Brahma Chellaney
@Chellaney
22h
BENDING OVER BACKWARDS: Biden tells Xi "US does not seek a new Cold War with China; does not aim to change China’s system; the revitalization of its alliances is not targeted at China; US does not support 'Taiwan independence'; and has no intention to seek a conflict with China."
Yonhap News Agency
@YonhapNews
39s
(LEAD) Moon calls for meeting with Yoon without conditions
View: https://twitter.com/YonhapNews/status/1506822735867314181?s=20&t=JzvOqhi-sd_omVxAM7B6Zg
It's the big one, according to South Korea: North Korea used an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in today's test, Yonhap reports. Could be first full-range ICBM test since 2017
View: https://twitter.com/joshjonsmith/status/1506877306735783936?t=gGq9YDA2Yb56U814Trt-oA&s=19
Chad O'Carroll @chadocl Journalist from London, based in Seoul. Founder of http://nknews.org This is a personal account, so it’s personal views (not official company ones). Media & News Companykorearisk.com Joined July 2013 724 Following 18K Followers |
THREAD: North Korea conducted its most significant missile test in years today, representing: - final nail in coffin for US & ROK's diplomatic outreach - possible completion of a major new weapon capability - precursor to major tensions on the Peninsula North Korea’s first ICBM test in years may trigger security crisis in the region | NK PRO North Korea conducted its most significant missile test in years on Thursday, marking an official end to Kim Jong Un’s April 2018 moratorium on long-range weapons testing. Besides representing the fin… North Korea’s first ICBM test in years may trigger security crisis in the region | NK PRO 1. While Kim Jong Un hinted he no longer felt bound by the self-declared testing moratorium on ICBMs and nuclear weapons, today’s launch is a clear sign that North Korea’s five-year pause on long-range weapons testing is now over. Renewed North Korean nuclear testing is therefore on the horizon and should surprise no one when it comes. But it remains to be seen whether this change to the status quo will influence a major change in U.S. policy towards North Korea. Given Washington has few options to compel Pyongyang to denuclearize and has its hands full in Ukraine, its unlikely the US will shift significantly away from positions outlined in Biden’s policy review last April. South Korea's position will harden, significantly, however. 2. Thursday’s ICBM reached an altitude of 6,200 km on a lofted trajectory and had a recorded range of some 1,080 km, indicating it may have been the massive Hwasong-17 first unveiled at the DPRK military parade in Oct. 2020. Though full standard trajectory launch estimations are not yet in, it’s probable that the test is part of Kim Jong Un’s Eighth Party Congress goal to develop an ICBM with a 15,000 km range. Today's launch also appears to be a success. Given North Korea only tested its Hwasong-15 ICBM once in 2017 before ordering it into mass production, this means Kim Jong Un could announce the new capability as complete, possibly as soon as tomorrow. 3. The ICBM launch comes amid Kim Jong Un’s recent order to: - expand and modernize the Sohae space launch facility - a forthcoming April 15 military parade - indicators that North Korea is the Punggye-ri nuclear test site. With U.S.