007, as he ultimately coined the term "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" (FOIP) to apply the international rules-border order concept to the region. Both phrases have been readily adopted by the U.S., which renamed U.S. Pacific Command to Indo-Pacific Command in 2018, as well as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue comprising the U.S., Australia, India and Japan.

Today, Japan views threats from both China and North Korea in its part of the world as especially existential.

Beijing's rapid military rise has coincided with an uptick in encounters near a set of disputed islands under Japanese control in the East China Sea, as well as accelerated People's Liberation Army military exercises and missile tests. Pyongyang has also pressed forward with nuclear-capable assets and has fired missiles near and even over Japanese territory.

"The Indo-Pacific is the very region that leads global growth in the future, but faces various security and economic challenges," the Japanese official said. "So, we should demonstrate our commitment to FOIP."

For Japan, demonstrating this commitment has manifested in unprecedented changes to the military doctrine of a country that remained officially pacifist under the U.S. nuclear umbrella for six decades.

The shift began under Abe, who set out to expand the role of the Japan Self-Defense Forces, and was further carried out by his successor, then-Prime Minister Suga Yoshihide. Now, under Kishida, the third leader in more than a decade of Liberal Democratic Party rule, groundbreaking advances were achieved in his approval of three historic documents last December, an event that was praised by the U.S.

"We welcome the release of Japan's updated strategy documents—the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and Defense Buildup Program—which reflect Japan's staunch commitment to upholding the international rules-based order and a free and open Indo-Pacific," U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said in a statement at the time.

As Chinese President Xi Jinping often speaks of "great changes unseen in a century" in the global order, the new Japanese National Security Strategy begins by declaring that "the international community is facing changes defining an era." The document makes reference to Russia in both its conflict in Ukraine and activities near the disputed border with Japan, but it particularly defines the perceived threat posed by China.

"China has intensified its attempts to unilaterally change the status quo by force in the maritime and air domains including in the East and South China Seas, such as its intrusions into the territorial waters and airspace around the Senkaku Islands," the document reads, "and has expanded and intensified its military activities that affect Japan's national security in the Sea of Japan, the Pacific Ocean, and other areas as well."

"Furthermore," the Japanese National Security Strategy adds, "China is strengthening its strategic ties with Russia and attempting to challenge the international order."

Kanehara Nobukatsu, a longtime Japanese diplomat who served as the first-ever deputy secretary-general of the National Security Secretariat among other high-level positions under Abe, argued that it was the mutual responsibility of Tokyo and Washington to maintain order in the region in the face of this precarious geopolitical environment.

"The peace and stability of the Northwest Pacific is the responsibility of Japan and the U.S.," Kanehara told Newsweek. "The extraordinary military buildup of China, whose economic might has become three times bigger than Japan, and whose military budget has become five times bigger than Japan, and North Korean nuclear weapons development push Japan to cope with them."

"That is the reason why PM Kishida decided to double the defense budget," Kanehara added.

Beijing and Moscow have openly embraced the growing relationship they have defined as a "comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination for the new era." Although China has not expressed support for Russia's war in Ukraine, the two powers are united in their suspicion of Japan's transformation.

During a press briefing Wednesday, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin made a direct connection between Japan's evolving military doctrine and its disposal of radioactive water from the Fukushima nuclear plant that was devastated by a 2011 tsunami.

"One would expect Japan to show more sense of responsibility in addressing international concerns as the G7 presidency puts it in the spotlight this year," Wang said.

"Disappointingly and disturbingly, despite the concerns of its Asian neighbors and the international community," he added, "Japan has kept pushing the ocean discharge plan, dramatically increased its defense spending, developed offensive weapons, repeatedly sought to break away from the pacifist constitution and commitments to an exclusively defense-oriented policy, and often sought to honor the militarists and justify their war crimes during World War II."

