WAR 04-20-2024-to-04-26-2024__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

Housecarl

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(341) 03-30-2024-to-04-05-2024__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

(342) 04-06-2024-to-04-12-2024__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

(343) 04-13-2024-to-04-19-2024__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****


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From a couple of days ago......

Posted for fair use.........

WORLD NEWS

Argentina asks to join NATO as President Milei seeks a more prominent role for his nation​

Updated 3:20 PM PDT, April 18, 2024

BUENOS AIRES, Argentina (AP) — Argentina formally requested on Thursday to join NATO as a global partner, a status that would clear the way for greater political and security cooperation at a time when the right-wing government of President Javier Milei aims to boost ties with Western powers and attract investment.

The request came as NATO’s Deputy General Secretary Mircea Geoana held talks in Brussels on regional security challenges with visiting Argentine Defense Minister Luis Petri.

Geoana said he welcomed Argentina’s bid to become an accredited partner in the alliance — a valued role short of “ally” for nations that are not in NATO’s geographical area and not required to take part in collective military actions. NATO membership is currently limited to countries of Europe, Turkey, Canada and the United States.

The designation could allow Argentina access to advanced technology, security systems and training not previously available to it, the Argentine presidency said.

“Argentina plays an important role in Latin America,” Geoana said at the NATO headquarters. “Closer political and practical cooperation could benefit us both.”

Milei has been pushing a radical libertarian agenda aimed at reversing years of protectionist trade measures, overspending and crippling international debt that have plunged the country’s economy into a tailspin.

Over his past four months as president, he has reshaped Argentina’s foreign policy to one of almost unconditional support for the United States — part of an effort to return Argentina to prominence in the global economy after past administrations allowed relations with Washington and European allies to wither.

Milei’s government is also seeking security benefits through warming ties with Western countries. On Thursday, the U.S. government announced it was providing Argentina with $40 million in foreign military financing for the first time in more than two decades — a grant that allows key U.S. allies like Israel to buy American weaponry.

The funds, intended to help Argentina equip and modernize its military, will help foot the bill for 24 American F-16 fighter aircraft Argentina bought from Denmark earlier this week. Defense Minister Petri hailed the acquisition of the advanced warplanes as “the most important military purchase since Argentina’s return to democracy” in 1983. The $300 million price tag has drawn criticism from Milei’s political opponents as he slashes spending across the government.

Formally partnering with NATO requires the consensus of all 32 NATO members. Argentina’s ties to key NATO ally Britain have been fraught since 1982, when the two went to war over the contested Falkland Islands in the South Atlantic.

Other global partners of the Alliance include Afghanistan, Australia, Iraq, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Mongolia, New Zealand and Pakistan. Currently the only NATO partner in Latin America is Colombia.

Conferring the status of “global partner” on a country does not mean NATO allies would come to the country’s defense in the event of an attack. That commitment — laid out in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s founding treaty — is limited to full members of the alliance.

NATO’s dialogue with Argentina began in the early 1990s. In a largely symbolic move to thank the pro-American government at the time for sending troops on peacekeeping operations to Bosnia, former President Bill Clinton designated Argentina “major non-NATO ally” in 1998.
 

Housecarl

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Posted for fair use......

POLITICAL WARFARE: THE OBVIOUS CHOICE AGAINST OUR MAGINOT LINE BY MATT ARMSTRONG​

  1. Blog
Fri, 04/19/2024 - 2:53pm

Access the entire essay by Matt Armstrong HERE.
This is just another great essay from one of our nation's true experts on all things related public diplomacy, information and influence, psychological operations ,and political warfare, Matt Armstrong.

Hopefully this will make the light bulb go on in the minds of some:

Even if you’re not interested in political warfare, political warfare may be interested in you. I wrote “maybe” because a neat trick of political warfare is the ability to bypass or neutralize resistance, like an island-hopping campaign.
We must get better at political warfare if we want to be successful in strategic competition.
I recommend that people read and reread this paragraph at least a dozen times.

It is useful to know that Russia and China, among others, would be dumb not to wage political warfare against our interests and those of our democratic allies. Political warfare is inexpensive, especially relative to traditional warfare. Munitions, which include but go well beyond mere “information,” are cheap. The damage to physical infrastructure from political warfare is virtually or completely nil compared to a traditional invasion. If we want to be glib, we can throw in that political warfare is environmentally friendly. Political warfare is tolerant of mistakes and missteps. It allows for multiple and simultaneous, even potentially contradictory, lines of effort along multiple fronts, audiences, and territories. Further, political warfare can result in a deeper and longer-lasting positive result without post-invasion reconstruction, occupation troops, or possibly a directly appointed viceroy, depending on the objective.
And I think this is the best definition of political warfare I have found:
My definition of political warfare is derived primarily from Burnham:
Political warfare is the expression of power for hostile intent through discrete, subversive, or overt means, short of open combat, onto another. It is not mere rivalry or competition, it may have strategic or tactical objectives, and it may operate in one or more areas—political, societal, economic, psychological, or other—that are available for exploitation to affect change.
Political warfare: the obvious choice against our Maginot Line
Political warfare: the obvious choice against our Maginot Line
 

Housecarl

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Hummm......

Posted for fair use.......




THE AXIS OFF-KILTER: WHY AN IRAN-RUSSIA-CHINA “AXIS” IS SHAKIER THAN MEETS THE EYE​

LUCAS WINTER, JEMIMA BAAR, AND JASON WARNER
APRIL 19, 2024
COMMENTARY

On 11 March, Iran, Russia, and China launched the fourth iteration of their four-day annual trilateral naval exercises. According to Iranian Second Rear Admiral Mustafa Taj al-Dini, the exercises “testif[y] to the emergence of a new alliance to ensure security in the northern Indian Ocean.” The reality, though, might not be quite so dramatic.

First held in 2019, these exercises have always taken place in the Arabian Sea, and been based out of the Iranian port of Chabahar. They occur in a highly strategic corridor in the northern Indian Ocean, which links the Arabian Peninsula to Chinese ports in the Pacific Ocean via the Strait of Malacca. What is most notable about these exercises are the geopolitical implications of strategic coordination between Iran, Russia, and China. Indeed, even as talk of a burgeoning Iran-Russia-China axis increases, these naval exercises remain the only regularly cited example of trilateral military coordination in action. As such, they have much to tell us about the nature of this trilateral relationship — its motivations, possibilities, and limitations.

Relations between all three states seem to be deepening. Chinese General Secretary Xi Jinping has made “strengthen[ed] strategic coordination” with Russia a priority, while in his post-“election” victory speech, Russian President Vladimir Putin declared that China’s and Russia’s “national interests coincide,” which “creates a favorable environment for resolving our common tasks and in the sphere of international relations.” In our recently published reports from the U.S. Army’s Foreign Military Studies Office, we found that both China and Russia employ instruments of national power for military influence in Iran at a high level, each scoring a four on a five-point scale. Furthermore, our research assesses that both Russian and Chinese military influence in Iran are likely to increase in the next three years. Alongside the stronger bilateral relations between the three countries, Iran recently joined the Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa (BRICS) group and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, arguably the two most prominent Russo-Chinese alternative multilateral institutions. In articulating their importance to Iran, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi described membership in the BRICS as “countering unilateralism,” while the Shanghai Cooperation Organization was “a great family of civilizations” standing in opposition to Western “moral downfall.” The foundation for a trilateral security alliance, in short, seems to be in place.

This burgeoning engagement between Iran, Russia, and China is a cause for serious concern, as it places three of the most significant U.S. adversaries in a coalition that, at its core, seeks to disrupt and challenge the U.S.-led order. Commentators have thus raised the alarm about a new “axis of disorder,” “Axis of Evil 2.0,” “axis of autocracy,” “unholy alliance,” or even “Legion of Doom.” Yet increased bilateral engagement and multilateral cooperation do not necessarily result in a trilateral “axis.” How cohesive is such an Iran-Russia-China “axis,” and how concerned should the United States and its allies be?

While concerning to a degree, this axis is, currently, more rhetorical than real. Although there are clear reasons why the three countries might mutually benefit from the emergence of deep and consistent trilateral engagement — and have indeed collaborated in practice — important fissures in such a trilateral axis exist. The aforementioned naval exercises, for example, are not as important as typically portrayed. On a broader level, each of the three countries brings its own challenges to the would-be axis. As a result, the United States and its allies — while remaining wary — should recognize the tenuousness of this axis and avoid viewing all interactions between these three states as inherently deep, meaningful, and, thus, threatening. Instead, the real threat is more subtle: each of these three countries seeks to leverage its growingnetwork of multilateral partnerships, often beyond this trilateral context, to its benefit and to the detriment of the United States.

The Trilateral Axis in Theory

On the surface, for China, Russia, and Iran, the potential benefits of collaboration in a formalized axis are intuitive. First, it would facilitate the shared goal of challenging and remaking the U.S.-led global order. Within this group, there is no shortage of rhetoric extolling this objective. Xi has called for China to “lead the reform of the global governance system” and has launched initiatives to rival the U.S.-led world order, such as the Belt and Road Initiative, Global Development Initiative, and Global Security Initiative. Russia, the mid-level partner, has a primary foreign policy focus, as articulated in the so-called Primakov doctrine, to create a multipolar world in which the United States is constrained by other major powers. Raisi appeals to his Chinese and Russian counterparts to join the “resistance” to “turn the threat [of the United States] into an opportunity for progress.”

Second, while America’s primary concern over the axis is its military implications, the creation of a formalized trilateral axis offers opportunities for robust economic partnerships amongst all three countries, at least two of which (Russia and Iran) are under punitive global sanctions. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, there has been renewed interest in Moscow and Tehran for developing the International North-South Transport Corridor , a multi-mode route for moving freight between Russia, Central Asia, and India. Tangible steps toward greater economic integration have occurred: in February 2023, Moscow and Tehran announced that they had connected their national financial messaging services after their access to the Belgium-based Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication was suspended. The move insulates bilateral financial exchanges from Western sanctions and could be expanded to involve other countries in the future.

