WAR 03-30-2024-to-04-05-2024__THEWINDSofWAR

Housecarl · Mar 30, 2024

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INTL - China's Attacks on Philippine Resupply Missions Test 70-Year-Old Defense Pact - USNI News

news.usni.org China's Attacks on Philippine Resupply Missions Test 70-Year-Old Defense Pact - USNI News Mallory Shelbourne and Sam LaGrone A China Coast Guard cutter blasts the resupply vessel Unaizah Mae 4 on March 23, 2024. Armed Force of the Philippines Image...

www.timebomb2000.com

GOV/MIL - Pentagon Fast-Tracks "Fixes" in Hypersonic Weapons, Moves to Catch & Pass China

warriormaven.com Pentagon Fast-Tracks "Fixes" in Hypersonic Weapons, Moves to Catch & Pass China Kris Osborn, Warrior Maven - Center for Military Modernization By Kris Osborn, President, Warrior Maven The Pentagon and the military services are taking aggressive...

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ILL IMM - Chinese Migrant Suddenly Found on California Military Base

Chinese Migrant Suddenly Found on California Military Base Nick Mordowanec The arrest of a Chinese national at a Marine Corps base in California is spurring many questions. The presence of Chinese nationals on American soil has been on lawmakers' radar for months, given the recent...

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ALERT - RUSSIA INVADES UKRAINE - Consolidated Thread

Here then is the question we need to ask regarding the PTB in the West, both in front of and especially behind the curtain; how many dead Ukrainians, Russians and finally their own people are they willing to stack up for "their" goals? That being said, exactly what are those goals? Those of...

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HEALTH - Experts warn nation's food supply threatened by infected illegals

Experts warn nation's food supply threatened by infected illegals | WND | by WND Staff Experts warn nation's food supply threatened by infected illegals WND Staff WND 'Mass releasing these people who could be carrying multiple diseases' Mycobacterium tuberculosis There is ample evidence the...

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INTL - "Israel is in an all-out war. " MAJOR Palestinian Ground Incursion From Gaza Into Israel Ongoing. Hundreds Killed. (Please watch for dups #1881)

Omar Abu Layla @OALD24 And here we go .. Moments ago, the leader of the Iraqi militia, Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada, Abu Ala al-Walai, released a statement threatening Israel with strikes on all its ports in the Mediterranean Sea, targeting airports, military bases, and power stations. If we...

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Putin friend predicts nuclear strike "most likely" coming

Viktor Medvedchuk said, "If the collective West continues to assert its right to global dominance, Ukraine's human capital will not be enough in any case."

www.newsweek.com

Putin Friend Predicts Nuclear Strike 'Most Likely' Coming

Published Mar 30, 2024 at 11:02 AM EDT Updated Mar 30, 2024 at 2:54 PM EDT

165 Comments

Amid the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war, Russian President Vladimir Putin's friend, Viktor Medvedchuk, recently predicted that a nuclear strike will "most likely" be coming.

Putin and senior Russian officials have repeatedly threatened nuclear escalation against Kyiv and its Western partners since Moscow launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

During Putin's annual state of the nation address last month he warned that Russia's "strategic nuclear forces are in a state of full readiness." He also warned that there was a genuine risk of nuclear war if Western nations send troops to Ukraine, as suggested by French President Emmanuel Macron last month.

Western nations, Putin added, "must realize that we also have weapons that can hit targets on their territory. All this really threatens a conflict with the use of nuclear weapons and the destruction of civilization. Don't they get that?"

However, Macron appears to have walked back his previous comments earlier this month about sending troops to Ukraine. During an interview with Czech news publication Novinky.cz. Macron emphasized that France is not actively considering sending military forces to Ukraine.

"In response to one question I was asked about sending troops, I said that nothing is out of the question," he recalled. "This does not mean that we are considering the possibility of sending French troops to Ukraine in the near future, but we are starting discussions and thinking about everything that can be done to support Ukraine, especially on Ukrainian territory."

On Friday, according to Russian news agency Tass, pro-Russian Ukrainian politician Medvedchuk who was exiled to Russia in 2022 in exchange for Ukrainian prisoners of war predicted that a nuclear strike will "most likely" be coming as the West continues to "assert its right to global dominance."

"If the collective West continues to assert its right to global dominance, Ukraine's human capital will not be enough in any case...If we continue the policy of war to the bitter end, sooner or later foreign troops will have to be introduced. And most likely, [we will be] looking at a nuclear strike eventually," he said.

However, Medvedchuk does not rule out that countries outside of Europe could become involved if the conflict expands. "It is clear that the Arab world is being drawn into the war, and after that, China and India will also be involved, as they do not have issues with soldiers."

Newsweek has reached out to the Russian defense ministry via email for comment.

This comes as Western leaders including President Joe Biden, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg have consistently warned that a direct Russia-NATO confrontation is unthinkable given the nuclear stakes.

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However, Putin and the Kremlin have long framed its war on Ukraine as a preemptive war on the "collective West."

"The West miscalculated and ran into the firm position and determination of our multinational people," Putin told government officials, members of parliament, and leading civil society figures during his annual speech.

Meanwhile, NATO leaders—particularly on the alliance's long frontier with Russia—are increasingly warning that direct conflict with Moscow is a realistic danger, suggesting the West has between three and 10 years to prepare for war. However, Putin described such warnings as "nonsense."

"At the same time they themselves are choosing targets for striking our territory," the Russian leader said referring to Scholz's revelation that British and French personnel are helping Ukraine target Russian positions with Storm Shadow/SCALP cruise missiles.

Housecarl · Mar 30, 2024

Hummm..........

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IAEA Warns Of Iraq-Like Scenario For Iran Without Transparency

The UN nuclear watchdog cautions that without improved transparency on Iran's nuclear program, it cannot assure its peaceful nature, echoing fears of repercussions akin to the Iraq War.

www.iranintl.com

IAEA Warns Of Iraq-Like Scenario For Iran Without Transparency

6 hours ago
Iran International Newsroom
The UN nuclear watchdog cautions that without improved transparency on Iran's nuclear program, it cannot assure its peaceful nature, echoing fears of repercussions akin to the Iraq War.

In a Friday interview with PBS, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi expressed concern over Iran's advancements in its nuclear program alongside restrictions placed on IAEA monitoring activities.

Grossi emphasized that without full Iranian cooperation, the agency cannot verify that its program is peaceful. The lack of visibility would be a major setback, similar to the situation during the late 1980s and 90s in Iraq.

Iraq's lack of cooperation with UN inspections fueled international isolation and ultimately led to the 2003 US-led invasion. While Iraq had pursued WMD programs from the 1960s to 1990s, it declared their destruction in the 1990s. However, concerns arose under US President George W. Bush and UK Prime Minister Tony Blair that these programs continued. The UN Security Council demanded full Iraqi cooperation with inspections, but the US viewed Iraq's actions as insufficient and cited this as justification for war. Despite President Bush's stated goals of disarming Iraq, ending Saddam Hussein's support for terrorism, and liberating its people, a later US Senate report revealed significant inaccuracies in pre-war intelligence regarding Iraqi WMDs.

Tacitly referring to the US-led invasion of Iraq, Grossi said that the world earned a harsh lesson then, and repeating it would be in no one's interest, least of all Iran. "Shutting inspectors out; telling inspectors to go away is never, never, a good idea,” he said.

In September 2023, Iran withdrew the designation of several inspectors assigned to conduct verification activities in Iran under the Non-Proliferation Treaty Safeguards Agreement. Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), Mohammad Eslami, justified Tehran's decision by claiming that those expelled had a history of"extremist political behavior".

Grossi emphasized that the general direction of Iran’s nuclear activities is "a trend of increase of nuclear material and it has reached a very, very high level,” and that the issue is “very complex.” Beyond enrichment levels, “which is very important because that’s how nuclear weapons are made,” the key concern is the declining access for IAEA inspectors to fully monitor Iran's activities. He added that the IAEA is in Iran but "we are not inspecting at the levels and with the depth that we should be given the nature of that program.”

In February, Grossi had said that Iran is enriching at an elevated rate of around 7 kg of uranium per month to 60% purity. Enrichment to 60% brings uranium close toweapons grade and is not necessary for commercial use in nuclear power production. Iran denies seeking nuclear weapons, but no other state has enriched to that level without producing them.

Elsewhere in his Friday interview, Grossi also described the 2015 nuclear deal between Iran andworld powers as an “empty shell.” “There is no diplomacy, there is no conversation and yet again the IAEA is the only link that provides some visibility of what's happening there.”

Grossi implied that reviving the deal – officially known as the JCPOA – may not be the best plan of action now, noting that the 2015 agreement was based on specific technologies and capabilities but nearly a decade later, Iran has rapidly advanced its program. They now possess faster, more efficient centrifuges and facilities producing centrifuge parts. Additionally, Iran is developing new sites for nuclear activities.

“The spectrum of that agreement is clearly superseded at this point,” he said.“The Iran of 2015 is not the Iran of 2024.”

