WAR 04-10-2021-to-04-16-2021___THEWINDSofWAR

Housecarl · Apr 10, 2021

(464) WAR 03-20-2021-to-03-26-2021___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****
WAR - 03-20-2021-to-03-26-2021___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

(465) 03-27-2021-to-04-02-2021___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****
WAR - 03-27-2021-to-04-02-2021___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

(467) 04-03-2021-to-04-09-2021___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

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Well if even half of this is accurate this is definitely not good......

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Pak aiding Turkey's nuclear ambitions and assert control over Kabul: Report

Pakistan's General Nadeem Raza and Turkey's General Yasar Guler met and discussed collaborations on several military projects and existing geopolitical issues last month.

www.hindustantimes.com

A Pakistani-made Shaheen-III missile, that is capable of carrying nuclear warheads, is carried on a trailer during a military parade in connection with Pakistan National Day celebrations, in Islamabad, Pakistan. (AP)
WORLD NEWS
Pak aiding Turkey's nuclear ambitions and assert control over Kabul: Report
Pakistan's General Nadeem Raza and Turkey's General Yasar Guler met and discussed collaborations on several military projects and existing geopolitical issues last month.

ANI | | Posted by Shankhyaneel Sarkar
PUBLISHED ON APR 09, 2021 03:30 PM IST

Pakistan is helping Turkey to develop nuclear weapons and control Afghanistan by expanding Recep Tyyip Erdogan's Caliphate expedition to the country.

As per an article by Paul Antonopoulos in Greek City Times, Pakistan's Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC), General Nadeem Raza, visited Turkey from March 27th to April 2nd.

Turkey's Chief of General Staff, General Yasar Guler, hosted Raza at the Turkish General Staff Headquarters on March 30th, where both sides discussed collaborations on several military projects and existing geopolitical issues.

Guler also conferred Turkey's top military award 'Legion of Merit' to Raza for his "services for promotion of Pakistan-Turkey defence ties" during the meet.

Antonopoulos said that the biggest agenda of the visit was furthering the mutual interests of Turkey and Pakistan in Afghanistan.

Pakistan also wants Turkish forces to replace NATO and American forces as withdrawal of forces is expected amidst the ongoing Afghan Peace Process and Intra Afghan Negotiations, reported Greek City Times.

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Further, Pakistan also conveyed that through the help of the Haqqani Network (HQN), it has already managed to convince the Taliban to allow Turkish forces to continue their deployment as well as to send more troops to Afghanistan.

Moreover, General Raza also met Turkish Defence Minister Hulusi Akar for discussions on content and form of deployment of Turkish armed forces in Afghanistan and assured him of every possible help on Pakistan's behalf.

Both of them also brainstormed on efficiently using terror organisations like Al-Qaeda, Islamic State, and HQN for creating a more conducive environment in Afghanistan for Turkey, reported Antonopoulos.

Defence experts have expressed their apprehensions on Turkey deploying Islamic State terrorists fleeing from Syria to Afghanistan.

This could also lead to the emergence of a new pattern wherein terrorists from Pakistani outfits as well as those from the Islamic State could operate together.

Besides assisting Turkey in its ambitious Afghanistan plan, another motive behind the visit was to fast-track the inclusion of Turkey as a part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and accelerate building an alliance between the three.

Greek City Times also reported that Pakistan is coordinating with Turkey and China for collaboration on developing a fifth-generation fighter aircraft.

The idea is to bring the expertise and capabilities of the three countries together for mutually developing aerial vehicles and fighter jets.

Pakistani Army sees a massive potential in convergence of Turkish expertise on drones and Chinese expertise on fighter jets to boost the air power of the three countries.

The emergence of a China-Pakistan-Turkey nexus on nuclear proliferation and Pakistan coordinating on capacity building of the three countries have already been flagged by watchdogs and media.

Erdogan has already expressed his desperation on developing the 'Caliphate atom bomb' to fulfil his neo-Ottoman aspirations, and China and Pakistan have been facing charges of illegal sale of missiles and creating a clandestine proliferation market, reported Greek City Times.

Housecarl · Apr 10, 2021

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Myanmar junta attacks again as spokesman defends crackdown

YANGON (AP) — Security forces in Myanmar cracked down heavily again on anti-coup protesters Friday even as the military downplayed reports of state violence.

apnews.com

Myanmar junta attacks again as spokesman defends crackdown
today

YANGON (AP) — Security forces in Myanmar cracked down heavily again on anti-coup protesters Friday even as the military downplayed reports of state violence.

Reports on online news outlets and social media said at least four people were killed in Bago, about 100 kilometers (60 miles) northeast of Yangon, in an attack by government troops and police that began before dawn and continued sporadically until after dark.

The Bago Weekly Journal Online said a source at the city’s main hospital, whom it didn’t name, believed about 10 people had been killed.

It was the third attack this week involving the massive use of deadly force by security forces to try to crush active opposition to the Feb. 1 coup that ousted the elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi.

On Wednesday, attacks were launched on opponents of military rule in the towns of Kalay and Taze in the country’s north. In both places, at least 11 people -- possibly including some bystanders -- were reported killed. Security forces were accused of using heavy weapons in their attacks, including rocket-propelled grenades and mortars. The allegations could not be independently confirmed by The Associated Press.

Some of the protesters used homemade weapons, especially in Kalay, where defenders called themselves a “civil army,” and some were equipped with rudimentary hunting rifles.

Most protests in cities and town around the country have been nonviolent, with demonstrators espousing civil disobedience.

Violence by security forces was also reported Friday in several other areas, including Loikaw, the capital of Kayah sate in the east, where live ammunition was employed, according to numerous social media posts.

At least 614 protesters and bystanders have been killed by security forces through Thursday, according to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, which monitors casualties and arrests.

At a news conference in the capital, Naypyitaw, a spokesman for the ruling junta defended the actions of the security forces.

Brig. Gen. Zaw Min Tun, when asked about reports that automatic weapons have been fired at protesters, replied that if that were the case, 500 people would have been killed in just a few hours.

He challenged the death toll issued by the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners and said the government’s tally was 248. He also said 16 policemen had been killed.

Asked about air strikes carried out by government jets on territory held by guerrillas from the Karen ethnic minority in eastern Myanmar, which reportedly killed at least 14 civilians, Zaw Min Tun said the aerial raids allowed more exact targeting than ground attacks which would have caused more deaths. Supporters of the Karen charge that the army is carrying out a ground offensive as well, including the use of artillery.

Housecarl · Apr 10, 2021

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With Afghanistan Withdrawal Looming, What About al-Qaeda?

Al-Qaeda's presence in Afghanistan and its ties with the Taliban are a tough challenge for the Biden administration.

sofrep.com

EXPERT ANALYSIS
WITH AFGHANISTAN WITHDRAWAL LOOMING, WHAT ABOUT AL-QAEDA?

by Steve Balestrieri
9 hours ago

According to the peace agreement between the United States and the Taliban signed in February last year, the remaining 2,500 American troops in Afghanistan are due to be withdrawn on May 1. As part of the agreement, the Taliban agreed to stop attacks on U.S.-led coalition troops, decrease the violence in Afghanistan, cut all ties with al-Qaeda, and enter into negotiations with the Afghan government.

President Joe Biden has repeatedly stated that trying to withdraw all American troops by the May 1 deadline was going to be difficult. This has frustrated some senior officials in the Pentagon who have expressed criticism that the Biden administration is wracked by indecisiveness and “dithering,” according to an NBC News post on April 8.

One official was quoted as saying, “There needs to be a decision,” adding, “just tell us what we’re doing here.”

White House Press Secretary Jen Psaki said that President Biden, will announce his decision by the end of the month, and “wants to take the time to make the right decision.” This announcement by Psaki all but guarantees there will be an extension of the U.S. withdrawal.

“There Needs to Be a Decision”
It would be nearly impossible logistically for the U.S. and all of its coalition partners to withdraw by May 1. Back in March, the president said as much, stating, “It’s going to be hard to meet the May 1 deadline. Just in terms of tactical reasons, it’s hard to get those troops out.” He added, “And if we leave, we’re going to do so in a safe and orderly way.”

Biden promised, during his election campaign, that he’d leave counter-terrorism troops in Afghanistan to work alongside Afghan commandos. That would be a breaking point with the Taliban, which would then open the door for them to attack the U.S.-led coalition. In fact, the Taliban have already done exactly that.

Late last month, the Taliban twice attacked a covert CIA base in Afghanistan Firebase Chapman in Kandahar in eastern Afghanistan. A water tower was struck and several mortar rounds landed inside the base. No American or coalition troops were injured, however, seven civilians were wounded in the attack. This is how the Taliban test the waters to gauge a potential American reaction.

The Taliban haven’t lived up to their part of the agreement in several key ways, and this latest attack just adds to it. They haven’t reduced the violence in the country, and in fact, have increased it. They’ve made it abundantly clear that the Afghan government in Kabul is, in their minds, a puppet regime of Washington.

Al-Qaeda Dealbreakers and Lies in Afghanistan
But arguably the biggest dealbreaker is the Taliban’s relationship with al-Qaeda. Nineteen years ago, then-President Bush demanded that they turn over the al-Qaeda terrorists that had planned and organized the 9/11 attacks on the United States. The Taliban refused, believing that the U.S. would never be a threat to them. That was the entire reason the U.S. began its 19-year (and counting) involvement in Afghanistan.

The Taliban continue to lie about al-Qaeda, insisting that they have no relationship with the terrorist group and they are not present in Afghanistan. And yet, in October last year, Afghan forces killed Abu Muhsin al-Masri, a senior al-Qaeda leader who was on the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Most Wanted Terrorist list.

Al-Masri, an Egyptian national, who also went by the name Husam Abd-al-Ra’uf, was believed to be al-Qaeda’s second-in-command. He was killed during a special operation in the central Ghazni province, Afghanistan’s National Directorate of Security (NDS) said at the time.

And although the Taliban deny that al-Qaeda is present in Afghanistan, the terrorist group’s communication points to the contrary.

FDD’s Long War Journal published a very informative piece that shows that al-Qaeda’s Thabat, the terrorist group’s weekly newsletter, posted multiple reports of al-Qaeda’s activities in Afghanistan.

Thabat is described by the United Nations Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team as “one of [al-Qaeda’s] media arms,” that covers its operations around the world.

The Long War Journal’s piece noted the following:

“An analysis of 16 issues of Thabat (issues 3 through 18) shows that Al Qaeda and its constellation of allies in Afghanistan have been involved in dozens of attacks from Nov. 2020 to the present in 18 of Afghanistan’s provinces. The provinces where Thabat reported on operations are Badakhshan, Balkh, Farah, Faryab, Ghazni, Helmand, Jawzjan, Kapisa, Kabul, Kandahar, Kunar, Kunduz, Khost, Logar, Nangarhar, Takhar, Uruzgan, and Zabul.”

