AlfaMan
Has No Life - Lives on TB
That's indeed a "big boy".....
Yes. Looks SS-18 sized or larger. if that is liquid fuelled, I'd be curious to know what fuels they are using.
That's indeed a "big boy".....
post 5350 suggests it's largest liquid fueled missile anywhere... .. I've asked about the fuels, before, but if anyone knows, they don't bother telling me...Yes. Looks SS-18 sized or larger. if that is liquid fuelled, I'd be curious to know what fuels they are using.
post 5350 suggests it's largest liquid fueled missile anywhere... .. I've asked about the fuels, before, but if anyone knows, they don't bother telling me...
Simplest is LOX and kerosene/RP-1. Alternatively you have LOX and LH2. But when you get into military strategic weapons, the fuels get a lot more exotic and toxic. The oxygen component is often a corrosive and the fuel is a complex and very toxic hydrocarbon. These can be either kept in the missile for long periods of time while it is on alert or can be quickly pumped into the missile prior to launch, particularly if it is a mobile system.
See this for more.....
6. PROPELLANTS
History Publications and Resources - NASA
The NASA History Series includes over 200 books and monographs on a wide range of topics from rockets and wind tunnels to the psychology and sociology ofhistory.nasa.gov
from:
SPACE HANDBOOK:
ASTRONAUTICS AND ITS APPLICATIONS
Mr. McCORMACK, Chairman of the Select Committee on Astronautics
and Space Exploration, submitted the following
STAFF REPORT
[Pursuant to H. Res. 496 (85th Cong.)]
History Publications and Resources - NASA
The NASA History Series includes over 200 books and monographs on a wide range of topics from rockets and wind tunnels to the psychology and sociology ofhistory.nasa.gov
Simplest is LOX and kerosene/RP-1. Alternatively you have LOX and LH2. But when you get into military strategic weapons, the fuels get a lot more exotic and toxic. The oxygen component is often a corrosive and the fuel is a complex and very toxic hydrocarbon. These can be either kept in the missile for long periods of time while it is on alert or can be quickly pumped into the missile prior to launch, particularly if it is a mobile system.
See this for more.....
6. PROPELLANTS
History Publications and Resources - NASA
The NASA History Series includes over 200 books and monographs on a wide range of topics from rockets and wind tunnels to the psychology and sociology ofhistory.nasa.gov
from:
SPACE HANDBOOK:
ASTRONAUTICS AND ITS APPLICATIONS
Mr. McCORMACK, Chairman of the Select Committee on Astronautics
and Space Exploration, submitted the following
STAFF REPORT
[Pursuant to H. Res. 496 (85th Cong.)]
History Publications and Resources - NASA
The NASA History Series includes over 200 books and monographs on a wide range of topics from rockets and wind tunnels to the psychology and sociology ofhistory.nasa.gov
I don't think DPRK is making hypergolic fuels. Even if they used it to fuel this monster ICBM, tank corrosion would be a serious issue. I seriously doubt DPRK could safely handle liquid hydrogen either. An RP-1/LOX combo is most likely.
That TEL (transporter/erector/launcher) looks like an upsized SS-25 unit. Does North Korea have a road system stressed for that amount of weight?
Markus Schiller
@RocketSchiller
·
2h
So you can’t move this thing fueled, and you can’t fill it at the launch site. This thing makes absolutely no sense at all, except for threat equation games, like sending the message of “we now have a mobile ICBM with MIRVs, be very afraid”.
3/3
Show this thread
Markus Schiller
@RocketSchiller
·
2h
Adding the TEL weight, only special roads and bridges could support this in fueled condition. And no sane person would drive this ticking bomb through the North Korean countryside. But fueling this behemoth would probably take half a day, and several large tanker trucks. 2/3
Show this thread
Markus Schiller
@RocketSchiller
·
2h
Ok, just one quick thought. This thing is HUGE. If
@DavidLaBoon
is right, it is 24-25 m long, with ~2.5 m diameter. It’s road-mobile, with two stages, therefore storable liquids tech, so it should weigh in at ~120 t launch mass, with 100+ t of hypergolic propellants. 1/2
Thread unroll on twitter from Professor at @miis, staff at @jamesmartincns, and host of The Deal (@irandealpodcast) and @acwpodcast. Pondering what Tom Lehrer called "universal bereavement".