Third, the creation of a trilateral axis would help each of the countries shore up its security as they look to a conflict-ridden future, with China contemplating conflict with the United States over Taiwan, Russia considering a longer-term war in Europe, and Iran viewing itself as perennially under attack. While the naval exercises demonstrate the potential maritime security implications, the three have also collaborated in the space domain. For example, all three have made concerted efforts to eliminate their reliance on the United States’ GPS global navigation satellite system and instead reinforce each other’s. In 2021, Iran’s military was granted full access to China’s BeiDou satellite navigation system (the second country apart from Pakistan), while integration efforts between BeiDou and Russia’s indigenous satellite system, GLONASS, are under way.

The Limits of Naval Cooperation

While the ideological bases for a trilateral axis are theoretically in place, in practice, the most frequently invoked example of the axis’ existence is less than the sum of its parts. Specifically, the trilateral naval drills in the Arabian Sea — the sole public instance of trilateral military coordination — remain largely performative. Alone, they are unlikely to increase trilateral interoperability in any meaningful way. Still, the fact that these exercises have occurred with some regularity is indicative of a desire by all three parties, even if symbolic, to project an image of trilateral coordination.

Militarily, there is no indication that these exercises — or past editions — are intended to simulate a complex coordinated operation. Instead, they involve fairly standard tactical-level maritime exercise activities and have hardly changed in this focus over the years. The 2024 edition, called “Security Bond–2024” (or alternatively “Maritime Security Belt 2024”) was focused primarily on “firing at sea and armed rescue of hijacked merchant vessels.” Previous iterations of the exercises were similarly focused on simulated hijacked vessel rescue operationsand nighttime target shooting. The types of Russian and Chinese vessels involved in these exercises have changed little over the years.

In addition to the limited nature of what the exercises are, it is also instructive where they are. It is noteworthy that the Arabian Sea remains the sole area of operations where this “trilateralism” comes to life. This is no coincidence: The Arabian Sea is one of the few spaces where all three core elements of a potential axis mentioned above — challenging the U.S.-led order, facilitating economic partnerships, and shoring up security — converge in one place. In this particular environment, each country prioritizes these elements to different degrees. Russia sees the exercises as a means of moving forward its “Collective Security in the Persian Gulf” agenda, which was unveiled a few months before the first edition of trilateral exercises occurred in 2019. The exercises also play a role in furthering Moscow’s goal of becoming a “great maritime power,” which, as detailed in its 2022 naval doctrine, involves establishing a naval presence in the Persian Gulf. For Iran, the host nation, security is at the forefront, and the exercises respond to a desire for strengthened naval projection capabilities in the increasingly contested Indian Ocean region. For China, the exercises enhance the projection of its naval escort taskforce in the Gulf of Aden, which, along with a naval base in Djibouti, give Beijing a limited but permanent naval presence in this strategic corridor through which the majority of its oil is transported. In short, while the exercises are of limited relevance to strengthening interoperability between the three navies, each participant has specific, if limited, needs met through participating.

Individual Challenges

Beyond the fact that the naval exercises themselves are weaker as a means of trilateral cooperation than are often portrayed, a closer inspection reveals that each state brings to the table its own distinct issues that hinder the formation of such a more formalized trilateral axis.

Continued.....
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Continued.....

One of the greatest impediments from the Iranian side is the fact that Tehran is pushing for a broader security cooperation coalition than the other two seemingly feel comfortable with. Although it is the newest member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Tehran has been an ardent proponent of fundamentally refocusing the organization to serve as a conduit for greater military cooperation amongst all states. Immediately after Iran became a full member, Minister of Defense Brigadier General Mohammad-Reza Ashtiani declared that the “[Shanghai Cooperation Organization] member states share the responsibility for designing a new world order.” He called for the establishment of a “Shanghai Maritime Security Belt” — a new military zone that would protect trade between members. Though this has not materialized, the proclamation, if embraced, would have been indicative of a fundamental shift of the organization’s raison d’être,reorienting it from its founding focus on combating what China describes as “the Three Evils” — terrorism, separatism, and extremism — and toward protection against external state threats. Tellingly, neither Russia nor China has addressed this proposal publicly.

Indeed, for China, one of the biggest stumbling blocks to the creation of a formal alliance with Iran and Russia is, quite simply, it does not want one, at least in the way desired by Iran. First, Iran’s bravado in likening its cooperation with Russia and China to “a new NATO” is diametrically opposed to China’s preferred approach. Successive Chinese leaders, including Xi Jinping, have eschewed deep, binding security alliances. Second, for China, membership in an overtly anti-Western bloc with two global pariahs would fly in the face of its desire to explicitly avoid pursuing (or being perceived as pursuing) a full break with the United States. Given its significant “equities in the current international system, China is likely reluctant to engage in an explicit counter-order that leads to a more severe rupture with Washington. After all, it was Beijing’s desire to avoid being perceived as part of an overtly anti-U.S. bloc that caused China to hesitate granting Iran full membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization for over a decade.

Russia’s challenge to the emergence of such a trilateral axis is not a lack of interest, but rather a lack of focus. Since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Moscow has been too overwhelmed to be a reliable partner. An illustrative example is Russia’s repeated failure to deliver the Su-35s that Iran had purchased. Another challenge that Russia brings to a would-be trilateral alliance is its reluctance to step in on Iran’s behalf in all circumstances. For instance, Russia has shown a limited willingness to push back against Israel’s ongoing attacks on Iranian facilities and personnel in Syria. There are, in other words, already clear limits to how far Russia is willing to extend its support for Iran.

A final challenge is that China diverges from Russia and Iran on its perspective on India’s role in all this. Indeed, both Iran and Russia appear to want something more than a trilateral alliance with China: Instead, they arguably seek a quadrilateral alliance that would include India and that would theoretically exert overwhelming influence throughout Eurasia. The Primakov doctrine, for example, names China and India explicitly as the powers with which Russia cooperates against the United States through a “strategic triangle.” Iran, meanwhile, looks favorably on both Russia and India as providing the means to bolster its economy, via participation in the International North-South Transport Corridor, in the face of Western sanctions. A trilateral alliance that excludes or antagonizes India, in short, is unlikely to gain much traction in Moscow or Tehran.

Beijing, by contrast, is not on board with inviting India into this tenuous axis. At present, China and India are increasingly competing for influence in South Asia. India has begun “flexing its naval power” in the Indian Ocean, deploying ships to its backyard to demonstrate to China that it does not have a monopoly on patrolling the region. The tensions extend to the naval exercises themselves: Following the first Russia-China-Iran trilateral in December 2019, a deadly border skirmish in 2020 led China and India to refuse invitations to participate in the second edition in early 2021. (In the end, only Russia and Iran participated in the 2021 exercises, which proved to be largely inconsequential.) Tellingly, India hosted multilateral naval exercises in February 2024, which included, among others, Russia and Iran, as well as the United States. China was not invited.

Finally, the ongoing Israel-Hamas war underscores the fact that where there does appear to be trilateral coordination, it is often limited to rhetorical alignment and nonmilitary diplomacy that is not exclusive to the trilateral grouping. Russian and Chinese narratives on Gaza, for instance, largely mirror those of Iran — critical of Israel and supportive of Hamas. Russian and Chinese officials have both met with Hamas leaders. When it comes to Gaza-related resolutions, the two countries have voted in tandem at the United Nations Security Council. Yet these rhetorical and diplomatic positions are hardly limited to members of the purported trilateral axis, but rather reflect a deeper global divide from which Russia and China seek to capitalize. Although ties between Israel and both Russiaand China have frayed as a result of these positions, both countries seek to preserve their positive relations with Israel, and neither has assisted Hamas on the battlefield.

The strengths and limits of trilateral coordination have also been on display in the Red Sea. In late January, China reportedly expressed its displeasure with Houthi anti-ship attacks and asked Iran to help rein them in. In mid-March, the Houthis purportedly struck a formal deal to not target Russian or Chinese vessels off Yemen’s coast. Days later, though, Houthi anti-ship ballistic missiles struck a Chinese merchant vessel, likely by mistake.

What’s Next

While bilateral relations between China, Russia, and Iran are robust, this does not alone amount to a trilateral axis. Indeed, the fact that the largely performative naval exercises off the Iranian coast are the only instance of trilateral military coordination between them, in addition to the individual challenges that each state brings to the table, is testament to the practical challenges facing such coordination.

Still, these exercises should not be written off as irrelevant. Cooperation can always deepen. Indeed, military ties between Russia, China, and Iran may well be on stronger footing than were the relations between the three World War II Axis powers (Germany, Italy, and Japan) prior to the Tripartite Pact of 1940, which created a defense alliance between the three countries. Structurally, the similarities between then and now are striking, with revisionist powers “seeking a dramatically transformed global order” at a time of global interdependence. As in World War II, a common enemy could well become a somewhat sudden, unifying externality.

Second, although the Russia-China-Iran trilateral axis does not appear to be blossoming into a trilateral alliance on the level of, for example, NATO, its emergence is suggestive of a new modus operandi. Russia, China, and Iran have all demonstrated an inclination to work individually and collectively to create a robust network of multilateral partnerships that erode U.S. security relationships by enticing U.S. partners to join one of their clubs. For instance, in the latest edition of the trilateral naval exercises, several countries were invited as observers, including Azerbaijan, India, Kazakhstan, Oman, Pakistan, and South Africa. The countries represent overlapping membership in several “alternative” multilateral organizations and projects, most importantly the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, BRICS, and the International North-South Transport Corridor. Thus, the creation of a variety of alternatives, rather than a single alternative, to the current order may prove more challenging.

