WAR 03-20-2021-to-03-26-2021___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

[Housecarl]

(461) 02-27-2021-to-03-05-2021___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****
WAR - 02-27-2021-to-03-05-2021___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

(462) 03-06-2021-to-03-12-2021___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****
WAR - 03-06-2021-to-03-12-2021___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

(463) 03-13-2021-to-03-19-2021___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

--------------------------------------------------

This was posted on by Jward in the prior thread. Now being reported in the MSM in CONUS.......

Posted for fair use.....

Gunmen kill 13 police in ambush in central Mexico

Gunmen apparently from a drug gang ambushed a police convoy Thursday in central Mexico. killing eight state police officers and five prosecution investigators in a hail of gunfire, authorities said…

www.kron4.com

Gunmen kill 13 police in ambush in central Mexico

World


by: The Associated Press
Posted: Mar 20, 2021 / 10:42 AM PDT / Updated: Mar 20, 2021 / 10:43 AM PDT


MEXICO CITY (AP) — Gunmen apparently from a drug gang ambushed a police convoy Thursday in central Mexico, killing eight state police officers and five prosecution investigators in a hail of gunfire, authorities said.

The massacre of the 13 law enforcement officers in the State of Mexico was the country’s single biggest slaying of law enforcement since October 2019, when cartel gunmen ambushed and killed 14 state police officers in the neighboring state of Michoacan.

The Thursday ambush sparked a huge search for the killers in a rural, gang-plagued area southwest of Mexico City, which is surrounded on three sides by Mexico State. The dead law enforcement officers worked for the state.

While Mexico State contains suburbs of the capital, it also includes lawless mountain and scrub lands like the one where the attack occurred.

Rodrigo Martínez Celis, the head of the state Public Safety Department, said soldiers, marines and National Guard troops were combing the area by land and from the air looking for the killers.

“The convoy was carrying out patrols in the region, precisely to fight the criminal groups that operate in the area,” Martínez Celis said. “This aggression is an attack on the Mexican government.

“We will respond with all force,” he added.

There was no immediate indication as to what gang or cartel the gunmen might have belonged to. Several operate in the area around Coatepec Harinas, where the attack occurred.

The town is near a hot springs resort known as Ixtapan de la Sal, which is popular among Mexico City residents as a weekend getaway. But it also relatively close to cities like Taxco, where authorities have reported activities by the Guerreros Unidos gang apparently allied with the Jalisco cartel and by the Arcelia gang, dominated by the Familia Michoacán crime organization.

The attack appears to present a challenge for President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, who has pursued a strategy of not directly confronting drug cartels in an effort to avoid violence.

Trademark and Copyright 2021 The Associated Press. All rights reserved.

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use.....

Turkey-Pakistan Increasing Defense Ties: West And Indian Rant About Nuclear Proliferation – OpEd

The 15th meeting of the Turkey-Pakistan ‘High-Level Military Dialogue Group’ (HLMDG) was held in Ankara, Turkey from 22-23rd December 2020. The group is referred to as the biggest institutional set…

www.eurasiareview.com

Turkey-Pakistan Increasing Defense Ties: West And Indian Rant About Nuclear Proliferation – OpEd

March 20, 2021 Haris Bilal Malik* 0 Comments

By Haris Bilal Malik*

The 15th meeting of the Turkey-Pakistan ‘High-Level Military Dialogue Group’ (HLMDG) was held in Ankara, Turkey from 22-23rd December 2020. The group is referred to as the biggest institutional setup between the two countries that has the mandate to make policies and plans of actions to enhance the defence ties between both countries. The key areas for military cooperation that have been discussed during the meeting hold immense significance in view of the enhanced cooperation between the two countries. These include mutual cooperation in; military training, education, counter-terrorism, and prospects of joint production and procurement in the defence industry.

Both the countries have openly supported each other on matters related to the prevalent regional security environment in the Middle East, South Asia, and Afghanistan. On the other hand, there have been widespread insinuations and hype in the Western countries and India that both Turkey and Pakistan are cooperating with each other on nuclear weapons. Specifically, Pakistan has been accused of sharing nuclear and missile technologies with Turkey.

Both the West and India are involved in disseminating news that the popular Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan desperately wants to have nuclear weapons capability. Based on such dynamics, analysts around the world would remain highly curious about the matter. Particularly, considering how the West and India have been propagating it in the larger part of the screenplay of sharing nuclear weapons capability. The recent meeting has nevertheless created considerable hype in both the Western and the Indian media. India has been spreading propaganda against the backdrop of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile technologies. In this regard, India has alleged Pakistan of agreeing to provide support and the recent meeting was in-line to discuss the technical aspects of the transfer of nuclear technology. This was all based on insinuations rather than any undeniable evidence. Though Pakistan’s delegation visited various Turkish defence companies and has met with the officials to discuss prospects of defence cooperation, this does not mean that the visit was intended to discuss the transfer of nuclear cooperation.

If we go back to history, in the ’70s and ‘80s when Pakistan was left with no choice but to develop a nuclear capability given the existential security threats from India. This quest was referred to as the ‘Islamic Bomb’ by both the West and India. The rationale behind this whole rhetoric was that nuclear capability which is to be acquired by Pakistan (an Islamic country) would ultimately be the weapon of the whole Islamic world as a shared asset. The propaganda went to an extent that the nuclear capability of Pakistan was termed as a ‘nuclear sword’ which would be used to wage ‘jihad’ against the west and India.

This whole conspiracy theory was further augmented in the pretexts of nuclear proliferation, globalization, and the resurgence of Islam. Such conspiracies were more inclined towards creating a fearful idea that would be applied to the nuclear policies of any Muslim state. In this regard, Pakistan’s nuclear capability that is purely defensive in principle was generalized as a much-hyped phenomenon that would encompass the whole Muslim world in between the South Asian region, Middle East, and North Africa. Ever since that, the term has been ironically used to create fear in the world by linking Islamic states, the militant groups, and all the proliferation networks in the world in just one frame.

In the same vein, since many terms have already been linked with the Islamic world, this specific Indo-West originated term of Islamic bomb now in the form of Turkey-Pakistan nuclear cooperation is more about the ‘Islam phobia’ that has spread across the globe rather than deliberating on how and why the nuclear technology has spread. Representing the same aggressive and jingoistic approach, both India and the West are involved in anti-Islam posturing. In fact, their recent attempt to build an international narrative against Pakistan and Turkey, there appears to be nothing new at all.


Inspired by such notions and in a typical fashion, the recent meeting of high military officials of Turkey and Pakistan Turkey is insinuated as ‘nuclear weapon cooperation’. No evidence would support this baseless allegation. How come a formal meeting between the delegates of both countries provides evidence of nuclear collaboration between them? At the same time, it has been reported that the meeting also involved discussion on cooperation in the field of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). As part of getting the benefit of their enhanced strategic ties, both countries have the right to cooperate in emergent defence technologies like the UAVs. This has nothing to do with the transfer of nuclear technology between the two countries. Linking all with this nuclear weapons proliferation would not justify the western and Indian propaganda. The Western and Indian thinkers just wasted a little time in blaming Pakistan for sharing nuclear weapons capability with Turkey. Furthermore, it appears to be in-line with the grave western and Indian agenda to sabotage the ever-increasing and enhanced strategic relations of both countries.

This further supports the discriminatory approach of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime as well which has given India a free hand for nuclear trade. The fact remains that the NSG was formed in response to the Indian so-called peaceful nuclear explosion of 1974 that paved the way for the nuclearization of the South Asian region later on. Since then, Pakistan has been accused of nuclear proliferation and the recent allegations of helping Turkey to develop its nuclear weapons are nothing new for Pakistan. Nonetheless, India remains the biggest proliferator of nuclear weapons in the region, while Pakistan’s nuclear capability is purely in response to the Indian threats.

Hence, it is quite apparent that the west and India are quite uncomfortable with the enhanced strategic ties of Turkey and Pakistan. Since both the countries are Islamic, being in an unbreakable bond, they have been cooperating with each other on matters of mutual interest over the years. Both the west and India have found nothing in it so unfortunately, they intend to blame both the countries for nuclear weapons proliferation. This is further evident from the deliberations in western and India as; if Turkey does not get nuclear weapons from Pakistan, at the least, it could learn from Pakistan how to acquire nuclear weapons. By such deliberations, it appears quite comprehensible that both the west and India are desperate to accuse Turkey and Pakistan of nuclear proliferation at any cost. In this regard, both countries need to remain vigilant of the widespread western and Indiana propaganda.

*The author currently works as a Research Associate at the Strategic Vision Institute (SVI) in Islamabad, Pakistan. He tweets @HarisMalik00

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use.....

U.S. Needs to Be Prepared for Increasing Nuclear Threats to Homeland

In a hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, General Glen VanHerck, the commander of U.S. Northern Command, brought some necessary attention to the growing nuclear threats to the U.S. homeland.

www.heritage.org

U.S. Needs to Be Prepared for Increasing Nuclear Threats to Homeland

Mar 19th, 2021 4 min read

Commentary By
Patty-Jane Geller
Policy Analyst, Nuclear Deterrence and Missile Defense

Elizabeth May
Spring 2021 member of the Young Leaders Program at The Heritage Foundation

Key Takeaways
To match a more assertive nuclear doctrine, Russia is undertaking a massive nuclear modernization effort.

North Korea also has an active nuclear weapons program.

Iran is steadily increasing its potential to eventually assemble an ICBM that could hold the continental United States at risk.


In a hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, General Glen VanHerck, the commander of U.S. Northern Command, brought some necessary attention to the growing nuclear threats to the U.S. homeland.
Russia was at the top of his concerns. To match a more assertive nuclear doctrine, Russia is undertaking a massive nuclear modernization effort. This includes a first-of-its kind heavy intercontinental ballistic missile that can carry a hypersonic glide vehicle that is able to evade U.S. early warning systems.

VanHerck also highlighted Russia’s entirely new capabilities under development, including a nuclear torpedo and a nuclear-powered cruise missile, which could have unlimited range.

China, once hoped to rise peacefully, has also been rapidly advancing its ability to reach the U.S. homeland with a nuclear weapon. It has deployed several road-mobile ICBMs and ballistic missile submarines, and, according to VanHerck, will eventually deploy advanced hypersonic weapons.

Admiral Charles Richard, commander of U.S. Strategic Command, has already warned us that China is on track to become a nuclear peer to the U.S. by the end of the decade.

And, of course, we can’t forget about North Korea and Iran.

Despite longstanding doubts about the rogue nation’s abilities, North Korea has made significant strides with its ballistic missile arsenal. Since 2017, North Korea developed three ICBMs that could target the U.S. homeland and recently paraded a new ICBM that could be even more powerful.

North Korea also has an active nuclear weapons program. It’s worth contrasting this with the state of the U.S.’s nuclear infrastructure, which—after being allowed to atrophy for years—is incapable of building a nuclear weapon.

And then there’s Iran, which continues to invest in missile and space technologies. Iran is steadily increasing its potential to eventually assemble an ICBM that could hold the continental United States at risk.

To address these threats, VanHerck homed in on missile defense, which provides the capability to deter an adversary by denying their ability to harm the U.S. That means that if an adversary sees the U.S. has a capability to stop a successful attack by shooting down a missile, an adversary will be less emboldened to press the launch button.

The first step to a strong missile defense is a good network of sensors and radars able to see the incoming threat. When discussing the growing cruise missile threat posed by Russia and China, VanHerck remarked, “We don’t want to be in a situation … where end game defeat is our only option.”

He’s right on the money with this. Defeating advanced missiles must start with improving sensors. After all, seeing the threat is a prerequisite to being able to shoot it down.

One improvement the U.S. is making in this area is the development of the Long Range Discrimination Radar program in Alaska, which will improve the ability to track incoming missiles headed toward the homeland. Last year, Congress also provided funding for a radar to be built in Hawaii to further expand radar coverage.

And of course, the U.S. needs to be able to intercept incoming missiles. Currently, the U.S. deploys 44 ground-based interceptors capable of defending against a limited ballistic-missile attack. Fielded in 2004, these interceptors are currently undergoing repairs and upgrades to ensure they will last through the end of the decade, but will ultimately need to be replaced by the upcoming Next-Generation Interceptor program. The next-generation interceptors will bolster the size, reliability, and capability of today’s interceptors, and is absolutely crucial to being able to defend against increasing threats from North Korea and Iran.

After over a year of delay in the contract award for the Next Generation Interceptor, it currently awaits approval on the desk of Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks.

In a response to a question from Sen. Deb Fischer, R-Neb., VanHerck was clear about the importance of moving forward with the Next Generation Interceptor: “It gives us extra capacity to go against threats that … could exceed our current [ground-based interceptor] inventory and … will give us capability because the threat continues to advance their capabilities.”

The deputy secretary’s decision to approve the Next-Generation Interceptor program will surely be an easy one.
VanHerck’s testimony gives a useful reminder that missile defense must be a top priority. Threats to the U.S. homeland are clearly becoming increasingly challenging, and in turn, so is the task of fulfilling the United States’ moral obligation to protect its citizens from attack. To realize this reality, the onus is on the Biden administration and Congress to ensure this critical priority receives the attention and funding that it deserves.

This piece originally appeared in The Daily Signal

 

[Housecarl]

Well here's some potential good news.......

Posted for fair use.....

Saudi Arabia Confirms Mediating Between India & Pakistan To Reduce Tensions

Saudi Arabia is trying to reduce tensions between India and Pakistan, Deputy Foreign minister of the Gulf nation, Adel al-Jubeir, said in a television interview recently.

eurasiantimes.com

Saudi Arabia Confirms Mediating Between India & Pakistan To Reduce Tensions


By Mansij Asthana

March 20, 2021
Saudi Arabia is trying to reduce tensions between India and Pakistan, Deputy Foreign minister of the Gulf nation, Adel al-Jubeir, said in a television interview recently.

The two South Asian neighbors have been at loggerheads over the Kashmir issue and fought three major wars since their independence.

Over the years, Indian and Pakistani security forces had exchanged fire almost regularly at the Line of Actual Control, the de facto border that divides the Kashmir region between the two nations.

Moreover, the relations between the two have further deteriorated after New Delhi abrogated Article 370 of the Indian Constitution stripping the India-administered Jammu and Kashmir of its special status in 2019.

Last month, Indian and Pakistani armies finally announced that they would maintain a complete ceasefire along the LoC as per their 2003 agreement, but troubles between the two are far from over.

Saudi Arabia, which has close ties with both New Delhi and Islamabad, has admitted it is trying to make peace between the nuclear-armed neighbors.

The Saudi Deputy Foreign Minister said the Kingdom wishes to bring peace in the entire region and is involved in working closely at many levels to reach the goal.

“We work to stabilize the region — whether it’s trying to bring peace between Israelis and Palestinians; whether it’s in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan; trying to reduce tensions between India and Pakistan; whether it’s stabilizing Sudan; whether it’s working to end the war in Libya or to deal with the G5 (Sahel) countries, in their fight against Boko Haram. We have played a positive role everywhere,” al-Jubeir said during the interview.

According to earlier reports, Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin-Salman had played a role in securing the release of Indian Air Force (IAF) pilot Wing Commander Abhinandan, who had been captured by Pakistani troops during the 2019 conflict.

 

[Housecarl]

Hummm.........

Posted for fair use.....

Sahel Coalition adopts road map to combat terrorism - Dailynewsegypt

Road map aims to strengthen military capabilities of national armies and joint force of Sahel Coalition

dailynewsegypt.com

Sahel Coalition adopts road map to combat terrorism

Road map aims to strengthen military capabilities of national armies and joint force of Sahel Coalition

Sami Hegazi 5 mins ago

The Coalition for the Sahel has adopted a special road map to combat terrorism in the five Sahel states, namely Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad.

The second ministerial meeting of the Coalition for the Sahel took place virtually on Friday, and was attended by Ambassador Hamdy Sanad Loza, Egypt’s Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs for African Affairs.

The road map, which was discussed during the meeting, aims at combating terrorism by strengthening the military capabilities of national armies and the joint force, and strengthening the presence of state agencies on all their territories.

In his speech, the Ambassador Loza stressed Egypt’s continued support for the Sahel region countries at the bilateral level and in regional frameworks.

He said that Egypt was keen to include the issues of the Sahel countries within a special session of the Aswan Forum, which was held between 1-5 March this year.

The Ambassador also said that the conclusions and recommendations of this session will be delivered to the Coalition secretariat in the coming days.