The U.S. military in Afghanistan has been well aware of foreign terrorists operating in the country with the approval and support of the Taliban for two decades. The U.S. military has launched nearly 400 operations against terrorist groups in 27 of the country’s 34 provinces. Those are the first things that need ironing out before any further ‘deals’ with the Taliban get done.

Housecarl · Apr 10, 2021

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Analysts expecting another attack ‘in the next few months’ in northern Mozambique

The extremist insurgency in Mozambique has been an ongoing threat since 2017. SADC needs to act now, say analysts

mg.co.za

Analysts expecting another attack ‘in the next few months’ in northern Mozambique

Erika Gibson
10 Apr 2021

More than 8 000 refugees have converged on the provincial capital of Pemba following the siege of Palma in Mozambique’s most northern province of Cabo Delgado two weeks ago.

According to Zvika Karadi, a Pemba businessman who lost millions of rands of earthmoving equipment in Palma after insurgents set it alight, the town was deserted this week, except for a few looters extracting what they could carry from the burnt shops. Communication lines are still down and reception masts destroyed.

Karadi took video footage showing the destruction of the town and his plant, with decomposing bodies still left on the streets where they were mowed down in a bloody insurgent assault that started on 24 March.

“Just outside the Amarula Hotel, where contractors hid during the assault, we found a shallow grave with some 12 bodies — all men with their hands tied behind their backs. They are lighter skinned than the Mozambicans and the locals don’t know them at all.

They might have been with the attackers,” Karadi said after he returned to Palma to search for some of his missing employees.

He said he was also assisting in organising the return of at least 300 contracting staff that were left behind as residents fled.

During the Palma attack, the insurgents “resupplied” themselves by looting food trucks from the World Food Programme and decapitating the drivers in the process, Lionel Dyck from the private military company Dyck Advisory Group (DAG) previously told the Mail & Guardian.

Helicopters belonging to DAG were in action in Palma as part of its contract with the Mozambican police. A barge, the Alpha Jimbo, which was anchored a few hundred metres offshore, was also looted.

According to analysts from Willsher & Associates — a risk analysis company for Africa and the Middle East — the insurgents can move faster with fresh supplies of food and a newly acquired fleet of vehicles, while they have the upper-hand over the Mozambican forces.

Earlier this week there were unconfirmed reports on social media of a possible Islamist militant presence in the Namacande area of Muidumbe district, some 200km southwest of Palma. According to the analysts, this could indicate that the insurgents might be using their newly acquired mobility to deploy their fighters faster.

Pemba is 300 kilometres away from Muidumbe. As the most strategic coastal town in the province, fears are real amongst the residents of Pemba that they might be next in the crosshairs of the extremist insurgents affiliated to the Islamic State terror group.

Boatloads of Palma residents were evacuated to Pemba following the attack, with United Nations agencies trying to record all the new arrivals. But many are entering Pemba by foot. According to businesspeople in the town and security analysts who spoke to the M&G, this provides ideal cover for insurgents to gradually populate themselves around Pemba.

According to a former South African military officer who now has business interests in Mozambique and wants to be anonymous, Pemba was meant to serve as the hub for the whole developing liquefied natural gas industry in Cabo Delgado.

“The Mozambican navy trained their members in Pemba. When the South African navy was still conducting patrols along the coast as part of a maritime security agreement with Mozambique and Tanzania, it used Pemba as its base,” the former officer told the M&G.

“Most of the subcontractors for Total, who were developing the gas field at Afungi, close to Palma, are staying in Pemba. If I was an extremist, my forward teams would have been deployed with the refugees, because blending in with the communities has been how they operate.”

A senior risk analyst at British company IHS Markit, Eva Renon, said pre-emptive attacks on villages close to Pemba can be expected within the next two to three months.

“It has been a destination and a transit hub for most of the 700 000 internally displaced persons who have fled from the northern part of Cabo Delgado. All roads north of Pemba and east of Mueda are under control of the insurgents and road ambushes are systematic,” she said.

“The attack [on Palma] is the largest to date in the insurgency [starting in 2017] and is very likely to have required more planning and a greater number of fighters than in previous attacks, demonstrating increased capability.

“Unless the security situation changes significantly, in the next six months, insurgents are likely to attempt to capture Pemba. They will probably target beachfront hotels, government facilities and the personnel and assets of non-governmental organisations, the Catholic Church and the United Nations.”

Renon said the same is likely in Tanzania’s Mtwara, just across the Mozambican border, where hundreds of refugees also fled.

Renon said while the Mozambican government and its armed forces have been described as being “weak” in their response to the attacks, it is less likely that the insurgents will be able to capture and hold Mtwara because the Tanzanian security forces are more capable.

According to some expat residents of Pemba who spoke to the M&G, they began meeting informally in the past week in an effort to prepare for a possible onslaught and have even been contemplating to erect bulletproof shelters.

“The main topic of conversation is the decision not to renew the DAG contract. They were the only effective countermeasure against the insurgents,” one expat said.

DAG left Mozambique on 4 April after its contract was not renewed. Another South African company, Paramount Group, has now been contracted by the Mozambican military to take over from DAG.

As part of this contract, two Russian-made Mi-17 and Mi-24 helicopters, as well as some light Gazelle helicopters flown by contracted Ukrainian and also freshly trained Mozambican pilots will form part of Mozambique’s defences.

“Some of our residents are leaving Pemba or have started [making] plans to leave. There are contractors who have lost all of their equipment and vehicles in Palma. They still owe the banks and have nothing left to continue their work. We have to fend for ourselves – very much like we had to in Palma,” the expat said.

Helicopters belonging to DAG — a private military company — were in action in Palma as part of its contract with the Mozambican police. A barge, the Alpha Jimbo, which was anchored a few hundred metres offshore, was also looted.

According to analysts from Willsher and Associates — a risk analysis company for Africa and the Middle East — the insurgents can move faster with fresh supplies of food and a newly acquired fleet of vehicles, while they have the upper-hand over the Mozambican forces.

Earlier this week there were unconfirmed reports on social media of a possible Islamist militant presence in the Namacande area of Muidumbe district, some 200km southwest of Palma. According to the analysts, this could indicate that the insurgents might be using their newly acquired mobility to deploy their fighters faster.

Pemba is 300 kilometres away from Muidumbe. As the most strategic coastal town in the province, fears are real amongst the residents of Pemba that they might be next in the crosshairs of the extremist insurgents affiliated to the Islamic State terror group.

Boatloads of Palma residents were evacuated to Pemba following the attack, with United Nations agencies trying to record all the new arrivals. But many are entering Pemba via foot. According to businesspeople in the town and security analysts who spoke to the Mail and Guardian, this provides the ideal cover for insurgents to gradually populate themselves around Pemba.

According to a former South African military officer who now has business interests in Mozambique and wants to remain anonymous, Pemba was supposed to serve as the hub for the whole developing liquefied natural gas industry in Cabo Delgado.

“The Mozambican navy trained their members in Pemba. When the South African navy was still conducting patrols along the coast as part of a maritime security agreement with Mozambique and Tanzania, it used Pemba as its base,” the former officer told the M&G.

“Most of the subcontractors for Total, who were developing the gas field at Afungi, close to Palma, are staying in Pemba. If I was an extremist, my forward teams would have been deployed with the refugees, because blending in with the communities has been how they operate.”

A senior risk analyst at British company IHS Markit, Eva Renon, says pre-emptive attacks on villages close to Pemba can be expected within the next two to three months.

“It has been a destination and a transit hub for most of the 700 000 internally displaced persons who have fled from the northern part of Cabo Delgado. All roads north of Pemba and east of Mueda are under control of the insurgents and road ambushes are systematic,” according to Renon.

“The attack [on Palma] is the largest to date in the insurgency [starting in 2017] and is very likely to have required more planning and a greater number of fighters than in previous attacks, demonstrating increased capability.

“Unless the security situation changes significantly, in the next six months insurgents are likely to attempt to capture Pemba. They will probably target beachfront hotels, government facilities and the personnel and assets of non-governmental organisations, the Catholic Church and the United Nations.”

Renon says the same is likely in Tanzania’s Mtwara, just across the Mozambican border, where hundreds of refugees also fled.

Renon says while the Mozambican government and its armed forces have been described as being “weak” in their response to the attacks, it is less likely that the insurgents will be able to capture and hold Mtwara because the Tanzanian security forces are more capable.

According to some expat residents of Pemba who have spoken to the M&G, they have started meeting informally in the past week in an effort to prepare for a possible onslaught and have even been erecting bulletproof shelters.

One expat resident said that “the main topic of conversation is the decision not to renew the DAG contract. They were the only effective countermeasure against the insurgents”.

DAG left Mozambique on 4 April after its contract was not renewed.

Another South African company, Paramount, has now been contracted by the Mozambican department of defence to take over from DAG.

As part of this contract, two Russian-made Mi-17 and Mi-24 helicopters, as well as some light Gazelle helicopters flown by contracted Ukrainian and also freshly trained Mozambican pilots will form part of Mozambique’s defences.

“Some of our residents are leaving Pemba or have started [making] plans to leave. There are contractors who have lost all of their equipment and vehicles in Palma. They still owe the banks and have nothing left to continue their work. We have to fend for ourselves – very much like we had to in Palma,” said the expat.

SADC to decide on way forward in Mozambique
While the Mozambican army can continue with its efforts on the land side, the fastest and most logical intervention now is for the South African navy to restart its maritime patrols along the Mozambican coast, according to Tim Walker, senior researcher at the Institute for Security Studies.

These patrols, codenamed “Operation Copper”, have stopped due to constraints in the defence budget. Operation Copper started some 10 years ago as part of agreements signed by South Africa, Mozambique and Tanzania to fight piracy along the east coast.

Last year, President Cyril Ramaphosa extended the operation for another year at a cost of R145-million without a single patrol taking place, says Walker. In March this year, Ramaphosa extended the operation again at a cost of R38-million.

“The strategic environment has since changed significantly, and maritime security should become its aim especially with the militants’ renewed successes. These patrols should have started already.”

An urgent extraordinary double troika summit was called for Wednesday and Thursday, 7 and 8 April, in the Mozambican capital of Maputo by the Southern African Development Community (SADC)’s Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation.

The summit was called by Botswana’s president, Mokgweetsi Masisi, who chairs the organ. Ramaphosa was set to attend the meeting with Zimbabwe, Malawi and Tanzania also represented.

“The SADC will have to take some firm decisions and cannot be seen as dependent only on private military companies to provide security in a situation which affects stability in the whole region,” said Walker.

