ALERT The Winds of War Blow in Korea and The Far East
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danielboon
TB Fanatic
And yet with all the activity in the south China Sea we are also trying to provoke war in the middle east
View: https://mobile.twitter.com/FirstSquawk/status/1307857391623446535
northern watch
TB Fanatic
Taiwan military says it has right to counter attack amid China threats
By Yimou Lee
September 21, 2020 1:25 AM Updated 16 minutes ago
TAIPEI (Reuters) - Taiwan said on Monday its armed forces have the right to self-defence and counter attack amid “harassment and threats”, in an apparent warning to China, which last week sent numerous jets across the mid-line of the sensitive Taiwan Strait.
FILE PHOTO: A Taiwanese AH-1 Cobra helicopter fires during the live-fire, anti-landing Han Kuang military exercise, which simulates an enemy invasion, in Taichung, Taiwan July 16, 2020. REUTERS/Ann Wang/File Photo
Tensions have sharply spiked in recent months between Taipei and Beijing, which claims democratically-run Taiwan as its own territory, to be taken by force if needed.
Chinese aircraft crossed the mid-line to enter the island’s air defence identification zone on Friday and Saturday, prompting Taiwan to scramble jets to intercept them, and President Tsai Ing-wen to call China a threat to the region.
In a statement, Taiwan’s defence ministry said it had “clearly defined” procedures for the island’s first response amid “high frequency of harassment and threats from the enemy’s warships and aircraft this year”.
It said Taiwan had the right to “self-defence and to counter attack” and followed the guideline of “no escalation of conflict and no triggering incidents”.
Taiwan would not provoke, but it was also “not afraid of the enemy”, it added.
MID-LINE “DOES NOT EXIST”
Taiwanese and Chinese combat aircraft normally observe the mid-line of the Taiwan Strait and do not cross it, although there is no official agreement between Taipei and Beijing on doing so, and the rule is observed unofficially.
“Taiwan is an inseparable part of Chinese territory,” Foreign Ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin told reporters in Beijing. “The so-called mid-line of the Strait does not exist.”
Since 2016 Taiwan has reported only five Chinese incursions across the line, including the two last week.
Late on Monday, Taiwan’s Defence Ministry reported two Chinese anti-submarine aircraft had flown into Taiwan’s air defence identification zone - but not over the mid-line - to the island’s southwest, and were warned away by Taiwanese fighters.
The drills came as Beijing expressed anger at the visit of a senior U.S. official to Taipei.
On Monday, the official China Daily newspaper said the United States was trying to use Taiwan to contain China but nobody should underestimate its determination to assert its sovereignty over the island.
“The U.S. administration should not be blinkered in its desperation to contain the peaceful rise of China and indulge in the U.S. addiction to its hegemony,” it said in an editorial.
China has been angered by stepped-up U.S. support for Taiwan, including two visits in as many months by top officials, one in August by Health Secretary Alex Azar and the other last week by Keith Krach, undersecretary for economic affairs.
The United States, which has no official diplomatic ties with the island but is its strongest international backer, is also planning major new arms sales to Taiwan.
China this month held rare large-scale drills near Taiwan, which Taipei called serious provocation. China said the exercise was a necessity to protect its sovereignty.
Reporting by Yimou Lee; Additional reporting by Ben Blanchard, and Gabriel Crossly in Beijing; Editing by Robert Birsel, Clarence Fernandez and Gareth Jones
uk.reuters.com
By Yimou Lee
September 21, 2020 1:25 AM Updated 16 minutes ago
TAIPEI (Reuters) - Taiwan said on Monday its armed forces have the right to self-defence and counter attack amid “harassment and threats”, in an apparent warning to China, which last week sent numerous jets across the mid-line of the sensitive Taiwan Strait.
FILE PHOTO: A Taiwanese AH-1 Cobra helicopter fires during the live-fire, anti-landing Han Kuang military exercise, which simulates an enemy invasion, in Taichung, Taiwan July 16, 2020. REUTERS/Ann Wang/File Photo
Tensions have sharply spiked in recent months between Taipei and Beijing, which claims democratically-run Taiwan as its own territory, to be taken by force if needed.
Chinese aircraft crossed the mid-line to enter the island’s air defence identification zone on Friday and Saturday, prompting Taiwan to scramble jets to intercept them, and President Tsai Ing-wen to call China a threat to the region.
In a statement, Taiwan’s defence ministry said it had “clearly defined” procedures for the island’s first response amid “high frequency of harassment and threats from the enemy’s warships and aircraft this year”.
It said Taiwan had the right to “self-defence and to counter attack” and followed the guideline of “no escalation of conflict and no triggering incidents”.
Taiwan would not provoke, but it was also “not afraid of the enemy”, it added.
MID-LINE “DOES NOT EXIST”
Taiwanese and Chinese combat aircraft normally observe the mid-line of the Taiwan Strait and do not cross it, although there is no official agreement between Taipei and Beijing on doing so, and the rule is observed unofficially.
“Taiwan is an inseparable part of Chinese territory,” Foreign Ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin told reporters in Beijing. “The so-called mid-line of the Strait does not exist.”
Since 2016 Taiwan has reported only five Chinese incursions across the line, including the two last week.
Late on Monday, Taiwan’s Defence Ministry reported two Chinese anti-submarine aircraft had flown into Taiwan’s air defence identification zone - but not over the mid-line - to the island’s southwest, and were warned away by Taiwanese fighters.
The drills came as Beijing expressed anger at the visit of a senior U.S. official to Taipei.
On Monday, the official China Daily newspaper said the United States was trying to use Taiwan to contain China but nobody should underestimate its determination to assert its sovereignty over the island.
“The U.S. administration should not be blinkered in its desperation to contain the peaceful rise of China and indulge in the U.S. addiction to its hegemony,” it said in an editorial.
China has been angered by stepped-up U.S. support for Taiwan, including two visits in as many months by top officials, one in August by Health Secretary Alex Azar and the other last week by Keith Krach, undersecretary for economic affairs.
The United States, which has no official diplomatic ties with the island but is its strongest international backer, is also planning major new arms sales to Taiwan.
China this month held rare large-scale drills near Taiwan, which Taipei called serious provocation. China said the exercise was a necessity to protect its sovereignty.
Reporting by Yimou Lee; Additional reporting by Ben Blanchard, and Gabriel Crossly in Beijing; Editing by Robert Birsel, Clarence Fernandez and Gareth Jones
Reuters | Breaking International News & Views
Find latest news from every corner of the globe at Reuters.com, your online source for breaking international news coverage.
uk.reuters.com
northern watch
TB Fanatic
China Military Releases War Simulation Video Of Attack On US Guam Base
by Tyler Durden
Zero Hedge
Monday, 09/21/2020 - 12:05
Following weeks of multiple Chinese fighter jet incursions over Taiwan, the Chinese air force released a shocking video on Saturday showing bombers conducting a simulated attack "on what appears to be Andersen Air Force Base on the U.S. Pacific island of Guam," according to Reuters.
Taiwanese Foreign Minister Joseph Wu warned Saturday that China was increasing drills and other forms of military pressure with the threat of intervention. Wu said China's crackdown in Hong Kong is a reminder that "Taiwan might be next".
The short video, titled "The god of war H-6K goes on the attack!," was posted on the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) Weibo account, comes as the Chinese military carried out the second day of drills near Chinese-claimed Taiwan.
The South China Morning Post (SCMP) said the island in the simulation video "has more than a passing resemblance to the US facility on the island of Guam." Reuters noted the runway in the video mirrors that of Anderson's.
PLAAF wrote in the description of the video:
Collin Koh, a research fellow at Singapore's Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, told Reuters the propaganda video has aims to project PLAAF's increasing long-range power.
PLAAF's H-6K bombers have a combat range of 3,700 miles and can carry nuclear weapons, long-range cruise missiles, and will one day be armed with hypersonic missiles.
Drew Thompson, a former US defense department official who was responsible for managing US relations with mainland China and Taiwan, told SCMP the video is a warning to surrounding countries:
Stillframe from moment of strike on what closely resembles Anderson AFB, Guam.
To sum up, the video is likely a powerful message to Washington: Don't mess with Taiwan.
www.zerohedge.com
by Tyler Durden
Zero Hedge
Monday, 09/21/2020 - 12:05
Following weeks of multiple Chinese fighter jet incursions over Taiwan, the Chinese air force released a shocking video on Saturday showing bombers conducting a simulated attack "on what appears to be Andersen Air Force Base on the U.S. Pacific island of Guam," according to Reuters.
Taiwanese Foreign Minister Joseph Wu warned Saturday that China was increasing drills and other forms of military pressure with the threat of intervention. Wu said China's crackdown in Hong Kong is a reminder that "Taiwan might be next".
The short video, titled "The god of war H-6K goes on the attack!," was posted on the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) Weibo account, comes as the Chinese military carried out the second day of drills near Chinese-claimed Taiwan.
The South China Morning Post (SCMP) said the island in the simulation video "has more than a passing resemblance to the US facility on the island of Guam." Reuters noted the runway in the video mirrors that of Anderson's.
PLAAF wrote in the description of the video:
"We are the defenders of the motherland's aerial security; we have the confidence and ability to always defend the security of the motherland's skies."
Collin Koh, a research fellow at Singapore's Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, told Reuters the propaganda video has aims to project PLAAF's increasing long-range power.
PLAAF's H-6K bombers have a combat range of 3,700 miles and can carry nuclear weapons, long-range cruise missiles, and will one day be armed with hypersonic missiles.
Drew Thompson, a former US defense department official who was responsible for managing US relations with mainland China and Taiwan, told SCMP the video is a warning to surrounding countries:
Stillframe from moment of strike on what closely resembles Anderson AFB, Guam.
To sum up, the video is likely a powerful message to Washington: Don't mess with Taiwan.
Zerohedge
ZeroHedge - On a long enough timeline, the survival rate for everyone drops to zero
www.zerohedge.com
northern watch
TB Fanatic
northern watch
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AlfaMan
Has No Life - Lives on TB
China Military Releases War Simulation Video Of Attack On US Guam Base
by Tyler Durden
Zero Hedge
Monday, 09/21/2020 - 12:05
Following weeks of multiple Chinese fighter jet incursions over Taiwan, the Chinese air force released a shocking video on Saturday showing bombers conducting a simulated attack "on what appears to be Andersen Air Force Base on the U.S. Pacific island of Guam," according to Reuters.
Taiwanese Foreign Minister Joseph Wu warned Saturday that China was increasing drills and other forms of military pressure with the threat of intervention. Wu said China's crackdown in Hong Kong is a reminder that "Taiwan might be next".
The short video, titled "The god of war H-6K goes on the attack!," was posted on the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) Weibo account, comes as the Chinese military carried out the second day of drills near Chinese-claimed Taiwan.
The South China Morning Post (SCMP) said the island in the simulation video "has more than a passing resemblance to the US facility on the island of Guam." Reuters noted the runway in the video mirrors that of Anderson's.
PLAAF wrote in the description of the video:
Collin Koh, a research fellow at Singapore's Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, told Reuters the propaganda video has aims to project PLAAF's increasing long-range power.
PLAAF's H-6K bombers have a combat range of 3,700 miles and can carry nuclear weapons, long-range cruise missiles, and will one day be armed with hypersonic missiles.
Drew Thompson, a former US defense department official who was responsible for managing US relations with mainland China and Taiwan, told SCMP the video is a warning to surrounding countries:
Stillframe from moment of strike on what closely resembles Anderson AFB, Guam.
To sum up, the video is likely a powerful message to Washington: Don't mess with Taiwan.
Zerohedge
ZeroHedge - On a long enough timeline, the survival rate for everyone drops to zero
The Badgers wouldn't get within a thousand miles of Guam.
No, but the cruise missiles it carried and the MRBMs/IRBMs would.....
And this guy is only the tip of the iceberg. Heck, Facebook is being used for this as well. If not I'd be shocked....
northern watch
TB Fanatic
NYPD Officer Arrested, Charged With Spying For China
by Tyler Durden
Zero Hedge
Monday, 09/21/2020 - 18:15
A NYPD officer has been arrested and charged with acting as an agent of China, according to WABC New York.
Community affairs officer Baimadajie Angwang of the 111 precinct in Queens and a US Army Reservist at Fort Dix acted "at the direction and control" of CCP government officials operating out of the consulate in New York, and was reporting on the activities of ethnic Tibetans, according to the allegations against him.
NYPD officer Baimadajie Angwang in an interview with NTD in Queens, New York, on Nov. 8, 2019. (via The Epoch Times)
Angwang is accused of using his official position with the NYPD to give consulate officials access to senior NYPD officials.
He is also accused of committing wire fraud, making false statements and obstructing an official proceeding, according to the report.
"None of these activities falls within the scope of Angwang's official duties and responsibilities with either the NYPD or the USAR," reads the complaint.
"Angwang also discussed the utility of developing sources for the PRC government in the local Tibetan community and suggested that the primary qualification for a source as follows: 'If you're willing to recognize the motherland, the motherland is willing to assist you with its resources,'" reads the complaint, which adds that Angwang maintained a relationship with at least two PRC officials stationed at the Consulate since prior to 2018, one of whom is believed to have been assigned to the "China Association for Preservation and Development of Tibetan Culture," a division of the PRC's United Front Work Department ("UFWD"). According to the report, the department is responsible for neutralizing PRC potential sources of opposition.
Angwang made his first virtual appearance in federal court in downtown Brooklyn Monday afternoon.
