ALERT RUSSIA INVADES UKRAINE - Consolidated Thread

Tom McDowell

Tom McDowell

BAMN
Hello,

I'm afraid things are going to get really strange regarding Ukraine during the next few weeks.

There's a high probability the news we'll be consuming may be novel.

Novel ˈnä-vəl ​
1 ​
a: new and not resembling something formerly known or used​
New technologies are posing novel problems.​
​
b: not previously identified​
transmission of a novel coronavirus​
a novel genetic mutation​
novel bacterial strains​
​
2​
: original or striking especially in conception or style​
a novel scheme to collect money​
novel solutions​



I'm inclined to project 1a from above.

It's my hope this post may be an aid in the form of mental preparation.

The situation for Ukraine is going to radically deteriorate. Such that it is now bad, it'll get much worse during the course of the next few days and weeks.

As a result of which, the onslaught of propagated controversy may reach beyond a fevered pitch.

Most everyone reading this understands this alert. My purpose is to prepare those outside this very small audience of our membership. Please prepare to aid those within your sphere of influence.

In short I believe things are getting ready to turn really weird.
​
"When the going gets weird - the weird turn pro." Hunter Thompson​

Some indicators contained herewith:


RT 20 minutes or so. The gist of, is presented during the first seven minutes.

These topics will begin the onslaught.

Gird up thy loins.

Best Regards,

tom



===
.
 
jward

jward

passin' thru
FLASH
@Flash_news_ua
21

⚡️An updated list of the aid package for Ukraine was published on the website of the Federal Government of Germany:

- ammunition for the MARS II multiple rocket launcher system;
- 3 M1070 Oshkosh heavy-duty semi-trailers (8 in total);
1668962769896.png
- 17 units of cars for the border service (already 39 in total); - 1 loader (already 4 in total); - spare parts for the M2 large-caliber machine gun; - 24 MG3 for armored evacuation vehicles (already 30 in total); - 10 drone protection sensors (already 28 in total);
- 20 special devices for electronic devices to protect against drones; - 116 field heaters.
 
jward

jward

passin' thru
Defense of Ukraine
@DefenceU
·
1m
Ukraine government organization
Those who are now talking about a possible "pause in hostilities" due to freezing temperatures in the winter have likely never sunbathed in January on the southern coast of Crimea.
 
C

Cedar Lake

Connecticut Yankee
onetimer said:
The results of the shelling of the Zaporozhye Nuclear Power Plant.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1594284092526186496
View: https://twitter.com/WarMonitors/status/1594284092526186496?t=NhgfnpHAW87luq-mhZnoaA&s=19
Click to expand...
Amazing. you think that firing 2 AFU missiles into Poland is stupid,
Today, The AFU continues to fire more missiles into a civilan nuclear power plant.
World class stupidity on the part of the AFU.
I don't see or hear anything said from Poland or all of Europe about this.
I wonder why?
 
wait-n-see

wait-n-see

Veteran Member

Russia Continues Grinding Away Ukrainian Military & Electrical Power​


Runtime - 25:36

Nov 20, 2022 Update on Russian military operations in Ukraine for November 21, 2022

- Russian makes incremental gains in the Donbass region;
- Ukraine’s power grid continues to degrade under Russian missile and drone strikes;
- Ukraine continues denying responsibility for missile strike in Poland;
- US claims NASAMS air defense systems performed at 100% effectiveness, provide no numbers or proof of this claim;
- There are not enough NASAMS arriving in Ukraine over the next several years to protect Ukraine from further Russian missile and drone salvos;
- Ukraine has more or less abandoned Kherson city;
- US DoD admits Ukraine cannot achieve its main objective of expelling Russia;
- Failure to achieve Ukraine’s objective while continuing to fight and lose men and equipment equates to demilitarization;

References:

Al Jazeera - Ukraine to begin voluntary evacuation from Kherson: Deputy PM: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1...
Breaking Defense - Zelensky advisor: ‘Important’ to wait for results of Poland missile explosion investigation: https://breakingdefense.com/2022/11/z...
Guardian - In eastern Poland, Putin’s war has turned former enemies into friends: https://www.theguardian.com/world/202...
ABC News - Ukrainian officials refute US estimates on number of killed, injured soldiers: https://abcnews.go.com/International/...
BBC - Ukraine war: 10 million without power after Russian strikes: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe...
US Department of Defense - Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III and Army General Mark A. Milley, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Hold a Press Briefing Following Ukrainian Defense Contact Group Meeting Nov. 16, 2022: https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcri...
Human Rights Watch - Off Target: The Conduct of the War and Civilian Casualties in Iraq: II. CONDUCT OF THE AIR WAR: https://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/usa1...
Houston Business Journal - KBR completes power substation project in Iraq: https://www.bizjournals.com/houston/s...
Bloomberg - Transcript: Vladimir Putin’s Televised Address on Ukraine (February 24, 2022): https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articl...
 
Red Baron

Red Baron

Paleo-Conservative
_______________
Description:
While much of the narrative around the early stages of Russia's 2022 invasion centre on the battle for Kyiv and the reverses Russia suffered there, in the South, the Russian invasion was altogether more successful in its opening moves.

Advancing from Crimea, the Russians rapidly secured a number of critical positions in the South of the country, including a regional capital on the right bank of the Dnipro, the city of Kherson.

The fighting to take back Kherson would be some of the hardest for Ukrainian forces. They would face a number of high quality Russian units who were heavily dug in, and they would do it over unfavourable ground.

The fighting would take months and claim many lines before the final Russian withdrawal in November.

This is the story of that campaign - from the city's fall to its liberation, along with some of the lessons and observations that we can (with admittedly low confidence levels) make using the data available so far.

1:11:48

Ukraine's Kherson Campaign - Lessons & Implications of the Southern counterattack

View: https://youtu.be/fxR1jmZTLew


Timestamps:
00:00:00 — Opening Words
00:02:36 — What Am I Talking About?
00:03:18 — SPONSOR: GROUND NEWS
00:04:29 — The Fall of Kherson
00:07:20 — Victory at Mykolaiv
00:09:34 — Steady Transition
00:10:19 — The Shaping Campaign
00:12:06 — Telegraphing the Offensive
00:14:25 — The Himars Campaign
00:16:51 — The Crimean Dimension
00:17:51 — Concentrating Capability
00:20:00 — The Campaign Begins
00:21:44 — The Attack Goes In
00:22:42 — Russia Claim Victory
00:24:52 — Announcing Victory
00:26:04 — Continuing Pressure
00:27:21 — Supply, Attrition, Corrosion
00:28:05 — The Story of a Bridge
00:29:33 — Back and Forth
00:31:45 — Final Days
00:32:55 — The End
00:33:04 — The First Cracks
00:34:42 — The Withdrawal
00:39:03 — Reclamation
00:40:09 — Losses and Military Observations
00:44:39 — New Capabilities...
00:46:06 — ... And Old Ones
00:47:10 — The Cost of Victory...
00:47:52 — ... And of Defeat
00:49:10 — Interrogating Losses
00:50:48 — Some Very Old Stuff...
00:53:33 — Reactions & Significance
00:53:52 — Ukrainian Elation?
00:55:35 — Russia - Confusion and Anger
00:57:39 — International Community
00:58:55 — Discrediting "Annexation"
01:01:00 — What Next?
01:01:12 — Reading the Terrain
01:03:55 — Redeployment Opportunities
01:05:23 — Towards a Winter Campaign
01:07:24 — Conclusions
01:10:19 — Channel Update
 
A

Abert

Veteran Member
onetimer said:
The results of the shelling of the Zaporozhye Nuclear Power Plant.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1594284092526186496
View: https://twitter.com/WarMonitors/status/1594284092526186496?t=NhgfnpHAW87luq-mhZnoaA&s=19
Click to expand...
This RUSSIA is shelling the ZNP is such BS!!!! - They control it - they have troops there - if they wanted to blow it up all they need to do is have their troops - which are at the plant - place HE at critical places and BOOM. NO NEED to shell it from the parking lot!
 