-ROK military exercises scheduled to begin in April – a traditional friction point with Pyongyang – and a ROK presidential handover in May, the next weeks and months will offer numerous opportunities for Kim Jong Un to justify increasingly escalatory weapons testing. This is because, as a direct result of today’s launch, the U.S. and ROK will probably increase efforts to try to deter further North Korean escalation, by showcasing advanced military hardware ahead of and during forthcoming planned exercises. South Korean missile tests are already taking place, in retaliation to North Korea’s Thursday test, indicating that Seoul will likely also test its own emerging missile capabilities with increasing frequency in the short to medium term. Further, once Yoon Suk-yeol takes office, Seoul may engage in a more confrontational approach to North Korea that results in fiery rhetoric between the two sides and other non-military forms of confrontation, such as anti-regime broadcasts from loudspeakers along the border. If precedent is a guide, Pyongyang will use any such activities to raise tensions with South Korea, as well as to justify things like nuclear tests, submarine ballistic missile tests, and live-fire drills near the disputed inter-Korean maritime border. Conclusion: It seems inevitable that North Korea will soon return to nuclear testing, and with global focus on Ukraine, it’s unclear what consequences North Korea will face, at least from the perspective of new U.N. sanctions. But there can be no doubt: get ready for a bumpy ride on the peninsula in the weeks and months ahead. Tensions might not reach the fever pitch of 'fire and fury' in 2017, or the inter-Korean acrimony of 2013, but they will be close. • • • |
Date | Missile Type | Number Launched/Yield | More info |
Mar-24-2022 | Unidentified ICBM | 1 | New York Times |
Mar-16-2022 | Failed ICBM Development Test | 1 | Washington Post |
Mar-4-2022 | ICBM Development Test | 1 | New York Times |
Feb-27-2022 | ICBM Development Test | 1 | Reuters |
Jan-30-2022 | Hwasong-12 (IRBM) | 1 | Japan Times |
Jan-25-2022 | Cruise Missile | 2 | Wall Street Journal |
Jan-17-2022 | KN-24 (SRBM) | 2 | VOA |
Jan-13-2022 | KN-23 (SRBM) | 2 | New York Times |
Jan-11-2022 | MaRV Ballistic Missile | 1 | VOA |
Jan-4-2022 | MaRV Ballistic Missile | 1 | NBC News |
Oct-19-2021 | “New type SLBM” | 1 | The Washington Post |
Sep-29-2021 | New “hypersonic” weapon | 1 | Yonhap News |
Sep-16-2021 | KN-23 (SRBM) | 2 | Reuters |
Sep-13-2021 | New long-range cruise missile | 2 | Yonhap News |
Mar-25-2021 | New SRBM | 2 | Associated Press |
Mar-21-2021 | Unknown (Cruise Missile) | 2 | The Diplomat |
Jul-6-2020 | Unknown (ASCM) | 1 | Yonhap News |
Apr-14-2020 | Kumsong-3 (ASCM) | 2+ | Yonhap News |
Mar-29-2020 | KN-25 (SRBM) | 2 | Yonhap News |
Mar-21-2020 | KN-24 (SRBM) | 2 | Yonhap News |
Mar-2-2020 | KN-25 (SRBM) | 2 | Yonhap News |
Nov-28-2019 | KN-25 (SRBM) | 2 | Missile Threat |
Oct-31-2019 | KN-25 (SRBM) | 2 | Yonhap News |
Oct-2-2019 | Pukguksong-3 (SLBM) | 1 | The Japan Times |
Sep-9-2019 | KN-25 (SRBM) | 2 | Yonhap News |
Aug-24-2019 | KN-25 (SRBM) | 2 | Yonhap News |
Aug-16-2019 | KN-24 (SRBM) | 2 | Yonhap News |
Aug-10-2019 | KN-24 (SRBM) | 2 | Yonhap News |
Aug-6-2019 | KN-23 (SRBM) | 2 | Yonhap News |
Jul-25-2019 | KN-23 (SRBM) | 2 | Yonhap News |
May-9-2019 | KN-23 (SRBM) | 2 | New York Times |
May-4-2019 | KN-23 (SRBM) | 1 | Washington Post |