"As alleged in this federal complaint, Baimadajie Angwang violated every oath he took in this country," reads a statement from NYPD Commissioner Dermot Shea, who added "One to the United States, another to the U.S. Army, and a third to this Police Department. From the earliest stages of this investigation, the NYPD's Intelligence and Internal Affairs bureaus worked closely with the FBI's Counterintelligence Division to make sure this individual would be brought to justice."
www.zerohedge.com
by Tyler Durden
Zero Hedge
Monday, 09/21/2020 - 18:15
A NYPD officer has been arrested and charged with acting as an agent of China, according to WABC New York.
Community affairs officer Baimadajie Angwang of the 111 precinct in Queens and a US Army Reservist at Fort Dix acted "at the direction and control" of CCP government officials operating out of the consulate in New York, and was reporting on the activities of ethnic Tibetans, according to the allegations against him.
NYPD officer Baimadajie Angwang in an interview with NTD in Queens, New York, on Nov. 8, 2019. (via The Epoch Times)
Angwang is accused of using his official position with the NYPD to give consulate officials access to senior NYPD officials.
He is also accused of committing wire fraud, making false statements and obstructing an official proceeding, according to the report.
"None of these activities falls within the scope of Angwang's official duties and responsibilities with either the NYPD or the USAR," reads the complaint.
In one phone conversation, Angwang told his handler at the consulate that he offered to "raise our country's soft power" by having the consular official attend NYPD events, and provide the official with nonpublic information about the NYPD's internal workings.
"Angwang also discussed the utility of developing sources for the PRC government in the local Tibetan community and suggested that the primary qualification for a source as follows: 'If you're willing to recognize the motherland, the motherland is willing to assist you with its resources,'" reads the complaint, which adds that Angwang maintained a relationship with at least two PRC officials stationed at the Consulate since prior to 2018, one of whom is believed to have been assigned to the "China Association for Preservation and Development of Tibetan Culture," a division of the PRC's United Front Work Department ("UFWD"). According to the report, the department is responsible for neutralizing PRC potential sources of opposition.
Angwang made his first virtual appearance in federal court in downtown Brooklyn Monday afternoon.
"As alleged in this federal complaint, Baimadajie Angwang violated every oath he took in this country," reads a statement from NYPD Commissioner Dermot Shea, who added "One to the United States, another to the U.S. Army, and a third to this Police Department. From the earliest stages of this investigation, the NYPD's Intelligence and Internal Affairs bureaus worked closely with the FBI's Counterintelligence Division to make sure this individual would be brought to justice."
Zerohedge
ZeroHedge - On a long enough timeline, the survival rate for everyone drops to zero
www.zerohedge.com
NYPD Officer Arrested, Charged With Spying For China
by Tyler Durden
Zero Hedge
Monday, 09/21/2020 - 18:15
A NYPD officer has been arrested and charged with acting as an agent of China, according to WABC New York.
Community affairs officer Baimadajie Angwang of the 111 precinct in Queens and a US Army Reservist at Fort Dix acted "at the direction and control" of CCP government officials operating out of the consulate in New York, and was reporting on the activities of ethnic Tibetans, according to the allegations against him.
NYPD officer Baimadajie Angwang in an interview with NTD in Queens, New York, on Nov. 8, 2019. (via The Epoch Times)
Angwang is accused of using his official position with the NYPD to give consulate officials access to senior NYPD officials.
He is also accused of committing wire fraud, making false statements and obstructing an official proceeding, according to the report.
"None of these activities falls within the scope of Angwang's official duties and responsibilities with either the NYPD or the USAR," reads the complaint.
In one phone conversation, Angwang told his handler at the consulate that he offered to "raise our country's soft power" by having the consular official attend NYPD events, and provide the official with nonpublic information about the NYPD's internal workings.
"Angwang also discussed the utility of developing sources for the PRC government in the local Tibetan community and suggested that the primary qualification for a source as follows: 'If you're willing to recognize the motherland, the motherland is willing to assist you with its resources,'" reads the complaint, which adds that Angwang maintained a relationship with at least two PRC officials stationed at the Consulate since prior to 2018, one of whom is believed to have been assigned to the "China Association for Preservation and Development of Tibetan Culture," a division of the PRC's United Front Work Department ("UFWD"). According to the report, the department is responsible for neutralizing PRC potential sources of opposition.
Angwang made his first virtual appearance in federal court in downtown Brooklyn Monday afternoon.
"As alleged in this federal complaint, Baimadajie Angwang violated every oath he took in this country," reads a statement from NYPD Commissioner Dermot Shea, who added "One to the United States, another to the U.S. Army, and a third to this Police Department. From the earliest stages of this investigation, the NYPD's Intelligence and Internal Affairs bureaus worked closely with the FBI's Counterintelligence Division to make sure this individual would be brought to justice."
Zerohedge
ZeroHedge - On a long enough timeline, the survival rate for everyone drops to zero
Hummm....so when did he immigrate and with whom and what were their loyalties?
northern watch
TB Fanatic
I would not be surprised
jward
passin' thru
UN chief warns against 'new Cold War'
AFP•September 22, 2020
People walk on an empty First Avenue near the United Nations headquarters in New York on September 9, 2020.
UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres on Tuesday urged the world to prevent a Cold War between the United States and China and halt conflicts so it can focus on the Covid-19 pandemic.
"We must do everything to avoid a new Cold War," Guterres said in an address as he opened an almost entirely virtual UN General Assembly.
"We are moving in a very dangerous direction. Our world cannot afford a future where the two largest economies split the globe in a Great Fracture -- each with its own trade and financial rules and internet and artificial intelligence capacities," he said, without saying the United States and China by name.
Tensions have soared between the United States and China in recent months, with President Donald Trump blaming Beijing for the Covid-19 pandemic that has claimed some 950,000 lives around the world and cast a shadow over his reelection bid.
Guterres has campaigned for an end to all violent conflicts as the world instead focuses on stopping the disease.
He pointed to some partial successes including ceasefires declared in Cameroon, Colombia and Cameroon.
He pressed for a universal ceasefire by the end of the year.
"I appeal for a stepped-up international effort -- led by the Security Council -- to achieve a global ceasefire by the end of this year," Guterres said.
"We have 100 days. The clock is ticking."
Guterres also offered open criticism of right-wing movements in the face of the coronavirus.
"Populism and nationalism have failed. Those approaches to contain the virus have often made things manifestly worse. "
news.yahoo.com
AFP•September 22, 2020
People walk on an empty First Avenue near the United Nations headquarters in New York on September 9, 2020.
UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres on Tuesday urged the world to prevent a Cold War between the United States and China and halt conflicts so it can focus on the Covid-19 pandemic.
"We must do everything to avoid a new Cold War," Guterres said in an address as he opened an almost entirely virtual UN General Assembly.
"We are moving in a very dangerous direction. Our world cannot afford a future where the two largest economies split the globe in a Great Fracture -- each with its own trade and financial rules and internet and artificial intelligence capacities," he said, without saying the United States and China by name.
Tensions have soared between the United States and China in recent months, with President Donald Trump blaming Beijing for the Covid-19 pandemic that has claimed some 950,000 lives around the world and cast a shadow over his reelection bid.
Guterres has campaigned for an end to all violent conflicts as the world instead focuses on stopping the disease.
He pointed to some partial successes including ceasefires declared in Cameroon, Colombia and Cameroon.
He pressed for a universal ceasefire by the end of the year.
"I appeal for a stepped-up international effort -- led by the Security Council -- to achieve a global ceasefire by the end of this year," Guterres said.
"We have 100 days. The clock is ticking."
Guterres also offered open criticism of right-wing movements in the face of the coronavirus.
"Populism and nationalism have failed. Those approaches to contain the virus have often made things manifestly worse. "
UN chief warns against 'new Cold War'
UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres on Tuesday urged the world to prevent a Cold War between the United States and China and halt conflicts so it can focus on the Covid-19 pandemic.
jward
passin' thru
zerohedge
@zerohedge
7m
Taiwan's Military Says It Has The Right To Counterattack Chinese Warplanes
View: https://twitter.com/zerohedge/status/1308598214396915712?s=20
@zerohedge
7m
Taiwan's Military Says It Has The Right To Counterattack Chinese Warplanes
View: https://twitter.com/zerohedge/status/1308598214396915712?s=20
jward
passin' thru
Hmmm.
Yonhap News Agency
@YonhapNews
3m
Childbirths in S. Korea drop 8.5 pct in July
View: https://twitter.com/YonhapNews/status/1308602028612960259?s=20
Yonhap News Agency
@YonhapNews
3m
Childbirths in S. Korea drop 8.5 pct in July
View: https://twitter.com/YonhapNews/status/1308602028612960259?s=20
Macgyver
Has No Life - Lives on TB
Chinese Propaganda Video Rips Off Hollywood Movies to Fake Bombing of U.S. Base
The Chinese military has published a new propaganda video on the social media platform Weibo that appears to show Chinese bombers attacking a U.S. military base in Guam. Te video is an unexceptional piece of digital saber-rattling between China and the U.S., but the new video might seem oddly...
www.gizmodo.com.au
Gizmodo Australia
Chinese Propaganda Video Rips Off Hollywood Movies to Fake Bombing of U.S. Base
Matt Novak
Published 2 days ago: September 21, 2020 at 11:22 pm
The Chinese military has published a new propaganda video on the social media platform Weibo that appears to show Chinese bombers attacking a U.S. military base in Guam. Te video is an unexceptional piece of digital saber-rattling between China and the U.S., but the new video might seem oddly familiar to Americans. That’s because the Chinese video includes clips from at least three Hollywood movies: The Rock from 1996, The Hurt Locker from 2008, and Transformers: Revenge of the Fallen from 2009.
The video, which was originally posted to the People’s Liberation Army Air Force account on Weibo, is titled “The god of war H-6K goes on the attack!” and shows several planes taking off with the kind of hazy and stylised cinematography you’d see in a professional movie trailer, slowly building to climactic explosions.
The H-6K is China’s upgraded version of an old Soviet plane, but it’s capable of carrying nuclear weapons and was specifically designed to threaten Taiwan and any U.S.-allied ships in the Pacific.
“We are the defenders of the motherland’s aerial security; we have the confidence and ability to always defend the security of the motherland’s skies,” the video’s description says, according to an English-language translation by Reuters.
The PLA Air Force video has also been uploaded to YouTube, but we’ve created our own side-by-side comparison to the Hollywood movies here.
Several English-language news outlets like Reuters and the South China Morning Post have reported that the target in the new Chinese propaganda video appears to be the U.S. territory of Guam.
The reason to attack Guam (at least virtually) is twofold: First, Guam is the site of a strategic air base that would be considered the frontline of any potential shooting war with U.S. military adversaries in Asia, including China and North Korea. But obviously the second reason is that the footage is pulled directly from Hollywood movies where Guam, or a landmass somewhat resembling Guam, was the target.
For example, the Chinese video uses a short clip from the 2009 Transformers movie where a huge catlike robot is sent to Earth. But in the Chinese military version, it looks like a missile being directed at a target that eventually explodes. Some of the clips don’t show Guam at all, like the explosion from The Rock, which is set on Alcatraz, off the coast of San Francisco.
The use of Hollywood movies for the video, first spotted by semi-anonymous users on Twitter who claim to be based in Hong Kong, is particularly ironic when you consider the pro-U.S. and generally patriotic source material. The Rock and Transformers were both produced and directed by Michael Bay, who has an extremely close relationship with the U.S. Air Force, and the Air Force Entertainment Liaison Office specifically. Bay gives the Pentagon final say on his scripts and in exchange he gets to use military resources like fighter jets and warships in his movies.
This is far from the first time that U.S. geopolitical adversaries like China and Russia have used Hollywood movie clips for propaganda purposes. Russia’s embassy in the U.S. tweeted out a very familiar looking clip in 2018 to criticise American policies that were being perceived as hostile.
“It seems that the attempts to ratchet up tension can be explained by the need to justify the adoption by Western countries of laws designed to tighten control over their citizens and restrict fundamental rights and freedoms,” the tweet from the Russian embassy in the U.S. explains.
But the video in the tweet is actually from the movie Enemy of the State, the 1998 espionage thriller directed by Tony Scott, starring Gene Hackman and Will Smith. The movie became especially important after Edward Snowden’s revelations in 2013 about domestic spying by the NSA.
A Chinese Air Force video from 2011 also lifted footage from the 1986 movie Top Gun, as the South China Morning Post notes. And we could go on and on.
American movies have been a tool of propaganda since at least the first World War, when Hollywood’s biggest stars like Mary Pickford were releasing features like 1917’s The Little American and the short film “100% American” to help sell war bonds. But here in the 21st century, it’s a bit strange to see America’s so-called adversaries adopt American movies to create propaganda that simulates the destruction of American military bases.
The whole situation speaks to just how powerful U.S. media has become over the past century — a power where even American geopolitical adversaries love Hollywood’s cultural products and use them to attack the U.S. And it perhaps gives some insight into at least part of why the Trump regime has felt threatened by TikTok. Yes, there may be some real national security concerns about the Chinese government having access to individual user data, though the government is still not being specific about how TikTok is a larger threat than, say, Facebook. But arguably the bigger concern for Trump’s cronies was a Chinese-made app being popular with Americans at all.
If you believe that social media is to the 21st century what Hollywood blockbusters were in the 20th century, TikTok is a threat to the U.S. soft power. And while the entire American entertainment community is probably concerned with the world’s eyeballs being glued to social media apps — Netflix recently called TikTok a “competitor” in a very explicit way — the people threatening to shut down TikTok are the same people who will lose long-term if China dominates global culture.
Steven Mnuchin isn’t just Trump’s Treasury Secretary, he’s also the producer of everything from Wonder Woman to Mad Max: Fury Road to The Lego Batman Movie. As always, none of this is really hidden from public view. With Trump, it’s all being done out in the open.
