WAR 04-17-2021-to-04-23-2021___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

[Housecarl]

(465) 03-27-2021-to-04-02-2021___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****
WAR - 03-27-2021-to-04-02-2021___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

(467) 04-03-2021-to-04-09-2021___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

(468) 04-10-2021-to-04-16-2021___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

WAR - 04-10-2021-to-04-16-2021___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

(464) WAR 03-20-2021-to-03-26-2021___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR**** WAR - 03-20-2021-to-03-26-2021___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR**** (465) 03-27-2021-to-04-02-2021___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR**** WAR - 03-27-2021-to-04-02-2021___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR**** (467)...

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Abbott demands Biden add cartels to terrorist list, but didn’t squawk when Trump decided not to

WASHINGTON — Insisting the administration is “standing by” as Mexican cartels terrorize South Texas, Gov. Greg Abbott demanded that President Joe Biden add the crime groups to a list of

dentonrc.com

Abbott demands Biden add cartels to terrorist list, but didn’t squawk when Trump decided not to

• By Todd J. Gillman Dallas Morning News
• 40 min ago

WASHINGTON — Insisting the administration is “standing by” as Mexican cartels terrorize South Texas, Gov. Greg Abbott demanded that President Joe Biden add the crime groups to a list of terrorist organizations that includes al Qaeda and the Islamic State.

“In November 2019, cartel gunmen fatally ambushed nine U.S. citizens, all women and children,” Abbott wrote Biden, invoking a number of brutal attacks to justify the designation.

All of the attacks he cited took place when Donald Trump was president, and Abbott never publicly pressured Trump to designate the cartels as terrorist groups.

Nor did Abbott air any complaint when Trump backed down from a threat to add cartels to the foreign terrorist group list, under pressure from Mexico.

The brutality of the cartels is not in doubt.

But the laser focus on Biden suggests a degree of political theater. And Abbott is hardly the only Republican to cast him as weak on cartels while glossing over the fact that Trump never did what they now demand from the new president.

“To take a few examples from the past year: a U.S. citizen held hostage by the Sinaloa Cartel was recently rescued; heavily armed members of the Jalisco New Generation Cartel attempted to assassinate Mexico City’s chief of police; and a journalist was beheaded for his coverage of the cartels,” Abbott noted in his letter to Biden noting that cartels “smuggle narcotics and weapons into the United States to fund their illegal enterprises. They force women and children into human and sex trafficking ... [and] murder innocent people, including women and children.”

The kidnapping, Mexico City attack and decapitation he cited all took place in 2020, before Biden was elected.

Like previous presidents, Biden has taken steps short of adding cartels to the State Department’s list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations. The 72 groups currently on the list include the Haqqani Network, Boko Haram, Hamas, and a number of al Qaeda affiliates and offshoots. Apart from a handful of separatist groups such as Peru’s Shining Path, nearly all are Islamic militants.

On April 6, for instance, the Treasury Department blocked assets and criminalized financial dealings with three people linked to the Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion, which has been blamed for the assassination of a former Jalisco state governor in December at a Puerto Vallarta tourist restaurant.

On Thursday, Rep. Chip Roy, R-Austin, filed a bill to immediately designate the Reynosa/Los Metros faction of the Gulf Cartel and the Cartel Del Noreste faction of Los Zetas as Foreign Terrorist Organizations.

It also gives the State Department 30 days to assess what other cartels meet the criteria.

“These are people who hang, behead and burn people alive to threaten and control government officials and Mexico and they are starting to bring those dangerous tactics here to the United States,” Roy said. “To make matters worse, they’re growing even more powerful, wealthy and brazen as a result of this administration’s self-inflicted border crisis.”

In February, freshman Rep. Tony Gonzales, R-San Antonio, whose district includes 820 miles of border, filed legislation that would, among other things, require the State Department to quickly decide whether six of the most notorious cartels meet the definition of terrorist organization: Jalisco New Generation, Sinaloa, Juarez, Tijuana, Gulf and Los Zetas.

“The Biden Administration is essentially aiding and abetting cartels by allowing them to grow into a force that destabilizes Central and South American nations, abuses woman and children, and funnels illegal drugs into our country,” said Rep. Michael Cloud, R-Victoria, one of 30 co-sponsors on Roy’s bill.

It’s a federal crime to knowingly offer support to a designated terrorist organization. Members of such groups are subject to deportation and cannot enter the country legally.

Banks must freeze funds they suspect are connected to such groups, and alert the U.S. Treasury.

In short, it’s a powerful tool.
In November 2019, Trump vowed to slap the designation on drug cartels after the bloodiest attack on U.S. citizens in Mexico in years. Three women and six children were killed in an ambush in northern Mexico.
The outcry in Mexico was intense.

President Manuel Lopez Obrador expressed adamant opposition. Others warned that the United States would use the designation as pretext for an invasion, just as it has gone to war against al Qaeda and ISIS.

Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama had likewise considered using the terrorist designation to unleash new tools in the fight against drug trafficking. Then, too, Mexico pushed back.

Abbott argued that invoking the Foreign Terrorist Organization law would lengthen prison terms for cartel members, and make them inadmissible to the United States.

“It would allow the United States to freeze the assets of these organizations and … put them out of business,” he said on Fox News, where he also asserted that “the White House has nobody in charge of operations at the United States border with Mexico, 1,200 miles of which includes the state of Texas.

“Not the president, not the Vice President, not anybody else has been on the ground taking charge of maintaining these operations,” he claimed. “All they have done is created a complete open border where you have not only young unaccompanied minors, family units, you have men and you have terrorists that are coming across the border as well as these cartels.”

Homeland Security Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas has visited the border three times, most recently last week, when he stopped in McAllen and El Paso.

His department includes the Border Patrol and immigration enforcement, making him in charge of operations at the border.

“The Biden administration is standing by while people in South Texas are terrorized. It could be murderers, it could be kidnappings, robberies, all kinds of crimes are taking place,” Abbott said.

Abbott’s attack echoed demands from conservatives that Biden and Vice President Kamala Harris visit the border. GOP politicians and their allies in conservative media label Harris the “border czar,” though that has never been her assignment.

Rather, Biden put her in charge of dealing with Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador, the same role he held as Barack Obama’s vice president.

Also despite Abbott’s contention, the border is not “open” under any reasonable definition, though it is certainly true that the Border Patrol has been stretched thin and overwhelmed by a surge in migrants, partly driven by expectations of a more welcoming policy under Biden.

But the Biden administration has continued a policy of expelling all migrants who are caught — except for unaccompanied children, a change from when Trump was in charge.

 

[Housecarl]

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Libya: UN backs ceasefire mechanism, urges foreign forces withdraw | Africanews

It comes as a unity government was approved in March to lead the war-ravaged North African nation to December elections.

www.africanews.com

Libya: UN backs ceasefire mechanism, urges foreign forces withdraw
By Africanews and AFP
Last updated: 14 hours ago

BENGHAZI

Libyans are flooding the markets In the city of Benghazi on the first Friday of the holy month of Ramadan.

But Libyans may also have another reason to celebrate after the UN Security Council on Friday unanimously passed a resolution that calls for all foreign forces and mercenaries to leave Libya.
It also backed a ceasefire monitoring component to monitor last October’s historic ceasefire agreement.


This unit is separate from the UN ceasefire monitoring mechanism.

Ambassadors also passed a resolution renewing measures relating to the illicit export of petroleum,
It comes as a unity government was approved in March to lead the war-ravaged North African nation to December elections.

Oil-rich Libya descended into conflict after dictator Moamer Kadhafi was toppled and killed in a NATO-backed uprising in 2011, resulting in multiple forces vying for power.

On the security front, the resolution stresses "the need to provide for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (into society) of armed groups and all non-state armed actors, security sector reform and the creation of an inclusive and accountable defense architecture for Libya.

Mercenaries scattered across the Sahel
The text "calls on all Libyan parties to fully implement the October 23, 2020 ceasefire and strongly urges all member states to respect it, including with the immediate withdrawal of all foreign forces and mercenaries from Libya.

The figure of 60 UN observers falls far short of what the West originally wanted, which called for "a robust mechanism". However, the UN has run into opposition from Libyans for a strong foreign presence on their soil to supervise the ceasefire, which they want to keep under control.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1383201539464957958

View: https://twitter.com/UN/status/1383201539464957958


The presence in Libya of Turkish foreign troops and Russian, Syrian, Chadian and Sudanese mercenaries "is a big concern," UN spokesman Stephane Dujarric said Thursday. But, he said, the mission of unarmed UN civilian observers "will be focused on the ceasefire.

According to several diplomats speaking on condition of anonymity, the non-departure of foreign troops and mercenaries from Libya, although demanded by the Libyan parties themselves since October, is problematic in view of the elections.

Countries in the region, including Niger, are also worried about mercenaries being scattered across the Sahel to fuel the violence that is difficult to control.

"The Russian-affiliated groups and Russia say 'we can't leave until the Turks leave. And the Turks say 'we are here on a legal basis, we were invited unlike the Russians'" by the previous UN-recognized government in Tripoli, a diplomat said.

 

[Housecarl]

Hummm......

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The Clandestine War on Africa: France’s Endgame in Mali - Kashmir Reader

In a recent report, the United Nations Mission in Mali, known as MINUSMA, concluded that, on January 3, French warplanes had struck a crowd attending a wedding in the remote village of Bounti, killing 22 of the guests. According to the findings, based on a thorough investigation and interviews...

kashmirreader.com

The Clandestine War on Africa: France’s Endgame in Mali
By Ramzy Baroud on 1:55 am April 17, 2021
No Comment

In a recent report, the United Nations Mission in Mali, known as MINUSMA, concluded that, on January 3, French warplanes had struck a crowd attending a wedding in the remote village of Bounti, killing 22 of the guests.

According to the findings, based on a thorough investigation and interviews with hundreds of eyewitnesses, 19 of the guests were unarmed civilians whose killing constitutes a war crime.

Unlike other wars in the region, the French war in Mali receives little media coverage outside the limited scope of French-speaking media, which has successfully branded this war as one against Islamic militants.

However, the story has less to do with Islamic militancy and much to do with foreign interventions. Anti-French sentiment in Mali goes back over a century when, in 1892, France colonized that once-thriving African kingdom, exploiting its resources and reordering its territories as a way to weaken its population and to break down its social structures.

The formal end of French colonialism of Mali in 1960 was merely the end of a chapter, but definitely not the story itself. France remained present in Mali, in the Sahel and throughout Africa, defending its interests, exploiting the ample resources and working jointly with local elites to maintain its dominance.

Fast forward to March 2012 when Captain Amadou Sanogo overthrew the nominally democratic government of Amadou Toumani Touré. He used the flimsy excuse of protesting Bamako’s failure to rein in the militancy of the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) in the north.

Sanogo’s pretense was quite clever, though, as it fit neatly into a grand narrative designed by various Western governments, lead among them France, who saw Islamic militancy as the greatest danger facing many parts of Africa, especially in the Sahel.

Interestingly but not surprisingly, Sanogo’s coup, which angered African governments, but was somehow accommodated by Western powers, made matters much worse. In the following months, northern militants managed to seize much of the impoverished northern regions.

The army coup was never truly reversed but, at the behest of France and other influential governments, was simply streamlined into a transitional government, still largely influenced by Sanogo’s supporters.

On December 20, 2012, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 2085, which authorized the deployment of the African-led International Support Mission to Mali. Armed with what was understood to be a UN mandate, France launched its war in Mali, under the title of ‘Operation Serval’.

It is worth mentioning here that the Mali scenario had just transpired in Libya when, on March 17, 2011, the UNSC passed Resolution 1973, which was conveniently translated into a declaration of war. Both scenarios proved costly for the two African countries as the interventions allowed violence to spiral even further, leading to yet more foreign interventions and proxy wars.

On July 15, 2014, France declared that ‘Operation Serval’ was successfully accomplished, providing its own list of casualties on both sides, again, with very little international monitoring. Yet, almost immediately, on August 1, 2014, it declared another military mission, this time an open-ended war, ‘Operation Barkhane’.

Barkhane was spearheaded by France and included Paris’ own coalition, dubbed ‘G5 Sahel’. All former French colonies, the new coalition consisted of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger. The declared goal of France’s indefinite intervention in the Sahel is to provide material support and training to the ‘G5 Sahel’ forces in their ‘war on terror’.

However, according to Deutsche Welle, the ‘optimism’ that accompanied ‘Operation Serval’ completely vanished with ‘Operation Barkhane’. “The security situation has worsened, not only (in the) north but (in) central Mali as well”, the German news agency recently reported, conveying a sense of chaos, with farmers fleeing their land, “self-defense militias” carrying out their own operations to satisfy “their own agendas”, and so on.

In truth, the chaos in the streets merely reflected the government’s own bedlam. Even with a heavy French military presence, instability continued to plague Mali. The latest coup in the country took place in August 2020. Worse still, the various Tuareg forces, which have long challenged the foreign exploitation of the country, are now unifying under a single banner. The future of Mali is hardly promising.

So what was the point of the intervention, anyway? Certainly not to ‘restore democracy’ or ‘stabilize’ the country. Karen Jayes elaborates. “France’s interests in the region are primarily economic,” she wrote in a recent article. “Their military actions protect their access to oil and uranium in the region.”