 

[danielboon]

Putin's message to Biden: Tu-22M3 strategic bombers take off in anti-drilling exercise ...
March 20, 2021 - 23:10

 

[Ractivist]

China, once hoped to rise peacefully.........geez

 

[jward]

The Future of U.S.-Russian Arms Control: Principles of Engagement and New Approaches
March 12, 2021
Download the Report


As one of its first decisions regarding security policy, the Biden administration agreed to extend the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) for five years with no conditions. New START represents one of the last remaining vestiges of international arms control architecture and one of the few areas of potentially productive U.S.-Russian dialogue in an otherwise toxic, distrustful bilateral relationship. Yet the security environment has drastically changed since New START was negotiated in 2010. The treaty covers only a part of the “security equation” wherein missile defense, new weapons systems, space-based assets, and advanced technologies are not subject to formal arms control agreements. Both Moscow and Washington—though to different extents—have grounds to be concerned about the nuclear capabilities of third countries that are not party to existing arms control arrangements.

Against this backdrop, how can we begin to reframe the U.S.-Russian arms control dialogue for the future? Where should the negotiation or discussion start: with new capabilities or rebuilding some semblance of trust through greater transparency measures? Should principles be reaffirmed and developed in multilateral forums rather than through formal treaties? What can realistically be accomplished during the five-year extension period? These questions provided the backdrop to a U.S.-Russian Track 2 Strategic Stability Dialogue held over four, in-depth conversations in November and December 2020, hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Moscow-based PIR Center. This bilateral and bipartisan dialogue was unique in featuring a wide range of views on arms control on both the U.S. and Russian sides. In doing so, the organizers sought to build the groundwork for an approach to arms control talks that would withstand political fluctuations in both countries.

U.S. and Russian dialogue participants disagreed between and among themselves on how best to reframe arms control in the twenty-first century, but all agreed on the benefits of cooperative efforts to manage nuclear risks. Although successful arms control negotiations have occurred between Washington and Moscow during equally tense bilateral moments, this juncture feels especially fraught. The Track 2 dialogue centered on developing a roadmap for arms control talks that simultaneously addresses both parties’ deep-seated concerns and an evolving strategic environment. Elements of this roadmap have been well-surveyed, and significant roadblocks well-known; other elements will require exploring and mapping new principles, concluding new treaties, or creating a web of interlinking agreements. But before this process can begin, both Russia and the United States must reaffirm the necessity of arms control, as the language concerning doctrinal thresholds for nuclear use has become casual and ambiguous.

U.S. and Russian dialogue participants disagreed between and among themselves on how best to reframe arms control in the twenty-first century, but all agreed on the benefits of cooperative efforts to manage nuclear risks.

The Road That Must Be Traveled
It is with this renewed urgency and opportunity in mind that participants outlined several principles for productive engagement:

• Begin talks early. Both Russian and U.S. participants were critical of the Trump administration’s delay in initiating a conversation with Russia on arms control, with the discussion on extending New START only beginning in earnest in spring 2019. The delayed talks were further bogged down by extraneous U.S. requests, such as engaging with China on a trilateral basis and seeking a temporary freeze on all nuclear weapons. These delays inevitably ran into the U.S. presidential election calendar. Although it appeared that the Russian government was prepared to agree to a limited extension accompanied by a temporary nuclear freeze, the talks stalled over a U.S. demand that the extension be accompanied by more intrusive verification measures, which Russia was not ready to accept. Ultimately, the decision regarding extension was left until the last two weeks before the treaty was set to expire in February 2021. Although New START was extended for another five years, participants pointed to the need to begin new arms control talks immediately, as the negotiating calendar will again be subject to the political calendar.
• Signal buy-in to the negotiating process. Some participants believed that the Trump administration approached negotiations with the assumption that Russia needed arms control more than the United States did and that Moscow would therefore be ready to make concessions in order to achieve an extension. Valid or not, building the next generation of arms control architecture will require a shared belief in the value of arms control. This means equal buy-in to the negotiating process and creative approaches to policy, including entertaining greater flexibility regarding long-standing negotiating postures and recognizing that the other side has legitimate concerns.
• Table, sort, prioritize. Following the extension of New START, participants agreed that the United States and Russia should immediately begin informal, mid-level diplomatic discussions while the new U.S. administration organizes itself. After the United States consults with its allies, these informal discussions could place all issues on the table—giving each side an opportunity to explain areas of priority and air grievances, thereby aligning understandings of current arms control regimes’ problems, particularly the risks posed by certain technologies. Not all issues will be addressed in this initial discussion, nor can all issues be addressed simultaneously; this would result “in the [negotiating] table collapsing,” as one participant put it. But the informal nature of the discussion would enable negotiators to sort these issues into “baskets” and identify emerging agenda items to be prioritized in formal negotiations. This would help ensure greater buy-in from both sides.

Correctly sorting, organizing, prioritizing, and sequencing these issues will likely determine the success of the extension negotiations. Should negotiators tackle issues that present the greatest risk, for example, or build confidence by sequencing issues that might be successfully addressed more quickly? One participant proposed a simultaneous, three-track negotiation structure that would better elucidate the interaction between capabilities. Described as a “strategic equation,” one track would focus on offensive capabilities, a second on defensive capabilities, and a third on conventional capabilities. Others proposed addressing strategic weapons and delivery systems in one track, non-strategic systems in another, and cyberattacks, new technologies, and space-based systems in a third. Another proposal would create a separate track for each technology or platform: command control and cybersecurity risks, hypersonic weapons, space-based systems, and so forth. Yet another approach would have a track on weapons and delivery systems, including nuclear and long-range precision strikes; a separate track on securing targets, including critical infrastructure, space-based assets, and Command, Control, Communications, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR); and a third track on new domains such as cyber defense and automation.

Once organized, the United States and Russia must prioritize issue areas. Two straightforward questions might guide this process: Which capabilities or technologies pose the greatest threat to predictability and transparency? And where can both sides mitigate risk? Participants wondered if another Cuban Missile Crisis was needed to create greater political investment in the process and initiate serious discussions. Could war games at the Track 2 or Track 1.5 levels help align understandings about which capabilities cause the greatest distress and misinterpretation—and therefore must be immediately prioritized? Some participants believed that such a priority focus could be to reach an agreement that neither side would deploy a cyberattack against the other’s nuclear weapons command and control systems.

• Ready for agreement, aim for treaties, shoot for arms control processes. Are treaties (versus voluntary norms and principles) the best pathway to re-establish a productive arms control process? To reach a new agreement, the United States and Russia will need to address a broad range of concerns spanning space-based systems, underwater drones, nuclear cruise missiles, cyberattacks, and other capabilities (see below). But participants were doubtful that the United States and Russia would be willing or, in the United States’ case, able to ratify a legally binding treaty covering all these classes of weapons, in part because of the two sides’ disagreement over which of these technologies are destabilizing. Nevertheless, the United States and Russia should pursue legally binding agreements in which verification is deeply embedded—particularly in relation to the total number of nuclear warheads and their means of delivery—including for future technological developments. New bilateral treaties would set a positive precedent and build the foundation for more complicated multilateral arms control discussions.
• Be mindful of political realities. U.S.-Russian arms control must be anchored in domestic political realities and resilient to political fluctuations. In the United States, this means that any future agreement—legally binding or otherwise—must have sufficient, bipartisan Congressional support. Political polarization in Washington, the narrow margin of Democratic control in a split Senate, and the U.S. electoral calendar mean that it may be difficult to achieve a new, ratified treaty in the short term. In this context, U.S. arms control negotiators should engage members of Congress early and throughout the negotiating process to expand the number of informed stakeholders. Indeed, both Moscow and Washington will face political challenges in the lead-up to their respective presidential elections in 2024. Understanding what is feasible within each other’s domestic political contexts is essential. U.S.-Chinese relations also will increasingly weigh on U.S.-Russian relations. Understanding how arms control negotiations will impact the strategic balance in specific regions, such as the Indo-Pacific, could be helpful.

Extending New START
At the time of the Track 2 dialogue in fall 2020, President-elect Biden had indicated his intention—as ultimately occurred—to extend New START before its February 5 expiration without pre-conditions. However, a reported internal debate within the Biden transition team over how long to extend New START mirrored the discussion that took place within our Track 2 discussions and remains illustrative of larger debates within the U.S. national security community. Some U.S. participants favored multiple rolling extensions within a five-year period.

Proponents of this view believed an unconditional, five-year extension might “reward” Moscow, reduce urgency in the negotiating process, and place the expiration date beyond Biden’s four-year term—potentially reducing U.S. leverage in follow-on discussions with Russia and increasing uncertainty over whether the United States would ratify a new treaty. Conversely, Americans who called for an unconditional, five-year extension believed that the United States would benefit from a legally binding verification of Russia’s strategic nuclear forces and that a full extension would create “breathing room” and a stable foundation for follow-on discussions covering a wider range of systems. Overall, U.S. participants were divided on the issue, while Russian participants were unanimously in favor of a five-year extension.

Yet nearly all participants agreed that extending New START in some form would sustain transparency and predictability; this sole remaining U.S.-Russian strategic treaty could be built upon by, for example, introducing unilateral and verifiable commitments to reduce deployed warheads below the New START ceiling of 1,550. This would signal mutual restraint and provide a positive tone ahead of the August 2021 review conference for the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).

Next-Generation Arms Control
For over a decade, U.S.-Russian arms control negotiations have been paralyzed by the question of what is and is not on the negotiating table. Russia seeks to establish the parameters for future negotiations that will address a broader array of issues affecting strategic stability, such as missile defense, before consenting to negotiating any one element. The United States is not going to negotiate with Moscow on missile defense, cyber defense, and conventional precision-strike systems until Moscow demonstrates willingness to engage on non-strategic nuclear weapons. Each views its own unrestricted capabilities as hedges against the other’s. Withdrawals from and violations of previous arms control treaties, combined with the overall toxic state of bilateral relations, has diminished the political space for arms control talks.

Both Washington and Moscow have an interest in breaking this stasis over the next five years to achieve a new arms control agreement (or agreements) to succeed New START. A future agreement will need to address a broad range of old and new capabilities that affect the strategic calculus, including missile defense, non-strategic nuclear weapons, conventional strike systems, hypersonic missiles, nuclear cyber threats, space-based assets, and novel strategic systems. Such an overarching agreement or set of narrowly defined agreements could exist in a legally binding form on its own or alongside separate codes of conduct, principles, norms of behavior, and other non-binding arrangements that address issue areas (such as cyber defense, space-based systems, and artificial intelligence) for which there are greater challenges to verification.

Missile Defense and Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons
Russian officials have long expressed concerns about U.S. missile defense, which is intended to counter threats from North Korean and Iranian intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) but which Russia and China believe hinders their own deterrence capabilities, thereby upsetting the strategic balance. Highlighting these long-standing Russian concerns about the intent of U.S. missile defenses, former U.S. president Donald Trump has remarked, “Our goal is simple: to ensure that we can detect and destroy any missile launched against the United States — anywhere, anytime, anyplace.” Furthermore, during the course of the Track 2 dialogue, the United States successfully intercepted a test ICBM using the Aegis Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IIA ship-to-missile technology—which, Russian participants noted, underscored and reinforced their concerns.

Russian participants noted that their recent advances in hypersonic guided cruise missiles—which U.S. participants noted with great concern—were a result of the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, leading Moscow to attempt to counter ABM systems and remain at strategic parity with the United States. Because of these developments in hypersonic technology, U.S. participants wondered whether missile defense was still a concern for Moscow.
In response, Russian participants maintained that U.S. missile defense systems remain destabilizing due to uncertainty regarding their efficacy against Russian strategic systems. In its current form, U.S. missile defense may not be able to upset the strategic balance, but its potential for improvement is a major concern for the Russian arms control community. Progress in bilateral arms control will likely require addressing the growing technological capabilities of both the United States and Russia in order to avoid a destabilizing cycle in which Russia develops new offensive systems designed to defeat U.S. missile defenses, compelling the United States to develop greater global missile defense capabilities.

The United States continues to express great concern over Russia’s development of non-strategic nuclear warheads and its implications for transatlantic security—a subject outside the purview of New START restraints. U.S. and Russian participants engaged in a productive discussion that attempted to better understand Russia’s military purpose and intent in possessing such a high number of non-strategic weapons. Russian participants maintained that non-strategic nuclear weapons are a means of regional deterrence. Moscow is concerned over the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) conventional superiority over Russia in Europe. Moreover, Russia is within range of NATO non-strategic nuclear weapons, while Russia’s own non-strategic nuclear weapons are allegedly kept in depots in the center of Russia, far from the European theater, and would take time to make operational. U.S. participants argued that Russia has announced the movement of non-strategic weapons to Kaliningrad and Crimea and that the number of warheads far exceeds the need to deter NATO forces and weapons systems. A future agreement could seek to ground this debate in the logic of sufficiency. How many non-strategic nuclear weapons are enough for Russia to achieve regional deterrence and offset NATO missile defense systems in Europe? Joint declarations on numerical or locational limits—to be closely followed by the development of verification mechanisms—could be a first, politically binding step toward arms control without treaties. Another potential way forward could be for Russia to move more non-strategic weapons away from the European theater (accompanied by verification) or for both countries to renew lab-to-lab scientific cooperation on methods of counting non-strategic nuclear capabilities.

 

[jward]

continued.. . ..

Cyber Defense and Space-Based Systems
Cyber threats to C4ISR and critical infrastructure are ripe material for bilateral discussions regarding a potential code of conduct or joint statement of principle prohibiting the use of cyberattacks against nuclear command-and-control infrastructure and early warning systems. Participants on both sides emphasized that cyber activities cannot be disassociated from nuclear arms control discussions; to ensure strategic stability, nuclear communications structures must be immune to cyber penetration. Among U.S. participants, there was some concern that Russia would use cyber capabilities to deny its opponent’s advantage during the opening phases of war. However, both the United States and Russia have a mutual interest in securing their own command and control systems against cyberattacks. Although difficult to achieve, this could create room for some discussion of cybersecurity standards for protecting strategic systems.

Unfortunately, discussions related to the nexus of cyber defense, space-based assets, and arms control are nascent, unlikely to produce quick results, and occur against the backdrop of regular offensive and defensive cyber breaches by the United States and Russia into each other’s systems. Nevertheless, the United States and Russia should make attempts to delink cyber threats to strategic infrastructure from other forms of cyberattacks and cyber espionage and to initiate preliminary talks on the former. One participant noted that the entire field of arms control was at one point nascent and the path forward unclear, but engagement (though messy at first) helped align understandings of the threat and paved the way for more formal agreements. Participants agreed that because of challenges around verification, it may be difficult to achieve legally binding agreements on uses of cyberattacks, but establishing rules of the road and norms could help clarify intentions and reduce cyber risks.

Nevertheless, the United States and Russia should make attempts to delink cyber threats to strategic infrastructure from other forms of cyberattacks and cyber espionage and to initiate preliminary talks on the former.

Likewise, the increased use of space-based assets, particularly anti-satellite weapons designed to inhibit missile warning or reconnaissance and surveillance systems, must be addressed within any weapons treaty. New START does provide for non-interference in national technical means of verification. In the C4ISR domain, however, that is not enough. Outer space bears great potential for disrupting the strategic balance. To prevent such a disruption, Moscow and Washington could explore a formal agreement to ban anti-satellite tests and space-based conventional weapons and develop some form of transparency and verification mechanisms. Signaling mutual restraint may prompt other parties to make their own unilateral commitments not to target space-based infrastructure.

Hypersonic and High-Precision Weapons
The proliferation of high-speed and high-precision weapons—nuclear or conventional and regardless of delivery system—is a threat to strategic stability and offers an opportunity for negotiators. Some form of agreement, formal or informal, is needed for these systems. The United States and Russia could begin a discussion on limiting use of these weapons. The United States has expressed concern over Russia’s unmanned underwater vehicle, Poseidon, and its Avangard hypersonic missile systems. Russian participants in turn noted that the United States has its own systems unparalleled by the Russian military, including the Boeing X-37 unmanned spacecraft, which Russian participants posited may be closer to actual deployment than the Russian systems. This opened a conversation on the role of information, during which it was noted that Russia will at times overstate its capabilities in order to project strength—which can obfuscate actual capabilities, create uncertainty around Russia’s intent, and intensify U.S. weapon development, thus heightening strategic instability.

Doctrines
Russian and U.S. participants discussed the role of information and signaling in deepening their understanding of shifts in the other’s nuclear doctrine. Strategic ambiguity is an inherent feature of both U.S. and Russian nuclear doctrines. Both are also based on nuclear deterrence and ensuring second-strike capability. However, in recent years more questions have arisen regarding what circumstances might prompt the United States and Russia to employ nuclear weapons. On the U.S. side, the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review uses strategic ambiguity in identifying what type of attack would require a nuclear response rather than a conventional one. Its inclusion of “significant non-nuclear strategic attacks” as such an instance prompted Russian participants to wonder whether the United States had lowered its threshold for nuclear use. These concerns are reinforced by the U.S. deployment of low-yield warheads on Trident II (D5LE) submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). On the other side, there are unresolved questions about whether the concept of “escalate to de-escalate” is a part of Russia’s nuclear doctrine. While ambiguity serves an important purpose, excessive ambiguity can be destabilizing and could send the wrong signals, which is particularly dangerous while U.S.-Russian bilateral relations are in a state of crisis.