As the United States and its allies consider the recent naval exercises between Iran, Russia, and China, they should refrain from fixating solely on this somewhat tenuous trilateral nexus. Instead, they should look at the broader trend toward multipolarity among countries committed to eschewing U.S. leadership. Regrettably, this trilateral engagement is but one symptom of a much larger problem.

What would a more pronounced Iran-Russia-China axis look like? One potential indicator of deepening trilateral engagement would be the public acknowledgment and inclusion of Tehran’s ambitious proposals for more structured military cooperation in the official discourse of Moscow and Beijing. Iran’s quest for Shanghai Cooperation Organization membership is an instructive example: After over a decade of resistance, Beijing eventually came around to the idea following sustained advocacy from Moscow and Tehran. If Moscow were to take Iran’s side and advocate for formalized military engagement among all three nations, it would represent a significant step in this direction, as together, the two states may be able to soften China’s position. Should Beijing, likely the most resistant partner, indicate its interest in the idea, a formalized military alliance could be imminent. Until then, observers should realize that for now, the axis is indeed off-kilter.

Lucas Winter is the senior Middle East analyst at the U.S. Army’s Foreign Military Studies Office, part of the U.S. Army’s Training and Doctrine Command G-2. He is co-director of the office’s M-DIME Research Project, which systematically assesses Russian and Chinese military influence across the globe. He has a M.A. in international relations from Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and was an Arabic language flagship fellow in Damascus, Syria, in 2006–2007.

Jemima Baar is a research fellow at the Foreign Military Studies Office. She is pursuing a master’s degree in international affairs at Columbia University, where she is an international fellow. She has been a research intern at the Council on Foreign Relations and a research assistant at Cambridge’s Center for Geopolitics.

Dr. Jason Warner is the Director of Research at the Foreign Military Studies Office, where he is also the Senior Africa and Senior Terrorism and Transnational Crime Analyst. He is also co-director of the office’s M-DIME Research Project. Between 2016 and 2022, he was a civilian Assistant Professor in the Department of Social Sciences at the U.S. Military Academy (West Point). He holds a Ph.D. from Harvard University.

The opinions expressed in this piece are the authors’ and do not represent the views of the U.S. Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.
 

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Up the flag poll a bit late perhaps?......

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Europe—but Not NATO—Should Send Troops to Ukraine​

To Halt Russia’s Advance, Kyiv Needs More Boots on the Ground​

By Alex Crowther, Jahara Matisek, and Phillips P. O’Brien

April 22, 2024

A taboo has been broken in Europe. Only a few months ago, it would have been inconceivable for European leaders to propose sending European troops to Ukraine. But on February 26, French President Emmanuel Macron said the deployment of European forces to Ukraine could not be “ruled out.” Since then, other European officials have joined the chorus; the Finnish defense minister and Polish foreign minister have both suggested that their countries’ forces could end up in Ukraine. These comments, combined with existing support for such measures in the Baltic states, show that there is a growing bloc of countries open to direct European intervention in the war.

These explosive comments are driven by shifting conflict dynamics. The debate in the U.S. Congress over sending military aid to Ukraine has been a debacle. A new aid package is finally on track for approval, but the months of dithering in Washington have dismayed Europeans and given Moscow hope that Western resolve to support Kyiv is cracking. Russian forces—bolstered by equipment from China, Iran, and North Korea—have taken advantage of the gap in U.S. military support for Ukraine by stepping up their attacks on civilians and nonmilitary infrastructure. In early April, knowing that Ukraine was running short of antiaircraft ammunition, Russia launched a missile attack that destroyed the largest power plant in the Kyiv region. Earlier, in March, Russian forces targeted a hydroelectric dam in Dnipro and other electrical facilities around Kherson, undermining Ukrainian industry and making the country’s economy more dependent on the European electrical grid. Further damage to critical infrastructure, nuclear power plants, and agricultural land will dramatically raise the costs of reconstruction, for which Ukraine’s partners in the West will likely have to foot much of the bill.

As Russian forces speed up their advance, the possibility that they could break through Ukrainian defenses along the eastern front and challenge Ukrainian control of Kharkiv or even Kyiv presents Europe with a security threat it cannot ignore. A Russian victory in Ukraine would vindicate President Vladimir Putin’s revisionist ambitions and belief in the inherent weakness of the West. It would enable the Kremlin to keep Russia on a war footing—an all-of-society approach to conquest that European countries would be unable to match. There is no reason to expect Putin to stop with Ukraine. He has called the breakup of the Soviet Union “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe” of the twentieth century, lamenting that “tens of millions of our co-citizens and compatriots found themselves outside Russian territory.” The Baltic states are in danger, as is Poland: last year, the former Russian prime minister and Putin loyalist Dmitri Medvedev described the Baltics as “our” (meaning Russian) provinces and Poland as “temporarily occupied” (meaning by NATO).

By threatening to send troops, European countries are trying to disrupt this worrying trajectory. To truly change the outcome in Ukraine, however, European countries must do more than simply talk about deployments. If the United States continues to delay aid, and especially if it elects Donald Trump (who has pledged to end the war in Ukraine within 24 hours, presumably by allowing Putin to keep his ill-gotten gains) as president in November, Europe will be Ukraine’s only defender. European leaders cannot afford to let American political dysfunction dictate European security. They must seriously contemplate deploying troops to Ukraine to provide logistical support and training, to protect Ukraine’s borders and critical infrastructure, or even to defend Ukrainian cities. They must make it clear to Russia that Europe is willing to protect Ukraine’s territorial sovereignty. Accepting the dire reality of the situation in Ukraine and addressing it now is better than leaving a door open for Russia to accelerate its imperial advance.

CHANGE THE CONVERSATION​

The idea of European troops deploying to Ukraine has elicited predictable objections. The Kremlin was outraged by Macron and others’ recent statements warning of war—possibly a nuclear one—with all of Europe. Washington and Berlin also responded angrily. Both Germany and the United States have strictly limited the aid they gave Ukraine throughout the war, agonizing that Russia might make good on its threats of escalation, and they sharply criticized the more hawkish European states for what they see as unnecessary provocation.

Such opposition does not lessen the benefits that European forces would provide in Ukraine, and the fact that Berlin, Moscow, and Washington all reacted so strongly shows why it is so important to have this discussion. European leaders have demonstrated that it is possible to break out of a one-sided escalation debate that, until how, has worked to Russia’s advantage. In the previous pattern, Moscow has threatened escalation, and Berlin and Washington have responded with words and actions aimed at de-escalation—a dynamic that deters both Germany and the United States from sending the more advanced missile systems that Ukraine desperately needs. Now, Europe is making the threats, and Russia is looking deeply uncomfortable.

Too many politicians and pundits in the United States and Europe echo Putin’s own talking points by warning that any kind of external intervention in Ukraine would lead to World War III. In reality, sending European troops would be a normal response to a conflict of this kind. Russia’s invasion disrupted the regional balance of power, and Europe has a vital interest in seeing the imbalance corrected. The obvious way to do this is to provide a lifeline to a Ukrainian military that could once again be left high and dry by the United States, and the best lifeline would be European soldiers. Unless the politics in the United States change, Ukraine will need alternate sources of assistance to keep its fight going—and Europe is the natural backer.

SEND IN THE TROOPS​

European forces could undertake either noncombat or combat operations to relieve some of the pressure on Ukraine. A strictly noncombat mission would be easiest to sell in most European capitals. European forces could relieve the Ukrainians performing logistics functions, such as maintaining and repairing combat vehicles. By staying west of the Dnieper River—a natural barrier protecting much of Ukraine from Russian advances—European forces would demonstrate that they are not there to kill Russian soldiers, preempting the inevitable Russian accusation of European aggression. Some Ukrainian vehicles are already being sent to Germany, Poland, and Romania for substantial repairs, but conducting this task closer to the front would speed up the process, reduce the time equipment is out of combat, and free up more Ukrainian forces for combat duties. French, Polish, and other European military advisers could also provide lethal and nonlethal training within Ukraine to further professionalize the country’s military. If additional mobilization expands the Ukrainian military in the coming year—which seems likely—increased capacity to train new recruits inside Ukraine will be particularly useful.

Of course, European forces could do more than repair and train. The most limited form of European combat missions could still remain west of the Dnieper River and be defensive in nature. One such mission could involve strengthening Ukraine’s air defense capabilities in this region by deploying personnel, providing equipment, or even taking over command and control of the Ukrainian air defense system. The risks of escalation would be minimal, as European forces would have little chance of killing the Russian military pilots who launch munitions into Ukraine from Belarusian and Russian airspace. But they would help shoot down cruise missiles and drones. In doing so, European-led air defense batteries would free up more Ukrainian troops to protect forces near the frontlines while also frustrating Russian attempts to destroy critical infrastructure and terrify the Ukrainian population into surrender. European forces could perform other defensive and humanitarian tasks, too, such as demining and defusing unexploded Russian ordinance. Taking over such work from Ukrainian personnel would help protect civilians and support Ukraine’s economic recovery, as farmers are now struggling to plant and harvest crops in fields full of mines and other unexploded munitions.



Sending European troops would be a normal response to a conflict of this kind.
Another combat role—which, like an air defense mission, would likely not engage Russian forces—would involve patrolling parts of the Ukrainian border where Russian troops are not deployed, such as the Black Sea coast and the borders with Belarus and Transnistria (a breakaway region in Moldova occupied by Russian forces). Guarding these flanks would free up more than 20,000 Ukrainian troops (and the weapons and ammunition they carry) to fight on the frontlines. It would also reduce the likelihood of a new front opening along these borders, as Russia would almost certainly seek to avoid broadening the war by attacking other European militaries. European forces could also help secure Ukraine’s three remaining Black Sea ports, which are vital to both the Ukrainian economy and global food security, relieving additional Ukrainian soldiers. Any kind of European operation in Ukraine would carry emotional weight as well. The presence of European troops would raise the morale of the Ukrainian people and reassure them that their country’s future is in Europe.