A report published earlier in March found that Iran continues to make progress in constructing a deeply buried nuclear site near Natanz. The report by the Institute for Science and International Security discovered that based on analysis of satellite imagery, Iran has completed construction of tunnels related to the site and is working on underground rooms that could hold enrichment halls.

The site may be invulnerable to military strikes, allowing Tehran to successfully produce weapons-grade uranium for a nuclear weapon using material diverted from other facilities, Washington-based the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) said.

“This Iranian nuclear weapons-making facility could be impervious to Israeli andperhaps even American bombs. The time is quickly running out, as Iran moves into a zone of nuclear immunity, to deny the regime permanent use of this deadly site,” said FDD CEO Mark Dubowitz.

Richard Goldberg, an FDD Senior Advisor, said, “If Tehran is allowed to complete this facility and move its enrichment infrastructure inside, we will enter a new and potentially irreversible era of the Iranian nuclear threat. Completion of this facility must be added to the list of red lines for the United States and its allies.”

Housecarl · Mar 30, 2024

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Navy's Rush To Test Microwave Weapons Tied To Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Fears

The Navy wants high-power microwave systems to help ships conserve other weapons, specially ones capable of downing ballistic missiles.

www.twz.com

Navy’s Rush To Test Microwave Weapons Tied To Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Fears

The Navy wants high-power microwave systems to help ships conserve other weapons, specially ones capable of downing ballistic missiles.

BY JOSEPH TREVITHICK | PUBLISHED MAR 29, 2024 5:11 PM EDT

JOSEPH TREVITHICKView Joseph Trevithick's Articles
FranticGoat

The U.S. Navy hopes to have a prototype high-power microwave directed energy weapon ready for shipboard testing by the end of 2026. The service sees weapons of this type as critical additional defensive options that will help its warships keep higher-end surface-to-air missiles in reserve for threats they might be better optimized for, including anti-ship ballistic missiles. The experience of American warships shooting down Houthi missiles and drones over the past six months has rammed home concerns about the magazine depth of the Navy's surface fleets, issues The War Zone previously explored in detail in a feature you can find here.....

Housecarl · Mar 30, 2024

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Northrop says Air Force design changes drove higher Sentinel ICBM cost

The Sentinel nuclear missile's costs have spiked 37%, largely due to the complexity of its command and launch segment, and triggered a review process.

www.defensenews.com

Northrop says Air Force design changes drove higher Sentinel ICBM cost

By Stephen Losey
Mar 28, 02:00 PM

A Northrop Grumman official on Monday attributed the explosive projected cost growth of the U.S. Air Force’s next intercontinental ballistic missile to the service’s design changes, including to the nuclear missile’s silo and connecting cables.

The Air Force’s original plan for modernizing its ICBM enterprise included keeping nearly all its existing copper cabling in place to be reused for the upcoming LGM-35A Sentinel. That’s roughly 7,500 miles’ worth of copper cabling, connecting 450 half-century-old Minuteman III ICBM silos scattered through the Great Plains region with launch control centers and other facilities.

But the company official, who spoke with reporters on the condition that he be identified only as an official familiar with the Sentinel program, said the Air Force concluded it is necessary to upgrade the copper cables with a higher-performing fiber-optic network. That decision apparently came after the service awarded the engineering and manufacturing development contract to Northrop Grumman in 2020, and during the company’s work on the program’s early design phase.

The Air Force also realized that the original designs for Sentinel’s launch facilities — the massive concrete-encased silos from which the missiles would launch — would not work and had to be changed, the Northrop official said. Those original concepts were drawn up during the technology maturation and risk-reduction phase as well as the early engineering and manufacturing development step.

And with hundreds of launch facilities dotting the Great Plains region, often in 1-acre plots, and thousands of miles of cable stretching across farmland and other privately held property that now must be dug up, the cost of these changes swiftly added up, the Northrop official said.

“As we’ve worked through those changes. That’s led to a design that’s different than the one that they [the Air Force] started with,” the official explained. “When you multiply that by 450, if every silo is a little bit bigger or has an extra component, that actually drives a lot of cost because of the sheer number of them that are being updated.”

In a statement to Defense News, the Air Force said the Pentagon is still studying what exactly caused the severe cost overruns, which triggered a review process known as a critical Nunn-McCurdy breach.

“In accordance with statute, [the Office of the Secretary of Defense] will determine what factors caused the cost growth that led to a critical breach via the Nunn-McCurdy process, which is currently underway,” an Air Force spokesperson said. “Early estimates indicate that a large portion of the Sentinel program’s cost growth is in the command and launch segment, which is the most complex segment of the Sentinel program.”

‘Unknown unknowns’ on $96B program

Sentinel is a massive program to replace the Air Force’s aging LGM-30G Minuteman III ICBMs, which now make up the land-based portion of the U.S. military’s nuclear triad. In 2020, Northrop Grumman received a $13.3 billion cost-plus-incentive-fee contract for Sentinel’s engineering and manufacturing development phase.

The program was expected to run about $96 billion, with the total per-unit cost amounting to $118 million when its most recent cost, schedule and performance goals were set in 2020. But the price tag has skyrocketed at least 37%, and the per-unit cost is now about $162 million.

In a congressional hearing this month, Rep. John Garamendi, D-Calif., pegged Sentinel’s current cost at more than $130 billion.

That triggered the Nunn-McCurdy breach, and the Pentagon is now reviewing Sentinel to figure out how to get it back on track as well as where to find funds to keep it going. Top Air Force officials have publicly said that with Minuteman III well past its originally expected life span, the service has no choice but to replace it with a new, more reliable model — and will find money to pay for it.

Sentinel, which was originally supposed to reach initial operational capability in 2029, is now expected to fall two years behind schedule. The nuclear missile’s first flight test, which had been expected to take place in 2024, is now likely to come in February 2026, according to the Air Force’s budget documents.

The Air Force said in an email to Defense News that the Sentinel’s first flight was pushed back due to longer lead times for components in its guidance computer. But the delayed flight test is not a factor in the program’s Nunn-McCurdy breach, the service said.

In a March hearing held by the House Armed Services Committee’s sea power and projection forces panel, Garamendi voiced his displeasure to Air Force officials over the Sentinel’s cost overruns, as well as the service’s inability to explain potential “trade-offs” to keep the program alive.

Garamendi questioned the need for the United States to spend vast sums of money on Sentinel, arguing the belief that the nation must maintain a triad of nuclear weapons has become a “religious issue, having very little to do with the world in which we’re now living.”

The Northrop Grumman official told reporters Monday that the company’s work on Sentinel continues, despite the Nunn-McCurdy breach and ensuing review process.

“We don’t have a pause on our EMD [engineering and manufacturing development] work,” the official said. “We’re continuing to make progress on developing the missile and iterating the designs for all the facilities.”

In a discussion last fall, Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall said given it’s been so long since the service created an ICBM, early cost estimates for Sentinel were based on “a huge uncertainty.”

“There are unknown unknowns that are surfacing, that are affecting the program,” Kendall said during a November 2023 event with Center for a New American Security think tank. Kendall also said the Sentinel program was “struggling.”

The Northrop Grumman official highlighted such comments — including Kendall’s about the uncertainty that went into the program’s cost estimates — and said some estimates that went into the 2020 baseline review turned out to be incorrect.

Mock-up silo

Northrop also said the company’s effort to game out how a conversion process might work also showed problems with the original plan.

Before it received the Sentinel contract in September 2020, the firm started building a full-scale mock-up of a Minuteman III silo in Promontory, Utah, which it completed in spring 2021. The project was a major undertaking, and on Northrop Grumman’s dime. But the company saw it as a worthwhile investment in its bid to win the lucrative Ground Based Strategic Deterrent contract, as the program was then known.

Northrop didn’t have direct access to the Minuteman III silos — and likely won’t until the government hands them over for conversion into Sentinel silos — since the missiles must remain ready for launch at all times. And so the company considered its construction project the best way to understand how the massive retrofitting process might work — and to find where the biggest risks might lie.

The company’s team, alongside the Air Force, pored through the nonoperational mock-up and started to lay out components akin to what Sentinel would require. But as they did so, the Northrop official said, the group found some of the original conversion plans weren’t going to work.

Other design processes, including computer-aided design work, also helped the Sentinel team map out how much square footage various configurations would take up. In the process, some of the unknown factors that led to the original shaky estimates were cleared up. Still, it became clearer that the costs would be much higher than originally believed.

“They learned, along with us, things that needed to be potentially different or changed from the design,” the official said.

Five programs in one

In January, top Air Force official Kristyn Jones compared the Sentinel project to five major acquisition programs rolled into one. But the nuclear missile itself “is not an area of concern,” said Jones, who is performing the duties of undersecretary of the Air Force.

The Northrop official said the Sentinel missile will not just be a new iteration of the Minuteman series of ICBMs — “it’s not a Minuteman IV,” the official said — but a brand-new weapon top to bottom.

Its solid-rocket motors will be made of composite materials instead of the steel used on the Minuteman III, he explained, and it will have a more advanced guidance system.

Its design also includes modular components that allow the Air Force and Northrop Grumman to more easily add new technology as it becomes available.