The Biden administration’s renewed emphasis on arms control and on reestablishing policy that is consistent and credible provides a signaling opportunity. The Biden administration could decide to reaffirm the 1986 Reagan-Gorbachev statement that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought,” as Russia has proposed. The United States could reaffirm a no-first-use policy (although this would not address the use of new conventional platforms and technologies), clarify the language in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review by reaffirming that the primary role of nuclear weapons for the United States is deterrence, or issue a “sole purpose” declaration. It may be politically challenging for the United States to initiate any of these statements. However, if it takes any of these steps, Russia should ideally respond jointly and in kind. Several participants present in the Track 2 dialogues posited that, at a minimum, Russia could do more to clarify its policy from the highest levels of government regarding an “escalate to de-escalate” approach.

But affirmations and clarity related to doctrinal language only get you so far. It is the perception of intent and the ability to verify statements and treaties that ultimately matter for arms control, and this perception is affected by the domestic, bilateral, and geopolitical environment. Moscow’s threat perception is shaped by the United States’ conventional capabilities, NATO’s frontiers, and Washington’s perceived Russophobia. Washington’s threat perception is shaped by Russia’s military modernization and its political willingness to deploy military capabilities in Ukraine, Syria, Libya, and elsewhere—as well as by cyberattacks and domestic influence operations of foreign origin.

But affirmations and clarity related to doctrinal language only get you so far. It is the perception of intent and the ability to verify statements and treaties that ultimately matter for arms control, and this perception is affected by the domestic, bilateral, and geopolitical environment.

Multilateral Disarmament
The United States and Russia no longer view arms control exclusively through the lens of U.S.-Russian strategic stability. Washington increasingly acknowledges that China is now a larger threat and military competitor, and it seeks to limit Beijing’s quickly growing nuclear and conventional forces. From Washington’s perspective, arms control agreements that do not include China are incomplete, even if they provide for a measure of security and predictability in U.S.-Russian strategic relations. Participants widely felt that the Trump administration’s efforts to coerce Russia into pressuring China to join trilateral negotiations were clumsy at best and damaging to these arms control efforts at worst. Some participants observed that the United States and Russia have deep expertise and a strategic culture related to arms control and non-proliferation issues, despite a significant slowdown over the past decade. However, China has no bilateral arms control culture. It must be created through nascent bilateral and multilateral arms control steps involving China—but, even so, an arms control culture may not develop at all if Beijing remains unwilling to engage.

As Russia and the United States embark on bilateral arms control negotiations, the United States—after extensive consultation with its allies and partners—should seek to establish confidence-building measures with China, such as agreeing to notify each other in advance of ballistic missile test launches, in order to reduce regional misunderstandings and miscalculations. These smaller steps could open the way for a bilateral and/or trilateral dialogue with Moscow that could discuss wider issues such as verifying and limiting intermediate-range nuclear missiles in the Indo-Pacific.
Russian participants noted that Beijing is unlikely to engage in arms control negotiations unless it can negotiate from a position of strength. Because the United States and Russia account for 92 percent of the world’s nuclear stockpile, it will be difficult to convince China—or other states—to reduce or limit its arsenal unless the United States and Russia both agree to asymmetric reductions (which they are unlikely to do). Participants discussed the number of missiles China possesses; while some estimates ranged from 200–300 strategic and intermediate-range nuclear weapons, others suggested these figures were much higher, which raises important questions about how to institute a viable verification regime. The United States, having only recently withdrawn from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, has not yet deployed mid-range missiles in Asia but has considered doing so. Discussing limits on intermediate-range missiles could be a starting point for initial trilateral discussions.

Multilateral arms control could also occur through the UN Security Council, though participants were generally quite skeptical about whether the P5 format could produce a binding agreement. For one, multilateral deterrence is by nature impossible, as each state has different threat perceptions and different countries to deter; one cannot involve China without India, and India without Pakistan, although India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear stockpiles are not officially declared. Nevertheless, participants believed that the P5 could issue a statement reaffirming the Reagan-Gorbachev principle and establish nuclear risk reduction centers in Asia, which would together signal a multilateral commitment to reducing nuclear risk.
In sum, there is some room for optimism that Russian and U.S. negotiators can use the five-year extension to New START to begin building a new arms control “scaffolding” that will be able to address new technologies and prioritize the issues presenting the most immediate challenge to second-strike capabilities. Once a sturdier U.S.-Russian strategic stability negotiation framework is constructed, greater trilateral negotiating opportunities with China can be pursued. Progress in these areas will pave the way for greater success in other important multilateral non-proliferation forums such as the NPT Review Conference.

Heather A. Conley is senior vice president for Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctic and director of the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Vladimir Orlov is founder and director of the Moscow-based PIR Center. Gen. Evgeny Buzhinsky is chairman of the PIR Center Executive Board. Cyrus Newlin is an associate fellow with the CSIS Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program. Sergey Semenov is coordinator of the PIR Center Nonproliferation and Russia Program. Roksana Gabidullina is a program manager and research associate with the CSIS Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program.
CSIS wishes to express its great thanks to the Moscow-based PIR Center for the constructive role it played in developing and implementing this dialogue. Dialogues, however, are only as good as the participants who generously give their time and insights, and this dialogue received an abundance of both. CSIS would also like to thank Dr. Olga Oliker, Dr. Jeffrey Mankoff, and Sharon Squassoni for their thoughtful leadership and guidance throughout this dialogue series and for the indefatigable efforts of CSIS program manager and research associate Roksana Gabidullina, as well as our funders, the U.S. Air Force Academy and the Carnegie Corporation of New York.
This report is made possible with support from the U.S. Air Force Academy and the Carnegie Corporation of New York.

This report is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).

© 2021 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.

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The Future of U.S.-Russian Arms Control: Principles of Engagement and New Approaches

As Washington and Moscow look beyond New START to the future of arms control, how should they approach discussions? What means and methods can promote stability and reduce risk between the U.S. and Russia in an evolving strategic environment?

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Islamic State claims attack against Mali army last Monday

BEIRUT, March 21 — The Islamic State group today claimed responsibility for a deadly attack against the Malian army almost a week earlier that killed 33 soldiers. “IS...

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Islamic State claims attack against Mali army last Monday

Sunday, 21 Mar 2021 11:38 PM MYT

BEIRUT, March 21 — The Islamic State group today claimed responsibility for a deadly attack against the Malian army almost a week earlier that killed 33 soldiers.

“IS fighters set up an ambush last Monday for a convoy of the Malian army... and attacked it with different kinds of weapons,” IS propaganda outlet Amaq said.

Dozens of assailants on motorbikes and in pickup trucks on March 15 stormed a military post southwest of the town of Ansongo, the Malian army said at the time. The bodies of 20 jihadists were found after the attack, it added.

The ambush, near Mali’s border with Burkina Faso and Niger, is the deadliest jihadist attack on the country’s army so far this year.

It came the same day as a brutal massacre of 58 civilians in neighbouring Niger, where militants attacked four buses carrying villagers returning from a market in the west of the Sahel state.

Much of the central Sahel has been locked in a vicious conflict between state forces, jihadists and ethnic militias for years, in a battle which shows no sign of abating.

But attacks in this three-borders region between the countries had fallen in recent months due in part to increased activity from the French forces operating there alongside the national armies.

Today’s attacks however recalled the dark days of late 2019 and early 2020, when jihadist fighters targetted the armies of all three countries, favouring raids on isolated outposts.

Nearly all of those attacks were claimed by Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (EIGS).

Islamist fighters in the Sahel first emerged in northern Mali in 2012, during a rebellion by ethnic Tuareg separatists that was later overtaken by the jihadists.

France intervened to crush the rebellion, but the jihadists scattered and regrouped, taking their campaign into central Mali in 2015 and then into neighbouring Niger and Burkina Faso. — AFP


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Austin visits Afghanistan amid unknowns regarding US troop withdrawal

By Baber Khan Sahel Kabul, Mar 21 (efe-epa).- US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin on Sunday emphasized the need to reach a "just and lasting" peace in Afghanistan during a surprise visit to the Central Asian nation during which he met with Afghan President Ashraf Ghani a little more than a month...

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Austin visits Afghanistan amid unknowns regarding US troop withdrawal

Online News Editor
March 21, 2021

By Baber Khan Sahel

Kabul, Mar 21 (efe-epa).- US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin on Sunday emphasized the need to reach a “just and lasting” peace in Afghanistan during a surprise visit to the Central Asian nation during which he met with Afghan President Ashraf Ghani a little more than a month before Washington’s deadline for withdrawing its troops from the country.

The US has agreed to withdraw its forces before May 1, the accord coming as part of the historic agreement reached in Doha in February 2020, and Austin’s visit takes on special relevance because of the doubts expressed recently by President Joe Biden about whether the deadline will be met.

This is Austin’s first visit to Afghanistan as defense secretary, and it comes as part of an international tour on which he has visited Japan, South Korea and India.

Austin said on Twitter that he was very pleased to meet with Ghani, adding that he had gone to Afghanistan to listen and learn. He went on to say that the visit was of great help to him and would inform his participation in the review the US, including President Biden, is undertaking of Washington’s policy in the region.

According to a statement released by the Afghan Presidential Palace, Austin “expressed his concern over the increase in armed violence” in the country and “hailed” the sacrifices made by Kabul’s armed forces.

Among the commitments made by the Taliban in the Doha agreement, besides guaranteeing that Afghan territory will not take in foreign terrorists or serve as a base from which to carry out attacks on other countries, is to reduce the level of violence.

However, in recent months Afghanistan has experienced an increase in fighting and a wave of targeted killings of journalists, activists, politicians and intellectuals. The Kabul government blames the Taliban for the violence, although the insurgents have repeatedly denied participating in the murder of civilians.

Biden said last Wednesday in an interview with ABC that the withdrawal agreed to by his predecessor, Donald Trump, could be postponed depending on whether or not the Taliban have adhered to their Doha commitments.

The May 1 deadline could be met but it will be difficult to do so, said Biden, adding that the agreement was not negotiated in a very firm way.

When Trump signed the Doha document there were just 12,000 US troops in Afghanistan, a significant reduction from the 100,000 that had been there in 2011.

Currently, there are about 2,500 US troops and 1,000 Special Forces troops in the country.

The US in recent weeks, along with other nations, including neighboring countries, its diplomatic efforts to move the blocked intra-Afghan peace talks in Qatar forward.

Since the talks got under way last September, the Afghan and Taliban delegations have made only scanty progress and have only managed to agree on the rules for the negotiations.

One of the international efforts to try and get the talks moving again took place last Thursday in Moscow in the presence of Afghan government and Taliban representatives, when Russia, the US, China and Pakistan all supported accelerating “without delay” the intra-Afghan peace dialogue.

A second international meeting was announced for April in Istanbul, also with the aim of giving a push to the intra-Afghan talks.

Amid these international initiatives and the unexpected unknowns regarding the US withdrawal, the Taliban last Friday said in Moscow that they will consider the agreement with Washington null and void if the US does not carry out its side of the accord.

The insurgent group said Sunday in a communique that the Doha agreement with the US resolved the foreign element of the conflict, and it warned that international pressure to accelerate a peaceful solution could lead to the failure of the intra-Afghan talks.

 

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Indonesia, Malaysia Call For Urgent ASEAN Summit On Myanmar Crisis

By Ronna Nirmala and Muzliza Mustafa Concerned over the Myanmar military junta’s relentless deadly crackdown on protesters, Indonesian President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo and Malaysian Prime Minister Mu…

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Indonesia, Malaysia Call For Urgent ASEAN Summit On Myanmar Crisis

March 20, 2021 BenarNews 0 Comments

By BenarNews
By Ronna Nirmala and Muzliza Mustafa

Concerned over the Myanmar military junta’s relentless deadly crackdown on protesters, Indonesian President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo and Malaysian Prime Minister Muhyiddin Yassin called for an emergency ASEAN summit Friday to discuss the turmoil in their fellow member state.

Muhyiddin especially used strong language in an apparent attack on the junta, which has shot and killed more than 200 mostly peaceful protesters since it seized power on Feb. 1 after a resounding election victory in November for ousted leader Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD).

“We in Malaysia and the larger ASEAN community cannot afford to see our brotherly nation of Myanmar become so destabilized at the hands of a selected few, who seek to promote their own vested interests,” Muhyiddin said in a statement, supporting Jokowi’s call for an urgent meeting of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) leaders.

“It is clear that the current political struggle only victimizes the common people of Myanmar. This has no place in the values of our beliefs, conscience and culture.

“It contradicts the principles enshrined in the ASEAN Charter, which we in ASEAN commit ourselves to promote and protect so that peace, security and prosperity for our region is guaranteed.”


Muhyiddin said that Malaysia was “gravely concerned over the tragic situation” in Myanmar and that he was “appalled by the persistent use of lethal violence against unarmed civilians which has resulted in a high number of deaths and injuries, as well as suffering across the nation.

“There is no question about it – the use of live ammunition against peaceful protests is unacceptable. This deplorable situation must stop immediately.”

The 10-member ASEAN has come under fire from critics for its lukewarm response to ending the escalating crisis in its backyard. Indonesian launched a diplomatic effort immediately after the coup but its efforts appeared to be futile, with the junta continuing to gun down peaceful protesters.

About 40 journalists have been arrested since the Feb. 1 coup, with roughly half still in detention, including Thein Zaw of The Associated Press. Two more journalists were arrested on Friday.

Jokowi called “for an immediate end to the use of violence in Myanmar to prevent further loss of lives,” saying the safety of the Myanmar people should be given priority.

“I will hold talks with the Sultan of Brunei Darussalam as the chairman of ASEAN for the possibility of an ASEAN summit to discuss the crisis in Myanmar,” he said.

Brunei, a tiny sultanate on Borneo island, holds the rotating chairmanship of ASEAN, which aside from Indonesia, Malaysia and Myanmar, includes Cambodia, Laos, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.

Jokowi urged parties in Myanmar to start dialogue and reconciliation to restore democracy, peace and stability.

The United States and the European Union have been ratchetting pressure on the junta to end the violence and restore democracy in Myanmar.

EU foreign ministers are on Monday set to approve sanctions on 11 junta officials over the military coup there, while in Washington on Friday, the U.S. House of Representatives in a resolution urged the junta to allow the elected Parliament unseated by the coup to resume its work.

House lawmakers also condemned the military takeover in Myanmar, demanding the release of all people detained and restoration of media freedom.
Calls unheeded

On Thursday, Indonesia’s military chief Air Marshal Hadi Tjahjanto expressed “profound concern” about the violence in Myanmar.

“The TNI [Indonesian Armed Forces] is always ready to provide assistance and share its experience in building professional armed forces in a democracy,” Hadi told a virtual meeting of ASEAN defense chiefs.

Indonesia, under the leadership of former Gen. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the country’s first directly elected president, played a significant role in Myanmar’s democratic transition about a decade ago.

Yudhoyono said on Twitter Friday that he backed Jokowi’s call for an immediate high level meeting of ASEAN to contain the crisis in Myanmar.

“This initiative is appropriate with Indonesia’s traditional role as a global peacemaker and peacekeeper,” he said.

Yudhoyono helped mediate conflicts between the Myanmar government and ethnic minorities, provided input on drafting democratic laws, and invited officials to learn about democratic institutions. But those interactions waned under Jokowi, analysts have said.

Shortly after the coup, Malaysia and Indonesia led calls for a special ASEAN meeting on Myanmar, but it failed to reach a consensus on demanding the immediate release of Myanmar’s civilian leader Aung San Suu Kyi and others detained by the military.

Instead, ASEAN merely called for a halt to violence in Myanmar and urged dialogue to end the crisis.

In the first known face-to-face meeting between Myanmar’s military government and foreign diplomats, Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi told the junta’s envoy in late February that it must listen to Myanmar’s people, refrain from violence and allow a democratic transition process.

But the calls were unheeded.

An analyst at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI), Dewi Fortuna Anwar, said ASEAN needed to issue a strong statement supporting democracy in Myanmar.

“ASEAN does not have the instruments to impose sanctions, but it can put pressure on the junta to stop violence and open the door to dialogue with the NLD leadership,” Dewi told BenarNews, referring to the party that won the November election.

Dewi said that it would be challenging for ASEAN to come up with a common stance because of different views among member states on the coup.

“At ASEAN, decisions on politics and security must also be made by consensus. So it’s difficult for ASEAN to take a firm stance,” she said.