To appreciate this claim more fully, one only needs a single example of how Mali’s wealth of natural resources is central to France’s economy. “An incredible 75 percent of France’s electric power is generated by nuclear plants that are mostly fueled by uranium extracted on Mali’s border region of Kidal.” Therefore, it is unsurprising that France was ready to go to war as soon as militants proclaimed the Kidal region to be part of their independent nation-state of Azawad in April 2012.

As for the bombing of the Bounti wedding, the French military denied any wrong-doing, claiming that all of the victims were ‘jihadists’. The story is meant to end here, but it will not – as long as Mali is exploited by outsiders, as long as poverty and inequality will continue to exist, leading to insurrections, rebellions and military coups.

The writer is a journalist and Editor of The Palestine Chronicle. He is the author of five books. www.ramzybaroud.net

 

[Housecarl]

Hummm.......

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With food and fuel, Hezbollah braces for the worst in Lebanon collapse

Lebanon's Hezbollah has made preparations for an all-out collapse of the fracturing state, issuing ration cards for food, importing medicine and readying storage for fuel from its patron Iran, three sources familiar with the plans told Reuters. The steps highlight rising fears of an implosion...

news.yahoo.com

With food and fuel, Hezbollah braces for the worst in Lebanon collapse

Laila Bassam and Ellen Francis
Fri, April 16, 2021, 6:19 AM


By Laila Bassam and Ellen Francis
BEIRUT, (Reuters) - Lebanon's Hezbollah has made preparations for an all-out collapse of the fracturing state, issuing ration cards for food, importing medicine and readying storage for fuel from its patron Iran, three sources familiar with the plans told Reuters.

The moves, responding to a grave economic crisis, would mark an expansion of services provided by the armed movement to its large Sh'ite support base, with a network that already boasts charities, a construction firm and a pension system.

The steps highlight rising fears of an implosion of the Lebanese state, in which authorities can no longer import food or fuel to keep the lights on. They underline Hezbollah's growing role in tackling the emergency with services that the government would otherwise provide.

The plan chimes with worries in Lebanon that people will have to rely on political factions for food and security, in the way many did in the militia days of the 1975-1990 civil war.

In response to a question about Hezbollah's plans, Leila Hatoum, an adviser to the caretaker prime minister, said the country was "in no condition to refuse aid" regardless of politics.

The sources from the pro-Hezbollah camp, who declined to be named, said the plan for a potential worst-case scenario has gathered pace as an end to subsidies looms in the coming months, raising the spectre of hunger and unrest.

Lebanon's currency has crashed as the country runs out of dollars, with no state rescue in sight. Food prices have shot up 400%.

Fights in supermarkets are now commonplace, as are people rummaging through trash. A brawl over food packages this week killed one person and injured two others.

Hezbollah's plan would help shield its communities - not only members but also mainly Shi'ite residents of districts it dominates - from the worst of the crisis, the sources said. It could also contain any restlessness among core supporters, analysts say.

Hezbollah, which with its allies has a majority in parliament and government, did not respond to a request for comment.

"The preparations have begun for the next stage...It is indeed an economic battle plan," said one of the sources, a senior official.

OUTSIZED NETWORK
Already, the new ration card, seen by Reuters, helps hundreds of people buy basic goods in the local currency - largely Iranian, Lebanese and Syrian cheaper items at a discount up to 40%, subsidised by the party, the sources said.

The card - named after a Shi'ite Imam - can be used at co-ops, some of them newly opened, in the southern Beirut suburbs and parts of southern Lebanon where Hezbollah holds sway. The sources did not elaborate on the budget or recipients.

An Iran-funded paramilitary force which critics once called "a state within a state", Hezbollah has grown more entangled in Lebanese state affairs in recent years.

Washington, which deems Hezbollah a terrorist group, has ramped up sanctions to choke off its sources of funding, including what it estimates as hundreds of millions of dollars from Tehran every year.

Iranian funding keeps Hezbollah better off than many in the country's mosaic of parties, including those opposed to its arsenal. Some factions have issued aid baskets to their patronage communities, but the Iran-backed network remains outsized in comparison.

"They're all doing it...But Hezbollah's scope is much bigger and more powerful, with more resources to deal with the crisis," said Joseph Daher, a researcher who wrote a book on Hezbollah's political economy. "This is more about limiting the catastrophe for its popular base. It means the dependency on Hezbollah particularly will increase."

And while Hezbollah gives ration cards, the state, hollowed out by decades of graft and debt, has talked up the idea of such a card for poor Lebanese for nearly a year without acting.

Ministers have said the need for parliamentary approval has stalled the cabinet's plan for cards.

DARKNESS AND HUNGER
Photos on social media of shelves stacked with canned goods, reportedly from one of Hezbollah's co-ops, spread across Lebanon last week.

Fatima Hamoud, in her 50s, said the ration card allows her once a month to buy grains, oil and cleaning products for a household of eight. "They know we're in bad shape," she said. "Without them, what would we have done in these tough times."

A second Shi'ite source said Hezbollah had filled up warehouses and launched the cards to extend services outside the party and plug gaps in the Lebanese market, where cheap alternatives are more common than pre-crisis.

He said the card offers a quota, based on the family size, for needs like sugar and flour.

The goods are backed by Hezbollah, imported by allied companies or brought in without customs fees through the border with Syria, where Hezbollah forces have a footing since joining the war to back Damascus alongside Iran.

The source added that Hezbollah had similar plans for medicine imports. Some pharmacists in the southern suburbs of Beirut said they had received training on new Iranian and Syrian brands that popped up on the shelves in recent months.

Two of the sources said the plan included stockpiling fuel from Iran, as Lebanon's energy ministry warns of a possible total blackout. The senior official said Hezbollah was clearing storage space for fuel in next-door Syria.

"When we get to a stage of darkness and hunger, you will find Hezbollah going to its back-up option...and that is a grave decision. Then Hezbollah will fill in for the state," said the senior official. "If it comes to it, the party would've taken its precautions to prevent a void."

(Writing by Ellen Francis, Editing by William Maclean)

 

[Housecarl]

DOT......

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Prophet Muhammad depiction rage explodes in Pakistan - Asia Times

PESHAWAR - Fierce street clashes have crippled Pakistan’s biggest cities this week when Tehreek-i-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) activists took to the streets

asiatimes.com

Prophet Muhammad depiction rage explodes in Pakistan
Radical TLP group lays siege to Pakistani cities after government arrests its leader and reneges on a vow to expel France's top envoy

By FM SHAKIL
APRIL 16, 2021

PESHAWAR – Fierce street clashes have crippled Pakistan’s biggest cities this week when Tehreek-i-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) activists took to the streets after police arrested the radical Islamic group’s chief Saad Hussain Rizvi.

At least 14 people have been killed, including four police, and over 500 injured, again including around 300 police, since Monday as club-wielding religious fanatics have wrought havoc across major urban areas.

The government banned the group on Thursday under anti-terrorism laws, a move that could further galvanize its followers and drive its more radical members into more shadowy attacks on state targets.

On Friday, authorities blocked social media sites for at least four hours in a bid to quell the spiraling unrest.

TLP, which advocates for the imposition of sharia law across Pakistan, has demanded specifically that Prime Minister Imran Khan’s government cut diplomatic ties with France, recall the Pakistan ambassador from Paris and expel the French ambassador over the republishing of caricatures of the Prophet Muhammad that TLP considers blasphemous.


The government agreed to implement the party’s demands in a November written agreement, with Minister for Religious Affairs Noorul Haq Qadri and Interior Minister Sheikh Rasheed Ahmed signing on behalf of Khan’s administration. It was signed to defuse a previous TLP street action in Islamabad.

The government was bound under the agreement to expel the French ambassador within three months, refrain from appointing any ambassador to France and release all detained TLP members. It had also agreed not to lodge any new cases against the religious party’s leaders or workers after it agreed to call off its November sit-in.

The TLP claims that Khan’s government has reneged on the agreement by refusing to expel the French envoy and arresting its leader Saad on Thursday in the northern city of Lahore.

In a video message on Tuesday, TLP naib emir Syed Zaheerul Hassan Shah exhorted the party’s supporters to “come out on the roads” against the government and “jam the entire country.”

The unrest is causing diplomatic ripples. The French embassy sent an email to all French nationals and companies in Pakistan on Thursday advising them to leave the country temporarily after violent anti-France protests paralyzed large parts of the country.


“Due to the serious threats to French interests in Pakistan, French nationals and French companies are advised to temporarily leave the country,” the embassy said in an email to French citizens.

Khan’s government deployed paramilitary forces on Tuesday in Punjab to quell the disturbances. The police and rangers say they have achieved some success in restoring order and clearing roads and intersections but fierce clashes with protestors have continued.

Reports indicated that traffic has come to standstill on all major highways in Punjab, Sindh and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces, causing a disruption in oxygen supplies to hospitals where Covid-19 patients are being treated.

A senior police official in Punjab told Asia Times that the government has apparently begun some behind-the-scenes talks with the TLP to restore peace and reach a settlement before the situation spirals out of violent control.

The police source said that over 2,000 TLP activists have been rounded up by authorities and booked under anti-terrorism laws.

TLP was founded in 2015 by Khadim Hussain Rizvi, a firebrand cleric who died of Covid-19 in November last year; his son Saad Hussain Rizvi succeeded him.

The far-right group’s core ideology revolves around the “finality” of the Prophet Muhammad and the protection of Pakistan’s blasphemy laws. The religious-based party staged a sit-in at the country’s capital Islamabad for over three weeks in 2017.

In November last year, the TLP paralyzed Pakistan’s capital when thousands of radical clerics rallied on the outskirts of Islamabad. That protest was defused by the agreement the TLP claims the government has failed to honor.

Jan Achakzai, a geopolitical analyst, politician and ex-adviser to the Balochistan province government told Asia Times that the ban on TLP would not resolve the issue because it is a religious-political group with strong roots in the masses.

“Our experience tells us that whenever we ban an entity it emerges with a new credential. This is the case with the Awami National Party, Pakistan People’s Party and many other political and religious entities,” he said.


Achakzai said that unless the TLP’s ideology and narratives are challenged, it would continue to operate albeit under a different name.

“Their demands, including the expulsion of the French Ambassador, were irrational and the government simply cannot meet them. This is a well-entrenched group that should be contained ideologically. A mere blanket ban would not solve the problem,” he added.

The opposition Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), which suffered a massive electoral loss due to TLP’s registration as a political party in the 2018 elections, has interestingly opposed the far-right group’s ban.

PML-N Senator Musadik Malik told Asia Times that his party did not ban the ruling Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf when it triggered unrest during its tenure. “Our government did not ban the PTI when it attacked the parliament, Pakistan Television and other government offices in 2014,” Malik said, adding that there was no provision in the law to ban a political party.

Opposition party Jamiat Ulema Islam-Fazl (JUI-F) has also objected to the government’s decision to ban TLP. JUI-F senior leader Hafiz Hamdullah asked that if the TLP was now a “terrorist group”, then why did the government ink a written agreement with terrorists.

While the terrorism brand is debatable, TLP supporters have not shied from violence.

Hotels, restaurants, private homes, government and public offices have been smashed up with bricks and clubs in the last five days of unrest. TLP protesters have beat police with iron rods, sticks and clubs and even used firearms to disperse police.

They also took a dozen police officials hostage in Lahore, but later released them to law enforcement agencies. Observers wonder if such extreme tactics will be intensified now that the government has banned the hard-line group.

 

[jward]

This Is Our First Ever Look At A Top Secret Soviet Space 'Missile'
The Shchit-2 was a missile-like system designed to protect Soviet military space stations from attack.
By Joseph Trevithick April 21, 2021

The Russian Ministry of Defense's official television station, TV Zvezda, has given the world the first-ever public look at the Shchit-2, or at least a mockup thereof. This was a Soviet-era missile-like space weapon primarily intended to protect Almaz military space stations from incoming threats. The Shchit-2 was a follow-on project to the Shchit-1 self-defense system, which featured a 23mm cannon and is the only gun to have been fired in space, at least that we know about.

The most recent episode of TV Zvezda's "Military Acceptance" program was focused on the Almaz series and associated developments, including both the Shchit-1 and the Shchit-2. Examples of both systems, among other things, were on display in a restricted area at NPO Mashinostroyenia when TV Zvezda's reporter visited recently. NPO Mashinostroyenia is a Russian state-run space development firm, which evolved from a Soviet entity, known simply as OKB-52, that was responsible for, among other things, the development of the Almaz space stations.

TV Zvezda capture

A look at the front end of the Shchit-2 space weapon on display at NPO Mashinostroyenia.
A televised visit by Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu to NPO Mashinostroyenia earlier this year had already yielded the best and most complete view of the Shchit-1 system to date. You can read more about that gun, as well as the Almaz program, here. Anatoly Zak, a Russian author who also manages the website RussianSpaceWeb.com, had been among the first to notice that new look at the Shchit-1 system, as well as this public debut of the Shchit-2.

The Almaz program was a covert effort to develop military space stations, primarily outfitted to conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions, hidden within the Saylut civilian space station project. The Almaz effort, which began in the 1960s, was only officially declassified in the early 1990s after the fall of the Soviet Union.

The Soviets had planned to arm the Almaz stations from the very beginning, fearing attacks by American anti-satellite weapons, including small, but highly maneuverable "killer satellites" and more traditional interceptors. An example of the Shchit-1 system actually made it into space attached to the Almaz OPS-2 satellite. The Soviets conducted a live-fire test of that gun remotely on January 24, 1975, the station's last day in orbit.