© 2007 - 2020 Pedestrian Group
jward
passin' thru
VatsRohit
@KesariDhwaj
Chinese should be careful; such videos reveal a lot. - None of the Z-10 is carrying anti-tank missiles. - Only 2 x rocket pods with <10 rockets each. - Talk of Z-10 being underpowered are true? - Pakistan supposedly opted for Turkish gunship over Z-10 because of this factor.
View: https://twitter.com/KesariDhwaj/status/1308439400221614081?s=20
@KesariDhwaj
Chinese should be careful; such videos reveal a lot. - None of the Z-10 is carrying anti-tank missiles. - Only 2 x rocket pods with <10 rockets each. - Talk of Z-10 being underpowered are true? - Pakistan supposedly opted for Turkish gunship over Z-10 because of this factor.
View: https://twitter.com/KesariDhwaj/status/1308439400221614081?s=20
Hummm......
Posted for fair use.....
Regional Strategies Week
Southeast Asia: A New Strategic Nexus for Japan’s Maritime Strategy
September 21, 2020 Guest Author 1 Comment
Regional Strategies Topic Week
By John Bradford
Japan’s maritime strategy is fundamentally focused on partnering with its United States ally to ensure that the Indo-Pacific sea lanes critical to its security are safe and secure. Most of the activities by its two maritime security services, the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) and Japan Coast Guard (JCG), are focused on Japan’s near seas and seek to deter aggressive actions by the People’s Republic of China (PRC), North Korea, and Russia while enabling good governance of the Japanese EEZ. Japan also deploys its forces to locations along those sea lanes, such as the Gulf of Aden and Strait of Hormuz, where Japanese shipping is under significant and direct threat. Equally critical to the strategy are the Japanese activities aimed at the relatively more safe and secure, yet still vulnerable sea lanes that pass through and near Southeast Asia. This includes enclosed seas such as the South China Sea, Java Sea, and Bay of Bengal as well as critical chokepoints such as the Straits of Malacca, Singapore, Sunda, and Lombok.
Much of this effort draws on Japan’s economic strength and Japan has been heavily invested in developing infrastructure and safety capacity alongside this region’s coastal states for more than 50 years. For the last 20 years the Japan Coast Guard has also been engaged with developing the coastal states’ maritime law enforcement capacity. In the last decade, the Japanese Ministry of Defense has become involved. It has started new capacity-building projects with regional navies and the JMSDF has been increasingly conducting military operations in the regional waters.
With all branches of Japan state power now investing in Southeast Asian maritime security, this region is cementing as a new nexus in Japan’s maritime strategy. The scope, strategic intent, and likely future development of Japan’s maritime security activities in Southeast Asia merits closer examination.
Japan’s Maritime Strategy
Japan’s well-established maritime security strategy can be broadly separated into two geographic segments, one pertaining to Japan’s home waters and the other to Indo-Pacific sea lanes. In its near seas, Japan faces significant security pressures from the north, west, and south. Aggressive contemporary military postures, territorial disputes, and war legacy issues create security concerns and constrains cooperation between Japan and its neighbors Russia, China, and the Koreas.
In the maritime space, the competition with the PRC is the most strained. The concentric rings of Japanese and PRC coast guard and naval forces persistently contest sovereignty, probe reactions, and seek to assert control over the waters surrounding the Senkaku (Diaoyu in Mandarin) islands.1 This situation demands significant fleet resources while the remainder of the East China Seas provides a long front for patrol and surveillance. The ballistic missile threat from North Korea and Japan’s support for the enforcement of United Nations Security Council sanctions against that state also keep the fleet busy. Above the waters approaching Japan, the Japan Air Self Defense Force (JASDF) regularly scrambles fighters in response to PRC and Russian flight operations. Given this increasingly severe situation, protecting Japan’s rights and executing its national responsibilities in the sea and airspace associated with the nation under UNCLOS have occupied the bulk of Japan’s security resources.
Although pressured in home waters, the government of Japan has long understood that its national security equally relies on the safe transit of goods along critical sea lanes. As measured in calories, Japan is reliant on imports for more than 60 percent of its food.2 Japan is also 99.7 percent, 97.5 percent, and 99.3 percent dependent on imports for crude oil, liquified natural gas (LNG), and coal, respectively. Together, these three commodities provide more than 85 percent of Japan’s energy. The LNG sources are well-diversified, but 88 percent of the crude oil comes from the Middle East, and Australia is the main supplier of coal.3 Thus, most of Japan’s energy passes along Southeast Asian sea lanes. This energy fuels Japan’s status as the world’s fourth largest exporter of products. Over $700 billion of goods leave Japan, about 99 percent of those by ship.4
Japan’s strategy to ensure the safety and security of its critical sea lanes rests on three elements: capitalizing on its alliance with the United States, deploying forces to most critical threat locations, and strengthening positive relations with increasingly capable partners along the sea routes.
In recent years, Japanese maritime strategy has cleanly nested under national campaigns to focus Japan’s foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific band that stretches along its sea lanes to Europe and Africa. Shortly after Prime Minister Shinzo Abe first assumed office in 2006, Foreign Minister Taro Aso announced the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity.5 This foreign policy complemented Japan’s existing priorities involving managing relations with immediate neighbors and strengthening the U.S. alliance with an additional emphasis on promoting democracy and increased capability with an arc of partner nations stretching from northern Europe, though the Middle East, past the Indian subcontinent, and across Southeast Asia.6 Notably, this arc aligned geographically with Japan’s main trade routes minus those across the Pacific Ocean that were already secure thanks to the U.S. alliance. Abe is also credited as the first global leader to highlight the Indo-Pacific geopolitical concept when he gave a 2007 address to the Indian Parliament entitled, “Confluence of the Two Seas.”7 The next two Prime Ministers, both also from the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), continued with this prioritization. When the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) led the government from 2009-2012, Prime Ministers Hatoyama, Kan, and Noda used different branding but sustained this foreign policy approach toward the coastal states of South and Southeast Asia.8 Immediately after returning to power in 2012, Abe published an essay titled “Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond.” This essay opened with:
“Peace, stability, and freedom of navigation in the Pacific Ocean are inseparable from peace, stability, and freedom of navigation in the Indian Ocean. Japan, as one of the oldest sea-faring democracies in Asia, should play a greater role – alongside Australia, India, and the U.S. – in preserving the common good in both regions.”9
Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force’s first-of-class flattop JS Izumo visits Vietnam’s Cam Ranh port in June 2019. (JMSDF)
Southeast Asia was clearly at the heart of the diamond and it is now the central nexus of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific vision announced in 2016.10
Japan’s Maritime Forces: Operations Near Home and Far Abroad
Japan’s 1945 constitution states that “sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained.” Imperial Japanese Navy veterans were re-employed by the Maritime Safety Agency (MSA), a civilian law enforcement body established in 1948 that was also tasked with clearing the approximately 100,000 sea mines laid around Japan during World War II. As the Cold War progressed, the United States forged an alliance with Japan and encouraged the development of Japanese defense forces. In 1952 the first U.S.-Japan security treaty was ratified and the Maritime Guard Forces, equipped with former U.S. frigates and landing craft, were established under the MSA. In 1954, this body was detached from the MSA, redesignated as the maritime component of the new Self Defense Force (SDF), and its units were quietly dispatched to support mine countermeasure operations around the Korean Peninsula. In 1960, the current U.S.-Japan Security Treaty came into force obligating U.S. forces based in Japan to provide for the defense of Japan and the security of the region. As the Cold War progressed, the JMSDF became more capable and began working hand-in-glove with the U.S. Navy (USN) to contain Soviet units operating from Pacific ports. After the Cold War, JMSDF capability continued to grow and the United States encouraged Japan to expand the geographic scope of JMSDF operations. The MSA remained a civilian force responsible for law enforcement and maintaining the safety of Japanese waters, and its name was officially revised in English to Japan Coast Guard (JCG) in April 2000.
In the years after the Cold War, the JMSDF has been dispatched on a series of mission to enhance security around the western terminus of its Indo-Pacific sea lanes. These dispatches have all been made in coordination with the U.S. and all but one responded to immediate threats to Japanese shipping. The first JMSDF operation beyond Northeast Asia was the 1991 deployment of vessels to support the clearance of sea mines from the Arabian Sea in the wake of the First Gulf War. 10 years later, it sent a force to provide logistics support to the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan. In 2009, the new DPJ government ended the Afghanistan support mission, but established a new anti-piracy mission in the Gulf of Aden thereby continuing the persistent presence of Japanese maritime forces in the Western Indian Ocean. Initially, the JMSDF units and their JCG augments provided anti-piracy escorts and conducted maritime surveillance without being a part of any coalition, but they coordinated closely with the United States and eventually joined the U.S.-sponsored CTF 151. In 2015 and 2020, Japan commanded CTF 151. In 2020, Japan dispatched an additional maritime force to gather intelligence and protect its ships in the approaches to the Strait of Hormuz. The government of Japan has made clear that these forces were not a part of the U.S. Operation Sentinel to guard shipping against Iranian provocations. However, it should be noted that the dispatch was made after a U.S. request, so may represent a compromise within the alliance. It can be safely assumed that the operations, including the P-3 flights originating from a Djibouti runway Japan shares with American forces, are coordinated with the U.S. 5th Fleet in a manner reminiscent to that of the initial anti-piracy deployments in 2009.
Japanese Civil Activities to Strengthen Southeast Asian Maritime Safety and Security
The sea lanes between Japan’s home waters and the dangerous sea space around the Middle East stretch for more than 5000 nautical miles. For the most part, these sea lanes pass by coastal states capable of providing the governance needed to ensure safety that is sufficient for the free flow of commerce. However, the coastal states vary widely in terms of maritime capacity, the sea lanes are far from hazard free, and Japanese business and government leaders worry about the possibility that disruptive events could quickly create a crisis. The hazards that concern Japan include the navigation challenges associated with densely trafficked chokepoints, environmental challenges such as extreme weather and oil spills, piracy, terrorism, and war risks. For the last five decades Japan has become increasingly involved in addressing these challenges by supporting coastal state capacity-building projects as a core element of its maritime security strategy.
Japan began these efforts in the late 1960s with an initial focus on assisting coastal state efforts to improve navigational safety in Southeast Asian waterways. The key milestone marking the start of these activities was the founding of the Malacca Strait Council (MSC) in 1969. This Tokyo-based organization coordinated efforts of the privately-funded Nippon Foundation with those of the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Japanese Transportation Ministry, and JCG. Projects included the installation and maintenance of navigation aids, the removal of shipwrecks, the provision of oil skimming vessels, the donation of a buoy tender to Malaysia, and dredging work.11
In the 1970s the Japanese foundations and government agencies expanded their capacity-building activities to include waterways and coastal states beyond the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. These projects neatly aligned with Japan’s other Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) activities in Southeast Asia that similarly aimed to build capacity that strengthen the region’s trust in Japan and develop relationships that would help drive Japan’s economic success. When, in 1975, the grounding of the Japanese tanker Showa Maru created a massive oil spill in the Singapore Strait, Japan swiftly recognized the potential for environmental catastrophes to interrupt commerce and added environmental protection to their capacity-building portfolio.12 Under the 1977 Fukuda Doctrine, this ODA was decoupled from political objectives and Japan pledged that it would not assume a military role in Southeast Asia. When, in 1981, Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki responded to U.S. demands for Japan to assume greater burdens within the alliance by announcing the JMSDF would begin defending sea lanes up to 1000 nautical miles from Japan, it was no coincidence that the distance reached only the Bashi Channel and not into the South China Sea. Indeed, Japan remained quite concerned about memories of war and Southeast Asia sensitivities.13
In the early and mid-1990s, Japan took advantage of its improved standing in the region to take initial steps to become involved in Southeast Asia’s maritime security. For example, a subsidiary of the Nippon Foundation provided most of the seed money for the International Maritime Bureau Piracy Report Centre established in Kuala Lumpur in 1992, and the Japanese shipping industry covered significant portions of its operating costs.14 During the 1990s the JMSDF also conducted some leadership engagements under the auspices of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium and held its first navy-to-navy staff talks with Southeast Asian partners in 1997.15
The rise of regional piracy rates in the wake of the 1997 Asian Monetary Crisis catalyzed an expansion of Japan’s capacity-building efforts to include maritime law enforcement.16 Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi kickstarted this expansion at the December 1999 ASEAN +3 summit when he sought international cooperative actions against piracy by proposing the establishment of a regional “Coast Guard body,” the strengthening of state support for shipping companies, and improvement of regional coordination.17 Soon Japan was offering equipment and training, and pressing for joint patrols.18 After a series of Japanese fact-finding delegations visited the region and Tokyo-hosted several large conferences, the Japan’s ambitions were scaled back, but the expanded involvement in Southeast Asian maritime law enforcement nonetheless came quickly. In 2000 the JCG began establishing permanent overseas positions for officers to support regional coast guards (starting with the nascent Philippine Coast Guard), and in 2001 the JCG began exercising with regional coast guards (starting with the Philippines and Thailand). In 2006 Japanese diplomatic efforts culminated in the creation of the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP).19
A notable aspect of Japan’s support for Southeast Asia’s maritime security has been transfer of patrol boats to regional maritime law enforcement agencies. These transfers have included used converted fishing vessels, retired Japanese patrol boats, and new construction vessels. They have been provided by private Japanese foundations, through government facilitated loans, and as direct assistance. An early example were the transfers to Indonesia and the Philippines made in the mid-2000s. As these vessels were armored, the transfers were governed by Japan’s Three Principals on Arms Exports and the receiving partners could only use them for law enforcement operations, to include anti-piracy and counterterrorism.20 Relaxations of the Three Principals in 2011 and 2014 have streamlined the policy process and in recent years Japan has expanded its programs to provide patrol vessels. To date, coast guard and maritime law enforcement agencies in Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pulau, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam have received patrol vessels from Japan.