 

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An Irregular Upgrade to Operational Design - War on the Rocks

Irregular warfare is an enduring, economical contribution to America’s national security, and will remain an essential core competency of the U.S.

warontherocks.com

An Irregular Upgrade to Operational Design

Brian Petit, Steve Ferenzi, and Kevin Bilms

March 19, 2021

Commentary

Irregular warfare is an enduring, economical contribution to America’s national security, and will remain an essential core competency of the U.S. Department of Defense.

– Summary of the Irregular Warfare Annex to the National Defense Strategy


Operational design — the analytical framework that underpins U.S. military planning — has a relevance problem. Cracking open the newly revised Joint Planning manual, one would hope to find some insight on how to optimize military planning for today’s “information-age competition.” For example, developing an information campaign to inoculate vulnerable populations against subversion, or conversely, to catalyze popular mobilization against adversary interests. Or maybe applying counter-threat finance to deny the financial access that gives adversaries leverage over partner nations. What about blending different aspects of engagement like security force assistance, foreign military sales, and international military education to simultaneously counter violent extremist organizations and compete with China and Russia?

No such luck. Instead, we get more of the same design elements familiar to planners: objectives, military end state, lines of operation, center of gravity, decisive points, forces and functions, and so on. The checklist continues in the traditional fashion, focused on applying overwhelming firepower and maneuver to achieve decisive victory. This continued stagnation doesn’t bode well for national security going forward. Despite the rhetorical shift “away” from irregular warfare “to” great-power competition (read: large-scale combat operations), the United States does not have the luxury of ignoring how China and Russia are advancing their interests in the gray zone short of armed conflict. Irregular warfare accounts for the missing half of strategic competition — information warfare, ambiguous or denied proxy operations, and subversion.


To close this intellectual gap, the Irregular Warfare Annex to the 2018 National Defense Strategy requires the entire joint force (not just special operations forces) to “institutionalize irregular warfare as an enduring core competency.” However, “institutionalization” doesn’t happen by simply waving a magic wand. It requires implementing potentially uncomfortable changes to operational design doctrine that will make their way into professional military education and joint planning groups. The good news is that the doctrine doesn’t require a wholesale rewrite. It just needs minor adaptations that integrate a broader understanding of influence to address a wider spectrum of geopolitical challenges ranging from cooperation through war. We propose five specific operational design elements to do this: position of continuing advantage, strategic levers, concurrent effects, narrative, and empowerment.

Operational Design, from Inception Through Today

Operational design entered the U.S. Army’s lexicon in its 2010 Field Manual 5-0, The Operations Process, as part of an effort to “secure the lessons of 8 years of war and provide a cognitive tool to commanders who will encounter complex, ill-structured problems in future operational environments.” In 2015, the joint version of the manual added a chapter for Joint Operational Design. But both the Army and joint versions remain lacking — either looking back to Iraq, or forward to a simplified vision of great-power competition. The U.S. Army Special Operations Command attempted an update of its own, but it also proved problematic. In 2014 it published the SOF [Special Operations Forces] Campaign Planner’s Handbook of Operational Art and Design. A step in the right direction, it sought to calibrate existing operational design for irregular warfare. However, because of its “SOF Operational Design” label it was soundly rejected by everyone outside of the special operations community. Discussions about “Framing the SOF Environment” are based on a fallacy; an environment isn’t special or conventional, it’s just an environment, and it affects more than the military element of national power. Making “SOF” an adjective everywhere parochializes problems and implies that special operations forces are the preordained solution.

An important update subsequently appeared in the form of a book called Going Big by Getting Small: The Application of Operational Art by Special Operations in Phase Zero. Based on years of practical experience in non-wartime environments, retired Col. Brian Petit sought to arm planners with a refined way to look at strategic U.S. engagement abroad before the shooting starts. This study kept the 13 elements of design, but modified them where needed for phase zero, that amorphous planning space where everything short of war happens — and where we find ourselves today. A wholesale rewrite would have been too aggressive, too revolutionary, and ultimately, not useful. With a shift away from the traditional phasing construct and toward “integrated campaigning,” Going Big by Getting Small is a valuable starting point to account for irregular warfare in competition planning — by everyone, not just special operations forces.

Evolution, Not Revolution

But making operational design relevant will require more changes. We propose five crucial shifts to account for the human-centric aspects of influence and relationships that are central to today’s great-power contests.

Shift from “Military End State” to “Position of Continuing Advantage”

Joint Planning describes the military end state as the “set of required conditions that defines achievement of all military objectives.” This may be helpful for planning tactical engagements or the end of an armed conflict, but has less utility for day-to-day competition at the theater-strategic level. A former U.S. ambassador commented: “I loathe the concept of end-state. It’s an OK idea, but not for the political dynamic.” Instead, position of continuing advantage captures the idea of building and maintaining an enduring U.S. competitive advantage through relationships — found peppered throughout contemporary strategic documents and service operating concepts. While many planners may generally understand this idea, focusing on it more directly will help them avoid myopically preparing only for the high-end warfight and mitigate the risk of winning the war only to lose the peace.

The last 75 years of both great-power war and counter-terrorism operations illustrate why this shift is so necessary. The U.S. military has been repeatedly forced to transition between missions based on political circumstances. As seen in conflicts such as World War II and Afghanistan, the military doesn’t simply pack up and leave when combat operations are over. Instead it continues to support U.S. diplomacy in various ways, such as advise-and-assist missions and defense institution building. The new joint planning manual subsumes the old “termination” element under military end state, but fails to add competition-related nuance. Thinking of how to achieve positions of continuing advantage through a diverse set of tools increases relevance for military planning across the competition continuum.

Beyond “Center of Gravity” to “Strategic Levers”

The concept of center of gravity can lead planners to believe that focusing on a specific target — such as national will or a military force, would cause the enemy to crumble. Grounded in Carl von Clausewitz’s concept of “Schwerpunkt,” center of gravity has been a staple of military planning for hundreds of years. Many have attempted to refine the concept, including applying it to decentralized systems, but they have failed to account for human will in situations where complete destruction is not an option. Strategic levers better captures the challenge faced in waging a human-centric campaign outside of war to influence an adversary’s understanding or actions.

A lever could be a partner, or a mechanism that creates influence. The former may include state security forces, resistance partners, or nongovernmental implementing partners. Crafting a campaign that accounts for these partners’ considerations and their means allows for applying appropriate U.S. capabilities (such as special operations or conventional advisers) at the right locations and the right time. This approach helps the United States better understand, shape, and support partner perspectives and methods. This element accepts a possible loss of the direct control that traditional approaches crave, but it establishes enduring relationships that are more resilient in crisis or conflict. These relationships may be decisive in providing an advantage over adversaries, rather than in controlling a specific geographic location or single event.

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Conversely, the targets of these levers may be corrupt state officials, proxies, and economic and cultural institutions, like Confucius Institutes, that allow China and Russia to gain influence over a country’s political decisions. Denying that access requires emphasizing cognitive and financial aspects of the environment. On the economic front, China uses infrastructure investments, state-owned enterprises, and crooked local officials to purchase influence and gain long-term leverage over vulnerable countries that could enable strategic military power projection. Targeted counter-threat finance and influence campaigns can degrade those tools and capitalize on popular anger over China’s predatory behavior.

Elevate “Simultaneity” to “Concurrent Effects”

Simultaneity refers to the simultaneous application of military and nonmilitary power to collapse an enemy by overloading its forces and functions in war. It is actually a subcomponent of the “arranging operations” design element, but deserves separate emphasis. Despite some wishful thinking to the contrary, counter-terrorism is not going away. Concurrent effects opens the door for resource-sustainable ways to conduct counter-terrorism with an eye toward using security assistance as a way to compete for influence and increase America’s legitimacy. Security cooperation and capacity-building activities promote the United States as the partner of choice, bringing professionalism and credibility that adversaries struggle to match.

Viewed through the lens of concurrent effects, a single mission can serve multiple purposes, thereby providing a higher return on investment by efficiently integrating efforts toward counter-terrorism, competition, and assisting partners. They are not mutually exclusive, and investments in one can provide returns in another. Moreover, a single mission can generate multiple effects within or among the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. For example, an advise-and-assist mission in the Philippines becomes a “two-fer” by countering Chinese influence, while simultaneously countering the Islamic State, Russia, and Iran in Syria may even be a “three-fer.”

Adding “Narrative,” or Shaping Information to Attain Influence

Narrative is an enduring (if not the primary) element of adversarial competition among different worldviews. Who has the better brand — democratic or autocratic systems? Social movement scholars characterize this competition in the information environment as “framing” — the process of constructing shared meaning to inspire collective action. It’s not about truth but about the meaning of information. While the importance of framing has been apparent from the American Revolution to the recent protests in Hong Kong, the military remains flatfooted in both shaping and exploiting its adversaries’ missteps in this realm.

Instead of just “sprinkling some information operations” like Salt Bae and isolating information-related activities as a supporting effort, a “narrative” design element accounts for the broader aspects of culture and perception linked to all actions. Disinformation, spyware, split mobile phone networks — these cognitive controls are like the lethal anti-access “bubbles” the military tends to focus on. By integrating conduit-centric aspects of information warfare (such as cyber and space capabilities) with content-focused aspects (like psychological operations), planners can facilitate penetrating information barriers, connecting indigenous brokers and interorganizational partners, and amplifying narratives that are most likely to resonate with target audiences.

Enabling with “Empowerment,” or the Right Tools to Wield Influence

Building partnerships and shaping narratives require empowerment. This usually comes in the form of authorities and funding — things planners wouldn’t care about in a conventional war. At the national level, Congress provides fiscal authorities such as Section 333 to build partner capacity, as well as broader authorizations like the European and Pacific Deterrence Initiatives. At lower echelons, commanders often complain that there is less bureaucratic red tape involved in putting a warhead on a forehead than dropping a leaflet with a message. In between these extremes is day-to-day competition, where planners seek to conduct irregular warfare activities to influence populations and enhance legitimacy in other countries. Yet these activities require the approval of the relevant U.S. ambassador, meaning that if the military doesn’t possess the legal authority, permissions, and resources to execute a plan, it is moot.

Empowerment facilitates leveraging the appropriate fiscal and operational authorities (both U.S. and partner) to enable engagements that influence behavior over time. It’s not just about using existing authorities, but also adapting existing authorities and working with congressional stakeholders to anticipate where new authorities will be necessary. For example, the aforementioned Section 333 is a staple authority for building partner capacity in counter-terrorism, but applying this creatively for broader competition could provide a significant return on investment by empowering partners to defend against subversion while building U.S. access, influence, and legitimacy. The empowerment element refocuses the emphasis on building partnerships through existing or emerging authorities, with the desired objective of both supporting partners and influencing adversaries.

An Irregular Upgrade for 21st-Century Strategic Competition

These five alternative and additive operational design elements can help the military optimize operational approaches throughout all stages of competition. Irregular warfare is not a “special operations thing” — it’s a joint responsibility. Just as some of us in the policy world have made the case for rethinking how we describe irregular warfare activities, the military should reconsider how to plan for them.

As emphasized earlier, these new elements are evolutionary, not revolutionary. There is no need to cast aside traditional concepts. Existing operational design remains useful when thinking about large armies colliding on the battlefield with the purpose of destroying each other. Building on well understood and timeless principles will help new approaches gain acceptance across the joint force. A radical manifesto may be admired but it is more likely to be cast aside.

Now these new ideas should be codified into doctrine. Doctrine isn’t sexy — no argument there. But almost everyone in uniform can agree that unless codified, ideas will rarely translate into professional military education and joint planning efforts. This is what “institutionalizing irregular warfare” means in practice. An irregular upgrade for operational design will aid the United States in competing indirectly and asymmetrically to advance its interests without a catastrophic military confrontation.



Col. (ret.) Brian Petit is a career U.S. Army special forces officer with worldwide experience in combat, conflict, and peacetime environments. He is the author of Going Big by Getting Small: The Application of Operational Art by Special Operations in Phase Zero.

Maj. Steve Ferenzi is a U.S. Army strategist in the U.S. Army Special Operations Command’s G-5 Strategic Planning Division. He has served in a number of special operations and conventional assignments and holds a master of international affairs degree from Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs.

Kevin Bilms is a career Department of Defense civilian serving in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict. Prior to this assignment, he served as the senior policy adviser for counter-terrorism and transnational threats at the National Security Council.

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.

 

[danielboon]

EndGameWW3 Retweeted




Aleph א


@no_itsmyturn
·
12m

Fantastic
Quote Tweet

Aircraft Spots

@AircraftSpots
· 43m
Tomorrow, USAF B-2A Spirit bombers will fly from Whiteman AFB to Lajes Field in the Atlantic Ocean for a Bomber Task Force mission.

 

[jward]

Smells wee bit warish

Disclose.tv
@disclosetv

NEW - Russia, China need to urgently leave Western-controlled international payment systems, says Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov.

6:33 PM · Mar 21, 2021·Twitter Web App

 

[jward]

US deploys Green Berets to defeat ISIS-linked insurgents accused of beheading children on a new front in southern Africa

Naina Bhardwaj
Sat, March 20, 2021, 4:31 AM·4 min read

US Army 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne) Green Berets observe a CH-47 Chinook helicopter conduct hoisting operations during helocast training at Eglin Base Air Force Base, Florida, February 6, 2013. US Army/Spc. Steven K. Young

• US Army Special Forces will train Mozambican marines for the next two months to counter al-Shabab's spread.
• It comes after the US listed the group as a foreign terrorist organization last week because of its links to ISIS.
• The violence in the northernmost province of Cabo Delgado has caused 2,000 deaths and displaced 670,000 people.
• See more stories on Insider's business page.

The elite Green Berets have been deployed to help defeat Islamic State insurgents accused of beheading children as young as 11 in Cabo Delgado, Mozambique.

US Army Special Forces soldiers are to train Mozambican marines for the next two months to counter the rapidly escalating insurgency from ISIS-linked terrorist group al-Shabab.

It comes after the US officially listed the group as a foreign terrorist organization last week because of its links to ISIS, who it pledged allegiance to in 2018 and who claimed its first attack in June 2019.


Mozambique, in southern Africa, represents the worrying spread of Islamic insurgency on the continent. Other nations facing ISIS-linked violence include Somalia, Nigeria, Niger, Mali, and Libya.

The deployment of the Green Berets is "to prevent the spread of terrorism and violent extremism," the US Embassy in Maputo, Mozambique's capital, said, The Times reported.

According to an Insider report last month, the Green Berets are called on to deploy worldwide, build lasting relationships with local groups friendly towards the United States, and then teach those groups how to kill effectively. The SF soldiers then begin going on missions with the locals and fight side-by-side.

The situation in the northernmost province of Cabo Delgado, which began in 2017, became even more urgent last year, with up to 3,500 fighters regularly engaging with the military to capture key towns.

At least 2,000 civilians have been killed, according to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project and 670,000 have been displaced, Save the Children added. Around a million people are also in need of food aid, the UN estimated.

'They took my eldest son and beheaded him'

Elsa, 28, whose name has been changed to protect her identity, stands with her family in a displacement camp in Cabo Delgado, Mozambique on January 26, 2021. Rui Mutemba/Save the Children/Handout via Reuters
Children as young as 11 years old have been executed, according to Save the Children, that has spoken to displaced families that have described horrific executions by the Islamic insurgents.

One mother, Elsa, 28, whose name has been changed, told Save the Children: "That night our village was attacked and houses were burned. When it all started, I was at home with my four children.

"We tried to escape to the woods, but they took my eldest son and beheaded him. We couldn't do anything because we would be killed too."

Impoverished Mozambique, in southern Africa, had been relying on foreign mercenaries, mainly from South Africa, who have also been accused of human rights abuses.

An Amnesty International report found that both sides committed war crimes, with government forces responsible for abuses against civilians, something it has denied.

The remains of a burned and destroyed home is seen in the recently attacked village of Aldeia da Paz outside Macomia, Mozambique, on August 24, 2019. Marco Longari/AFP via Getty Images
Cabo Delgado has a population of 2.3 million, most of whom are Muslim, and is one of the poorest provinces in Mozambique with high illiteracy and unemployment rates, according to the BBC.

Al-Shabab, not to be confused with the Somalian al-Qaeda-linked terrorist group of a similar name, means The Youth in Arabic.

It has found ready recruits among the unemployed young people from the area, al-Jazeera reported.

Although a ruby deposit and gas field were discovered in Cabo Delgado in 2009 and 2010, creating dreams of a better life for locals, these were soon undermined by violence and extreme flooding, the BBC noted.

