ALERT The Winds of War Blow in Korea and The Far East

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Mysterious New Missile Launched By China's Giant Type 055 Destroyer
Tyler Rogoway

5-6 minutes


Video has emerged out of China showing what is reported to be one of its huge Type 055 destroyers launching a mysterious new missile out of one of its vertical launch cells. While exactly what missile this is and what concept of operations underpins it isn't perfectly clear, there are certainly some distinct possibilities, one of which is highly probable.
The video clip shows a missile being 'cold-launched' then boosted into the air. The booster is relatively short while its payload is a long conical-like shape with small fins at its base. The design is highly reminiscent of a maneuverable reentry vehicle (MaRV).

image

Our friend @Alexluck9 on Twitter pointed out that this missile design has been hinted at before as future armament for China's advanced vertical launch system (VLS) equipped warships:
The weapon seen is most likely a sea-launched anti-ship ballistic missile that has been rumored to have been in development for some. Fielding such a weapon at sea would have major implications as, currently, China's only anti-ship ballistic missile capabilities are land-based, with an air-launched type also being in development. In fact, on the same day this video emerged, we also got our best look yet at the air-launched "Eagle Strike" JY-21, which you can read about here. The timing is suspicious, without a doubt, but fits China's flow of 'leaks' that act as informal strategic messaging.
The missile appears to use a thinner, more elongated, conical-shaped maneuvering reentry vehicle compared to the one found on the YJ-21, as well as what we have seen on many other MaRV-equipped missiles. Combined with a much shorter rocket booster, the design is clearly optimized to fit inside the tight confines of a ship's VLS cells. The relatively short booster rocket would substantially reduce its striking distance, but that would be a reasonable tradeoff considering the capability would already be forward deployed at sea. Even a range of a couple hundred or so miles would be beneficial. This weapon could presumably strike fixed targets on land, as well.
image

Like most MaRVs, the shape of the DF-15 short-range ballistic missile's MaRV is very similar to what we are seeing with the missile in question, although the latter has a more elongated shape to fit inside a VLS cell.
The system could borrow some components already in use by the CM-401 shore-based short-range anti-ship ballistic missile, although the MaRV profile is clearly different as is the type's rocket section. You can read all about the CM-401 in our profile on it.
image

CM-401 in its launch canister mockup display. (Credit: Chinese Internet)
image

A Chinese graphic showing an anti-ship ballistic missile executing a hard-to-intercept skip-glide trajectory. (Credit: Chinese Internet)
Layering in even short-range anti-ship ballistic missiles with air-breathing anti-ship cruise missiles would complicate even the most advanced naval adversary's ability to defend itself. Also, the shorter range would fit with a Chinese flotilla's organic sensor capabilities for detecting and engaging targets without having to rely on overly complex external datalinks and sensor platforms networks like shore-based medium and long-range anti-ship ballistic missiles rely on.
image

China's Type 055 destroyer. (Credit: Chinese Navy)
Another possibility, although one we think is quite remote, is that this is a cruise missile of some type, even perhaps an air-breathing hypersonic one. The fact that the missile appears to enter a push-over maneuver for a shallower fly-out trajectory shortly after clearing the ship further points to this possibility. But still, its silhouette is puzzling if that were the case. It is worth noting that a number of very-high-speed Chinese anti-ship cruise missile designs have emerged in recent years, but that feature body-mounted air intakes to feed ramjet engines and otherwise have configurations that do not look at all like this missile. It's also a greater technological challenge to create something like a hypersonic anti-ship missile than an anti-ship ballistic missile.
Finally, this could be some new anti-air weapon, although we really don't have anything to directly compare it to in terms of its basic shape.
Regardless of the mystery surrounding this weapon, it's another reminder that China is pushing ahead with new weapons concepts for its growing armada.
What do you think it is? Let us know in the comments below.

Please see source for video
Posted for fair use
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Mysterious New Missile Launched By China's Giant Type 055 Destroyer
Tyler Rogoway

5-6 minutes


Video has emerged out of China showing what is reported to be one of its huge Type 055 destroyers launching a mysterious new missile out of one of its vertical launch cells. While exactly what missile this is and what concept of operations underpins it isn't perfectly clear, there are certainly some distinct possibilities, one of which is highly probable.
The video clip shows a missile being 'cold-launched' then boosted into the air. The booster is relatively short while its payload is a long conical-like shape with small fins at its base. The design is highly reminiscent of a maneuverable reentry vehicle (MaRV).

image

Our friend @Alexluck9 on Twitter pointed out that this missile design has been hinted at before as future armament for China's advanced vertical launch system (VLS) equipped warships:
The weapon seen is most likely a sea-launched anti-ship ballistic missile that has been rumored to have been in development for some. Fielding such a weapon at sea would have major implications as, currently, China's only anti-ship ballistic missile capabilities are land-based, with an air-launched type also being in development. In fact, on the same day this video emerged, we also got our best look yet at the air-launched "Eagle Strike" JY-21, which you can read about here. The timing is suspicious, without a doubt, but fits China's flow of 'leaks' that act as informal strategic messaging.
The missile appears to use a thinner, more elongated, conical-shaped maneuvering reentry vehicle compared to the one found on the YJ-21, as well as what we have seen on many other MaRV-equipped missiles. Combined with a much shorter rocket booster, the design is clearly optimized to fit inside the tight confines of a ship's VLS cells. The relatively short booster rocket would substantially reduce its striking distance, but that would be a reasonable tradeoff considering the capability would already be forward deployed at sea. Even a range of a couple hundred or so miles would be beneficial. This weapon could presumably strike fixed targets on land, as well.
image

Like most MaRVs, the shape of the DF-15 short-range ballistic missile's MaRV is very similar to what we are seeing with the missile in question, although the latter has a more elongated shape to fit inside a VLS cell.
The system could borrow some components already in use by the CM-401 shore-based short-range anti-ship ballistic missile, although the MaRV profile is clearly different as is the type's rocket section. You can read all about the CM-401 in our profile on it.
image

CM-401 in its launch canister mockup display. (Credit: Chinese Internet)
image

A Chinese graphic showing an anti-ship ballistic missile executing a hard-to-intercept skip-glide trajectory. (Credit: Chinese Internet)
Layering in even short-range anti-ship ballistic missiles with air-breathing anti-ship cruise missiles would complicate even the most advanced naval adversary's ability to defend itself. Also, the shorter range would fit with a Chinese flotilla's organic sensor capabilities for detecting and engaging targets without having to rely on overly complex external datalinks and sensor platforms networks like shore-based medium and long-range anti-ship ballistic missiles rely on.
image

China's Type 055 destroyer. (Credit: Chinese Navy)
Another possibility, although one we think is quite remote, is that this is a cruise missile of some type, even perhaps an air-breathing hypersonic one. The fact that the missile appears to enter a push-over maneuver for a shallower fly-out trajectory shortly after clearing the ship further points to this possibility. But still, its silhouette is puzzling if that were the case. It is worth noting that a number of very-high-speed Chinese anti-ship cruise missile designs have emerged in recent years, but that feature body-mounted air intakes to feed ramjet engines and otherwise have configurations that do not look at all like this missile. It's also a greater technological challenge to create something like a hypersonic anti-ship missile than an anti-ship ballistic missile.
Finally, this could be some new anti-air weapon, although we really don't have anything to directly compare it to in terms of its basic shape.
Regardless of the mystery surrounding this weapon, it's another reminder that China is pushing ahead with new weapons concepts for its growing armada.
What do you think it is? Let us know in the comments below.

Please see source for video
Posted for fair use

Hummm....so would the laser based CIWS that the US has been testing for forever and the Israeli one that's supposed to be ready for prime time be able to handle this latest PRC blivet?
 

jward

passin' thru
China’s navy puts 2 more advanced Type 055 destroyers into service in push for blue-water fleet

  • Anshan and Wuxi take part in night drill, according to state media report
  • Vessels expected to play a big part in country’s aircraft carrier strike groups

Liu Zhen



Liu Zhen in Beijing
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Published: 10:00pm, 22 Apr, 2022

Updated: 10:43pm, 22 Apr, 2022


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China has put two more Type 055 destroyers into service. Photo: CCTV

China has put two more Type 055 destroyers into service. Photo: CCTV

The Chinese navy has put two more of one of the world’s most powerful destroyers into service, taking to five the number confirmed as commissioned in the last two years as part of China’s plans to create a blue-water navy.
There was no formal announcement of the commissioning of the Anshan and Wuxi but the Type 055 guided-missile destroyers were reported to have taken part in a night firing and search and rescue exercise with their sister ship the Lhasa, state broadcaster CCTV reported on Thursday.
The Type 055 is regarded as second in power only to the US Navy’s Zumwalt-class stealth ship and the People’s Liberation Army plans to have eight of them in service in a first batch.
Zhao Shugan, captain of the Wuxi, told CCTV that his crew were being assessed around the clock, with the evaluation starting from the moment they left port and continuing until they docked.




“We must be ready to deal with emergency situations at all times, and immediately raise the level of deployment to deal with sea and air situations once a danger is detected,” Zhao was quoted as saying.
The report did not say when and where the exercise took place, but photos circulating online indicated that four of the destroyers were in the Yellow Sea last week.



China’s most advanced amphibious assault ship likely to be deployed in disputed South China Sea


01:50

China’s most advanced amphibious assault ship likely to be deployed in disputed South China Sea



Compared with the land attack-focused Zumwalt, the Type 055 is designed to be a multirole warship, equipped with weapons to counter missiles, ships and submarines.

The destroyers are also equipped with the country’s most advanced integrated electric propulsion system, allowing them to travel up to 10,000 nautical miles without refuelling – 2½ times further than the navy’s Type 054 multi-role frigate, the most numerous PLA warship in service.
The PLA Navy plans for the destroyers to play a key role in aircraft carrier strike groups as well as amphibious assault combat groups.