Nov-28-2017 | Hwasong-15 (ICBM) | 1 | CNN |
Sep-14-2017 | Hwasong-12 (IRBM) | 1 | Associated Press |
Sep-3-2017 | Nuclear Test | 100-140 kt yield | Newsweek |
Aug-28-2017 | Hwasong-12 (IRBM) | 1 | Washington Post |
Aug-26-2017 | KN-21 Scud variant (SRBM) | 3 | Washington Post |
Jul-28-2017 | Hwasong-14 (ICBM) | 1 | Washington Post |
Jul-4-2017 | Hwasong-14 (ICBM) | 1 | CNN |
Jun-7-2017 | Kumsong-3 (ASCM) | 4 | Reuters |
May-28-2017 | KN-18 (SRBM) | 1 | Reuters |
May-21-2017 | KN-15 (MRBM) | 1 | CBS |
May-14-2017 | Hwasong-12 (IRBM) | 1 | CBS |
Apr-29-2017 | Hwasong-12 (IRBM) | 1 | Reuters |
Apr-16-2017 | Hwasong-12 (IRBM) | 1 | Fox News |
Apr-5-2017 | Hwasong-12 (IRBM) | 1 | Fox News |
Mar-22-2017 | Unknown | 1 | North Korea News |
Mar-6-2017 | Scud-ER (MRBM) | 4 | New York Times |
Feb-12-2017 | KN-15 (Pukkuksong-2) | 1 | CNN |
Oct-19-2016 | Musudan | 1 | New York Times |
Oct-15-2016 | Musudan | 1 | New York Times |
Sep-9-2016 | Nuclear Test | 10 kt yield | BBC |
Sep-5-2016 | No Dong | 3 | CNN |
Aug-24-2016 | KN-11 (SLBM) | 1 | BBC |
Aug-3-2016 | No Dong | 1 | New York Times |
Jul-18-2016 | SRBM (Scud variant) | 3 | CNN |
Jul-9-2016 | KN-11 (SLBM) | 1 | Reuters |
Jun-22-2016 | Musudan | 2 | CNN |
May-31-2016 | Musudan | 1 | BBC |
Apr-28-2016 | Musudan | 2 | Reuters |
Apr-23-2016 | KN-11 (SLBM) | 1 | North Korea |
Apr-15-2016 | Musudan | 1 | BBC |
Mar-9-2016 | SRBM (Scud variant) | 2 | New York Times |
Feb-7-2016 | Taepodong-2 / Unha-3 / | 1 | BBC |
Jan-6-2016 | Nuclear Test | 7-10 kt yield | Federation of American Scientists |
Dec-21-2015 | KN-11 (SLBM) | 1 | Yonhap News |
Nov-28-2015 | KN-11 (SLBM) | 1 | Reuters |
Jun-14-2015 | KN-01 (Cruise Missile) | 3 | CNN |
May-9-2015 | KN-11 (SLBM) | 1 | CNN |
Apr-3-2015 | KN-02 (SRBM) | 4 | UPI |
Mar-2-2015 | SRBM (Scud variant) | 2 | New York Times |
Feb-8-2015 | KN-02 (SRBM) | 5 | New York Times |
Feb-7-2015 | Kumsong-3 (Cruise Missile) | 1 | New York Times |
Sep-6-2014 | KN-02 (SRBM) | 3 | New York Times |
Sep-1-2014 | KN-02 (SRBM) | 1 | Telegraph |
Jul-26-2014 | SRBM (Scud variant) | 1 | Washington Times |
Jul-13-2014 | SRBM (Scud variant) | 2 | USA Today |
Jul-9-2014 | SRBM (Scud variant) | 2 | New York Times |
Mar-25-2014 | No Dong | 2 | BBC |
Mar-3-2014 | SRBM (Scud variant) | 2 | CNN |
Feb-27-2014 | SRBM (Scud variant) | 4 | Reuters |
Feb-12-2013 | Nuclear Test | 6-9 kt yield | New York Times |
May-(19/20)-2013 | SRBM | 3 | Reuters |
May-18-2013 | SRBM | 3 | New York Times |
Mar-2013 | KN-02 (SRBM) | 2 | Korea Times |
Dec-12-2012 | Taepodong-2 / Unha-3 / | 1 | New York Times |
Apr-2012 | Taepodong-2 / Unha-3 / | 1 | IHS Jane’s Weapons: Strategic, 2015-2016 |
Jan-11-2012 | KN-02 (SRBM) | 2 | IHS Jane’s Weapons: Strategic, 2015-2016 |
Oct-12-2009 | KN-02 (SRBM) | 5 | CBS News |
Jul-2009 | Scud-ER (MRBM) | 4 | IHS Jane’s Weapons: Strategic, 2015-2016 |
July-2009 | No Dong 2 | 2 | IHS Jane’s Weapons: Strategic, 2015-2016 |
May-25-2009 | Nuclear Test | 2.4 kt yield | New York Times |
May-25-2009 | KN-02 (SRBM) | 3 | New York Times |
Apr-5-2009 | Taepodong-2 / Unha-3 / | 1 | IHS Jane’s Weapons: Strategic, 2015-2016 |
May-2008 | KN-01 (Cruise Missile) | 3 | IHS Jane’s Weapons: Strategic, 2015-2016 |
Mar-2008 | KN-01 (Cruise Missile) | 3 | IHS Jane’s Weapons: Strategic, 2015-2016 |
Jun-2007 | KN-02 (SRBM) | 3 | IHS Jane’s Weapons: Strategic, 2015-2016 |