Continued......
Posted for fair use.....
Regional Strategies Week
Southeast Asia: A New Strategic Nexus for Japan’s Maritime Strategy
September 21, 2020 Guest Author 1 Comment
Regional Strategies Topic Week
By John Bradford
Japan’s maritime strategy is fundamentally focused on partnering with its United States ally to ensure that the Indo-Pacific sea lanes critical to its security are safe and secure. Most of the activities by its two maritime security services, the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) and Japan Coast Guard (JCG), are focused on Japan’s near seas and seek to deter aggressive actions by the People’s Republic of China (PRC), North Korea, and Russia while enabling good governance of the Japanese EEZ. Japan also deploys its forces to locations along those sea lanes, such as the Gulf of Aden and Strait of Hormuz, where Japanese shipping is under significant and direct threat. Equally critical to the strategy are the Japanese activities aimed at the relatively more safe and secure, yet still vulnerable sea lanes that pass through and near Southeast Asia. This includes enclosed seas such as the South China Sea, Java Sea, and Bay of Bengal as well as critical chokepoints such as the Straits of Malacca, Singapore, Sunda, and Lombok.
Much of this effort draws on Japan’s economic strength and Japan has been heavily invested in developing infrastructure and safety capacity alongside this region’s coastal states for more than 50 years. For the last 20 years the Japan Coast Guard has also been engaged with developing the coastal states’ maritime law enforcement capacity. In the last decade, the Japanese Ministry of Defense has become involved. It has started new capacity-building projects with regional navies and the JMSDF has been increasingly conducting military operations in the regional waters.
With all branches of Japan state power now investing in Southeast Asian maritime security, this region is cementing as a new nexus in Japan’s maritime strategy. The scope, strategic intent, and likely future development of Japan’s maritime security activities in Southeast Asia merits closer examination.
Japan’s Maritime Strategy
Japan’s well-established maritime security strategy can be broadly separated into two geographic segments, one pertaining to Japan’s home waters and the other to Indo-Pacific sea lanes. In its near seas, Japan faces significant security pressures from the north, west, and south. Aggressive contemporary military postures, territorial disputes, and war legacy issues create security concerns and constrains cooperation between Japan and its neighbors Russia, China, and the Koreas.
In the maritime space, the competition with the PRC is the most strained. The concentric rings of Japanese and PRC coast guard and naval forces persistently contest sovereignty, probe reactions, and seek to assert control over the waters surrounding the Senkaku (Diaoyu in Mandarin) islands.1 This situation demands significant fleet resources while the remainder of the East China Seas provides a long front for patrol and surveillance. The ballistic missile threat from North Korea and Japan’s support for the enforcement of United Nations Security Council sanctions against that state also keep the fleet busy. Above the waters approaching Japan, the Japan Air Self Defense Force (JASDF) regularly scrambles fighters in response to PRC and Russian flight operations. Given this increasingly severe situation, protecting Japan’s rights and executing its national responsibilities in the sea and airspace associated with the nation under UNCLOS have occupied the bulk of Japan’s security resources.
Although pressured in home waters, the government of Japan has long understood that its national security equally relies on the safe transit of goods along critical sea lanes. As measured in calories, Japan is reliant on imports for more than 60 percent of its food.2 Japan is also 99.7 percent, 97.5 percent, and 99.3 percent dependent on imports for crude oil, liquified natural gas (LNG), and coal, respectively. Together, these three commodities provide more than 85 percent of Japan’s energy. The LNG sources are well-diversified, but 88 percent of the crude oil comes from the Middle East, and Australia is the main supplier of coal.3 Thus, most of Japan’s energy passes along Southeast Asian sea lanes. This energy fuels Japan’s status as the world’s fourth largest exporter of products. Over $700 billion of goods leave Japan, about 99 percent of those by ship.4
Japan’s strategy to ensure the safety and security of its critical sea lanes rests on three elements: capitalizing on its alliance with the United States, deploying forces to most critical threat locations, and strengthening positive relations with increasingly capable partners along the sea routes.
In recent years, Japanese maritime strategy has cleanly nested under national campaigns to focus Japan’s foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific band that stretches along its sea lanes to Europe and Africa. Shortly after Prime Minister Shinzo Abe first assumed office in 2006, Foreign Minister Taro Aso announced the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity.5 This foreign policy complemented Japan’s existing priorities involving managing relations with immediate neighbors and strengthening the U.S. alliance with an additional emphasis on promoting democracy and increased capability with an arc of partner nations stretching from northern Europe, though the Middle East, past the Indian subcontinent, and across Southeast Asia.6 Notably, this arc aligned geographically with Japan’s main trade routes minus those across the Pacific Ocean that were already secure thanks to the U.S. alliance. Abe is also credited as the first global leader to highlight the Indo-Pacific geopolitical concept when he gave a 2007 address to the Indian Parliament entitled, “Confluence of the Two Seas.”7 The next two Prime Ministers, both also from the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), continued with this prioritization. When the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) led the government from 2009-2012, Prime Ministers Hatoyama, Kan, and Noda used different branding but sustained this foreign policy approach toward the coastal states of South and Southeast Asia.8 Immediately after returning to power in 2012, Abe published an essay titled “Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond.” This essay opened with:
“Peace, stability, and freedom of navigation in the Pacific Ocean are inseparable from peace, stability, and freedom of navigation in the Indian Ocean. Japan, as one of the oldest sea-faring democracies in Asia, should play a greater role – alongside Australia, India, and the U.S. – in preserving the common good in both regions.”9
Southeast Asia was clearly at the heart of the diamond and it is now the central nexus of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific vision announced in 2016.10
Japan’s Maritime Forces: Operations Near Home and Far Abroad
Japan’s 1945 constitution states that “sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained.” Imperial Japanese Navy veterans were re-employed by the Maritime Safety Agency (MSA), a civilian law enforcement body established in 1948 that was also tasked with clearing the approximately 100,000 sea mines laid around Japan during World War II. As the Cold War progressed, the United States forged an alliance with Japan and encouraged the development of Japanese defense forces. In 1952 the first U.S.-Japan security treaty was ratified and the Maritime Guard Forces, equipped with former U.S. frigates and landing craft, were established under the MSA. In 1954, this body was detached from the MSA, redesignated as the maritime component of the new Self Defense Force (SDF), and its units were quietly dispatched to support mine countermeasure operations around the Korean Peninsula. In 1960, the current U.S.-Japan Security Treaty came into force obligating U.S. forces based in Japan to provide for the defense of Japan and the security of the region. As the Cold War progressed, the JMSDF became more capable and began working hand-in-glove with the U.S. Navy (USN) to contain Soviet units operating from Pacific ports. After the Cold War, JMSDF capability continued to grow and the United States encouraged Japan to expand the geographic scope of JMSDF operations. The MSA remained a civilian force responsible for law enforcement and maintaining the safety of Japanese waters, and its name was officially revised in English to Japan Coast Guard (JCG) in April 2000.
In the years after the Cold War, the JMSDF has been dispatched on a series of mission to enhance security around the western terminus of its Indo-Pacific sea lanes. These dispatches have all been made in coordination with the U.S. and all but one responded to immediate threats to Japanese shipping. The first JMSDF operation beyond Northeast Asia was the 1991 deployment of vessels to support the clearance of sea mines from the Arabian Sea in the wake of the First Gulf War. 10 years later, it sent a force to provide logistics support to the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan. In 2009, the new DPJ government ended the Afghanistan support mission, but established a new anti-piracy mission in the Gulf of Aden thereby continuing the persistent presence of Japanese maritime forces in the Western Indian Ocean. Initially, the JMSDF units and their JCG augments provided anti-piracy escorts and conducted maritime surveillance without being a part of any coalition, but they coordinated closely with the United States and eventually joined the U.S.-sponsored CTF 151. In 2015 and 2020, Japan commanded CTF 151. In 2020, Japan dispatched an additional maritime force to gather intelligence and protect its ships in the approaches to the Strait of Hormuz. The government of Japan has made clear that these forces were not a part of the U.S. Operation Sentinel to guard shipping against Iranian provocations. However, it should be noted that the dispatch was made after a U.S. request, so may represent a compromise within the alliance. It can be safely assumed that the operations, including the P-3 flights originating from a Djibouti runway Japan shares with American forces, are coordinated with the U.S. 5th Fleet in a manner reminiscent to that of the initial anti-piracy deployments in 2009.
Japanese Civil Activities to Strengthen Southeast Asian Maritime Safety and Security
The sea lanes between Japan’s home waters and the dangerous sea space around the Middle East stretch for more than 5000 nautical miles. For the most part, these sea lanes pass by coastal states capable of providing the governance needed to ensure safety that is sufficient for the free flow of commerce. However, the coastal states vary widely in terms of maritime capacity, the sea lanes are far from hazard free, and Japanese business and government leaders worry about the possibility that disruptive events could quickly create a crisis. The hazards that concern Japan include the navigation challenges associated with densely trafficked chokepoints, environmental challenges such as extreme weather and oil spills, piracy, terrorism, and war risks. For the last five decades Japan has become increasingly involved in addressing these challenges by supporting coastal state capacity-building projects as a core element of its maritime security strategy.
Japan began these efforts in the late 1960s with an initial focus on assisting coastal state efforts to improve navigational safety in Southeast Asian waterways. The key milestone marking the start of these activities was the founding of the Malacca Strait Council (MSC) in 1969. This Tokyo-based organization coordinated efforts of the privately-funded Nippon Foundation with those of the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Japanese Transportation Ministry, and JCG. Projects included the installation and maintenance of navigation aids, the removal of shipwrecks, the provision of oil skimming vessels, the donation of a buoy tender to Malaysia, and dredging work.11
In the 1970s the Japanese foundations and government agencies expanded their capacity-building activities to include waterways and coastal states beyond the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. These projects neatly aligned with Japan’s other Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) activities in Southeast Asia that similarly aimed to build capacity that strengthen the region’s trust in Japan and develop relationships that would help drive Japan’s economic success. When, in 1975, the grounding of the Japanese tanker Showa Maru created a massive oil spill in the Singapore Strait, Japan swiftly recognized the potential for environmental catastrophes to interrupt commerce and added environmental protection to their capacity-building portfolio.12 Under the 1977 Fukuda Doctrine, this ODA was decoupled from political objectives and Japan pledged that it would not assume a military role in Southeast Asia. When, in 1981, Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki responded to U.S. demands for Japan to assume greater burdens within the alliance by announcing the JMSDF would begin defending sea lanes up to 1000 nautical miles from Japan, it was no coincidence that the distance reached only the Bashi Channel and not into the South China Sea. Indeed, Japan remained quite concerned about memories of war and Southeast Asia sensitivities.13
In the early and mid-1990s, Japan took advantage of its improved standing in the region to take initial steps to become involved in Southeast Asia’s maritime security. For example, a subsidiary of the Nippon Foundation provided most of the seed money for the International Maritime Bureau Piracy Report Centre established in Kuala Lumpur in 1992, and the Japanese shipping industry covered significant portions of its operating costs.14 During the 1990s the JMSDF also conducted some leadership engagements under the auspices of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium and held its first navy-to-navy staff talks with Southeast Asian partners in 1997.15
The rise of regional piracy rates in the wake of the 1997 Asian Monetary Crisis catalyzed an expansion of Japan’s capacity-building efforts to include maritime law enforcement.16 Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi kickstarted this expansion at the December 1999 ASEAN +3 summit when he sought international cooperative actions against piracy by proposing the establishment of a regional “Coast Guard body,” the strengthening of state support for shipping companies, and improvement of regional coordination.17 Soon Japan was offering equipment and training, and pressing for joint patrols.18 After a series of Japanese fact-finding delegations visited the region and Tokyo-hosted several large conferences, the Japan’s ambitions were scaled back, but the expanded involvement in Southeast Asian maritime law enforcement nonetheless came quickly. In 2000 the JCG began establishing permanent overseas positions for officers to support regional coast guards (starting with the nascent Philippine Coast Guard), and in 2001 the JCG began exercising with regional coast guards (starting with the Philippines and Thailand). In 2006 Japanese diplomatic efforts culminated in the creation of the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP).19
A notable aspect of Japan’s support for Southeast Asia’s maritime security has been transfer of patrol boats to regional maritime law enforcement agencies. These transfers have included used converted fishing vessels, retired Japanese patrol boats, and new construction vessels. They have been provided by private Japanese foundations, through government facilitated loans, and as direct assistance. An early example were the transfers to Indonesia and the Philippines made in the mid-2000s. As these vessels were armored, the transfers were governed by Japan’s Three Principals on Arms Exports and the receiving partners could only use them for law enforcement operations, to include anti-piracy and counterterrorism.20 Relaxations of the Three Principals in 2011 and 2014 have streamlined the policy process and in recent years Japan has expanded its programs to provide patrol vessels. To date, coast guard and maritime law enforcement agencies in Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pulau, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam have received patrol vessels from Japan.
Continued......
Continued.....