TV Zvezda capture

TV Zvezda's reporter, at right, stands next to NPO Mashinostroyenia head Leonard Smirichevsky, while leaning on a display case containing an example of the Shchit-1 system.


The outcome of that test remains classified and the next Almaz space station, OPS-3, launched without any weapons installed. OPS-4, which never made it to space, was supposed to carry the Shchit-2 system. There's no indication Shchit-2, the general existence of which has been known before know, ever went into space, either, though details about the system remain extremely limited.
As to the weapon itself, Leonard Smirichevsky, the current head of NPO Mashinostroyenia, described it to TV Zvezda's reporter as having four major components. The base of the system is a solid-fuel rocket motor, which is then attached to a spin-stabilization system consisting of a rotating wheel with blade-like fins. There there is a hybrid propulsion-warhead section, which we will come back to in a moment, followed by a proboscis-like radar seeker at the front.

TV Zvezda capture

A view from the rear of the Shchit-2 space weapon.


By far, the propulsion-warhead section is the most interesting part. Outwardly, it has what appears to be a circular array of small, grenade-like charges, which one would imagine would unleash a cloud of shrapnel that would particularly dangerous to other objects in the vacuum of space. However, these projectiles are actually solid and are designed to act as hard-kill interceptors, destroying whatever they hit through the sheer force of the impact, according to Anatoly Zak. More interestingly, Smirichevsky made clear to TV Zvezda that this portion of the weapon was also used to propel it in some fashion, though he did not elaborate.

TV Zvezda capture

A close-up view of the hybrid propulsion-warhead section.


"Upon their ignition, the chambers/grenades might have fed hot propulsive gas into a single or multiple combustion chambers at the center of the contraption, producing either the main thrust and/or steering the vehicle," Anatoly Zak wrote on RussianSpaceWeb.com. "When the missile reached the proximity of the target, according to its guiding radar, the entire vehicle would explode and the small solid chambers would eject under their own propulsive force in every direction acting as shrapnel."
How Shchit-2, which is said to have had an expected maximum effective range in space of just over 62 miles, was supposed to be launched is also not entirely clear. "The weapon was stored in the coffin-like container, which appeared to a [sic] have a remote control for the activation by the crew aboard the Almaz and a spin-up mechanism, which could be activated at the release of the weapon in orbit," Zak noted. The reported plan was for the Almaz OPS-4 station to carry two of these missile-like weapons.

TV Zvezda capture

What could be part of a remote control interface of some kind on the outside of the Shchit-2 canister.


What happened to Shchit-2 after the end of the Almaz program in 1978 is entirely unknown. It's also not clear why the Russians have decided to offer a look at the system now.

It does come amid renewed discussion about on-orbit anti-satellite weapons, including interceptors and directed energy weapons, as well as killer satellites, and the development of these systems, both in Russia and the United States, among other countries. Last year, Chief of Space Operations General John "Jay" Raymond, U.S. Space Force's top uniformed officer, publicly accused the Russian government of carrying out an on-orbit anti-satellite weapon test wherein one of its very maneuverable and small "inspector" satellites fired an unspecified projectile. The U.S. government has already expressed concern that these orbital inspectors, ostensibly designed to check up on other Russian satellites in space, could have an offensive capability.

There is no indication one way or another that the projectile launched from this Russian satellite was in any way related to the Shchit-2 weapon, a design that is now more than four decades old, at the very least. At the same time, it certainly underscores the potentially significant knowledge base in Russia with regards to the development of such systems.
Whatever the reasons the Russian government has for disclosing the Shchit-2 design publicly now, and no matter what the current state of on-orbit anti-satellite weapons in Russia might be, it is absolutely fascinating to get our first glimpse of this previous top-secret Soviet space missile.
Contact the author: joe@thedrive.com

Posted For Fair Use

This Is Our First Ever Look At A Top Secret Soviet Space 'Missile'

The Shchit-2 was a missile-like system designed to protect Soviet military space stations from attack.

www.thedrive.com

 

[Housecarl]

What you sow........

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Pakistani Taliban claims suicide bombing in Quetta | FDD's Long War Journal

The TTP claimed yesterday's suicide bombing in Quetta, Pakistan, saying the "martyrdom-seeking" operation targeted Pakistani officials.

www.longwarjournal.org

Pakistani Taliban claims suicide bombing in Quetta

By Thomas Joscelyn | April 22, 2021 | tjoscelyn@gmail.com | @thomasjoscelyn

Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (the TTP, or Pakistani Taliban) has claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing at a luxury hotel in Quetta, Pakistan. The group has identified the terrorist responsible as Muhammad Abbas (a.k.a. “Farooq”), saying he “targeted police officers and other higher-ups with a martyrdom-seeking attack” on the “five-star Serena hotel.”

At least several people were killed and a dozen or more wounded in the blast yesterday (Apr. 21). According to the Pakistani interior ministry, a Chinese diplomatic delegation, including China’s ambassador, was staying at the same hotel, but was not at the location at the time of the bombing. There is no indication that the Chinese delegation was intentionally targeted.

Instead, the TTP claims that two Pakistani “assistant commissioners” perished, while “scores of other security officers were either killed or injured” and many vehicles “were burnt and destroyed in the attack.”

The TTP has executed a string of mostly small-scale attacks, including assassinations, against Pakistani military and security personnel this year. The group claims the latest bombing is evidence of its “strong military leadership” and the “might” of its “intelligence” arm.

The jihadists’ claim of responsibility was posted by the TTP’s official propaganda outlet, Umar Media, on social media and its website. The message is attributed to the TTP’s spokesperson, a man identified as “Muhammad Khurasani .” The author of the statement criticizes unnamed Pakistani journalists and officials for supposedly covering up the success of the operation, saying these people “childishly” hid “information on the type of attack and its target.”

Like other jihadist organizations, the TTP has suffered a string of setbacks over the years. However, the group has been reconstituted under the leadership of its current emir Noor Wali Mehsud.

Noor Wali was named the emir of the TTP in June 2018, shortly after his predecessor, Mullah Fazlullah, was killed in Afghanistan. Fazlullah’s tenure was rocky, as the TTP suffered defections to the Islamic State’s upstart Khorasan branch, as well as other disruptions in its chain of command. Noor Wali has sought to reunify the TTP’s ranks, formally welcoming breakaway factions back into the fold and publicly accepting oaths of allegiance.

The TTP has been closely allied with al-Qaeda since its formation in late 2007, a relationship that is highlighted in the group’s media. Some personnel are dual-hatted, meaning they serve in both the TTP’s and al-Qaeda’s ranks.

The TTP maintains a significant presence in Afghanistan, where it is waging jihad to restore the Afghan Taliban’s Islamic Emirate. As part of a Feb. 29, 2020, withdrawal deal with the U.S., the Afghan Taliban is supposed to prevent terrorist organizations that threaten the U.S. from operating inside Afghanistan. However, there is no evidence of a break between the Afghan Taliban and the TTP. The TTP’s international aspirations have long been known. In addition to conducting regular attacks inside Pakistan, the group is responsible for the failed May 2010 Times Square bombing.

According to a United Nations monitoring team, thousands of Pakistani jihadists, many of whom are affiliated with the TTP, continue to wage jihad in Afghanistan.

Thomas Joscelyn is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Senior Editor for FDD's Long War Journal.

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use.......

Lawmakers, defense officials joust over next-gen ICBM plans

The war over a next-gen ICBM flared up at the U.S. Capitol on Wednesday.

www.defensenews.com

Congress
Lawmakers, defense officials joust over next-gen ICBM plans

By: Joe Gould , Aaron Mehta , and Valerie Insinna   12 hours ago

WASHINGTON ― The war over developing a next-generation intercontinental ballistic missile ― whether it’s vital to deter Russia and China, as conservatives say, or whether existing missiles can be overhauled for less ― flared up at the U.S. Capitol on Wednesday.

Lawmakers from both parties leveled pointed questions at Pentagon officials over whether it’s worthwhile to study extending the life of the 50-year-old Minuteman III as an alternative to its $100 billion replacement program, the Air Force’s Ground Based Strategic Deterrent.

In the lead up to the Biden administration’s far-reaching nuclear posture review, left-leaning lawmakers say the Pentagon’s $1.2 trillion nuclear modernization plans are a money pit and question whether the United States could deter its rivals for less with only its bombers and submarines. Conservative lawmakers worried GBSD needs protection from cancellation are opposing further analysis by the Pentagon.

Progressives last month offered legislation to scrap GBSD and shift $1 billion from the program to help develop a COVID vaccine ― potentially a long shot after the panel rejected a similar measure to defund GBSD last year, in a bipartisan vote.

Northrop Grumman, which the Air Force awarded a $13.3 billion contract in September to develop GBSD, has a lot riding on the outcome of the debate. So do the states that host the Minuteman III, deployed across Colorado, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, and Wyoming.




GBSD’s high-powered defenders from both parties include Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee Chairman Jon Tester, D-Mont., who vowed in public remarks to be “working to make sure that this program stays on track.”





Washington’s battle over nuclear weapons budget already underway
The U.S. budget cycle is just getting started, but already Democrats and Republicans are in a war of words over whether to curb or continue the trajectory of spending on nuclear weapons modernization.

By: Joe Gould

Wednesday’s venue was a hearing before the House Strategic Forces Subcommittee, where the panel’s top Republican, Rep. Mike Turner, said he’d been told of a recently-initiated Pentagon study into the cost-effectiveness of cannibalizing parts from 200 Minuteman III’s to stretch the lives of other 200.

Turner, of Ohio, asked Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense, Strategy, Plans and Capabilities Melissa Dalton whether a study by the Pentagon’s Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation office was ongoing, as he’d heard, and why.

“Every time this has been studied, it’s been seen as ill-advised, to look at any life extension of Minuteman III ― not just merely for costs but also for capabilities,” Turner said. “Ms. Dalton, are you aware of this study, did you approve it and what is in this study?”

Amid Turner’s questions, Dalton said she wasn’t aware any such study was underway but said she’d look into it and keep Turner informed. The GBSD program would be examined, she said, in the course of drafting the Biden administration’s nuclear posture review and national defense strategy.

As the strategic reviews look at threats and current capabilities to counter them, “we will of course be looking at at cost and what is the right balance of the mix of programs that may be necessary to have a safe, effective, and secure nuclear deterrent well into the future,” she said.

The Pentagon did not immediately respond to a request for comment, but sources familiar with the matter either told Defense News the CAPE analysis was underway or under discussion.

The hearing’s sharpest exchanges were between California Democratic Rep. Garamendi, whose amendment to require DoD study a life-extension to 2050 died in committee last year, and U.S. Strategic Command’s chief, Adm. Charles Richard, who argues the Minuteman IIIs is dangerously obsolete.

When Richard said the Defense Department had reported several times to Congress ― in a 2019 analysis most recently ― that a life-extension would not be cost-effective, Garamendi cut him off to say the assumption in DoD’s analysis was that Minuteman III’s life could be extended. Then Richard grew more emphatic.

“From an operational point of view, I do not see an operational reason to even attempt to do that,” Richard replied. “The Minuteman III is 1970s-era, designed to go against Soviet analog defenses. I need a weapon that will work and make it to the target, and to expect that, in the timeframes you’re talking about, to penetrate potentially advanced Russian and Chinese systems is going to be a challenge.”

When Garamendi cited 2019 testimony that it would be technologically feasible to extend the life of the propulsion and guidance systems one more time (the witness then was Lt. Gen. Richard Clark, then the Air Force’s deputy chief of staff for strategic deterrence and nuclear integration), Richard pointed out that the Air Force would be the best source of any cost analysis and the defense secretary the ultimate decider.

“Now don’t go off talking to me about the secretary of defense. We’re talking about the viability of the Minuteman III,” Garamendi said. “If I’m incorrect and it is not possible to extend it one more time, then please provide the written documentation to that.”





US bombers could go back on alert if ICBMs are curtailed, top general says
U.S. Strategic Command head Adm. Charles Richards argued in favor of keeping new ICBMs on track during a Tuesday congressional hearing.

By: Valerie Insinna

Richard said, as an operational commander, he wasn’t sure it was technically possible to extend the life of the Minuteman III or harden its command-and-control systems from a cyber attack, as those systems were “designed before the internet.”

“Why are you not sure? It’s your business to be sure,” Garamendi said, prompting Richard to fire back: “Exactly. That’s why I need a new one.” Then Garamendi’s time expired.



Later, Wyoming Republican Rep. Liz Cheney pushed back, saying her colleagues’ solution to Russia and China’s nuclear buildup and expansion programs, “is for us to risk our own security, to tie our own hands with ‘no-first use,’ to reduce our own capabilities, to delay yet again modernization.”

While China is estimated to have about 320 warheads ― much less than the U.S. and Russia ― Richard said its arsenal is undergoing “a breathtaking expansion.” By way of contrast, Richard went on to say the long list of scarce parts for America’s Minuteman III includes a launch switch for control centers that no company will manufacture anymore.

“It’s like asking a company to make a dial-up modem. There’s no profit in doing something like that,” Richard said. “The Air Force has been consistently pulling rabbits out of the hat to solve these problems. I’m afraid there’s a point where they won’t be able to pull the rabbit out of the hat and the system won’t work.”

 

[Housecarl]

Hummm.......

Posted for fair use.....