Reached for comment, Liu Pengyu, spokesperson for the Chinese Embassy in Washington, D.C. told Newsweek that "we hope that the G7 conducts dialogue and cooperation with China and other countries on the basis of equality and respect, instead of adhering to the Cold War mentality, ideological prejudice and 'bloc politics' based on the interests of a clique."

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Although Russian charge d'affaires in Japan Gennady Ovechko told the state-run TASS Russian News Agency on Tuesday that Moscow and Tokyo maintain "traditionally deep cultural ties," he also issued a strong warning against the changes to Japan's defense policy.

"The Japanese government is pursuing a policy of dismantling the constitution's pacifist provisions, which the country has been so proud of for decades," Ovechko said. "We feel that Prime Minister Fumio Kishida's administration is rejecting the peaceful progress declared by past generations of politicians and is returning the country to the rails of rampant militarization."

Newsweek has reached out to the Russian Embassy in Washington, D.C. and U.S. State Department for comment.

North Korea, which has also recently bolstered its ties with both China and Russia, has regularly criticized Japan for its military buildup, its longtime alliance with the U.S. and efforts to reconcile with fellow U.S. ally South Korea. This rhetoric has increased since Kishida traveled to Seoul on Monday for a summit with South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol in order to overcome lingering tensions over Tokyo's imperial history and boost cooperation in line with Washington.

"Japan should not forget that the U.S., which had made hundreds of thousands of innocent Japanese people fall victim to the world's only nuclear holocaust, considers the Japanese archipelago as a war powder magazine and logistic base only," an article attributed to North Korean Foreign Ministry Institute for Japan Studies researcher Kim Sol Hwa read Wednesday.

"If Japan persistently resorts to forming the U.S.-led tripartite military alliance, turning its face away from the reality," the article added, "it will plunge Northeast Asia into instability and finally turn it into a sea of flames, where it will perish."

There is another battleground where rivalries in the Asia-Pacific are playing out. Japan has set out to spread its vision of a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" beyond strictly U.S.-aligned nations, especially in Southeast Asia, where Beijing and Moscow continue to enjoy strong influence.

"The national interests of the nations in the region or globally can best be served and protected by maintaining and enhancing the liberal international order," Kanehara told Newsweek. "For that purpose, the best way is to keep the unity of the Western powers and to expand the liberal order into the Global South."

The Japanese official with whom Newsweek spoke agreed, noting that the countries of the Global South "are important players as we try to tackle and to solve the Ukraine issue and they have been influenced so much by the war, in many cases in terms of energy prices and so forth."

"We have to take note of their concerns and discuss with them," the Japanese official said.

This too will be a focus of the G7 summit and served as motivation for inviting representatives from Southeast Asia, Latin America and Africa. Though Japan's history continues to play a role in defining its relationship with countries in the region, its post-World War II economic growth and more recently developing security role are seen by Tokyo as important assets for engaging with Global South countries caught in the crosswinds of great power competition.

"I think Japan is in a unique position to actually do so and chair a meeting like this, because we are the only one among the G7 members from Asia," the Japanese official said. "We've had a long and friendly history with many of these countries."

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Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Hummm.......

Posted for fair use.....

Should We Fear Nuclear Submarine Proliferation? – Analysis​

May 12, 2023 IDN 0 Comments
By IDN
By Leonam dos Santos Guimarães Capt. (ret.) Brazilian Navy*

The potential cause-effect relationship between nuclear attack submarine development and nuclear weapons production by Non-Proliferation Treaty/nonnuclear-weapons states is a subject that has been scarcely discussed in unclassified sources until the trilateral security pact between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (AUKUS), announced on 15 September 2021 for the Indo-Pacific region.

The issue can be stated as follows: Given their cost, environmental impact, and possible connection to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, are nuclear attack submarines the most appropriate naval technology for facing realistic threats to the national security of a particular non-nuclear weapons state?

The debate on the wisdom of nuclear attack submarine acquisition is reminiscent of the long-standing controversy over the desirability of using nuclear power as an energy source in developing countries—in particular states—without nuclear weapons.
The connection between nuclear power and the spread of nuclear weapons arose after India’s first nuclear-weapon test in 1974, and from the perception that the use of nuclear power would expand rapidly after the 1973 oil crisis.