And airmen are expected to be able to more easily maintain the Sentinel than its predecessor, with key components accessible without the need to delve too deeply into the missile and bring along a massive security detail while it is opened up.

Sentinel will be slightly larger and lighter than the Minuteman III, which will allow it to carry more propellant and payload, he said. And it is being designed to last until at least 2075 — far longer than the decade Minuteman III was originally supposed to last.

The infrastructure for Sentinel — including the silos themselves, the launch control centers where airmen control the ICBMs, and supporting infrastructure — will also be refurbished.

That portion — which Jones called “essentially a civil works program” — is especially challenging, particularly with issues such as inflation, the supply chain and labor force shortages.

The service and Northrop Grumman plan to reuse the existing Minuteman III silos as much as possible. But that will require a great deal of new construction and equipment updates to ensure the Sentinel silos can keep operating through disruptions such as power outages.

Old computers in launch centers — some of them 1980s-era terminals with green screens — will receive updates with modern equipment.

But not all Minuteman III silos were built in the same configuration, the Northrop official said, which will further complicate their conversions.

With the nation’s roughly 400 Minuteman IIIs spread out across nearly 32,000 square miles in Wyoming, Montana, North Dakota, Colorado and Nebraska, that makes the Sentinel program a massive real estate project, requiring the government to negotiate easements and, in some cases, property purchases with numerous landowners.

All of that adds up to “one of the most large, complex programs I’ve ever seen,” Kendall said of Sentinel in November 2023. “It’s probably the biggest thing, in some ways, that the Air Force has ever taken on.”

There’s also another factor at play: What happens if the Air Force and Northrop Grumman look deeper within the existing Minuteman III silos and find they’re in worse shape than expected?

The condition of the silos is a potentially high-risk area for the program, the Northrop official acknowledged, but the program still expects to be able to reuse existing ones. A “handful” of LiDAR — or light detection and ranging — scans of current ICBM sites already took place, he said, and there have been reviews of silos decommissioned in the 2000s.

But deeper, destructive testing — “breaking apart the concrete to see what’s behind it and what the conditions are” — has not occurred on existing silos, the official said, since they have to remain operational.

Minuteman III silos have concrete liners as well as mechanical launch tubes and missile suspension systems that hold the current ICBMs. The tubes and suspension systems will be replaced, the official said, and the concrete liners underneath will undergo inspection to determine if repairs need done and what is reusable.

The government has contingency plans if the silos’ foundations prove to be seriously cracked or damaged, the official said. That could include remediation work such as patching cracks or replacing portions of the concrete.

If a site is too far gone to fix, however, drilling may have to take place for an entirely new silo.

“There’s currently no plan to dig new holes,” the official said. “But given the site conditions of the land, [there is] certainly the potential that when they get to investigating more of the silos, they may find that [reusing] some of them might not be possible.”

Though the Nunn-McCurdy review process is still underway, the Northrop official said the company is talking to the Air Force about ways to bring down costs. One idea under discussion, he noted, is potentially changing the way mechanical rooms are constructed to build them in a more modular way, which could lower expenses.

But no matter how difficult or expensive Sentinel becomes, or what trade-offs are made to pay for it, the Air Force is adamant it must happen.

Lt. Gen. Richard Moore, the service’s deputy chief of staff for plans and programs, said at the January appearance alongside Jones that extending the Minuteman III missile significantly longer is “not a viable option.”

“We will find the money,” Moore said. “Sentinel is going to be funded. We’ll make the trades to make that happen.”

About Stephen Losey
Stephen Losey is the air warfare reporter for Defense News. He previously covered leadership and personnel issues at Air Force Times, and the Pentagon, special operations and air warfare at Military.com. He has traveled to the Middle East to cover U.S. Air Force operations.

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Housecarl · Mar 30, 2024

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New NATO members prompt US Army to revisit 'high north' stock locations - Breaking Defense

The service is also crafting a plan and working the diplomatic channels to gain new agreements for Army prepositioned stock sites in the Indo-Pacific region, said AMC’s Lt. Gen. Christopher Mohan.

breakingdefense.com

GLOBAL, LAND WARFARE

New NATO members prompt US Army to revisit ‘high north’ stock locations

The service is also crafting a plan and working the diplomatic channels to gain new agreements for Army prepositioned stock sites in the Indo-Pacific region, said AMC’s Lt. Gen. Christopher Mohan.

By ASHLEY ROQUE on March 29, 2024 at 2:29 PM

GLOBAL FORCE 2024 — After a sudden leadership shake up at Army Materiel Command, its deputy, Lt. Gen. Christopher Mohan, has stepped in to perform the duties of his boss — and says planning is moving forward on prepositioning stockpiles throughout Europe and the Indo-Pacific region.

“This is a difficult time but I’ve got a great team: I’ve got great support from the secretary and the chief [and] I’ve got all the authorities I need,” the three-star general told Breaking Defense on Wednesday. “We’re driving the organization forward [and] my message on Monday morning was, ‘Operations normal.’”

On March 22, Army Secretary Christine Wormuth suspended AMC head Gen. Charles Hamilton. pending an investigation. The move was spawned by a Military.com report that he may have inappropriately intervened in an assessment panel’s work to help a subordinate officer. Those events unfolded just days before senior Army leaders and industry descended on the AMC’s home in Huntsville, Ala., for the annual Association of the US Army’s Global Force symposium. Hamilton’s planned keynote speech was swapped out for one by Mohan, and the show went on.

While it isn’t clear how long Hamilton’s investigation will take or what the findings will be, Mohan said it’s full-steam ahead on a variety of fronts, including finding new locations to place Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) inside the European and the Indo-Pacific regions.

Right now In Europe, the service has two APS sites in Germany and spots in the Netherlands, Poland, Belgium and Italy. But as the war inside Ukraine wages on, and Finland and Sweden are now NATO’s newest members, more sites are needed, especially in the high north.

“The addition of the NATO partners changes the security landscape and our responsibilities as part of NATO,” Mohan said, noting that the service is homing in on just what equipment and locations are best for the high north and Arctic.

US European Command head Gen. Christopher Cavoli, he added, is spearheading some of those changes and crafting a plan that will “embrace and integrate Finland and Sweden into the NATO enterprise, and that’s going to drive some changes on the ground.”

While Mohan didn’t disclose possible new site locations in Europe, Maj. Gen. Ronald Ragin — the commanding general for the 21st Theater Sustainment Command tasked with Army Europe-Africa — said on Tuesday that Norway is one option. However, he cautioned that the diplomatic process necessary to iron out such deals takes time and can be littered with roadblocks.

“That’s why I asked, if I had two years yet before a conflict, where would I be? And so we’re working those agreements very hard … [and] the Army is making investments in APS, specifically, modernizing,” the two-star general told Breaking Defense.

Nailing down such deals is even more complicated in the Indo-Pacific region where a NATO-like alliance doesn’t exist, and the US leans on individual bilateral agreements.

The Army’s current stockpile to support that region includes equipment stored on its floating APS and equipment in Australia. But even with all that combined, Mohan said it’s not adequate for the region. Instead, US Army Pacific, in conjunction with other service leaders, is developing options for other potential ground-based APS locations.

“This is the tyranny [of] transportation … everything’s eight hours [away] there,” he said. While having more ground-based APS sites is good for the US, Mohan cautioned such deals increase the host nation’s “exposure” to retaliation from countries like China. The US also has to weigh the costs of maintaining such sites.

As for when that plan may be wrapped up, Mohan said it isn’t clear.

“It is an iterative, with decision and risk points along the way,” he added. “Our job is to develop options, and then clearly articulate the risk.”

“A risk point would be, hey, look, we’ve got warehousing, but we don’t have humidity control yet, which is who requires to touch it more often, which is going to cost more money. But if that allows us to shorten a transportation timeline, is it worth the risk?” the three-star general added.

Housecarl · Mar 31, 2024

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Race against time: Can the US counter China's rising nuke capabilities? - Times of India

China News: US faces challenges with aging nuclear arsenal amidst China, Russia advancements. Despite uncertainties, efforts like modernizing deterrents are under

timesofindia.indiatimes.com

Race against time: Can the US counter China's rising nuke capabilities?

TIMESOFINDIA.COM | Mar 31, 2024, 08.14 PM IST

NEW DELHI: The US policymakers view nuclear deterrence as the cornerstone of the nation's security. Since nuclear weapons' inception, the US has prioritized maintaining a robust, credible nuclear force, ready at a moment's notice. However, as per a Newsweek report, concerns are mounting about the aging US nuclear arsenal, especially in light of rapid advancements by China and an increasingly assertive Russia. Questions arise about whether the US is adequately investing in modernizing its nuclear capabilities for an uncertain future.

Heather Williams from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) highlights the criticality of the next five years for US nuclear modernization. The US is updating its deterrent, replacing old Minuteman IIIs with Sentinels, introducing the Columbia class submarines to replace the Ohio class, and integrating the stealthy B-21 Raider. Yet, as modernization coincides with the end of the current arsenal's lifecycle, there's concern that without swift, decisive action, and in the face of possible delays, the US nuclear position could be precarious by the next decade, the Newsweek report said.