onetimer

onetimer

Veteran Member
Abert said:
This RUSSIA is shelling the ZNP is such BS!!!! - They control it - they have troops there - if they wanted to blow it up all they need to do is have their troops - which are at the plant - place HE at critical places and BOOM. NO NEED to shell it from the parking lot!
Click to expand...
True, even if RF is attempting to use the NPP as a shield the UA should know better considering what happened at Chernobyl in northern Ukraine.
 
Shadow

Shadow

Swift, Silent,...Sleepy
jward said:
NEXTA
@nexta_tv


#Germany proposes to transfer "Patriot" air defense systems to Poland
"We have offered #Poland support in ensuring the security of the airspace with our Eurofighter fighters and Patriot air defense systems," said the head of the German Defense Ministry.
https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1594472638847586306
View: https://twitter.com/nexta_tv/status/1594472638847586306?s=20&t=Z8HD8JPYJRmWDh05xmEQuw
Click to expand...
We need to be more protective of our technology than that. I don't care if the Russians have more advanced technology now. Examining our patriots may give them insight into our design priorities and philosophy, giving them an edge in their future weapon development.

Shadow
 
H

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
jward said:
NEXTA
@nexta_tv


#Germany proposes to transfer "Patriot" air defense systems to Poland
"We have offered #Poland support in ensuring the security of the airspace with our Eurofighter fighters and Patriot air defense systems," said the head of the German Defense Ministry.
https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1594472638847586306
View: https://twitter.com/nexta_tv/status/1594472638847586306?s=20&t=Z8HD8JPYJRmWDh05xmEQuw
Click to expand...

Considering the state of the German military, that's pretty much everything they've got left....
 
jward

jward

passin' thru

Three scenarios for how war in Ukraine could play out​




The best one for Ukraine is also the most dangerous​

By Shashank Joshi: Defence editor, The Economist
ANY SEASONED intelligence analyst might have scoffed had they been told in March 2022 that Ukraine would still be an independent state eight months later; that Ukraine’s army would have killed or wounded 80,000 Russians; that the flagship of the Russian Black Sea Fleet would be at the bottom of that sea; and that Ukraine’s air force would still be flying. Ukraine has defied expectations. It is winning the war. But winter is coming and Russia is mobilising. Consider three scenarios for the year ahead.

In the first, Russia snatches victory from the jaws of defeat. Russia’s army stabilises the front lines over the winter months, while building new battalions with freshly mobilised recruits. Meanwhile, Republicans in America block new arms packages for Ukraine, as supplies from Europe run out. Russia’s defence industry is starved of semiconductors and specialised equipment, but churns out enough basic armour and artillery to equip the new forces.

By the spring, the new Russian units go on the attack, forcing back a Ukrainian force that is weary from months of offensive action. Russian drones continue to hammer Ukraine’s energy and water infrastructure. As summer arrives, Ukraine is on the back foot. Russia captures Kryvyi Rih, a key industrial town north of Kherson, and Slovyansk and Kramatorsk in Donetsk. Western countries urge Ukraine to accept a Russian offer of a ceasefire. Volodymyr Zelensky, Ukraine’s president, has little choice but to accept. In the months, perhaps years, that follow, Russia assiduously rearms for another attempt on Kyiv.
A Putin ultimatum: stop, or face the use of nuclear weapons

Far more likely is a second scenario: stalemate. Russia mobilises hundreds of thousands of young men, but cannot turn them into effective fighters. All the best trainers are on the front lines. Experienced officers are dead or already deployed. The recruits are fashioned into basic light-infantry units, lacking armoured vehicles and unfit to go on the offensive—but able to fill trenches and man fortifications.
20221129_EUC001.png

Russia, having announced a withdrawal from Kherson city in November, safely evacuates the 30,000 or so troops it had on the west bank of the Dnieper river. They retreat east, leaving huge amounts of weaponry behind. It is a triumph for Ukraine, but it ultimately puts Russia in a stronger military position, with the river protecting its left flank. The Ukrainian advance slows to a crawl; Ukrainian troops take heavy casualties for each kilometre of territory won.

