WAR Regional conflict brewing in the Mediterranean

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Liveuamap MiddleEast (@lummideast) Tweeted:
Dozens of dead and wounded civilians in the city of Aricho, south of Idlib, as a result of raids by Russian warplanes targeting a hospital and a civilian neighborhood Dozens of dead and wounded civilians in the city of Aricho, south of Idlib, as a result of raids by Russian warplanes targeting a hospital and a civilian neighborhood Arihah, Idlib Governorate - Map of Syrian Civil War - Syria news and incidents today - syria.liveuamap.com انس المعراوي Anas ALmaarawi on Twitter via @anasanas84 #Syria
https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1222787891455283201
View: https://twitter.com/lummideast/status/1222787891455283201?s=20
 
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Housecarl

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UN resolution calls for withdrawal of mercenaries from Libya

NEW YORK: The UK sent its fellow Security Council members an amended draft resolution on Libya on Friday, calling for the withdrawal of mercenaries from the country, according to the text, seen by AFP. The draft expresses the Council’s “concern over the growing involvement of mercenaries in...
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UN resolution calls for withdrawal of mercenaries from Libya
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Libya has been mired in chaos since a 2011 NATO-backed uprising that killed longtime ruler Muammar Qaddafi, with rival administrations vying for power. (Reuters)
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UN resolution calls for withdrawal of mercenaries from Libya

NEW YORK: The UK sent its fellow Security Council members an amended draft resolution on Libya on Friday, calling for the withdrawal of mercenaries from the country, according to the text, seen by AFP. The draft expresses the Council’s “concern over the growing involvement of mercenaries in...
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  • The conflict deepened last year when military strongman Khalifa Haftar, who controls much of the south and east of Libya, launched an assault in April to seize Tripoli, the base of the UN-recognized Government of National Accord
Updated 10 sec ago
AFP
February 02, 2020 00:16
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NEW YORK: The UK sent its fellow Security Council members an amended draft resolution on Libya on Friday, calling for the withdrawal of mercenaries from the country, according to the text, seen by AFP.
The draft expresses the Council’s “concern over the growing involvement of mercenaries in Libya,” despite commitments made on Jan. 19 at an international summit in Berlin, including “ceasing all support for and withdrawing all armed mercenary personnel.”
The text also urged all member states “not to intervene in the conflict or take measures that exacerbate the conflict.”
According to diplomats, Russia strongly opposes any mention of mercenaries in the text. No date has yet been set for a vote on the resolution.
Libya has been mired in chaos since a 2011 NATO-backed uprising that killed longtime ruler Muammar Qaddafi, with two rival administrations vying for power.
The conflict deepened last year when military strongman Khalifa Haftar, who controls much of the south and east of Libya, launched an assault in April to seize Tripoli, the base of the UN-recognized Government of National Accord (GNA).
Haftar has the backing of Russia and some Middle Eastern countries while the GNA is supported by Qatar and Turkey.
HIGHLIGHT
Russia strongly opposes any mention of mercenaries in the text. No date has yet been set for a vote on the resolution.
The first version of the British draft, dated Jan. 24, contained no mention of armed foreign fighters.
On Thursday, UN envoy Ghassan Salame accused “unscrupulous” foreign actors — without specifying who — of continuing to meddle in Libya’s conflict, in violation of the Berlin commitments.
Russia is accused of facilitating the arrival of several thousand Russian mercenaries in Libya, while Turkey allegedly brought Syrian rebel fighters into the north African nation.
For the past 10 months, the Security Council has been unable to adopt any resolution on the conflict in Libya.
The amended British text “condemns the recent increase in levels of violence and demands the parties commit to a lasting cease-fire.”
It also asks UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres to “submit his views on the necessary conditions for, and proposals on effective cease-fire monitoring.”
Unlike the first draft, which only mentioned the importance of the role of neighboring countries and unidentified regional organizations in contributing to a solution, the amended version specifically mentions “the African Union, League of Arab States and European Union.”
 