Finally, Europe needs to consider a direct combat mission that helps protect Ukrainian territory west of the Dnieper. In addition to reducing the burden of the Ukrainian military in these regions, the presence of European troops would make it unlikely that Russian forces would advance across the river, protecting much of Ukraine from conquest. One potential Russian target is Odessa, Ukraine’s main port where most of the country’s exports are shipped. If Russian troops were to approach the city, European forces in the vicinity would have the right to defend themselves by firing on the advancing soldiers. They could help thwart a Russian offensive that, given Odessa’s strategic position, could strangle the Ukrainian economy and position Russian forces for a potential invasion of Moldova. Moscow would try to spin any lethal response to a Russian attack as European aggression, but Russia would be responsible for any escalation.

PUTIN ON THE BACK FOOT​

The risk that deploying European soldiers to Ukraine in any capacity will escalate the conflict is overblown. Russia has precious little room to scale up its conventional attacks, short of deploying biological or chemical weapons. It has already lost more than 90 percent of its prewar army, with hundreds of thousands of casualties, tens of thousands of combat vehicles destroyed, and the vast majority of its most advanced weapons systems expended in attacks on Ukraine. Sanctions have made Russian weapons production more difficult and costly, and the deployment of troops to Ukraine has left Russia with barely enough forces to guard the rest of its long border, let alone mount a significant operation against other European states. In January 2022, the Russian army was widely considered second only to the U.S. Army; today, it may not even be the most powerful army in Ukraine. But if European leaders were to let Russia win in Ukraine, Putin’s takeaway would be that making nuclear threats could allow him to conquer more countries without provoking a European military response.

The real question is whether Russia would actually use nuclear weapons if European forces enter Ukraine. Arguably, this is already a moot point, given that special operations forces from Western countries are currently operating inside Ukraine. Moscow regularly employs aggressive rhetoric toward NATO members, but so far it has been all bark and no bite, avoiding contact with NATO forces and focusing instead on neighboring countries outside the alliance, such as Georgia and Ukraine, that it can safely kick around. Putin threatened to attack Poland, Romania, and the Baltic states back in 2014, and over the next several years he threatened to invade Finland and Sweden for joining NATO, Norway for hosting additional U.S. troops, Poland and Romania for housing ballistic missile defense facilities, and “any European countries” that allowed U.S. missiles to be deployed on their soil. In the past decade and a half, the Kremlin has threatened or run war games that simulate the use of nuclear weapons against Denmark, Poland, Sweden, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, the Baltic states, the European Union as a whole, and, of course, NATO and the United States. At some point, European leaders must ignore Putin’s saber-rattling, which is merely propaganda premised on the baseless notion that NATO wants to attack or invade Russia.

The arrival of European forces in Ukraine would change Putin’s calculations.
Ultimately, Russia cannot afford to fight multiple European countries at once, much less start a nuclear war. Tellingly, the countries that are most likely to be targeted in a nuclear attack—those that border Russia, particularly Poland and the Baltic states—are the least concerned about that prospect but rightly fear the aggression of a reconstituted conventional Russian military, buoyed by success in Ukraine. Europe is far richer, is more technologically advanced, and has a much larger population than Russia. Moscow knows it cannot win by provoking the whole continent, and it seeks to avoid the U.S. military intervention that would very likely follow if Russian forces were to invade a NATO country and trigger Article 5 of the alliance’s charter.
Instead, Russia is basing its hopes for victory almost entirely on Europe treating Ukraine as separate from the rest of the continent. So far, its hopes have come to pass. European leaders have tolerated attacks on Ukraine that would have triggered a united European response had they happened in any NATO or EU member state. This attitude has allowed Russia to escalate its war in Ukraine, safe in the knowledge that the rest of Europe will keep its distance.
The arrival of European forces in Ukraine would change that calculation. Moscow would have to face the possibility that European escalation could make the war unwinnable for Russia. Moreover, a European-led response would subvert Russian propaganda that NATO countries’ intervention in Ukraine is merely an American ploy to undermine Russia. The narrative that NATO is the aggressor in this war is popular in many parts of the world, and countering it could help Europe further isolate Moscow both diplomatically and economically. And because European forces would be acting outside the NATO framework and NATO territory, any casualties would not trigger an Article 5 response and draw in the United States. Russia’s opponent would not be NATO but a coalition of European countries seeking to balance against naked Russian imperialism.
Ukraine is doing the best it can, but it needs help—help that European countries are able and increasingly willing to provide. Rather than force Russian escalation, a European troop presence would be more likely to prevent the conflict from spreading and prevent further damage to Ukraine’s economy and infrastructure. European leaders do not need to follow the dictates of an increasingly unreliable United States about how the battle in Ukraine should be waged; they can and should decide for themselves how best to ensure the continent’s freedom and security. Europe must do what it takes to safeguard its own future, and that starts with making sure Ukraine wins this war.

CORRECTION APPENDED (APRIL 22, 2024)​

An earlier version of this article incorrectly claimed that Russian President Vladimir Putin had declared that all former Soviet republics should be returned to Russia.

  • ALEX CROWTHER is a Senior Fellow with the Transatlantic Defense and Security Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis and a retired U.S. Army Colonel.
  • JAHARA MATISEK is a Military Professor at the U.S. Naval War College, Research Fellow at the European Resilience Initiative Center, and a Lieutenant Colonel in the U.S. Air Force. The views expressed here are his own.
  • PHILLIPS P. O’BRIEN is Head of the School of International Relations and Professor of Strategic Studies at the University of St. Andrews.
  • MORE BY ALEX CROWTHER
  • MORE BY JAHARA MATISEK
  • MORE BY PHILLIPS P. O’BRIEN
 

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Poland's Duda says country ready to host nuclear weapons​

Issued on: 22/04/2024 - 23:14 Modified: 22/04/2024 - 23:19

Video by:Mark OWENFollow|Andrew HILLIARFollow

Poland is ready to host nuclear weapons if NATO wants to reinforce its eastern borders against Russia. President Andrejz Duda said the Warsaw-Washington talks were about the idea of nuclear sharing. Andrew Hilliar takes a closer look at where the alliance currently keeps the weapons. Mark Owen speaks to Kristine Berzina, Managing Director, Geostrategy North at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, about NATO and the nuclear deterrent in the Ukraine war.
 

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Poland ready to host NATO members' nuclear weapons to counter Russia, president says​

Story by NEWS WIRES
• 2h • 2 min read

Poland’s president says the NATO member would be ready to host the nuclear weapons of the military alliances's other members in response to Russia’s moving its nuclear weapons to neighboring Belarus.

President Andrzej Duda made the comments in an interview published Monday in the Fakt tabloid.

Russia has “recently relocated its nuclear weapons to Belarus,” Duda said, in a reference to Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko's announcement in December.

“If there were a decision by our allies to deploy nuclear weapons within the nuclear sharing also on our territory in order to strengthen the security of NATO's eastern flank, we are ready,” Duda said.

He said Poland is aware of its obligations within the 32-member alliance that includes the United States.

Prime Minister Donald Tusk, who shares Duda’s views on national security, later told journalists that Poland's security and military potential are his priorities, but he needs to discuss this suggestion with Duda urgently.

“I would also like any potential initiatives to be, first of all, very well prepared by the people responsible for them and (I would like) all of us to be absolutely positive that we want it,” Tusk said in a rather reserved response.


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Related video: Poland's Duda says country ready to host nuclear weapons (France 24)

“This idea is absolutely massive, I would say, and very serious (and) I would need to know all the circumstances that have led the president to make this declaration,” he said.

Duda has previously spoken of Poland’s openness to nuclear sharing within NATO, before Tusk's government came to power in December.

In Moscow, a Kremlin spokesperson said any deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in Poland would be met with steps necessary for Russia’s security.

“The military will, of course, analyze the situation if such plans are implemented, and in any case will do everything necessary, (will take) all the necessary retaliatory steps to guarantee our safety,” Dmitry Peskov said during a daily news conference.

Three NATO members are nuclear powers: the U.S., the United Kingdom and France.

Within the sharing program, the U.S has nuclear facilities based in some allied countries: Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey, to deploy and store the weapons. Washington retains absolute control and custody over the weapons it deploys.
Seven members of the alliance have dual-capability aircraft that can carry conventional bombs or nuclear warheads and are available for use should such a strike be needed.

Poland is a staunch supporter of neighboring Ukraine as it fends off Russia's full-scale invasion, now in its third year.

(AP)
 

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China’s new H-20 stealth bomber ‘not really’ a concern for Pentagon, says intel official

“The thing with the H-20 is when you actually look at the system design, it's probably nowhere near as good as US LO [low observable] platforms, particularly more advanced ones that we have coming down,” said a DoD intelligence official.​

By MICHAEL MARROW on April 22, 2024 at 4:20 PM

WASHINGTON — Whatever may come of China’s new long-range stealth bomber known as the Xi’an H-20, US officials are confident it won’t measure up to American designs, according to a DoD intelligence official.

“The thing with the H-20 is when you actually look at the system design, it’s probably nowhere near as good as US LO [low observable] platforms, particularly more advanced ones that we have coming down,” the official said, speaking on condition of anonymity in a briefing with reporters at the Pentagon today.

“They’ve run into a lot of engineering design challenges, in terms of how do you actually make that system capability function in a similar way to, like, a B-2 or a B-21,” the official added.

The H-20 is expected to be Beijing’s answer to American platforms such as the new B-21 Raider, though little is known about the Chinese program given intense state secrecy.