“While [Mozambican President Filipe] Nyusi has not wanted to allow an intervention by either the African Union or SADC, the latter — with all its promises in the past of mobilising a standby or rapid deployment force in security situations like in Mozambique – faces an existential crisis if it cannot intervene now.

“The humanitarian tragedy and security catastrophe which is playing out in Cabo Delgado can reverberate for years as an indication of all of the countries in southern Africa’s inability to secure the region against extremist insurgencies.”

The former military officer believes it is too late now to worry about political sensitivities. Portugal has indicated its willingness to deploy forces to the country.

“Nyusi should accept the offer and ask for the maximum number of troops to deploy to Pemba as soon as possible. France, with its defence capability stationed in Mayotte, could assist with maritime patrols,” said Walker.

“The United States already has special forces training the Mozambican soldiers in Maputo. They should train these forces to operate in small teams. Mozambique should pay its armed forces better and regularly to ensure that they don’t change sides to the better-paying insurgents.

“South Africa and the rest of SADC can assist with the rapid training of further Mozambican units while the private military companies already contracted, can use the trained teams in Cabo Delgado. There is no time to waste anymore unless SADC wants to witness the total collapse of security in Mozambique.”

Housecarl · Apr 11, 2021

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Biden's New Security Reality

In the first few months of the Biden administration, America has seemingly sent a message internationally that the U.S. is no longer making its security a top priority, and not just at the southern border. The current migrant crisis, which has spi...

www.americanthinker.com

April 10, 2021
Biden's New Security Reality
By Julio Rivera

In the first few months of the Biden administration, America has seemingly sent a message internationally that the U.S. is no longer making its security a top priority, and not just at the southern border.

The current migrant crisis, which has spiraled into a human tragedy, was created by President Biden when he declared his intention to legalize as many as 11 million illegal Central American and Mexican residents of the U.S. in the wake of his victory in this past November’s election.

This incredibly dangerous messaging from Biden, along with the administration’s decision to cease border wall construction, played a part the 78,323 encounters between border patrol and migrants in the states of Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and California during the month of January. Not surprisingly, this was more than twice the 36,585 border patrol encounters reported in January of 2020, according to U.S. Customs and Border Protection.

Despite a media blackout, the truth about the situation is evident, and the cartels and human traffickers are well aware of America’s new attitude towards illegal immigration and are raking in the profits as they benefit from enabling human transport as well as activities related to illegal drug trafficking and other criminal activities.

Now we’ve seen detention centers that were built to house individuals awaiting their day in court date to determine their fate in the U.S. become filled well beyond capacity. But despite this, Department of Homeland Security Chief Alejandro Mayorkas claimed just weeks ago that there was no crisis at the border, while simultaneously acknowledging that the U.S. is on pace to encounter more illegals on the southern border than at any time in the last two decades.

Hearing Mayorkas deny the obvious, especially considering that he occupies a post that is so incredibly important to the safety of Americans, should certainly do more than just raise eyebrows, especially when considering that DHS also oversees one of America’s most vital security agencies, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA).

CISA is tasked with handling American cybersecurity and protecting our critical infrastructure, including America’s power grid. This is particularly concerning, consider that hackers from several countries including Russia and China are known to have already successfully compromised existing vulnerabilities in the energy grid.

Adding to these matters is the fact that CISA has thus far failed to reach its full operational capacity according to a recent report from the Government Accountability Office. The report showed that the agency is yet to implement the final phase of organizational changes that were outlined as part of the CISA Act of 2018.

The act created a new organization chart, infrastructure security points of contact and incident response centers, but as of mid-February of this year, over 50 planned tasks were yet to be completed.

Additionally, organizational changes at CISA are still expected to occur at the top, as President Trump appointment Brandon Wales, who was appointed to replace the fired former director, Cristopher Krebs, is merely seen as a placeholder for Joe Biden’s eventual nominee. This leaves the agency in a somewhat compromised position, with widescale incidents like the SolarWinds hack, recent attacks from the Chinese hacking group Hafnium that affected Microsoft’s Exchange Server software as well as Advanced Persistent Threat or APT attacks against Fortinet FortiOS, that have compromised a reported nine federal agencies in addition to countless private sector entities.

The state of denial regarding the border issue that the leader of the United States’ top federal executive department directly responsible for public security is currently in invites offensive acts of aggression from not only the cartel, human traffickers and terrorists, but also state-sponsored hacking groups looking to attack America via hacks against our critical infrastructure.

America has become a very different country than it was under President Trump just a few months ago. The new global reality sees an emboldened North Korea testing tactical guided missiles, while Iran and the international community discusses the lifting of Washington’s sanctions on the Iranian nuclear program. It didn’t take long for America’s enemies to start taking advantage of our domestic state of chaos.

Julio Rivera is a business and political strategist, the Editorial Director for Reactionary Times, and a political commentator and columnist. His writing, which is focused on cybersecurity and politics, has been published by websites including Newsmax, Townhall, American Thinker and BizPacReview.

Zagdid · Apr 11, 2021

Russian-made drones may be delivered to Armenia - Military & Defense - TASS

7 APR, 10:20
Russian-made drones may be delivered to Armenia
The Orion is a medium-altitude, long-duration unmanned aerial system with a maximum take-off weight of 1 tonne and a maximum payload weight of 200 kg

MOSCOW, April 7. /TASS/. The Federal Service for Military and Technical Cooperation does not rule out the possibility of delivering Russian-made unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to Armenia, Federal Service Spokeswoman Valeria Reshetnikova told TASS on Wednesday.

"As of today, we are offering a number of unmanned aerial vehicles for exports, in particular, the Orion-E reconnaissance system with a long-duration flight capability. In case of the corresponding requests from the Armenian side, we are ready to consider them in accordance with the established procedure," the spokeswoman said.

The Orion is a medium-altitude, long-duration unmanned aerial system with a maximum take-off weight of 1 tonne and a maximum payload weight of 200 kg.

According to the data of the state arms seller Rosoboronexport, today the drone is offered for exports as an air reconnaissance system. At the same time, Orion drones in their strike version are arriving for the Russian troops.

Housecarl · Apr 12, 2021

Posted for fair use.....

Building and Enabling Urban Resistance Networks In Small Countries - A Crucial Role For U.S. Special Forces In Great Power Competition | Small Wars Journal

During the last couple decades U.S. Special Forces have become champions of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations. However, with the recent changes of the global strategic landscape and the increasingly multipolar world they are required once again to adapt to emerging challenges...

smallwarsjournal.com

Sun, 04/11/2021 - 3:31pm

Building and Enabling Urban Resistance Networks In Small Countries - A Crucial Role For U.S. Special Forces In Great Power Competition
By Dr. Sandor Fabian

During the last couple decades U.S. Special Forces have become champions of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations. However, with the recent changes of the global strategic landscape and the increasingly multipolar world they are required once again to adapt to emerging challenges. While as many practitioners and scholars already argued the U.S. Special Forces must maintain all their hard-earned irregular warfare skills, they must also find new niche capabilities to effectively support the activities of the rest of the U.S. government during the competition. This article argues that one such capability is building urban resistance networks within allied and partner nations pre-conflict and enabling such networks during war.

The 2018 U.S. National Security Strategy and the NATO 2030 strategic concept document cemented what we have known since the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the recent Chinese activities in the South China Sea, the primacy of counterterrorism is a thing of the past and the world has returned to the era of great power competition. While many argue that this competition is not a new Cold War, others suggest that its characteristics are extremely similar since all sides` activities focus on securing influence, shaping conditions, deterring the other side, and building a more lethal force in case of armed conflict occurs. Another factor frequently cited by proponents of the era of new Cold War is the fact that the likelihood of armed confrontation between the competitors are extremely low and just like during the Cold War while we see some activities occurring directly against each other and on the soil of the competitors the majority of the competition and potential conflicts are (will be) done by proxies and occur within the territories of allied and partner states. This latter fact makes small countries` defense capabilities a priority for U.S. national security and a key factor regarding the potential outcome of the great power competition.

The U.S. military has started preparing for such competition and approaching this challenge through the recently developed “deter and defeat” strategic framework. This concept focuses on building a ready and lethal force to deter and if needed, defeat any military aggression either at home or around the globe. This is the general strategic framework that U.S. Special Forces must find ways to make themselves relevant and effective. Some argue that simply maintaining their competency in irregular warfare skills and sustaining their operations against non-state actors are themselves already crucial contributions since they allow the rest of the U.S. military to focus on the other elements of the great power competition. Others propose that U. S. Special Forces have much more to offer. They can gather critical information, impose costs on competitors, manage crisis response, conduct strategic raids, help to improve the capabilities of foreign militaries and develop and lead resistance networks in small countries in case of a foreign invasion and occupation. Let us explore this last task.

Emergence of resistance-based concepts
It has been long understood that given the substantial time-distance-force ratio advantage of their neighbors many U.S. allied and partner countries could defend themselves against great power aggression. This assertion has recently been confirmed several times through a series of wargames. One such simulation conducted for the Baltic scenario concluded that Russia could defeat and occupy the three Baltic states within less than 60 hours while another wargame in Poland found they would lose a conventional war against Russia within just 5 days. Simulations conducted in the East China Sea region where Taiwan was the subject of the aggression also showed catastrophic results. As a response to these findings small countries started to look at asymmetric defense solutions to strengthen their defense capabilities and to mitigate the conventional advantages of major powers. Small countries have come up with concepts in which their conventional military capabilities are augmented with civilian resilience and resistance efforts. Besides the fact that these concepts are based on civilian contribution they also capitalize on the defensive advantages of built-up areas since all of them are situated in urban areas. The point of these urban resistance concepts is to increase the cost of an armed attack to a potentially unacceptable level and with that effectively contribute to both deterring and if necessary defeating conventional military aggression. Such asymmetric approaches have already been introduced in the three Baltic states, the Scandinavian states, Poland, and Taiwan. Some scholars argue that these kinds of approaches might proliferate to other small countries threatened by Russia and China, and some even suggest that they might materialize in even more radical ways such as transforming the small countries` entire militaries into professional resistance forces. The strategic importance of small states in great power competition and the emergence and proliferation of resistance based national defense concepts present a unique opportunity for the U.S. special forces to make significant and effective contributions.

Although at least some elements of the U.S. Special Forces seem to have recognized the emerging pattern of resistance-based strategies and started investigating their potential role in supporting these approaches they still seem to be far away from fulfilling their potential. While for example, the U.S. Special Operations Command Europe (hereafter, U.S. SOCEUR) helped the Scandinavian countries, the Baltic States and Poland to develop a Resistance Operating Concept which seems to serve as a foundation for these countries` resistance activities, U.S. special forces have much more room to involve themselves into small countries` resistance activities both during the pre-conflict period and in war. To do that effectively they must consider several key factors regarding building and enabling such networks.