Not Just for SOF Anymore: Envisioning Irregular Warfare as a Joint Force Priority - Modern War Institute

The recent buildup of Russian troops near Ukraine and Chinese naval exercises to the east and west of Taiwan may be seen as evidence that great power competition will require […]

mwi.usma.edu

Not Just for SOF Anymore: Envisioning Irregular Warfare as a Joint Force Priority

Michael P. Noonan | 04.21.21

The recent buildup of Russian troops near Ukraine and Chinese naval exercises to the east and west of Taiwan may be seen as evidence that great power competition will require a return to focusing on the threats posed by the maneuver brigades, air wings, and naval fleets of competitors. For the Biden administration, which entered office stating that “diplomacy, development, and economic statecraft should be the leading instruments of American foreign policy,” and “the use of military force should be the last resort,” there is a clear temptation to reduce US commitments to messy political-military conflicts on what many see as the strategic periphery (i.e., Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia). President Biden’s announcement last week that the United States will remove all troops from Afghanistan by September 2021 is a prominent, but certainly not the only, indicator of this trajectory. For some this means, perhaps, that there should be a division of labor between conventional forces and special operations forces (SOF) that might assign these messy contingencies to the latter forces, but that would be a mistake.


As the Biden administration develops its national security strategy, it should not conflate great power competition with major theater war or conventional operations. The last twenty years of conflict have pushed both state and nonstate actors to challenge the United States in ways that it has historically been uncomfortable countering. This is particularly the case in the gray zone, where actors oftentimes blend and blur various tools of power in order to achieve objectives below the threshold of war. Responding to this international environment will mean that thinking of policy elements in discrete bins of force, diplomacy, and development will hamper US responses to threats and opportunities. The United States will need to merge all instruments of power, to include various components of its military power, to counter challenges from its rivals.


For the Department of Defense, this will mean that the military will be actively engaged overseas, oftentimes alongside partners and allies, in order to respond to or—more preferably—shape regional dynamics. Irregular warfare (IW) will play an important role in this national security environment. Though much public debate over the definition and centrality of IW has centered on authoritative documents such as the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) and its 2020 IW annex, more informal notes on military doctrine offer useful frames through which to understand IW, such as the cooperation, competition, and conflict continuum. When we understand the nature and scope of IW through both national security guidance and doctrine, it becomes clear that IW will be an important element across the joint force. Neglecting IW or making it the exclusive domain of Special Operations Command (SOCOM) will limit and suboptimize our responses to these types of competition and threats.


Irregular Warfare and the US National Security Strategy


What is IW and why is it important in the current environment? National security guidance documents, to include the recently released Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, provide some useful framing to answer this question. The DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms defines it as a “violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s).” But the inclusion of the word “violent” is a bit limiting because information operations, cyberattacks, and shows of force or shaping operations that do not cross the threshold into violence can still have influence or effect the legitimacy of local power brokers.


While the term does not appear in the unclassified summary of the 2018 NDS, it is the subject of an unclassified annex to the report that was not released until October of 2020. The two documents combined number a slender twenty-six pages—almost certainly shorter than their classified counterparts. Strategic ambiguity or opacity are likely the rationale for only sharing small snapshots of these documents—the United States does not want to telegraph all of its capabilities and strategic thinking so that it can deter threats or challengers. But perhaps the 2018 NDS was too ambiguous. The public summary of that document led many to think that DoD was shifting to great power competition at the expense of smaller contingencies. Until the release of the annex, people had to take the word of Frank Hoffman, one of the authors of the NDS, that the concept of GPC was not just about turning the page from the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq to prepare for major theater war against near-peer competitors.


The recent IW Annex to the NDS usefully drops the word “violent” from the previous definition. “Struggle” is a more satisfactory term because it gets around the discrete concepts of war and peace. It also states that while GPC is the primary national security challenge, IW remains a critical task and that the United States “will sharpen these capabilities for application against peer competitor, nation-state adversaries.” This is an important statement because the use of irregular warfare techniques will be crucial no matter whether the United States is competing against China or Russia, combating nonstate actors such as al-Qaeda or the Islamic State, or assisting allies and partners against state-backed proxy forces. As suggested above, the last nearly twenty years of conflict, while showing some strong tactical performances by US forces in the conduct of such activities, has not translated to long-term operational or strategic success that might lead adversaries or competitors to steer clear of such techniques.


On the legislative side, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of FY2018 contains section 1202 (“Support of special operations for irregular warfare”). This law, which was extended as section 1207 in the FY2021 NDAA, defines IW as “activities in support of predetermined United States policy and military objectives conducted by, with, and through regular forces, irregular forces, groups, and individuals participating in competition between state and non-state actors short of traditional armed conflict.” While on the one hand this limits IW by putting it firmly in the domain of SOF, the removal of “legitimacy” and “influence” may be useful as those factors might not always be the primary drivers of US objectives—this would be the case particularly in a proxy war environment where one might back a side primarily to impose costs on an adversary.


Continued.....

 

[Housecarl]

Continued.....

The Biden administration’s Interim National Security Strategic Guidance does not mention either IW or GPC. It clearly and accurately describes China and Russia as revisionist powers. It singles out China’s assertiveness and potential in harnessing its elements of power to challenge the “stable and open international system.” Russia is assessed more as a disruptor. It describes both states as seeking “to check US strengths and prevent us from defending our interests and allies around the world.”


But the guidance also, seemingly, silos a focus on crisis response, counterterrorism (CT), and unconventional warfare (UW) to SOF. Although CT and UW are missions in which SOF is often in the lead, they are not the exclusive domain of these forces. The fifth SOF Truth, after all, is that “most special operations require non-SOF support.” While the interim guidance does state that capabilities will be developed to “compete and deter gray zone actions,” those are not elaborated upon. The administration will likely refine this over time, but it should not make IW exclusively the domain of SOF. Doing so would not only ensure that those forces are overused, but would also reinforce or create additional seams in US capabilities to respond to the current and future operating environments.


The Competition Continuum and the Joint Force


One way to ensure that these additional seams are not created and to focus the joint force on the challenges posed by the contemporary operating environment would be to use the thought template found in Joint Doctrine Note 1-19, Competition Continuum. While such notes are not authoritative, they are issued to “facilitate information sharing on problems and potential solutions as a supporting effort of formal joint doctrine development and revision.” This note is particularly useful as it describes the blending and blurring of cooperation, competition, and conflict—including how all three can occur simultaneously. Effectively conducting all three activities simultaneously requires a joint force effort.


The purpose of delineating these concepts is not simply to explain the environment, but to improve integrated campaigning. Cooperation usually relates to an enduring activity with an ally or partner. Sometimes, however, it can extend to neutral or adversarial partners. Competition below the level of armed conflict also tends to occur over a protracted period. Typically, it is more indirect and less resource driven than armed conflict. Armed conflict campaigning is rather straightforward for a military audience, but it argues that if cooperation and competition are “ignored or treated as strictly ancillary to the armed conflict effort, then the joint force is at increased risk for failure to meet some or all of the desired objectives.” Deterrence applies across the continuum.


The continuum is useful because all of these activities can occur simultaneously. For example, one might consider the current situation in Iraq. There, the United States has been cooperating with the national and the Kurdish regional governments and combating the Islamic State and other adversaries while also competing with Iran.


In terms of competition with China or Russia, cooperation with allies, partners, or potential partners will be essential. The United States will have to wisely weave together elements of its national power with those of its allies and then, as best as possible, leverage those resources and capabilities to promote engagement. The United States cannot maintain a permanent presence everywhere, so cooperation can take myriad forms, such as training or providing education to foreign officers or enlisted personnel through international military education and training, selling or providing weapons systems to friends or allies, and conducting bilateral or multilateral training exercises to build relationships and interoperability such as Cobra Gold in Thailand or maneuvers in South Korea.


While the military will not be the sole component of such cooperation, the size and ability of forces to move, communicate, and, when necessary, shoot often make it a useful tool. However, this engagement should not be a SOF-centered endeavor. This will drive overuse and, as the commander of SOCOM General Richard Clarke recently testified, the threats posed by violent extremism remain the primary focus of these units (60 percent of deployed forces) as opposed to GPC (40 percent). Even if these forces were 100 percent committed to GPC, their size and need for dwell time, for example, would not allow them to optimize US engagement across these activities. The more limited systems and capabilities of SOF also do not make them ideally suited to be the main effort to cooperate with the conventional units of friends and allies. Smaller, more frequent deployments of ships, aircraft, and company-sized elements not only could enable engagement with regional allies and partners, but would also show US commitment to an open international system without being overly provocative, facilitate relationships necessary for the future, and, hopefully, share American ideals.


The Biden Administration and the Future of Irregular Warfare


The Biden administration and DoD will likely face pressures to reduce US engagement and capability development for IW environments. The president has already signaled a commitment to reinvigorating US alliances while shifting some resources from military capabilities to diplomacy, development, and intelligence tools. Defense budgets are likely to decline over time. Under institutional and political pressures, the military will likely shift its focus from engaging in the vagaries of counterinsurgency operations to preparing for large battles or pouring resources into capital-intensive systems to create smaller, more capable units. (To be sure, there are some valid reasons for wanting to turn the page from counterinsurgency, but other state and nonstate actors also get a vote in how they choose to confront us.) There will be calls for artificial intelligence and autonomous air, sea, and land systems to be the harbingers of the next American way of war. These systems, in many cases, will be important. But it will be vital to remember that nuclear weapons and other large conventional capabilities have deterrence effects that will tend to drive competition and conflict down into the IW domain.


SOF and the intelligence community will remain important actors in the United States’ IW political-military toolkit. Their training, experience, and capabilities will make them the forces of choice for sensitive activities, particularly when a light footprint and a low-visibility approach are required. But not all engagements should be low-visibility. This is particularly the case in competition. Countering the aims of revisionist powers will require imaginative planning that will balance the right mix of admitting students from county X into international military education and training programs, deploying a light infantry company to train with troops from country Y, and deploying humanitarian and civil assistance to country Z, for instance.


Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin should ensure that the military leadership buys into a vision that understands IW as a joint force priority. The IW Annex’s underlying logic should remain in place, at least loosely—that the “purpose of competition is not only to gain military advantages, but also to defeat adversaries’ strategies, shape their perceptions, and deny their strategic objectives in the pursuit of national interests.” In order to avert open conflict with revisionist powers such as China and Russia, the United States will need to cooperate with friends and compete against challengers in myriad ways across the elements of power. If proxy wars continue to proliferate and be the preferred means of competition between the great powers, then US capabilities in foreign internal defense and unconventional warfare will be as important for the new era of great power competition as they were in earlier ones. This will be the case in both intranational and international conflicts. After all, the hottest conflicts of the Cold War took place on the peripheries while the coolest spots were where the preponderance of conventional capabilities faced off. This will likely remain the case.




Michael P. Noonan, PhD, is the author of Irregular Soldiers and Rebellious States, a veteran of OIF, and a senior fellow in the national security program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute.


The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense, or any organization with which the author is affiliated.

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use.....

Hybrid War and What to Do About It

In no environment since the Cold War has the adage si vis pacem, para bellum --if one wants peace, (prepare) for war--rung louder or truer. Perhaps nothing is more essential in this effort than asking the question “What is hybrid war?” and then answering the follow-on: “what should we do about it?”

thestrategybridge.org

Hybrid War and What to Do About It

Jeffrey Bristol

April 21, 2021

The National Security Strategy (NSS) dictates America’s transition to “Great Power Competition.” While the 2017 NSS fails to define the term and uses it only once, the tone of the document is rife with its essential idea: The United States is no longer the hegemon and must operate in a global milieu of rising nations whose interests only sometimes align with the United States’ own. Within this context, the NSS dedicates itself to “preserv(ing) peace through strength.”[1] In no environment since the Cold War has the adage si vis pacem, para bellum--if one wants peace, (prepare) for war--rung louder or truer. Perhaps nothing is more essential in this effort than asking the question “What is hybrid war?” and then answering the follow-on: “what should we do about it?”

What Is Hybrid war?
The Russian General Valery Gerasimov articulated the best-known articulation of hybrid war in his article “The Value of Science Is in the Foresight.”[2] According to Gerasimov, hybrid war combines military activities with the “protest potential of the population.”[3] Local politics provide entrée to the Russian military. Information operations shape the environment initially. Once organized protest solidifies, military operators infiltrate covertly. Conventional forces then invade, finalizing the conquest. This cycle, presented by Gerasimov as the result of new technologies and political realities, is hybrid war. Despite this 2016 article’s claims to innovation, the Russain use of hybrid war is much older. In fact, Russia’s Cold War strategy was hybrid war avant la lettre.[4]

…the Soviet Union used the cover of peacekeeping, ensuring democratic government and civil stability as cover to insert military forces to preserve its control over restive populations.

The Soviet Union used hybrid war strategies regularly to confront adversity where conventional warfare was impossible. The Soviet Union exploited hybrid war-like doctrine for interventions in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, indicating continuity of armed revanchism in the “Near Abroad.”[5] In each of these uprisings, led almost entirely by local populations, the Soviet Union used the cover of peacekeeping, ensuring democratic government and civil stability as cover to insert military forces to preserve its control over restive populations. Other notable examples include Ethiopia and Somalia where Soviet diplomats used trade agreements, propaganda and advisers to advance regime-change and forge tight alliances leading directly to an expansion in Soviet power and influence, often at the expense of the local population.[6] Earlier, the Soviets used the international COMINTERN to push local party cadres in forming fifth columns to accomplish a version of hybrid war, which they called socialist revolution.[7]

The U.S. does more than hide hybrid war in its military doctrine, she also employs it.