In March, a Chinese military official reportedly told state-owned newspaper Hong Kong Commercial Daily that the H-20 would be unveiled soon, though the timeline is not clear.

“You may choose to unveil it just because they want to show that they’re a great, you know, military power. That doesn’t necessarily mean it actually delivers them the kind of capability that they would need or at the quantity that they would need,” the DoD intelligence official said.

Asked whether the H-20 is a concern, the official replied “Not really.”

It’s not the first time a DoD official has verbally shrugged at a key part of China’s military aviation modernization plan. In September 2022, former Pacific Air Forces Commander Gen. Kenneth Wilsbach told reporters that the J-20 stealth fighter isn’t “anything to lose a lot of sleep over.” (The DoD intelligence official today said the J-20 is “still a highly capable system” but one that did not “meet all of [China’s] original parameters.”)

Preparing For A ‘Protracted’ Fight With US​

While not billed as a China briefing, the DoD intelligence official’s comments today were almost exclusively focused on the military threat posed by Beijing, which Pentagon officials have dubbed America’s “pacing challenge.” China is serious about preparing all levels of society for a “protracted” conflict with the US, the official said, emphasizing that Beijing is purposefully equipping the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to exploit American military weaknesses.

One key focus of China’s burgeoning military modernization is the expansion of its nuclear portfolio, with Beijing already amassing an operational arsenal of 500 nuclear warheads that officials warn [PDF] could surpass 1,000 by 2030. But there are doubts about some elements of the country’s actual military prowess given widespread corruption, which prompted outcomes like missiles filled with water instead of fuel and missile silos whose launch lids probably wouldn’t work, Bloomberg reported.

Asked about the Bloomberg report, the official said “some of them were probably filled with water or had door lids that didn’t open but not all of them” across China’s military force.

“The biggest, I guess, kind of challenge for the Chinese side is actually not so much capability of actual systems, it’s more capability of personnel to effectively employ those systems at speed and at scale,” the official said.

Notably, China’s Rocket Force has seen a number of leaders publicly expelled from their roles in recent months, a purge which included then-Defense Minister Li Shangfu, reportedly under “corruption” charges. Though rooting out corruption in years past may have been a front to more simply consolidate power, recent anti-corruption moves by Chinese President Xi Jinping “seem to actually be [targeting] instances of corruption,” according to the official.

Nevertheless, officials are still preparing for a scenario where the bulk of Beijing’s military might is highly effective. Although US officials have publicly emphasized that war with China is neither inevitable nor imminent, Xi and “the CCP [Chinese Communist Party] almost certainly does” think war is inevitable, the official said, adding that CCP leadership believes that the US would be the one to start the conflict.

Explaining the thinking of senior Pentagon leaders, the DoD intelligence official said “I don’t want to rely on the Chinese not being good [at combat], because we’re not going to know they’re not good until they’re shooting at us. And I don’t want to be in a position where I find out, ‘Oh, they actually are that good. That’s a problem.’”
 

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Europe

Russia funneling weapons through Libyan port, eying gateway to Africa​

By Tom Kington
Friday, Apr 19

ROME — Russian vessels have been unloading thousands of tons of military equipment in the eastern Libyan port of Tobruk this month after repeated visits by Russia’s deputy defense minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov to Gen. Khalifa Haftar, the strongman running eastern Libya.

The shipments, arriving from the Russian-controlled port of Tartus in Syria, contain towed artillery, armored personnel carriers and rocket launchers according to video released by Libyan news site Fawasel Media.

The equipment may in part be used to sustain Russia’s growing military presence in eastern Libya, but are also likely destined for countries further south in Africa like Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso where Russia has ties to leaders of recent coups.

Some experts see the uptick in activity as a result of America’s diplomatic strategy toward Haftar, which has failed to stop the warlord from allying with Russia and given Moscow the chance to pour weapons into the country, turning it into a gateway to supply its growing presence across Africa, the criticism goes.

“Eastern Libya is becoming a significant way station into Africa for Russia, and it comes after the U.S. seriously misplayed Haftar,” said Ben Fishman, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

“There has been an continuous U.S. attempt to engage with Haftar, rather than isolate him, but he has repeatedly defied our requests and UN requests and moved closer to Russia. The U.S. approach has been to run the same football play over and over and expect a different result,” said Fishman, who previously served on the National Security Council.

Fishman said that Haftar had received Russian visits and made trips to Moscow while also holding meetings in Libya with Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Barbara Leaf and U.S. special envoy Richard Norland.

“Indeed, the day after Norland and the Commander of Africom visited Derna in eastern Libya after the floods last September, Haftar flew to Moscow,” he said.

“Their approach was ‘He will move closer to Russia if we isolate him,’ but he moved closer anyway and Moscow is profiting,” said Fishman.

Through its proxy Wagner mercenaries, Russia backed Haftar’s failed bid to conquer western Libya in 2019 after the country split following the ousting of national leader Col. Muamar Gadaffi in 2011.

American diplomacy has recently aimed at convincing Haftar to take part in national elections to reunite the country, while Moscow has reportedly focused on negotiating a permanent Russian naval presence at Tobruk, giving it a foothold in the central Mediterranean.

As Russian military instructors meanwhile arrive in Niger to support coup leaders who took over the country last year, the fate of a U.S. base in the country from which drone flights are launched across Africa is in the balance.

“For some U.S. officials, Haftar is a good anti-terrorism asset so they are prepared to look away when he abuses human rights or jumps into bed with the Russians,” said a former Western diplomat who declined to be identified.

“But if the U.S. is worried about Russia’s growing role in Africa then maybe it should go beyond occasionally expressing concern,” the diplomat said.

On April 17, a U.S. Navy MQ-4C Triton drone flying out of Sigonella airbase in Sicily monitored Tobruk.

Fishman argued that the U.S. should have enlisted the help of the UAE or Egypt, who back Haftar. “Egypt has no interest in an increased Russian presence across the border in Libya - this was a missed opportunity,” he said.

“We never made it clear that isolation was an option. The next move could be sanctions, although that could be complicated by the fact that Haftar is a U.S. citizen. Aware of the threat, he has reportedly been moving accounts out of the U.S.,” said Fishman.

Before marshaling troops in Libya, Haftar was a CIA asset, living for years in Virginia.

Fishman said, “To reduce Russia’s ability to use Tobruk, there could be disruption of radar use or the stationing of vessels off the coast – but that is now impossible now given our commitments in the Red Sea.”
 

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Kim Jong Un leads first 'nuclear trigger' system test with salvo missile launch | NK News​



North Korea warns U.S. and South Korea, blames recent joint air force drills for raising tensions
Kim Jong Un leads first ‘nuclear trigger’ system test with salvo missile launch

Kim Jong Un and top missile development officials Jang Chang Ha (left) and Kim Jong Sik (right) at the missile test site on April 22 | Image: Rodong Sinmun (April 23, 2024)

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un led the country's first "'Nuclear Trigger' system" test on Monday in the form of a salvo missile launch, according to state media, while blaming the U.S. and South Korea for raising tensions.

The drills involved training over raising the country's war alert system leading up to the launch of four 600mm multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) rockets at once using the “national nuclear weapon comprehensive control system” that Pyongyang has named “Nuclear Trigger.”
 

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Opinion Geopolitics

Ukraine is the front line of a much larger conflict​

America and its allies see Russia, China, Iran and North Korea as an axis of adversaries

GIDEON RACHMAN
YESTERDAY Comments 986

After many months of argument and hesitation, the House of Representatives has finally acted. The vote in Washington to provide $61bn in new military aid for Ukraine may be a turning point in the war with Russia. At the very least, it will keep Ukraine in the fight. The Russians will continue to hope that, if Donald Trump is elected president this November, this might be the last big package of American military aid. But even that might not be fatal to the Ukrainian cause. Europe’s military industries are belatedly cranking into action and will be in a better position to supply Ukraine in 2025.

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The vote to provide extra money for Ukraine went through the House, alongside separate votes providing substantial aid for Israel and Taiwan. Together they offer a clear sense of how America — and its key allies in Europe and Asia — now see the world. Collectively all of this money is intended to push back against four countries that General Chris Cavoli, the commander of US forces in Europe, describes as an “axis of adversaries”: Russia, China, Iran and North Korea. Talk of an axis brings back unfortunate memories of 2002 and George W Bush’s “axis of evil”, which seriously overplayed the connections between Iraq, Iran and North Korea. But, two decades on, there is much harder evidence of serious military co-operation between Moscow, Beijing, Tehran and Pyongyang. The US charges that China is supplying Russia with engines for drones, machines for cruise missiles and other forms of military aid. The regimes in Pyongyang and Tehran have become vital suppliers of weaponry for Moscow. China also recently proclaimed its “deep friendship” with North Korea, and dispatched a very senior official to Pyongyang for talks.

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As these four autocracies pull closer together, so America’s democratic allies are also tightening their links. In Washington, the US and Japan recently announced a raft of new agreements that will take their security partnership to a new level. South Korea is also a major supplier of weapons for Ukraine. The “western alliance” is now, in reality, a global network of allies that sees itself as engaged in a series of linked regional struggles. Russia is the key adversary in Europe. Iran is the most disruptive power in the Middle East. North Korea is a constant danger in Asia. China’s behaviour and rhetoric are becoming more aggressive, and it can marshal resources that are not available to Moscow or Tehran. Of course, there remain important distinctions between these countries. Russia, Iran and North Korea are treated as pariah nations by the US and its allies. By contrast, China remains a major trading partner of all the countries of the “global west”. In Washington and Tokyo, however, the acting assumption is that, in the long run, Xi Jinping is just as determined as Vladimir Putin or Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to overturn the current world order. The Japanese, like the Americans, think that what happens in Ukraine will have a vital bearing on what happens in the Indo-Pacific.