Unable to win the war on the battlefield, Mr Putin then tries to prolong it long enough to undermine Ukraine’s economy, sap its morale through strikes on civilian infrastructure and exhaust its partners. Europe struggles to fill its gas-storage sites during 2023, causing blackouts as winter arrives. Mr Putin aims to hold out until late 2024, when he hopes Donald Trump will retake the White House and end support for Ukraine. But it is a high-stakes gamble: Russian opinion turns against the war, its economy shrivels and Mr Putin looks ever more vulnerable.

The third scenario is the most encouraging—and perhaps the most dangerous. Ukraine keeps the initiative and the momentum, inflicting heavy damage on Russian forces as they leave Kherson and then bringing its long-range HIMARs rockets within range of Crimea for the first time. Russian lines in Luhansk collapse, with Ukraine recapturing Severodonetsk and then quickly moving farther east. As Russian casualties mount, new recruits refuse to fight. Western countries rush new air-defence systems to Ukraine, blunting the impact of Russia’s terror tactics, based on its rapidly dwindling arsenal of precision missiles.

In the spring Mr Zelensky orders his army to open a new front in Zaporizhia. Five brigades slice through Russian lines, cutting Mr Putin’s land bridge to Crimea and encircling Mariupol by the summer. Ukraine moves its HIMARs rocket launchers into the south, targeting ports, bases and depots in Russian-occupied Crimea. Ukraine threatens to enter the peninsula. Mr Putin issues an ultimatum: stop, or face the use of nuclear weapons. Victory is within sight. But so, too, are the risks that it brings.■

Shashank Joshi: Defence editor, The Economist
This article appeared in the Europe section of the print edition of The World Ahead 2023 under the headline “Conflicting possibilities”
The Economist today

Handpicked stories, in your inbox​

www.economist.com

Three scenarios for how war in Ukraine could play out

The most encouraging scenario is also perhaps the most dangerous. Victory is within sight, but so, too, are the risks it brings
www.economist.com www.economist.com
 
A

Abert

Veteran Member
jward said:
NEXTA
@nexta_tv


#Germany proposes to transfer "Patriot" air defense systems to Poland
"We have offered #Poland support in ensuring the security of the airspace with our Eurofighter fighters and Patriot air defense systems," said the head of the German Defense Ministry.
https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1594472638847586306
View: https://twitter.com/nexta_tv/status/1594472638847586306?s=20&t=Z8HD8JPYJRmWDh05xmEQuw
Click to expand...
Not surprised Germany wants to dump the "Patriot" on Ukraine - effectively no one wants them!
 
R

raven

TB Fanatic
jward said:

Three scenarios for how war in Ukraine could play out​




The best one for Ukraine is also the most dangerous​

By Shashank Joshi: Defence editor, The Economist
ANY SEASONED intelligence analyst might have scoffed had they been told in March 2022 that Ukraine would still be an independent state eight months later; that Ukraine’s army would have killed or wounded 80,000 Russians; that the flagship of the Russian Black Sea Fleet would be at the bottom of that sea; and that Ukraine’s air force would still be flying. Ukraine has defied expectations. It is winning the war. But winter is coming and Russia is mobilising. Consider three scenarios for the year ahead.

In the first, Russia snatches victory from the jaws of defeat. Russia’s army stabilises the front lines over the winter months, while building new battalions with freshly mobilised recruits. Meanwhile, Republicans in America block new arms packages for Ukraine, as supplies from Europe run out. Russia’s defence industry is starved of semiconductors and specialised equipment, but churns out enough basic armour and artillery to equip the new forces.