Why building resistance networks before, not during conflict
The idea of incorporating resistance networks and especially urban resistance networks into their national defense strategies did not come out of the blue for many countries. There are several major factors that influenced the introduction of these concepts. First, many countries, the Scandinavian and Baltic countries in particular, have a rich history of operating covert organizations in difficult physical terrain during foreign occupation and with that they have vast knowledge about the usefulness of such networks. Second, due to their participation in expeditionary counterinsurgency operations over the last two decades small countries` such as the Baltic states militaries experienced first-hand how ad hoc organized networks with off-the-shelf equipment in urban environments can challenge a numerically and technologically superior conventional force. While these factors indeed advise us about the potential usefulness of resistance networks utilizing difficult terrain and built-up areas in small states` defense strategy these same historical examples and current experiences must also lead to another major recognition. Recent conflicts such as Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria demonstrated that resistance networks organized in an ad hoc way during the conflicts could operate very effectively against the world's most advanced militaries. They did so without specific prior training in resistance operations, without purpose-built organizations, specifically prepared terrain, or custom-made equipment. So it is quite clear that if such resistance networks could be so effective than similar organizations created, specifically trained and equipped before conflict should be much more effective when it comes to fighting against foreign forces. Recent scholarly research supports this theory.

Continued.....

Housecarl · Apr 12, 2021

Continued.....

In his 2015 research article, titled “The Phoenix Effect of State Repression: Jewish Resistance During the Holocaust” Evgeny Finkel examines urban Jewish resistance groups in World War II Eastern Europe. Finkel finds that urban resistance networks possessing a specific prewar “toolkit” are more likely to operate successfully against overwhelming forces than those who lack such knowledge and experiences. According to Finkel such toolkit includes the ability to communicate securely, the ability to possess/acquire weapons covertly, the ability to create safe havens, the ability to conduct effective forging and the ability to identify and neutralize informers and infiltrators. Another recent study by Andrew Boutton and Thomas Dolan provides additional evidence of why resistance networks should be organized, equipped, and trained locally before the conflict occurs. In their 2021 research article, titled “Enemies in the Shadows: On the Origins and Survival of Clandestine Clients” Boutton and Dolan explores the characteristics of World War II French resistance networks. They find that resistance networks that were organized locally and later supported by coalition forces are more likely to be successful than those resistance networks that were organized during the conflict by foreign operatives inserted covertly into France. Boutton and Dolan suggest that operations security is one of the key elements of resistance networks survival and with that it is a necessary condition for their success. They argue that prewar local networks can be more proficient in security measures than those organized by foreign operatives during the war leading to higher success rate in case of the former. So what does this all mean for U.S. Special Forces.

Enabling resistance networks both before and during conflict
While maintaining their current engagement with small countries` military forces to help them sustain current capabilities and improve their conventional military skills and interoperability U.S. Special Forces should extend their cooperation with these countries` existing or developing civil resistance networks. During the pre-conflict period U.S. Special Forces should focus on helping local resistance networks create and master the “toolkit” they will need to effectively fight against a numerically and technologically superior enemy independently and also in support of a conventional coalition. The already existing regionally focused U.S. Special Forces units must develop a habitual relationship through training and exercising with the small states` resistance networks, build trust, mutual understanding, and common standing operating procedures pre-conflict to maximize the utility of these networks when it comes to actual armed confrontation. It is important that both the U.S. Special Forces (at all levels) and the resistance network members clearly understand their goals, capabilities, expectations, and limitations. However, the U.S. Special Forces are not ready yet to take on such a challenge without some significant adjustments in their training and changes in the way they currently operate. Although probably most green berets will argue that their unconventional warfare training already includes all the fundamental principles and tools that they would need to take on the proposed task there are some elements that are either missing or need to be altered to ensure maximum effectiveness. Here are some potential examples for consideration.

First, U.S. Special Forces training must go back to the basics in many aspects while also inventing new basics. Since almost all new resistance-based concepts are focusing on urban resistance U.S. Special Forces operators must become experts in all aspects of the urban operational environment. Skills like urban navigation, urban movement and maneuver, urban survival skills, weapons effects and limitations in built-up areas, communication opportunities and challenges in cities, and operating non-standard, civilian transportation platforms are just some examples that must become training priorities starting from the famous Special Forces basic training, the Qualification Course.

Second, U.S. Special Forces training must focus on skills necessary to effectively operate within a foreign society hidden in plain sight for an extended period of time. Special Forces operators need skills enabling them to effectively operate without their 21st century personal gadgets and without all the combat support and combat service support they have become accustomed to during recent decades. This requirement must also generate major adjustments in the development and fielding of new equipment and weapon systems. U.S. Special Forces need gear (both individual and collective) that is specifically designed for operations conducted in urban environments and in civilian clothes.

Third, U.S. Special Forces training must include elements that address how to extend existing resistance networks, how to recruit and wet new members, how to create and maintain urban safe havens and how to conduct tactical training for new members given the opportunities and challenges of built-up areas and how to do all this during an ongoing conflict in a foreign country.

Fourth, the enemy is no longer low-tech insurgents but professional military forces with peer or near-peer conventional and specialized capabilities. U.S. Special Forces must become intimately familiar with the capabilities and vulnerabilities of the weapon systems and major equipment of the potential enemies. Besides knowing how to exploit the features of the urban terrain to avoid the strengths of these systems it is also crucial that U.S. Special Forces members understand and master how to best attack and destroy these systems. Intimate knowledge of adversaries’ equipment, doctrine, formations, decision-making processes, leadership principles and operating procedures must become a focus area in the curriculum of Special Forces training at all levels.

Fifth, U.S. Special Forces must learn how to teach all these skills to part-time, half-civilian resistance members during both peace and conflict as well as how to enable the resistance networks to maximize their fighting capabilities during war. Finally, such changes in training, equipment and potentially in mindset should also generate some serious debates whether the U.S. Special Forces` sacred team organization is appropriate for such tasks. A deep analysis of the future urban operational environment, the small countries` defense concepts, the structures of the different resistance networks, and the capabilities and limitations of the competitors might even require some organizational adjustments.

Conclusion
The U.S. is and will be engaged in great power competition with peer and near-peer competitors for a long time. The outcome of such competition will largely depend on small countries and their defense capabilities. Recent developments and shifts in small countries` defense strategies suggest that urban resistance networks have become a major part of their defense establishments. This development has created an opportunity and arguably a need for U.S. Special Forces to go beyond their current contributions and provide even more meaningful support to the U.S. government's other efforts to succeed in great power competition. Accordingly, helping small countries building their urban resistance networks and enabling these networks in conflict should become a fundamental task for the U.S. Special Forces. This article argued that although there are some useful foundations for such tasks in the green berets’ unconventional warfare toolkit, successful 21st century urban resistance will require some major adjustments in mindset, tools and potentially even in structure. This analysis did not intend to provide a blueprint for such changes rather to serve as a fire starter for the much needed debate about what and how to change within the Special Operations community to remain strategically relevant and the tip of the spear.

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About the Author(s)

Sandor Fabian
Dr. Sandor Fabian is a former Hungarian Special Forces lieutenant colonel with more than twenty years of military experience. He is a graduate of the Miklos Zrinyi Hungarian National Defense University, holds a master’s degree in Defense Analysis (Irregular Warfare) from the US Naval Postgraduate School, has a graduate certificate in National Security and Intelligence Studies and a PhD in Security Studies from the University of Central Florida. Dr. Fabian is currently a research associate at the University of Central Florida and a curriculum developer and team leader at LEIDOS. Dr. Fabian is the author of the book titled “Irregular Warfare, The Future Military Strategy For Small States.” His research has appeared in Defence Studies, Defense & Security Analysis, the Special Operations Journal, the Combating Terrorism Exchange Journal, the Florida Political Chronicle, and the Hungarian Seregszemle Journal.

Housecarl · Apr 12, 2021

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Armed Overwatch: Airpower in Irregular Warfare—Past, Present and Future - Modern War Institute

Aviation has played an important role in irregular warfare, from its use by the British against rebellious tribesmen in Iraq and Transjordan in the interwar period to the era of […]

mwi.usma.edu

ARMED OVERWATCH: AIRPOWER IN IRREGULAR WARFARE—PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE
Andrew Milburn and Shawna Sinnott | 04.10.21

Aviation has played an important role in irregular warfare, from its use by the British against rebellious tribesmen in Iraq and Transjordan in the interwar period to the era of the unblinking eye and precision strike in Afghanistan.

Our guests discuss this evolution in the use of airpower to support ground forces, illustrating that although rapid advances in technology have brought to the point of near perfection the various procedures recently employed in Afghanistan and Iraq, the role of aviation in war—irregular or otherwise—has not significantly changed to this point. They then go on to explain, however, that with the transition to more distributed operations across the globe, it will no longer be possible to provide the level of responsive support to which the US military has become accustomed. The capabilities and inventory of current aviation platforms are ill suited for the task in hand. Instead, the US military must be prepared to take a step back from its pursuit of continuous technological improvement and look to platforms—manned or unmanned—that are more versatile and robust. But to do so, and thus successfully meet the challenges that lie ahead, will require a fundamental change in culture across the joint force—and a greater willingness to accept risk. The question that they ponder, from their unique perspectives, is whether the US military is capable of taking such a step, and if so, what doing so will entail.

Our guests today are both experts in their fields. One is a practitioner with decades of experience in the use of airpower—from the cockpit to the halls of the Pentagon. The other is an historian and academic, renowned for his expertise not only on the topic of airpower but also irregular warfare and special operations. Together they provide a substantive and highly informative dialogue on a topic that is at the pinnacle of current national security issues.

Retired Lieutenant General Thomas Trask transitioned from the Air Force in 2017 after thirty-three years of service, retiring as the vice commander of United States Special Operations Command. During his career Tom flew rescue and special operations helicopters, accumulating more than 3,200 hours and over fifty combat missions.

Dr. James Kiras teaches at the US Air Force’s School of Advanced Air and Space Studies. In addition to his knowledge of aviation history, his other areas of expertise include irregular warfare, international terrorism, and special operations, He is the author of Special Operations and Strategy: From World War II to the War on Terrorism.

The Irregular Warfare Podcast is produced by the Irregular Warfare Initiative, a collaboration between the Modern War Institute and Princeton University’s Empirical Studies of Conflict Project. You can listen to the full episode below, and you can find it and subscribe on Apple Podcasts, Stitcher, Spotify, TuneIn, or your favorite podcast app. And be sure to follow the Irregular Warfare Initiative on Twitter.

Housecarl · Apr 12, 2021

Hummm......

Posted for fair use.....