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The US and its allies believe therefore that they are playing defence by supporting countries that are in the line of fire of the axis of adversaries — above all, Ukraine, Israel and Taiwan. Strengthening military support for these countries has attracted criticism across the political spectrum. The isolationist right in the US remains bitterly opposed to aiding Ukraine. The progressive left accuses the US of supporting Israeli “genocide” in Gaza. Even some who support the aspiration to defend the current global power structure worry about the strategy. The late Henry Kissinger was concerned that American support for Ukraine was driving Russia into the arms of China. Others believe that America simply lacks the military and economic resources to lead the pushback against adversaries in Asia, Europe and the Middle East simultaneously. There may be some truth in that. A senior Biden administration aide concedes that “we’re pretty maxed out at the moment”. But the Americans and their allies also know that their adversaries have huge difficulties. Russia has sustained hundreds of thousands of casualties in its war with Ukraine. The Chinese economy is struggling. Iran faces internal unrest and North Korea is a nuclear-armed basket case. Washington is also grappling with how to strengthen deterrence without getting the US directly involved in a war with any of the axis of adversaries. In practice, this has often meant providing America’s frontline allies with new military aid, while simultaneously trying to restrain their actions. Throughout the Ukraine war, the US has tried to discourage Ukraine from striking deep inside Russia. After Iran fired a barrage of missiles at Israel this month, the US also moved to stop the conflict escalating further. And even as the US provides extra political and military support to Taiwan, it has insisted that Taiwan must not provoke Beijing by taking overt steps towards formal political independence from China. America is playing a potentially deadly mind game with its adversaries, deploying military force selectively, in the hope of preventing the outbreak of a wider war. Ukraine is fighting for its own freedom and independence. But it is also the front line in what is potentially a much larger conflict.

gideon.rachman@ft.com Letter in response to this column: Ukraine analysis conjures Shakespeare comparison / From Mergen Mongush, Moscow, Russia
 

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FT Investigations Russian politics

How Russia war-gamed a Chinese invasion​

Leaked military documents lay bare Moscow’s long-standing fears about Beijing

Max Seddon and Chris Cook in London
FEBRUARY 28 2024
Comments 255

Angry mobs clashing with police in eastern cities. Networks of saboteurs smuggling arms across the border for attacks on police stations and military barracks. A resentful nuclear power boosting defence production as it accuses its neighbour of ethnic cleansing.

These all sound like Russia’s playbook when it first invaded Ukraine in 2014, then launched a full-scale war in 2022. But the storylines are all from Russian military training exercises based on a hypothetical Chinese invasion of its far east.

The war games, which were written by Russian officers between 2008 and 2014 and leaked to the Financial Times, offer an extraordinary window on the army’s long-standing fears about Beijing’s real intentions, according to experts who reviewed the files.

As well as offering unprecedented detail on Russia’s nuclear doctrine, they recount years of exercises rehearsing a possible Chinese invasion, revealing the military establishment’s deep suspicion of Beijing even as leaders Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping began forging a “no limits” partnership.

Though the prospect of war between China and Russia may seem far-fetched today, the scenarios give granular insight into how Moscow’s military thought about threats from China — as well as the tactics it deployed to wage war in Ukraine.

In one war game scenario, China pays fake protesters to clash with police in Russia’s far east, then sends saboteurs to covertly attack Russian security infrastructure. Once tensions reach a boiling point, China increases defence production and ominously deploys army units at the border as it accuses Russia of “genocide”.

Alexander Gabuev, director of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center in Berlin, said Russia regularly practised such war games during the 2008-2014 period against a China that “was obviously seen as a threat”.

“Many new weapons systems were deployed to the far east first, even though Russia always said Nato was the main threat and China was a partner.”

Fears in Moscow that Beijing could exploit Russia’s weaknesses along its sparsely populated end of their border were particularly pronounced in the 1960s and 1970s, including a seven-month undeclared military conflict in 1969. They rose again in the 1990s as a weak Russia faced up to its eastern neighbour’s rise.

But after Putin came to power at the end of the decade, the dynamic changed. China and Russia signed an agreement never to invade each other, or carry out a nuclear first strike, and dropped all territorial claims.

Putin built an even closer relationship with Xi Jinping, who came to power in 2012. Their co-operation became a “no-limits” partnership weeks before the invasion of Ukraine. Beijing has offered tacit backing for Moscow’s campaign, as well as an economic lifeline to lessen the blow from western sanctions.

Putin’s spokesperson on Wednesday said the Kremlin “strongly doubts” the authenticity of the leaked documents. China’s foreign ministry meanwhile stressed that “eternal friendship and non-enmity” had been “legally established” between the two countries. “The ‘threat theory’ has no market in China and Russia.”

In the world of these military training scenarios, however, such friendship is viewed with suspicion — a facade for China’s imperial designs on Russia’s far eastern territories.

One document from a 2014 exercise describes relations spiralling towards conflict following the rise to power of “a new generation of nationalist leaders” in Dasinia, the fictional name for a country with China’s precise geography.

Initially, Dasinia is said to want to deepen its ties with the Northern Federation, the alias for Russia. But the deeply cynical Dasinians seek to exploit any tensions between the North and western countries.

Soon Dasinia is demanding “sharp increases of raw hydrocarbon materials at extremely disadvantageous conditions” from the North to power its overheated economy. Dasinia begins preparing for war after the North says no.

Some documents suggest concern that China might mount offensives via Kazakhstan — possibly leading to strikes on western Siberia and even the Urals. But in several exercises dating back as far as 2008, the invasion force’s ultimate goal is to take over the Russian far east.

The plots highlight Russian fears about the Chinese diaspora within Russia, who are depicted as an explicit foreign policy tool of Beijing. The population, however, is small — with fewer than 29,000 officially recorded in the 2010 census.

One of several exercises focused on an invasion of Kazakhstan and western Siberia, dated July 2014, says China wants to find more “living space” for its population there, turning the countries into “resource colonies”.

Michael Kofman, a senior fellow at Carnegie, cautioned that the “road to war” in military exercises are often “contrived, designed to test the force, and set up the exercise”. “They’re not necessarily reflective of what is assessed as the likeliest or most realistic threat.”

Indeed in recent years Russia’s military has appeared to lower its guard with China. Large-scale Vostok drills held by Moscow’s forces in 2018 and 2022 in the far east included some limited Chinese participation, while Beijing has acquired some advanced Russian weaponry such as the S-400 missile defence system. The two countries held their largest joint naval and air exercise on Japan’s doorstep last year.

But William Alberque, a director at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, said the military co-operation had still largely been limited to “photo opportunities and parades” rather than areas of particular sensitivity, such as joint operations, planning or dynamic targeting.

Experts say current Russian exercises with nuclear-capable missile systems near the Chinese border, held as recently as November, indicate the Russian military is still training for a possible conflict — one that could potentially involve tactical nuclear weapons.

Spheres of competition between Russia and China remain, particularly in Central Asia. Russia’s focus on Kazakhstan in the documents indicates how Moscow saw the challenge from Beijing in Central Asia coming through military diplomacy, said Jack Watling, senior fellow at the Royal United Services Institute.

“Kazakh personnel were being invited to Chinese staff colleges [for military education] at a scale that began to outmatch Russia’s,” he said. “Many traditional Russian partners in the ‘near abroad’ were having to hedge between Moscow and Beijing.”

Gabuev said for now, though, the war in Ukraine has led an overstretched Russia to become more accepting of China in Central Asia. “Russia doesn’t have the resources to be the main regional policeman on its own any more. It’s looking towards sharing the burden with China to stop any kind of western presence.”
 

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TurkishFacts4u
@TurkishFacts4U

IMPORTANT

There are indications that Turkiye will declare its nuclear weapons State status immediately upon it commissioning its indigenous MILDEN submarines & testing its Satellite Launch Vehicle.

At that point no one can stop it with force.

10:24 PM · Apr 24, 2024
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----------------

I haven't been able to find anything further on this statement.

Erdogan's past statements are telling......From 2019

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World

Erdogan says it's unacceptable that Turkey can't have nuclear weapons​

By Reuters
September 4, 2019 5:59 PM PDT Updated 5 years ago

ANKARA (Reuters) - Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan said on Wednesday it was unacceptable for nuclear-armed states to forbid Ankara from obtaining its own nuclear weapons, but did not say whether Turkey had plans to obtain them.

"Some countries have missiles with nuclear warheads, not one or two. But (they tell us) we can't have them. This, I cannot accept," he told his ruling AK Party members in the eastern city of Sivas.

"There is no developed nation in the world that doesn't have them," Erdogan said. In fact, many developed countries do not have nuclear weapons.

Turkey signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1980, and has also signed the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which bans all nuclear detonations for any purpose.

Erdogan hinted that he wanted the same protection for Turkey as Israel.

"We have Israel nearby, as almost neighbours. They scare (other nations) by possessing these. No one can touch them."

Foreign analysts say Israel possesses a sizable nuclear arsenal. Israel maintains a policy of ambiguity around the nuclear issue, refusing to confirm or deny its capabilities.

Reporting by Ece Toksabay; Editing by Frances Kerry

_________________________________________________________

Turkish-Navy-MILDEN-Submarine.jpg


map-range-rings-2.gif

 

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A PRUSSIAN STRATEGY FOR WARS OF ATTRITION​

ADAM L. STORRING
APRIL 24, 2024
COMMENTARY

As we enter spring 2024, Ukraine’s military position looks tenuous. Its counter-offensive in 2023 did not achieve the ambitious results that Ukraine’s allies had hoped for, and the Ukrainians are now under pressure from Russian forces that have great superiority in both troops and materiel.

In a recent article, Alexander Burns argued that Ukraine’s predicament is in many ways similar to that of the German state of Prussia during the Seven Years’ War of 1756–63. In that conflict, Prussia not only survived a long struggle against much larger opponents but even ended up militarily on the front foot. Delving deeper into Prussian history can offer even more into how this was, and is, possible.