In a shipbuilding spree that has given China the world’s largest navy by number of ships, the hulls of eight Type 055 destroyers were built between 2017 and 2020.

The first one, the Nanchang, was delivered in January 2020 to the Northern Theatre Command, or North Sea Fleet; and the second, the Lhasa, went into service in March 2021, also with the North Sea Fleet.

The third, the Dalian, was commissioned in April last year for the Southern Theatre Command, or the South Sea Fleet.
A military source told the South China Morning Post earlier that the Yanan, another Type 055, was also in service


The Anshan and Wuxi are named after cities in Liaoning and Jiangsu provinces.

The Anshan was also the name of the navy’s first destroyer, a second-hand Soviet Gnevny-class destroyer Rekordny, bought in 1954 and retired in 1992.
China has an aggressive plan to build a real blue-water navy. It aims to build at least six aircraft carrier battle groups by 2035.

Please see source for video and additional photos
Posted for fair use
 

jward

passin' thru
US warns against China military presence in Solomon Islands

AFP
April 22, 2022 12:06 pm

China military base on Solomon Islands
Source: Pixabay




US officials visiting the strategic Solomon Islands on Friday warned of serious repercussions if China were to establish a permanent military presence there after the Pacific nation signed a defence pact with Beijing.
A White House delegation in the capital Honiara delivered the stern warning on the same day that China’s ambassador attended an event with Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare — a sign of the importance both nations are according to the small island state.

The United States and Australia — the Pacific nation’s traditional allies — are deeply suspicious of the defence deal, fearing it may give China a military foothold in the South Pacific.
The White House said the officials had told Sogavare that the recently signed pact has “potential regional security implications” for Washington and its allies.
“If steps are taken to establish a de facto permanent military presence, power-projection capabilities, or a military installation, the delegation noted that the United States would then have significant concerns and respond accordingly,” the White House said in a statement.
National Security Council Indo-Pacific Coordinator Kurt Campbell and Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel Kritenbrink led the delegation, which also included Pentagon officials.

According to the White House statement, “Sogavare reiterated his specific assurances that there would be no military base, no long-term presence, and no power projection capability, as he has said publicly.”
Beijing announced this week it had signed the undisclosed security pact with Honiara.
A draft of the pact shocked countries in the region when it was leaked last month, particularly measures that would allow Chinese naval deployments to the Solomons, which are located less than 2,000 kilometres (1,200 miles) from Australia.
Sogavare says his government signed the deal with “eyes wide open”, but declined to tell parliament when the signed version will be made public, and his public assurances have done little to ease concerns in Washington and Canberra.

– ‘Enormous pressure’ –
Too late to stop the security deal with China, the White House said its diplomatic delegation was visiting Fiji, Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands this week to “ensure our partnerships deliver prosperity, security and peace across the Pacific Islands and the Indo-Pacific”.
The US diplomatic team landed in Honiara just three days after the security pact with China was announced.
During a 90-minute meeting with Sogavare and two dozen members of his cabinet and senior staff, the US officials discussed expedited opening of a US embassy, health care assistance, vaccine deliveries and increased “people-to-people ties,” the White House said.

The delegation also met with opposition leaders and religious leaders.
Kritenbrink tweeted that he and Campbell had honoured those lost during the Guadalcanal campaign in World War II.
Meanwhile, China’s envoy Li Ming attended a ceremony with Sogavare to hand over an elite running track, which is part of a China-funded national stadium complex reportedly worth US$53 million.
The facility will host the 2023 Pacific Games — the first time the event has been staged in the history of the Solomons, where many of the 800,000 citizens live in poverty.

“On behalf of the Chinese government and people of China, we congratulate the government of the Solomon Islands,” Li said, as he delivered the latest investment lavished by Beijing on a Pacific nation.
Sogavare’s government severed ties with Taiwan in September 2019 in favour of diplomatic relations with China, unlocking investment but stoking inter-island rivalries.
Last November, protests against Sogavare’s rule sparked violent riots in the capital, during which much of the city’s Chinatown was torched.

While the unrest was partly fuelled by poverty and unemployment, anti-China sentiment was also cited as playing a role.
When asked about China’s influence in the Pacific, Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison told reporters Friday that Beijing was exerting “enormous pressure” on leaders of Pacific island nations.
Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian in turn accused “Australian politicians” of “coercive diplomacy” in the region.
 

jward

passin' thru



NK NEWS
@nknewsorg


BREAKING: North Korea rolled out Hwasong-17 ICBM the country claimed to have tested on March 24 during the April 25 military parade.

9:37 PM · Apr 25, 2022·Twitter Web App


Nathan J Hunt
@ISNJH



Key take away this is indeed a longer missile. also trailer was adjusted to hold the longer SLBM.. The strap down position also different on trailer to allow the missile to sit higher on trailer to extend past the raised front section.
@nktpnd
@DaveSchmerler
@ArmsControlWonk
View: https://twitter.com/ISNJH/status/1518801609249067008?s=20&t=08CgC15eUvdqLRIk6jZEYA
 

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Chinese navy ship enters Japan waters near Kagoshima Pref. islands

KYODO NEWS
KYODO NEWS - 4 hours ago - 04:02 | All, Japan


cropped_image_l.jpg



A Chinese navy vessel has been spotted in Japan's territorial waters near islands of the southwestern prefecture of Kagoshima, the Defense Ministry said Wednesday.
A survey ship entered Japanese waters from west of Kuchinoerabu Island at around 11 p.m. Tuesday and sailed out of the territorial waters south of Yakushima Island at around 2:10 a.m. Wednesday, the ministry said.

It is the first such intrusion by a Chinese navy vessel that the Defense Ministry has confirmed and announced since last November. The Japanese government lodged a protest with China through diplomatic channels.
The Maritime Self-Defense Force and the Japan Coast Guard monitored the passage of the Chinese vessel.
Chinese ships have repeatedly entered Japan's territorial waters or navigated in adjacent areas, most notably near the Senkaku Islands, a group of East China Sea islets controlled by Japan but claimed by China under the name Diaoyu.
China's growing military presence in the South and East China seas has been a source of friction with countries in the region, with some having overlapping territorial claims.

Apr 27, 2022 | KYODO NEWS
 

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passin' thru
North Korea’s New Short-Range Ballistic Missile

Source: Rodong Sinmun
On April 16, North Korea tested a new, unnamed short-range ballistic missile (SRBM), claiming the test would improve the operation of its “tactical nukes.”[1] The new missile would add incrementally to the substantial existing artillery and SRBM threat against South Korean and US forces within about 100 km of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). But it would not add meaningfully to North Korea’s tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) capability, given its longstanding deployment of large numbers of other nuclear-capable SRBMs, such as the Scud and the new KN-23. More significant is Pyongyang’s rhetorical emphasis on “tactical nukes,” clearly an effort to heighten South Korean and US concerns about the potential use of such weapons. Observers have rightly noted that the North’s claims, in conjunction with renewed activity at its nuclear test site, could mean Pyongyang plans to test a TNW in the near future. Although such a test would be logical (and probably required to field a small, low-yield TNW), it is still not clear what exactly the North means by “tactical nukes,” and there are logical reasons to test various other types of nuclear weapons as well.


Information to Date


On April 17, Guam’s Office of Civil Defense reported “the recent launch of an unidentified projectile out of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).” Later that day, North Korea issued a brief statement reporting that Kim Jong Un “observed the test-fire of a new-type tactical guided weapon.”[2] North Korean media reported that the successful test “is of great significance in drastically improving the firepower of the frontline long-range artillery units and enhancing the efficiency in the operation of tactical nukes of the DPRK and diversification of their firepower missions.” The accompanying photos showed a new type of solid-propellant SRBM fired from one of four rectangular launch canisters mounted on a small, wheeled, road-mobile launcher.[3] In the wake of Pyongyang’s announcement, the Republic of Korea’s (South Korea) Joint Chiefs of Staff reported that the North had launched two projectiles on April 16 to an altitude of about 25 km, a range of about 110 km, and a top speed of Mach 4.0 or less.


Analysis


The unnamed new missile appears to draw on the earlier KN-23 solid-propellant SRBM. Based on the photos, launch vehicle and trajectory, however, it is a much smaller system with a much shorter range (some 110 km vs. 450 km for the full-payload KN-23). This range appears consistent with the North’s claims that this missile will improve “frontline long-range artillery units,” akin to the role of South Korea’s similar-appearing 180-km range Korea Tactical Surface-to-Surface Missile (KTSSM).


The new missile has a similar range to Pyongyang’s earlier KN-02 Toksa SRBM (120-170 km), making it unclear whether it will fulfill a different role. If the new missile is derived from the KN-23, it has the potential to be more accurate than the older KN-02. It may also be guided throughout flight as the KN-23 is believed to be, enabling it to perform unexpected maneuvers that would complicate the task of US-ROK missile defenses.