Notional Phasing for Military Activities (Joint Publication 3.0)
Hybrid war is therefore far older and far more common than assumed. It owes its ubiquity to the fact that it is repressed war that happens when open invasion is too costly. Hybrid war’s indirectness, introducing military forces only after shaping the local environment, provides operational cover where the aggressor seemingly maintains peace while really effecting war, allowing revanchist nations to flout norms while appearing to respect them and wage war while ostensibly supporting peace.

While hybrid war seems exotic, the Phases of Joint Operations from American military doctrine explain it. Phase 0 is the shaping phase where Russia uses IO to create favorable conditions. In Phase 1, Russia supports lawful protest movements. Autochthonous cadres use extra-legal political opposition and increasingly direct Russian involvement Seize the Initiative in Phase 2.[8]

Next in joint operational phases comes 3, Domination: military defeat of the enemy. In hybrid war, Stabilize and Enable Civil Authority--Phases 4 and 5--preempt Domination. In these phases, Russian proxies fully replace local government. This replacement presents Russia as liberator. When this stage resolves, if conflict remains, Russia enters Domination where she inserts armed forces. Finally Phase 0, Shaping, returns where Russian conquest succeeds as a fait accompli with Russia governing the territory in fact even if without recognition.

Despite the lack of actual NATO involvement, Russian officials have construed lessons learned from what they imagine NATO’s role to have been.

The U.S. does more than hide hybrid war in its military doctrine, she also employs it. The ideal-type Special Forces mission, doctrinally defined as unconventional war, where teams enter denied areas, train partisans while engaging in psychological operations is hybrid war by another name.[9] American operations employing this doctrine include those in Southeast Asia, Central America and elsewhere.[10]
Complicating U.S. involvement in hybrid warfare are those hybrid wars without American action. Russia considers the various “Color Revolutions,” usually bloodless revolutions coinciding with political unrest especially the end of Communism, as NATO Information Operations. Gerasimov indicates these “operations” inspired hybrid war theory despite the fact that such revolutions were entirely the product of local political activity and involved no U.S. or NATO intervention.[11] Despite the lack of actual NATO involvement, Russian officials have construed lessons learned from what they imagine NATO’s role to have been.

Morocco’s operations in the Western Sahara show even minor powers using hybrid war. After being fought to a standstill with the POLISARIO in 1991, the Moroccan king drafted a policy encouraging Moroccan immigration into the territories to dilute the native population, derailing a UN-organized independence referendum. The plan succeeded wildly. The referendum was delayed indefinitely. Meanwhile, Morocco governed the territory under military occupation.[12] Thirty years later, Moroccan hybrid warfare seems to have succeeded with American recognition of the annexation.[13]
Hybrid war, despite the hype, is old wine in new bottles.[14] While new media and cyberspace, which supposedly makes hybrid war different from previous forms of war, does change the conflict environment, the heralds’ prophecies of heralds foretelling great change in warfare, like most eschatological predictions, are hyperbole at best. Despite changing circumstances, war remains a human phenomenon and human nature never changes. This is why Thucydides and Sun Tzu remain relevant despite their ignorance of contemporary domains of warfare. Nations now, as then, wage war for “fear, honor and interest.”[15] Viewed in this lens, hybrid war is really conventional warfare modified to suit the peculiar milieux of our time.

Hybrid war is therefore hybrid because its tactics are Janus-faced, showing conventional aggression to one foe and canny asymmetry to another.

The primary characteristic of this milieu is the dominance of the U.S. and her allies, especially the NATO alliance. Without their stabilizing effect, actors like Russia and China would engage not in limited warfare with asymmetric aspects--e.g. hybrid war/“Grey Zone” operations--, but in conventional war. Hybrid war is a placeholder for broader conflicts, conflicts which will re-emerge when the system weakens enough that revanchist powers can use fitter strategies to counter expansionist ends.

American Hegemony, Decline and Hybrid War

CJCS Meets with Turkish and Russian Counterparts (Petty Officer 2nd Class Dominique Pineiro)

Given the international system, countries like Russia face a variety of actors with both greater and lesser power than itself, putting her in an asymmetrical world. This difference is important because many consider hybrid war asymmetrical.[16] While partially true, asymmetry isn’t universal, but relative and so the label obscures as much as it reveals. The same force may be asymmetrical against one party and symmetrical against another, necessitating strategic dynamism. Russia benefits from this differential, engaging the global stage asymmetrically where she’s weak and symmetrically locally where she’s strong. She uses arms when attacking targets in her “Near Abroad” that are easily susceptible to Russian pressure but hard for her enemies to defend, places like the Crimea and South Ossetia, while simultaneously refusing to directly engage enemies in the NATO alliance where open Russian aggression is certain to end in military defeat. For these latter targets, Russia engages in information and cyber operations like propaganda, hacking and political interference. This difference explains why countries outside the NATO block like the Ukraine and Georgia are subject to direct military attack while those within it, like Poland and the Baltic states, are subject only to indirect measures. Hybrid war is therefore hybrid because its tactics are Janus-faced, showing conventional aggression to one foe and canny asymmetry to another.

The current international system necessitates hybrid versatility. While one of Russia’s main goals is expansionism, an absolute prohibition against changing national borders through aggression forms one of the primary mandates of the postwar order. Decolonizing powers originated this mandate to prevent the very kinds of territorial aggression currently sought by Russia from affecting relations between decolonizing states.[17] After decolonization’s completion, the U.S. and USSR supported this prohibition in order to avoid turning the Cold War hot through the competition of proxy states. After the Soviet Unions’s collapse, Russia’s personal interest in maintaining the peace ended with its imperium of Communism, but America and her allies continued to preserve the rule, in order to ensure the Pax Americana and encourage the survival of the global commons.

While anti-expansionist norms remain valid, Russia cannot openly invade territory without risking unwinnable wars.

With the beginning of the War on Terror, American international control slipped from hegemony to dominance. While a general policy of border protection remains ensconced in international custom, many countries, including newly resurgent Russia and China, find it in their own interest to challenge it. As a result, the international system stands at crossroads. On one side, powers supporting the status-quo hold the balance of military and diplomatic power, desiring frozen borders. On the other assemble the revanchists. The international system is sufficiently imbalanced that revanchism has a window, but the system remains powerful enough to stop direct aggression. The tension created manifests most clearly Europe and sets the framework for what we call hybrid war.

Continued.....

 

[Housecarl]

Continued.....

NATO opposes Russian expansionism, but the bloc is disunited. While the treaty’s formal commitments remain fixed, different countries regard Russia differently. France is friendlier to her than Germany, cleaving the central EU axis.[18] This tension leaves countries like the Ukraine in a suspended state with NATO, neither in nor out of the bloc, rendering all weak. Making things more complicated, many countries’ national policies vary from popular sentiment. While Germany remains committed to NATO, its people do not feel so devoted.[19] Sweden remains outside the bloc yet conducts military exercises with members.[20] These fractures open geo-political chinks in the alliance's armor for Russia to exploit.

Conflict exists at many levels with many variations and possible uses, running the gamut from information operations to economic pressure to open warfare.

Hybrid war’s dual-level strategy infiltrates this gap. While anti-expansionist norms remain valid, Russia cannot openly invade territory without risking unwinnable wars. Russia knows if it operates surreptitiously, it can create environments where invasion transmutes into “peacekeeping,”[21] making de facto expansion palatable in an environment with many conflict-adverse opponents. Russia affects its exploitation of this gap by altering strategies throughout the course of conflict, shifting from asymmetrical to symmetrical strategies as needed.

While Russia relies on asymmetric strategies during initial operational phases, she engages in symmetric action for the Enabling Civil Authority, Stabilizing and Domination phases. During these two periods, Russia inserts military personnel under increasingly open guises, escalating, as in the Crimea, from “little green men,” to whole units “on leave,” to uniformed troops. When the cycle ends, Russia actually controls the territory it invaded even if it lacks international recognition. This de facto government exists in both South Ossetia and the Crimea. Given that no major powers are willing to risk conflict to oust Russia, possessing actual control over territory matters more than international recognition for Russia’s purposes, possession, it seems, is nine-tenths of the law in both power and property. Challenging this possession where it is made and preventing it elsewhere is the major challenge the Russian strategy poses to the NATO bloc.

What to Do?
Peace never reigns when great powers compete. Conflict exists perpetually. The Phases of Joint Operations recognizes this truth by describing times of peace as “shaping phase(s)” where military operations obtain at all times.[22] Ubiquity of conflict does not mean ubiquity of violence, however. Conflict exists at many levels with many variations and possible uses, running the gamut from information operations to economic pressure to open warfare. Russia understands this well. She uses a range of operations from quiet, non-attributable cyber operations to outright military invasion depending on which tool is appropriate to achieve her ends. Hybrid war, therefore, is a formal strategy with discrete parts. So long as the US and her allies understand this, they can defeat it.

Understanding Russia’s intention variation of strategy allows us to interpret her thoughts and intentions based on her actions. If Russia engages in open military operations, she feels strong. If she engages in purely information warfare, she feels weak. Given that Russia feels the need to mix her strategies between the covert and the overt, one infers that she does not feel generally confident of her strength beyond certain confined areas. In other words, the fact that Russia relies on hybrid warfare is a sign of her weakness, not of her strength.

As Russia succeeds using its hybrid war strategies, she will gain consequent confidence, leading to hybrid war’s obsolescence and the re-emergence of conventional war.

One must remember, however, that success begets success. This poses hybrid war’s greatest risk. If its successes succeed too well, the extant conventions against aggressive territorial expansion, the very conventions which help hold the NATO alliance together, will lose force through subversion. As Russia succeeds using its hybrid war strategies, she will gain consequent confidence, leading to hybrid war’s obsolescence and the re-emergence of conventional war. Russia will then target a wider range of states with direct military power. If nations continue to ignore NATO treaty obligations and do not form a solid front, popular reticence within NATO countries will make even diplomatic objections to revanchism, let alone armed contest, impossible.

NATO Defense Ministers, 2020 (Tech. Sgt. Cody Ramirez)
As it stands, France already looks the other way when Russia engages in expansionist action. Britain, America’s staunchest ally is now disengaged from the EU and could support American efforts only with difficulty. In a world with a fractured NATO, Russian armies could operate freely, able to attack the Baltic states and to skirmish on the borders of Finland and Poland (potentially using Belarussian proxies against the latter). Such a state of affairs, which Russia can achieve incrementally via hybrid war, would collapse the postwar order at relatively little cost to Russia.

The U.S. and NATO must answer hybrid war’s challenge with measures as serious as the stakes. This means not only having the right strategy, but also the right personnel and bureaucratic structures in place to counter the Russian threat. A proper mentality is equally important. While never precipitating armed conflict, NATO must never appear unwilling to finish a war once started. It must even be willing to finish wars that Russia only half starts, knowing that Russia fears NATO and has more to lose in a war than NATO itself does. This determination means NATO forces must be willing to train troops to fight Russian invaders whether in uniform or out. Training is especially essentially when a country is being invaded, not just before or after. A failure to engage in either preemptive training or training support post-invasion was NATO’s greatest failure in the Ukraine crisis. While the U.S. especially is heavily engaged in preemptive military training, such as in the Baltics, it has shied away from training missions in countries engaged in active conflict with Russia.[23]

When directly attacked, as happens regularly, retaliation in kind may be necessary, especially when minimal civilian impact is possible.

The international component of hybrid war relies on both military and diplomatic action. Countermeasures must include both. Russia uses media like RT and Facebook as well as direct cyber-attacks.[24] While NATO mustn’t respond to every cyber-attack in kind it can make use of excellent media operations, like Voice of America, developed in the Cold War.[25] NATO must update these for the current media landscape and deploy them as countermeasures to combat the Information Operations portion of Russian hybrid campaigns.

NATO should publish information about Russian cyber-attacks widely and provide, free of charge or request, antidotes to Russian malware. NATO countries do this, but such measures should be explicated as responses to Russian aggression, declaring her activities as criminal. When directly attacked, as happens regularly, retaliation in kind may be necessary, especially when minimal civilian impact is possible. Publishing the details of Russia’s attacks makes deniability more difficult, thereby forcing Russia either to desist or suffer the consequences of its actions, making the covert aspect of hybrid war overt.

Diplomacy is a key ingredient in defeating hybrid war just as soft power is a key element in hybrid war’s success. Firm, heavily engaged diplomacy will help to solidify the NATO alliance as well as bring new countries into the American-led alliance. An expansion of NATO’s reach is a reduction of Russia’s. Realizing the opportunities of such diplomacy is difficult, however. In the U.S. particularly, diplomacy and military forces often oppose one another in practice. This results from a cabinet structure separating the two departments and pitting them against each other as budgetary adversaries. Diplomats and military officers should operate in tandem, attending each other’s schools, gaining credentials in each department. Diplomats should serve in the Reserves; military officers as diplomatic staff other than as attachés. State should include them in diplomatic missions, not merely for military expertise, but as active diplomats in exchange programs. This will increase their interoperability and allow each to leverage the talents of the other, creating hybrid defense to hybrid aggression.

Russia fears nothing more than a threat to its nuclear arsenal. Aegis Ashore opens the possibility of neutralizing a Russian nuclear strike.