Williams stresses that decisions critical for a 21st-century nuclear arsenal are overdue. The challenges include ensuring new systems are timely, maintaining political continuity, and developing a coherent strategy to deter adversaries and reassure allies. Failures here could lead the US into its weakest nuclear stance by 2030.

The US nuclear triad's modernization, delayed post-Cold War, is now proceeding rapidly. Issues like Minuteman III's reliability and potential delays in introducing new systems have raised concerns. However, experts like Robert Soofer, former deputy assistant secretary of defense, assure that measures are in place to ensure a seamless transition to newer systems, the Newsweek report said.

The political landscape influences nuclear modernization significantly. Conflicts within Congress and between administrations over nuclear strategies introduce uncertainties that could affect the US's ability to maintain a coherent nuclear posture.

Looking forward, the US faces challenges from China's growing nuclear capabilities and Russia's modernized arsenal. The Biden administration's Nuclear Posture Review underscores the urgency of addressing these challenges, with projections of China having 1,000 deliverable warheads by 2030. The US finds itself preparing for a potential strategic competition with two major nuclear powers, a scenario it has never faced before.

Despite these challenges, there's still optimism. Solutions exist to extend current systems' lifespans and expedite the new deterrent's deployment. However, decisions must be made promptly to ensure the US is prepared for emerging threats, the Newsweek report said.

Housecarl · Mar 31, 2024

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https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2024/april/better-case-slcm-n

A Better Case for SLCM-N

Yes, the United States needs a sea-launched nuclear cruise missile, but focusing on warhead yield ignores other important issues.

By Lieutenant Commander Alan Cummings, U.S. Navy Reserve

April 2024
Proceedings
Vol. 150/4/1,454

Arguments that the Navy should deploy a nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N)—particularly arguments centered on low-yield characteristics—contribute important points to ongoing discourse about U.S. nuclear modernization.1 But there is more to consider than yield. Senior policy-makers need to understand SLCM-N in the context of a broader question: How should the United States bolster theater deterrence distinct from but reinforced by strategic deterrence?2

While yield matters, focusing on it diminishes other considerations and plays into established opposition. Recall that the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) canceled SLCM-N in part because “the W76-2 low yield submarine-launched ballistic missile warhead, globally deployable bombers, dual-capable fighter aircraft, and air-launched cruise missiles” were considered sufficient for theater deterrence.3

There are three stronger arguments for SLCM-N than firepower per se. First, it improves theater deterrence options by decreasing reliance on aircraft-delivered weapons. Second, it could complement or replace the W76-2, distributing some of the theater deterrence role to attack submarines (SSNs) while reserving ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs) for higher levels of conflict. Third, SLCM-N contributes to U.S. arms control, assurance, and nonproliferation objectives as complementary facets of U.S. nuclear strategy. These arguments align with the 2023 Strategic Posture Commission’s recommendations that “U.S. theater nuclear force posture should be urgently modified to: Provide the President a range of militarily effective nuclear response options to deter or counter Russian or Chinese limited nuclear use, . . . address the need for U.S. theater nuclear forces deployed or based in the Asia-Pacific, . . . [and] address allied concerns about extended deterrence.”4

Yielding Theater Deterrence

Theater deterrence is not a lesser included case of strategic deterrence. Deterring peer adversaries from limited nuclear use far from the U.S. homeland is different from deterring all-out nuclear strikes on the continental United States. This underlies the credibility issues with threatening large-scale retaliation for small-scale theater attacks. The United States abandoned such “massive retaliation” in favor of “flexible response” during the Kennedy administration. Since then, “U.S. presidents have sought a range of nuclear employment options so that they would not be forced into a choice of either ordering an all-out cataclysmic retaliatory nuclear attack or accepting that a nuclear attack would go unanswered.”5

Flexible response relies on philosophies about what “limited” means in the context of a nuclear exchange. “Limited war” does not refer only to limits on the political ends of a conflict; pursuing limited objectives with unlimited means is a recipe for escalating to total war. Rather, the concept must include limits on both ways and means—for example, which weapons are employed, from what platforms, and against what targets.6 Expanding the conflict along these dimensions is an escalation of intensity (vertical) or scope (horizontal). Conversely, mutually accepted restraints are the result of a tacit bargaining process that manages escalation and limits the overall war. This logic applies directly to theater deterrence predicated on possessing nuclear capabilities that are distinct from strategic weapons.

Paul Nitze wrote in 1956 that it is “to the interest of the West that the means employed in [nuclear] warfare and the area of engagement be restricted to the minimum level which still permits us to achieve our objectives.”7 The United States pioneered this understanding of theater dynamics during the Cold War, but Russia and China have been vigorously operationalizing it during the past decade. Nearly 70 years after Nitze’s comment, the Defense Department 2023 China military power report states, “[Chinese] military writings as of 2017 noted that while strategic nuclear weapons remain the foundation of deterrence, tactical nuclear weapons with high hit precision and smaller yield would be effective in lowering the cost of war.”8

If conflict crosses the nuclear threshold, lower yields would signal a clear interest in limiting its intensity. Fundamentally, yield is about the destructive force of the weapon—the effects it can impose on a target and its potential for collateral damage. A lower yield decreases a strike’s destructive force and therefore is a method of waging war with limited means. But defining a “low yield” threshold is notoriously difficult. Moreover, fixating on yield distracts from other important considerations.

The delivery system and host platforms are critical factors. Their combined capabilities and limitations govern responsiveness, tactics, logistics, vulnerabilities, command and control, and other operational requirements. How the United States addresses these requirements and thereby wields its theater deterrence platforms is a powerful source for signaling and shaping the limited nature of a potential nuclear exchange.

Controlling the weapon’s origin and flight path also signals limits on the conduct of nuclear exchanges. Adversaries will likely try to discern viable points of origin before a potential strike is launched and will almost certainly try to identify the origin after an attack. That information may be used to destroy the launch locations preemptively or in retaliation. This is one reason why U.S. intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), for example, are reserved for higher levels of destruction, stake, and resolve.

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory’s Brad Roberts assesses that using theater-based weapons “might not be seen to be inviting or legitimizing a nuclear retaliatory strike on the American homeland.”9 In-theater platforms can deliver nuclear effects with fewer risks of horizontal escalation. By increasing options for the ways and means by which an attack is delivered, one gains flexibility in signaling and negotiating—kinetically, if need be—the limits of a conflict. This premise has likely informed Russia’s development of its theater nuclear arsenal and China’s reported interest in these capabilities.

Target choice is essential to signaling limitations. Targets must be valuable to the adversary, meet U.S. objectives, and be well-suited to nuclear effects but not so critical as to impel catastrophic escalation. This would be difficult in practice, however. Potential nuclear targets may have been destroyed or defeated earlier by conventional means. Others might have been intentionally avoided because of robust defenses or the risks of escalation and collateral damage. The degree of control for targeting is therefore a function of having weapons that can reliably reach a broad set of relevant maritime and terrestrial targets despite complex air-defense systems. This is even more important for tailored deterrence, which requires the ability to threaten a range of targets that differ by adversary and scenario.

Finally, deterrence success and deterrence failure have distinct playbooks, but they are mutually reinforcing and must be considered simultaneously. This paradox is especially relevant to theater dynamics and is why SLCM-N ultimately would help raise the nuclear threshold by ensuring potential adversaries see no possible advantage in limited nuclear escalation.

Diversifying Options

The U.S. nuclear weapon enterprise is dedicated to providing meaningful options for the President. Unfortunately, as the Strategic Posture Commission’s report shows, the current arsenal is suboptimal for theater deterrence. As nuclear policy expert Franklin Miller notes, “Nothing could be more dangerous than a president trying to manage a crisis with a nuclear-armed adversary assuming—and basing decision-making on—options that do not exist.”10

While the United States employs a robust nuclear triad for strategic deterrence, it relies on a near-monad of air-delivered capabilities for theater deterrence. Other than the W76-2, the NPR says the President’s options for theater deterrence are “bombers, dual-capable fighter aircraft, and air-launched cruise missiles.” These are valuable deterrence tools, and the justification for SLCM-N does not rest on being “more valuable” than them. Rather, it rests on “giving the President as many options as possible.” “Maintaining calculated ambiguity complicates an adversary’s decision calculus,” as Admiral Christopher Grady stated in 2021.11

Aviation assets are rightly lauded for their agility and scalable visibility and the option to recall them. Yet, for theater deterrence, they also bring several challenges. For one, launching a strike from a U.S. airfield poses concerns similar to those of launching an ICBM. Deploying aircraft and nuclear weapons forward to a theater requires airfields that can meet security, sustainment, and air-defense requirements. This demands deep cooperation with host and overflight nations—who may have reservations in peacetime, never mind in wartime. U.S. operations could expose them to preemptive or retaliatory nuclear strikes. Many allies willingly shoulder this burden as part of U.S. extended deterrence relationships and in recognition of greater threats from China and Russia. But prudence demands the President have options that are not contingent on local basing while minimizing risks to U.S. territory.