Read the original article on Business Insider

US deploys Green Berets to defeat ISIS-linked insurgents accused of beheading children on a new front in southern Africa

The al-Shabab insurgency in Mozambique's mineral-rich northern province of Cabo Delgado has caused 2,000 deaths and displaced 670,000 people.

news.yahoo.com

 

[jward]

Russia, China must move away from western-controlled payment systems, says Lavrov


ANI
Sun, 21 March, 2021, 7:01 pm·1-min read

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov

Moscow [Russia], March 22 (ANI): Amid the growing bans by the United States on Beijing and Moscow, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has said the US sanctions risks need to be alleviated by switching to alternative currencies and moving away from using the dollar.

"We need to reduce sanctions risks by strengthening our technological independence, by switching to payments in national currencies and in world currencies, alternative to the dollar. We need to move away from the use of Western-controlled international payment systems," Lavrov said in an interview with Chinese media, as quoted by Sputnik.
Earlier this month, US President Joe Biden's administration slapped sanctions on seven Russian officials in response to the poisoning and imprisonment of Kremlin critic Alexey Navalny. This was among a series of steps the new administration had announced on Tuesday in its first significant move against Moscow, CNN reported.

Accusing the US of constraining the technological development of Russia and China, Lavrov said Beijing and Moscow need to strengthen their independence.
"They are promoting their ideologised agenda aimed at maintaining their dominance by holding back the development of other countries. This policy runs counter to the objective trend and, as it was customary to say, is 'on the wrong side of history.' The historical process will still take its toll," Lavrov was quoted as saying by Sputnik.

In the recent past, the US has been at loggerheads with both Russia and China on several issues including trade and human rights. (ANI)

Posted For Fair Use

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The search engine that helps you find exactly what you\'re looking for. Find the most relevant information, video, images, and answers from all across the Web.

in.news.yahoo.com

______________________________________
Russia, China Must Move Away From Using Dollar, Western-Controlled Payment Systems -Lavrov
Sputnik | Updated: 2021-03-22 13:30

(Updates with more quotes, details in paras 5-13)

MOSCOW, March 22 (Sputnik) - The US sanctions risks need to be alleviated by switching to alternative currencies and moving away from using the dollar, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said.

"We need to reduce sanctions risks by strengthening our technological independence, by switching to payments in national currencies and in world currencies, alternative to the dollar. We need to move away from the use of Western-controlled international payment systems," Lavrov said in an interview with Chinese media, published by the Russian Foreign Ministry.

The minister said the US is aiming to limit the technological development of Russia and China, so the two countries need to strengthen their independence.

"They are promoting their ideologized agenda aimed at maintaining their dominance by holding back the development of other countries. This policy runs counter to the objective trend and, as it was customary to say, is ‘on the wrong side of history.’ The historical process will still take its toll," Lavrov said.

According to the Russian Foreign Minister, the US and other western countries are no longer capable of using classical diplomacy and only resort to one tool on the international arena: sanctions.

"Diplomacy is relations between people, it is the ability to listen to each other and hear each other and the ability to find a balance of interests. That’s exactly the values that the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China are promoting in diplomacy," Lavrov said.

He emphasized that ultimatums and expectations for a partner state to "accept mistakes" and agree to the presented terms are not diplomacy, but that’s exactly what western states engage in and, when met with resistance, they impose sanctions.

Lavrov said that the administration of US President Joe Biden is sticking to the same sanctions policy as former administrations.

"This approach [sanctions instead of diplomacy] has, unfortunately, taken root in the US. It started with the administration of Barack Obama, continued for four years when Donald Trump was at the helm of the White House. Now we are seeing the same ‘instincts’ demonstrated by the new US administration," the minister explained.

Lavrov stressed that sanctions benefit no one, as evident in the losses that EU businesses have been suffering because of anti-Russia sanctions.

"You hear how European business expresses dissatisfaction with the fact that it is incurring losses, and meanwhile its niche in the Russian market is being occupied by other countries that are guided by their national interests, the interests of developing their economy, supporting business, and not by the logic of punishing someone for something," Lavrov said.

The Russian foreign minister emphasized that sanctions are particularly damaging amid the coronavirus pandemic and expressed concern over the fact that calls for the freezing of sanctions and for creating "green corridors" free of sanctions have been ignored.

"We must form the widest possible coalition of countries that will fundamentally oppose this illegal practice," the Russian Foreign Minister concluded.
Posted For Fair Use
Russia, China Must Move Away From Using Dollar, Western-Controlled Payment Systems -Lavrov





Ditch the dollar & scrap Western payment systems with us to avoid US sanctions’ sting, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov tells China
22 Mar, 2021 14:55

Ditch the dollar & scrap Western payment systems with us to avoid US sanctions’ sting, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov tells China

Beijing and Moscow could together reduce their vulnerability to Western sanctions by divesting from the dollar and building their own financial systems to rival international versions, Moscow’s top diplomat has told Chinese media.

www.rt.com

Smells wee bit warish

Disclose.tv
@disclosetv

NEW - Russia, China need to urgently leave Western-controlled international payment systems, says Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov.

6:33 PM · Mar 21, 2021·Twitter Web App

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use.....

Hypersonic weapons are coming—whether we’re ready or not | The Strategist

It’s always risky to proffer an opinion on the probable impact of a new technology, especially if you aren’t entirely convinced that a much-touted ‘game-changer’ is quite as significant as its proponents would have you ...

www.aspistrategist.org.au

Hypersonic weapons are coming—whether we’re ready or not

23 Mar 2021 | Andrew Davies

It’s always risky to proffer an opinion on the probable impact of a new technology, especially if you aren’t entirely convinced that a much-touted ‘game-changer’ is quite as significant as its proponents would have you think. For example, there were plenty of distinguished scientists and engineers last century who badly misread the future possibilities for aircraft or nuclear energy, two developments that changed the nature of warfare and military strategy. There’s even a hall of infamy for erroneous predictions about technology—into which I would prefer not to be inducted. Nonetheless, I’ve had a go at assessing the significance of hypersonic technologies in a new ASPI paper released today.

Hypersonics is both literally and figuratively a fast-moving field. I’ve had to revise my paper several times in the past few weeks to include new publicly available information—which is an indication of the current high level of activity, as several nations push ahead with the rapid development of new hypersonic weapons. (There is no precise definition of hypersonic, but roughly speaking it includes anything travelling faster than Mach 5, or five times the speed of sound.)

Australia is a player in the field as well. We have been involved in joint experimental activities with the US for over 20 years and have a cadre of world-class researchers. The government has included hypersonic weapons in its defence acquisition plans—though, typically, details of funding and timelines are scant.

As I explain in the paper, hypersonic systems are not new to the world’s military arsenals. The first intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) appeared in the 1950s. Their development required engineering solutions to deal with the heat generated by very high-speed flight through the atmosphere, but that problem was solved theoretically in the mid-1950s and practically in the years that followed. Re-entering the earth’s atmosphere at speeds in excess of Mach 20, ICBMs were essentially immune to any sort of defensive action, leading to the Cold War standoff of mutually assured destruction.

Even today, defence against anything other than a small number of unsophisticated ICBMs remains highly problematic. And the emerging generation of hypersonic weapons is likely to render defensive efforts even less effective. At the strategic level, there are hypersonic ‘prompt global strike’ systems, in the form of glide weapons that skip off the upper layers of the atmosphere one or more times before re-entering at hypersonic speed. By travelling at a lower altitude than the lofted trajectories of ICBMs, they provide reduced warning times to ground-based radar. And, because they can manoeuvre—in contrast to the predictable trajectories of ICBMs—they can approach the intended target from almost any direction.

At the tactical level, air-breathing hypersonic strike weapons will enable attackers to stand off at long range, but still engage the target in short times. A Mach 8 weapon travels 100 kilometres in a little over half a minute. Heating caused by motion through the atmosphere means that hypersonic speed isn’t practically achievable near sea level, so the flight will take place at high altitude before dropping down to a supersonic terminal phase. Because high speed precludes high manoeuvrability, such weapons won’t be suitable against fast-moving targets but could be very effective against fixed targets or slow-moving targets such as ships. In 30 seconds, a 20-knot surface vessel will have travelled around 400 metres. Provided that the initial position data programmed into the missile at launch was accurate, only small course corrections would be needed.

Australia is investing many billions of dollars in advanced sensors and combat systems to defend its surface vessels against subsonic and supersonic weapons. In the paper, I hedge about the possible consequences of hypersonic strike weapons for the effectiveness of our current and future ship-based missile defence systems. I think that’s analytically correct, as there might be clever ways of using the systems we’re buying to work against faster and less predictable incoming weapons. But my gut says otherwise. The fundamental problem of defending ships is that they are large, slow and confined to a two-dimensional surface. And if they have to rely on large, multimillion-dollar missiles that can’t be reloaded once fired, any performance increase to the incoming weapon that reduces the effectiveness of the defensive missile makes life much harder.

In between strategic and tactical systems, intermediate range (500- to 5,000-kilometre) hypersonic weapons raise some serious arms control and stability issues. Intermediate range ballistic weapons were banned by treaty towards the end of the Cold War because the reduced warning times increased the risk of uncontrolled escalation. (That was at the heart of the Cuban missile crisis.) So hypersonic weapons don’t create a new problem, but they exacerbate the old one by providing even shorter warning times.

My paper contains a survey of current hypersonic developments. Many Russian and Chinese systems are being developed with the capability to field either conventional or nuclear warheads. That presents an obvious escalation concern—the detection of an incoming weapon that could be carrying a nuclear weapon presents a decision-maker with a difficult choice. Again, that’s not a new problem, as Chinese anti-ship ballistic missiles already raise that spectre, but hypersonic delivery further increases the chance of miscalculation.

Collectively, the issues raised by the likely deployment of hypersonic weapons during the course of this decade have prompted the US Congressional Research Service to wonder whether there’s ‘a need for risk-mitigation measures, such as expanding New START [the new strategic arms reduction treaty], negotiating new multilateral arms control agreements, or undertaking transparency and confidence-building activities’. With new announcements and reports of hypersonic developments coming along every few weeks, it seems like a good time to move discussions of their implications along at a faster speed as well.

Author
Andrew Davies is a senior fellow at ASPI. He was the inaugural director of ASPI’s defence and strategy program until March 2018. Image: Lockheed Martin.

 

[jward]

Multiple Destroyers Were Swarmed By Mysterious 'Drones' Off California Over Numerous Nights
The disturbing series of events during the summer of 2019 resulted in an investigation that made its way to the highest echelons of the Navy.
By Adam Kehoe and Marc Cecotti March 23, 2021


In July of 2019, a truly bizarre series of events unfolded around California’s Channel Islands. Over a number of days, groups of unidentified aircraft, which the U.S. Navy simply refers to as ‘drones’ or 'UAVs,' pursued that service's vessels, prompting a high-level investigation.

During the evening encounters, as many as six aircraft were reported swarming around the ships at once. The drones were described as flying for prolonged periods in low-visibility conditions, and performing brazen maneuvers over the Navy warships near a sensitive military training range less than 100 miles off Los Angeles. The ensuing investigation included elements of the Navy, Coast Guard, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The incidents received major attention, including from the Chief of Naval Operations—the apex of the Navy's chain of command.
The following is our own investigation into these events, during which we discovered these events were far more extensive in scale than previously understood.

A Strange Story Emerges
Last year, documentary filmmaker Dave Beaty uncovered initial details about the events, centering on the Arleigh Burke class destroyer USS Kidd (DDG-100). That initial account described a tense encounter, culminating in the deployment of onboard intelligence teams.

USN
USS Kidd.

New documents significantly expand the public's knowledge of the scope and severity of that incident and reveal others that occurred around the same time. These details come largely from our Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, which resulted in the disclosure of deck logs from the ships involved. Additionally, our investigation utilized hundreds of gigabytes of automatic identification system (AIS) ship location data to forensically reconstruct the position of both military and civilian ships in the area during this strange series of events.

Newly Released FAA Documents Give Unprecedented Look Into Colorado Drone Swarm Mystery By Brett Tingley and The War Zone staff Posted in The War Zone

The Night A Mysterious Drone Swarm Descended On Palo Verde Nuclear Power Plant By Tyler Rogoway and Joseph Trevithick Posted in The War Zone

Mysterious Drone Incursions Have Occurred Over U.S. THAAD Anti-Ballistic Missile Battery In Guam By Tyler Rogoway and Joseph Trevithick Posted in The War Zone

Here Are The Navy Pilot Reports From Encounters With Mysterious Aircraft Off The East Coast By Tyler Rogoway and Joseph Trevithick Posted in The War Zone

What The Hell Is Going On With UFOs And The Department Of Defense? By Tyler Rogoway Posted in The War Zone


By using the USS Kidd's position as a starting point, we were able to identify several other ships in close proximity to it during the incidents in question, including U.S. Navy destroyers USS Rafael Peralta, USS Russell, USS John Finn, and the USS Paul Hamilton. Subsequent FOIA requests for these ships' records allowed us to build a composite picture of the events as a whole.

USN

Night One: July 14th, 2019
It appears the incidents began with an initial ‘UAV’ sighting by the USS Kidd around 10:00 PM on the night of July 14th, 2019. Deck logs like the one below provide information about the course and speed of the ship. Additionally, they record any other relevant information about unusual events or changes in the ship's behavior. This log records the first drone sighting:

Navy via FOIA

As previously reported, two drones, typically described as UAVs or unmanned aerial vehicles throughout the logs, were spotted by the Kidd. The Ship Nautical Or Otherwise Photographic Interpretation and Exploitation team, or "SNOOPIE team," refers to an onboard photographic intelligence team tasked with documenting unknown contacts, events of interest, and other objects of interest on short order.

USN

A member of a destroyer's SNOOPIE team with a video camera in hand.

Though an Aegis-equipped ship like the USS Kidd has some of the most sophisticated sensors on earth, sailors equipped with consumer-grade cameras act as a kind of nimble spotting and event recording team, able to quickly adapt to changing conditions while providing situational awareness and recording what they see through traditional video and photo methods. You can see a SNOOPIE team in action and one of their products in the video below:

Moments after the sighting on July 14th, the USS Kidd entered into a condition of restricted communications designed to enhance operational security and enhance survivability. This is noted throughout many of the logs as "River City 1." During the events, the ships often engaged “emissions control,” or EMCON, protocols designed to minimize their electronic emissions profile.
Less than 10 minutes after the sighting, the USS Kidd advised the USS Rafael Peralta of the situation. The USS Rafael Peralta logs show that at around 10:00 PM it activated its own SNOOPIE team. They also show that reports of additional sightings were coming in from the USS John Finn.

Navy via FOIA

For its part, the logs of the USS John Finn simply reported possible UAV activity, and deactivation of the ship's AIS transponder system. In fact, the selective deactivation of AIS was a challenge for us in reconstructing ship positions, as we sometimes had to rely on cross-comparison of deck logs to locate the position of the ships.
Shortly after the initial sighting, a red flashing light was spotted.

Navy via FOIA

Among the more dramatic entries in the logs from this incident is the one below from the USS Rafael Peralta, describing a white light hovering over the ship's flight deck.

Navy via FOIA

The log reflects that the drone managed to match the destroyer's speed with the craft moving at 16 knots in order to maintain a hovering position over the ship’s helicopter landing pad. To further complicate what was already a complex maneuver, the drone was operating in low visibility conditions (less than a nautical mile) and at night.
By this point, the encounter had lasted over 90 minutes—significantly longer than what commercially available drones can typically sustain.

USN
The red-lit bridge of an Arleigh Burke class destroyer at night.

According to AIS data, few civilian ships were in the immediate vicinity. AIS is not strictly mandatory in all cases, and can be turned off, so it is possible other vessels could have been nearby, as well. The civilian bulk carrier Bass Strait, cited later in the investigation, was situated towards the northern edge of the encounter area. A Liberian-flagged oil tanker, the Sigma Triumph, was just south of the position of the three destroyers. The ORV Alguita, a 50-foot catamaran, briefly a subject of interest in the official investigation that would come, was just off the western tip of San Clemente Island. Importantly, San Clemente Island is owned by the Navy and is frequently used for military training and testing purposes.

The following map shows maritime traffic around the ports of Los Angeles and San Diego on July 14th. The position of each ship at 10:00 PM is marked with a black indicator, and the track of the ship before and after the incident time is marked with colored dots. The approximate positions of each cluster of ships are numerically marked.

Author's illustration

The two groups of destroyers and the ORV Alguita form a roughly triangular shape with each side approximately 50 nautical miles long, containing an area just over 1000 square nautical miles. The Bass Strait and the USS Paul Hamilton were in relatively close proximity at marker one. The ORV Alguita was off the northern tip of San Clemente Island at marker two. The USS Kidd was at marker three, and the formation of three destroyers was at marker four. The tanker Sigma Triumph was just to the west of the formation of three destroyers, at marker five.