The most significant aspect of the North Korean statement about the recent test was its association of the new missile with “the operation of tactical nukes of the DPRK.” This is the first time Pyongyang has linked a specific delivery system with TNW. But that does not necessarily mean the new missile is North Korea’s first delivery system for such warheads or that TNW are only now being deployed. A few key points to keep in mind:


  • Analysts have long assessed that North Korea’s earlier SRBMs are capable of carrying nuclear weapons.
  • By noting that the new missile is “enhancing the efficiency in the operation of tactical nukes of the DPRK and diversification of their firepower missions,” the March 17 statement implies that such warheads have already been deployed with earlier delivery systems.
  • Kim Jong Un’s January 2021 Eighth Party Congress report noted that Pyongyang had by that time already developed the technology “to miniaturize, lighten and standardize nuclear weapons and to make them tactical ones,” and that it had “proceeded to develop ultra-modern tactical nuclear weapons including new-type tactical rockets.”[4] It also sought to “make nuclear weapons smaller and lighter for more tactical uses …to develop tactical nuclear weapons to be used as various means according to the purposes of operational duty and targets of strike in modern warfare.”[5]

Implications


If deployed, the new missile would add only incrementally to the substantial existing North Korean artillery and SRBM threat against South Korean and US forces within about 100 km of the DMZ. If fielded in substantial numbers, it could free up some longer-range SRBMs to strike targets deeper inside the ROK—although producing the new missile may come at the expense of additional KN-23 production if the two missiles use the same production infrastructure. If armed with conventional warheads, its probable greater accuracy than the Scud and KN-02 means fewer missiles would be needed per strike to be confident of destroying targets. If it has KN-23-like maneuverability, the new missile’s improved survivability against missile defenses also would allow using fewer missiles per target than earlier systems.


It is unlikely the new missile will add meaningfully to North Korea’s TNW capability, given its longstanding deployment of large numbers of other nuclear-capable SRBMs. More significant than the new missile is Pyongyang’s choice of the April 16 tests to emphasize its “tactical nukes.” It clearly is using the opportunity to heighten South Korean and US concern about such weapons, as well as tout its technological progress and its successes in implementing the leadership’s military development plans.


Observers have been quite right to note the coincidence of the North’s April 17 statement with renewed activity at the Punggye-ri nuclear test site. If the North resumes nuclear testing, a TNW test would be logical—although we still do not know if, by “tactical nukes,” North Korea means:


  • “regular” nukes on longer-range SRBMs used against battlefield and other tactical targets;
  • shorter-range delivery systems equipped with “regular” nukes; and/or
  • smaller, lower-yield nuclear weapons.

The latter probably would require nuclear testing. Based on Kim’s January 2021 report and its weapons development trends, however, North Korea would also have reason to test a thermonuclear weapon, a boosted fission weapon, or a smaller strategic weapon better suited for multiple-warhead missiles, among others.


  1. [1]
    “Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Observes Test-fire of New-type Tactical Guided Weapon,” Rodong Sinmun, April 17, 2022.
  2. [2]
    Ibid.
  3. [3]
    Ibid.
  4. [4]
    “Great Programme for Struggle Leading Korean-style Socialist Construction to Fresh Victory: On Report Made by Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un at Eighth Congress of WPK,” DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 9, 2021.
  5. [5]
    Ibid.
North Korea’s New Short-Range Ballistic Missile - 38 North: Informed Analysis of North Korea
 

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Australia’s foreign minister denounces China’s ‘secret’ security deal with Solomon Islands
Marise Payne says other members of the ‘Pacific family’ share concerns but she rejects claims her government ‘dropped the ball’ in the region

Foreign affairs minister Marise Payne addressed the United States Studies Centre on Thursday. She said China’s security deal with Solomon Islands was ‘not transparent’. Photograph: Dan Himbrechts/AAP

Daniel Hurst Foreign affairs and defence correspondent

@danielhurstbne
Thu 28 Apr 2022 01.57 EDTLast modified on Thu 28 Apr 2022 03.39 EDT


Marise Payne has denounced the “secret” terms of China’s security deal with Solomon Islands, while insisting “no document signed and kept away from public view” would change Australia’s commitment to answering Pacific countries’ needs.
The foreign affairs minister said the agreement was “not transparent” – unlike Australia’s existing security treaty with Solomon Islands – and was also being hidden from other Pacific countries.

As the Coalition continues to reject Labor’s claims it presided over the worst Australian foreign policy failure in the Pacific in decades, Payne said other members of the “Pacific family” shared Australia’s concerns about the secretive arrangement.

Labor ‘gravely concerned’ by Karen Andrews’ claim about potential China election interference
Read more

The prime minister, Scott Morrison, has relied on the public promises of his counterpart, Manasseh Sogavare, that Solomon Islands would not allow a Chinese military base or a persistent military presence.

But Payne revealed on Thursday Australia had “continued to seek assurances on that and we will be doing so into the future”.

Payne made the remarks during a significant pre-election foreign policy address, during which she warned “we’ve entered a period that is becoming more dangerous, less stable and less prosperous”.

She called for “rules over anarchy” and argued the Coalition’s hard line against Beijing’s “growing assertiveness” had been vindicated.

“We have led on this,” Payne said at a United States Studies Centre event in Sydney.

“There is now strong agreement from amongst the Australian people that standing firm on our values and principles, even in the face of pressure, is the right approach for our long-term future.”

In a reference to China, Payne said “a region in which an authoritarian power is dominant doesn’t get us closer” to Australia’s goal of a freer, more open Indo-Pacific.


The deal that shocked the world: inside the China-Solomons security pact
Read more

But China’s signing of the security agreement with Solomon Islands, 1,600km from Cairns, has complicated the Coalition’s push to project a strong message on national security before the 21 May election.

On Thursday a key adviser to the premier of the most populous province in Solomon Islands also expressed concern that the deal could enable Sogavare to use Chinese armed police and military personnel to quash democratic dissent and hold power for years to come.

Payne implicitly rejected claims Australia had “dropped the ball” in the region.


Australia had been dealing with security developments “consistently for some time”, including discussions about China’s desire to establish a security presence in the region, she said.

Those conversations had enabled Australia to “even more readily” deploy Australian federal police and Australian defence force personnel in response to unrest in Honiara in November and December, together with New Zealand, Papua New Guinea and Fiji.

“It’s important to acknowledge that that is a Pacific family security response that worked, that was immediate, that addressed the needs of the Solomon Islands,” Payne said.

But she said “ultimately a security arrangement kept secret at the insistence of a partner is what we are dealing with now”.


US won’t rule out military action if China establishes base in Solomon Islands
Read more

Payne acknowledged that Solomon Islands had made a sovereign decision but added: “We know other members of the Pacific family share our concerns.”

When asked late on Wednesday whether Beijing planned to disclose the whole treaty, a Chinese foreign ministry official said the two countries would “act in accordance with international customary practice on the basis of bilateral consultation”.

The official, Wang Wenbin, said “some Australian politicians” were “seeking their own political gains by making denigrating remarks against China”. He accused the US and Australia of “pure double standards”.

“The US shows no openness and transparency when it conducted nuclear tests and dumped nuclear wastes in the South Pacific region and when Aukus opened the Pandora’s box of nuclear proliferation in the Asia Pacific region,” Wang said.

Labor’s home affairs spokesperson, Kristina Keneally, echoed Payne’s concerns about the secrecy surrounding the deal.

“We have already now got China dictating terms to a member of our Pacific family,” Keneally told reporters in Sydney.

But Donald Rothwell, a professor of international law at the Australian National University, said reports that China had advised Solomon Islands it did not wish the treaty to be publicly released at this time were “not exceptional”.

Rothwell said there was no requirement under international treaty law that a treaty be immediately made publicly available.

“Some care needs to be taken to applying Australian standards to this treaty, especially when it is asserted it is ‘secret’,” he said.

“Australian treaty practice in this regard is generally considered to be world leading, but I would observe that in my experience there is always a time lag between an announcement that a treaty has been signed and when it becomes publicly available.”

Keneally continued to prosecute the argument Morrison “has been caught asleep at the wheel and as a result Australia is less secure”.

She cited “extraordinary” remarks from the head of Australia’s Office of National Intelligence, Andrew Shearer, denying that the deal reflected an intelligence failure.

“That means it was a government failure,” Keneally said.


Solomons PM could use Chinese police to stay in power, key provincial adviser fears
Read more

Keneally accused Karen Andrews of indulging in “conspiratorial fantasies and unhinged commentary about foreign interference” after the home affairs minister implied on Wednesday China might have timed the announcement to influence the Australian election outcome.
Keneally said Andrews had yet to reply after she wrote to the minister on Wednesday reminding her of “the vital convention that opposition is briefed on any developing matters of national security” during the election campaign.
Andrews has not responded to Guardian Australia’s questions about the matter.


 

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passin' thru

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Posted for fair use.....

North Korea preparing for first nuclear test since 2017, warn experts
Satellite images at test site emerge as Kim Jong Un watches parade of sophisticated weaponry

Christian Davies in Seoul
45 minutes ago

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New satellite images of a North Korean nuclear facility suggest that Pyongyang is inching towards its first nuclear test since 2017, experts have warned, as Kim Jong Un ratchets up tensions on the Korean peninsula. The commercial satellite images were collected this week and analysed by experts from the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. They revealed the construction of buildings, movement of lumber and an increase in equipment and supplies immediately outside a new entrance to the Punggye-ri nuclear test site in the country’s north-east. The images also showed personnel playing volleyball in the courtyard of the test site’s main administrative and support area.

“Although some sources suggest the seventh nuclear test could occur between May and September of this year, the date of a seventh nuclear test will undoubtedly depend exclusively upon the personal decision of Kim Jong Un,” said the authors of the CSIS study. “Current satellite imagery indicates that preparations are well under way and should not be discounted as insignificant activity.” Leif-Eric Easley, a professor of international studies at Ewha Womans University in Seoul, said that “if the Kim regime wants to be provocative, it could test soon after South Korea’s new president takes office [on May 10] and before President Biden’s trip to Asia later in the month”.

“But in order to avoid offending Pyongyang‘s benefactors in Beijing, the next test will likely avoid dates close to China’s five-yearly Communist party Congress later in the year.” Kim presided over a military parade through the streets of Pyongyang this week, during which the regime flaunted a hypersonic glide vehicle, its “monster” Hwasong-17 intercontinental ballistic missile and a new solid fuel missile that was possibly designed to be launched from a submarine.