The conventional wisdom was that the establishment of a civilian nuclear power program could provide a convenient rationale for the acquisition of special fissile material and related technologies for nuclear weapons production. To avoid this possibility, an international safeguard regime was established by Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) agreements and enforced by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Reactors, enrichment, reprocessing, and other nuclear facilities in states without nuclear weapons are internationally safeguarded in order to detect and deter the production or diversion of weapons-grade fissile material.

De jure Non-Proliferation Treaty/nuclear-weapons states (United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China), however, have more often than not regarded this regime with skepticism. They are not fully confident that safeguards could detect illegal actions in a timely manner. The prevailing view has been that mere possession of sensitive technologies elevates a state without nuclear weapons to a de facto nuclear-weapons-state status.

The possibility that a nuclear device might be made rapidly leads prudent adversaries to act as if the weapon already has been made. Nevertheless, from a technical point of view, special-fissile-material acquisition constitutes only a first step for those procuring an explosive device– the further steps also are submitted to other international safeguard regimes, such as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

Today, the fears about the spread of nuclear power—potentially leading to a “horizontal” nuclear weapons proliferation—have not been realized. Mainly owing to concerns about reactor safety, slow economic growth, and the high costs of the required infrastructure and reactor construction, nuclear power has hardly diffused beyond those states where it already existed in the 2000’s. The focus of proliferation concerns has been on the efforts of some countries to develop a nuclear-weapons capability.

The supposed—or publicly assumed—plans of several non-nuclear-weapons states to acquire nuclear attack submarines (such as Brazil, beginning in the 1980s) have heated up the proliferation debate.

Historically, the development of nuclear reactors for naval propulsion in nuclear weapons states preceded their use as power sources for civilian applications. For instance, the commercial pressurized water reactor is a direct descendant of submarine reactors developed for the U.S. Navy in the early 1950s. In the case of the United States, nuclear propulsion was developed after nuclear-weapons acquisition.

A Peaceful Application of Nuclear Energy?

There was a difference between IAEA and Non-Proliferation-Treaty safeguard approaches: the former stated that nuclear energy should not be used for “not-well-defined” military purposes, while the latter insisted that nuclear energy should not be used for “well-defined” explosive warfare purposes. In the past, this led to some ambiguous interpretations, which have since been clarified.

According to IAEA statute the agency shall ensure—so far as it is able —that assistance provided by it, or at its request or under its supervision or control, is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose. This provision implies, for example, that safeguards would be designed to ensure that enriched uranium supplied for use in a civilian power reactor would not be used in nuclear weapons or in non-explosive military applications such as naval propulsion or military satellites.

In contrast, Non-Proliferation Treaty agreements prohibit the diversion of nuclear material from “peaceful activities” to “weapons or other explosive devices,” but do not include any prohibition on “non-explosive military applications.” These agreements include provisions that allow a state to withdraw nuclear material from general safeguards while it is being used for a “non-proscribed military activity,” such as fuel for a submarine propulsion reactor.[ii]

To harmonize these originally different approaches, the actual IAEA safeguard agreements[iii] incorporate the Non-Proliferation Treaty principles, including provisions to withdraw from general safeguards materials to be used in “non-proscribed military activities,” such as nuclear submarine propulsion.

The official IAEA opinion—in response to an Argentinean representative on the Board of Governors request arising from the presence of a British nuclear attack submarine in the South Atlantic during the Malvinas /Falklands War is extremely relevant.

It directly questioned the degree of compatibility among the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in Latin America and the Caribbean, the safeguards agreements in force, and the IAEA statute referring to the legitimacy of non-explosive military applications of nuclear materials.

The IAEA report established that the differences among the various types of agreements do not convey any incompatibility.[iv] It is reasonable to say that nuclear submarine propulsion is compatible with a nuclear program exclusively directed to peaceful ends—such as Brazil’s program.