Deploying SLCM-Ns on board SSNs would do exactly that. It would offer a persistent, mobile, responsive platform that can launch from international waters outside allied territory and positions that minimize overflight requirements. Logistically, underway replenishments can keep SSNs at sea for long patrols. Whereas aircraft require a large degree of concentrated support in executing a nuclear strike (e.g., in-flight refueling, escort, suppression of enemy air defenses, etc.), SSNs can contribute to strike packages with minimal added signature and while remaining otherwise available for their conventional missions.

Given that U.S. forces are no longer structured to fight two major wars simultaneously, SLCM-N also would improve the President’s options for maintaining deterrence in a secondary theater. According to the NPR, “The Joint Force will need to be postured with military capabilities—including nuclear weapons—that can deter and defeat other actors who may seek to take advantage” of the U.S. military being principally engaged elsewhere. If such a scenario arises, deploying nuclear-armed SSNs to the secondary theater would impose fewer logistics and security burdens than deploying aircraft, which in any case might be needed for conventional operations in the primary theater.

Continued......

Housecarl · Mar 31, 2024

Continued......

Opponents argue that increasing theater-oriented nuclear options could encourage arms racing, incentivize nuclear warfighting, and invite a tit-for-tat escalatory spiral.12 The U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance rebutted such critiques in 2020, pointing out that, “while limited response options are not guaranteed to work, a massive response to a limited attack is even less likely to restore deterrence and more likely to spur further escalation.” The Bureau also notes that critiques often “conflate the possession of low-yield weapons with a doctrine of responding symmetrically. . . . The United States has no such doctrine.”13 Whether one views these statements as cognitive dissonance (both eschewing and threatening massive retaliation) or deliberate ambiguity, the fact remains that SLCM-N could significantly improve the President’s symmetric response options without constraining asymmetric ones.

Reserving Boomers

Credibly deterring and—if needed—waging limited nuclear war requires decoupling theater and strategic deterrence platforms. The United States relies on its SSBN force as the most survivable leg of its strategic nuclear triad and the guarantor of an assured second strike. Yet, as the only platform capable of delivering the low-yield W76-2 warhead, SSBNs could be called on early in a theater nuclear exchange. The SSBN force is thoroughly capable of this mission, but it would be a dangerous blurring of the line between theater and strategic roles, undermining efforts to demarcate the boundaries of a limited nuclear exchange.

By commingling theater and strategic weapons on SSBNs, the United States increases the risk that an adversary pursuing theater objectives could breach a red line by accidental, preemptive, or retaliatory targeting of an SSBN (read: strategic asset). If an adversary were to sink an SSBN, would the United States interpret that as strategic escalation? Even if the President did not prefer that interpretation, what retaliatory pressure might he or she perceive from military advisors, Congress, or allies and partners? In addition, any missile launched from an SSBN would expose its location and provide adversaries with a validated example of wartime procedures for the most survivable U.S. deterrence platform; an SSBN launch also might be misinterpreted as the beginning of a strategic attack. While SSBNs may never fully shed their theater deterrence role, it is unwise to risk these strategic assets during the earliest stages of a conflict if less vital platforms can be brought to bear.

Deploying SLCM-Ns on board attack submarines (SSNs) would bring important operational benefits. For one, there are many more SSNs that can be distributed in theater against only 14 Ohio-class SSBNs. Further, the 14 Ohio-class boats will eventually be replaced by just 12 Columbia-class SSBNs, each of which will have only 16 missile tubes, versus 20 per Ohio. Total SSBN tubes will decrease from 280 to 192—a little over 30 percent—putting a premium on magazine space that must be allocated to SLBMs for strategic deterrence missions rather than theater roles.14 While an adversary would have to assume all SSNs are nuclear armed, decoupling U.S. theater deterrence from strategic SSBNs would strengthen bulwarks for deterrence and improve escalation control options if deterrence fails.

Arms Control, Extended Deterrence, and Nonproliferation

Arms control, assurance, and nonproliferation serve the fundamental purpose of U.S. nuclear strategy—deterring aggression. These complementary endeavors reduce the number and type of nuclear threats for which the United States must account.

Arms control agreements reduce risks by negotiating limits on the means of warfare. For decades, nuclear agreements between Washington and Moscow protected strategic stability and constrained the threats each posed to the other, saving them from the costs of unconstrained competition. As arms control frameworks have degraded, the security environment has become more threatening, precarious, and expensive. Because China is not constrained by and refuses to discuss meaningful arms control, its role as a third peer in deterrence calculations exacerbates this.

Deploying SLCM-N would be an unmistakable signal of a U.S. commitment to safeguard itself and its allies by force when pressed. The Atlantic Council’s Matthew Kroenig suggests that if a new arms race is afoot, “It may be the type of arms race in which the United States must compete and win in order to protect itself and its allies.”15 However, deploying SLCM-N (along with other activities) would increase pressure on adversaries and could help revitalize arms control, much as deployment to Europe of U.S. Pershing II missiles in the 1980s encouraged negotiation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. Rather than trade SLCM-N away, the negotiation objective should be an overall numerical cap on theater weapons. As Kroenig puts it: The United States “should view arms control not as an end in itself but rather as a useful tool that can be employed to advance U.S. and allied interests.”16

Last, extended deterrence goes hand in hand with nonproliferation. By minimizing the number of nuclear weapon programs in the world through cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, extended deterrence guarantees, counterproliferation activities, etc., the United States is acting to protect its interests. Francis Gavin describes these “strategies of inhibition” as designed to favorably shape the strategic environment—hardly anathema to U.S. nuclear deterrence policy.17

Escalation Management

Submarine-based SLCM-Ns would be especially useful in the Indo-Pacific, where the United States lacks a permanent theater deterrence capability. They would signal the gravity of U.S. extended deterrence commitments and the ability to fulfill them without increasing risk to U.S. or allied territory. If deterrence fails, the United States could manage escalation by firing from the sea, thereby shifting some escalatory burden to the adversary by disincentivizing retaliatory strikes against targets ashore.

If a nuclear response is required, the President must have options to limit the scale and scope of a strike while the United States works to restore deterrence. SLCM-N would fill a gap in theater delivery capabilities necessary to meet that obligation.

Air Force General Anthony Cotton, commander of U.S. Strategic Command, affirmed the prospective value of SLCM-N, stating, “A low-yield, non-ballistic nuclear capability to deter, assure and respond without visible generation (similar to the characteristics of SLCM-N) offers additional options and supports an integrated deterrence approach.”18 Although the 2022 NPR canceled SLCM-N, renewing it would be consistent with the larger promise: “To deter theater attacks and nuclear coercion of Allies and partners, we will bolster the Triad with capabilities that further strengthen regional deterrence.”

1. CDR Paul Giarra, USN (Ret.), “Time to Recalibrate: The Navy Needs Tactical Nuclear Weapons . . . Again,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 149, no. 7 (July 2023); and Brandon Patterson, “The Navy Needs a Low-Yield Nuclear Weapon,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 148, no. 12 (December 2022).
2. The NPR primarily uses “regional” deterrence. “Theater” deterrence is arguably more appropriate because it conveys greater focus on deterring theater use by actors capable of strategic nuclear warfare while more clearly emphasizing escalation control.
3. Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2022 National Defense Strategy of the United States, including the Nuclear Posture Review and Missile Defense Review (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 27 October 2022), media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.PDF.
4. Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, America’s Strategic Posture (Washington, DC: Institute for Defense Analysis, October 2023).
5. Charles Glaser and Brian Radzinsky, “Basics of Deterrence and U.S. Nuclear Doctrine and Forces,” in Managing U.S. Nuclear Operations in the 21st Century, Charles Glaser, Austin Long, and Brian Radzinsky eds. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2022).
6. See Jeffrey Larsen, “Limited War and the Advent of Nuclear Weapons,” in On Limited Nuclear War in the 21st Century, Jeffrey Larsen and Kerry Kartchner eds. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014).
7. Paul H. Nitze, “Atoms, Strategy and Policy,” Foreign Affairs 34, no. 2 (1 January 1956).
8. Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2023 Report on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, October 2023).
9. Brad Roberts, The Case for U.S. Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2016).
10. Franklin C. Miller, “Establishing the Ground Rules for Civilian Oversight,” in Managing U.S. Nuclear Operations, Glaser, Long, and Radzinsky eds.
11. “Senate Armed Services Committee Advance Questions for Admiral Christopher W. Grady” (Washington, DC, December 2021).
12. Andrew Reddie and Bethany Goldblum, “Evidence of the Unthinkable: Experimental Wargaming at the Nuclear Threshold,” Journal of Peace Research 60, no. 5 (September 2023): 760–76.
13. Bureau of Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance, Strengthening Deterrence and Reducing Nuclear Risks: The Supplemental Low-Yield U.S. Submarine-Launched Warhead (Washington, DC: Department of State, 24 April 2020).
14. Ronald O’Rourke, Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress, 2 October 2023, crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R41129.
15. Matthew Kroenig, The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy: Why Strategic Superiority Matters (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018).
16. Kroenig, The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy.
17. Francis J. Gavin, “Strategies of Inhibition: U.S. Grand Strategy, the Nuclear Revolution, and Nonproliferation,” International Security 40, no. 1 (2015): 9–46.
18. Bryant Harris, “New U.S. Nuclear Chief Takes Fresh Stance on Sea-Launched Cruise Missile,” Defense News, 14 March 2023.