The North Korean leader also delivered a speech in which he stressed that the country’s nuclear weapons had a “secondary mission” beyond the “primary mission” of preventing war. Experts have warned that Kim might use his nuclear arsenal to assert control over the entire Korean peninsula.

Analysts noted that the US-led international sanctions regime instituted after North Korea’s last nuclear test in 2017 has failed to prevent Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons programme from growing steadily.

Diplomacy has stalled since the collapse of a summit at Hanoi in 2019 between Kim and former US president Donald Trump. Recommended News in-depthNorth Korea nuclear tensions North Korea: ‘Kim doesn’t just want more missiles, he wants better ones’

But Duyeon Kim, a Seoul-based senior fellow at the Center for New American Security think-tank, said that Washington had little choice but to stick to its demand that North Korea give up its nuclear weapons.

“It’s difficult to imagine that the Biden administration would ever scrap denuclearisation as the end goal,” she said. “If any US administration did that, then the supporters of the incoming conservative South Korean administration will demand Seoul make its own nuclear weapons, because they will perceive Washington to be unreliable in guaranteeing South Korea’s security.

“The longer the diplomatic stalemate, the more time North Korea has to perfect its nuclear weapons capability, build political leverage before negotiations and strengthen its grip on its nuclear arsenal,” she added. “The problem is, Pyongyang continues to refuse to return to the dialogue table."
 

jward

passin' thru
Australia has to end its long Pacific stupor before it’s too late
Australia’s neglect has allowed China to expand its grand strategy of global base-building into the Pacific. It is not too late for us to shore up our place in the region, writes the former head of RAMSI

Nick Warner
Apr 29, 2022 – 5.00am



For two generations, since the end of World War II, Australia has squandered the chance to build deep and enduring relations with our neighbours in the South Pacific. And now it’s almost too late.
The people-to-people links that were once so strong with countries such as PNG and Fiji have fallen away. Successive governments in Canberra have been preoccupied with what were seen as more pressing and more important issues elsewhere in the world, rather than focusing enough attention on our closest friends and neighbours.
97f2757bfd773454dd4ce067639efa2bb98c171d

Scott Morrison has engaged a lot with the Pacific but the results have been mixed. AAP
As a result, the Pacific became something of a backwater. It was quiet. It was remote. Few other countries took much notice. Our Embassies and High Commissions were small, generally under-staffed and seldom headed by senior diplomats. Over the years Australia has had some excellent and experienced diplomats stationed through the Pacific – Greg Urwin, Matt Anderson and James Batley come to mind. But generally the Pacific hasn’t been high on the priority list for up-and-coming diplomats; if you want to climb the career ladder, go for Washington or London.
It’s not that no attention was paid to the South Pacific. In the 1990s Labor’s Gordon Bilney worked hard to strengthen relations, followed by Richard Marles a decade later. Alexander Downer focused a lot of successful effort on PNG (Sandline and the Bougainville peace agreement that ended a brutal and bloody conflict) and Solomon Islands (the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands – RAMSI).
Julie Bishop would take the shadow foreign minister on annual pre-Christmas tours of the region, but was prevented from doing more by cuts to the DFAT budget and the aid budget. And the Morrison government increased its engagement and assistance (the Pacific Step-Up).

When there were serious problems, together with New Zealand, we could muster the energy and resources to step in and help.
So good things were done, but none of it was enough, and certainly not enough when China started to ramp up its presence and influence a decade ago.
A rising China was always going to play a bigger role in the South Pacific – just another great power exerting its influence. But China also came with strategic intent. A key ambition for the Chinese Communist Party is for the PLA to be a “world-class” global military force by 2049 – the 100-year anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China. To achieve that goal, China needs military bases and facilities across the globe.
This was a game of ‘whack-a-mole’. We whacked successfully, but China wasn’t going to give up its ambition for a military base.
The first Chinese military base outside China was built in Djibouti in 2016 at a cost of almost $800 million. I drove around the base late last year – an imposing concrete structure with towering walls, and curious guards peering through binoculars. The second base is being built at Ream in Cambodia. And China has looked far afield for other sites – from Abu Dhabi in the United Arab Emirates, to Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Gwadar in Pakistan, to Bata in Equatorial Guinea.

Sometime after 2015 it became clear in Canberra that China was looking at sites for a naval base in the South Pacific. Oblivious until that point, we were sleepwalking into a new and dangerous strategic environment: a Chinese naval base or facility in the South Pacific would seriously complicate Australia’s security, depending on its size, nature and location, and require a significant increase in defence spending (well above the current 2 per cent of GDP) and changes to the force structure of the ADF.

Over the past few years the media has covered some of this with reporting about Chinese ambitions in Vanuatu, the PNG island of Daru in the Torres Strait, Bougainville and elsewhere.
With good and timely information, nimble and well-funded government action, and clever and sensitive diplomacy, none of these and other Chinese hopes for a base came off. But as others have said, this was a game of “whack-a-mole”. We whacked successfully, but China wasn’t going to give up its ambition for a military base.
And it was clear that if we slipped up, were too slow, or were less adroit with our diplomacy, we would wake up one morning to the news that China had signed a security agreement with one of our neighbours.
And, of course, that is what happened a week or so ago.

I don’t know what went wrong, which part of our response was deficient – I’m out of that loop.
But now, for the first time I can think of since World War II – when my war correspondent father accompanied American forces from Torakina in Bougainville, to Guadalcanal in the Solomons, and onto Saipan, Peleliu and Tokyo – we are looking to the US to intervene and to fix a significant security problem in the South Pacific. The Americans bring power and influence and money. But Solomon Islands is far from Washington and even further from its knowledge base.

The Americans have said Washington will “respond accordingly” if China builds a military base in the Solomons, and Prime Minister Morrison has said that he shares “the same red line” with the US. But threats don’t generally go down well in the Pacific. Patience, trust, quiet communication, building relationships, that’s what works.
(And as Obama showed over the use of chemical weapons in Syria, if a red line is prescribed then not enforced, it leads to derision and broader failure.)

Nineteen years ago, together with the AFP’s Ben McDevitt, I led a multi-national Pacific peacekeeping operation to the Solomon Islands. The country was on the verge of becoming a failed state. RAMSI – and Australia – was immensely popular with Solomon Islanders, who welcomed us with open arms and enormous relief. When RAMSI left 14 years later, Australia’s popularity and influence remained strong. And now, just five years later, despite calls from the Prime Minister, visits by the heads of ASIS and ONI, and by the Minister for the Pacific, Prime Minister Sogavare has told the world that in signing the security agreement with China he is “on the right side of history”.

Sogavare is a proud Solomon Islander, and a clever and mercurial politician who has been prime minister four times in a long career. A few years ago, I called on him in Honiara and, building on the work of the High Commission, talked to him about the risks of signing up Huawei to build an internet cable to connect Honiara and Sydney. He listened carefully. The deal didn’t go forward and instead Australia funded the Coral Sea cable. Relationships – and alternatives and money – are important.
China is now seemingly entrenched in Solomons and will also be looking for other opportunities for a base elsewhere in the Pacific. But, for better or worse, Pacific politics seldom provide certainty. It’s not too late for Australia to shore up its place in the South Pacific and to protect its strategic interests.
Morrison has shown personal interest in the South Pacific and his Step-Up was a welcome and important move. But it should have been the first of many steps on a long journey, not a one off beefing-up of resources and attention. That was never going to be enough.

And our position on climate change has undermined our standing, importantly with Prime Minister Bainimarama in Fiji.
Labor is right to be talking about more aid, more seasonal workers and about defence force training in Australia.
But that’s the easy part. What is needed is a fundamental resetting of our political relationship with the countries of the South Pacific.

There are many models that we could draw from – including in the Pacific. But the bottom line needs to be a much closer association with any regional country that wants to go forward with us – including perhaps some form of political association with some of the micro-states.

Related
How Australia can end the race for bases in the Pacific
I put this idea to the Gillard government a decade ago and, to his credit, Richard Marles took some of it forward, as did Julie Bishop and DFAT under Frances Adamson years later. But now, with the very real threat of a Chinese base 2000 kilometres from Australia, it’s time for braver and more creative thinking and action.
We can continue to wander into this new and more dangerous strategic environment or we can actually, finally, after a long stupor, do what we should have done decades ago – truly embrace our friends in the South Pacific.
Nick Warner is a Dragoman counsellor, former Director-General of the Office of National Intelligence, and was the Special Coordinator of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands.

Expert coverage of Australia’s public sector.
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Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Breaking911
@Breaking911

5m

BREAKING: North Korea fires unidentified projectile toward East Sea - Yonhap


Posted for fair use.....

North Korea launches suspected missile toward sea

By The Associated Press
Published: May. 3, 2022 at 8:50 PM PDT | Updated: 9 minutes ago

SEOUL, South Korea (AP) - North Korea has launched a suspected ballistic missile toward its eastern waters on Wednesday, South Korean and Japanese officials said, days after North Korean leader Kim Jong Un vowed to bolster his nuclear arsenal “at the fastest possible pace” and threatened to use them against rivals.

The launch, the North’s 14th round of weapons firing, also came six days before a new South Korean president takes office for a single five-year term.

South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff said in a brief statement that the launch was made off the North’s eastern coast but gave no further details.

Japan’s Defense Ministry said North Korea has fired a possible ballistic missile without providing further details.

North Korea’s unusually fast pace in weapons testing this year underscores its dual goal of advancing its missile programs and applying pressure on Washington over a deepening freeze in nuclear negotiations, experts say.

There are also signs that the North is preparing for a nuclear test at its remote northeastern testing facility.

Last week, Kim Jong Un showcased his most powerful missiles during a massive military parade in capital, Pyongyang, where he vowed to develop his arsenal at the “fastest possible pace” and warned that the North would proactively use its nuclear weapons if its national interests are threatened.