By the spring, the new Russian units go on the attack, forcing back a Ukrainian force that is weary from months of offensive action. Russian drones continue to hammer Ukraine’s energy and water infrastructure. As summer arrives, Ukraine is on the back foot. Russia captures Kryvyi Rih, a key industrial town north of Kherson, and Slovyansk and Kramatorsk in Donetsk. Western countries urge Ukraine to accept a Russian offer of a ceasefire. Volodymyr Zelensky, Ukraine’s president, has little choice but to accept. In the months, perhaps years, that follow, Russia assiduously rearms for another attempt on Kyiv.
A Putin ultimatum: stop, or face the use of nuclear weapons

Far more likely is a second scenario: stalemate. Russia mobilises hundreds of thousands of young men, but cannot turn them into effective fighters. All the best trainers are on the front lines. Experienced officers are dead or already deployed. The recruits are fashioned into basic light-infantry units, lacking armoured vehicles and unfit to go on the offensive—but able to fill trenches and man fortifications.
20221129_EUC001.png

Russia, having announced a withdrawal from Kherson city in November, safely evacuates the 30,000 or so troops it had on the west bank of the Dnieper river. They retreat east, leaving huge amounts of weaponry behind. It is a triumph for Ukraine, but it ultimately puts Russia in a stronger military position, with the river protecting its left flank. The Ukrainian advance slows to a crawl; Ukrainian troops take heavy casualties for each kilometre of territory won.

Unable to win the war on the battlefield, Mr Putin then tries to prolong it long enough to undermine Ukraine’s economy, sap its morale through strikes on civilian infrastructure and exhaust its partners. Europe struggles to fill its gas-storage sites during 2023, causing blackouts as winter arrives. Mr Putin aims to hold out until late 2024, when he hopes Donald Trump will retake the White House and end support for Ukraine. But it is a high-stakes gamble: Russian opinion turns against the war, its economy shrivels and Mr Putin looks ever more vulnerable.

The third scenario is the most encouraging—and perhaps the most dangerous. Ukraine keeps the initiative and the momentum, inflicting heavy damage on Russian forces as they leave Kherson and then bringing its long-range HIMARs rockets within range of Crimea for the first time. Russian lines in Luhansk collapse, with Ukraine recapturing Severodonetsk and then quickly moving farther east. As Russian casualties mount, new recruits refuse to fight. Western countries rush new air-defence systems to Ukraine, blunting the impact of Russia’s terror tactics, based on its rapidly dwindling arsenal of precision missiles.

In the spring Mr Zelensky orders his army to open a new front in Zaporizhia. Five brigades slice through Russian lines, cutting Mr Putin’s land bridge to Crimea and encircling Mariupol by the summer. Ukraine moves its HIMARs rocket launchers into the south, targeting ports, bases and depots in Russian-occupied Crimea. Ukraine threatens to enter the peninsula. Mr Putin issues an ultimatum: stop, or face the use of nuclear weapons. Victory is within sight. But so, too, are the risks that it brings.■

Shashank Joshi: Defence editor, The Economist
This article appeared in the Europe section of the print edition of The World Ahead 2023 under the headline “Conflicting possibilities”
The Economist today

Handpicked stories, in your inbox​

www.economist.com

Three scenarios for how war in Ukraine could play out

The most encouraging scenario is also perhaps the most dangerous. Victory is within sight, but so, too, are the risks it brings
www.economist.com www.economist.com
Click to expand...
The analysts have been about as right as one of those old time Circus Tent prophets.
It is much more likely that Russia has a different scenario in mind that they did not think of.
It is "The Economist" after all.

You are better off putting your money into the slot machines at a reservation casino.
 
R

raven

TB Fanatic
db cooper

db cooper

Resident Secret Squirrel
jward said:
Historical Firearms | Matthew Moss
@historicfirearm
New video!