Japan Self Defense Force Operations in Southeast Asia
Civilian arms of Japan’s foreign policy apparatus have been investing in strengthening the safety and security of Southeast Asian sea lanes for more than 50 years. In contrast, the JMSDF was essentially absent in Southeast Asia until a bit over a decade ago. That is not to say it was completely missing. Its annual training cruise invariably made some goodwill port visits in the region, ships and aircraft paused to enjoy liberty and build relations while enroute to and returning home from missions in the Western Indian Ocean, it was involved in Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) activities, and it provided transportation support to peacekeeping operations in Cambodia and Timor Leste.21 However, these activities were irregular, generally small in scale, and did not involve strengthening the capabilities of neither the JMSDF nor their partners. In the most recent 10 or so years, a period that scholar Andrew Oros marks as corresponding to a Japanese “security renaissance” when a broad political consensus developed in favor of expanding Japan’s direct involvement in international security affairs, the JMSDF began deploying forces specifically to influence the security situation in Southeast Asian waters.22
SASEBO, Japan (July 31, 2020) – Commander, Fleet Activities Sasebo Capt. Brad Stallings and Deputy Commander, Amphibious Force 7th Fleet Capt. Marvin Thompson meet with Capt. Tetsuro Sato, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Sasebo District’s director of operations and plans onboard CFAS July 31, 2020. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman Jasmine Ikusebiala)
The earliest JMSDF ship deployments aimed specifically to impact the Southeast Asian maritime security situation were in alignment with multilateral efforts and frameworks. In December 2004, SDF ships and aircraft were among the international forces that responded to the Indian Ocean tsunami.23 In 2005, the JMSDF participated in the inaugural WPNS at-sea exercise that was hosted by the Republic of Singapore Navy, and the Japan Ground Self Defense Force (JGSDF) officers participated in the tsunami relief workshop and high-level staff exercise portions of the U.S.-Thai exercise Cobra Gold.24 Since then, maritime exercises sponsored by multilateral organizations such as WPNS, ARF, and ADMM+ have become more frequent and the JMSDF has consistently participated, often sending the largest contingents.25 While significant from a defense diplomacy perspective, these multinational maritime exercises were often quite simple and were aimed more at confidence-building than strengthening operational capacity. Many focused on disaster response rather than more traditional security concerns.26
Japan’s National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) of 2010 was the first major Japanese policy document to state that the SDF would begin conducting capacity building missions with foreign militaries. The first operation of this new policy was the 2010 deployment of a JMSDF ship to conduct capacity-building activities in Vietnam and Cambodia as a part of the U.S. Pacific Partnership campaign. Since then, JMSDF ships have participated in Pacific Partnership annually, only missing 2011 when they were occupied with supporting domestic disaster response operations in the wake of the tsunami and earthquake. In 2012, Japan executed its first bilateral capacity-building activity in Southeast Asia, an underwater medicine seminar held with the Vietnam Navy. The second bilateral event was a February 2013 oceanography-focused seminar held at the Indonesian Navy Maritime Operations Center in Jakarta. Since then, Japan has conducted similar bilateral capacity-building activities with another eight partner nations. Of these 10 partners, all but Mongolia are South China Sea or Bay of Bengal coastal states.27 In December 2013, Japan’s first ever National Security Strategy explained the strategic intent behind these activities: “Japan will provide assistance to those coastal states alongside the sea lanes of communication and other states in enhancing their maritime law enforcement capabilities, and strengthen cooperation with partners on the sea lanes who share strategic interests with Japan.”28 In November 2016, Japanese Defense Minister Tomomi Inada delivered the Vientiane Vision at the second ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers’ Informal Meeting. Meant to be a major defense policy statement, the Vientiane Vision outlined Japan’s priority for defense cooperation with the ASEAN states as centering on the principles of international law, especially in the field of maritime and air space; promoting maritime security through the building of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and search and rescue (SAR) capacities, and capability growth in other security fields.29
In the last decade, the JMSDF has also expanded its naval operations in the South China Sea. Unlike the multilateral exercises and capacity-building activities previously mentioned, these activities appear to be more focused on developing JMSDF options to conduct high-end naval operations around that body of water. In that sense, the activities clearly go well beyond the militarization and geographic limitations described four decades ago in the Fukuda and Suzuki Doctrines. Since the government of Japan does not publish the locations of its ships and submarines, it is unclear exactly when these deployments began. One of the earliest activities reported by the Japanese government was a June 2011 trilateral JMSDF-USN-Royal Australian Navy (RAN) exercise in the South China Sea. Since then, reports of JMSDF exercises with other extra-regional navies in the South China Sea have become increasingly frequent. However, JMSDF operational presence in the South China Sea may date back even further. After the Japanese government reported a September 2018 unilateral ASW exercise in the South China Sea, Prime Minister Abe explained, “Japan has been performing submarine exercises in the South China Sea since 15 years ago [sic]. We did so last year and the year before that.”30 The apparent emphasis on ASW may reflect concerns that PRC submarines could interdict Japanese shipping. Some analysts, including some retired JMSDF admirals, argue that the JMSDF is also readying itself to be able to counter a potential PRC ballistic missile submarine bastion in those waters.31 Either concern would help explain the JMSDF’s emphasis on its partnerships with the Philippines and Vietnam, the nations that straddle the north section of the South China Sea, and flank the important PRC submarine base on Hainan Island.
The JMSDF’s relationship with the Philippine Navy is the most developed of its Southeast Asia partnerships. SDF officers began observing the annual U.S.-Philippines Balikatan exercise in 2012 and involvement increased such that the ‘observing’ delegation of 2018 included two destroyers and a submarine. The Philippines also hosted a JMSDF P-3 for a maritime patrol exchange that took place simultaneously with the U.S.-Philippines exercise CARAT 2015. Japanese P-3s have since visited for several additional cooperative events, and in May 2018 the JMSDF deployed a P-1 to the Philippines for a training event. Notably, before this mission, P-1s had only been deployed overseas for airshows and for a brief counter-piracy mission flying from Djibouti. In 2016, Japan’s training submarine Oyashio visited Subic Bay alongside two JMSDF destroyers and the crews took part in confidence-building activities with Filipino counterparts. This was the first JMSDF submarine port call to the Philippines in 15 years, but since that event JMSDF submarines have been frequent visitors to Subic Bay.32
In October 2018, the JGSDF’s nascent Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade (ARDB) landed amphibious assault vehicles from a USN ship onto the Philippine shores during the U.S. and Philippine exercise Kamandag. This was the first overseas deployment of the ARDB, a unit created, at least in part, to conduct defensive operations against potential foreign state aggression around Japan’s outlying islands. It was also the first deployment of Japanese armored vehicles to Southeast Asia since World War II. Although Japanese spokesmen emphasized that the training was focused on disaster response, other elements of the U.S.-Philippine joint military exercise suggest that it was structured in such a way to also have military applications.33
The Philippines is also the first, and, thus far, only, nation to acquire Japanese defense equipment. 2014 policy reforms allowed Tokyo to approve defense exports to partner militaries, and in 2017 two used JMSDF TC-90 training aircraft were delivered directly from the SDF to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) where they were redesignated as C-90s for work as maritime patrol aircraft. Three additional TC-90s were transferred in 2018. Although offering a significant boost to the Philippine ability to develop maritime domain awareness, this new capacity offers limited military value. The C-90s are incapable of carrying weapons and do not incorporate the sort of electronic information collection and sharing system required for effective military surveillance and targeting missions. There are reports that Japan is interested in transferring P-3C aircraft, an ASW-focused aircraft capable of carrying a wide array of weapons and electronic systems, to Southeast Asian partners, but contacts in those countries have explained to the author that their preference for lower life-cycles costs would likely result in acquiring newly constructed European options.34
In August 2020, Japan’s Mitsubishi Electric Corporation concluded a contract with the Philippines’ Department of National Defense to support four air defense radars. For the Philippines, the three FPS-3 fixed radar units and one TPS-P14 mobile radar will provide it considerable new capability to detect and track missiles and aircraft. For Japan, this transfer breaks new ground in that it is the first transfers of newly-built Japanese-made defense equipment to any nation since the end of World War II. In contrast to past transfers of unarmed patrol boats and aircraft, this is the first Japanese transfer of equipment that will enable much more significant contributions to creating the kill-chains need to counter serious military threats.35
JMSDF P-1 patrol craft (Photo via Japanese Ministry of Defense)
Japan has also been prioritizing the development of its defense relations with Vietnam. Japan’s first JMSDF capacity-building activity in the region was the previously mentioned 2010 dispatch of JS Kunisaki to Qui Nhon, Vietnam under the Pacific Partnership umbrella. While focused on medical treatment activities and cultural exchanges, the visit included the use of amphibious vehicles landing on a Vietnamese beach.36 The next year, Vietnam hosted the first SDF capacity-building activities in Southeast Asia that were not facilitated as part of a U.S. or multilateral event. Since then the relationship has continued to grow, though it has not yet reached a level such that it includes bilateral defense exercises or operations. In April 2016, two Japanese destroyers made the country’s first-post war port call at Cam Ranh Bay. In 2018, JS Kuroshio became the first-ever JMSDF submarine to visit Vietnam. Interactions ashore included courtesy calls and cultural exchanges.37 In 2019, JS Izumo (the helicopter carrier now slated for refit to carry F-35B fighters) and an escort visited Cam Ranh Bay and conducted goodwill exercises with a Vietnam Navy corvette.38 This decade of engagements is clearly creating a valuable partnership. In April 2020, Vietnam agreed to provide refueling services to a JMSDF P-3 returning home from a Djibouti deployment when other nations declined due to their COVID-19 precautions. The aircraft then developed mechanical issues preventing its departure. Vietnam hosted the crew for nearly two months and facilitated special arrangement or the entry of technicians and parts during the height of the pandemic.39
Annual deployments of large helicopter carriers such as Izumo for a multi-month deployment to Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean provide excellent encapsulations of the varied nature of new JMSDF activities in the region. In 2016, during the first of these deployments, JS Ise was the largest ship at the multinational exercise Komodo hosted by Indonesia. Ise then transited to the South China Sea with a cadre of midshipmen from WPNS navies onboard for training while conducting a trilateral passing exercise with RAN and USN ships.40 After a goodwill visit to Manila, Ise was then the largest ship involved in the May 2016 ADMM+ Maritime Security/Counter-Terrorism Field Training Exercise that began in Brunei and concluded in Singapore. The following year, the largest ship in the JMSDF fleet, JS Izumo, made a similar deployment to Southeast Asia that included a maritime security training program for officers from ASEAN navies while the ships were in the South China Sea; hosting Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte during a port visit to Manila; calling in Sri Lank; and completed two days of exercises with ships from Australia, Canada, and the U.S. that included cross-deck exchanges and live-fire events.41 Similar deployments in 2018 (JS Kaga) and 2019 (JS Izumo) similarly blended unilateral operations in the South China Sea, exercises with the U.S. and other extra-regional navies, support for multilateral maritime security programs, and bilateral relationship-building with regional partners.42
Continued.....
Japan Self Defense Force Operations in Southeast Asia
Civilian arms of Japan’s foreign policy apparatus have been investing in strengthening the safety and security of Southeast Asian sea lanes for more than 50 years. In contrast, the JMSDF was essentially absent in Southeast Asia until a bit over a decade ago. That is not to say it was completely missing. Its annual training cruise invariably made some goodwill port visits in the region, ships and aircraft paused to enjoy liberty and build relations while enroute to and returning home from missions in the Western Indian Ocean, it was involved in Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) activities, and it provided transportation support to peacekeeping operations in Cambodia and Timor Leste.21 However, these activities were irregular, generally small in scale, and did not involve strengthening the capabilities of neither the JMSDF nor their partners. In the most recent 10 or so years, a period that scholar Andrew Oros marks as corresponding to a Japanese “security renaissance” when a broad political consensus developed in favor of expanding Japan’s direct involvement in international security affairs, the JMSDF began deploying forces specifically to influence the security situation in Southeast Asian waters.22
The earliest JMSDF ship deployments aimed specifically to impact the Southeast Asian maritime security situation were in alignment with multilateral efforts and frameworks. In December 2004, SDF ships and aircraft were among the international forces that responded to the Indian Ocean tsunami.23 In 2005, the JMSDF participated in the inaugural WPNS at-sea exercise that was hosted by the Republic of Singapore Navy, and the Japan Ground Self Defense Force (JGSDF) officers participated in the tsunami relief workshop and high-level staff exercise portions of the U.S.-Thai exercise Cobra Gold.24 Since then, maritime exercises sponsored by multilateral organizations such as WPNS, ARF, and ADMM+ have become more frequent and the JMSDF has consistently participated, often sending the largest contingents.25 While significant from a defense diplomacy perspective, these multinational maritime exercises were often quite simple and were aimed more at confidence-building than strengthening operational capacity. Many focused on disaster response rather than more traditional security concerns.26
Japan’s National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) of 2010 was the first major Japanese policy document to state that the SDF would begin conducting capacity building missions with foreign militaries. The first operation of this new policy was the 2010 deployment of a JMSDF ship to conduct capacity-building activities in Vietnam and Cambodia as a part of the U.S. Pacific Partnership campaign. Since then, JMSDF ships have participated in Pacific Partnership annually, only missing 2011 when they were occupied with supporting domestic disaster response operations in the wake of the tsunami and earthquake. In 2012, Japan executed its first bilateral capacity-building activity in Southeast Asia, an underwater medicine seminar held with the Vietnam Navy. The second bilateral event was a February 2013 oceanography-focused seminar held at the Indonesian Navy Maritime Operations Center in Jakarta. Since then, Japan has conducted similar bilateral capacity-building activities with another eight partner nations. Of these 10 partners, all but Mongolia are South China Sea or Bay of Bengal coastal states.27 In December 2013, Japan’s first ever National Security Strategy explained the strategic intent behind these activities: “Japan will provide assistance to those coastal states alongside the sea lanes of communication and other states in enhancing their maritime law enforcement capabilities, and strengthen cooperation with partners on the sea lanes who share strategic interests with Japan.”28 In November 2016, Japanese Defense Minister Tomomi Inada delivered the Vientiane Vision at the second ASEAN-Japan Defence Ministers’ Informal Meeting. Meant to be a major defense policy statement, the Vientiane Vision outlined Japan’s priority for defense cooperation with the ASEAN states as centering on the principles of international law, especially in the field of maritime and air space; promoting maritime security through the building of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and search and rescue (SAR) capacities, and capability growth in other security fields.29
In the last decade, the JMSDF has also expanded its naval operations in the South China Sea. Unlike the multilateral exercises and capacity-building activities previously mentioned, these activities appear to be more focused on developing JMSDF options to conduct high-end naval operations around that body of water. In that sense, the activities clearly go well beyond the militarization and geographic limitations described four decades ago in the Fukuda and Suzuki Doctrines. Since the government of Japan does not publish the locations of its ships and submarines, it is unclear exactly when these deployments began. One of the earliest activities reported by the Japanese government was a June 2011 trilateral JMSDF-USN-Royal Australian Navy (RAN) exercise in the South China Sea. Since then, reports of JMSDF exercises with other extra-regional navies in the South China Sea have become increasingly frequent. However, JMSDF operational presence in the South China Sea may date back even further. After the Japanese government reported a September 2018 unilateral ASW exercise in the South China Sea, Prime Minister Abe explained, “Japan has been performing submarine exercises in the South China Sea since 15 years ago [sic]. We did so last year and the year before that.”30 The apparent emphasis on ASW may reflect concerns that PRC submarines could interdict Japanese shipping. Some analysts, including some retired JMSDF admirals, argue that the JMSDF is also readying itself to be able to counter a potential PRC ballistic missile submarine bastion in those waters.31 Either concern would help explain the JMSDF’s emphasis on its partnerships with the Philippines and Vietnam, the nations that straddle the north section of the South China Sea, and flank the important PRC submarine base on Hainan Island.