The Sahel: Europe’s Forever War?

www.eubulletin.com

The Sahel: Europe’s Forever War?
Written by @Eubulletin | Sunday, April 11th, 2021

The Sahel, a region south of the Sahara desert stretching from the Atlantic coast to Sudan, is experiencing its worst escalation in violence in ten years. The Sahel includes the five states of the ‘G5 Sahel’, a regional security grouping: Mali, Niger, Mauritania, Burkina Faso and Chad. When the instability began in 2012-13, the conflict was primarily in northern Mali, caused by an uprising of the Tuareg and jihadist groups. However, since 2015 there has been a rapid increase of intercommunal violence between ethnic groups in central Mali. This violence has spread in recent years to Burkina Faso and Niger, with jihadist groups taking advantage of inter-ethnic tensions to recruit new members. The Sahel is a strategic priority for Europe for three reasons. First of all, its location just below Algeria and Libya makes it relevant to the EU, which is seeking to limit migration flows from Africa. Many Europe-bound migrants travel through Niger and then towards the Mediterranean. Networks of smugglers have used the region’s porous borders to traffic migrants through Libya to cross the sea in boats.

Second, the presence of jihadist groups affiliated with al-Qaida and IS in the region is of great concern to Europe. France, in particular, is worried that these organisations could sponsor terrorism in Europe or attack French-owned uranium mines in Niger, which are crucial to France’s nuclear power programme. The French army has been heavily involved in counter-terrorism in Mali since the Tuareg and jihadist uprising in 2012, when it launched Opération Sérval. Sérval drove back the armed Islamist groups which had been gaining control over swathes of territory in Mali’s north and centre. In 2014, France launched Opération Barkhane, with a longer-term mandate to counter jihadist groups. French forces help troops from Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso and Chad – which make up the G5 Sahel’s Joint Force – to carry out counter-terrorism operations. The Joint Force, founded in 2014, brings together soldiers from the G5 states to deal with cross-border terrorist threats.

Third, the region is of wider importance to European security. The Sahel conflict is a rare example of Europe deploying not only significant resources but also political capital. The EU has been involved in development projects in the region for decades, but it had to re-direct this funding when fighting broke out in 2012. The EU now plays a role as a crisis manager in the region, with three Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions in Mali and Niger. The European Commission has adapted and boosted development funding so that it can be used for security-related purposes, and the EU has appointed a Special Representative to the Sahel, Ángel Losada, who co-ordinates diplomatic engagement with the region. As a result, Mali has been referred to as a “laboratory of experimentation” for the EU as a security actor. By investing so much energy and so many resources in the Sahel, the EU has given itself an opportunity to demonstrate its competence as a crisis manager to the rest of the world, and to prove it can manage instability in its own neighbourhood.

Europe is at a critical juncture in its engagement in the Sahel. Violence is at its worst since 2012, with nearly 6,500 people killed in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger in 2020 alone. As a result of rising intercommunal and Islamist violence, the number of internally displaced people has increased from less than 100,000 in 2018 to 1.5 million in 2020. At the same time, the region has undergone significant political upheaval. In August 2020, Mali’s government was overthrown by a military coup in the wake of mass protests against corruption and the government’s inability to stop violence in the centre of the country. Discontent with governing elites in outlying regions of northern Burkina Faso and southwestern Niger is growing, as intercommunal violence worsens in these countries. The head of the French external intelligence service, the General Directorate for External Security (DGSE), recently voiced concerns that jihadist activity could spread further south to the Gulf of Guinea.

Europe will always have strong interests in the security and stability of the Sahel region. Geographically it is part of Europe’s wider neighbourhood, and against a background of escalating violence in the region both the EU and its member-states are anxious to avoid a repeat of the refugee crisis of 2015. France’s strong focus on counter-terrorism will similarly keep it engaged in the Sahel for the foreseeable future. But what Europe gets back from this engagement depends on how it reshapes its strategy at this critical juncture. As the EU reviews its Sahel strategy, its future success as a crisis manager depends on it reordering priorities, so that it puts accountability and good governance ahead of building the capacity of the security forces.

Europe’s approach so far has done little towards achieving a lasting solution to the problem of insecurity. European strategies are designed to address migration flows and terrorism. But these problems are only the symptoms of deeper-rooted instability. As a consequence, Europeans are in danger of playing whack-a-mole with raids against jihadist groups, which will continue to return so long as intercommunal tensions and mistrust of government persist. France and the EU know that they need to engage with questions of governance, justice and accountability; their importance is now consistently mentioned in European strategies. But Europeans will be wary of articulating any substantive ideas for the political future of the region, or of making ambitious rhetorical commitments that are hard to implement. State-building in Afghanistan has shown few signs of success after 20 years of international efforts.

Rather than seeking to impose any top-down vision for the region, the best path for Europe is to engage with civil society and help build trust between governments and their citizens, so that a process of reconciliation can begin. The EU will need to impose strict conditionality on governments and security forces in the region, to ensure its interventions do not make the conflict worse. This approach could also force Europe to consider difficult compromises, such as whether to put a lower priority on migration in EU strategies, vis-à-vis the importance of good governance. But such shifts may be necessary in order to stop violence and eliminate the conditions that drive irregular migration and terrorism. While France, as the former colonial power, says it is reluctant to engage with the domestic politics of the Sahel, the EU is well placed to play such a role. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has maintained that engagement with civil society and greater focus on good governance will be central to the new EU-Africa strategy. Given that the EU already has a strong presence in the region, the Sahel would be an excellent place to set this new approach in motion.

A traditional argument for backing state security forces and strongmen in Africa is that they ‘get the job done’; they have the means to impose stability through force and ensure that violence does not spread across a region. But Europe’s track record in the Sahel suggests that a security- and state-centric approach has not only failed to stop a catastrophic escalation in the violence – 2020 was the deadliest year since the violence began in 2012 – but also has proved that backing regimes that commit atrocities against their civilians undermines stability. Abuses and corruption by governments are driving recruitment to jihadist groups, causing civil unrest and perpetuating the conflict. There is no contradiction in the Sahel between the EU’s interests in ending the conflict and its values such as democratic governance, accountability and the rule of law. Unless the EU lives up to these values, and does more to ensure that its regional partners do the same, conflicts will continue. The sooner Europeans realize this, the better.

‚The Sahel: Europe’s Forever War?‘ – Policy Brief by Katherine Pye – Centre for European Reform / CER.

Zagdid · Apr 13, 2021

Turkey’s cutting-edge Akıncı drone passes another test | Daily Sabah
Turkey’s cutting-edge Akıncı drone passes another test
APR 11, 2021 4:50 PM GMT+3

The third prototype of Turkey’s state-of-the-art unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV) Akıncı has successfully passed another test, the company’s official said Saturday.

Sharing the visuals of the latest tests on his Twitter account, Baykar Makina’s Chief Technology Officer (CTO) Selçuk Bayraktar said the prototype passed the Medium Altitude System Identification Test.

“Free and independent in our sky,” Bayraktar wrote.

The CTO in February said the company would soon begin mass production of the domestically made UCAV.

Akıncı is expected to enter the Turkish security forces’ inventory this year.

The drone can fly for 24 hours and has a service ceiling of 40,000 feet (12,192 meters), a 20-meter wingspan and the capacity to carry a load of 1,350 kilograms (2,976 pounds).

The Akıncı will be equipped with the locally-made active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar and air-to-air missiles Gökdoğan and Bozdoğan, and will be able to launch several types of locally made ammo, such as standoff missiles (SOM).

The drone’s second prototype last month successfully completed the Developed System Identification Test.

It had completed its first test flight in August at the Çorlu Airport Base Command, in northwestern Tekirdağ province.

News regarding the UCAV’s entry into the inventory, as well as its mass production, has been closely followed by defense enthusiasts both in Turkey and abroad, thanks to the local drone magnate’s proven success with other locally made drones like the Bayraktar TB2.

This particular drone earned worldwide fame after it was operated in Syria, Libya and Azerbaijan, paving the way for more export deals for Baykar.

Housecarl · Apr 14, 2021

Hummm.......

Posted for fair use......

Troops are Leaving Afghanistan. Can the U.S. Still Advise Afghan Security Forces?

The Biden administration has made the decision to extend the U.S. troop presence in Afghanistan past the May 1, 2021 deadline agreed to with the Taliban. However, all U.S. forces will be withdrawn by

www.realcleardefense.com

Troops are Leaving Afghanistan. Can the U.S. Still Advise Afghan Security Forces?

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By Alexander Powell & Jonathan Schroden
April 14, 2021

The Biden administration has made the decision to extend the U.S. troop presence in Afghanistan past the May 1, 2021 deadline agreed to with the Taliban. However, all U.S. forces will be withdrawn by September 11, 2021, bringing to a close America’s longest war. Yet as strong as the urge may be to move on, the U.S. still has a security interest in Afghanistan that it must safeguard. As stated repeatedly over the years, that interest is for Afghanistan to never again be a safe haven from which terrorists launch attacks against the United States or its allies. Relative to the future of U.S. policy on Afghanistan, securing this interest is typically associated with two options: leaving behind a residual counterterrorism force in perpetuity as an “insurance policy” against terrorist threats, or withdrawing forces and relying on the threat of future U.S. military action to deter the Taliban from breaking their commitments to prevent terrorist groups from using Afghanistan to conduct international attacks. With the Biden administration’s decision to withdraw by September irrespective of conditions on the ground, it would seem as though it is taking the latter course.

However, a third option exists. Since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in Afghanistan, U.S. forces there have shifted to a primarily virtual posture to advise Afghan security forces. Even prior to this, the United States was providing “fly-to-advise” support to some Afghan partner units. These experiences open the door to the possibility of conducting long-term, over-the-horizon advisory support without a sustained U.S. presence in Afghanistan. While this topic has been discussed in general terms, it has yet to be closely examined in the context of Afghanistan. Here we introduce and explore the concept of a remote advisory cell designed to help secure the primary U.S. security interest in Afghanistan.

In order to design such a cell, it is necessary to determine how it should be focused and what capabilities it needs. The primary U.S. security interest in Afghanistan is focused on al-Qaeda (and its regional affiliate in the Indian subcontinent) and the Islamic State-Khorasan. Despite years of persistent military pressure applied against these groups, they have proven resilient. As CNA found in a previous study, when counterterrorism pressure is removed from terrorist groups that are resilient, they will regroup and expand into areas of reduced pressure. Therefore, in recent years, the U.S. has sought to strike al-Qaeda and Islamic State targets in Afghanistan with its own forces and build and leverage capabilities within Afghan partner forces to do the same. If by the time U.S. forces fully withdraw from Afghanistan, the U.S. has not shifted to a stance of fully trusting the Taliban to secure its counterterrorism interests in Afghanistan, the Biden administration may want to maintain capabilities that are sufficient for Afghan security forces to generate adequate pressure on al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. The Afghan units best suited to do this are the Afghan Air Force and Afghan special operations forces (SOF). These elements have been partnered with U.S. units conducting counterterrorism operations as part of Operation Freedom's Sentinel since 2015 and Operation Enduring Freedom before that. As such, they represent the minimum viable capability for Afghan security forces to maintain the necessary level of military pressure on al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in Afghanistan.