A Deception for Nuclear Weapons?

The technological capabilities acquired while developing nuclear attack submarine could theoretically facilitate the future acquisition of nuclear weapons. These capabilities, however, also facilitate social and economic growth. Obviously, the potential spin-off effects arising from a nuclear-propulsion program go well beyond just weapons applications.

There is no doubt that the development of nuclear-fission technology enhances the potential capacity of a country to produce nuclear weapons. To make them, however, is a political decision. An example of strong political will against such weapons is Brazil, whose Federal Constitution unambiguously bans nuclear weapons from its national territory.

In 1991, Brazil and Argentina signed the so-called Bipartite Treaty to safeguard their indigenous nuclear facilities, creating an independent agency for nuclear material inventory control called ABACC. IAEA was then invited to participate fully in this particular safeguard regime, and the so-called Quadripartite Treaty was signed in the same year—and is currently being enforced.[v]

This treaty defines specific provisions for the use of materials produced by safeguarded facilities in nuclear propulsion. In this case, their “special procedures” assure safeguard enforcement above and beyond the safeguards imposed by IAEA, without disclosing technological or military classified information on nuclear attack submarine design and operation.
The proliferation of nuclear weapons is an eminently political and non-technical subject. Both de jure and de facto nuclear-weapons states obtained fissile material through programs specifically directed to that purpose.

Consequently, they have followed the shortest and economic way toward the objective pursued, and it is highly unlikely that a country procuring nuclear weapons capability would choose such an indirect route as the development of nuclear naval propulsion.

It is to be noted that, not adhering to NPT, Indian Navy developed nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarines, after developed nuclear weapons: the Arihant class. This was the first nuclear submarine to be built by a country other than the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council.

It is to be noted too that Israel, also not adhering to NPT, developed, with German partnership, the Dolphin class, a conventionally-powered and nuclear armed submarine. The same is supposed to be done by North Korea.

A “Proliferant” Fuel Cycle?

Even though not proscribed by the Non-Proliferation Treaty, naval propulsion is undoubtedly a military application of reactor technology. This might lead some to conclude there is a major difference between the fuel cycles of nuclear submarines and stationary power or research reactors, and that international and/or multilateral safeguards would have difficulty in deterring the diversion of nuclear materials from a submarine’s fuel cycle.

Technically, this is not the case at all. Owing to constraints on space in a submarine and the operational requirement for infrequent refueling, submarine reactors do use uranium fuel in an enrichment higher than stationary reactors (current U.S. submarine reactors even are said to use weapons-grade highly enriched uranium). On the other hand, France developed an alternative low-enrichment uranium fuel technology in the 1970s, and there are indications that Russia may not use high-enrichment uranium fuel neither.

Presently, naval propulsion reactors are compact pressurized water types. Fuel enrichment is not necessarily “weapons grade,” nor is this kind of reactor suitable for plutonium production. A naval propulsion reactor is exactly the same as many of the research and power reactors that are operating throughout the world-without anyone claiming they may represent a possible violation of the status quo.

Regarding this aspect, a new problem arises from AUKUS Agreement. The specific type of nuclear fuel for the AUKUS submarines has not been announced yet. However, it is expected that they will use highly enriched uranium as US and UK submarines. This poses questions about in what extent the NPT obligations of US and UK, as nuclear weapon states, and Australia, as a non-nuclear weapon state, are fully respected.

A Rationale for Regional Nuclear Weapons Races?

Considering its capital value for naval power, nuclear attack submarine acquisition by a non-nuclear weapons state could induce nuclear weapons proliferation in other countries that feel threatened by such change in their regional naval balance of power. Nuclear propulsion is a part of a conventional weapon system, however, and a more appropriate response would be to develop their own nuclear submarines. By this same rationale, the introduction of any totally non-nuclear weapon system could alter the balance of power.