The JMSDF’s relationship with the Philippine Navy is the most developed of its Southeast Asia partnerships. SDF officers began observing the annual U.S.-Philippines Balikatan exercise in 2012 and involvement increased such that the ‘observing’ delegation of 2018 included two destroyers and a submarine. The Philippines also hosted a JMSDF P-3 for a maritime patrol exchange that took place simultaneously with the U.S.-Philippines exercise CARAT 2015. Japanese P-3s have since visited for several additional cooperative events, and in May 2018 the JMSDF deployed a P-1 to the Philippines for a training event. Notably, before this mission, P-1s had only been deployed overseas for airshows and for a brief counter-piracy mission flying from Djibouti. In 2016, Japan’s training submarine Oyashio visited Subic Bay alongside two JMSDF destroyers and the crews took part in confidence-building activities with Filipino counterparts. This was the first JMSDF submarine port call to the Philippines in 15 years, but since that event JMSDF submarines have been frequent visitors to Subic Bay.32
In October 2018, the JGSDF’s nascent Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade (ARDB) landed amphibious assault vehicles from a USN ship onto the Philippine shores during the U.S. and Philippine exercise Kamandag. This was the first overseas deployment of the ARDB, a unit created, at least in part, to conduct defensive operations against potential foreign state aggression around Japan’s outlying islands. It was also the first deployment of Japanese armored vehicles to Southeast Asia since World War II. Although Japanese spokesmen emphasized that the training was focused on disaster response, other elements of the U.S.-Philippine joint military exercise suggest that it was structured in such a way to also have military applications.33
The Philippines is also the first, and, thus far, only, nation to acquire Japanese defense equipment. 2014 policy reforms allowed Tokyo to approve defense exports to partner militaries, and in 2017 two used JMSDF TC-90 training aircraft were delivered directly from the SDF to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) where they were redesignated as C-90s for work as maritime patrol aircraft. Three additional TC-90s were transferred in 2018. Although offering a significant boost to the Philippine ability to develop maritime domain awareness, this new capacity offers limited military value. The C-90s are incapable of carrying weapons and do not incorporate the sort of electronic information collection and sharing system required for effective military surveillance and targeting missions. There are reports that Japan is interested in transferring P-3C aircraft, an ASW-focused aircraft capable of carrying a wide array of weapons and electronic systems, to Southeast Asian partners, but contacts in those countries have explained to the author that their preference for lower life-cycles costs would likely result in acquiring newly constructed European options.34
In August 2020, Japan’s Mitsubishi Electric Corporation concluded a contract with the Philippines’ Department of National Defense to support four air defense radars. For the Philippines, the three FPS-3 fixed radar units and one TPS-P14 mobile radar will provide it considerable new capability to detect and track missiles and aircraft. For Japan, this transfer breaks new ground in that it is the first transfers of newly-built Japanese-made defense equipment to any nation since the end of World War II. In contrast to past transfers of unarmed patrol boats and aircraft, this is the first Japanese transfer of equipment that will enable much more significant contributions to creating the kill-chains need to counter serious military threats.35
Japan has also been prioritizing the development of its defense relations with Vietnam. Japan’s first JMSDF capacity-building activity in the region was the previously mentioned 2010 dispatch of JS Kunisaki to Qui Nhon, Vietnam under the Pacific Partnership umbrella. While focused on medical treatment activities and cultural exchanges, the visit included the use of amphibious vehicles landing on a Vietnamese beach.36 The next year, Vietnam hosted the first SDF capacity-building activities in Southeast Asia that were not facilitated as part of a U.S. or multilateral event. Since then the relationship has continued to grow, though it has not yet reached a level such that it includes bilateral defense exercises or operations. In April 2016, two Japanese destroyers made the country’s first-post war port call at Cam Ranh Bay. In 2018, JS Kuroshio became the first-ever JMSDF submarine to visit Vietnam. Interactions ashore included courtesy calls and cultural exchanges.37 In 2019, JS Izumo (the helicopter carrier now slated for refit to carry F-35B fighters) and an escort visited Cam Ranh Bay and conducted goodwill exercises with a Vietnam Navy corvette.38 This decade of engagements is clearly creating a valuable partnership. In April 2020, Vietnam agreed to provide refueling services to a JMSDF P-3 returning home from a Djibouti deployment when other nations declined due to their COVID-19 precautions. The aircraft then developed mechanical issues preventing its departure. Vietnam hosted the crew for nearly two months and facilitated special arrangement or the entry of technicians and parts during the height of the pandemic.39
Annual deployments of large helicopter carriers such as Izumo for a multi-month deployment to Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean provide excellent encapsulations of the varied nature of new JMSDF activities in the region. In 2016, during the first of these deployments, JS Ise was the largest ship at the multinational exercise Komodo hosted by Indonesia. Ise then transited to the South China Sea with a cadre of midshipmen from WPNS navies onboard for training while conducting a trilateral passing exercise with RAN and USN ships.40 After a goodwill visit to Manila, Ise was then the largest ship involved in the May 2016 ADMM+ Maritime Security/Counter-Terrorism Field Training Exercise that began in Brunei and concluded in Singapore. The following year, the largest ship in the JMSDF fleet, JS Izumo, made a similar deployment to Southeast Asia that included a maritime security training program for officers from ASEAN navies while the ships were in the South China Sea; hosting Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte during a port visit to Manila; calling in Sri Lank; and completed two days of exercises with ships from Australia, Canada, and the U.S. that included cross-deck exchanges and live-fire events.41 Similar deployments in 2018 (JS Kaga) and 2019 (JS Izumo) similarly blended unilateral operations in the South China Sea, exercises with the U.S. and other extra-regional navies, support for multilateral maritime security programs, and bilateral relationship-building with regional partners.42
Continued.....
Continued.....
Conclusion: Future Trajectories for Japan’s Involvement in Southeast Asian Maritime Security
The blended nature of the JMSDF capital ship deployments to Southeast Asian waters reflects its multifaceted maritime goals in the region. Japan is expanding on its decades of capacity-building initiatives in the region to include military dimensions. These activities are aimed at creating strengthened relationships with increasingly capable coastal states along Japan’s Indo-Pacific sea lanes. These naval activities are in some ways a simple progression of Japan’s longstanding policy to support the development of maritime capacity. However, this expansion reflects a loosening of Japan’s domestic policy constraints and the increased comfort that Southeast Asian partners have with hosting Japanese forces. The PRC’s increasing capabilities and assertive maritime behavior have hastened this trajectory given Japan’s heavy reliance on South China Sea sea lanes and Japan’s concerns that China’s campaign to assert sovereignty in the South China Sea is strongly linked to its campaign against Japan in the East China Sea.
Japan’s overarching strategic goal to promote the sustained safety and security of the critical Southeast Asian sea lanes has remained essentially unchanged for more than 50 years. However, Japan has incrementally expanded the range of regional security challenges that it directly addresses and agencies that it mobilizes to assist in this effort. For the last decade or so, these agencies have included the Ministry of Defense and the JMSDF. The JMSDF now regularly deploys to the South China Sea and has a record of conducting high-end warfare exercises with the U.S. and other extra-regional navies in that contested body of water. It makes major contributions to multilateral exercises in the region and has been conducting bilateral capacity-building activities with regional navies. The activities should be expected to continue to expand with the primary limiting factors being the availability of ships and other fleet resources.
To date, the bilateral engagements in Southeast Asia have been almost entirely restrained to goodwill activities, and modest projects focused on building regional partners’ constabulary capacities. However, we can expect to see Japan become more involved in assisting regional states with the military defense capabilities. The deal to send newly built and modern air defense radars to the Philippines sets an important precedent in this regard. Continued PRC maritime aggression will be an important driver, but Japan will remain concerned by other maritime threats and increasingly seek to diversify it defense relations away from reliance on the U.S.
Although Prime Minister Abe has been an important figure driving Japan’s defense engagement in Southeast Asia, his departure is unlikely to cause major adjustments to this trajectory. The domestic policymaking constraints that previously inhibited these sort of defense activities have been dismantled and there is a broad political consensus advocating for more Japanese direct involvement in regional security affairs. Most of the LDP candidates to succeed Abe as Prime Minister played a direct role in developing and implementing these policies. Others, such as former Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba, hold similar views. Even the opposition DPJ seems comfortable with expanding SDF operations in Southeast Asia. This is not an area where they have resisted, it was on their watch that ships were first sent to Southeast Asia under the Pacific Partnership.
The developments are proceeding in general alignment with a Japanese effort to foster stronger multilateral security networks and new bilateral partnerships in the face of a shift in relative power and influence that is unfavorable to its ally, the United States. With the Ministry of Defense and SDF joining the other Japanese agencies as direct participants in Southeast Asian maritime security, Southeast Asia has clearly become a new nexus in Japan’s maritime strategy. It is important for Southeast Asian states to realize that as Japan’s self-restraint relaxes, they will face bigger decisions regarding the nature and scope of the defense relations they desire with Japan.
John Bradford is a Senior Fellow in the Maritime Security Programme at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies and the Executive Director of the Yokosuka Council on Asia Pacific Studies. Prior to entering the research sector, he spent 23 years as a U.S. Navy Surface Warfare Officer focused on Indo-Pacific maritime dynamics.
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Featured Image: Japanese: Maritime Self-Defense Force escort ship Atago (DDG-177) front port side. April 13, 2019 at Maizuru base (Wikimedia Commons)
Conclusion: Future Trajectories for Japan’s Involvement in Southeast Asian Maritime Security
The blended nature of the JMSDF capital ship deployments to Southeast Asian waters reflects its multifaceted maritime goals in the region. Japan is expanding on its decades of capacity-building initiatives in the region to include military dimensions. These activities are aimed at creating strengthened relationships with increasingly capable coastal states along Japan’s Indo-Pacific sea lanes. These naval activities are in some ways a simple progression of Japan’s longstanding policy to support the development of maritime capacity. However, this expansion reflects a loosening of Japan’s domestic policy constraints and the increased comfort that Southeast Asian partners have with hosting Japanese forces. The PRC’s increasing capabilities and assertive maritime behavior have hastened this trajectory given Japan’s heavy reliance on South China Sea sea lanes and Japan’s concerns that China’s campaign to assert sovereignty in the South China Sea is strongly linked to its campaign against Japan in the East China Sea.
Japan’s overarching strategic goal to promote the sustained safety and security of the critical Southeast Asian sea lanes has remained essentially unchanged for more than 50 years. However, Japan has incrementally expanded the range of regional security challenges that it directly addresses and agencies that it mobilizes to assist in this effort. For the last decade or so, these agencies have included the Ministry of Defense and the JMSDF. The JMSDF now regularly deploys to the South China Sea and has a record of conducting high-end warfare exercises with the U.S. and other extra-regional navies in that contested body of water. It makes major contributions to multilateral exercises in the region and has been conducting bilateral capacity-building activities with regional navies. The activities should be expected to continue to expand with the primary limiting factors being the availability of ships and other fleet resources.
To date, the bilateral engagements in Southeast Asia have been almost entirely restrained to goodwill activities, and modest projects focused on building regional partners’ constabulary capacities. However, we can expect to see Japan become more involved in assisting regional states with the military defense capabilities. The deal to send newly built and modern air defense radars to the Philippines sets an important precedent in this regard. Continued PRC maritime aggression will be an important driver, but Japan will remain concerned by other maritime threats and increasingly seek to diversify it defense relations away from reliance on the U.S.
Although Prime Minister Abe has been an important figure driving Japan’s defense engagement in Southeast Asia, his departure is unlikely to cause major adjustments to this trajectory. The domestic policymaking constraints that previously inhibited these sort of defense activities have been dismantled and there is a broad political consensus advocating for more Japanese direct involvement in regional security affairs. Most of the LDP candidates to succeed Abe as Prime Minister played a direct role in developing and implementing these policies. Others, such as former Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba, hold similar views. Even the opposition DPJ seems comfortable with expanding SDF operations in Southeast Asia. This is not an area where they have resisted, it was on their watch that ships were first sent to Southeast Asia under the Pacific Partnership.