Night Two: July 15th, 2019
Due to new FOIA disclosures, we now know that another major series of incursions occurred on the following night, July 15th, 2019.
This time, the USS Rafael Peralta was the first to spot the objects and to deploy its SNOOPIE teams at 8:39 PM.

Navy via FOIA

By 9:00 PM, the USS Kidd had also spotted the drones and again deployed its SNOOPIE team. The drones seem to have pursued the ships, even as they continued to maneuver throughout the incident.

Navy via FOIA

By 9:20 PM, the USS Kidd logs simply remark "Multiple UAVs around ship" – with the word "above" crossed out:

Navy via FOIA

17 minutes later, the command is issued to man Mark 87 stations:

Navy via FOIA

The meaning of this is not exactly clear, but it could be referring to the Mark 87 Electro-Optical Director that is a component of the massive infrared and optical turret known as the Mk20 Electro-Optical Sighting System (EOSS) located above the bridge. This system was originally meant to help direct the ship's 5-inch gun, but also provides surveillance and tracking over long distances. The War Zone has done a complete profile on this powerful optical system, which could have been useful in trying to understand what was going on around the ship and to possibly identify the drones at night.

USN/L3Harris
The Mk20 EOSS.

The reference could also be in regards to the ship’s 25mm/87 Mk38 chain guns that are also equipped for remote use via a FLIR ball, although this is less likely. There is also the Mk 87 line throwing rifle adapter used for firing lines to other ships during underway replenishment and other activities, but this makes little sense in the context of the moment.
At approximately the same time, the USS Russell records a frenzy of activity:

Navy via FOIA

The logs describe drones dropping in elevation, and apparently moving forward and backward, left and right.
Meanwhile, the USS Rafael Peralta received a radio call from a passing cruise ship, the Carnival Imagination, notifying them that the drones are not theirs, and that they also see as many as five or six drones maneuvering nearby:

Navy via FOIA

The incident continued into the night, with the USS Rafael Peralta first recording two UAVs and then four UAVs near their ship:

Navy via FOIA

Approaching midnight, the USS Russell reports a final sighting:

Navy via FOIA

 

[jward]

continued

Despite the nearly three-hour duration of the event, none of the warships involved appear to have been able to identify the drones.

USN
An Arleigh Burke destroyer underway at night.

In contrast to the first night, the second set of encounters occurred closer to shore. Several of the drone sightings placed their position between San Clemente Island and San Diego. The approximate positions of the ships and drone sightings are depicted below. Note that the track dots indicate the position of the ships throughout the event, with a larger black dot indicating the position of each ship near the start of the incident at 8:45 PM.

Author's illustration

The Official Investigation
As might be expected for such an unusual set of encounters, a formal investigation appears to have been launched immediately. The first email we obtained was dated July 17th, and referenced earlier phone conversations.
By the morning of July 18th, a Navy liaison to the Coast Guard began requesting updates for information on vessels involved in the encounter, citing "higher-level visibility."

Navy via FOIA

An hour later, a special agent with Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), assigned to 3rd Fleet as a "Staff CI Officer," with CI likely standing for "counter-intelligence," thanked a colleague in the Coast Guard. They mentioned that the information would go directly to the commander of the Pacific Fleet and to the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) – the top of the Navy hierarchy, and a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Navy via FOIA

It appears the initial focus of their investigation was the ORV Alguita. An email sent just 10 minutes later expressed the need to relay information about the ship to a larger team.

Navy via FOIA

By this time, an agent with the Los Angeles office of the FBI was included in the email chain. Preliminary information indicated that while the ORV Alguita did have drones onboard, they had very limited capabilities.

Navy via FOIA

A follow-up email on the evening of July 18th indicated that the Coast Guard had contacted the ship directly via satellite phone. Based on the subject line reference to San Nicolas Island and the time period given by investigators, it seems the ORV Alguita was being examined specifically for the events of July 14th.

Navy via FOIA

The investigators had encountered several problems at this point. The owners of the Alguita denied operating a drone during the time in question, and claimed that their drones were incapable of operating more than a few feet from the ship. Further, the Phantom IV drone is a small quadcopter and has a maximum flight time of 28 minutes, according to manufacturer DJI, which is inconsistent with the long durations of the incidents and general performance described as observed in the deck logs.

DJI

Phantom 4 Pro.
Although not referenced in these emails, the Alguita was also significantly west of the events of the second night, July 15th, based on AIS data. Apparently recognizing that ORV Alguita was a poor fit, investigators conceded that they needed to keep looking. Emails reflect that Navy intelligence began to take a more active role in the investigation by July 19th, with the director of the Maritime Intelligence Operations Center (MIOC) within 3rd Fleet, identified by the acronym C3F, "looping in" the rest of the command's intelligence office, or N2.

Navy via FOIA


Investigators next sought to rule out the possibility that the drones were operated by the Navy itself. By Tuesday of the following week, a representative from the Fleet Area Control and Surveillance Facility (FACSFAC) based in San Diego clarified that UAVs were only operated by the Navy in certain limited areas. They then provided the following map of operational areas (OPAREAS) with a breakdown of platforms in use.

Navy via FOIA

Somewhat cryptically, one of the investigators referenced "recent observations" and further clarified the need to "correlate or rule out operations." He further requested data detailing operations between the 14th to the 17th of July.

Navy via FOIA

FACSFAC San Diego, in turn, sent spreadsheets of scheduled activity during that time, and explained that UAV operations are highlighted in yellow. Though the flight schedules released to us for July 14th are completely redacted, the underlying highlighting is visible. No yellow highlighting can be seen for July 14th:

Navy via FOIA

By the afternoon of July 23, the investigators were still grappling with determining the intent behind the incidents.

Navy via FOIA

The last email disclosed to us was from July 25th. It references a classified briefing on drones (referred to here as UAS).

Navy via FOIA

A further FOIA request for information about these briefings was denied due to their classification level. After July 25th, the email trail turns cold.
Remarkably, the drone incidents began occurring again around this time. Renewed sightings occurred during the early hours of July 25th and July 30th, just as investigators were beginning to examine classified briefings and were apparently still seeking to identify the intent behind the July 14th and 15th incursions.
The incident on the 25th involving the USS Kidd began around 1:20 AM, with the SNOOPIE team being deactivated around 1:52 AM.

Navy via FOIA

The incident on July 30th was longer, with the team activated around 2:15 AM and only deactivated by 3:27 AM:

Navy via FOIA

Navy via FOIA

These later incidents are notable because they occurred during the investigation, and after FACSFAC San Diego had been closely consulted.
At the time of writing, we do not have complete deck logs for the month of July except for USS Kidd, so it remains uncertain if other ships also continued to have drone encounters later in the month.
Further information continues to emerge from FOIA requests, but based on the available evidence it appears that the initial investigation did not ultimately identify the source of the drones.

Increasingly Pressing Questions
Cumulatively, these new details raise a host of difficult questions.
It is unclear why anyone would operate drones near Navy warships in such a brazen manner. Commercially available drones are not commonly capable of flying for such long durations across great distances with speeds in excess of 45 miles an hour. Based on the pooled data available from the deck logs, we estimate the drones traversed at least 100 nautical miles in the July 14th incident.
Furthermore, the drones were able to locate and catch a destroyer traveling at 16 knots in conditions with less than one nautical mile of visibility. Equally baffling, their operators appear to have coordinated at least five to six drones simultaneously. Then there is the question of line-of-sight control, and control methods in general, which make the capabilities described all that much more puzzling.

USN
A U.S. Navy destroyer cruises under the stars.

To be sure, San Clemente Island and nearby training area FLETA HOT are hosts to a bevy of testing, which can include classified programs. Is it possible that the drones were operated by the military itself in an errant test of some kind?
If so, the incursions continued after a concerted investigation that reached the highest level of the Navy hierarchy. It also appears that no UAV activity was scheduled by FASFAC San Diego during July 14th. On the other hand, it is a general area where extremely strange things have occurred in the past.

If the drones were not operated by the American military, these incidents represent a highly significant security breach. If they were part of some kind of covert action, it is nonetheless unclear why they were flown so openly and so frequently in almost a harassing manner. More troubling still, if a foreign state actor was involved, where exactly were the drones launched from?

One thing is fairly sure: the U.S. Navy has a large amount of data on these events. The documents above reflect that multiple independent photographic intelligence teams were deployed. These teams are only a small part of a sophisticated suite of surveillance capabilities and advanced sensors, including the ability to detect radio emissions in the vessels’ vicinity, available to any one of the ships involved. This is on top of the land-based sensors that closely surveil the area. In fact, it is puzzling that those sensors, coupled with a likely extensive photographic record, were not sufficient in and of themselves to resolve the matter. This calls into question the “drone” designation. Was there ever even a hard description of these craft beyond lights in the sky?

The question remains: who was operating these craft with apparent impunity, and for what purpose, and was this extremely bizarre case ever resolved?
Our investigation is into this event is still underway and we will update you as soon as more information becomes available.
Contact the editor: Tyler@thedrive.com
posted for fair use

Multiple Destroyers Were Swarmed By Mysterious 'Drones' Off California Over Numerous Nights

The disturbing series of events during the summer of 2019 resulted in an investigation that made its way to the highest echelons of the Navy.

www.thedrive.com

 

[jward]

Iraq wants new round of talks over withdrawal of remaining US combat forces

Qassim Abdul-Zahra, The Associated Press
15 hours ago

In this Jan. 13, 2020, file photo, U.S. soldiers stand at a site of Iranian bombing at Ain al-Asad air base in Anbar, Iraq. (Qassim Abdul-Zahra/AP)

BAGHDAD — Iraq has sent a formal request to President Joe Biden’s administration for a date to resume strategic talks on bilateral relations and the withdrawal of remaining U.S. combat forces, Iraqi officials said Tuesday.

The talks, which began in June under the Trump administration, would be the first under Biden, who assumed office in January. The discussions are meant to shape the future of the U.S.-Iraq relationship.
Relations between the two countries have been fraught with tension, particularly following the U.S. airstrike in January 2020 that killed Iranian Gen. Qassem Soleimani and Iraqi militia leader Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis just outside the Baghdad airport.

Outraged, Iraqi lawmakers, spurred by Shiite political factions, passed a non-binding resolution to oust U.S.-led coalition forces from the country following the attack.

American troops had only hours to react to Iranian ballistic missile attack. Here’s what they did.
“I don’t know what I’ve done to deserve such dedicated and loyal Airmen, but I know without a doubt the blind trust and genuine love we’ve developed over the past few months played a major role in our survival that night.”
Shawn Snow

Relations have improved since Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi took over the helm of Iraq’s government in May. But some parties, notably parliament’s Iran-backed Fatah bloc, continue to call for the withdrawal of U.S. forces.

So far, two sessions of strategic talks have been held — in June and August. Among the issues on the agenda laid out ahead of the talks were the presence of U.S. troops in the country, militia groups acting outside of state authority and Iraq’s dire economic crisis. The U.S. blames Iran-backed Shiite Iraqi militias for numerous attacks targeting U.S. personnel and interests in Iraq.

According to three government officials, Iraq recently sent an official memo to the U.S. requesting a date for a new round of discussions on bilateral relations and specifically, the withdrawal of remaining combat forces.

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The memo was given to U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Mathew Tueller earlier this month, they said, adding the Iraqis hope to have the discussion in April. The officials spoke to The Associated Press on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to talk to the media. No immediate date has been set.


Iraqi and U.S. officials have said they support a scheduled withdrawal of forces from Iraq, but questions remain over time-frames and the scope of the threat posed by the Islamic State group.
According to the Pentagon, the number of U.S. troops in Iraq has dropped to about 2,500 over the past months

posted for fair use

Iraq wants new round of talks over withdrawal of remaining US combat forces

According to three government officials, Iraq recently sent an official memo to the U.S. requesting a date for a new round of discussions on bilateral relations and specifically, the withdrawal of remaining combat forces.

www.militarytimes.com

 

[jward]

Army Missiles, Missile Defense Race Budget Crunch To 2023
“In my career, certainly this is the most amount of modernization I’ve seen,” Brig. Gen. Brian Gibson says. Can multiple Army programs make their 2023 deadline?
By Sydney J. Freedberg Jr. on March 22, 2021 at 1:53 PM

Lockheed’s prototype Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) fires from an Army HIMARS launcher truck
UPDATED with Maj. Gen. Ferrari comments WASHINGTON: The Army’s ambitious plans for offensive missiles and missile defense will reach fever pitch just as Pentagon budgets may well come crashing down, in 2023. That said, not every expert forecast is so pessimistic – see below.

Target 2023
The Army has big plans in multiple areas, but other expensive weapons are scheduled to enter service somewhere around 2027-2030 — for example the Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV) to replace the 1981-vintage M2 Bradley or the Future Vertical Lift aircraft to replace Reagan-era helicopters. By contrast, multiple missile systems are set to enter service in 2023. That includes both offensive missiles to strike enemy ground targets (and, in later upgrades, ships) and defensive missiles to shoot enemy missiles, drones, and aircraft out of the sky before they can kill American troops.

Yet most experts we talk to expect a sharp dip in the 2023 budget because that is when the Biden Administration will have its first chance has to truly shape Pentagon spending for the post-COVID world. The Army’s own former chief of staff, now Joint Chiefs chairman, has predicted a budgetary “bloodletting” of ground force programs in the next few years to fund a naval and air buildup against China. Can all these Army programs survive?

“Seriously, in my career, certainly this is the most amount of modernization I’ve seen and experienced inside the air and missile defense portfolio,” Brig. Gen. Brian Gibson, air and missile defense modernization director at Army Futures Command, said on a Foundation for Defense of Democracies webcast last week. “It’s probably the most simultaneous [modernization programs] since the Cold War.”

The IBCS network connects previously incompatible radars and launchers into a unified air and missile defense system (Northrop Grumman graphic)

The offensive side is similar. After decades in which US ground-based missiles were limited in range by the INF Treaty, “in ’23 there’s gonna be a lot of stuff that goes past INF restrictions of 499 km,” said Brig. Gen. John Rafferty, Gibson’s counterpart for Long-Range Precision Fires, at AUSA’s virtual Global Force conference last week. “Starting with… the Long Range Hypersonic Weapon in the thousands of kilometers, down to the Mid-Range Capability, a mix of SM-6 and Tomahawk [ranging about 1,600 km – ed.] and then the Precision Strike Missile, which we’re going to push beyond 500 km a little bit later this year out at Vandenberg.”
The Army wants combat-ready prototypes of all three offensive missile systems in service in 2023, along with a prototype battery of 18 Extended Range Cannon Artillery howitzers.

The years between now and ’23 are also a big push for air and missile defense. The Army is fielding a new command and control network for the split-second timing missile intercepts require, IBCS; a new IBCS-compatible radar, LTAMDS; a new frontline Maneuver Short-Range Air Defense (MSHORAD) anti-aircraft and anti-drone system on the 8×8 Stryker chassis; the Israeli-made Iron Dome anti-rocket system; and the new Indirect Fire Protection Capability (IFPC), optimized to take down cruise missiles. (Patriot and THAAD remain the defenses of choice against ballistic threats).

“In two to three years, you will have the first battalion fielded with this Integrated Battle Command System [IBCS],” Gibson said at the FDD event. “They will also be equipped with the Lower-Tier Air & Missile Defense [Sensor],” aka LTAMDS.
The Army’s two Iron Dome batteries will be operational late this year, Gibson said. While he didn’t say so today, the Army is not likely to buy additional full-up batteries, but the Iron Dome’s upgraded Tamir missile is in the mix of potential ammunition types to be fired from the IFPC launcher, with a “shoot-off” among contending interceptors later this year.

For IFPC, “we will have initial capability, several … launchers and missiles, in FY [fiscal year] ’23,” Gibson continued. “Lastly, we will be on the tail end of fielding this first set of our Maneuver Short Range, Air Defense battalions.
“So, in three years, you’ll see all of this kit fielded in our Army,” he concluded. And just to be clear, that three-year clock has already started: It’s 2021, 2022, 2023.

Dynetics concept for their Common Hypersonic Glide Body (C-HGB) for use by Army and Navy missiles.

The Optimists
Now, not every expert predicts a budgetary meltdown in those years.
“Often, messages that command the least amount of mainstream support enjoy the biggest megaphones,” said retired Army three-star Thomas Spoehr, now with the Heritage Foundation. “I think that is the case with those who now propose the defense budget should be cut.

Lt. Gen. (ret.) Thomas Spoehr
“You will note that very few of them actually serve on an armed services or defense appropriations committee,” he said in an email. “If you look at Democratic leaders in the defense area, Senator Jack Reed (D-RI) or Rep. Adam Smith (D-WA), both of them have discounted steep reductions in defense.