Copyright 2022 The Associated Press. All rights reserved.
 

jward

passin' thru
Dr. Malcolm Davis
@Dr_M_Davis

13h

After Solomon Islands - PNG comes next. Wake up and open our eyes to China's ambitions in the Southwest Pacific!

Geoff Wade
@geoff_p_wade


Papua New Guinea: New PRC-linked port and economic base being established at Ihu in Gulf Province. Papua New Guinea. Includes "military base" https://businessadvantagepng.com/work-is-underw


Papua New Guinea's Ihu Special Economic Zone builds momentum - Business Advantage PNG
Paul Chai

4-5 minutes


Ground has been broken at the Ihu Special Economic Zone (ISEZ) in Papua New Guinea’s Gulf Province. Project Director Peter KenGemar says companies are already contemplating a move into the zone to take advantage of generous incentives.

With new roads, airstrips and increased interest for business, it has been a busy two years for Ihu Special Economic Zone (ISEZ) in Gulf Province, and a reminder of the adage (from the classic baseball film Field of Dreams), ‘if you build it, they will come.’

The impetus for the zone was to support the TotalEnergies-led Papua LNG gas project, set for a final investment decision at the end of 2023, and localise some of the project’s expected economic benefits.
The National Executive Council’s approval of the ISEZ was announced in 2019. Two years on, momentum is building, not only in anticipation of Papua LNG but also Mayur Resources’ nearby Orokolo Bay Industrial Sands Project, the mining lease for which was granted last December.

Ihu Special Economic Zone (ISEZ). Credit: Office of Member for Kikori Open Electorate

Seed funding
While a green light for Papua LNG will be the trigger for the zone’s construction, Peter KenGemar, Project Director of ISEZ, told the recent the 2021 Business Advantage Papua New Guinea Investment Conference that the necessary seed funding to advance the zone was now in place.

‘The government has approved the funding of up to K100 million,’ says KenGemar. ‘That’s K20 million annually to support the administration and the office and the work that we are doing. The national government also passed the Special Economic Zone Authority Act in 2020.
Story continues after advertisment...

‘The Special Economic Zone Authority Act clearly states that there will be concessions and relief from taxes for the first ten-to-fifteen years for any new companies that come into our space.’
The ISEZ has also attracted international funding of K80 million from China in a deal signed last year with China’s Ambassador to PNG, Zeng Fanhua.
In the first instance, that means infrastructure and ISEZ has wasted no time in getting to work.

‘We are working with state agencies and other agencies that are responsible for that infrastructure such as the works department and the department of transport and port facilities as well as telecommunication companies like DataCo.’
Work has begun on roads from Petoe to Ihu and from Purari to Ihu as well as the rehabilitation of local airfields. Ihu Airstrip was re-opened in 2021 after 17 years. More recently, the Baimuru airstrip was re-opened after 14 years.
Incentives

ISEZ’s Peter KenGemar
KenGemar said there was already interest in the ISEZ not only from international companies but also local ones.
‘We are already hearing in Port Moresby companies say that, if we can give them incentives, they might migrate from Moresby, where the cost is high and the taxes are high [compared] to our location.

‘The Special Economic Zone Authority Act clearly states that there will be concessions and relief from taxes for the first ten-to-fifteen years for any new companies that come into our space. So, that is the attractive part about it.’
The hope is that ISEZ will also help to empower local Gulf businesses to grow with the help of these incentives, combined with the business knowledge and experience that will be moving into the area from elsewhere.

‘Our people in Gulf are good fishermen and they have a lot of access to fisheries. The other area is agriculture,’ KenGemar says. ‘Those are two of the low-hanging fruits that we are looking for our people to get engaged in and local investors and other investors want to invest in that space.’

KenGemar points to the fact that 20 per cent of PNG’s forest acreage resides in Kikori District, where there are a couple of timber permits already operating.
‘They are exporting round logs. Now, we want to go into downstreaming, so we are looking at SME spaces so that people could engage in that.’ A corresponding SME training and funding program will roll out to support this, he says.
 

northern watch

TB Fanatic
China aircraft carrier on combat training in Western Pacific
China's navy says its Liaoning aircraft carrier group has embarked on a "realistic combat" training mission in the Western Pacific
ByThe Associated Press
3 May 2022, 22:04

WireAP_8ee7c868b10f4e63ac19a1891e7703b6_16x9_992.jpg


BEIJING -- China's Liaoning aircraft carrier group has embarked on a “realistic combat” training mission in the Western Pacific, the Chinese navy said Tuesday.

In a posting on its social media site, the navy said the mission is routine, adhers to all international laws and practices and is “not directed at any third parties."

However, the mission underscores the growing role of China’s naval forces as Beijing seeks to supplant the U.S. as the preeminent military power in Asia.

China operates the world’s largest navy by number of ships, while the U.S. maintains an edge in aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines as well as in numbers of bases and allies in the region, where the competition is focused on the strategically vital South China Sea.

The Liaoning was originally purchased as a hulk from Ukraine and entirely refurbished. China has since added a second entirely home-built carrier, the Shandong, and is believed to be at work on at least two more.

Exercising under realistic wartime conditions has become a focus of China's military in recent years, in apparent recognition of its lack of combat experience going back four decades.

China aircraft carrier on combat training in Western Pacific - ABC News (go.com)
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Will Ripley
@willripleyCNN


#urgent US military & intelligence agencies now assess North Korea could be ready to resume underground nuclear testing this month, three US officials tell @barbarastarrcnn. If NK conducts a test, it would be their 7th underground nuclear test and the first in nearly five years.
View: https://twitter.com/willripleyCNN/status/1522367106209120257?s=20&t=z7ugCxknDsJHoped-q38fQ

I'm guessing that the next test is going to go for yield.
 

jward

passin' thru
Marines Based Inside China’s Striking Distance Key To Deterrence General Says
Force Design 2030 will work because it is better for Marines to be forward than to fight their way in, says Lt. Gen. Karsten Heckl.
by
Howard Altman
May 5, 2022 4:40 PM

Marines Forward Deployed Japan China


That was the message delivered Wednesday afternoon by Marine Corps Lt. Gen. Karsten Heckl, the officer in charge of carrying out sweeping changes to the Corps ordered by Commandant Gen. David Berger.

It was part of an effort to sell Berger’s controversial Marine Force Design 2030 initiative. Heckl told a virtual panel held by the Center for International and Strategic Studies and the U.S. Naval Institute that the objective was to keep a stand-in force of Marines - currently the III Marine Expeditionary Force headquartered in Okinawa, Japan - forward inside the range of Chinese fires. That, said Heckl, will make the communist nation think twice about taking aggressive action in the Pacific.
heckl.jpg

Marine Lt. Gen. Karsten Heckl says being there is better than getting there. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Tia Carr).
Being forward inside the weapons engagement zone, with allies and partners, reassuring them every day, by walking the real estate with them, that is deterrence,” Heckl said. “And that is the true value proposition of force design- to simply make the leadership within the CCP wake up in the morning and go, ‘today just ain't it,’ right?”

The Force Design 2030 initiative, officially launched on March 23, 2020, aims to fundamentally change the way Marines operate after 20 years of land-focused warfare in Afghanistan and Iraq.
GettyImages-451602654-scaled.jpg

After 20 years of war in places like Iraq and Afghanistan, the Marines are looking to get their sea legs back. (Photo by Robert Nickelsberg/Getty Images)

It calls for addressing what the current Marine leadership says are shortfalls in a variety of increasingly important capabilities, including expeditionary long-range precision fires; medium to long-range air defense systems; short-range (point defense) air defense systems; high-endurance, long-range unmanned systems with intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, electronic warfare, and lethal strike capabilities. In addition, the initiative seeks “disruptive and less-lethal capabilities appropriate for countering malign activity by actors pursuing maritime 'gray zone' strategies.”




The idea is to redesign the force to focus once again on naval expeditionary warfare “and to better align itself with the National Defense Strategy, in particular, its focus on strategically competing with China and Russia,” according to a 2021 Congressional Research Service report.
The Force Design initiative is informed by two operational concepts: Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment and Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO).

Littoral Operations In a Contested Environment is a concept to allow U.S. maritime forces to operate in contested areas, where the adversary operates closer to home, in a sensor-rich environment with ample long-range fires to counter U.S. naval power.
At its core, EABO involves relatively small groups of Marines quickly establishing bases of operation in forward areas, especially on small islands. This concept of distributed operations also envisions them being able to then rapidly reposition themselves, as necessary. The purpose is to use these flexible, responsive ground forces to help control littoral areas, and even surrounding "seaspaces," to deter opponents in situations short of an actual conflict, and then, if that fails, be well-positioned to engage enemy forces.
eabo.jpg

A Marine holding a Stinger missile launcher stands in front of a Combat Rubber Raiding Craft on Ukibaru Island off the coast of Okinawa during Exercise Hagatna Fury 21. USMC
To make these concepts work, the Marines intend to eliminate or reduce several types of units and their corresponding military occupational specialities, including tank, bridging and law enforcement.
The Marines have ditched tanks entirely, with the plan to rely on the Army if needed.

"We have sufficient evidence to conclude that this capability, despite its long and honorable history in the wars of the past, is operationally unsuitable for our highest-priority challenges in the future," Berger wrote in his initial Force Design document. "Heavy ground armor capability will continue to be provided by the U.S. Army."
The Marines are also looking to deactivate several aviation squadrons - tilt rotor and rotary wing.
TRS-264.jpg

The Marines want to get rid of Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 264, seen here in Afghanistan Afghanistan in 2013. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Gabriela Garcia/Released).