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Turkey following Iranian model with Libya move

As the days go by, more and more revelations emerge about Turkey sending fighters from the Free Syrian Army or Turkmen Iraqi militias to fight in Libya alongside Tripoli’s Government of National Accord, led by Prime Minister Fayez Al-Sarraj. These fighters are transferred using military jets to...
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Turkey following Iranian model with Libya move

Author
Dr. Mohammed Al-Sulami
February 03, 2020 15:29
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Turkish-backed Syrian fighters hold a position in the village of Al-Yalishli in Manbij, which is under the control of the Syrian regime. (AFP)
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Turkey following Iranian model with Libya move

As the days go by, more and more revelations emerge about Turkey sending fighters from the Free Syrian Army or Turkmen Iraqi militias to fight in Libya alongside Tripoli’s Government of National Accord, led by Prime Minister Fayez Al-Sarraj. These fighters are transferred using military jets to...
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As the days go by, more and more revelations emerge about Turkey sending fighters from the Free Syrian Army or Turkmen Iraqi militias to fight in Libya alongside Tripoli’s Government of National Accord, led by Prime Minister Fayez Al-Sarraj. These fighters are transferred using military jets to Tripoli airport, where they are received by a special team of Turkish officers who have been tasked with working with Syrian and Libyan fighters. The UN envoy to Libya, Ghassan Salama, asserted in an interview with Reuters last month that fighters loyal to Turkey had already landed, saying: “I can confirm that those fighters have arrived in Libya.” Salama estimated that up to about 2,000 fighters had arrived from outside Libya.
For its part, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights stated that Turkey’s transfer of fighters from Syria to Libya was still ongoing. It also pointed out that a total of 1,750 fighters had arrived in Tripoli, while the number of fighters that had arrived at Turkish-administered camps to receive training had reached 1,500, with massive recruitment operations underway in both Afrin and the Euphrates Shield areas. A video was circulated on social media showing four fighters speaking in the Syrian dialect, who were reported to be affiliated with the Turkish-affiliated Al-Rahman Legion. They were filmed sitting in an apartment, with a Kalashnikov assault rifle in the middle of them. One of them spoke explicitly about receiving a lot of money, showing a large number of US dollar and Libyan dinar banknotes.
The New York Review of Books went even further, with reporter Frederic Wehrey recounting the everyday life of Syrian fighters in Libya and what their commander told him in this respect in a recent investigative report published by the magazine. The columnist said that, at the start of his investigation, while he was only 150 feet from the front line, a tall fighter approached him, but suddenly turned back when Wehrey saw him. He wrote: “I’ve been covering Libya’s conflicts for years and noticed some minor but distinctive details about his appearance: A do-rag tied around his head, an olive green tactical vest, and perhaps a certain military bearing. The Libyan commander I was with confirmed it, with a chuckle: ‘That’s not a Libyan look.’” The reporter then recounted a conversation he had with the chief commander of the fighters, who he said told him: “I belong to the Turkish army. We all have homes in Istanbul and Gaziantep.”
In the same context, Sky News Arabia reported last week that the French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle spotted a Turkish frigate escorting a ship carrying armored vehicles, which was heading to Tripoli.
These details of Turkey sending its troops to Libya alongside Syrian fighters brings to mind the Iranian regime’s experience in Syria, as well as the media and political handling of this issue.
Many Turkish fighters are using their deployment as an opportunity to enter mainland Europe
Dr. Mohammed Al-Sulami
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At the start of its intervention in Syria, the Iranian regime denied all reports that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) had members and paramilitary fighters present in the country. Later on, Tehran admitted a presence but claimed that this was confined to offering military advice to Bashar Assad’s forces without engaging in fighting. However, with an increasing number of IRGC members killed, including senior commanders like Maj. Gen. Hossein Hamadani, Iran admitted to sending IRGC and paramilitary fighters to Syria. Iran claimed they were there in order to defend Shiite shrines such as Sayyidah Zaynab and others in Damascus. However, the fighters were not confined to Damascus, but spread right across Syria.
Another striking similarity between Iran and Turkey is that they both turned to fighters who engage in conflict purely for personal benefit. The Iranian regime deployed fighters from Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan, as well as Afghan refugees who had fled to Iran seeking asylum, using financial incentives of about $500 per month and intimidation to get them to fight in Syria. The Afghan refugees were promised many things, such as permanent residency for themselves and their families in Iran, as well as their children being admitted to Iranian schools, which had previously rejected their applications because of a lack of residency documents. The IRGC, represented by its powerful elite arm, the Quds Force, formerly headed by Qassem Soleimani, was responsible for the recruitment, training and deployment of fighters to Syria, with IRGC training camps in northern and central Iran overseeing three-month basic training courses. The fighters were then sent to Syria on military jets or on the IRGC’s civilian Mahan Air airline’s passenger planes.
Despite the Iranian regime deploying Pakistani and Afghan fighters (the Zainabiyoun and Fatemiyoun Brigades), as well as the Lebanese Hezbollah and numerous Iraqi proxies, including Kata’ib Hezbollah and the Abu Al-Fadl Al-Abbas Brigade, it was ultimately Russia’s involvement in the Syrian conflict that tilted the scale in favor of the Syrian regime thanks to its aerial bombardment. Based on the Syrian experience, we can possibly predict how things will play out for the Turkish fighters in Libya, both with and without aerial support, with the former likely to be extremely costly.
Another similarity between the fighters of Iran in Syria and those of Turkey in Libya is that many Turkish fighters are using their deployment as an opportunity to enter mainland Europe. A number of Western Persian-language news agencies and television stations revealed during the course of a series of interviews conducted with Afghan nationals located in Eastern Europe that they had fled the fighting in Syria and joined refugee convoys to Europe, disguising themselves as Syrians. Similarly, we find media reports mentioning that many Syrian fighters sent by Turkey to Libya have also fled to Europe in general and Italy in particular. One report described how 17 fighters arrived at the Italian mainland on boats that sailed from ports controlled by the Al-Sarraj government, while many more former fighters who fled the battlefield are reportedly on their way to Europe.
The Iranian regime sent many heavily indoctrinated fighters to Syria. They are largely recognizable by their brightly colored, often red, bandanas decorated with sectarian slogans. Tehran claims that these fighters are performing their religious duties. In addition, it has claimed that they volunteered to fight in the ranks of Iran’s army under the rule of the Islamic Republic. Turkey, which is following in the footsteps of the Iranian regime, is learning from Tehran and indoctrinating the fighters it has dispatched with an ideology allegedly based on restoring the Ottoman Empire. These loyalist fighters also wear bandanas similar to those of the Iranian fighters. Ahmad Shihabi, a top-ranking commander in the Syrian National Army that is loyal to Turkey, said in an interview broadcast on Akit TV last month: “We are willing to sacrifice our lives, our children, and our elderly for the sake of our country… for the sake of the Ottoman Caliphate. We will go wherever there is jihad. We won’t stop.”
In conclusion, both Iran and Turkey are using Arab fighters to kill their Arab brothers in Syria, Libya, Iraq, Yemen and other conflict hotspots in order to fulfill their own self-serving, nationalist projects.
• Dr. Mohammed Al-Sulami is Head of the International Institute for Iranian Studies (Rasanah). Twitter: @mohalsulami
Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not necessarily reflect Arab News' point-of-view
 