Lieutenant Commander Alan Cummings, U.S. Navy Reserve

Lieutenant Commander Cummings is a Department of Defense civilian and a surface warfare officer in the U.S. Navy Reserve.
MORE STORIES FROM THIS AUTHOR

jward · Mar 31, 2024

NEXTA
@nexta_tv

One U.S. state is not covered by NATO's Article 5 The U.S. state of Hawaii is not covered by NATO's Article 5 on collective defense. If a foreign nation attacked the U.S. Navy base at Pearl Harbor or the Indo-Pacific Command headquarters northwest of Honolulu, NATO members would not be required to stand up to defend Hawaii. As CNN explains, such an exception is spelled out in Washington's NATO founding treaty, signed 10 years before Hawaii became a U.S. state.

wcsmythe.eth
@w0rdsmythe

Strictly speaking, that is correct. The same would apply for Alaska. The relevant section of the treaty is Article 6, which states: "For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack: a. on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France (2), on the territory of Turkey or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer; b. on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer."

This means that an attack on Hawaii or Alaska would not automatically trigger the collective defense obligation under Article 5 of the NATO treaty. However, the United States, as a member of NATO, would still have the option to invoke Article 4, which allows for consultations among the member states if the security of any of them is threatened. Answer courtesy of Grok.

9:25 AM · Mar 31, 2024
18K
Views

Housecarl · Mar 31, 2024

jward said:
NEXTA
@nexta_tv

One U.S. state is not covered by NATO's Article 5 The U.S. state of Hawaii is not covered by NATO's Article 5 on collective defense. If a foreign nation attacked the U.S. Navy base at Pearl Harbor or the Indo-Pacific Command headquarters northwest of Honolulu, NATO members would not be required to stand up to defend Hawaii. As CNN explains, such an exception is spelled out in Washington's NATO founding treaty, signed 10 years before Hawaii became a U.S. state.

wcsmythe.eth
@w0rdsmythe

Strictly speaking, that is correct. The same would apply for Alaska. The relevant section of the treaty is Article 6, which states: "For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack: a. on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France (2), on the territory of Turkey or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer; b. on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer."

This means that an attack on Hawaii or Alaska would not automatically trigger the collective defense obligation under Article 5 of the NATO treaty. However, the United States, as a member of NATO, would still have the option to invoke Article 4, which allows for consultations among the member states if the security of any of them is threatened. Answer courtesy of Grok.

9:25 AM · Mar 31, 2024
18K
Views

A "foreign power" attacks either Alaska or Hawaii and the US military forces there and someone is going to be on the wrong end of a MIRV in short order.

Housecarl · Apr 1, 2024

Housecarl said:
Posted for fair use.......

Navy's Rush To Test Microwave Weapons Tied To Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Fears

The Navy wants high-power microwave systems to help ships conserve other weapons, specially ones capable of downing ballistic missiles.

www.twz.com

Navy’s Rush To Test Microwave Weapons Tied To Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Fears
The Navy wants high-power microwave systems to help ships conserve other weapons, specially ones capable of downing ballistic missiles.

BY JOSEPH TREVITHICK | PUBLISHED MAR 29, 2024 5:11 PM EDT

JOSEPH TREVITHICKView Joseph Trevithick's Articles
FranticGoat

The U.S. Navy hopes to have a prototype high-power microwave directed energy weapon ready for shipboard testing by the end of 2026. The service sees weapons of this type as critical additional defensive options that will help its warships keep higher-end surface-to-air missiles in reserve for threats they might be better optimized for, including anti-ship ballistic missiles. The experience of American warships shooting down Houthi missiles and drones over the past six months has rammed home concerns about the magazine depth of the Navy's surface fleets, issues The War Zone previously explored in detail in a feature you can find here.....

Continued......

Details about the Navy's current high-power microwave (HPM) shipboard defense plans are included in its budget request for the 2025 Fiscal Year, which the service rolled out earlier this month. USNI News was the first to report on aspects of the Navy's HPM plans from the new budget proposal.

The Navy has working toward a prototype HPM weapon system specifically for this role through a program called REDCAT since at least 2023. The service's latest budget proposal says the plan is now to rename that development effort METEOR, for reasons that are not entirely clear and that we come back to later. REDCAT and METEOR both appear to be acronyms, but their meanings are unknown.

HPM weapons, in general, are designed to generate bursts of microwave energy that are capable of disrupting or destroying the electronics inside a target system. In a maritime context, HPM systems, as they are understood now, are best suited to providing close-in defense against missiles, drones, and small boats.

A key benefit of HPM systems, which exist in other forms, compared to much more commonly discussed laser directed energy weapons is the former's ability to produce very different graduated effects. This means a single HPM weapon could potentially offer a range of capabilities, including jamming-like functionality and more destructive effects. The wider beam that some HPM systems can emit also out gives them distinct advantages compared to lasers when it comes to their ability to engage multiple targets far faster. In certain cases, this could make them better suited to tackling drone swarms.
HPM also occupies just one end of a broader spectrum of microwave directed energy weapons. The U.S. military has even fielded lower-power microwave systems in the past on a limited (and controversial) basis as non-lethal crowd control assets.

Regardless of specific type and design, directed energy weapons are attractive because of their low cost per-shot and lack of need for any kind of physical reloading compared to traditional weapons systems involving guns or missiles. An HPM or laser weapon system has theoretically unlimited magazine depth, at least in a physical sense, although there may be limitations as to how fast they can re-emit and for how long over a given period of time. Reductions in range and general effectiveness due to atmospheric and meteorological interference is another factor. For HPM weapons, electromagnetic shielding countermeasures can be an issue, but this would add weight and complexity to the threat system. For lasers, even reflective coatings can potentially impact their efficacy under certain circumstances. As such, these systems are best utilized as part of a multi-layered defense.

With all this in mind, the Navy says "the METEOR HPM weapon development will provide capability with low cost-per-shot, deep magazine, tactically significant range, short time engagement for multi-target approach, dual deception and defeat capability," according to the service's 2025 Fiscal Year budget request. "The objective of METEOR is to demonstrate [a] tactically significant, non-kinetic, High Power Microwave (HPM) payload integration onto Naval platforms to defeat, track, engage and assess operational threats while assessing integrated sensors and weapon control options."

The sections of the US Navy's 2025 Fiscal Year budget proposal discussing the METEOR program are seen above and below. <em>USN</em>

The sections of the US Navy's 2025 Fiscal Year budget proposal discussing the METEOR program are seen above and below. USN

USN

USN
The Navy is seeking just over $9 million for METEOR in Fiscal Year 2025. This is a decrease from the $13.5 million the service asked for to support the previous REDCAT effort in the 2024 Fiscal year.

The Navy's budget documents say that this is in part "due to a large portions [sic] of [the REDCAT] hardware build [being] completed and moving into the testing phase." One of METEOR's main objectives now is to "transition prior REDCAT hardware into parallel activities to provide a shipboard weapon prototype for integration in FY26, as well as a test bed for continued technology maturation and evaluation," those documents add. Land-based testing of the system is also expected to occur first.

METEOR also looks to have been included in a separate section of the Navy's previous 2024 Fiscal Year budget request for programs being conducted as part of the Pentagon's Rapid Defense Experimentation Reserve (RDER) initiative. Whether or not the Navy is seeking additional funding for this HPM development effort through that part of the budget in the 2025 Fiscal Year is unclear. The service's latest budget proposal does not include specific details about the programs contained within that line item.
The METEOR entry in the Navy's proposed 2024 Fiscal Year budget provides interesting additional context about the Navy's desire for shipboard HPM defense capability.

Continued......

Housecarl · Apr 1, 2024

Continued......

"Currently, the Joint Force suffers from a lack of redundant, resilient hard kill/soft kill options against stressing stream raid threats of Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBM). The issue is particularly acute in the USINDOPACOM AOR [U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Area of Responsibility] due to the vast geographic distances involved, ship magazine size and adversary actions," the service's Fiscal Year 2024 budget request explains. "Without additional hard kill/soft kill options preserving magazine depth, US forces in the AOR face unacceptably high risks to the mission and to the force. Available assets in the AOR are limited with a limited number of missile inventory. HPM payload capability will solve this problem by supplementing and conserving the ships [sic] kinetic defensive weapons."

The sections on the Meteor program that appeared in the US Navy's 2024 Fiscal Year budget request. The effort looks to be directly related to the program outlined in the service's latest proposed budget. USN
This is a clear reference to the Chinese People's Liberation Army's (PLA) very open development and fielding of an increasingly capable and diverse array of ground, sea, and air-launched anti-ship ballistic missiles. The PLA's efforts are part of a larger anti-access/area denial strategy that is heavily focused on denying U.S. carrier strike groups the ability to operate within striking distance of its shores.