Periodic reports on the capabilities of Afghanistan’s air force and SOF make clear that these units are operationally proficient. For example, in the 4th quarter of 2020, Afghan SOF conducted 94% of their operations independent of U.S. and coalition assistance. Their operational prowess notwithstanding, these units continue to struggle with the support capabilities necessary to enable success, including logistics, personnel management, and maintenance, as our prior independent assessments and more recent work has made clear. Thus, a remote advising cell would need to primarily focus on improving (or least preventing the failure of) these supporting functions while also maintaining an emphasis on operational aspects.

There are a number of ways to configure a remote advisory cell, but we will discuss three here. The first option would be a cell located outside of Afghanistan. Such a cell would consist of a group of advisers with open communications channels to the Afghan Air Force and Afghan SOF. These advisers would provide persistent, virtual advisory support to better enable these units to conduct counterterrorism operations but would never physically enter Afghanistan.

Subsumed within this option are two additional possibilities concerning the cell's location. The cell could be located somewhere in proximity to Afghanistan or located somewhere inside the continental United States. The benefits of the cell being in the region include minimizing the time difference between advisers and Afghan units and decreasing the number of distractions for the cell’s personnel. However, the quality of communications and connectivity may be reduced in this option. It may be harder to find high-quality volunteers with the right skillsets to persistently deploy to a forward location. Conversely, a cell located in the continental United States would likely have better, more reliable communications channels and access to a broader pool of volunteers, but it would have a substantial time difference from Afghanistan, and its members would have the normal distractions of daily home life.

The second option for a remote cell builds on the first. In addition to having a remote cell outside of Afghanistan to provide virtual advice to the Afghan Air Force and SOF, this cell would maintain the capability to conduct limited duration face-to-face engagements with these units’ personnel. These engagements could be structured in two different ways. First, cell members could conduct limited duration fly-to-advise missions into Afghanistan. These missions could be conducted by either military or non-uniformed personnel (civilians or contractors). This would better allow the cell to maintain personal relationships with the leaders of Afghan partner units and would enable the cell to conduct face-to-face training courses for, especially complex matters. Alternatively, the United States could sponsor Afghan Air Force and SOF visits to the cell’s location for limited training programs or conferences in “fly-to-be-advised” operations. The United States has enabled Afghans to attend training courses in the U.S. and other countries in the past (such as pilot training). Given the current needs of the force, one could imagine hosting logistics conferences, training on personnel systems or similar activities focused on sustainment of unit capabilities.

The third option for a remote advisory cell represents a significant departure from the first two. In the first two options, the United States would maintain control and oversight of the TAA cell since the U.S. military would run it. However, the United States could alternatively provide Afghanistan’s government with the funding necessary to staff and operate an advisory cell using contractors. The Afghan government would then manage its own contracts in this regard, finding a willing company with the requisite expertise to address the needs of the Afghan Air Force and SOF.

Aside from the specific benefits and detriments afforded by each option, one can imagine several overarching advantages and disadvantages of a remote advisory cell more broadly. Advantages include the potential for longer deployments (and thus the chance to develop longer, stronger relationships with relevant Afghan Air Force and SOF personnel), greater force protection for U.S. personnel, and the likelihood of reduced operating costs for the advisory cell as compared to the current situation in Afghanistan. Disadvantages include the burden of building relationships with minimal to no in-person interactions and a reduced ability on the part of the United States to exercise control over how the Afghan government uses the Afghan Air Force and SOF.

Regardless of the model chosen for a remote advisory cell, our analysis of the concept suggests that it should adhere to three common factors to best enable its success. First, it should be focused more on supporting capabilities than operational ones, in accordance with the needs of the Afghan Air Force and SOF. This should drive personnel requirements and associated skillsets needed to staff the advisory cell. Second, any remote advisory cell should be jointly and selectively manned. There are already several U.S. Air Force and Army units that have longstanding relationships with the Afghan Air Force and SOF, respectively. These connections should be maintained via the leadership and structure of the remote advisory cell. Third, the cell should be fully integrated as a single entity instead of having multiple advisory cells independently focused on advising their particular partner unit.

The choice to establish a remote advisory cell as just described would be a bilateral one between the U.S. and the government of Afghanistan, but it is nonetheless useful to consider how the Taliban might react to such a move. To do so, we engaged four experts on the Taliban to explore whether the group would object to a remote advisory cell's existence and, if so, under what pretext. Their collective insights revealed several pertinent findings. First, the United States should prepare for verbal pushback from the Taliban against the notion of a remote advisory cell, though whether or how this would affect Taliban offensive actions on the battlefield is hard to predict. Second, establishing a remote advisory cell would likely curtail any potential future U.S.-Taliban cooperation on counterterrorism matters, as it would send a clear signal that Afghan security forces remain the United States’ partner of choice. Third, if postured properly, a remote advisory cell could prove helpful in negotiations with the Taliban. For example, suppose the U.S. fully withdrew from Afghanistan before a comprehensive peace settlement is reached (as is stipulated in the U.S.-Taliban agreement). In that case, a remote advisory cell could help retain some leverage for the U.S. and the government of Afghanistan while negotiations continued. Conversely, if the United States fully withdrew its forces and did not maintain a remote advisory cell—and the situation in Afghanistan deteriorated—the creation of such a cell at that time could be an option to reinforce the Afghan Air Force and SOF short of sending U.S. troops back into Afghanistan.

In conclusion, al-Qaeda and the Islamic State remain present in Afghanistan, and the U.S. retains an enduring interest in keeping counterterrorism pressure on those groups. As long as the Taliban waver on their counterterrorism commitments, the Afghan Air Force and SOF are the United States’ chief and best options for conducting counterterrorism operations absent a U.S. troop presence on the ground. A remote advisory cell is a feasible option for maintaining security cooperation relationships with critical Afghan partner units, though it should adhere to the common features identified above to be as effective as possible. The Taliban, meanwhile, are unlikely to readily accept the establishment of a remote advisory cell, limiting the idea’s utility to specific circumstances. Even so, a remote advisory cell may have domestic political benefits given the increased force protection and likely reduced costs it would afford over the current U.S. footprint in Afghanistan.

Alexander Powell is a Research Analyst in the Countering Threats and Challenges Program at CNA Corporation, a non-profit, non-partisan research, and analysis organization based in Arlington, Virginia. He has worked extensively on security issues in Afghanistan, traveling there frequently to conduct assessments of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces. In 2017, Powell deployed with the Special Operations Joint Task Force-Afghanistan. He holds an M.A. in Security Studies from Georgetown University, where his thesis focused on foreign armed interventions in Afghanistan since the Anglo-Afghan Wars.

Dr. Jonathan Schroden directs the Countering Threats and Challenges Program at the CNA Corporation. His work at CNA has focused on counterterrorism and counter-insurgency activities across much of the Middle East and South Asia, including numerous deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan. You can find him on Twitter @jjschroden.

The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of CNA, the Department of the Navy, or the Department of Defense.

Housecarl · Apr 14, 2021

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China aims to weaponize space, says intel community report

The U.S. intelligence community is issuing a warning in its Global Risk Assessment.

www.defensenews.com

Congress
China aims to weaponize space, says intel community report

By: Joe Gould 8 hours ago

WASHINGTON ― China is working to weaponize space with an array of capabilities intended to target U.S. and allied satellites as part of its ambitious plans to displace the U.S. in space, the U.S. intelligence community warned in its new Global Risk Assessment report.

The Office of the Director of National Intelligence’s report says that China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army, plans to “match or exceed U.S. capabilities in space to gain the military, economic, and prestige benefits that Washington has accrued from space leadership.” Those counter-space operations will be “integral to potential military campaigns by the PLA.”

The broad-based report also highlights Russia’s space capabilities and overall calls China “the top threat” to U.S. technological competitiveness.

Asked about China’s nascent constellation of 138 commercial Earth observation satellites at a Senate Intelligence Committee hearing Wednesday, ODNI Director Avril Haines affirmed they were part of China’s challenge to American dominance. She declined to publicly discuss U.S. capabilities.

“I think there’s just no question, as a general matter, that China is focused on achieving leadership in space, in fact, as compared to the United States and has been working hard on a variety of different efforts in this area to try to contest what has been presumed our leadership,” Haines said.

Haines told lawmakers the administration is working to help the policy community understand it supports the new Space Force’s work to maintain American leadership in space and space’s benefits economically, in communications, intelligence and national security.

ULA head: Anti-satellite weapons require America keep its focus in space
Tory Bruno, CEO of the United Launch Alliance, believes growing anti-satellite capabilities from China and Russia is a sign the Air Force has to keep pushing forward with modernization in space.

By: Tory Bruno

The rare public disclosures come as champions of Space Force in Congress have said the government over-classifies information about the threats from space and that the American public needs to be better informed. House Armed Services Committee’s ranking member, Rep. Mike Rogers, R-Ala., is among them.

The intelligence community projects China will have an operational space station in low-Earth-orbit between 2022 and 2024, and will continue to conduct exploratory missions to the Moon aimed at establishing a robotic research station there and later an “intermittently crewed” base.

The report underscores the increased development and proliferation of counter-space weapons. In 2019, China’s space-focused Strategic Support Force reportedly began training with direct-ascent anti-satellite, or ASAT, missiles capable of targeting satellites in low-Earth orbit.

The report says Beijing has already fielded ground-based anti-satellite missiles meant to destroy satellites in low-earth orbit as well as ground-based anti-satellite lasers, “probably intended to blind or damage sensitive space-based optical sensors on” low-Earth-orbit satellites.

Russia and China are continuing to train their military space elements, and both are fielding new destructive and nondestructive anti-satellite weapons, the report says. Russia’s weapons include “jamming and cyberspace capabilities, directed energy weapons, on-orbit capabilities, and ground-based ASAT capabilities—to target US and allied satellites.”

The report projects that Russia, with its large network of reconnaissance, communications, and navigation satellites, “will remain a key space competitor.”

About this Author

About Joe Gould
Joe Gould is the Congress reporter for Defense News.

Housecarl · Apr 15, 2021

Taliban Promises 'Nightmare' For US Troops If They Stay Past May 1st

US to leave troops in Afghanistan beyond May, 9/11 new goal

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NATO allies to leave Afghanistan along with U.S.