North Korea's new ICBM is much larger than the Hwasong-15 ICBM (~2 m in diameter). Here are two stills from the parade that help illustrate the difference.
The truck ("transporter-erector-launcher" or TEL) is new. In December, @kyodo_english reported that Kim "ordered the mass production of vehicles used for transporting and launching missiles including [ICBMs]" using imported parts. Looks like it worked.
North Korea mass producing ballistic missile transporters: sources North Korean leader Kim Jong Un around February 2018 ordered the mass production of vehicles used for transporting and launching missiles including intercontinental ballistic missiles, Kyodo News has … North Korea mass producing ballistic missile transporters: sources
@mentions and I previously documented the expansion of the March 16 Factory for producing these vehicles.
New construction seen at missile-related site in North Korea SEOUL, South Korea (AP) — A new satellite image of a factory where North Korea makes military equipment used to launch long-range missiles shows the construction of a new structure. New construction seen at missile-related site in North Korea
The large diameter means the missile has a bundle of either two or (less likely) three RD250-like engines. (Each engine has a pair of combustion chambers fed from one turbo pump.) That's a lot of oomph -- plenty for multiple warheads.
This is exactly how I am thinking about the problem, but said more directly and clearly.
The point is that North Korea is clearly aimed at overwhelming the US missile defense system in Alaska. This is completely predictable because its much cheaper for North Korea to add warheads than for the US to add interceptors.
If each new North Korean ICBM can carry 3-4 warheads, we would need about 12-16 interceptors for each missile. (The GMD system salvo fires 4 interceptors at each warhead.) The last time the US bought 14 interceptors, it cost ... $1 billion.
archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/Tr…
So each one of these missiles that North Korea builds will cost the US about $1 billion to defend against. At that cost, I am pretty sure North Korea can add warheads faster than we can add interceptors.
Is it possible that they intend to keep it hidden in the tunnels, fuel it horizontally during crisis, and then drive out of the tunnel just far enough so it's safe to launch, erect it, (vehicle drives back in the tunnel) and let crew in bunny suits to launch it?
First take from the defense writers......
Posted for fair use.....
North Korea creates its own version of Russian Armata tank
North Korea has unveiled an advanced version of its main battle tank during a massive military parade and public rally in Pyongyang early on Saturday marking the 75th anniversary of the country'sdefence-blog.com
North Korea creates its own version of Russian Armata tank
NewsArmyPhoto
By Dylan Malyasov
Oct 10, 2020
Modified date: 21 seconds ago
North Korea has unveiled an advanced version of its main battle tank during a massive military parade and public rally in Pyongyang early on Saturday marking the 75th anniversary of the country’s ruling party.
The unusual predawn parade occurred in the North Korean capital Pyongyang early on Saturday marking the 75th anniversary of the country’s ruling party.
For the first time, were displayed the new modification of local-made main battle tanks is similar to Russia’s Armata main battle tanks by their visual design.
Photographs of the new tank look remarkably like those of a Russian-produced Armata. The design of the tank has many similarities and repeats the image presented at the military parade in Moscow in 2019 and 2020.
Reportedly, the upgraded North-Korea tank received a new reactive armor system, a new anti-tank missile system, and some experts indicate the possible installation of an active protection system.
If you wish to report grammatical or factual errors within our news articles, you can let us know by using the online feedback form.
Executive Editor
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North Korea Unveils Two New Strategic Missiles in October 10 Parade
By: Vann H. Van Diepen and Michael Elleman
- October 10, 2020
- Military Affairs, WMD
As widely expected, North Korea unveiled new missile capabilities during its military parade on October 10, marking the 75th anniversary of the founding of the Korean Workers Party.[1] But the specific new missiles revealed were a surprise: a road-mobile, liquid-propellant intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) much larger than previously known North Korean systems and a new solid-propellant submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM).
This paper provides an initial assessment of each of the two missiles based on the limited information currently available. Parading these two systems around has an obvious political messaging component; however, operationally, the rationale for such a very large ICBM is unclear and the new SLBM would only add marginally at best to the already sizable regional threat from North Korea’s land-based missiles.