Jun-19-2007 | KN-01 (Cruise Missile) | 1 | UPI |
Jun-7-2007 | KN-01 (Cruise Missile) | 2 | NTI |
May-25-2007 | KN-01 (Cruise Missile) | 1 | NTI |
Oct-09-2006 | Nuclear Test | 1-2 kt yield | Nautilus Institute |
Jul-05-2006 | No Dong | 2 | White House |
Jul-05-2006 | SRBM (Scud variant) | 4 | White House |
Jul-05-2006 | Taepodong 2 | 1 | IHS Jane’s Weapons: Strategic, 2015-2016 |
Mar-08-2006 | KN-02 (SRBM) | 2 | NTI |
May-2005 | KN-02 (SRBM) | 2 | IHS Jane’s Weapons: Strategic, 2015-2016 |
Apr-2004 | KN-02 (SRBM) | 1 | IHS Jane’s Weapons: Strategic, 2015-2016 |
Mar-1-2003 | KN-01 (Cruise Missile) | 1 | Armscontrol.org |
Oct-2003 | KN-01 (Cruise Missile) | 2 | DTIC |
Aug-31-1998 | Taepodong-1 | 1 | IHS Jane’s Weapons: Strategic, 2015-2016 |
May-31-1994 | KN-01 (Cruise Missile) | 1 | Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey |
May-1993 | No Dong 1 | 2 | New York Times |
May-1993 | Hwasong 6 (SRBM) | 2 | New York Times |
Jun-1992 | No Dong 1 | 1 | IHS Jane’s Weapons: Strategic, 2015-2016 |
Oct-1991 | Hwasong 6 (SRBM) | 1 | IHS Jane’s Weapons: Strategic, 2015-2016 |
Aug-1991 | No Dong 1 | 1 | IHS Jane’s Weapons: Strategic, 2015-2016 |
Jun-1990 | Hwasong 6 (SRBM) | 1 | IHS Jane’s Weapons: Strategic, 2015-2016 |
May-1990 | No Dong 1 | 1 | IHS Jane’s Weapons: Strategic, 2015-2016 |
Apr-1984 | Hwasong 5 (SRBM) | 7 | IHS Jane’s Weapons: Strategic, 2015-2016 |
What the hell is he smoking?InsideNK@inside_nk
North Korea leader Kim Jong-un says North Korea will prepare for a long-term confrontation with the U.S. (Yonhap)
2:51 PM · Mar 24, 2022
Cohibas with "something special".....What the hell is he smoking?
[URL='https://twitter.com/nktpnd']
Ankit Panda
@nktpnd[/URL]
Largest liquid propellant missile ever launched from a road-mobile launcher. Ever. Anywhere.
Ankit Panda
@nktpnd
2h
NEW: First images of North Korea's Hwasongpho-17 ICBM.
View: https://twitter.com/nktpnd/status/1507103483861864457?s=20&t=M5_UdOqzIGD0hyfbKHaWTw
Cool guys don't look at their ICBMs.
View: https://twitter.com/nktpnd/status/1507103781602963457?s=20&t=M5_UdOqzIGD0hyfbKHaWTw
More. Nice new payload fairing livery.
View: https://twitter.com/nktpnd/status/1507103889866301447?s=20&t=M5_UdOqzIGD0hyfbKHaWTw
160 ton force first stage. That'll get you to 6,200 km, yeah.
View: https://twitter.com/nktpnd/status/1507104672573763593?s=20&t=M5_UdOqzIGD0hyfbKHaWTw
That thing's a beast!.....
Colin considers alternative hypotheses, but recall the reports yesterday before KCNA released suggesting ROK intelligence was leaning Hwasong-15 on this launch. In general, strategic deception hasn’t been the norm with ground-launched missiles (more with the sub program).Lots of KCTV footage of the Hwasong-17 ICBM test doesn't match up with satellite imagery of the launch site Possible scenario: it's Hwasong-17 footage up until it exploded on March 16, using Hwasong-15 flight data March 24 as cover
It would mean whatever they successfully tested March 24 is being covered up and hidden, maybe forever, even though it was their greatest missile achievement ever. Or they launched another Hwasong-17 on March 24 but their cameras failed so they used old footage..
But what happens if Japan fishes out some missile debris and it's identified as a Hwasong-15 or something? I guess we'll see
Colin Zwirko
@ColinZwirko
View: https://twitter.com/ColinZwirko/status/1507296302157406213?s=20&t=7vzxG-WHLmp3R3DQ8XXm9w