The developments are proceeding in general alignment with a Japanese effort to foster stronger multilateral security networks and new bilateral partnerships in the face of a shift in relative power and influence that is unfavorable to its ally, the United States. With the Ministry of Defense and SDF joining the other Japanese agencies as direct participants in Southeast Asian maritime security, Southeast Asia has clearly become a new nexus in Japan’s maritime strategy. It is important for Southeast Asian states to realize that as Japan’s self-restraint relaxes, they will face bigger decisions regarding the nature and scope of the defense relations they desire with Japan.
John Bradford is a Senior Fellow in the Maritime Security Programme at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies and the Executive Director of the Yokosuka Council on Asia Pacific Studies. Prior to entering the research sector, he spent 23 years as a U.S. Navy Surface Warfare Officer focused on Indo-Pacific maritime dynamics.
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Featured Image: Japanese: Maritime Self-Defense Force escort ship Atago (DDG-177) front port side. April 13, 2019 at Maizuru base (Wikimedia Commons)
The only one this helps is Beijing.....of course this could again be seen as Duterte "playing games" again with the two camps.......
Posted for fair use.....
www.manilatimes.net
PH to ratify nuclear ban treaty
By Catherine S. Valente, TMT
September 24, 2020
The Philippines is committed to ratify the United Nations treaty to ban nuclear weapons, President Rodrigo Duterte said on Wednesday.
In his speech during the UN General Assembly’s high-level general debate, the President explained that nothing j ustified the use of nuclear arms, which he described as “weapons of death.”
“The global health crisis has further complicated the global security environment. But no aspiration nor ambition can justify the use of weapons that destroy indiscriminately and completely,” Duterte said.
“There is no excuse for deaths that a nuclear war could cause nor the reckless use of chemical and biological weapons that can cause mass destruction,” he added.
Duterte said nuclear weapons only put the world at “mortal risk especially if they fall in the hands of terrorists without a shred of humanity in their souls.”
“We call on all Member States to fully implement the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the Chemical and the Biological Weapons Conventions,” the President said.
“I have asked the Philippine Senate to ratify the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Importantly, we were among those to sign it first,” he added.
Under the 1987 Constitution, a treaty or international agreement will only be valid and effective upon the concurrence of at least two thirds of all members of the Senate.
In 2017, 122 UN member-states, including the Philippines, voted in favor a treaty to ban nuclear weapons despite opposition from nuclear-armed states.
At least 45 countries have ratified the treaty, five short of the 50 required for the pact to enter into force.
Under the treaty, the signatory states must not develop, test, produce, acquire, possess, stockpile, use or threaten to use nuclear weapons.
It also prohibits the deployment of nuclear weapons on national territory and provision of assistance to any state in the conduct of prohibited activities.
Posted for fair use.....
PH to ratify nuclear ban treaty – The Manila Times
The Philippines is committed to ratify the United Nations treaty to ban nuclear weapons, President Rodrigo Duterte said on Wednesday. In his speech during the UN General Assembly’s high-level general debate, the President explained that nothing j ustified the use of nuclear arms, which he...
www.manilatimes.net
PH to ratify nuclear ban treaty
By Catherine S. Valente, TMT
September 24, 2020
The Philippines is committed to ratify the United Nations treaty to ban nuclear weapons, President Rodrigo Duterte said on Wednesday.
In his speech during the UN General Assembly’s high-level general debate, the President explained that nothing j ustified the use of nuclear arms, which he described as “weapons of death.”
“The global health crisis has further complicated the global security environment. But no aspiration nor ambition can justify the use of weapons that destroy indiscriminately and completely,” Duterte said.
“There is no excuse for deaths that a nuclear war could cause nor the reckless use of chemical and biological weapons that can cause mass destruction,” he added.
Duterte said nuclear weapons only put the world at “mortal risk especially if they fall in the hands of terrorists without a shred of humanity in their souls.”
“We call on all Member States to fully implement the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the Chemical and the Biological Weapons Conventions,” the President said.
“I have asked the Philippine Senate to ratify the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Importantly, we were among those to sign it first,” he added.
Under the 1987 Constitution, a treaty or international agreement will only be valid and effective upon the concurrence of at least two thirds of all members of the Senate.
In 2017, 122 UN member-states, including the Philippines, voted in favor a treaty to ban nuclear weapons despite opposition from nuclear-armed states.
At least 45 countries have ratified the treaty, five short of the 50 required for the pact to enter into force.
Under the treaty, the signatory states must not develop, test, produce, acquire, possess, stockpile, use or threaten to use nuclear weapons.
It also prohibits the deployment of nuclear weapons on national territory and provision of assistance to any state in the conduct of prohibited activities.
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jward
passin' thru
Nathan J Hunt
@ISNJH
2m
Well who all is ready for the DPRK parade, with reports of possible new missile that might be unveiled, looks like us missile monitors might be very busy soon.
@ISNJH
2m
Well who all is ready for the DPRK parade, with reports of possible new missile that might be unveiled, looks like us missile monitors might be very busy soon.
jward
passin' thru
Hmm. No idea if these things get free passes or not..
Doge (BAL 2-0)
@IntelDoge
1m
Republic of Korea military states that North Korea shot and killed a South Korean civilian who went missing near Yeonpyeong Island, and then cremated the body. Now demanding an explanation, and punishment for those responsible. (Yonhap)
View: https://twitter.com/IntelDoge/status/1308950689914249217?s=20
North Korea shot a missing South Korean official to death and burned his body earlier this week, the defense ministry confirmed Thursday
__________________________
#BREAKING North Korea shot dead South Korean in its waters: Seoul
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South Korean intelligence suggests that North Korea questioned the South Korean official on board the patrol boat, after they had killed him, they poured oil over his body while aboard the patrol boat, and set it on fire. (Yonhap)
___________________________
Josh Smith
@joshjonsmith
NEW: Latest details from S.Korea's military suggest the man was taken aboard a North Korean patrol boat where he was questioned before being executed on orders from a higher official. Then North Korean troops wearing gas masks poured oil over his body and set it on fire.
Doge (BAL 2-0)
@IntelDoge
1m
Republic of Korea military states that North Korea shot and killed a South Korean civilian who went missing near Yeonpyeong Island, and then cremated the body. Now demanding an explanation, and punishment for those responsible. (Yonhap)
View: https://twitter.com/IntelDoge/status/1308950689914249217?s=20
North Korea shot a missing South Korean official to death and burned his body earlier this week, the defense ministry confirmed Thursday
__________________________
#BREAKING North Korea shot dead South Korean in its waters: Seoul
__________________________
South Korean intelligence suggests that North Korea questioned the South Korean official on board the patrol boat, after they had killed him, they poured oil over his body while aboard the patrol boat, and set it on fire. (Yonhap)
___________________________
Josh Smith
@joshjonsmith
NEW: Latest details from S.Korea's military suggest the man was taken aboard a North Korean patrol boat where he was questioned before being executed on orders from a higher official. Then North Korean troops wearing gas masks poured oil over his body and set it on fire.
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Merde......
jward
passin' thru
Worst case version is it was a S.Korean official. . .what would you expect the response, if any, to be? I don't wanna set the hair on fire unless need be. . .
Depends on what he was doing there....
jward
passin' thru
EndGameWW3
@EndGameWW3
1h
China will "start a just war" if U.S. troops return to Taiwan, state-affiliated media warns
View: https://twitter.com/EndGameWW3/status/1309156536489586699?s=20
@EndGameWW3
1h
China will "start a just war" if U.S. troops return to Taiwan, state-affiliated media warns
View: https://twitter.com/EndGameWW3/status/1309156536489586699?s=20
jward
passin' thru
China up to the usual tricks
War on the Rocks
@WarOnTheRocks
·
4m
Recently, a Chinese diplomat stated that the Pamir mountains of Tajikistan, bordering Xinjiang, belonged to China and always have.
View: https://twitter.com/WarOnTheRocks/status/1309271405696086016?s=20
War on the Rocks
@WarOnTheRocks
·
4m
Recently, a Chinese diplomat stated that the Pamir mountains of Tajikistan, bordering Xinjiang, belonged to China and always have.
View: https://twitter.com/WarOnTheRocks/status/1309271405696086016?s=20
northern watch
TB Fanatic
Taiwan: China's military flew surveillance planes on 3 days
Taiwan says China sent two military surveillance planes toward the island for three straight days and it dispatched patrols in response
By The Associated Press
24 September 2020
The Associated Press
Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen speaks during a visit to the Penghu Magong military air base in outlying Penghu Island, Taiwan Tuesday, Sept. 22, 2020. Tsai visited the military base on one of Taiwan’s outlying islands Tuesday in a display of resolve following a recent show of force by rival China. (AP Photo/Johnson Lai)
TAIPEI, Taiwan -- Taiwan on Thursday condemned recent Chinese military activity after Beijing sent two military surveillance planes toward the island for three straight days, calling it a “deliberate provocation.”
Tensions have risen in the Taiwan Strait as the U.S. has stepped up its official engagement with the self-ruled island that China considers part of its national territory.
On Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday, China sent two planes into Taiwan's air defense identification zone, according to Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense. In response, the Taiwanese side dispatched air patrols, the ministry said.
“We oppose China using military force against Taiwan, deliberately violating Taiwan’s naval and airspace safety and damaging the status quo,” added Chiu Chui-Cheng, deputy minister at Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council. “Our government will continue to cooperate with countries with similar values.”
Asked about the sorties, Chinese defense ministry spokesperson Tan Kefei said they were aimed at demonstrating China’s “determination and ability to defend national sovereignty and territorial integrity.”
China is targeting “the interference of external forces and the very small number of Taiwan independence separatists and their separatist activities,” Tan said at a monthly briefing.
Last week, China sent a total of 37 warplanes, including bombers and fighter jets, across the Taiwan Strait in a warning as a high-level U.S. State Department official visited the island. The Taiwanese defense ministry said the planes crossed the midline of the Taiwan Strait.
The midline has acted as an unofficial buffer zone between China and Taiwan for decades, in what the Mainland Affairs Council called “a tacit agreement that has kept the peace.”
On Monday, Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin denied the existence of any midline, saying that Taiwan is part of China. He also warned that China would retaliate for the U.S. visit. “We will take countermeasures, including against relevant individuals," he said.
Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen has remained defiant, visiting a military base on Tuesday and encouraging the personnel, in particular pilots and crew.
Taiwanese foreign minister Joseph Wu said in July that Chinese military exercises have increased in frequency and become “virtually a daily occurrence."
China has increased diplomatic and military pressure on Tsai’s government over her refusal to agree to China’s insistence that the island be considered part of Chinese territory. The vast majority of Taiwanese reject the prospect of political union with China under the “one country, two systems” framework used for Hong Kong.
Following Tsai's election in 2016, China cut off contact with the Taiwanese government and has sought to isolate it, siphoning off the island's diplomatic allies while ratcheting up political, military and economic pressure.
abcnews.go.com
Taiwan says China sent two military surveillance planes toward the island for three straight days and it dispatched patrols in response
By The Associated Press
24 September 2020
Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen speaks during a visit to the Penghu Magong military air base in outlying Penghu Island, Taiwan Tuesday, Sept. 22, 2020. Tsai visited the military base on one of Taiwan’s outlying islands Tuesday in a display of resolve following a recent show of force by rival China. (AP Photo/Johnson Lai)
TAIPEI, Taiwan -- Taiwan on Thursday condemned recent Chinese military activity after Beijing sent two military surveillance planes toward the island for three straight days, calling it a “deliberate provocation.”
Tensions have risen in the Taiwan Strait as the U.S. has stepped up its official engagement with the self-ruled island that China considers part of its national territory.
On Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday, China sent two planes into Taiwan's air defense identification zone, according to Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense. In response, the Taiwanese side dispatched air patrols, the ministry said.
“We oppose China using military force against Taiwan, deliberately violating Taiwan’s naval and airspace safety and damaging the status quo,” added Chiu Chui-Cheng, deputy minister at Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council. “Our government will continue to cooperate with countries with similar values.”
Asked about the sorties, Chinese defense ministry spokesperson Tan Kefei said they were aimed at demonstrating China’s “determination and ability to defend national sovereignty and territorial integrity.”
China is targeting “the interference of external forces and the very small number of Taiwan independence separatists and their separatist activities,” Tan said at a monthly briefing.
Last week, China sent a total of 37 warplanes, including bombers and fighter jets, across the Taiwan Strait in a warning as a high-level U.S. State Department official visited the island. The Taiwanese defense ministry said the planes crossed the midline of the Taiwan Strait.
The midline has acted as an unofficial buffer zone between China and Taiwan for decades, in what the Mainland Affairs Council called “a tacit agreement that has kept the peace.”
On Monday, Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin denied the existence of any midline, saying that Taiwan is part of China. He also warned that China would retaliate for the U.S. visit. “We will take countermeasures, including against relevant individuals," he said.
Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen has remained defiant, visiting a military base on Tuesday and encouraging the personnel, in particular pilots and crew.
Taiwanese foreign minister Joseph Wu said in July that Chinese military exercises have increased in frequency and become “virtually a daily occurrence."
China has increased diplomatic and military pressure on Tsai’s government over her refusal to agree to China’s insistence that the island be considered part of Chinese territory. The vast majority of Taiwanese reject the prospect of political union with China under the “one country, two systems” framework used for Hong Kong.
Following Tsai's election in 2016, China cut off contact with the Taiwanese government and has sought to isolate it, siphoning off the island's diplomatic allies while ratcheting up political, military and economic pressure.
Taiwan: China's military flew surveillance planes on 3 days
Taiwan says China sent two military surveillance planes toward the island for three straight days and it dispatched patrols in response
abcnews.go.com
jward
passin' thru
Global: MilitaryInfo
@Global_Mil_Info
3m
South Korea has elevated its military readiness posture to step up monitoring of North Korean military moves. They are intensely watching for movements in and around the Yellow Sea (NLL). - President Moon has vowed a firm response to any threats against SK lives and safety.