The New ICBM
(Source: KCTV via Martyn Williams)
The new ICBM, presumably a Hwasong-16, appears to be approximately 25-26 m long and 2.5-2.9 m in diameter—about 4-4.5 m longer and about 0.5 m larger in diameter than the North’s Hwasong-15 ICBM flight tested once in November 2017. Indeed, the new missile has been correctly characterized as the world’s largest mobile ICBM—in part because countries with ICBMs generally seek to make their road-mobile ICBMs smaller so they can be more mobile and concealable.
That said, we estimate the new missile’s launch weight at roughly 100,000-150,000 kg, compared to some 80,000 kg for the Chinese DF-41 solid-propellant, road-mobile ICBM and about 104,000 kg for the former Soviet SS-24 rail-mobile solid ICBM.
The first stage of the new ICBM appears large enough in diameter to accommodate four of the Soviet RD-250-sized rocket engines believed to power the Hwasong-15 (which uses two in its first stage). The number and type of engine used in its presumed second stage are unclear, making the new missile’s throw-weight capability uncertain. Based on the assumption of four RD-250-type engines in the first stage, however, we estimate the new missile could, in principle, deliver 2,000-3,500 kg of payload to any point in the continental United States—much greater than the Hwasong-15’s assessed 1,000 kg payload capability to the same range.
But why would the North Korean’s need or want such a big missile? Especially since the Hwasong-15 would appear to have sufficient range/payload capability and room for improvement to meet North Korea’s operational targeting needs, and is much easier to move and conceal. There are two main possibilities, which are not mutually exclusive.
First, there may be a political rationale for producing or parading the new system. An unexpected “super heavy” ICBM would be a classically Khrushchevian[2] statement of North Korea’s technical prowess, the robustness of its ability to threaten the US,[3] and the permanence of its nuclear weapons status. It is worth noting that there has been no open-source evidence that the new ICBM’s apparent first-stage propulsion system has been ground-tested, and one analyst has that “no North Korean ICBM design that was *first seen at a parade* has seen flight-testing to date.”
Second, there may be operational reasons to make such a large missile. The North may want to be able (or to be seen as able) to deliver a much larger payload to anywhere in the US.
In terms of larger payloads, the North may be working toward developing multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs). Perhaps the North’s current nuclear RVs are larger and heavier than we expect, and so the Hwasong-15 cannot carry enough such RVs along with the size of post-boost vehicle (PBV) the North currently can provide to dispense them. Or perhaps the Hwasong-15 can be MIRVed but the North wants to be able to deliver more MIRVs per booster.
It should be noted that North Korea has not demonstrated a militarily useful MIRV capability, which is technically demanding. For example, it has yet to flight test a PBV, much less the deployment of MIRVs from a PBV. Given the technical demands of MIRVs, it might instead first deploy non-independently targetable Multiple Reentry Vehicles (MRVs) like the US, USSR, and UK did. Even in this case, the North might want more payload capability to deploy more or larger MRVs.
Another reason for having a bigger payload capacity is the desire to carry more and/or more RV-like (heavier) decoys to spoof US missile defenses than is possible with the Hwasong-15. Alternatively, the North may have decided that it wanted to possess or portray the capability to deliver a “super heavy” single large thermonuclear RV against US cities for political or deterrent effect. While this also is Khrushchevian in nature, one should recall that the Soviet SS-18, Chinese CSS-4 and US Titan-II ICBMs were deployed with massive single RVs having up to 9 megatons of yield.[4]
Another size-related question raised by the new ICBM is: why make it road-mobile? Here, too, there could be a political component; after all, it is the world’s biggest mobile ICBM. But to the extent the North truly intends to deploy this system, it would almost certainly judge that road-mobile basing would be more survivable than silo- or other fixed-basing, even though the sheer size and weight of the new ICBM would render it less mobile than the Hwasong-15 and more constrained in the portions of the road network it could use, (limited to smooth, paved roadways), and probably needing to fuel the missile after it was erected at a launch site (adding to vulnerability and reducing response time).
The New SLBM
(Source: KCNA)
We have not been able to estimate the dimensions of the new “Pukguksong-4” SLBM from the currently available images; one analyst suggests it may be the same size as the current Pukguksong-3/KN-26. The missile’s short-and-wide appearance makes sense given the constraints of a submarine launch tube, especially for the size of submarine North Korea probably would be using.