Foreign troops under NATO command will withdraw from Afghanistan in coordination with a U.S. pull-out by Sept. 11, NATO allies agreed on Wednesday, pledging to mirror American plans to start removing troops on May 1 after two decades of war.

www.reuters.com

April 14, 20211:25 PM PDT
Asia Pacific
NATO allies to leave Afghanistan along with U.S.
Reuters, Sabine Siebold, Robin Emmott

Foreign troops under NATO command will withdraw from Afghanistan in coordination with a U.S. pull-out by Sept. 11, NATO allies agreed on Wednesday, pledging to mirror American plans to start removing troops on May 1 after two decades of war.

Around 7,000 non-U.S. forces from mainly NATO countries, also from Australia, New Zealand and Georgia, outnumber the 2,500 U.S. troops in Afghanistan, but still rely on American air support, planning and leadership for their training mission.

NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg, speaking alongside U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, said the decision was tough.

"This is not an easy decision, and it entails risks. As I said for many months, we face a dilemma. Because the alternative to leaving in an orderly fashion is to be prepared for a long-term, open-ended military commitment with potentially more NATO troops," Stoltenberg told a news conference.

U.S. President Joe Biden gave a speech on Wednesday in Washington announcing the U.S. withdrawal, saying that "it's time to end the forever war." read more

An integral part of NATO's current mission, Resolute Support, is to train and equip Afghan security forces fighting the Islamist Taliban, which was ousted from power by a U.S. invasion in 2001 and has since waged an insurgency.

With non-U.S. troop numbers reaching as high as 40,000 in 2008, Europe, Canada and Australia have moved in tandem with the United States in a mission also providing long-term funding to rebuild Afghanistan despite the resurgence of Taliban-led violence and endemic official corruption in the country.

"This is not the end of our relationship with Afghanistan but rather the start of a new chapter. NATO allies will continue to stand with the Afghan people but it is now for the Afghan people to build a sustainable peace that puts an end to violence," Stoltenberg said.

Germany and Bulgaria were two of the 36 countries involved in Resolute Support to immediate announce withdrawal plans. German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Biden discussed in a phone call the NATO military presence in Afghanistan and agreed to closely coordinate future steps, a German government spokesman said.

Sept. 11 is a highly symbolic date as it will be 20 years since al Qaeda attacked the United States with hijacked airliners, triggering military intervention in Afghanistan.

After withdrawing, the United States and NATO aim to rely on Afghan military and police forces, which they have developed with billions of dollars in funding, to maintain security, though peace talks are struggling and the insurgency is resilient.

A key reason for a coordinated withdrawal is the fact that NATO relies on U.S. airlift capabilities and shipping to move valuable equipment back home out of landlocked Afghanistan. NATO also wants to avoid any hardware falling into the hands of militants, as happened after the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq.

Housecarl · Apr 15, 2021

Hummm......

Posted for fair use.....

EXCLUSIVE India, Pakistan held secret talks to try to break Kashmir impasse

Top intelligence officers from India and Pakistan held secret talks in Dubai in January in a new effort to calm military tension over the disputed Himalayan region of Kashmir, people with close knowledge of the matter told Reuters in Delhi.

www.reuters.com

April 14, 20217:09 PM PDT
China
EXCLUSIVE India, Pakistan held secret talks to try to break Kashmir impasse

Sanjeev Miglani, Asif Shahzad

Ismail/File Photo

Top intelligence officers from India and Pakistan held secret talks in Dubai in January in a new effort to calm military tension over the disputed Himalayan region of Kashmir, people with close knowledge of the matter told Reuters in Delhi.

Ties between the nuclear-armed rivals have been on ice since a suicide bombing of an Indian military convoy in Kashmir in 2019 traced to Pakistan-based militants that led to India sending warplanes to Pakistan.

Later that year, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi withdrew Indian-ruled Kashmir's autonomy in order to tighten his grip over the territory, provoking outrage in Pakistan and the downgrading of diplomatic ties and suspension of bilateral trade.

But the two governments have re-opened a back channel of diplomacy aimed at a modest roadmap to normalising ties over the next several months, the people said.

Kashmir has long been a flashpoint between India and Pakistan, both of which claim all of the region but rule only in part.

Officials from India's Research and Analysis Wing, the external spy agency, and Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence travelled to Dubai for a meeting facilitated by the United Arab Emirates government, two people said.

The Indian foreign ministry did not respond to a request for comment. Pakistan's military, which controls the ISI, also did not respond.

But Ayesha Siddiqa, a top Pakistani defence analyst, said she believed Indian and Pakistan intelligence officials had been meeting for several months in third countries.

"I think there have been meetings in Thailand, in Dubai, in London between the highest level people," she said.

'IT IS FRAUGHT'
Such meetings have taken place in the past too, especially during times of crises but never been publicly acknowledged.

"There is a lot that can still go wrong, it is fraught," said one of the people in Delhi. "That is why nobody is talking it up in public, we don't even have a name for this, it's not a peace process. You can call it a re-engagement," one of them said.

Both countries have reasons to seek a rapprochement. India has been locked in a border stand-off with China since last year and does not want the military stretched on the Pakistan front.

China-ally Pakistan, mired in economic difficulties and on an IMF bailout programme, can ill-afford heightened tensions on the Kashmir border for a prolonged period, experts say. It also has to stabilise the Afghan border on its west as the United States withdraws.

"It’s better for India and Pakistan to talk than not talk, and even better that it should be done quietly than in a glare of publicity," said Myra MacDonald, a former Reuters journalist who has just published a book on India, Pakistan and war on the frontiers of Kashmir.

"...But I don't see it going very far beyond a basic management of tensions, possibly to tide both countries over a difficult period - Pakistan needs to address the fall-out of the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, while India has to confront a far more volatile situation on its disputed frontier with China."

DIALLING DOWN THE RHETORIC
Following the January meeting, India and Pakistan announced they would stop cross-border shooting along the Line of Control (LoC) dividing Kashmir which has left dozens of civilians dead and many others maimed. That ceasefire is holding, military officials in both countries said.

Both sides have also signalled plans to hold elections on their sides of Kashmir this year as part of efforts to bring normalcy to a region riven by decades of bloodshed.

The two have also agreed to dial down their rhetoric, the people Reuters spoke to said.

This would include Pakistan dropping its loud objections to Modi abrogating Kashmir's autonomy in August 2019, while Delhi in turn would refrain from blaming Pakistan for all violence on its side of the Line of Control.

These details have not been previously reported. India has long blamed Pakistan for the revolt in Kashmir, an allegation denied by Pakistan.

"There is a recognition there will be attacks inside Kashmir, there has been discussions as to how to deal with it and not let this effort derailed by the next attack," one of the people said.

There is as yet, however, no grand plan to resolve the 74-year-old Kashmir dispute. Rather both sides are trying to reduce tensions to pave the way for a broad engagement, all the people Reuters spoke to said.

“Pakistan is transiting from a geo-strategic domain to a geo-economic domain," Raoof Hasan, special assistant to Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan, told Reuters.

"Peace, both within and around with its neighbours, is a key constituent to facilitate that."

Housecarl · Apr 17, 2021

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Democrats reintroduce bill to block US from using nuclear weapons first

A pair of leading Democrats in the House and Senate reintroduced a bill Thursday to make it U.S. policy not to use nuclear weapons first in a military conflict.The bill from House Armed Services Co…

thehill.com

Democrats reintroduce bill to block US from using nuclear weapons first

By Rebecca Kheel - 04/15/21 04:17 PM EDT
121 Comments

A pair of leading Democrats in the House and Senate reintroduced a bill Thursday to make it U.S. policy not to use nuclear weapons first in a military conflict.

The bill from House Armed Services Committee Chairman Adam Smith (D-Wash.) and Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) simply says, “It is the policy of the United States to not use nuclear weapons first.”

“Threatening to use nuclear weapons first makes America less safe because it increases the chances of a miscalculation or an accident,” Warren said in a statement. “There are no winners in a nuclear war, and the US should never start one.”

It has long been the policy of the United States that the country reserves the right to launch a preemptive nuclear strike.

Smith and Warren previously introduced the bill in 2019, but it went to nowhere amid bipartisan concerns about a “no first use” policy.

Opponents of such a policy argue that taking the option off the table to use a nuclear weapon first could embolden adversaries and undermine the confidence of allies in the U.S. nuclear umbrella.

But the bill could find a more receptive audience in President Biden. Biden has not addressed the topic since he became president, but as vice president in 2017, he said he finds it “hard to envision a plausible scenario in which the first use of nuclear weapons by the United States would be necessary or make sense."

In an effort to build their case against a "no first use" policy should Biden move toward one, Republicans have been asking defense officials and nominees for their views on the issue at hearings.

At a House Armed Services Committee hearing Thursday, Gen. Tod Wolters, commander of U.S. European Command, told lawmakers that allies would have “mixed” reactions if the United States adopted a “no first use” policy “depending upon the ally’s awareness of the nuclear enterprise.”

“I currently support the U.S. position on not adhering to the nuclear no first use policy,” Wolters added under questioning from Rep. Scott DesJarlais (R-Tenn.).

In their news release Thursday, Smith and Warren argued their bill would improve U.S. national security by reducing the risk of a miscalculation, clarifying U.S. policy and preserving the ability to conduct a nuclear strike after a nuclear attack on the United States or its allies.

“The United States should never initiate a nuclear war,” Smith said in a statement. “This bill would strengthen deterrence while reducing the chance of nuclear use due to miscalculation or misunderstanding. Codifying that deterring nuclear use is the sole purpose of our nuclear arsenal strengthens U.S. national security and would renew U.S. leadership on nuclear nonproliferation and disbarment.”

Housecarl · Apr 17, 2021

Hummm.....

Posted for fair use.....

The nuclear bomb has become an Arab need

www.saudigazette.com.sa

The nuclear bomb has become an Arab need
April 16, 2021
Rami Al-Khalifa Al-Ali

IN his recent statement Prince Turki Al-Faisal, Saudi Arabia's former intelligence chief, stressed that “the leadership in Iran has become a real danger and all attempts over the past 40 years to rein it in have miserably failed."

"We do not harbor any hostility toward Iran nor do we want its people to suffer any harm. But we must strike a balance with it as any imbalance will be exploited by Iran,” he added.

Iran is also a danger because of its rebellious conduct for decades now and its endeavor to undermine the stability and security of its neighbors and fragment their societies. In this regard, the Iraqi experience gives us a model of the Iranian influence, its exploitation of Iraq’s resources, fueling sectarian divisions, and waging a war against the Iraqi state.

In his statements, Prince Turki Al-Faisal zeroed it on the real danger threatening the Arab world and the Arabian Gulf region in particular and that is specifically Iran. And this is at a time when Iran has not possessed a nuclear weapon, then what will happen when it actually possesses one.

At this point, observers can expect the arrogance and hegemony with which this rebellious regime will start dealing with other countries. The nuclear bombs would be looming over the heads of the people of the Arab countries, keeping them in a state of perpetual fear over the Iranian nuclear threat.