What’s more, Spoehr went on, “it isn’t just that Army missile and missile defense programs reach a “fever pitch” by 2022-2023: most of DoD’s programs also achieve that level of intensity then too—GBSD [a new ICBM], Columbia-class subs, B-21 bombers, and FFG(X) [frigates].”

The Army’s offensive missile programs, in particular, stand in good stead, Spoehr argued. “Given the recent strong statements of support from both Admiral Phil Davidson at INDOPACOM and General John Hyten, Vice Chairman, for the Army’s long range precision fires & missile defense programs, those programs are likely going to be prioritized highly in the Army and DoD.”

Gen. (ret.) Carter Ham
Carter Ham, a retired Army four-star who now heads the Association of the US Army, was less sanguine but still fundamentally optimistic. “Despite the recent letter from some 50 House Members to drastically reduce defense spending, I’m not sure ‘crashing down’ will be the correct descriptor of future defense budgets,” Ham told me. “Will defense budgets be under extraordinary scrutiny? Absolutely. But that’s not unusual.”

The Army’s already been making tough budget choices in recent, moving over $30 billion in grueling Night Court sessions, Ham pointed out, and it’s been consistent in its priorities – with offensive missiles at No. 1 and missile defense at No. 5 (of six). The hard part, he said, is explaining these choices to the public.
“The Army is challenged more than the other services in explaining requirements,” Ham said. “It’s just easier to explain requirements for ships, planes, satellites and other very high-priced items. Army capabilities are, in many cases, tied less to big-ticket platforms that result in lots of jobs in many states and districts.”

“The Army’s role in deterrence needs to be better defined,” he added, although a recent paper by Army Chief of Staff helps with that. “And, of course, underlying all of that is that, just as we almost always have done, few believe we’ll ever again be engaged in large-scale conflict.” Of course, so far in history, that’s one optimistic forecast that has always been proven wrong.

Flat Is The New Cut
But what if the budget does drop? Remember, said the former head of resourcing for the Army staff (section G-8), retired Maj. Gen. John Ferrari, even a flat budget is effectively a cut, not only because of inflation, but because of personnel costs that rise faster than inflation — and the Army has more personnel by far than any other service. “Even if you believe that there’s not going to be a large cut to defense, there’s certainly not going to be an increase to defense,” Ferrari told me. “And even a flat topline … is actually a cut to defense because of inflation, pay raises, and the cost of health care.”
The effect year to year isn’t that great, he said, but it insidiously eats into the services over time.

Retired Maj. Gen. John Ferrari
There’s a second problem that’s likely to be more dramatic, Ferrari added: pressure to transfer resources from the Army to the other services. “Probably for the first time in a long time, probably since Christine Fox was in charge of CAPE… you’re seeing a willingness to realign spending within DoD,” he said. “Those pressures don’t portend well for the army. because in neither one of those conversations is there anybody going on record, saying, ‘but hey, the Army can come out a winner in this.””

Historically, the Army has often zigged left when it should’ve zagged right, Ferrari told me. Under his boss, Chief of Staff Gen. Ray Odierno, the Army protected near-term readiness and current procurement while sacrificing some longer-term development programs. At other times, it sacrificed near-term needs to preserve the long-haul R&D, only to have those programs eventually canceled too — Future Combat Systems is the classic example — and end up with nothing.
When in doubt, Ferrari said, protect the program that’s actually producing hardware now over the one that’s still a promise of procurement years down the road. That principle, he noted, would put Army offensive missile and missile defense programs in great shape if they can just make it into prototype as planned by 2023.

“The Congress of the United States tends to support those types of programs when you can actually see something come off the assembly line,” he said — and that makes economic since, since the marginal cost of additional weapons on a hot production line is lower than that of starting production of something new. By contrast, he went on, “there are other programs the Army has that are just ramping into large R&D programs with a ‘trust me, we’ll get this right’ kind of focus — the helicopters, the Bradley replacements, [that] aren’t going to come into the force until the end of the decade.”
In tough budget times, Ferrari said, “those have not traditionally fared well.”

Posted For Fair Use

Army Missiles, Missile Defense Race Budget Crunch To 2023 - Breaking Defense

“In my career, certainly this is the most amount of modernization I’ve seen,” Brig. Gen. Brian Gibson says. Can multiple Army programs make their 2023 deadline?

breakingdefense.com

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use.....

Nuclear weapons blazing: Britain enters the US-China fray

Boris Johnson's 16 March speech before the British Parliament was reminiscent, at least in tone, of that of Chinese President Xi Jinping in October 2019, on the 70th anniversary of the founding of t...

www.middleeastmonitor.com

Nuclear weapons blazing: Britain enters the US-China fray

March 26, 2021 at 9:46 am | Published in: Article, Asia & Americas, China, Europe & Russia, Opinion, UK, US

Dr Ramzy Baroud
RamzyBaroud

March 26, 2021 at 9:46 am


Boris Johnson's 16 March speech before the British Parliament was reminiscent, at least in tone, of that of Chinese President Xi Jinping in October 2019, on the 70th anniversary of the founding of the Republic of China.

The comparison is quite apt if we remember the long-anticipated shift in Britain's foreign policy and Johnson's Conservative government's pressing need to chart a new global course in search of new allies – and new enemies.

Xi's words in 2019 signalled a new era in Chinese foreign policy, in which Beijing hoped to send a message to its allies and enemies that the rules of the game were finally changing in its favour. A new era in which China's economic miracle – launched under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping in 1992 – would no longer be confined to the realm of wealth accumulation, but would exceed this to politics and military strength, as well.

In China's case, Xi's declarations were not a shift per se, but rather a rational progression. However, in the case of Britain, the process, though ultimately rational, is hardly straightforward. After officially leaving the European Union (EU) in January 2020, Britain was expected to articulate a new national agenda. This articulation, however, was derailed by the COVID-19 pandemic and the multiple crises it generated.

READ: Turkey raises Uyghur rights at meeting with China FM

Several scenarios regarding the nature of Britain's new agenda were plausible:
One – that Britain maintains a degree of political proximity to the EU, thus avoiding more negative repercussions of Brexit.
Two – for Britain to return to its former alliance with the US, begun in earnest in the post-World War II era and the formation of NATO, reaching its zenith in the run-up to the Iraq invasion in 2003.
Finally, for Britain to play the role of the mediator, standing at an equal distance from all parties, so that it may reap the benefits of its unique position as a strong country with a massive global network.
A government report, "Global Britain in a Competitive Age", released on 16 March, and Johnson's subsequent speech, indicate that Britain has chosen the second option.

The report clearly prioritises the British-US alliance above all others, stating: "The United States will remain the UK's most important strategic ally and partner," underscoring Britain's need to place greater focus on the "Indo-Pacific" region, calling it "the centre of intensifying geopolitical competition".

Therefore, unsurprisingly, Britain is now set to dispatch a military carrier to the South China Sea, and is preparing to expand its nuclear arsenal from 180 to 260 warheads, in obvious violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The latter move can be directly attributed to Britain's new political realignment, which roughly follows the maxim of "the enemy of my friend is my enemy".

The government's report places particular emphasis on China, warning against its increased "international assertiveness" and "growing importance in the Indo-Pacific". Furthermore, it calls for greater investment in enhancing "China-facing capabilities" and responding to "the systematic challenge" that China "poses to our security".

READ: China plans to invite Palestine, Israel for talks, Saudi media says

How additional nuclear warheads will allow Britain to achieve its above objectives remains uncertain.
Compared with Russia and the US, Britain's nuclear arsenal, although duly destructive, is negligible in terms of its overall size. However, as history has taught us, nuclear weapons are rarely manufactured to be used in war – with the single exception of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The number of nuclear warheads and the precise position of their operational deployment are usually meant to send a message, not merely that of strength or resolve, but also to delineate where a specific country stands in terms of its alliances.

The US-Soviet Cold War, for example, was largely expressed through a relentless arms race, with nuclear weapons playing a central role in that polarising conflict, dividing the world into two major ideological-political camps.

Now that China is likely to claim the superpower status enjoyed by the Soviets until the early 1990s, a new Great Game and Cold War can be felt, not only in the Asia-Pacific region, but as far away as Africa and South America. While Europe continues to hedge its bets in this new global conflict – reassured by the size of its members' collective economies – Britain, thanks to Brexit, no longer has that leverage. No longer an EU member, Britain is now keen to protect its global interests through a direct commitment to US interests. Now that China has been designated as the US' new enemy, Britain must play along.

While much media coverage has been dedicated to the expansion of Britain's nuclear arsenal, little attention has been paid to the fact that the British move is a mere step in a larger political scheme, which ultimately aims at executing a British tilt to Asia, similar to the US "pivot to Asia", declared by the Barack Obama administration nearly a decade ago.

The British foreign policy shift is an unprecedented gamble for London, as the nature of the new Cold War is fundamentally different to the previous one; this time around, the "West" is divided, torn by politics and crises, while NATO is no longer the superpower it once was.

Now that Britain has made its position clear, the ball is in the Chinese court, and the new Great Game is, indeed, afoot.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.

 

[China Connection]

Sounds like WWIII is not far off...

 

[Housecarl]

Hummm...............

Posted for fair use.....

Reconsidering Arms Control Orthodoxy - War on the Rocks

The recent extension of New START brought with it a collective sigh of relief, bolstering optimism and leading some to extol arms control’s far-reaching

warontherocks.com

Reconsidering Arms Control Orthodoxy

Naomi Egel and Jane Vaynman

March 26, 2021
Commentary

The recent extension of New START brought with it a collective sigh of relief, bolstering optimism and leading some to extol arms control’s far-reaching potential to improve security conditions. But with optimism comes pessimism. Other analysts proclaim an imminent crisis and herald the demise of arms control. Both camps are falling prey to flawed assumptions. The optimists seem to forget that cooperation also comes with costs and risks, while the pessimists overstate obstacles and provide an overly narrow view of what is available for arms control. Of course, many experts find themselves in between those two camps. Yet clarity is missing even in this middle ground, where debates rage on about when arms control is possible, why states pursue it, and the nature of the benefits and drawbacks of various proposals.

In order to set the path to sound policy, we challenge several trends in the current discussion on the future of arms control. We identify five problematic arguments: first, that arms control is only possible during good relations; second, that a lack of mutual interest is the key impediment to creating agreements; third, that past cheating is an obstacle that needs to be addressed before future cooperation; fourth, that only bilateral (or conversely, only multilateral) approaches will be fruitful in the current security environment; and fifth, that issues that are non-starters for the United States should be avoided, while parity and symmetry should be preserved. Our analysis highlights a need to reconsider assumptions that inhibit more creative thinking about future arms control options.

While the U.S.-Russian relationship continues to be a useful model for thinking about the future, looking at a broader range of experiences shows that arms control is possible both when geopolitics are tense and when conditions are better, and that the effects of agreement violations are often misunderstood. Yet the simplicity of so-called mutual interests can be insufficient. Arms control requires a careful balance between the needs for creating transparency and preserving secrecy. In terms of agreement forms, multilateral and bilateral approaches may each be optimal under different conditions. Finally, the United States should also reassess what it is willing to offer in negotiations, including moving away from treating certain issues like missile defense as sacrosanct and seriously exploring the possibilities of deals with asymmetric terms.

Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin defined arms control as “all the forms of military cooperation between potential enemies in the interest of reducing the likelihood of war, its scope and violence if it occurs, and the political and economic costs of being prepared for it.” Many analysts readily quote this definition, but then fail to apply it in their search for models and lessons. Taking this definition seriously reveals that arms control is a robust and long-standing foreign policy tool, involving a wide range of actors and types of activities. As such, it is time for policymakers and other stakeholders to reconsider and widen the scope of arms control, reevaluate common wisdom about obstacles to cooperation, and address the constraints and opportunities for future cooperation.

Arms Control Is Possible in Both Good Times and Bad
Analysts and policymakers often decry the current state of U.S.-Russian relations, identifying bad relations as a key hurdle for cooperation on arms control. At the same time, others note that the need for arms control further increases when risks of war, crisis, or arms racing are heightened. Taken together, these views suggest a misleading conclusion: that arms control is only possible during détente, but only truly valuable when state relations are poor. Both positions are overstated and combining them leads to excessively pessimistic conclusions about when arms control agreements can successfully be negotiated and what they can achieve. In reality, states have signed agreements in times of good relations as well as bad.

The 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces treaty is a key example of an arms control agreement that was negotiated in the midst of tense U.S.-Soviet relations. At the same time, we have seen states sign agreements in periods of détente: SALT I in 1972 and the Moscow Treaty in 2002 are examples in the U.S.-Russian context. Some confidence-building agreements between India and Pakistan have a similar pattern, coming out of periods of relative calm. Arms control negotiations also often take place over many years — spanning changes in political leadership and geopolitical tensions. To conclude that starting arms control is impossible or unrealistic because of the current state of U.S.-Russian relations effectively forecloses opportunities to lay the foundation for future achievements.

Analysts argue that good relations foster great trust, which is a precondition for arms control. But the concept of “trust” is often misused. Arms control has never been based on blind trust. Trust in the genuine efforts of individual interlocutors, or a belief that the other side is serious about negotiations as a foreign policy process, can be beneficial to negotiations. However, states can and often do negotiate without trusting that the other side will ultimately comply with agreement terms. Arms control, of course, typically takes place between adversarial states rather than friendly ones. Rather than trust, states need an assessment that the other side perceives benefits from cooperation. If all parties do not see benefits in arms control, there is little basis for a negotiation.

This is not to say that underlying conditions do not matter. Indeed, they may affect outcomes well beyond the immediate security challenge. When relations between states are relatively good (or at least less tense), arms control can lay the groundwork to forestall arms racing and reduce the risks of conflict if (or when) relations take a negative turn. For example, arms control confidence-building agreements in the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe established at the end of the Cold War (e.g., the Vienna Document) have provided a framework for reducing military risks in the region that have endured even when relations between the United States and Russia have soured. In a different context, the Treaty of Tlatelolco (which established a nuclear weapon-free zone in Latin America) was also an effort to transform geopolitics more broadly. Agreements negotiated during high tensions can also affect broader competition, including by forestalling new technologies that could undermine strategic stability.

Even a relatively quick glance at historical patterns suggests that there is no perfect moment for arms control. Waiting for geopolitical relations to improve risks missing moments of opportunity when both sides see benefits in avoiding a certain costly or risky aspect of their ongoing competition. Neglecting arms control when relations are good suggests a failure to anticipate future threats and changes, not to mention forgoing opportunities to save resources. As long as the United States and other parties can identify a mutual interest in arms control, the United States should pursue negotiations.

Mutual Interest Is Not Enough
Yet agreements are still difficult even when both sides see benefits. Arms control can create benefits for states by reducing the costs of competition. This can come from reducing the material costs of arms racing or engaging in a war, reducing the risk of conflict starting or escalating, or reducing the damages sustained if war does happen. Yet there are also costs associated with arms control agreements. Importantly, arms control agreements that rely on intrusive verification and monitoring raise concerns that these provisions will provide the opponent with increased intelligence about the state’s activities beyond the contours of the agreement. For example, inspections to confirm that a military base does not contain prohibited weapons may also reveal information about other military capabilities or make it easier to attack the base in the future. States often find themselves unable to resolve the tradeoff between having enough transparency to make sure that each party is complying with the agreement and enough secrecy to protect each state’s security, leading to few possibilities for even those arms control agreements that reduce risks or costs.

Yet this tradeoff challenge is based on each side’s understandings of what it needs for secrecy, and these perceptions can change. In early Cold War arms control negotiations, the Soviet Union was deeply concerned about maintaining secrecy around its military sites, not only because of the military threats from the United States but also because they believed that transparency to Western audiences would create domestic doubt in the authority of the Soviet system. During the mid-1980s, the Soviet leadership’s assessment of the need to maintain such secrecy shifted, and this contributed in part to changes in their positions on intrusive verification. Parties’ assessments of how much information they need to verify compliance may also shift, as was the case when joint verification experiments allowed the United States and the Soviet Union to draw new conclusions about the capabilities of measurement tools for monitoring nuclear testing under the Partial Test Ban Treaty. Finally, some technological innovations can create new possibilities for verifying compliance without creating new security risks due to an agreement. The introduction of satellite surveillance in the 1970s allowed the United States and the Soviet Union to rely on “national technical means” rather than inspections for some agreements, and advances in satellite technology today continue to enhance treaty monitoring from afar. Another option to proactively address this dilemma is to empower third parties, like the International Atomic Energy Agency, to handle monitoring. However, all parties need to have confidence that the third party has the capacity not only to detect agreement violations but also to hold each state’s secrets secret.