The recent U.S.-facilitated rapprochement in the Middle East shows informal cross-over and America’s successes in uniting Israel with its erstwhile enemies shows how she might build alliances to confront Russian aggression, but such ad hoc integration happens too often at the State Department’s expense.[26] Far from collaborative and supportive, such uncoordinated action hampers America’s influence by undermining diplomats, creating duplicative chains of authority and teaching other countries that diplomats mightn’t have the final diplomatic word. This confusion undermines unity of effort and sunders hybrid action into discrete, uncooperative parts.

NATO must learn aggressive diplomacy. Aggressive diplomacy involves using allies in co-operation to pressure, isolate and diminish threats while simultaneously increasing one’s own strength. Establishing Aegis Ashore in Poland exemplifies aggressive diplomacy.[27] Russia fears nothing more than a threat to its nuclear arsenal. Aegis Ashore opens the possibility of neutralizing a Russian nuclear strike. It also provides Poland a position of strength vis-a-vis a potentially hostile neighbor. Linking the establishment of Aegis in Poland with Russian aggression will send a clear message both to Russia that her actions have consequences as well as communicating to Poland and America’s other allies about our enduring commitment to mutual defense. Moreover NATO must not take this action secretly. The alliance must communicate to Russia that its installation is a consequence of hybrid operations. The establishment shouldn’t be transactional, but irrevocable. Otherwise, allies become bargaining chips, a utilitarian mindset whose exploitation Russia understands too well. The Aegis system should inform Russia that when she aggresses, she suffers irreversible consequences.

Far from deterring discussion, as commonly believed, consequences are the only way to bend Russian calculus towards cooperation. Without them, Russia learns she can gain her desires unilaterally through aggression, which is faster and surer than diplomatic discourse. NATO has thus far taught the easy lesson. Now, the allies must force Russia to the table to end hybrid war.

Only the fig-leaf of deniability, the lack of American casualties and the decimation of Russian forces prevented the assault from consideration as hostilities.

NATO expansion remains the ultimate deterrent to Russian expansionism precisely because Russia knows it cannot win a war with the alliance. Embracing Ukraine or Georgia sends signals Russia can’t ignore, shaking Russia as deeply as her invasion of the Crimea shook Eastern Europe. This step is difficult and may forestall diplomatic discussion, but if Russia takes further action against a country in its ambit, admitting one or more of these countries may be necessary to communicate the limits against her behavior. The present immunity of the Baltic states, all NATO members, from Russia’s hardest manipulations proves membership’s value.

Non-military means of dissuasion also exist. Diplomats should negotiate favorable trading agreements with countries bordering Russia since economic interdependence is a gateway to Russian intervention and ultimate invasion. NATO should endeavor to sell the countries in Russia’s “near-abroad” subsidized petroleum products, build pipelines from Scandinavia to the Baltics, in direct response to Russia’s going the other way, i.e. Nord Stream, and reform regional infrastructure to eliminate dependence on Russia, permanently reducing her sphere of influence and making hybrid operations more difficult.[28]

These actions will disturb Russia. She has indicated previously that she considers them nearly a declaration of war. One wonders, however, what hybrid war actions in the Crimea, Syria or Georgia constitute other than acts of war? In Syria, Russians have already engaged U.S. troops directly.[29] Only the fig-leaf of deniability, the lack of American casualties and the decimation of Russian forces prevented the assault from consideration as hostilities. Imagine what would have happened if Russian troops had been, not victorious, but just more successful? If the U.S. had suffered casualties? War would have been likely.

Displaying strength, something NATO has yet to do, is in NATO’s and not Russia’s interest. With Russia slowly eroding NATO’s strength, Russia can only stand to gain from delayed action and NATO can only lose. Strength wins nothing if not used. By remaining passive and engaging only in sanctioning activity that Russia easily evades, NATO accomplishes little but making revanchism successful and its own defeat inevitable.
Jeffrey Bristol is an officer in the U.S. Navy Reserve and a veteran of the U.S. Army. He holds a Ph.D. in Anthropology, works as an independent scholar and practices law in Tampa, Florida. The views expressed are the author’s alone and do not reflect those of the U.S. Navy, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

 

[jward]

Why U.S. Bombers Might Have to Go Back on Nuclear Alert
A looming Pentagon decision could reshape the nuclear "triad."
By Kyle Mizokami Apr 22, 2021

Paul HarrisGetty Images

• The head of the U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) says he would ask to put bombers back on nuclear alert if the U.S. failed to replace the Minuteman-III.
• The Pentagon is planning to replace the Minuteman-III with a new intercontinental ballistic missile, but some critics think such a move is unnecessary.
• STRATCOM’s commander says he would need two legs of a nuclear triad, or dyad, on alert at all times, forcing a portion of the bomber force to be ready to fly at a moment’s notice.

The head of the U.S. Strategic Command will ask bombers to go back on nuclear alert status if the Pentagon doesn’t replace the Minuteman-III intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).

Adm. Charles Richard made the comments during a discussion of the nuclear force structure in a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on Tuesday, according to Defense News. President Joe Biden’s administration is preparing to assess the U.S.’s strategic nuclear arsenal while the Pentagon is preparing to order the development of the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent missile to replace the aging Minuteman-III.

Minuteman-III missile.
U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Jonathan Snyder

The U.S.’s strategic nuclear weapons are divided among three groups: Minuteman-III ICBMs, Ohio-class submarines armed with Trident D-5 submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and B-2 and B-52H strategic bombers.

Read This




Why the B-52 Is Such a Badass Plane

Each arm of the “triad” is known for specific advantages. ICBMs, for example, are fast, responsive, always ready for action, and capable of hitting their targets within 20 to 30 minutes. Missile submarines, meanwhile, are invulnerable to surprise attack, providing an “ace in the hole” that ensures hundreds of U.S. nukes would survive a bolt from the blue, ready to devastate the aggressor. Finally, bombers are known for their ability to be re-targeted in mid flight, or recalled back to base in the event of a misunderstanding or cease-fire.
Richard’s point is that today’s nuclear triad is actually a “dyad” in peacetime, as the bomber force doesn’t keep bombers fueled up and armed with thermonuclear weapons as it did during the Cold War.
In the 1960s, the Air Force’s Strategic Air Command kept up to 12 fully armed bombers in the air at all times, where they couldn’t be destroyed by a sudden nuclear attack. During the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, that number surged to 75 planes per day.

B-52 bomber flies over lower Manhattan, July 2020.
GothamGetty Images

Today, nuclear-capable B-2 and B-52H bombers still train for nuclear missions, but the relatively small force of 96 bombers (20 B-2, 76 B-52H) doesn’t maintain a force on alert status.

Rethinking the Triad




Does a Nuclear 'Diad' Make More Sense?

Strategic nuclear warfare is an existential threat to the U.S., and Richard is hedging against uncertainty. From a military planner’s perspective, relying on just one delivery platform—whether they’re submarines, ICBMs, or bombers—is reckless.
If the ICBM force was shuttered and bombers weren’t placed on alert, it would fall on the submarine force to provide constant deterrence. If a sudden technology for detecting submarines made it easier to sink missile subs, or a technical defect in the sub’s W-76 thermonuclear warhead made them suddenly unreliable, it could sideline the entirety of the force.
Here’s a Cold War-era video of B-47 Stratojet bomber crews scrambling to get into the air during a drill:
RT 4:30

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=juNEWW__LIY


Posted For Fair Use

U.S. Bombers Might Have to Go Back on Nuclear Alert

A looming Pentagon decision could reshape the nuclear "triad."

www.popularmechanics.com

 

[jward]

What’s Going on at the Iran-Pakistan Border?

A crackdown on the thriving trade in smuggled Iranian oil could wreak havoc on local economies on both sides of the border.



By Mariyam Suleman

April 23, 2021

Trucks stranded at the Iran-Pakistan border due to the closure.

Credit: Twitter/ Sana Ullah BALOCH, MPA
Pakistani Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi is on a three-day visit to Iran’s capital. In a meeting with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, both stressed the need for stability and peace in the region. Border security for the last few years has been a priority for both countries.

One crude method to improve security and promote legal trade, mutually employed by both countries, is a 959-kilometer barrier between Pakistan and Iran, planned to be complete by December this year.

But cross-border families are angry. With crossings restricted, thousands of pickup trucks, often called zambad by the locals, lined up at the border between Pakistan and Iran, have been held hostage for the last one month in uncomfortable heat and hunger.

Above these zambads are barrels full of fuel — the symbol of the notorious yet very common illegal Iranian fuel trade. Sale of Iranian oil is tightly restricted due to U.S. sanctions; once smuggled into Pakistan, however, the options for selling it are much broader.

The barren and underdeveloped nature of the region – despite the attention Pakistani Balochistan has been receiving since the inception of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor – and the few options for employment on both sides of the border make it difficult not to break the law. But the reasons behind the illegal fuel trade are multilayered.

For decades on and off, Iranian fuel smuggling has been a norm in the region, but the most recent oil boom came after the U.S. sanctions against Iran in 2013. Amid the sanctions, Iran overcame some of its economic difficulties through the cash flows generated by the illegal trade across Pakistan’s Balochistan border. Many experts even say that the smuggling of the fuel, mostly diesel, is actually very profitable for Iran’s economy. Thus even with security forces tightly monitoring the border, the Iranian government did not impose a complete crackdown on the illegal fuel smuggling trade.

On the other side of the border, although the Pakistani government has long been critical of the illegal trade, which is causing it economic losses at home, the security forces patrolling the border heavily benefit from the bribes they customarily receive from the smugglers. Therefore traders, zambad drivers, and others involved in the smuggling do not typically fear the dangerous terrain and the uncertainty of the work they do.


However, in the last decade, due to increased restiveness and security concerns on both sides of the border, both countries agreed upon fencing the border line. Pakistan’s concerns increased after its inking its deal with China on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which begins with Gwadar Port in the restive province. The economic losses caused by oil smuggling also contributed to the decision of fencing the border.

In January this year, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Imran Khan chaired a high-level meeting to develop a consensus at all levels to take strict measures against illegal trade. It was established that the smuggled fuel was causing a loss of at least 100 to 150 billion rupees ($650 million to $980 million) to the economy each year. With a crackdown on smuggled Iranian fuel, as suggested by the Pakistani Senate, the economy can potentially generate a fair amount of revenue that can then be allocated for the development of the border region.

But government development projects are not a major concern for the residents of the region anymore after their experience with CPEC, which has left the residents of Balochistan behind despite many promises. The anger over the crackdown at the border gave way to an online campaign, #JusticeForBorderVictims, after the reported deaths of four zambad drivers who have been stuck at the border for weeks.

“It is not the first time that the entire border is closed, but it has never been for thing long,” Shams ul Haq Kalmati, the president of Gwadar Chamber of Commerce and Industry told The Diplomat. The border has been shut down for at least a month. “And it is not only the border line of Gwadar district, but across Balochistan. There is no alternate to the economic benefits of the fuel trade for thousands of families from both sides of the border. Not even the joint border markets that government is planning to establish can fill the gap.”

The joint border markets are a mutual plan by the Iranian and Pakistani governments to encourage bilateral cooperation and legal cross-border trade. Pakistan’s foreign minister is in Iran partly to advance the same cause. A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to open a new border crossing and establish six joint border markets across the border was signed by Qureshi and his Iranian counterpart, Javad Zarif. The first three markets are planned to be opened at the border points of Kuhak-Chadgi, Rimdan-Gabd in Gwadar district, and Pishin-Mand in Kech district.

An unofficial analysis by local leaders in Gwadar found that all Balochistan heavily relies on the illegal fuel trade with Iran. Thousands will be left jobless if the crackdown continues. The analysis mentions that at least 9,074 registered fishing boats, 54 fish factories, 125 local trucks and loaders, 25 buses that travel to Karachi and Quetta, and even a number of vehicles used in Gwadar Port use the same fuel. And these unofficial statistics only cover one district of Balochistan.

A senior journalist in Gwadar, Bahram Baloch, told The Diplomat, “It is not that the border is entirely closed now. The few legal border [crossings] are still open, but the fuel trade has always relied on the illegal border crossings, which are now in the process of being fenced. This is causing thousands of trucks to wait at the border in the hope of the borders opening.”

It is to early to say whether the border fence will be permanent. But if it is, several questions raise concern. Are the Pakistani and Iranian governments ready to provide alternate employment for thousands of people who relied on the illegal trade? With the sanctions still in place, how will the Iranian government fill the gap left by the cash flows it received from the trade? And will the revenue Pakistani government expects to receive through the border markets actually be invested for the development of the region? Without having the answers for these questions, it is too early for both countries to firmly stick to the plan.

You have read 3 of your 5 free articles this month.
Posted For Fair Use

What’s Going on at the Iran-Pakistan Border?

A crackdown on the thriving trade in smuggled Iranian oil could wreak havoc on local economies on both sides of the border.

thediplomat.com

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use.....

Mexican Drug Cartel Used Explosive Drones on Police - Interesting Engineering

Reports of drones laden with hand grenades and packs of explosives are circulating.

interestingengineering.com

Mexican Drug Cartel Used Explosive Drones on Police

Reports of drones laden with hand grenades and packs of explosives are circulating.

By Fabienne Lang
Apr 22, 2021

Mexico's defense secretary said on Wednesday, April 21, that a Mexican drug cartel started using drones loaded with explosives to attack security forces, as a report by The Times said. Two officers were lightly injured, but no fatalities have yet been mentioned.