The Arab countries are now surrounded by nuclear countries starting with India up to Israel via Pakistan. There is a strong probability that the new member of the nuclear club will be Iran, as explained by Prince Turki Al-Faisal, as he very well knows the hidden secrets of the region. He is warning that “someday, Iran will own a nuclear bomb, especially under the unrevised nuclear agreement signed between Iran and the Western powers.”

Talks about an arms race in the Middle East and warnings against it have come far too late. For, since the end of the Iraqi-Iranian war, Iran has been working on igniting an arms race and setting the whole region on fire, in line with its extremist ideology, which wants to cause an implosion of societies from within.

Not only this, but it is supplying terrorist militias with strategic weapons, beginning with Hezbollah and ending with the Houthi militia. It has set up and is still establishing a militia in more than one Arab country.

What has aggravated the situation further is the struggle for influence among Iran, Israel, and Turkey at the expense of the Arab World. This has caused the Israeli danger to recede in the overall Arab mind, despite the fact that the Israeli danger had been lingering in the Arab mind as the greatest danger in the region for decades. But Israel continued to deal with others as a state, even if it was hostile and an occupier.

However, Iran and subsequently Turkey are dealing with others from the perspective of ideology and they always strive to create groups linked to them.

Within this sphere, the Iranian groups have built a wall preventing the return of the Arab countries occupied by Iran to exercise their roles as real states. Their current status can be likened to the banana republics, where the means for a decent life have collapsed. As to Turkey, Iran had already set a model for it to follow, so it kept finding its way in building its parallel influence in several Arab countries.

What is even worse is that the two countries have agreed to share the cake between them. As in Syria following the Astana Accords, to name a few. Were it not for Saudi Arabia and some of its sisterly Arab countries, which stood as a proud barrier in confronting the occupation schemes, Iran would have completed occupying all the four Arab capitals, as it brags. Egypt, Sudan, Libya, and even Tunisia would have been converted, due to the so-called Arab Spring, to regions under Turkish influence.

The dangers we have just mentioned are just the tip of the iceberg. They necessitate building an Arab defense capability. This is actually underway even though unannounced. Perhaps it is high time to build Arab nuclear knowhow and capability before the increasing nuclear danger in the whole region. According to my understanding, this has actually started. With regard to actual production, this will depend on the developments in the region in the near or distant future.

Housecarl · Apr 17, 2021

Posted for fair use.....

How the Saudis can fast-track a nuclear-weapons program - JNS.org

If I were them—and with Iran in mind—I would conclude that all the misbehavior that the Biden administration wants to punish me for would evaporate if I only had a nuclear-weapons program that I could use as leverage to extract whatever concessions I wish.

www.jns.org

Eric R. Mandel
How the Saudis can fast-track a nuclear-weapons program
If I were them—and with Iran in mind—I would conclude that all the misbehavior that the Biden administration wants to punish me for would evaporate if I only had a nuclear-weapons program that I could use as leverage to extract whatever concessions I wish.

(April 16, 2021 / JNS)

While the Biden administration offers sanctions relief to Tehran in exchange for temporarily limiting uranium enrichment to less than 20 percent, it is fulfilling another promise, to “recalibrate”—i.e., punish—longtime American ally Saudi Arabia. As the Saudis sustain Iranian-directed missile and drone attacks from Yemen and Iraq, the Biden administration chose to remove Patriot missile batteries from Saudi Arabia, as well as redeploy an aircraft carrier and surveillance systems away from the region. The clear message to Iran is: We will abandon our ally Saudi Arabia, your arch-enemy, if you will only rejoin the 2015 nuclear deal.

If I were the Saudis, I would conclude that all the misbehavior that the Biden administration wants to punish me for would evaporate if I only had a nuclear-weapons program that I could use as leverage to extract whatever concessions I wish from the Americans. I could do like the Iranians—threaten, intimidate and take over neighboring states—and be absolved if I would just slow down my nuclear-development program.

The Saudis might open their Rolodex and call Pakistan. According to the BBC, in 2013, “a senior NATO decision-maker … had seen intelligence reporting that nuclear weapons made in Pakistan on behalf of Saudi Arabia are now sitting ready for delivery.” This is the logical conclusion. The way we are headed, the Biden administration is about to start a nuclear arms race in the region with Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, among others learning the lessons of the Iranian nuclear agreement. The formula is to develop a secret nuclear program, lie about it, engage in disruptive behavior and then trade some of that for a nuclear deal in your favor or foreign aid.

Saudi Arabia is no angel. The stain of the Sept. 11 terror attacks and the country’s exporting radical Sunni Islamist ideology in the late 20th century has ramifications that we live with to this day. ISIS was the worst permutation yet of radical Sunni ideology. But after 9/11, the Saudis turned a page and began to align more closely with American interests. In the 21st century, they have been a moderating and stabilizing force in Sunni Islam.

Their support of the Abraham Accords, which allowed the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco to recognize Israel with diplomatic relations, is groundbreaking. Previous administrations did not even contemplate its possibility. If nurtured for regional stability, it is a path to suppress the Saudi need for a nuclear-weapons program. It also ended the fiction that the Israeli-Arab conflict needs to wait until the Israeli-Palestinian conflict ends. That is excellent news for those who believe Palestinian intransigence has been the roadblock to peace.

Instead of building on the game-changing Abraham Accords and pulling Saudi Arabia to the finish line by recognizing Israel, the Biden administration has chosen to make the Saudis a pariah, while begging the Iranian revolutionary regime to return to a deal that was created in their favor.

As a reminder, it was created to give Iran international legitimacy for an industrial-size nuclear program within the decade. Stipulated within the nuclear agreement is Iran’s ability to buy an unlimited number of conventional weapons right now. No wonder that Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei allowed his minions to sign it.

Like the Obama team, the Biden administration still believes that you can appease Iran by acquiescing in their nuclear blackmail. Obama’s policy was to distance the United States from its Gulf state allies and Israel while ingratiating his administration with the Iranians, who have never ceased undermining U.S. security interests worldwide. The only good to come out of this mistaken policy is the increased willingness of the Saudis and others in the region to be friendlier to Israel as the only nation willing to take on the Iranians. This has been especially evident as Israel continues to impede Iran’s progress towards a nuclear weapon, most recently with its alleged attack this week on the Natanz enrichment facility.

Kowtowing to a third-rate military that supports terror sends a poor message to American allies around the world. The administration seems intent on settling for merely slowing down Iran’s quest for nuclear weapons while ignoring and, in effect, funding with sanctions relief the Islamic Republic’s decades-long worldwide campaign of terrorism. The false hope offered to the American people that the administration will be able to negotiate a new agreement dealing with Tehran’s malign activities after the resumption of a deal would be laughable if it were not so dangerous.

Hopefully, the administration will reflect on the potential consequences of its actions and change course to avoid turning the Middle East into a nuclear Wild West. The Saudis and the rest of the Sunni Muslim world are watching.

Dr. Eric R. Mandel is the director of MEPIN, the Middle East Political Information Network. He regularly briefs members of the U.S. Senate, House and their foreign-policy advisers. He is a columnist for “The Jerusalem Post” and a contributor to i24TV, “The Hill,” JTA and “The Forward.”

Housecarl · Apr 17, 2021

With what's going on now, does anyone really think this will stop anything?

Posted for fair use.....

US lawmakers introduce bill to stop Saudi Arabia from obtaining nuclear weapons

Measure would stop 'most US arms sales' to the kingdom if it receives help in building nuclear facilities that do not meet IAEA standards

www.middleeasteye.net

US lawmakers introduce bill to stop Saudi Arabia from obtaining nuclear weapons

Measure would stop 'most US arms sales' to the kingdom if it receives help in building nuclear facilities that do not meet IAEA standards

MEE staff in Washington

Published date: 16 April 2021 17:15 UTC | Last update: 12 hours 37 mins ago

A group of US lawmakers have introduced legislation that seeks to stop the possibility of Saudi Arabia obtaining a nuclear weapon, after reports surfaced last year that China had secretly assisted Riyadh to expand its nuclear programme.

The bill, titled, The Saudi WMD Act, aims to "take steps to impede access to sensitive technologies that could pave the way to Saudi Arabia acquiring a nuclear weapon", according to a press release announcing the legislation on Thursday.

It was introduced in the Senate by senators Ed Markey and Jeff Merkley, and introduced in the House of Representatives by congressmen Ted Lieu and Joaquin Castro.

"Nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorists and rogue regimes is one of the gravest threats to the security of the American people and to our partners around the world," Merkley said in a statement.

Saudi Arabia constructs facility for extracting uranium yellowcake: Report
Read More »

"If Saudi Arabia is working to undermine the global nonproliferation and arms control regime, with the help of China or anybody else, the US must respond."

Markey said the bill "requires greater transparency into Saudi Arabia's efforts to build out a ballistic missile and civilian nuclear program".

If passed, the measure would require the Biden administration to determine whether any foreign person or country has transferred or exported to Saudi Arabia a Category One item under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), an informal political understanding that aims to limit the amount of missile proliferation worldwide.

A Category One item would include unmanned aerial vehicle systems such as ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and target drones that are capable of delivering a payload of at least 500kg to a range of at least 300km.

If such an entity is found, the bill would require the White House to sanction them.

The bill would also terminate "most US arms sales to Saudi Arabia", if it was found that the kingdom received help in building a nuclear fuel cycle facility not under the standards set by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Saudi Arabia has not signed up to the same restrictions to nuclear proliferation that other countries have, and the country only has a limited safeguards agreement with the IAEA.

Saudi nuclear projects
For years, Saudi Arabia has been trying to diversify its energy pool so that it can export more of its oil, rather than selling it domestically at subsidised prices.

Riyadh inked deals with Beijing in 2012 and 2017 for cooperation on a number of nuclear energy projects, and the kingdom has been working on its first two commercial nuclear reactors that will total 2.8 gigawatts.

The increasing nuclear partnerships between the two countries have been a cause of concern for the US. And last August, American intelligence agencies had been assessing reports that China is secretly helping Saudi Arabia expand its nuclear programme.

The agencies analysed suspected collaboration between the two countries at an undeclared site in the kingdom, close to a solar-panel production area.

The Wall Street Journal also reported last summer that another undisclosed site in the country's northwest was being used to extract uranium yellowcake from uranium ore - a further step towards the development of nuclear fuel that could put the kingdom on a path to developing nuclear weapons.

A month later, The Guardian reported that Saudi Arabia likely has enough mineable uranium ore reserves to pave the way for the domestic production of nuclear fuel, citing a confidential report by Chinese geologists.

In 2018, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman said that the country has no plans to pursue a nuclear bomb, but if Iran were to develop one, then it would follow suit "as soon as possible".
Under the previous Donald Trump administration, the US had given several authorisations to American companies to share sensitive nuclear power information.

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