The Seven Years’ War shows that there is more than one way of fighting the kind of war of attrition that we currently see in Ukraine and that, crucially, it is not necessarily vital to out-kill the enemy in order to win. Whereas the stronger side will take the offensive to grind down its opponent, even the side with fewer resources can still win a war of attrition by conserving its strength and waiting for other factors to turn to its advantage. Michael Kofman, Rob Lee, and Dara Massicot have argued that, in 2024, Ukraine should aim to “hold, build and strike,” and the record of Prince Henry of Prussia shows how such a strategy can indeed yield success. For years, Henry carefully husbanded the lives of his outnumbered troops, dragging out the war until circumstances turned in Prussia’s favor, and then counter-attacking to win a key battle that helped bring peace. His example is one that Ukraine can seek to emulate.

A German Way of War?

The Prussian and German armies are typically seen as archetypal exponents of offensive maneuver warfare. The United States and many of its allies have closely studied and sought to emulate the operations most famously of German armored formations during World War II. Western armed forces trained the Ukrainians to employ such methods in their 2023 counter-offensive, and the underwhelming results of this offensive have led to widespread criticism of Western methods of combined arms maneuver. In 2024, Ukraine clearly needs to take a much more defensive approach. Is it time to turn our back on Prusso-German examples? Not at all!

Understanding why begins with deconstructing the myth that there was an aggressive “German way of war.” The military methods of the famous Prussian King Frederick the Great (reigned 1740–86), for example, have been painted as prefiguring Blitzkrieg. But in fact, I have shown that these methods were not typically German at all; rather, they drew on French examples. Moreover, the Seven Years’ War, one of the defining wars of Prussian history, was an attritional struggle that was actually won on the defensive. While advocates of mobile warfare typically idolize Frederick the Great, I instead shine the spotlight on Prince Henry — perhaps the Prussian army’s most outstanding defensive commander — and explain how he can be the inspiration for Ukraine’s fightback.

History . . . teaches no lessons,” said Michael Howard, and Joseph Stieb has recently re-emphasized this in an article in War on the Rocks. Certainly, it is not possible to map any situation from the past completely onto one in the present, and the belief that any given historical event teaches lessons that are applicable in all cases irrespective of context can be very dangerous. The example of Prussia in the Seven Years’ War does not in every respect match the current situation of Ukraine, but it does offer a crucial new perspective: that even the weaker side can still win a war of attrition if it stops trying to out-kill its enemies and instead focuses on conserving its strength until other factors turn in its favor.

The Prussian Precedent Revisited

For Prussia, the Seven Years’ War was a grim struggle for survival. With only Great Britain and a few small German states as allies, Frederick the Great found himself facing a coalition of all Europe’s biggest land powers: the Austrian Habsburg empire, France, Russia, Sweden, and a host of other German states. Much like the Ukrainians in 2023, Frederick the Great tried to win decisive battles. Indeed, the Western armed forces that trained the Ukrainians see their methods of maneuver warfare as to some extent following Prusso-German traditions. Like the war in Ukraine today, however, the Seven Years’ War was dominated by artillery. Just as Ukraine’s offensive in 2023 struggled against tough Russian defenses, so Frederick — for instance, at the 1757 battle of Kolin — found himself unable to defeat enemies who used powerful artillery in strong defensive positions. Moreover, much like their counterparts in 2023, the Russian army used field fortifications to help beat off Prussian attacks at the battles of Kay and Kunersdorf. One commentator has even argued that Russia’s use of artillery in Ukraine reflects traditions that go back to the Seven Years’ War and earlier conflicts. Just like Ukraine’s leaders today, Frederick the Great found that a qualitatively superior army was being bled white by larger but qualitatively inferior enemies who made use of strong defensive positions and massed firepower.

Like Ukraine today, the Prussians responded by turning more to defensive positions. They also benefitted from their opponents’ inability to utilize fully their superior strength. For most of the Seven Years’ War, the mountain ranges that run along what is now the northern border of the Czech Republic made it extremely difficult for the Austrians to supplyoffensive operations on Prussian territory. They took years to punch through the mountains, and by then political developments had turned in Prussia’s favor and the Austrians themselves had nearly gone bankrupt. The French and Russians also struggled to supply their armies, which had to cover long distances to reach the Prussian heartland. In this respect, the Ukrainian case does not map neatly onto the Prussian one. Most obviously, the Ukrainians do not have the protection of mountain ranges. Nevertheless, heavy losses of vehicles in the battle of Avdiivka have already impeded Russian advances, and Ukraine has had some success in interdicting Russian lines of communication such as the Kerch bridge in Crimea. While it would go too far to draw concrete lessons for Ukraine, the Prussian example is certainly a reminder in general terms that, rather than having to withstand the blows of the Russian sledgehammer directly, it is also possible to prevent the Russians from swinging it with full force.

Most importantly, the Seven Years’ War shows that a strategy of attrition can take a variety of forms. Attrition does not necessarily need to involve killing and wounding larger numbers of the enemy’s troops. It can also involve trying to avoidcombat and dragging out a war until other circumstances change. In the Seven Years’ War, Prussia faced opponents with substantially larger armed forces than itself. The Austrian Empress Maria Theresa was aware of this, and repeatedly urged her top commander, Field Marshal Leopold Joseph von Daun, to seek battle with the Prussians. She even absolved him in advance if he were defeated: The important thing was to grind down the smaller Prussian army with the larger Austrian one. In Ukraine, the Russian army has become adept at employing this kind of strategy, using “meat” attacks that sacrifice large numbers of troops but reduce the numerically weaker Ukrainian forces.

This, however, was where Prince Henry made his crucial contribution. From the beginning of the war, he set himself against Frederick the Great’s strategy of risking heavy casualties through offensive operations. Whether Henry was actually any less aggressive than Frederick is debatable: he had written texts before the war that were as gung-ho as anything Frederick came up with. Henry, however, typically set himself up in opposition to his elder brother and so, with Frederick favoring the offensive, Henry became Prussia’s great apostle of the defensive.

Henry’s alternative approach made a big difference. When Frederick, for instance, wanted to attack the strong Austrian position at Zittau, Henry persuaded him that it was impossible. By one account, later in the war, Prussian troops lauded Prince Henry for winning “great success” with “small losses,” whereas under Frederick, “We are made to crack our heads like dogs, to no purpose.” In the same spirit, Ukraine’s leadership needs to resist Western pressure to launch another premature offensive, which could well turn into another Kolin or Kunersdorf. The Ukrainians, however, also need to avoid unnecessary battles that expose their troops to casualties they cannot afford. In the battle of Bakhmut, the Ukrainian army inflicted four times as many casualties as it suffered, but 70 percent of Russian losses were expendable convicts serving with the Wagner Group, and this is an example of how, for the weaker side, simply out-killing the opposition may not necessarily bring victory in a war of attrition.

During the Seven Years’ War, Prince Henry devised a most effective defensive system. His forces were always numerically inferior to their enemies, but he spread them out to cover large areas, with strong detachments holding carefully chosen defensive positions and other areas screened by irregular troops. The prince made up for his weakness through mobility, shifting units around, and harassing his enemies to keep them on the back foot. It was a risky approach, but he had the skill to pull it off.

By drawing out the war, preserving the lives of his troops, and slowing the enemy’s advances, Prince Henry gave time for other factors to turn in Prussia’s favor. In particular, there was a dramatic political shift, as Russia’s Empress Elizabeth died in 1762 and her successor — the Prussophile Peter III, who greatly admired Frederick the Great — actually allied with Prussia and sent a Russian army to help their former enemies!

Back to the Present

Fortunately for Ukraine, its victory does not depend on political change of this magnitude. All it needs is much smaller shifts in the politics of its existing allies in order to swing the war in its favor. Most obviously, the U.S. Congress could finally pass a new aid package for Ukraine, and the November elections could potentially yield a new Biden administration with congressional backing to continue supporting the Ukrainians. Within Europe, France could finally start pulling its weight in terms of sending military aid to Ukraine, and Britain could increase its aid to match that provided by Germany. Germany too could send more help, including Taurus missiles. The European Union’s defense program could pick up steam, and European Union countries could source more weapons for Ukraine from elsewhere in the world. All of these political changes — or some combination of them — are perfectly possible and realistic, and even if only some of them came to pass, they would greatly change Ukraine’s situation. The Ukrainians just need to hold out until they take effect. Alexander Burns noted that the support Prussia received from its ally Britain during the Seven Years’ War was highly contingent on British domestic politics, and this is a reminder that Ukraine’s supporters in Western countries have an important role to play in pressing their politicians to send more aid.

Russia’s change of sides in 1762 left Prussia able to take the offensive. Already three years earlier, Prince Henry’s skilled maneuvering had nearly driven the Austrians back out of the positions they had gained in the mountains. In late 1762, after his defensive line had absorbed a series of punishing offensives from the Austrians and their German allies, Henry recognized that the enemy position was exposed and swung over to the attack. His well-timed and meticulously planned offensive at Freiberg on Oct. 29, 1762, was a deft maneuver. Advancing in four separate columns, the Prussians surprised and overwhelmed their enemies, capturing the crucial post and leaving the Austrian position in the mountains virtually untenable. With Frederick also having recaptured a key fortress from the Austrians, Maria Theresa soon agreed to a peace settlement. This kind of transition from a defense that preserves its soldiers’ lives to an offensive that drives the enemy back is precisely what Ukraine could aspire to in the next twelve months.

Prussia’s experience in the Seven Years’ War offers hope for Ukraine, showing that, in a war of attrition, it is not necessarily vital to out-kill the other side in order to win. America famously found out in Vietnam that the body count is only one metric of attrition, and the Seven Years’ War shows that a strategy of attrition can take different forms. Whereas the stronger side needs to take the offensive, the weaker side can avoid combat where possible, preserving its limited resources and waiting for the political constellation to change or for the enemy to become economically exhausted.