At least portions of the missile’s motor case appear to be filament-wound, a technology the North Koreans previously have suggested they possess. If the entire motor case were so constructed, that would reduce the missile’s structure weight and allow greater range/payload capability.
The North Koreans presumably intend for the new SLBM to have greater range than the 1,900 km estimated for their most recently tested SLBM (albeit fired from a test barge, not a submarine), the Pukguksong-3/KN-26. If the new SLBM uses a larger solid-fuel motor than the Pukguksong-3, there is no open source evidence that motor has been ground tested. If the new SLBM is intended to be deployed, it may be intended for the new conventionally powered ballistic missile submarine that North Korea hinted at building in July 2019.[5]
The military significance of the new SLBM will turn on its range capability: The longer the range, the closer to North Korean military protection its launching submarine can remain and still hit regional targets. We presume the Pukguksong-4 will not have sufficient range to strike Guam, Hawaii or the US West Coast without a vulnerable transit.
In any case, as noted elsewhere, this missile could provide only a marginal addition to the threat posed by the North’s much larger, increasingly longer range and much more survivable land-based ballistic missile force.
posted for fair use
- [1]
Simon Denyer and Min Joo Kim, “North Korea Parades Huge, New ICBM, But Kim Jong Un Stresses Deterrent Nature,” The Washington Post, October 10, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/worl...f13a74-0869-11eb-8719-0df159d14794_story.html.- [2]
From the mid-1950s to early 1960s, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev tried to compensate for what he knew to be the USSR’s nuclear inferiority by staging bomber fly-bys with the same small number of aircraft fly over again and again to portray having a large bomber force, ordering the testing of a 50 megaton nuclear device that was not reflective of actual deployable weapons, etc.- [3]
Simon Denyer and Min Joo Kim.- [4]
See Missile Defense Project, “SS-18 ‘Satan,’” Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 10, 2016, last modified June 15, 2018, SS-18 "Satan" | Missile Threat; Missile Defense Project, “DF-5 (Dong Feng-5 / CSS-4),” Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 12, 2016, last modified November 18, 2019, DF-5 (Dong Feng-5 / CSS-4) | Missile Threat and Missile Defense Project, “Titan II,” Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 22, 2017, last modified June 15, 2018, Titan II | Missile Threat.- [5]
“Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Inspects Newly Built Submarine,” KCNA, July 23, 2019, Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Inspects Newly Built Submarine | KCNA Watch.
North Korea Unveils Two New Strategic Missiles in October 10 Parade - 38 North: Informed Analysis of North Korea
As widely expected, North Korea unveiled new missile capabilities during its military parade on October 10, marking the 75th anniversary…www.38north.org
Norbert Brugge is calling this the "first stage" of the "Unha X".....
calling doctor who! Those look like Darleks to me Housecarl?Norbert Brugge is calling this the "first stage" of the "Unha X".....
Ankit Panda
@nktpnd
1h
Didn't mean to be cagey above: the diameter measurement is concerning because it makes the Pukguksong-4 the largest-diameter solid propellant missile ever seen in North Korea. It may be part of a future solid ICBM. (Note the lack of KPN camo unlike the paraded Pukguksong-1 SLBM.)
This shot offers a good look at the wound filament airframe.
View attachment 225471
We’ve known North Korea has the ability to make wound filament rocket casings since early 2017. This was the big breakthrough that allowed the USSR to start producing large road-mobile ICBMs. (Liquid propellant road-mobile ICBMs aren’t ideal.)
So, we may soon be looking at a future where North Korea operates 2.5m diameter liquid propellant ICBMs with MRVs, and a single-RV ~2m diameter solid propellant ICBM. Bad news all around.
I don’t think it’s an SLBM, FWIW. The green truck & non-KPN personnel accompanying it suggest it’s a land-based system.
I dunno. Lil dough boy is starting to grow on me. Certainly more interesting to watch his persona morph into this statesmanesque dood from a boring, predictable 3rd rate bully. :: shrug :: I doubt we know what is really up tween DJT and doughboy though. I wouldn't be too terribly surprised if they were playing others in some regards. :: more shrugs ::
View attachment 225475