Supercut: Ukrainian Farmers Stealing Russian Tanks
VIDEO:
View: https://youtu.be/-sCV9FAc_fw

I've collected a lot of videos of Ukrainian farmers salvaging abandoned Russian kit over the last 8 months, so I've compiled them in one video!
Click to expand...
I've found many of these hard to believe simply because of having a construction background where we tried to tow a disabled cat it would not steer. In other words, it would not follow the towing vehicle which was a scraper. We learned that a tracked vehicle is steered by declutching one track from the transmission and slowing it down with a brake. Others have transmissions that slow one track and increase the speed of the other. In other words, the tracks need to be decoupled from the transmission to be towed. We have a riding lawnmower that cannot be towed unless to levers are pulled to decouple the drive wheels from the transmission. The same principle applies to many vehicles.

If these Russian vehicles have controls that decouple the tracks from the transmission and are towed with a towbar, a large farm tractor could pull them.

What is genuinely false is a tractor pulling a tracked vehicle with a cable or chain as the tracked vehicle will then go where it wants to. Practical example, at home pull a car with a chain without someone steering the towed vehicle and see what happens.

I suspect many of these are propaganda with the tank's engine running and someone inside steering along with the tractor.
 
Last edited:
M

mecoastie

Veteran Member
db cooper said:
I've found many of these hard to believe simply because of having a construction background where we tried to tow a disabled cat it would not steer. In other words, it would not follow the towing vehicle which was a scraper. We learned that a tracked vehicle is steered by declutching one track from the transmission and slowing it down with a brake. Others have transmissions that slow one track and increase the speed of the other. In other words, the tracks need to be decoupled from the transmission to be towed. We have a riding lawnmower that cannot be towed unless to levers are pulled to decouple the drive wheels from the transmission. The same principle applies to many vehicles.

If these Russian vehicles have controls that decouple the tracks from the transmission and are towed with a towbar, a large farm tractor could pull them.

What is genuinely false is a tractor pulling a tracked vehicle with a cable or chain as the tracked vehicle will then go where it wants to. Practical example, at home pull a car with a chain without someone steering the towed vehicle and see what happens.

I suspect many of these are propaganda with the tank's engine running and someone inside steering along with the tractor.
Click to expand...
I know that during WW2 my grandfather towed some with his tank when they ran out of fuel. The Israelis did the same in the 50s. For ease of removal and repairs I would think that they would be fairly easy to tow. Tow cables are attached to all the tanks already. If it was hard I wouldnt think they would be provided. Probably someone in the tank to steer it.
 
C

Cedar Lake

Connecticut Yankee
Hfcomms said:
They keep shelling that nuclear plant regardless of which side is doing it could really be a black swan for Europe already in the midst of epic crisis.
Click to expand...
There is only one side firing missles into the power plant,

1) The Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant has been under Russian supervision since Moscow troops captured it early in the war in March, but Ukrainian personnel continue to operate the facility.
2) The Russian forces are inside the power plant and outside on the grounds of the power plant.
3) NATO and The Europe Union have been supplying Ukraine and the UAF with all the money, weaponry, ammunition and NATO training so they can do this.
4) The Urainean UAF forces along with their NATO trainers have been sending the missles into the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant since March,2022.
5) Therefore, NATO and The Europe Union are fully compliant and must be in accord with the final consequennces of these actions.
6) Slava Ukraini????
 
Infoscout

Infoscout

The Dude Abides
The Urainean UAF forces along with their NATO trainers have been sending the missles into the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant since March,2022.

Are forces from Uranus now fighting the Russians? With NATO?

Sorry trying to be humorous!
 
M

Murt

Veteran Member
jward said:
Defense of Ukraine
@DefenceU
·
1m
Ukraine government organization
Those who are now talking about a possible "pause in hostilities" due to freezing temperatures in the winter have likely never sunbathed in January on the southern coast of Crimea.
Click to expand...

a "pause in the hostilities" seems to be a benefit to Russia---IF they are low on men and supplies that would give them time to re-group and re-supply
 
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