In addition, the Marines are planning to reduce the number of F-35B and C aircraft in each squadron from 16 to 10, and replace its fleet of RQ-21 Blackjack drones with larger and smaller remotely piloted aircraft.
The Marines also plan to reorganize higher echelon Marine formations and get smaller—reducing forces by 12,000 personnel by 2030. That reorganization of core Marine units includes the creation of these EABO-focused formations called Marine Littoral Regiments.
"We’ve recently stood up the 3rd Marine Littoral Regiment," said Heckl. "It should go out to sea sometime next year. And we’re looking forward to all the experimentation with that and how it’s going to inform Force Design."
The plan has drawn sweeping criticism, particularly from former Marine leaders, such as this one, titled "The Marine Corps’ plan to redesign the force will only end up breaking it."

“After a detailed examination of Force Design 2030 and supporting documents including the Tentative Manual for Expeditionary Advanced Based Operations and the concept for “Stand-in Forces” we can only conclude that Marine Corps leaders are moving to create a force that will be incapable of meeting the Congressional requirement to provide fleet marine forces with effective combined arms,” wrote retired Marine Lt. Gen. Paul K. Van Riper in a scathing series of editorials on the subject published by our sister publication, Task & Purpose.
US_Navy_030212-N-5319A-002_A_Landing_Craft_Air_Cushion_LCAC_from_the_USS_Tarawa_LHA_1_Amphibious_Ready_Group_ARG_offloads_an_M1-A1_Abrams_Tank.jpeg

A USMC M1 Abrams tank loads onto an LCAC in San Diego. After a long history of heavy armor operations, the Marines are out of the tank business in order for its force mix to align with its new strategy. U.S. Navy photo by Photographer's Mate 1st Class Brien Aho.

During the hour-long talk, moderated by Seth Jones, Heckl took some of the blame for the criticism.
“Let me start off with putting some of the responsibility for that where it belongs; probably on me for not doing an articulate enough job, which I’ve been doing a lot lately, of explaining Force Design,” he said.
Heckl explained that U.S. military policy, like the National Defense Strategy developed in 2018 under then-Defense Secretary James Mattis, is what is driving the Force Design initiative.

“We always, always build to the worst-case scenario, which in this case clearly is China,” he said, pointing out that in addition to military might, they have a great global economic influence.
“So this is much worse than the 70-year Cold War with the Soviet Union,” he said.
The Marine Air-Ground Task Force, or MAGTF, “still exists,” he said. “All the modernization that we’re doing with Force Design is going to make the rest of the MAGTF that much better.”
GettyImages-488867305-scaled.jpg

The Marines want a smaller, more mobile force to counter China. (TED ALJIBE/AFP via Getty Images)
The MAGTF is the primary organization Marines use to accomplish missions across the range of military operations. The most common iteration of the MAGTF is the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) stationed afloat on board the ships of a Navy Amphibious Ready Group (ARG).
"A MAGTF can be anything based on task and purpose, the mission given," said Heckl. "The real ability of a Marine Air-Ground Task Force to project is off of amphibious ships, where we can bring the full weight of a Marine Air-Ground Task Force, flight deck, fifth-gen fighters, well deck, 2,500 bloodthirsty Marines, right?"

That stand-in force - in this case, the III Marine Expeditionary Force - makes all the difference, said Heckl.
“Presence matters,” said Heckl. “They’re there. They live, eat, train every day inside the PRC’s [People's Republic of China] weapons engagement zone. You can even be a JV student of history and know that if you’re not there when a conflict begins or when a crisis begins, you’re going to have problems, right? If you’re going to have to fight your way in, that’s not a good place to begin, right?”
MarineFD2.jpg

It's better for Marines to be forward than to fight their way in, said Lt. Gen. Karsten Heckl. (Photo by Lance Cpl. Justin Marty)
The value of a stand-in force, with “very small signature management, is in everything we do with Force Design,” Heckl said, adding that “a small, maneuverable, very lethal, but forward, stand-in” force is the key to success.
“Being there is – this is me talking – 90 percent of the fight, you know,” he said. “So a real challenge for me as a MEF commander in San Diego, the biggest MEF in the Marine Corps, was the 7,000-mile physics problem I had.”
law.jpg

A model of Austal USA's Light Amphibious Warship concept., YouTube capture via Naval News
To keep future Marine forces supplied and mobile, Heckl pointed to Force Design 2030's call for Light Amphibious Warship (LAW).
“The light amphibious warship is an example of what would be a major contributor to logistics,” said Heckl. “So as indication and warnings are coming in, we would use the LAW to provide a quick dump of sustainment supplies and then back out as things escalate. What we should be focusing our sustainment efforts on are lethality – rearming and keeping Marines so that they can perform the missions they’re there for.”

Heckl also scoffed at criticism that the Marines are not purchasing enough remotely operated systems. The Corps has already ditched its fleet of RQ-21 Blackjack drones in favor of other unmanned platforms, including the MQ-9 Reaper. You can read a full report on those changes here.
“We’re going to have three MQ-9 squadrons,” he said. “We’ve got one fully up and running now doing missions all the time. We are very aggressively pursuing not just UAVs, but all things unmanned.”
Marine-MQ9.jpg

The Marines have three MQ-9 squadrons. USMC

That, he said, includes both on and under the waves.
“To be that fleet Marine force in support of a numbered fleet and the joint force, we have to be able to sense and make sense in all domains, to include sub,” he said. "So we’re pursuing avenues on all of that.”
But, he cautioned, with the rapid advance of technology, the Marine Corps has to “be careful of programs of record, right, because by the time you get one inked there is a new technology. So we need to stay nimble and agile so that we can maximize the technology and keep up with it.”
Heckl likened the Chinese military buildup on atolls in the South China Sea with Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 as additional examples of why the Force Design initiative makes sense despite the withering complaints.
GettyImages-1236503337-scaled.jpg

Tanks are deployed during a shore defense operation as part of a military exercise simulating the defense against the intrusion of Chinese military, amid rising tensions between Taipei and China, in Tainan, Taiwan, 11 November 2021. (Photo by Ceng Shou Yi/NurPhoto via Getty Images)
Both of those situations, he said, fall under the concept of “gray-zone” warfare, actions that fall below the threshold of all-out combat but which could encompass a range of activities, including cyberattacks, assassinations, or occupation by unofficial militias.

As a result, having a stand-in force of Marines will only be more important, he said.
“I would say the important thing with gray-zone activity if you have to be there,” he said. “In order to counter malign activity/coercive behavior, you have to be there – again, to the point of standing forces.”
Berger’s annual update is due out next week, said Heckl.
It remains to be seen whether that will quiet any of the critics or just add more fuel to their fire.
Contact the author: howard@thewarzone.com
stripe

 

jward

passin' thru
BNO News
@BNONews

1m

BREAKING: North Korea fires missile towards the Sea of Japan


Tokyoite Journal
@TokyoiteMag

57s

Breaking: Japanese Defence Ministry officials say that North Korea launched what may have been a ballistic missile at 2:15pm JST, NHK - Japan's public broadcaster reports. #NorthKorea



South Korea and Japan have both reported that North Korea appears to have launched another missile into the East Sea/Sea of Japan today, believed to be a ballistic missile. Authorities have yet to report further details regarding the projectile.
View: https://twitter.com/shreyas_k_reddy/status/1522810881498701826?s=20&t=T4-Ubz82uPqY1vzoPZX9ng



Ginsberg.fund
@ginsbergonomics

5m

Heads up! Twitter bout to freak about North Korea firing ANOTHER missile into the Sea of Japan. Chill, they do this literally every day.
 
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vector7

Dot Collector
If South Korea takes a path of turning hostile against it's neighbors, the end of it's path could be a Ukraine.

I heard this msg caused a storm of public opinion in S.Korea. Actually, this is a direct threat of war in the form of land warfare against both S.Korea and the US
View: https://twitter.com/DonnaWongHK/status/1522789768333230080?s=20&t=AhIjcVzR8bzg8mfQ8Kf2ZA

Joint US-Indonesia war games expand to 14 nations
View: https://twitter.com/grumblemumbler/status/1522819868390838273?s=20&t=AhIjcVzR8bzg8mfQ8Kf2ZA

North Korea fires ballistic missile from submarine, South Korea says
View: https://twitter.com/nypost/status/1523023887365459968?s=20&t=MHNHWtW4tERlisaUm-mG2g
 

jward

passin' thru
Home» News»North Korea Test Fires Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile


File picture: The KN-23 "mini-SLBM" test carried out on October 19th 2021

North Korea Test Fires Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile
North Korea launched a submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) towards the East Sea (Sea of Japan) from a submarine near Sinpo at 02:07 p.m. on May 7th. The launch comes just four days ahead of the presidential inauguration of Suk-yeol Yoon.
Daehan Lee 07 May 2022

The SLBM flew 600 km and reached an altitude of about 60 km. ROK and US intelligence services are still analyzing the launch
The ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff release a statement saying:
“North Korea’s continuous launches of ballistic missiles is a serious threat the peace and security of the Korean Peninsula and the international community. We define this as an obvious violation of the UN security resolution, and urges North Korea to stop it immediately.”
The outgoing president Moon held the National Security Council led by the Director of the National Security Hoon Suh, at 4 p.m., criticizing and pointing out again that this threat violates the UN security resolution and poses serious threats to the Korean Peninsula and the world. The NSC also requested North Korea to come back to the diplomatic table to solve issues.
KN-23
File picture: The KN-23 “mini-SLBM” test carried out on October 19th 2021
The SLBM launch of North Korea took place seven months after the North launched a mini-SLBM on October 19th 2021. Korean intelligence authorities reportedly consider the SLBM this time as similar to the mini-SLBM known as KN-23. The North’s Gorae-class submarine-launched SLBM last year flew high up to 60 km over a distance of 590 km.
The local reports analyzed that this could be a provocation against the upcoming visit of US President Joe Biden to Korea for the summit talk and the inauguration of the new conservative president-elect Suk-yeol Yoon.
North Korea revealed in late April a new SLBM and small-sized SLBM, as improved versions Pukguksung-5ㅅ.