There have been reports that Russia may now be exploring the development of similar capabilities, which it could also deploy in the Pacific region. The U.S. Army is also now pursuing anti-ship ballistic missiles of its own.

Iran has also emerged as a major developer of anti-ship ballistic missile capabilities and a key source for their increasing proliferation, including to non-state actors. Iranian-backed Houthi militants in Yemen have now become the first to employ these weapons in anger and how shown just how real a threat they pose in the course of their ongoing anti-ship campaign in and around the Red Sea. U.S. authorities say that the Houthis used anti-ship ballistic missiles in the attack that ultimately led to the sinking of the Belize-flagged cargo vessel MV Rubymar in February and the fatal attack on the Barbados-flagged container ship True Confidence earlier this month.

The Houthis have also been using anti-ship cruise missiles, aerial kamikaze drones, and explosive-laden uncrewed surface vessels and underwater vehicles (USVs and UUVs) – the exact kinds of threats an HPM weapon would be most useful against – to target foreign warships and commercial vessels off the southern coasts of the Arabian Peninsula. The Yemeni militants have also launched complex attacks involving multiple types of missiles and drones.

All of this only further underscores the Navy's stated reasoning behind the Meteor HPM program, even if those weapons are not primarily intended to be used against ballistic missile threats. That being said, there is a possibility that HPM systems could have some limited use against lower-tier anti-ship ballistic missiles.
Regardless, Navy warships have particularly limited and costly options for engaging ballistic missile threats, which present unique challenges for defenders just owning the very high speeds they reach during the terminal phase of flight. Advanced designs with varying degrees of maneuverability can be even harder to track and intercept. Novel hypersonic weapons, another set of emerging threats, combine these attributes to be even more difficult to protect against.

One of the Navy's main weapons for tackling ballistic, as well as hypersonic threats, to its ships today are variants of the Standard Missile 6 (SM-6). This is a highly capable multi-purpose design that can also be used against a variety of other targets in the air and on the surface, but one that is also expensive. In the surface attack role, SM-6 functions in many ways like a ballistic missile. The Navy's 2025 Fiscal Year budget request puts the unit price of an SM-6 Block IA, the most advanced variant currently in production, at $4.2 million. Each one of the still-in-development Block IB version, which will have greatly improved performance and other capabilities, is expected to have a price tag of around $8.5 million.

A portion of the Navy's Arleigh Burke class destroyers and the service's dwindling number of Ticonderoga class cruisers are also capable of employing variants of the SM-3. The members of the SM-3 family are specifically designed to intercept higher-end ballistic missiles, including intercontinental ballistic missiles (IBCM), in the mid-course portion of their flight outside of the Earth's atmosphere. The SM-3 Block IIA, the most advanced variant in production, has a unit cost of around $28 million, according to Pentagon budget documents.

A briefing slide showing details about the different versions of the SM-3. <em>MDA</em>

A briefing slide showing details about the different versions of the SM-3. MDA

The current price of a single Block IIIC variant of the SM-2, the latest version of the Navy's current standard ship-launched medium-range surface-to-air missile, is also around $2.5 million. Shorter-range RIM-162 Evolved Sea Sparrow Missiles (ESSM), each of which costs some $1.5 million, are another important component of the service's existing shipboard air and missile defense arsenal.

Navy ships can only carry so many of these missiles at once in their Vertical Launch Systems (VLS) and currently the service has no operational capacity to reload VLS cells at sea. This has long raised concerns about how quickly individual ships might deplete their magazines in a major conflict, as The War Zone explored in detail in our recent feature.

Just in operations against the Houthis between October and February, Navy warships fired at least 100 Standard series missiles. Expenditures of these and other weapons have only continued since then. The service could expect to see even higher volumes of incoming threats, including more capable anti-ship ballistic missiles, in any potential high-end fight against China in the Pacific.

"We are a learning organization. And so as we apply the concepts of defense in depth, it isn't always an expensive SM-2 missile that gets shot at a UAS [uncrewed aerial system]," Navy Adm. Christopher Grady, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said at a press conference about the proposed 2025 Fiscal Year budget earlier this month. "We've learned how to use other systems and have rapidly adjusted to this concept of defense in depth. And that's what gives me great confidence that we'll be able to sustain that as long as it takes to change the calculus over there."

The Navy's attitude toward the anti-ship ballistic missile threat, specifically, has dramatically shifted in recent years. In 2021, now-retired Navy Vice Admiral Jeffrey Trussler, then the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information Warfare, said "I hope they [the Chinese] just keep pouring money into that type of thing," indicating that the service felt at the time it had sufficient countermeasures and/or tactics, techniques, and procedures in place to defend against them. This assessment has clearly changed since then.

When operational Meteor HPM weapons might start being integrated onto Navy ships remains to be seen. The service could also seek to field systems, even on a limited basis, before 2026 through other programs. In February, Naval Sea Systems (NAVSEA) put out a very broad call for potential counter-drone capabilities that could be added to its ships within 12 months of a contract award.

As already noted, HPM systems are not new and a number of potentially viable designs already exist in various stages of development within the U.S. military and the commercial sector. Private firm Epirus has previously shown a concept for a shipboard version of its Leonidas HPM system, seen at the top of this story, that leverages existing components of the Mk 15 Phalanx Close-in Weapon System (CIWS) that is found on many Navy warships. BAE Systems has presented an HPM weapon concept for use in the maritime domain in the past, too.

The Navy has already been fielding various tiers of laser directed energy weapons on a limited number of warships and is in the process of developing additional designs that could be deployed on a broader basis.
No matter what, the Navy clearly sees HPM weapons as a key part of future layered defense arrangements for its warships to help ensure that they can maximize their overall defensive capabilities to protect against an array of threats, including anti-ship ballistic missiles.
Contact the author: joe@twz.com

Housecarl · Apr 2, 2024

Posted for fair use......

4/1/24 National Security and Korean News and Commentary | Small Wars Journal

smallwarsjournal.com

Mon, 04/01/2024 - 9:55am

Access National Security News HERE.
Access Korean News HERE.
National Security News Content:
1. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 31, 2024
2. Israel–Hamas War (Iran) Update, March 31, 2024
3. A Homeland Warning About ISIS-K
4. China’s Defense Budget Has Only One Trajectory: Up
5. The Dollar Is More Armored Division Than Currency
6. Russian assassination unit linked to U.S. officials' "Havana syndrome"
7. Former CENTCOM commander warns ISIS online radicalization among ‘most dangerous methods’ for attack
8. Beijing Deplores Taiwan’s Next President, but Welcomes an Old One
9. Against All Odds, Army Making Solid Progress on Modernization
10. The Navy Needs 355 Ships by 2030
11. The Celebrity Chef Who Beat the U.S. Military at Getting Aid Into Gaza
12. On the Hamilton Affair
13. How the FBI’s visit to a Muslim woman became a right-wing rallying cry
14. From ‘War on the Rocks’ to ‘AI on the Rocks’: A New Chapter for an Ambitious Project
15. America’s Pacific Partnerships Are Secure—For Now
16. Analysis | China decries U.S. ‘bullying.’ But, to many, China is the bully.
17. Stop Clipping Convergence: The Army Overlooks the Beard Domain at Its Peril
18. The Obstacles to Diplomacy in Ukraine
19. The Trouble With “the Global South”
20. Militant April

Korean News Content:
1. Kim Jong-un rejects unification out of fear of South Korea
2. ＜Investigation Inside N. Korea＞ A shocking situation...How are the neglected elderly faring? (1) 　Poverty-stricken elderly people live off begging and wander the streets Fewer elderly people seen in public than before
3. Russia’s veto on North Korea sanctions watchdog sparks international criticism
4. Don’t Count Samsung Out in the AI Memory Stakes
5. N. Korea reaffirms plan to launch multiple spy satellites this year
6. S. Korea detects no signs of preparations in N. Korea for military parade
7. Police probe 2 military doctors for writing collective action guidelines
8. Outgoing U.S. 8th Army commander receives state medal for contribution to alliance
9. Defense Ministry launches AI research center
10. Why preparation for COVID-29 is imperative
11. Kim Jong Un building new university to train officials to support family’s rule
12. The New Security Challenges on the Korean Peninsula

jward · Apr 4, 2024

Lockheed Martin Conducts Historic LRASM Flight Test

Orlando, Fla., April 3, 2024 – The U.S. Navy in partnership with Lockheed Martin [NYSE: LMT] successfully conducted a historic Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) flight test with four missiles simultaneously in flight.
During the 12th Integrated Test Event (ITE-12), the U.S. Navy was able to demonstrate the weapon’s inherent high-end lethality from mission planning through kill chain integration and its effects on the target. All mission objectives were met, reinforcing high confidence in the weapon’s capabilities and superior firepower.

"We have continued to invest in the design and development of LRASM’s anti-surface warfare capabilities to ensure that warfighters have the 21st century security solutions they need to complete their missions and come home safely,” said Lisbeth Vogelpohl, LRASM program director at Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control. "This event was a testament to our commitment to deliver reliable products that work each and every time, ensuring those who serve stay ahead of ready.”