There is a widespread consensus among strategists that future naval warfare will rely heavily on submarines—particularly the nuclear attack submarine—rather than on surface ships. This view is corroborated by the continuing development of increasingly sophisticated submarines in the West and Russia. This provides a strong incentive for nuclear submarine acquisition by militarily significant Third World countries.

To the extent that nuclear attack submarines could serve as surrogates for nuclear weapons, they may promote international stability: “Better a sub under the sea than a bomb in the basement.” On the other hand, their acquisition might spur naval weapons races among regional rivals with no net gain in national or international security.

Nuclear-weapons states cannot hope to minimize this trend by “advocating water and drinking wine.” Rather, they should follow their own example given in the case of nuclear weapons “vertical” proliferation reduction – by decreasing the reliance on nuclear attack submarines.

Conclusions

Even if potential nuclear attack submarine-related proliferation risks are not to be discarded, they should not be exaggerated. The emphasis on non-proliferation was largely based on the expectation that nuclear power would spread rapidly after the 1973 oil crisis.

That prediction did not become a reality. For similar reasons, such as high research, development, construction, and maintenance costs, technological risks, and stringent fissile-material supply conditions, the number of Third World states acquiring nuclear submarines will remain small, Brasil, South Korea, Australia and perhaps Iran being the most referenced as potential newcomers. Consequently, it is time to develop an internationally recognized policy toward these acquisitions regarding proliferation.

The emergence of a new class of “nuclear-submarine state” would tend to reduce both the psychological and the military distinctions between nuclear and non-nuclear-weapons states created by the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

As in the case of nuclear-weapons proliferation, the degree of opposition to such a development depends on the identity of the nuclear-submarine state. The United States is strongly opposed to any new nuclear-submarine states—because it might limit the U.S. Navy’s freedom of action around the world.

On the other hand, both the United Kingdom and France encouraged Canada’s nuclear-submarine ambitions—but presumably they would oppose Latin American ones. Russia leased twice a nuclear guided-missile submarine to India and probably also assisted the Indian domestic nuclear-submarine program-despite strong opposition from the United States.

By other side, China presumably would be extremely opposed to eventual nuclear submarine acquisition by an East or Southeast Asian country, as Australia—but not to others.

The stringent restraints on the supply of fissile materials and the political pressure exerted to prevent the indigenous development of nuclear attack submarines in Non-Proliferation Treaty/non-nuclear-weapons states in the Third World are fundamentally based on geopolitical and military strategic objectives. This practice is hardly related to the Non-Proliferation Treaty spirit; it is, in fact, a matter of freedom of the seas—not nuclear proliferation.

*Leonam dos Santos Guimarães is a nuclear and naval engineer (PhD) and a member of the Brazilian National Academy of Engineering. He was CEO of Eletronuclear SA and Coordinator of the Nuclear Propulsion Program at the Naval Technology Center in São Paulo. He is currently Coordinator of the Statutory Committee for Angra 3 Nuclear Power Plant constrution and commissioning.
Notes:
IAEA statute, Article III.
[ii] Non-Proliferation Treaty Article IV.
[iii] IAEA INFCIRC/153, Paragraph 14.
[iv] IAEA Report GOV/INF/433.
[v] Brazil adhered to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1998, Argentina some years before that.
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IDN​

IDN-InDepthNews offers news analyses and viewpoints on topics that impact the world and its peoples. IDN-InDepthNews serves as the flagship of the International Press Syndicate Group
 

jward

passin' thru

Canada Wants More Cooperation With AUKUS Allies on Advanced Technologies​


U.S. News StaffJuly 6, 2021​


OTTAWA (Reuters) - Canada wants to work more closely with allies including Australia, United States and the UK in areas of advanced technologies, Defense Minister Anita Anand said on Monday, when asked if the country wanted to join the AUKUS defense alliance.