 

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North Korea Fires Suspected SLBM

North Korea conducted its 15th missile test this year, believed to be a submarine-launched ballistic missile.

Mitch Shin


By Mitch Shin

May 09, 2022

North Korea fired a suspected short-range submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) from waters in the Sinpo area toward its east coast at 2:07 p.m. KST on May 7, South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) said. The missile flew about 600 km with an altitude of 60 km, according to the JCS.

A few minutes after Seoul’s JCS announced the North Korean missile test, National Security Advisor Suh Hoon presided over an emergency meeting of the National Security Council (NSC). The NSC released a statement condemning the North’s SLBM test and called it “a violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions.”

The U.S. and South Korean special representatives on North Korea also held spoke in a phone call and condemned the North’s missile tests. While urging Pyongyang to restrain from worsening the situation, they also delivered their consistent call for North Korea to return to the negotiating table.

Saturday’s launch was the first SLBM test since North Korea launched its “KN-23” short-range ballistic missile – which Pyongyang described as a “new type submarine-launched ballistic missile” – from its SINPO-class experimental ballistic missile submarine in October 2021. The missile flew around 590 km with a maximum altitude of 60 km. Based on the similar performance of the missile launched on Saturday, North Korea might have tested the KN-23 SLBM once again.

The SLBM missile test came three days after North Korea tested a presumed long-range ballistic missile on May 4. The missile test on Wednesday was conducted from the Sunan area, near Pyongyang, and experts believe that Pyongyang might have tested its ICBM system under an intentionally limited range and trajectory.

Saturday’s missile test, which was the North’s 15th missile test this year, also came three days before South Korean President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol takes office.

In his speech during North Korea’s military parade on April 25, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un ordered his military to beef up the country’s nuclear capabilities. As Kim has opened the possibility of using his nuclear weapons in preemptive strikes, more tests of Pyongyang’s advanced missile programs – including nuclear weapons – could possibly be conducted this year, South Korean officials have said.

Based on satellite imagery, Pyongyang has been accused of restoring its Punggye-ri nuclear site to test its miniaturized nuclear warheads. Experts believe Pyongyang might conduct a nuclear test in late May or early June, after the U.S. President Joe Biden visits South Korea and Japan later this month.

Jalina Porter, a U.S. State Department spokeswoman, said on Friday that North Korea “is preparing its Punggye-ri test site and could be ready to conduct a test there as early as this month, which would be seventh [nuclear] test.” Porter also said that “this statement is also consistent with the DPRK’s own recent public statements.” (DPRK is an acronym of North Korea’s official name, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.)

As concerns about a North Korean nuclear test loom in Seoul and Washington, Park Jie-won, the director of Seoul’s National Intelligence Service, said in an interview with a local newspaper that China has requested North Korea not to conduct ICBM and nuclear tests several times in recent weeks. Park said that Russia has also delivered the same message to North Korea, but their mediation has not worked: “North Korea will keep launching its missiles and will conduct a nuclear test,” he predicted.

North Korea reported that it had test-fired its new Hwasong-17 ICBM on March 24, although U.S. and South Korean officials disputed this. The missile North Korea tested on May 4 could also have been an ICBM, based on the site of the missile test and the performance of the missile announced by Seoul’s JCS. However, North Korea has not reported its recent missile tests, which is unusual based on the general routine of Pyongyang’s propaganda following a test. Pyongyang might have decided not to release its own reports on at least some missile tests after Beijing and Moscow conveyed their opposition to these tests.

Considering China specifically warned North Korea against ICBM and nuclear tests, North Korea might have chosen to test its SLBM, a shorter-range and thus less provocative missile, to confront the incoming Yoon administration in South Korea while showing how the North can beef up its military and defense capabilities with its missile tests. Beijing is likely to have unofficially demanded that Pyongyang not launch any ICBMs in the lead up to Yoon’s inauguration on May 10. Yoon’s classical conservative approach to North Korea issues is centered on strengthening ties with the United States, leaving China worried about the possibility of Seoul joining anti-China movements led by the U.S. in the region.

On the other side, North Korea might have carried out its missile tests to continue its version of “strategic patience” on the nuclear talks and inter-Korean dialogue. Nuclear talks with the U.S. have been deadlocked since the failed Hanoi summit in 2019. Pyongyang appears to have decided to consolidate its hardline stance to raise the stakes at the negotiating table in a bid to entice Seoul and Washington to make concessions first – which, to North Korea, ultimately means the removal of the so-called “hostile policies.” In that case, Pyongyang’s decision not to report on its missile tests can be interpreted as a tactical decision to deliver the message to the U.S., South Korea, and Japan that these tests are regular military exercises for North Korean “self-defense.” The implication is that these tests are so routine that Pyongyang does not have to report the type and performance of each missile.

U.S. President Joe Biden will meet the new South Korean president on May 21 in Seoul before heading to Japan for bilateral and Quad summit meetings. Experts and officials in Seoul and Washington think North Korea may carry out its seventh nuclear test in the lead up to the South Korea-U.S. summit meeting or shortly after Biden’s trip.

Authors
Mitch Shin
Contributing Author
Mitch Shin

Mitch Shin is Chief Koreas Correspondent for The Diplomat and a non-resident Research Fellow of the Institute for Security & Development Policy (ISDP), Stockholm Korea Center.
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Housecarl

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May 8, 2022 Topic: North Korea Region: Asia Tags: North KoreaKim Jong-unNuclear WeaponsSouth KoreaJuche
Nukes and National Interests: Why Kim Jong-un Threatens Preemptive War
Understanding North Korea’s core national interests is critical when it comes to predicting how its nuclear strategy will evolve.

by Manseok Lee

Kim Jong-un’s ambitious vow to preemptively use North Korea’s nuclear weapons to defend its “fundamental interests” has understandably drawn much attention in both Washington and Seoul. Experts have warned of a change in Pyongyang’s nuclear strategy, suggesting such a development to have significant implications for regional stability. However, some of these analyses have failed to provide meaningful policy alternatives due to being based on a theoretically and practically weak foundation.

Pessimists, for example, warn that North Korea is “working on a program which will one day make conquest possible—conquest of the South.” There is always a positive probability greater than zero that this will occur, although such a scenario is unlikely to happen as long as the U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK) military alliance serves to deter North Korea’s provocations. Indeed, any North Korean invasion would trigger devastating joint retaliation on the part of the alliance, especially given the substantial U.S. civilian and military presence in South Korea.

Optimists, however, claim that North Korea just focuses on protecting itself from America, and thus, the United States should facilitate cooperation with North Korea. Yet, such an analysis overlooks the fact that Pyongyang must maintain a hostile external environment to justify the regime’s rule. Thus, as Kim stated in his speech, North Korea will likely pursue a strategy that leverages its nuclear capabilities to achieve its political objectives.

The reason why the above analyses fail to provide substantial insights lies in the fact that they do not convincingly explain the substance of North Korea’s national interests—which Kim has said he would use nuclear force to defend. Therefore, understanding North Korea’s core national interests is critical when it comes to predicting how its nuclear strategy will evolve.

North Korea’s National Interests

In practical terms, North Korea is a revolutionary state whose very existence is based on achieving revolutionary national goals. In North Korea, the Workers’ Party of Korea leads the national revolution. As a consequence, the Workers’ Party exists above the state, with its bylaw serving as the supreme state document in North Korea, not the state constitution.

The Charter of the Workers’ Party stipulates North Korea to have two immediate national objectives, the first of which is to build a strong country on the northern half of the Korean Peninsula, that is, the North Korean region. The second goal is to establish a socialist state that encompasses the entire Korean Peninsula, including South Korea, which entails both liberating the South Koreans from perceived American imperialism and building a unified communist country.

The Kim family’s significance in relation to achieving these national objectives must also be emphasized. The Juche ideology, that is, the self-reliance principle that underpins North Korea’s vision of state and society, holds that the Kim family’s leadership represents the only means of successfully carrying out the socialist revolution, defeating the United States, and unifying the Korean Peninsula. Thus, in North Korean politics, Kim Jong-un is more than a dictator; he is a leader who directs the souls of North Koreans toward accomplishing their revolution.

Such a political system has become the foundation for North Korea’s attempts to define its own national interests. Ordinary countries generally regard territorial integrity, people’s well-being, and economic prosperity as vital national interests. However, while these may also be important national interests for North Korea, the Juche ideology elevates the Kim family’s survival above all other national interests, defining it as the country’s core national interest and raison d’être. The idea behind this is the belief that North Korea will only be able to achieve its national objectives and complete the revolution if the Kim family survives.

Cases of North Korea’s Nuclear Provocations

The key issue here concerns when North Korea perceives its core interests to be threatened. As North Korea’s core national security interests are linked to the existence of Kim’s regime, the situations in which Pyongyang perceives its core interests to be threatened may be more extensive than would otherwise be the case. In other words, the potential threats not only include external military threats to the state, but also external and internal situations that could undermine the legitimacy of the regime.

As a result, what North Korea refers to as deterrence is not only a measure for preventing an adversary from launching a preemptive attack on its homeland, but also a means of defending the Kim regime. The North’s conception of deterrence, therefore, includes elements of compellence that create an external environment intended to enhance the legitimacy of the regime or coerce neighboring countries into accepting the situation as Pyongyang wishes.

In fact, North Korea has used its military for this dual purpose for the past seventy years. The first aim in this regard has been to deter an invasion by the U.S.-ROK alliance, while the second has been to maintain and, sometimes, strengthen the legitimacy of the Kim regime. As a result, North Korea’s military-strategic approach has long been close to a so-called “escalation control“ strategy—Pyongyang achieves its desired political objectives by engaging in carefully calculated provocations that fall below the threshold for U.S. retaliation and, therefore, limit the risk of all-out war.