ITE-12 was the next ‘big-step’ in LRASM’s evolution. The successful test was a graduation exercise for the missiles’ latest configuration and lays the foundation for increased capabilities to come.
As a member of the AGM-158 family of cruise missiles, LRASM delivers long-range, highly survivable and lethal capability against highly defended surface combatants that no other weapon in the inventory can provide.
For additional information, visit Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM).

About Lockheed Martin
Lockheed Martin is a global defense technology company driving innovation and advancing scientific discovery. Our all-domain mission solutions and 21st Century Security vision accelerate the delivery of transformative technologies to ensure those we serve always stay ahead of ready. More information at Lockheedmartin.com.
Please follow @LMNews on Twitter for the latest announcements and news across the corporation.

Housecarl · Apr 5, 2024

Posted for fair use......

Pentagon weighs options to lengthen life of legacy nuclear platforms as new programs face delays - Breaking Defense

"The question is, how do you manage what you might call the transition from the legacy systems to modern systems?” John Plumb, assistant secretary of Defense for Space Policy, told reporters.

breakingdefense.com

AIR WARFARE, LAND WARFARE, PENTAGON, SPACE

Pentagon weighs options to lengthen life of legacy nuclear platforms as new programs face delays

"The question is, how do you manage what you might call the transition from the legacy systems to modern systems?” John Plumb, assistant secretary of Defense for Space Policy, told reporters.

By VALERIE INSINNA on April 05, 2024 at 3:17 PM

WASHINGTON — The Pentagon may have to take steps to prolong the life of its legacy ballistic missile submarines and intercontinental ballistic missiles due to delays in fielding their replacements, the Defense Department’s top space policy official said today.

The DoD is committed to modernizing its nuclear triad, said John Plumb, assistant secretary of Defense for Space Policy. But with construction of the first Columbia-class submarine at least one year behind schedule and the first flight of Sentinel ICBMs delayed by two years, the department is deliberating how to keep its older Ohio-class submarines and Minuteman III ICBMs ready to respond to a conflict for longer than anticipated.

“So really, the question is, how do you manage what you might call the transition from the legacy systems to modern systems?” he told reporters during a Defense Writers Group roundtable today. “We’re also starting to look at, what are these other force posture changes we might be able to make that don’t break the bank or put too much strain on our nuclear complex that could help address that as well.”

Plumb declined to discuss what specific options are under consideration. However, a service life extension for the Minuteman III program, which was explored by the US Air Force before it committed buying a next-generation replacement, is not on the table, said Plumb, who is set to vacate the space policy job in early May.

The Defense Department is currently conducting an evaluation of the Air Force’s Sentinel program after program costs increased by 37 percent, triggering a Nunn McCurdy breach that will force Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin to certify whether the program can move forward. Northrop Grumman won the Sentinel contract in 2020 and has defended its work, citing overly optimistic early cost estimates by the government and the discovery of complications in the Sentinel plan as it progressed.

Meanwhile, systemic industrial base challenges have dogged Navy shipbuilding efforts, leaving even its largest priority — the Columbia-class built jointly by General Dynamics Electric Boat and Huntington Ingalls Industries — between 12 and 16 months late, according to a Navy review unveiled earlier this month.

That leaves the B-21 bomber, also made by Northrop, as the lone nuclear modernization program that has largely stuck to its schedule — although inflation has driven a $1 billion financial loss on the initial production for which Northrop must pay due to the fixed-price terms of its contract with the Air Force.

In a October 2023 report, a congressional commission on US nuclear posture warned that the Pentagon’s nuclear modernization strategy is built on a “just in time” schedule where legacy systems are retired at the same time new platforms are become operational.

The commission made several recommendations to mitigate shortfalls in capacity that could be caused by modernization delays, such as funding upgrades to Ohio-class submarines to ensure they can operate past the current retirement timeline or — as part of the Minuteman III force structure ages out — spreading existing nuclear warheads to the nuclear platforms that remain operational. However, none are perfect solutions, the commission said.

“Some require significant additional investment and/or near-term decisions to hedge against the problem,” it said. “Others may require potential near-term decisions to be able to field different warhead loads. For example, sustaining the legacy force until its modernized replacement arrives will require additional investment in order to prevent a loss of capability and sustain the U.S. vital nuclear deterrent.”

jward · Apr 6, 2024

Mario Nawfal
@MarioNawfal

TEXAS GOV. ABBOTT WARNS WAR AT THE BORDER COMING “REALLY SOON”

The Governor of Texas is sounding the alarm about a potential “drone war” erupting between the US and Mexican cartels across the border.

Gov. Abbott:

“Let me foreshadow also another concern we're gonna have really soon, it's already kind of beginning right now, and that's gonna be drone wars.

The capability of the cartels about getting things across the border through drones already is extraordinary and they're gonna be more aggressive, more sophisticated in the drone attacks."

Source: Newsweek

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1776675993656123688

View: https://twitter.com/MarioNawfal/status/1776675993656123688

WAR 03-30-2024-to-04-05-2024__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

On TB every waking moment

(338) 03-09-2024-to-03-15-2024__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****​

(339) 03-16-2024-to-03-22-2024__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****​

(340) 03-23-2024-to-03-29-2024__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****​

Putin Friend Predicts Nuclear Strike 'Most Likely' Coming​

On TB every waking moment

IAEA Warns Of Iraq-Like Scenario For Iran Without Transparency​

On TB every waking moment

Navy’s Rush To Test Microwave Weapons Tied To Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Fears​

On TB every waking moment

Northrop says Air Force design changes drove higher Sentinel ICBM cost​

‘Unknown unknowns’ on $96B program​

Mock-up silo​

Five programs in one​

Trending Now​

Russia’s air force is hollowing itself out. More air defense can help.​

Northrop says Air Force design changes drove higher Sentinel ICBM cost​

Pakistan unveils aircraft and rocket programs, parades military tech​

Putin threatens striking Western air bases hosting Ukrainian F-16s​

Argentina to buy surplus F-16 jets from Denmark​

On TB every waking moment

New NATO members prompt US Army to revisit ‘high north’ stock locations​

The service is also crafting a plan and working the diplomatic channels to gain new agreements for Army prepositioned stock sites in the Indo-Pacific region, said AMC’s Lt. Gen. Christopher Mohan.​

On TB every waking moment

Race against time: Can the US counter China's rising nuke capabilities?​

On TB every waking moment

A Better Case for SLCM-N​

Yielding Theater Deterrence​

Diversifying Options​

On TB every waking moment

Reserving Boomers​

Arms Control, Extended Deterrence, and Nonproliferation​

Escalation Management​

Lieutenant Commander Alan Cummings, U.S. Navy Reserve​

passin' thru

On TB every waking moment

On TB every waking moment

Navy’s Rush To Test Microwave Weapons Tied To Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Fears​

On TB every waking moment

On TB every waking moment

passin' thru

On TB every waking moment

Pentagon weighs options to lengthen life of legacy nuclear platforms as new programs face delays​

"The question is, how do you manage what you might call the transition from the legacy systems to modern systems?” John Plumb, assistant secretary of Defense for Space Policy, told reporters.​

passin' thru

WAR 03-30-2024-to-04-05-2024__THEWINDSofWAR

(338) 03-09-2024-to-03-15-2024__THEWINDSofWAR

(339) 03-16-2024-to-03-22-2024__THEWINDSofWAR

(340) 03-23-2024-to-03-29-2024__THEWINDSofWAR

Putin Friend Predicts Nuclear Strike 'Most Likely' Coming

IAEA Warns Of Iraq-Like Scenario For Iran Without Transparency

Navy’s Rush To Test Microwave Weapons Tied To Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Fears

Northrop says Air Force design changes drove higher Sentinel ICBM cost

‘Unknown unknowns’ on $96B program

Mock-up silo

Five programs in one

Trending Now

Russia’s air force is hollowing itself out. More air defense can help.

Northrop says Air Force design changes drove higher Sentinel ICBM cost

Pakistan unveils aircraft and rocket programs, parades military tech

Putin threatens striking Western air bases hosting Ukrainian F-16s

Argentina to buy surplus F-16 jets from Denmark

New NATO members prompt US Army to revisit ‘high north’ stock locations

The service is also crafting a plan and working the diplomatic channels to gain new agreements for Army prepositioned stock sites in the Indo-Pacific region, said AMC’s Lt. Gen. Christopher Mohan.

Race against time: Can the US counter China's rising nuke capabilities?

A Better Case for SLCM-N

Yielding Theater Deterrence

Diversifying Options

Reserving Boomers

Arms Control, Extended Deterrence, and Nonproliferation

Escalation Management

Lieutenant Commander Alan Cummings, U.S. Navy Reserve

Navy’s Rush To Test Microwave Weapons Tied To Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Fears

Pentagon weighs options to lengthen life of legacy nuclear platforms as new programs face delays

"The question is, how do you manage what you might call the transition from the legacy systems to modern systems?” John Plumb, assistant secretary of Defense for Space Policy, told reporters.