The dilemma of the transparency-security tradeoff has a number of implications for next steps. First, cognizance of this dynamic is important for setting expectations — adversaries often have security reasons for avoiding transparency in arms control, even when they are, in principle, interested in cooperation. Addressing those concerns might need to happen both within the specific provisions set by an agreement, or in the context of security relations well beyond the issues at the agreement negotiating table. Second, there should be continued investment in research and development of verification technologies, including in collaboration with other countries and international third parties. Finally, the discussion of arms control should not idealize greater transparency as an all-around positive. Indeed, domestic political pressure for transparency that goes beyond the compliance needs of an agreement may undermine the deal as a whole.

Cheating Is Not Always an Obstacle
The common wisdom on arms control is that states only sign treaties they plan to comply with anyway and cheating that does occur should both be met with clear punishment and is also a sign of agreement failure. When Donald Trump’s administration withdrew from the Open Skies Treaty, it claimed that it did so in response to Russia’s violations of the treaty. Today, some analysts argue, the United States ought to somehow address Russian cheating before negotiating a new arms control agreement, even though the United States has already withdrawn from the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty where the violations occurred. Yet the history of arms control experience suggests that cheating does not necessarily derail prospects for future agreements, and there have actually been innovations in the design of agreements that allow states to address the consequences of cheating while still maintaining the overall architecture of a negotiated deal.

Cheating on arms control agreements is not a new phenomenon. For example, the Soviet Union violated the SALT II agreement, both by developing the SS-25 missile and by encrypting missile test data that was supposed to be shared for verification purposes. The Soviet Union also violated the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty by developing the Krasnoyarsk radar system in the late 1970s and early 1980s. At the time, many claimed that the United States needed to address Soviet cheating and respond to these violations by withdrawing from these agreements before committing to any future deal. However, neither of these violations led to the collapse of either agreement. Moreover, the United States and the Soviet Union began negotiations on what would become the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and the 1990 START I agreement despite outstanding violations of prior agreements and the tensions they produced. Instead, the United States and the Soviet Union were able to reach agreement on the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty — a significant bargain that banned all nuclear and conventional ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles that had a range of between 500 and 5,500 kilometers — in 1987. Soviet treaty violations were only finally addressed in 1989.

Continued.....

 

[Housecarl]

Continued.....

The implications of cheating and the options available for addressing it vary, but there is reason for optimism. Despite a tendency to focus on the negative effects of violations, the consequences of cheating depend partially on how the other parties respond. The Assad regime’s violations of the Chemical Weapons Convention in Syria, for example, did not lead to a flood of states violating the agreement and using chemical weapons in war. Nor did North Korea’s withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons lead to a rush of states pursuing nuclear weapons. Although instances of cheating on agreements are never desirable, the public identification of such violations combined with serious efforts to enforce the rules of the agreements demonstrate that the regime is working as intended and provides value in policing threats that arise.

Even when parties violate agreements, it may still be worthwhile to maintain them. This is the case if an agreement can still offer information that is more difficult to obtain or reveal otherwise. Despite concerns over Russian compliance with the Open Skies Treaty dating back to at least 2010, the United States has still gained transparency and predictability regarding Russian military forces that it now lacks after having withdrawn from the treaty. Specifically, information gained via Open Skies was critical for the United States in addressing Russian activities in Ukraine in 2014. Information gained through a treaty monitoring process is also easier to share with both allies and adversaries, allowing Washington to raise concerns or make claims in international disputes without revealing its own intelligence sources and methods. The implication here is not that cheating should be allowable, but rather that is not as clear cut of a problem as is often portrayed.

The design of arms control agreements has also evolved to allow more flexible responses to cheating. In most cases, a reciprocal violation, either secretively or more commonly through a formal treaty withdrawal, is the fundamental punishment for another state’s noncompliance. But this response scuttles the agreement as a whole and reactivates broader obstacles to cooperation, including long negotiations, a possible lack of political will, and domestic politics that may imperil treaty ratification. Violation resolution and punishment mechanisms built into the very terms of a treaty have the potential of improving agreement longevity. While such mechanisms were relatively rare in early arms control efforts, notable modern agreements include innovations addressing violations. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons itself does not include dispute resolution or interim punishment, but the U.N. Security Council has placed sanctions on Iran for its noncompliance with the treaty without any parties withdrawing from it. Returning to compliance with the treaty was the requirement for lifting the sanctions and avoiding further punishment. Likewise, the Iran nuclear deal allows parties to punish Iran with “snapback” sanctions if Iran fails to satisfy other parties’ accusations of noncompliance, but it does not require any parties to withdraw, and Iran can receive relief from sanctions if it reverses its violations of the agreement. Beginning with the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, bilateral arms control agreements have also included joint consultative commissions to work through irregularities in compliance.

Continued.....

 

[Housecarl]

Continued.....

In sum, the United States should carefully assess the consequences of other states cheating on arms control agreements and develop a proportional response, which in most cases should not be a rejection of all further efforts at cooperation. The design of future arms control agreements should be an innovative enterprise, focused in particular on developing legal mechanisms that would allow states to address violations within the context of the arms control agreements and related institutions.

Is Three (or More) a Crowd?
Recommendations for next steps on arms control have recently either highlighted the value of the U.S.-Russian bilateral model, alternatively claimed that a multilateral approach is necessary in the modern security environment, or suggested that both should be attempted. The problem is not in the proposals themselves, but rather in the lack of analysis devoted to why or when bilateral versus multilateral approaches may be preferable. At the same time, evidence from past cooperation suggests that the choice of approach is a consequential one both for basic progress in negotiations and in getting to effective agreements. In considering whether to pursue a bilateral or multilateral approach, the United States should assess the source of the challenge and the relevant parties needed to address it.

In multilateral agreements, reciprocity is diffuse: States do not engage in individual tit-for-tat bargains with one another but rather commit to general standards of behavior. Consequently, when the United States seeks to stave off threats that could potentially arise from anywhere (e.g., nuclear proliferation, terrorists acquiring nuclear weapons, or the placement of weapons of mass destruction in outer space), it has often pursued multilateral agreements rather than bilateral ones. The Australia Group — a multilateral export control regime to prevent the spread of chemical and biological weapons — has made important progress even though Russia does not participate. Other export control regimes (e.g., the Nuclear Suppliers Group or the Hague Code of Conduct on Ballistic Missile Proliferation) likewise aim to prevent any state that does not currently have these weapons and delivery vehicles from acquiring them. By making blanket rules for a large number of states, multilateral agreements may also allow the United States to preempt unforeseen threats or developments, and lock in favorable conditions. Moreover, when the costs of compliance are low for most states, multilateral agreements can formalize and institutionalize support for U.S. objectives.

Yet for many issues in arms control, there are only a few actors that the United States seeks to restrain, and the United States would do better to negotiate directly under conditions of specific reciprocity with those states whose behavior or capabilities threaten the United States. For example, it makes little sense at present for the United States to pursue multilateral negotiations to limit or ban nuclear-powered cruise missiles, given that Russia is the only state even considering developing such missiles. As many scholars have found, increasing the number of actors in a negotiation or bargaining scenario increases the difficulty of finding compromises and agreements that will be acceptable to all parties. Importantly, many states (even allies) do not always see eye-to-eye with the United States on both threats and solutions. Regional approaches to arms control highlight this difficulty: Japan and South Korea are both U.S. allies, but differ from each other and from the United States in their relationship with China and the threats they prioritize. These factors make a regional approach to arms control in East Asia more difficult and complicated than a bilateral Sino-American negotiation. Proposals for trilateral negotiations between Russia, China, and the United States are worth exploring because direct reciprocity could be established between this small set of parties. However, skepticism is also warranted: Russia and China differ substantially in both their capabilities and their relationships with the United States, and a deal between two parties may be unacceptable to the third. This could block progress that would otherwise be possible in a bilateral agreement.

Neither bilateralism nor multilateralism is inherently better for arms control. The U.S.-Russian bilateral model of arms control should not be taken as the only model, and the format for negotiations should be tailored to the source of the challenge. The United States should pursue multilateral initiatives when there is broad agreement on the problem, when risks and benefits are diffuse among states, and when the costs of compliance are low. Bilateral initiatives will be more fruitful when there are strong competing interests among both adversaries and allies, challenges and benefits are more concentrated and precise, and the United States is primarily concerned about the capabilities or behavior of one key state.

The American Offer
Analysis of future arms control options needs to include a close reassessment of at least two common views about what the United States should seek to include in negotiations: first, that some U.S. capabilities are supposedly off the table, and second, that states need to be at rough parity on particular capabilities in order to want arms control. Both supposedly untouchable systems and asymmetric deals should be the subject of intensive internal review.

In assessing the future of arms control, experts often emphasize what the United States should seek to limit in other states, such as Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons or new delivery systems, or a broader need to “bring China into arms control.” Yet the reverse — what the United States is willing to put on the table — is equally important. To successfully limit adversaries’ capabilities, the United States needs to consider how it can incentivize adversaries to agree to such limits.

One area where this is particularly clear is missile defense, which is often treated as a third rail in arms control given the strong bipartisan support in the United States for maintaining (and increasing) it. Since leaving the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002, the United States has worked hard in arms control negotiations to avoid limits on missile defenses, accepting only a broad mention of a connection between defensive and offensive systems in the New START preamble. Yet study after study shows the limited utility of missile defense in defending against both nuclear and nonnuclear attacks despite the massive investment in it. Many analysts argue that investing in missile defense actually drives arms racing rather than making the United States safer. Rather than treating missile defense as untouchable, Washington should reassess whether the gains from preserving missile defense are worth the tradeoffs of what could be obtained through limiting missile defense as part of an arms control agreement.

Second, evaluating asymmetric outcomes is difficult, but should be approached with less trepidation and more urgency. It is already clear that Russia and the United States have diverging views about which specific capabilities add to their security, so meeting an underlying goal of reducing spending and risks may require moving beyond the traditional model of like-for-like limitations. Indeed, we have already seen steps in this direction, such as in how New START allows each side flexibility on the mix of delivery systems under the central limits.

Beyond rejecting symmetry in specific weapons, analysts should reconsider the role of balance in agreement obligation or in states’ underlying interests in pursuing limits. Analysts sometimes claim that states will never accept arms control for capabilities where they have an advantage. Yet arms control can also be a tool to preserve advantage. Disadvantaged states may not like it, but accepting an agreement could still be better than the alternative. The Treaty of Versailles, for example, was a dramatically unequal arms control agreement that required German disarmament in exchange for Germany remaining a sovereign country. Proposals for addressing North Korea’s nuclear program often tacitly call for asymmetric arms control. And the 2015 Iran nuclear deal imposed a host of obligations on Iran to curtail its nuclear program in exchange for commitments from the P5+1 to lift sanctions. While experts might argue about which side got the “better end” of that deal, it is in its form an asymmetric bargain.

If Washington stops treating issues such as missile defense and asymmetry as arms control non-starters, then the bargaining space for future cooperation can substantially increase. Of course, few specific agreements will ultimately be viable, but more creative options may emerge in the process. We can imagine two routes for undergoing this reassessment — one where the United States focuses on an internal debate before coming to the negotiating table, and a second where the United States conducts its review while international negotiations are also ongoing. The first is the most intuitive, but the second has considerable merit that should not be overlooked. Learning more about other parties’ position, demands, or even possible bluffs in the course of negotiations can inform America’s self-assessment and internal planning process. It may uncover new options, including with respect to allies. For example, recent research suggests U.S. efforts to increase the credibility of extended deterrence commitments may be counterproductive. A reassessment of what allies really need for assurance may benefit arms control negotiations. It is also possible that pressure for negotiations would arise from other states before new U.S. internal assessments are complete. Being unprepared to take advantage of such moments could lead to missed opportunities for progress, especially when high-level political attention is a key ingredient for an agreement.

Conclusion
That the future of arms control poses many challenges is not news to most experts. Yet some of the barriers to arms control are overstated, while others have been overlooked. Unpacking assumptions about the form of arms control agreements and the conditions under which arms control can take place reveals that opportunities for arms control extend far beyond the model epitomized by New START. Arms control is not dead and the goals of arms control remain as important as ever. Arms control is a policy tool, not an end in itself — it may be appropriate in some cases and less applicable in others. Future progress requires a careful assessment of the consequences of technological and political developments, and a more creative, expansive understanding of what arms control involves.

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Naomi Egel is a Ph.D. candidate in government at Cornell University and the Janne Nolan Nuclear Security Visiting Fellow at the Truman Center for National Policy.
Jane Vaynman is an assistant professor of political science at Temple University.
Image: White House (Photo by Pete Souza)

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[Housecarl]

Hummm......

Posted for fair use....

H I Sutton - Covert Shores

www.hisutton.com

Russian-Navy-Base-In-Sudan
Sat 20 March 2021 By H I Sutton

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Image from video at

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1372878453683404800

View: https://twitter.com/Sputnik_Insight/status/1372878453683404800

Russia’s Increasing Global Reach: 2nd Navy Ship Calls At Port Sudan in Red Sea

The strategic impact of Russia’s new base in Port Sudan, Sudan, may take years to fully appreciate. The increased Russian presence in the Red Sea, at least in the short term, may be intended to deter suspected Israeli sabotage attacks on Iranian tankers supplying oil to Syria. The Russian Navy has already been escorting the tankers in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The overseas base has yet to be built, but in the meantime Russian warships are already increasingly using the port. Recently the RFS Stoikiy (545), an Pr.20380 Steregushchiy class corvette, called at the port. The warship was accompanied by the tanker Kola. They are now heading north towards the Suez Canal:

​

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Less than a month earlier in February RFS Admiral Grigorovich (494), a Pr.11356P Admiral Grigorovich class frigate, called at the port.

 

[jward]

Over 180 people trapped in Mozambique hotel after ISIL attack
Several people reportedly dead after attack in Palma near a liquified natural gas site in Cabo Delgado province.

27 Mar 2021

More than 180 people including foreign workers are trapped inside a hotel in a northern Mozambique town under siege for three days by fighters linked to the ISIL (ISIS) group, workers and security sources said Friday.
Several people were dead, according to witnesses and a rights group, after the attack in Palma near a liquified natural gas (LNG) site in Cabo Delgado province.
Keep reading

Mozambique military launches offensive after ISIL attackMozambique: Armed group attacks town near gas projectArmy, private firm, fighters accused of Mozambique war crimes
French oil giant Total is the principal investor in the $20bn project – Africa’s largest – with six other international firms including ExxonMobil involved in the area.

ISIL-linked fighters began a raid on the coastal town on Wednesday afternoon, forcing terrified residents to flee into the surrounding forest as LNG and government workers sought shelter at the Amarula Palma hotel.
“Almost the entire town was destroyed. Many people are dead,” said a worker on the LNG site speaking on the phone Friday evening after he was evacuated to Afungi.


He did not give details about the casualties nor their nationalities.
“As locals fled to the bush, workers from LNG companies, including foreigners, took refuge in hotel Amarula where they are waiting to be rescued,” he said, asking not to be named.

‘Bodies on the streets’
Human Rights Watch said the attackers are linked to a group known locally as al-Shabab, which has no known direct link to the Somali armed group with a similar name.
“Several witnesses told Human Rights Watch that they saw bodies on the streets and residents fleeing after the Al-Shabab fighters fired indiscriminately at people and buildings,” the rights group said in a statement on Friday.

South African news website News24 reported that one South African national had died during the attack.
Another worker from a company subcontracted by Total said helicopters flew over the hotel earlier on Friday trying to find “a corridor to rescue the approximately 180 people trapped in the hotel”.

“But until nightfall, many people remained on the premises while militants tried to advance towards the hotel,” he said.
In an unverified short video clip shared on social media, an unidentified man filmed the hotel lobby showing several people milling around the patio.
With the buzzing sound of a chopper in the background, he described the situation in Palma as “critical”.

“We don’t know if we will be rescued,” he said, adding the hotel had run out of food but still had water.
The Mozambique government on Thursday confirmed the attack on the town and said soldiers had launched an offensive to evict the fighters from the town, the hub of the giant gas project.
The fresh round of attacks began on Wednesday hours after Total announced a gradual resumption of work at the LNG project, which had been hampered by the continuing rebellion in the region.
Armed fighters affiliated with ISIL have raided villages and towns across the province, causing nearly 700,000 to flee their homes.
The violence has left at least 2,600 people dead, half of them civilians, according to the US-based data collecting agency Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED).
In a statement Friday, the US embassy in Maputo condemned the attack on Palma, pledging its commitment “to working with the government of Mozambique to counter violent extremism”.

Posted For Fair Use

Over 180 people trapped in Mozambique hotel after attack

Several people reportedly dead after attack in Palma near a liquified natural gas site in Cabo Delgado province.

www.aljazeera.com

 

[danielboon]

Hmmm

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1376189355983769600

View: https://mobile.twitter.com/EndGameWW3/status/1376189355983769600