"Canada is highly interested in furthering cooperation on AI, quantum computing and other advanced technologies with a defense nexus with our closest allies," Anand told reporters in Ottawa, when asked about a newspaper report saying Ottawa was seeking to join the AUKUS alliance.
The Canadian government wants to take advantage of the information-sharing and advanced technologies development part of the alliance, including undersea defense capabilities, the Globe and Mail reported earlier on Monday, citing unnamed government sources.

The Globe said Ottawa was only seeking to join only the non-nuclear component of the security alliance between Australia, UK and the U.S., which was launched in 2021.
The security pact also aims to provide Australia with the technology and capability to deploy nuclear-powered submarines.

Political Cartoons on World Leaders​


20230504edstc-a.jpg

The pact has been denounced by countries including China and France, which lost its own submarine deal with Australia after the alliance was formed. Canada's exclusion from the alliance was also seen as a snub by some for a country already in the intelligence-sharing Five Eyes alliance with AUKUS members and New Zealand.
"Our ties with our Five Eyes allies are strong, and indeed we remain interested in furthering cooperation in AI and other innovation efforts with our allies," Anand said.

(Reporting by Ismail Shakil in Ottawa; editing by Steve Scherer and Jonathan Oatis)
Copyright 2023 Thomson Reuters.

(beyond paywall)

Canada seeks to join non-nuclear pillar of AUKUS alliance​

Robert FifeOttawa Bureau Chief
Steven ChaseSenior parliamentary reporter
Published May 8, 2023
 

jward

passin' thru

Pentagon Officials Acknowledge Uncertainty In Defending Against Hypersonic Missiles​


by Tyler Durden​


Authored by John Haughey via The Epoch Times (emphasis ours),
The United States Department of Defense (DOD) is seeking nearly $30 billion in its $680 billion Fiscal Year 2024 (FY24) budget request for missile defeat and defense programs across all branches of the military.
Right now, the DOD is in a race to develop its own hypersonic missiles and engineer effective defenses against the high-velocity, maneuverable missiles being developed by Russia and, particularly, by the Peoples Republic of China (PRC).
During questioning by Senate Armed Services Committee’s Strategic Forces Subcommittee Chair Sen. Angus King (I-Maine) in a May 9 budget hearing, four flag officers said some existing systems have “capabilities” against hypersonic weapons but did not know for sure until they are tested against the evolving missile systems.

King was not happy. “It seems to me that we are spending a lot more money to developing hypersonic missiles than we are developing capabilities to defend against them,” he said.
King asked Missile Defense Agency Director Vice Adm. Jon A. Hill if an aircraft carrier could be defended against a hypersonic missile attack.

“We have the capability to stop it in two places, in the boost-glide phase” and when the missile re-enters the atmosphere, Hill said, noting the Navy’s SM-6 missiles are “cruise missile killers” designed to track and kill fast-moving, maneuverable targets that can fly high and skim the surface. “It would be defeated by a destroyer defending a carrier.”
Noting Ukrainians claim they shot down a Russian hypersonic weapon last week with a Patriot anti-air missile provided by the U.S., Hill said the Patriot systems, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense missiles (THAAD), and Aegis ballistic defense system all have “capability” demonstrated in tests against hypersonics.

THAAD operates on the edge of the atmosphere,” he said. “We haven’t tested it against hypersonic, but I’m willing to bet there are capacities that we can leverage there.
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy John F. Plumb said the budget request “makes substantial investments in regional ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic missile defense capabilities,” including $1.2 billion for PAC-3 Patriot missile “interceptors,” $1 billion for Aegis and THAAD interceptors, and $259 million for regional hypersonic and ballistic missile defense space sensors and the development of a G

21st Century Missiles vs. 1980s Technology​

King said these ant-missile systems are based on technologies from the 1980-90s and asked why DOD is not experimenting with using direct energy weapons to knock down missiles.
At $4 to $10 million each, using missiles in a “bullet on bullet approach is an expensive proposition” in defending against other missiles.
Developing a “directed energy” weapon for missile defense has been “a target for a period of time,” Hill said with prototypes being tested in the fleet. “It is scaling its way there. That work is being done today.”

 
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