Officials believe the Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG) is behind the drone attack that took place in the state of Michoacán on Tuesday, April 20, as well as in the states of Jalisco and Guanajuato.

Local news reports stated two drones were laden with hand grenades, per The Times, but shared images online instead show packets of explosives taped to them. At this stage, however, not much information about the drones has been disclosed to the public.

The BBC noted that back in August last year, two rigged drones were discovered in the boot of a car belonging to CJNG members, and that the two drones found this week might have been similarly outfitted. The August drones had packs of explosives taped to them, and could have done some serious harm had they been deployed.

It appears that the cartel could be starting to use tech like drones to help it in its fight against the police and military forces.

Drones in warfare
Drones are becoming a serious piece of warfighting equipment for a number of military forces worldwide. Many are using them as reconnaissance or support systems to bigger, manned aircraft or ground forces, while others like China are developing them to act as "suicide drones," where they deploy from helicopters and trucks to attack enemy targets.

It's easy to see why drones are being widely used around the world, not only because their capabilities keep increasing, but also because some are easily affordable, quick to make, they're easy to remotely control, and they come in many shapes and sizes, offering many options for their owners.


It has to be said, though, the bloody cartel wars in Mexico most likely did not need another way to add more victims to their already-high number of fatalities.

 

[jward]

Russian Political War: moving beyond the hybrid

In Russian Political War: moving beyond the hybrid from Routledge (2019), I address what I think we should be talking about instead of ‘hybrid war’ (let alone the mythical ‘Gerasimov Doctrine‘). It builds off my earlier report, Hybrid War or Gibridnaya Voina? to argue that while the Russian military – like everyone else – is looking at the opportunities in non-kinetic means to prepare the battlefield (after all, has any war not been ‘hybrid’?), the real challenge the West faces is different. The current campaign being waged against the West is not a preparation for eventual military conflict, but rather a wholly non-military campaign that echoes ‘political war’ as described by George Kennan at the start of the Cold War, and which has its spiritual home and command and control centre within the Presidential Administration and Russia’s civilian national security elites.

It’s available as both a hardback and an e-book.
Here’s the book cover blurb:
This book cuts through the misunderstandings about Russia’s geopolitical challenge to the West, presenting this not as ‘hybrid war’ but ‘political war.’

Russia seeks to antagonise: its diplomats castigate Western ‘Russophobia’ and cultivate populist sentiment abroad, while its media sells Russia as a peaceable neighbour and a bastion of traditional social values. Its spies snoop, and even kill, and its hackers and trolls mount a 24/7 onslaught on Western systems and discourses. This is generally characterised as ‘hybrid war,’ but this is a misunderstanding of Russian strategy.

Drawing extensively not just on their writings but also decades of interactions with Russian military, security and government officials, this study demonstrates that the Kremlin has updated traditional forms of non-military ‘political war’ for the modern world. Aware that the West, if united, is vastly richer and stronger, Putin is seeking to divide, and distract, in the hope it will either accept his claim to Russia’s great-power status – or at least be unable to prevent him. In the process, Russia may be foreshadowing how the very nature of war is changing: political war may be the future.

Reviews
[Russian Political War] “offers an expert overview of Russia’s ongoing non-kinetic assault on Western institutions…In Russian Political War, Galeotti provides a clear and cogent analysis of the “political war” Russia has been waging against the West…Galeotti’s description of the Russian arsenal for political war is both accurate and comprehensive.”
Mitchell A Orenstein, The Russians Are Coming
Video
In this lecture Professor Mark Galeotti is a RUSI Senior Associate Fellow, will argue that there is not ‘a’ Russian hybrid war approach so much as two, one rooted in military thinking and the other in the civilian national security establishment.
RT 1:04

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BW9bIFG88Qo

 

[jward]

Concerns over regional stability as Chad's longtime leader Deby is laid to rest

Issued on: 23/04/2021 - 08:08

French President Emmanuel Macron and other world leaders attended the funeral of Idriss Deby Itno on April 23, 2021. © Christophe Petit Tesson, AFP


Chad will bury veteran ruler Idriss Deby Itno on Friday as concerns mount over the loss of a lynchpin in the fight against jihadism in the Sahel and uncertainty over the country's democratic future. President Emmanuel Macron of France, the former colonial power, will attend the ceremony along with a dozen other heads of state and EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell.

The funeral, complete with military honours, is scheduled to take place in the morning in N'Djamena's main square, La Place de la Nation.
The ceremony is to be followed by prayers at the capital's Grand Mosque, after which Deby is to be laid to rest alongside his father in the village of Amdjarass next to his birthplace Berdoba, in the far east of the desert country near the border with Sudan.


Chad, with a well respected fighting force, is central to the West's fight against jihadists in the Sahel, where myriad Islamist extremist groups operate.
France's 5,100-strong Barkhane anti-jihadist force is headquartered in N'Djamena, capital of the country of 16 million.

Chad was thrown into turmoil by Deby's death, which was announced on Tuesday, just the day after he was declared the winner of an April 11 election -- giving him a sixth mandate after 30 years at the helm.
Deby's re-election was never in doubt, with a divided opposition, boycott calls and a campaign in which demonstrations were banned or dispersed.

The army said Deby had died on Monday from wounds suffered while leading troops in battle against rebels who had launched an incursion from neighbouring Libya.
The Front for Change and Concord in Chad (FACT) has vowed to pursue its offensive after a pause for Deby's funeral, with spokesman Kingabe Ogouzeimi de Tapol telling AFP that the rebels were "en route to N'Djamena".
On Monday -- the day of Deby's reported death -- the army had claimed a "great victory", saying it had killed more than 300 FACT rebels and captured 150 others, with the loss of five soldiers.

'Institutional coup'
Meanwhile allies of the late leader moved swiftly to ensure power remained in their hands, installing his 37-year-old son Mahamat, whose nickname is "Kaka", as president and head of a transitional military council while dissolving parliament and the government.
Following what the opposition called an "institutional coup d'etat", the transition period is meant to last 18 months and lead to democratic elections, though it can be extended once.

Deby came to power in 1990 and had twice thwarted attempted coups with support from France.
Macron, who met the younger Deby after arriving on Thursday evening, is the only western head of state to have announced plans to attend the funeral.

Other heads of state include those of immediate neighbours Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, as well as Felix Tshisekedi of the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Macron's presence suggests that France will give a form of endorsement for his successor son at a time of turbulence, while also setting down parameters for a democratic transition, analysts say.
The funeral presents a major security challenge, with the junta under pressure from the opposition and the FACT rebels, as well as infighting.

Roland Marchal of the International Research Centre at the Sciences-Po school in Paris, warned that an all-powerful elite force called the DDGSSIE, headed by the young Mahamat Deby, "faces the risk of splitting."

Posted for fair use

Concerns over regional stability as Chad's longtime leader Deby is laid to rest

Chad will bury veteran ruler Idriss Deby Itno on Friday as concerns mount over the loss of a lynchpin in the fight against jihadism in the Sahel and uncertainty over the country's democratic future.…

www.france24.com

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use.....

Using defense funds to ‘reduce the role of nuclear weapons’ irresponsible

The administration is sending mixed signals on nuclear modernization.

www.washingtontimes.com

Using defense funds to 'reduce the role of nuclear weapons' irresponsible
By Patty-Jane Geller - - Wednesday, April 21, 2021

ANALYSIS/OPINION:

The administration is sending mixed signals on nuclear modernization.

The president’s “skinny budget” declares it would maintain “a strong, credible nuclear deterrent for the security of the Nation and U.S. allies.” Yet his Interim National Security Strategy Guidance states: “We will take steps to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy while ensuring our strategic deterrent remains safe, secure, and effective.”

Those “steps” might include cutting the nuclear modernization budget. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Leonor Tomero recently suggested as much, stressing that “some plans are very expensive.”

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But reducing the nuclear modernization budget is incompatible with maintaining a “strong, credible nuclear deterrent.” You can’t have it both ways — cuts to modernization programs would likely weaken deterrence in the face of advancing nuclear threats.

The notion that the U.S. can maintain a strong deterrent while cutting the nuclear modernization budget flies in the face of repeated warnings, most recently voiced by both Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. John Hyten and Commander of U.S. Strategic Command Adm. Charles Richard, that nuclear modernization is already “late-to-need.”

After years of deferring the recapitalization of nuclear systems, the United States has no choice but to provide the necessary funding or face delays in key delivery schedules. Of course, cost savings based on engineering or manufacturing efficiencies would be welcome, but making reductions that would delay or harm programs for the sake of saving money would ignore the current reality.

To that point, last year former Pentagon acquisition chief Ellen Lord testified that even minor cuts to the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) — the replacement program for intercontinental ballistic missiles — would result in schedule delays.

With nuclear modernization already late-to-need, delays could stick the United States with Cold War capabilities whose deterrence value erodes as they continue to age.


For example, the current Minuteman III missiles are 50 years old and increasingly vulnerable to cyberattack. According to Adm. Richard, “Just to pace the cyber threat alone, GBSD is a necessary step forward.” If adversaries think they can defeat our 400 ICBMs with a cyberattack, doing so may become more attractive.

Our adversaries continue to build nuclear forces, so now is not the time to reduce the role of nuclear weapons and take on these potential risks.

Russia is expected to grow its unconstrained stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons, which already outnumbers the U.S. inventory by 10 to 1. And it’s building entirely new nuclear capabilities.

Meanwhile, China is expected to double — if not triple or quadruple — its nuclear stockpile, and become a peer nuclear competitor with the United States by the end of the decade.

Never before has the United States had to deter two peer adversaries — and deter them differently — at the same time. If anything, the United States should be working tirelessly to strengthen nuclear deterrence, rather than trying to cut down on nuclear modernization as much as possible without weakening national security.

And contrary to Ms. Tomero’s claim, nuclear modernization is not expensive. Critics like to quote estimates that nuclear modernization will cost $400 billion. Yes, that’s a lot of money, but it’s spread out over 30 years. Talking about 30-year life-cycle costs when the topic is a one- to five-year budget is highly misleading.

In fact, nuclear modernization costs less than what North Americans will pay for Netflix over the next 30 years. Netflix has about 74 million subscribers in North America who spend, on average, $13.32 per month. Taken over 30 years and adjusted for inflation, that’s more than $500 billion.

While President Biden says he’s committed to both addressing growing global threats and maintaining a strong nuclear deterrent, the budget will ultimately speak louder. A budget that does not fully support modernization at a time when nuclear threats are growing would be nothing less than irresponsible.

• Patty-Jane Geller is a policy analyst specializing in nuclear deterrence and missile defense in The Heritage Foundation’s Center for National Defense.

 

[Housecarl]

{CIVIL} French Military Balls: A letter from 20 Generals and MANY Staff officers etc,to Macron.

• night driver
• Today at 3:47 PM

Posted for fair use.....

France will 'never give in to Islamist terrorism,' says Macron after policewoman's killing

French prosecutors opened a terror inquiry Friday after a police employee was stabbed to death at a station southwest of Paris by a suspected Islamist extremist from Tunisia who was then shot dead by…

www.france24.com

France will 'never give in to Islamist terrorism,' says Macron after policewoman's killing

Issued on: 23/04/2021 - 16:01Modified: 23/04/2021 - 22:08

French prosecutors opened a terror inquiry Friday after a police employee was stabbed to death at a station southwest of Paris by a suspected Islamist extremist from Tunisia who was then shot dead by the security forces. Three people have been detained in connection with the attack.

President Emmanuel Macron said France would never give in to "Islamist terrorism" after the attack in Rambouillet, a tranquil commuter town about 60 kilometres (40 miles) from Paris, which revived the trauma of a spate of deadly attacks last year.

France's national anti-terrorism prosecutors said they had opened a terror investigation, also involving the DGSI domestic intelligence service, into the murder of a person holding public authority. Three people from the suspect's "entourage" were detained on Friday, according to a judicial source.

A source close to the inquiry told AFP the attacker shouted "Allahu Akbar" (God is Greatest) during the attack.

Chief anti-terror prosecutor Jean-François Ricard, who spoke outside the station along with Prime Minister Jean Castex, confirmed that "comments made by the assailant" indicated a terror motive, without giving further details.

'By her side'
The attack took place in the secure entrance area of the station at around 2:20pm (1220 GMT), a police source added.

The 49-year-old woman, an administrative assistant and mother of two who was returning from a lunch break, was stabbed in the throat twice and died of her wounds shortly afterwards, the source said.

The attacker, 36, was fatally wounded when an officer opened fire on him.

He arrived in France illegally in 2009 but had since obtained residency papers, a police source said, adding that he was unknown to security services. He had just moved to Rambouillet.

About 30 police officers wearing balaclavas raided the suspect's home in Rambouillet on Friday evening, AFP reporters at the scene said.

Police also searched the home of the person who sheltered the assailant when he first arrived in France, sources close to the inquiry said.

Macron vowed on Twitter that "in our fight against Islamist terrorism, we will never give in," identifying the murdered woman as Stéphanie.

"The nation is by the side of her family, her colleagues and security forces," he said.

Elle était policière. Stéphanie a été tuée dans son commissariat de Rambouillet, sur les terres déjà meurtries des Yvelines. La Nation est aux côtés de sa famille, de ses collègues et des forces de l’ordre. Du combat engagé contre le terrorisme islamiste, nous ne céderons rien.
— Emmanuel Macron (@EmmanuelMacron) April 23, 2021

Interior Minister Gérald Darmanin, who also visited officers in Rambouillet, said security would be stepped up at stations nationwide.