Crucially, Ukraine does not need political changes of the magnitude that Prussia benefitted from. If its existing allies would just give it more support, that would make a huge difference. On the battlefield, Ukrainians can take heart from the example of Prince Henry of Prussia: a commander who carefully preserved his troops’ lives, helped drag out the war until other factors turned in Prussia’s favor, and then oversaw a deft counter-attack that helped bring the war to an end with Prussia militarily on the front foot. As Ukraine aims to “hold, build and strike,” it can seek to emulate such achievements.



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Dr. Adam L. Storring has taught at the department of war studies at King’s College London. His PhD, completed at the University of Cambridge, was awarded the André Corvisier prize for the best dissertation on military history defended at any university anywhere in the world. He is a contributor to the Cambridge History of Strategy and the Royal United Services Institute “Talking Strategy” podcast series, and this article reflects his forthcoming chapter in the Oxford Handbook of the Seven Years’ War.
 

jward

passin' thru

US troops to leave Chad in second African state withdrawal​



The United States will withdraw some troops from Chad, the Pentagon has said, days after Washington agreed to move forces out of neighboring Niger.

The US has approximately 100 troops stationed in Chad as part of its strategy to combat extremism in West Africa.
“USAFRICOM is currently planning to reposition some US military forces from Chad, a portion of which were already scheduled to depart,” Pentagon press secretary Major General Pat Ryder told a news conference on Thursday, referring to the US Africa Command unit.

“This is a temporary step as part of a ongoing review of our security cooperation, which will resume after Chad’s May 6 presidential election.”
Chad’s air force chief had ordered the US military this month to halt activities at an air base near the capital N’Djamena, according to a letter sent to the transitional government and seen by AFP.
He said he had asked the US military to provide documents “justifying its presence at the Adji Kossei Air Base” but had not received any.
US troops at the the Adji Kossei military base train anti-terrorism special forces and an elite unit of the Chadian army to combat the Nigerian jihadist group Boko Haram.

Neighboring Niger is also a lynchpin in the US and French strategy to combat jihadists in the region.
But Niger’s ruling military junta said in March that it was ending a military cooperation agreement with Washington, claiming it had been imposed and the US troop presence was illegal.
Washington this week began discussions with Niger on withdrawing the more than 1,000 US personnel in the country, which is also home to a $100-million American drone base.
The United States will “continue to explore options on how we can ensure that we’re able to continue to address potential terrorist threats” in the wake of the withdrawal, Ryder said this week following the announcement of the US pull-out from Niger.

General Mahamat Idriss Deby Itno seized the presidency of Chad in a 2021 coup after the death of his father, Idriss Deby Itno, who had ruled the Sahel country with an iron fist for more than three decades.
He announced in March his candidacy in the upcoming presidential election that has seen opposition candidates banned from running, and his main rival Yaya Dillo Djerou shot dead in an army assault on his party headquarters.

 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Posted for fair use.......

Russia vetoes UN resolution to prevent nuclear weapons in space​

News / April 26, 2024 / 12:05 PM PDT
Russia on Wednesday vetoed a United Nations Security Council resolution that would have called on all states to prevent the placement of nuclear weapons in space and not take steps to develop weapons of mass destruction that could be deployed above Earth.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Posted for fair use.......

MILITARY

India aims new Crystal Maze missile at Pakistan’s nukes​

Air-launched, Israel-made missile marks a shift from Russian arms and move toward a counterforce nuclear strategy vis-a-vis Pakistan
By GABRIEL HONRADA APRIL 25, 2024

India has just tested an Israeli air-launched ballistic missile (ALBM), reflecting a move away from Russia as its primary supplier for high-end weapons and the possible adoption of a counterforce strategy against Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.

This month, multiple media sources reported that India has successfully tested the Crystal Maze 2 ALBM, launching the projectile from a Su-30 MKI fighter jet. This test took place in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, under the oversight of the tri-service Andaman and Nicobar Command.

The Crystal Maze 2, developed by Israel and known as ROCKS, is designed for precision strikes against high-value targets up to 250 kilometers away. It can operate effectively in GPS-denied environments and penetrate areas protected by air defense systems, offering penetration or blast fragmentation warhead options.

These tests underscore India’s operational readiness and commitment to self-sufficiency in defense manufacturing, with many of these missiles planned to be procured under the “Make in India” initiative.

The successful integration and demonstration of these advanced missile systems boost India’s strategic military capabilities, emphasizing the nation’s focus on enhancing its defense sector and reducing dependence on imports.

Israel may have used ROCKS during its retaliation strike against Iran this month, following an extensive drone and missile attack from Iran in response to Israel’s strike against its consulate in Damascus, Syria, which was allegedly a command center for the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and Hezbollah.

According to Israeli defense contractor Rafael, ROCKS is a next-generation extended standoff air-to-surface missile. It is designed to strike high-value stationary and relocatable targets above ground, underground and heavily fortified targets with pinpoint accuracy in GPS-denied areas. ROCKS can be armed with a penetration or blast warhead.

ROCKS builds on the technologies used in Rafael’s legacy Popeye cruise missile and SPICE smart bombs. Its multiple guidance systems, such as an electro-optical seeker, INS/GPS and anti-radiation homing ensure all-weather capability.

Before launch, the pilot allocates a mission to the missile and loads data such as target type, coordinates, impact angle, azimuth, topographic image data and fuse delays.

ROCKS uses INS/GPS guidance for midcourse navigation trajectory, with its terminal phase using terrain matching or anti-radiation technology that locks onto target radar signals to overcome GPS jamming scenarios and minimize target location errors, with a circular error probable (CEP) of just 3 meters.

India’s choice of Israel as a supplier of a strategic weapon such as an ALBM reflects its drive to wean itself off its dependency on Russian weapons, whose effectiveness has been put into question by the Ukraine war.

This month, Politico reported that India’s arms purchases from Russia have been declining, with the Ukraine war being a significant factor in the decrease. Politico notes that while Russian weapons made up 76% of India’s arms purchases from 2009 to 2013, that has now dropped to 36% in the last five years.

The source notes that while India will continue to buy spare parts from Russia for in-service Russian equipment, it no longer considers Russia a source of big-ticket items.

It mentions the poor performance of Russian weapons in the Ukraine war, such as its widely-touted Kinzhal hypersonic weapon, which has been intercepted by Patriot missiles in the conflict.

The report also notes its Black Sea Fleet warships have been sunk by drones and cruise missiles while top-of-the-line aircraft such as Sukhoi fighters have been shot down quickly.

The provision of substandard MiG-29K fighters to India and unfulfilled defense contracts have also acted as significant disincentives for India to continue to rely on Russia as its primary arms supplier, the report said.

Politico notes that while India cannot wean itself off Russian weapons overnight, it is diversifying its defense partners, engaging countries such as the US, France, Germany, South Korea and Israel, while recalibrating its relations with Russia to avoid Western secondary sanctions.

In discussing the role of ALBMs in India’s military doctrine, Rohit Kaura notes in a December 2018 article for the Center for Air Power Studies that evolving air defenses have rendered traditional strategic bombers obsolete, necessitating ALBMs to allow bombers to stay away from the range of surface-to-air missiles (SAM) and interceptor aircraft.

Kaura notes that ALBMs allow bombers to remain a credible second-strike option, as ALBMs are very hard to intercept after launch, ensuring counterstrike capabilities.

He also notes that ALBMs deprive adversaries of lower-altitude boost-phase intercept opportunities, with the ability to launch ALBMs from bombers from multiple locations, leaving terminal-phase interception the only realistic defense.


Kaura notes that in times of high alert, the Indian Air Force (IAF) could send its strike aircraft to holding positions far from the range of enemy air defenses, thus not needing to enter enemy airspace to be effective.

He notes that once ALBM-armed aircraft are airborne, the national leadership can be assured of retaliation capabilities, with aerial refueling enabling them to be airborne for a day.

Kaura mentions that ALBMs offer a way to increase the survivability of land-based nuclear forces until India can develop reliable submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) and nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) as the ultimate in nuclear deterrence.

He notes that ALBMs can be retargeted before launch, which is a capability deficient in ground-based systems. In addition, he says that ALBM-armed aircraft can be used as a second-strike weapon to attack targets missed in a first strike or attack countervalue or counterforce targets.

Countervalue targeting refers to using nuclear weapons to target an enemy’s cities or economic infrastructure. Coupled with the concept of mutually assured destruction (MAD), this is thought to reduce significantly the possibility of a first strike.

In contrast, counterforce targeting aims to eliminate an adversary’s military infrastructure in a limited nuclear war. However, counterforce targeting is associated with first-strike capabilities, bringing the possibility of nuclear escalation.

In a 2018 article in the peer-reviewed International Security Journal, Christopher Clary and Vipin Narang note that Pakistan’s introduction of tactical nuclear weapons may have put India in strategic paralysis, with India caught between its “no first use” nuclear doctrine and the possibility of Pakistan using tactical nuclear weapons against India’s conventional forces.

Hence, Clary and Narang note that some Indian policymakers are drawn to developing counterforce capabilities to eliminate Pakistan’s nuclear capability to attack strategic targets in India.

While they note that a counterforce strategy is in line with India’s massive retaliation doctrine, it incentivizes Pakistan to unleash its nuclear arsenal before losing it.

Moreover, they point out the questionable odds of a successful Indian counterforce strike on Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, mentioning challenges in identifying and intercepting Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.

They also say that India’s adoption of even a limited counterforce nuclear strategy could fuel an arms race, as Pakistan would most likely react to India’s acquisition of counterforce capabilities.
 
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