As Kim Jong-un explicitly stated in his speech, North Korea could use its nuclear weapons in the same way as it has used its military power to defend its core interests and deter a major war. This implies that North Korea manages to deftly employ or threaten to employ nuclear weapons to achieve its political objectives while staying below the threshold for U.S. nuclear retaliation. While North Korea is unlikely to drop nuclear bombs on South Korea, its nuclear weapons can be used in such a way that maximizes the effect of coercion through causing similar levels of fear to an actual attack.

What Can Be Done?

This apparent shift in the strategic environment poses a number of significant challenges for national security planners in both Washington and Seoul.

First, it is critical that national security planners develop scenarios in which North Korea could employ or threaten to employ its nuclear weapons. North Korea is likely to engage in various levels of controlled nuclear provocations in an effort to achieve its desired political objectives. The key issue is determining the strategies that North Korea will choose to employ under different conditions. Identifying these different options and triggering conditions is critical to ensuring effective crisis management.

Second, various means of response or retaliation are required. Some argue that since North Korea has developed nuclear weapons, South Korea should develop its own nuclear weapons, or else the United States should redeploy its tactical nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula. However, in light of North Korea’s current nuclear strategy, neither option may prove very effective. North Korea would likely attempt to achieve its objectives through controlled provocations, rather than through engaging in an all-out nuclear war. The reliance on nuclear options may indicate that the U.S.-ROK alliance lacks adequate means of responding to the North’s limited provocations. Instead, it might be more appropriate to strengthen South Korea’s advanced conventional forces and modernize the U.S. forces stationed in South Korea in order to bolster the credibility of the alliance’s immediate and proportional retaliation.

Third, there exists a need for a more delicate deterrence strategy to be developed. In the current circumstances, where the two sides are capable of destroying each other, the promise of unconditional and massive retaliation in response to any provocation by North Korea may render the South’s response unreliable. As a consequence, various levels of response options, ranging from small-scale retaliation to the possibility of phased retaliation and on to the threat of massive retaliation, should be prepared. This implies that the U.S.-ROK alliance would respond to North Korean provocations in a way that raises the possibility of all-out war, not the certainty of all-out war.

Finally, efforts to open a channel for dialogue with North Korea should be continued while reinforcing the alliance’s deterrent capabilities. Information exchange is critical in relation to crisis management because it allows each side to predict the other’s next move. This is particularly important when a crisis is escalated inadvertently, as in such a situation the same information can be processed differently, which can lead to errors in terms of impulsive decisions or judgments.

The Way Forward

North Korea is rapidly expanding its nuclear capabilities, and Kim Jong-un has made it clear that the North is willing to use its newly acquired capabilities actively and preemptively. This situation places a lot of pressure on military planners in Washington and Seoul. However, military planners should try to view the situation objectively during times like these. Emotions and biases are not a great help when it comes to the formulation of sound policies. Furthermore, it is critical that military planners remind themselves of their desired political objectives. The United States and South Korea are not competing ideologically with North Korea. Rather, their political goal is to achieve and maintain stability on the Korean Peninsula in order to ensure peace and prosperity. Thus, it is time to reconsider what would be the best military strategy for use in this situation.

Manseok Lee is a Ph.D. candidate in public policy at UC Berkeley and also an active-duty Army major of South Korea. His research interests include East Asian security (U.S.-China competition), North Korea’s nuclear problem, and the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. He has published eleven peer-reviewed journal papers and several commentary articles on these issues.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views or positions of the Korean government and army.
 

jward

passin' thru
South Korea's Yoon calls on North to trade nukes for aid
Sunghee Hwang


South Korea's new leader Yoon Suk-yeol on Tuesday called on the North to give up its nuclear weapons in exchange for massive economic aid, describing Pyongyang's missiles as a threat to regional and global security.
Yoon, 61, who started work in an underground bunker with a briefing on North Korea, takes office at a time of high tensions on the peninsula, with Pyongyang conducting a record 15 weapons tests since January, including two launches last week.
The former prosecutor, who won the election by a razor-thin margin in March, said in his inaugural speech that he would consider sending transformative levels of economic aid to the North -- but only if Pyongyang first gives up its nuclear weapons.

"If North Korea genuinely embarks on a process to complete denuclearisation, we are prepared to work with the international community to present an audacious plan that will vastly strengthen North Korea's economy and improve the quality of life for its people," he said.
Yoon's predecessor Moon Jae-in pursued a policy of engagement with Pyongyang, brokering summits between North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and then US president Donald Trump. But talks collapsed in 2019 and diplomacy has stalled since.
"While North Korea's nuclear weapon programmes are a threat not only to our security and that of Northeast Asia, the door to dialogue will remain open so that we can peacefully resolve this threat," Yoon added.
But the offer of "audacious" aid is a dud, analysts say: North Korea, which invests a vast chunk of its GDP into its weapons programmes, has long made it clear it will not make that trade.
"Since 2009, North Korea has stated it will not give up its nukes for economic incentives," Park Won-gon, a professor at Ewha University, told AFP.

"Yoon's comment will only trigger Pyongyang, who will see it as an attack."
Kim does not want massive economic growth because achieving this would require opening up North Korea's information ecosystem, said Chad O'Carroll of Seoul-based specialist site NK News.
"Ideological pollution would rapidly steep in, a key risk for Pyongyang's ruler... Yoon's denuclearisation plans won't go anywhere... because the 'carrot' is actually poisonous," he wrote on Twitter.
- Unpopular move -
During his inauguration speech, Yoon said South Korea was facing "multiple crises", citing the Covid-19 pandemic, global supply chain issues, economic woes and new armed conflicts.
"Such complex, multi-faceted crises are casting a long and dark shadow over us," Yoon said, adding that he was confident the country would emerge from its current difficulties.

But Yoon is not likely to have an easy ride, taking office with some of the lowest approval ratings of any democratically elected South Korean president at 41 percent, according to a Gallup poll.
The biggest reason for Yoon's unpopularity, the survey found, was his decision to move the presidential office from the decades-old Blue House to the former defence ministry in downtown Seoul.
The hasty, expensive move soured public sentiment, with critics claiming it was unnecessary and a security risk.
Yoon said the Blue House, on a site used by the Japanese colonial administration from 1910 to 1945, was a "symbol of imperial power", claiming the relocation would ensure a more democratic presidency.
The Blue House grounds will be opened to the public as a park.
The inauguration was held outside Seoul's National Assembly, featuring marching army bands, soldiers in ceremonial dress, and a 21-gun salute.
Around 40,000 people attended with local reports saying it was the country's most expensive such event by far, at 3.3 billion won ($2.6 million).

US President Joe Biden -- who is set to visit Seoul later this month -- sent a high-profile delegation headed by Douglas Emhoff, husband of US Vice President Kamala Harris.
Japan and China also sent high-level representatives, with Yoon saying he wanted to mend sometimes fractious relations with regional powers.
"At a time when the rules-based international order is under threat, the strategic collaboration between Japan and South Korea... is needed more than ever," Japan's Foreign Minister Yoshimasa Hayashi said after attending the inauguration.
sh/ceb/qan/leg
 

jward

passin' thru
Lockdown orders issued in Pyongyang due to ‘national problem’: Source | NK News
View more articles by Chad O'Carroll

2-3 minutes


North Korean residents in the capital seen scrambling to get home after the unexpected order
Residents in the North Korean capital of Pyongyang were abruptly ordered indoors on Tuesday afternoon, multiple informed sources told NK News. One source described the cause as being due to a “nationwide lockdown” while another referred to an unspecified “national problem.”
The order sparked a rush to get home, said the source, with long lines of people waiting at bus stops in the capital city Tuesday afternoon, while other residents could be seen hurrying home on foot.
North Korean authorities apparently instructed citizens not to go outside their buildings and did not specify when the order would be reversed, one source said. NK News understands the orders were likely issued nationwide, although people could still be seen farming alongside the inter-Korean border near Paju on Tuesday around 5 p.m. KST.
People tending fields in a village near the inter-Korean border, May 10, 2022 | Image: NK News
People tending fields in a village near the inter-Korean border, May 10, 2022 | Image: NK News
A North Korean pulls a cart down a dirt road in a village near the inter-Korean border, May 10, 2022 | Image: NK News
A North Korean pulls a cart down a dirt road in a village near the inter-Korean border, May 10, 2022 | Image: NK News
The apparent lockdown orders come weeks after North Korea and China suspended overland trade following a surge in COVID-19 cases in Liaoning and Jilin Province that border North Korea.
However, a foreign diplomat who worked in Pyongyang told NK News that short-term instructions to stay inside are not unusual, even before the COVID-19 pandemic began in 2020.

Authorities also ordered residents indoors on short notice last week, but sources in Pyongyang told NK News that lockdown was linked to severe levels of airborne particulate matter, commonly referred to as “yellow dust.”
NK News has previously reported on multiple occasions when citizens in the capital were told to stay indoors due to fears about COVID-19 arriving in the country in dust storms from overseas.
Ethan Jewell contributed to this report. Edited by Arius Derr
 

jward

passin' thru
Biden says discussing dropping US trade tariffs on China
May 10, 202211:43 AM CDTLast Updated 10 hours ago

1 minute





WASHINGTON, May 10 (Reuters) - President Joe Biden said on Tuesday discussions are ongoing about potentially dropping U.S. trade tariffs on China that were imposed by his predecessor, Republican Donald Trump.
"We're discussing that right now," Biden told reporters after a speech about inflation. "I'm telling you, we're discussing it, and no decision has been made on it."
Reporting by Jeff Mason and Steve Holland
 
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