Spate of attacks
Several attacks over the last year have reignited concerns about the spread of radical Islam inside France as well as immigration.

In September, a Pakistani man wounded two people with a meat cleaver outside the former offices of satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo, which had printed cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed.

On October 16, a young Chechen refugee beheaded teacher Samuel Paty who had showed some of the caricatures to his pupils.

And on October 29, three people were killed when a recently arrived Tunisian went on a stabbing spree in a church in the Mediterranean city of Nice.

In the most severe recent attack against French police, three officers and one police employee in Paris were stabbed to death in October 2019 by an IT specialist colleague who was himself then shot dead.

He was later found to have shown an interest in radical Islam.

These attacks came after the massacres carried out by Islamist extremists from 2015 that began with the massacre of staff in the offices of Charlie Hebdo in January that year.

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In France's deadliest peacetime atrocity, 130 people were killed and 350 were wounded when Islamist suicide bombers and gunmen attacked the Stade de France stadium, bars and restaurants in central Paris and the Bataclan concert hall in November 2015.

The next year a man rammed a truck into a Bastille Day crowd in Nice in 2016, killing 86 people.

Just a few weeks before, in June 2016, two police officers were stabbed to death at their home outside Paris by a man claiming allegiance to the Islamic State group.

Macron's government has introduced legislation to tackle radical Islamist activity in France, a bill that has stirred anger in some Muslim countries.

(FRANCE 24 with AFP)

 

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Posted for fair use.....

Deby's Death Seen as Blow to Counterterrorism Efforts in Africa's Sahel

Deby and his military had become a major actor in counterterrorism efforts in the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin, where Boko Haram and other Islamist extremist groups have been active in several countries

www.voanews.com

m Watch
Deby's Death Seen as Blow to Counterterrorism Efforts in Africa's Sahel
By Sirwan Kajjo

April 23, 2021 05:28 PM

The death of Chad's President Idriss Deby could be a major setback for counterterrorism efforts in Africa's restive Sahel region, according to Chadian activists, African politicians and security experts.

The 68-year-old longtime leader died Monday from injuries sustained while visiting troops fighting a Libya-based rebel group known as the Front for Change and Concord in Chad, or FACT. The group had advanced the previous week from the north toward the capital, N'Djamena.

Following Deby's death, generals set up a military council to run the country and named Deby's son, General Mahamat Idriss Deby Itno, 37, as interim president.

Local observers said the political turmoil could lead to more serious challenges in the Central African nation.

"The country has many security challenges to face right now," said Delphine Djiraibe, a human rights lawyer and the founder of the Public Interest Law Center, who is based in N'Djamena.

"In the fight against terrorism, President Deby was a close ally to France and other foreign powers, so his death will definitely create a vacuum," she told VOA in a phone interview. "Despite his dictatorial rule, his effectiveness in the campaign against terror in the region was the main factor why these countries supported him."

Deby had ruled Chad since coming to power in a military coup in 1990. In recent years, he and his military had become a major actor in counterterrorism efforts in the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin, where Boko Haram and other Islamist extremist groups have been active in several countries.

"He managed to keep our country largely secure from terror threats while also helping other countries in their struggle against terrorists," said Kaltuoma Makaila, 41, a resident of N'Djamena.

"With Deby gone, I'm not sure how our security situation will be, but we will definitely go through a period of uncertainty," she told VOA.

Regional stability

The repercussions of Deby's death could also be felt in other countries in the region, some politicians said.

Deby was "somebody who contributed greatly to regional stability. … I think his passing will be a source of instability in the subregion," said Alexandre-Ferdinand Nguendet, a former president of the National Transitional Council of the Central African Republic.

Chad's military has played a significant role in the 5,000-strong force of the G5 Sahel, which includes Niger, Mali, Chad, Burkina Faso and Mauritania. The G5 force cooperates with French troops, who have been present in the region since the outbreak of an insurgency in Mali in 2012.

"It is a hard blow for Chad, Mali and for the Sahel in its entirety, because he recently sent 1,200 Chadian troops to reinforce security" in the border zone between Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso, said a resident of Mali's capital, Bamako, who declined to be identified.

In neighboring Niger, a local resident said that Deby's death "will have unavoidable consequences in the subregion."

"A man who supported us is gone," he told VOA. "What should we do in order to replace the efforts he has done against terrorism?"

'Worrying moment'

The FACT rebel group said it rejected the transitional military council that will take charge of Chad for the next 18 months. This means, experts said, the rebel threat in the country remains real.

"This is a really worrying moment, because we don't know what's going to happen," said Daniel Eizenga, a research fellow at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies in Washington.

He said the regime crafted by the slain president was "highly authoritarian, very autocratic, and so all political power was consolidated under Deby and his ruling party."

"When you have these moments where there is political instability, everything is kind of up in the air," Eizenga told VOA. "It is that instability that is inherent to authoritarianism that is really problematic, and now we're in a situation where Chad may not be able to be a crucial partner because everything in Chad could collapse."

Son's role
A four-star general, Deby’s son has led multiple military operations against Islamist insurgents, including one in 2013, when Chadian soldiers deployed to northern Mali to help support the French Operation Serval.
"He's held very high positions within the defense intelligence world for Chad, and that suggests that he has connections to the broader diplomatic and defense corps that would be based in N'Djamena," Eizenga said.
France's anti-terror Operation Barkhane and the regional Multinational Joint Task Force are headquartered in Chad.
"I think that the fact that he's kind of emerged as the lead for the transitional military council suggests that there's an effort by some, at least in N'Djamena, to try and maintain some continuity and to stem whatever instability that may have otherwise erupted in the wake of Deby's death," Eizenga added.
VOA French Service's Freeman Sipila in Bangui, Central African Republic, Abdoul-Razak Idrissa in Niamey, Niger, and Mohamed Dagnoko in Bamako, Mali, contributed to this report.

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Experts Say Death of Chad’s Deby Will Impact Regional Security

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Chad President Déby’s Death Raises Security Concerns in West Africa

Déby was regarded as an essential ally by the West in the fight against terrorism. His death leaves security experts worried about what comes next.

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Deby's Son to Lead Chad as Interim President

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By VOA News

Wed, 04/21/2021 - 08:51 AM

 

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Will the South African Military Intervene in Mozambique?

Ansar al-Sunnah wa-Jamma (ASwJ) is the latest Islamist insurgency to emerge in southern Africa with links to Islamic State (IS), which has named the group Islamic State in Central African Province (ISCAP). ASwJ’s emergence in October 2017 with the two-day occupation of Mocimboa da Praia (MdP)...

jamestown.org

Will the South African Military Intervene in Mozambique?
Publication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 19 Issue: 8
By: Brenda Githing'u

April 23, 2021 05:47 PM Age: 6 hours

Ansar al-Sunnah wa-Jamma (ASwJ) is the latest Islamist insurgency to emerge in southern Africa with links to Islamic State (IS), which has named the group Islamic State in Central African Province (ISCAP). ASwJ’s emergence in October 2017 with the two-day occupation of Mocimboa da Praia (MdP), in hindsight, foreshadowed what was to come only three years later with the seizure of the city again in August 2020. The second MdP incursion was a highly coordinated, large-scale attack that outmaneuvered government security forces and allowed the militants to regain control of the town.

Since August 2020, ASwJ has used MdP as its main operational base for militants to gather to prepare for large-scale attacks, facilitate indoctrination of youths at camps, and hoard loot from attacks on nearby villages. The group has managed to sustain a coordinated insurgency and is comprised of a network of cells throughout Cabo Delgado Province that have led to the displacement of nearly 670,000 people (Médecins sans Frontières, March 4). This culminated in the major March 2021 attack on Palma, which is a town formerly believed to be a relatively safe home to thousands of displaced people from elsewhere in the province, as well as expatriates, foreign contractors, and tourists (SABC News, March 24).

Considering the proximity of Palma to liquefied natural gas (LNG) sites of multinational companies like Total, the attack marked a major shift in the development of the insurgency and its capacity to pose a threat to foreign investments and nationals from across the southern African region and the West, while further displacing thousands of locals.

Calls for Regional Intervention
As the state of insecurity worsens in Cabo Delgado, calls for regional intervention have mounted. Chief among such calls is for the South African government to deploy its military to Cabo Delgado. Taking note of this, IS made the case in an editorial in its al-Naba newsletter in July 2020 that South Africa has “enough internal problems [that] getting involved in this war that would place it in a great financial, security and military predicament and may result in prompting the soldiers of the Islamic State to open a fighting front inside its borders” (aymennjawad.org, July 3, 2020). These potential consequences continue to frame questions among security analysts and policymakers as to whether South Africa is sufficiently prepared to intervene against the insurgents in Mozambique and mitigate the threat of IS.

South African President, Cyril Ramaphosa, recently extended Operation Cooper, a bilateral agreement with Mozambique to combat piracy and enhance maritime security along their coastal areas (South African Government, June 1; News 24, March 19). The mission has been proposed as a cost effective, operationally low-risk option to gradually escalate South Africa’s involvement in Mozambique by enhancing its naval warfare capabilities through a combination of maritime and aviation operations to combat insurgents (Security Institute for Governance and Leadership in Africa, 2020). Nonetheless, this option remains unlikely due to severe financial constraints, as the estimated costs required for simply fully utilizing the South African Navy Forces would require a doubling of its existing budget to between $564-$635 million (Twitter.com/DarrenOlivier, April 7). Furthermore, intervention on a limited budget would also lead to operational gaps and pressure on troops to deliver tangible results, which may not be possible under the challenging circumstances in Mozambique. Therefore, at present, the South African government has neither the funds to support a maritime operation beyond its existing mission or a large-scale deployment for a sustained presence in Mozambique in the medium to long term.

Risks to South Africa
By intervening in the war against ASwJ in Cabo Delgado, the South African government risks losing popular support from the general public. Following the U.S. State Department designation of ASwJ as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) and IS affiliate, some influential members of the South African Muslim community were reluctant to define the insurgent group in the same way (U.S. Department of State, March 10). Dr. Faisul Suliman, Chairperson of the South African Muslim Network (SAMNET), argued that the conflict is “more about resources and a disgruntled local population than it is about some establishment of any Islamic state or caliphate in Southern Africa” (Independent Online, April 9).

Perceptions around the nature of the insurgency and atrocities committed by armed forces are likely to shape public opinion on the morality of South Africa’s involvement. This comes nearly 20 years after the U.S. began the War on Terror (WoT) in Afghanistan and Iraq, which former President Nelson Mandela strongly condemned (polity.org.za, June 28, 2003). The South African public has widely celebrated a foreign policy based on principles of human rights and the promotion of peace and security. Therefore, a War on Terror-styled military intervention in Mozambique would break a long-established non-interventionist approach that would prompt criticism, especially from faith-based communities and human rights organizations in South Africa.

South Africa also faces the risk of retaliatory attacks by a lone wolf or cell inspired by IS. The country currently has two major ongoing cases related to suspects allegedly linked to IS. These cases include those involving Brandon-Lee and Tony-Lee Thulsie as well as Fatima Patel, her husband Sayfydeen Aslam Del Vecchio, and Malawian national, Ahmad ‘Bazooka’ Mussa (Terrorism Monitor, November 5, 2020). While the latter trio have remained behind bars without trial, an accomplice of the Thulsie twins, Ronaldo Smith (and another South African, Mohammed Suliman), were alleged to have fled to Mozambique to join the insurgency. This has impeded efforts by the Thulsie twins to obtain bail (Club of Mozambique, September 3). Furthermore, a case of twelve suspects accused of the attack on the Shia Imam Hussein mosque in Verulam, Durban, was dismissed last year due to a lack of evidence (News 24, July 14, 2020). The Imman Hussain mosque is attended by the minority Shia community, which drew speculation of whether the attack was sectarian. Azad Seedat, chairperson of the Shia community and founder of the mosque, was among those who expressed disappointment at the court rulings (Daily Maverick, July 14).

Shortly after that dismissal, Fatima Patel and her two co-accused abandoned legal aid to be represented by advocate Jimmy Howse, who represented one of the twelve accused in the Shia mosque attack, Farhad Hoomer (Times Live, March 8). Additionally, another one of the twelve suspects from the Verulam, Durban case was arrested in a house in Kliprivier, south of Johannesburg, in an incident involving the kidnapping and extortion of a businessman. Police recovered an IS flag, explosives, and firearms from the house (Defence Web, August 14). These developments typify the nature of the threat of IS in South Africa, where state prosecutors, police, and analysts are able to identify incidents, connections, and patterns in the absence of definitive evidence to deny or confirm the potential impact of an IS-linked insurgency in Mozambique on South Africa.

Conclusion
Considering the increasingly sophisticated nature of the insurgency in Mozambique, South Africa will likely be drawn into the ongoing conflict as the South African Development Community (SADC) prepares a more substantial response to the insurgency (SADC, April 8). Due to the inevitable risk of retaliatory attacks on South African soil and likely criticism from faith-based communities and human rights organizations, the South African government will have to ensure it is able to achieve and maintain substantial gains against ASwJ if it is to intervene militarily. In the meantime, considerable measures to enhance the capabilities and cooperation between the state security and the special investigative unit, known as “the Hawks,” will remain paramount to mitigating the threat of IS attacks in South Africa.