Military tightens readiness posture after N. Korea's deadly shooting of S. Korean citizen
All News 10:56 September 25, 2020
SEOUL, Sept. 25 (Yonhap) -- South Korea tightened its military readiness posture to step up monitoring of North Korean military moves particularly near the tense sea border in the wake of the communist country's brutal killing of a South Korean citizen, the defense ministry said Friday.
On Tuesday, North Korean troops shot the fisheries official who was adrift in its waters and incinerated his body. He went missing the previous day while on duty near the Yellow Sea border island of Yeonpyeong.
"Our military issued the instruction on Thursday that calls for the strengthening of the readiness posture regarding the current situation," the ministry's deputy spokesperson Col. Moon Hong-sik told reporters.
"The focus is on closely monitoring North Korean military moves around the clock and to maintain a firm defense posture to swiftly react to all circumstances so as to prevent the escalation of tensions."
Ahn Young-ho, a Joint Chiefs of Staff officer, holds a press conference at the defense ministry in Seoul on Sept. 24, 2020, over the incident of North Korea shooting a missing South Korean official to death and burning his body earlier this week. (Yonhap)
graceoh@yna.co.kr
@Global_Mil_Info
3m
South Korea has elevated its military readiness posture to step up monitoring of North Korean military moves. They are intensely watching for movements in and around the Yellow Sea (NLL). - President Moon has vowed a firm response to any threats against SK lives and safety.
Military tightens readiness posture after N. Korea's deadly shooting of S. Korean citizen
All News 10:56 September 25, 2020
SEOUL, Sept. 25 (Yonhap) -- South Korea tightened its military readiness posture to step up monitoring of North Korean military moves particularly near the tense sea border in the wake of the communist country's brutal killing of a South Korean citizen, the defense ministry said Friday.
On Tuesday, North Korean troops shot the fisheries official who was adrift in its waters and incinerated his body. He went missing the previous day while on duty near the Yellow Sea border island of Yeonpyeong.
"Our military issued the instruction on Thursday that calls for the strengthening of the readiness posture regarding the current situation," the ministry's deputy spokesperson Col. Moon Hong-sik told reporters.
"The focus is on closely monitoring North Korean military moves around the clock and to maintain a firm defense posture to swiftly react to all circumstances so as to prevent the escalation of tensions."
Ahn Young-ho, a Joint Chiefs of Staff officer, holds a press conference at the defense ministry in Seoul on Sept. 24, 2020, over the incident of North Korea shooting a missing South Korean official to death and burning his body earlier this week. (Yonhap)
graceoh@yna.co.kr
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jward
passin' thru
Hmm...
EndGameWW3
@EndGameWW3
(URGENT) N. Korean leader apologizes to South Koreans for 'unsavory' shooting incident: Cheong Wa Dae
North Korea states more than 10 shots were fired towards the South Korean civilian as part of "infection control measure" for #COVID19.
EndGameWW3
@EndGameWW3
(URGENT) N. Korean leader apologizes to South Koreans for 'unsavory' shooting incident: Cheong Wa Dae
North Korea states more than 10 shots were fired towards the South Korean civilian as part of "infection control measure" for #COVID19.
jward
passin' thru
..more good news outta North Korea.. :: scratches head n wonders if I just said that ::
NK NEWS
@nknewsorg
3m
NEW: In its first international activity report since restarting its operations inside North Korea, Doctors Without Borders said that it helped upgrade facilities at two tuberculosis (TB) hospitals in North Korea.
View: https://twitter.com/nknewsorg/status/1309372081554034689?s=20
NK NEWS
@nknewsorg
3m
NEW: In its first international activity report since restarting its operations inside North Korea, Doctors Without Borders said that it helped upgrade facilities at two tuberculosis (TB) hospitals in North Korea.
View: https://twitter.com/nknewsorg/status/1309372081554034689?s=20
jward
passin' thru
https://twitter.com/no_itsmyturn
d-atis
@detresfa_
35m
#Areawarning #India issues two separate notifications regarding "Launch of Experimental Flight Vehicle" in the #BayOfBengal Launch Window : 30 Sept - 04 Oct 2020
d-atis
@detresfa_
35m
#Areawarning #India issues two separate notifications regarding "Launch of Experimental Flight Vehicle" in the #BayOfBengal Launch Window : 30 Sept - 04 Oct 2020
Plain Jane
Just Plain Jane
Zerohedge
ZeroHedge - On a long enough timeline, the survival rate for everyone drops to zero
www.zerohedge.com
"Very Sorry": Kim Jong-Un Issues Ultra Rare Apology Over Killing Of South Official
by Tyler Durden
Fri, 09/25/2020 - 10:15
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North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un has issued an extremely rare apology over the Thursday killing of a South Korean fisheries official who breached the border in the water off the coast while allegedly trying to defect. He had been shot on site by the north's border patrol in a boat who happened upon the life jacket wearing man, his body also immediately burned on coronavirus fears.
Kim's message was that the north was "very sorry" over the "unexpected, unfortunate incident" which was expressed in a letter to South Korean President Moon Jae-in.
"Chairman Kim Jong Un asked to convey that he feels very sorry that instead of giving aid to our compatriots in the South who is struggling with Covid epidemic, we have given President Moon and our compatriots in the South a great disappointment with this unseen misfortune in our sea," the letter read, according to the Blue House.
Yeonpyeong Island, via CNNHowever Kim did also take Seoul to task for charging Pyongyang with "atrocious acts" before formally inquiring into the matter to learn what had happened.
It further apologized for "an incident that will clearly negatively impact inter-Korean relation" while noting the north had recently upped the intensity of its maritime patrols along the border.
The letter revealed more details about the shocking killing:
The south's defense ministry had immediately suspected the 'shoot first' reaction by the soldiers had more to do with North Korea's extreme "shoot to kill" anti-coronavirus measures implemented along all border zones. "We assess it was carried out under the North's anti-coronavirus measure," a military official had told AFP.
Seoul defense sources had also said that "circumstances tell us that there was an intent to defect."
But the surprise apology direct from Kim strongly suggests a new and rare softening out of Pyongyang, which could portend near future major diplomatic openings toward peace.
Plain Jane
Just Plain Jane
Zerohedge
ZeroHedge - On a long enough timeline, the survival rate for everyone drops to zero
www.zerohedge.com
Fire Breaks Out At Huawei's 5G Antenna Research Lab
by Tyler Durden
Fri, 09/25/2020 - 11:35
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As the seemingly never-ending squabbling over TikTok's deal with Oracle and Walmart drags on, the Trump administration's battle with tech giant Huawei Technologies has seemingly taken a backseat over the last couple of weeks to this newest distraction.
But in a shocking new developing, a Huawei research lab in Dongguan caught fire on Friday, according to Reuters and local Chinese press.
The Chinese state-controlled Global Times confirmed reports of the fire but assured the public that nobody was injured.
"The lab in the city's Songshan Lake area is a steel structure and the main material burning is sound-absorbing cotton," Dongguan city fire-rescue department said in a statement.
The lab is allegedly the site for where the tech giant conducts testing for 4G and 5G antennas related to Huawei's base station business, sources told Reuters.
The Global Times noted the building was under construction at the time of the blaze. Videos from social media show thick black smoke pouring from the research lab.
NBC's Janis Mackey Frayer tweeted a picture of the blaze.
And the video has also surfaced online."There are images on Chinese social media of a big fire at Huawei's Dongguan campus near Shenzhen. More to come...," Frayer tweeted.
The fire comes at a critical time for Huawei, as it has continued to supply components for 5G infrastructure to many European nations, much to the Trump Administration's chagrin.
As for the cause of the fire, right now it's unclear. But we're certainly curious to learn more.
jward
passin' thru
China’s two aircraft carriers complete drills in September
By CAITLIN DOORNBOS | STARS AND STRIPES Published: September 25, 2020
China’s two aircraft carriers, the Liaoning and the Shandong, recently completed military drills in the South China Sea, according to a statement by the Chinese Ministry of Defense on Thursday.
It was the first time the Chinese navy has sent two carriers to sea at once, though the ships did not train together. The Shandong was commissioned in December; the Liaoning was commissioned in 2012.
While at sea, the Liaoning completed “regular exercises” while the Shandong conducted sea trials, according to a Thursday article by the Chinese state-run newspaper Global Times. Sea trials are a testing phase of ships and their systems.
“The moves aimed to test the equipment’s performance and troops’ training results, and boost their capability to carry out missions,” Defense Ministry spokesman Senior Colonel Tan Kefei said at a press conference Thursday, according to the Global Times.
- The Chinese aircraft carrier Liaoning, shown here April 28, 2020, was at sea conducting exercises in September 2020 while a second carrier, the Shandong, was also at sea.
JAPAN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE
By CAITLIN DOORNBOS | STARS AND STRIPES Published: September 25, 2020
China’s two aircraft carriers, the Liaoning and the Shandong, recently completed military drills in the South China Sea, according to a statement by the Chinese Ministry of Defense on Thursday.
It was the first time the Chinese navy has sent two carriers to sea at once, though the ships did not train together. The Shandong was commissioned in December; the Liaoning was commissioned in 2012.
While at sea, the Liaoning completed “regular exercises” while the Shandong conducted sea trials, according to a Thursday article by the Chinese state-run newspaper Global Times. Sea trials are a testing phase of ships and their systems.
“The moves aimed to test the equipment’s performance and troops’ training results, and boost their capability to carry out missions,” Defense Ministry spokesman Senior Colonel Tan Kefei said at a press conference Thursday, according to the Global Times.
China’s two aircraft carriers complete drills in September
It was the first time the Chinese navy has sent two carriers to the South China Sea at once, though the ships did not train together.
www.stripes.com
northern watch
TB Fanatic
Posted for fair use.....
www.outlookindia.com
New Delhi, Sep 26 (PTI) Navies of India and Japan on Saturday carried out a range of complex drills in the North Arabian Sea on the first day of their three-day military exercise aimed at further bolstering operational convergence, officials said.
It is the first military exercise between the two strategic partners after they signed a landmark agreement on September 9 that allows their militaries to access each other''s bases for logistics support.
The fourth edition of the India-Japan maritime exercise, JIMEX, is taking place in the backdrop of growing concerns over China''s military assertiveness in the Indian Ocean Region and Indo-Pacific.
The JIMEX series of exercises commenced in January 2012 with a special focus on maritime security cooperation. The last edition was conducted in October 2018 off the Visakhapatnam coast.
Indigenously-built stealth destroyer Chennai, Teg Class stealth frigate Tarkash and fleet tanker Deepak represented the Indian Navy in the exercise, an Indian Navy spokesperson said.
The Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force was represented by ships Kaga, an Izumo class helicopter destroyer and Ikazuchi, a guided-missile destroyer, he said.
In addition to ships, a fleet of long-range maritime patrol aircraft, helicopters and fighter aircraft are also participating in the exercise.
This week, the Indian and Australian navies too carried out a two-day mega exercise in the Indian Ocean Region that featured a range of complex naval manoeuvres, anti-aircraft drills and helicopter operations.
In July, the Indian Navy carried out a military exercise with a US Navy carrier strike group led by the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS Nimitz off the coast of Andaman and Nicobar Islands. The USS Nimitz is the world''s largest warship.
In the exercise with the US Navy, four frontline warships of the Indian Navy participated. The US carrier strike group was transiting through the Indian Ocean Region on its way from the South China Sea.
The Indian Navy carried out a similar exercise with the Japanese navy in June.
India has significantly expanded its deployment in the Indian Ocean Region with a plethora of warships and submarines following the border row to send across a message to Beijing.
The maritime space around the Malacca Strait is very critical for China''s supply chain through sea routes. PTI MPB RT
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- 26 September 2020 Last Updated at 10:02 pm | Source: PTI
New Delhi, Sep 26 (PTI) Navies of India and Japan on Saturday carried out a range of complex drills in the North Arabian Sea on the first day of their three-day military exercise aimed at further bolstering operational convergence, officials said.
It is the first military exercise between the two strategic partners after they signed a landmark agreement on September 9 that allows their militaries to access each other''s bases for logistics support.
The fourth edition of the India-Japan maritime exercise, JIMEX, is taking place in the backdrop of growing concerns over China''s military assertiveness in the Indian Ocean Region and Indo-Pacific.
The JIMEX series of exercises commenced in January 2012 with a special focus on maritime security cooperation. The last edition was conducted in October 2018 off the Visakhapatnam coast.
Indigenously-built stealth destroyer Chennai, Teg Class stealth frigate Tarkash and fleet tanker Deepak represented the Indian Navy in the exercise, an Indian Navy spokesperson said.
The Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force was represented by ships Kaga, an Izumo class helicopter destroyer and Ikazuchi, a guided-missile destroyer, he said.
In addition to ships, a fleet of long-range maritime patrol aircraft, helicopters and fighter aircraft are also participating in the exercise.
This week, the Indian and Australian navies too carried out a two-day mega exercise in the Indian Ocean Region that featured a range of complex naval manoeuvres, anti-aircraft drills and helicopter operations.
In July, the Indian Navy carried out a military exercise with a US Navy carrier strike group led by the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS Nimitz off the coast of Andaman and Nicobar Islands. The USS Nimitz is the world''s largest warship.
In the exercise with the US Navy, four frontline warships of the Indian Navy participated. The US carrier strike group was transiting through the Indian Ocean Region on its way from the South China Sea.
The Indian Navy carried out a similar exercise with the Japanese navy in June.
India has significantly expanded its deployment in the Indian Ocean Region with a plethora of warships and submarines following the border row to send across a message to Beijing.
The maritime space around the Malacca Strait is very critical for China''s supply chain through sea routes. PTI MPB RT