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Housecarl

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intothatgoodnight

. . .
B
Housecarl said:
Well that sure isn't going to go over well in Moscow. Considering that the Russians lost a diplomat not that long ago in Turkey to a similary minded individual, Erdogan may be in for a surprise eventually for this kind of crap.
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Bear in mind that, IIRC, the Russian fighters who are in Libya assisting the LNA forces are either military advisors not directly fighting, or Russian mercs not connected to the Russian military command chain - sounds similar to what the west has done in the ME for a couple of decades - mercs, logistics, weaponry, intel - actual fighting is performed by ME mercs and some western merc organizations (i.e., Blackwater and others).


intothegoodnight
 
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Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
intothatgoodnight said:
B

Bear in mind that, IIRC, the Russian fighters who are in Libya assisting the LNA forces are either military advisors not directly fighting, or Russian mercs not connected to the Russian military command chain - sounds similar to what the west has done in the ME for a couple of decades - mercs, logistics, weaponry, intel - actual fighting is performed by ME mercs and some western merc organizations (i.e., Blackwater and others).


intothegoodnight
Click to expand...

Yup. Even so, it's going to give Putin all that more reason to stick it to Erdogan as the opportunity presents itself.
 
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Housecarl

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Posted for fair use.....
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A Piece of a Greater Puzzle: The Libyan Civil War, External Influences and Regional Trends

Over the past few months, diplomatic activism around the Libyan civil war has intensified sharply. Two dynamics drove this process. First, the visible presence of Russian mercenaries fighting alongside the forces of Khalifa Haftar, the eastern-based leader of the Libyan National Army (literal...
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A Piece of a Greater Puzzle: The Libyan Civil War, External Influences and Regional Trends
Publication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 18 Issue: 3
By: Dario Cristiani

February 7, 2020 06:33 PM Age: 3 mins

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GNA Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan (source: alaraby.co.uk)

Over the past few months, diplomatic activism around the Libyan civil war has intensified sharply. Two dynamics drove this process. First, the visible presence of Russian mercenaries fighting alongside the forces of Khalifa Haftar, the eastern-based leader of the Libyan National Army (literal Arabic translation is the Libyan Arab Armed Forces). Second, the overt military support promised by Turkey to the Government of the National Accord (GNA), the UN-backed and internationally recognized Libyan government, in return for the GNA signing several agreements with Ankara. Among them, the most important was the agreement to delimit the maritime Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) between the Turkish southern Mediterranean coast and Libyan northeast shore in late November 2019. However, it is erroneous to assume that Turkey stepped in to support the GNA militarily only in late November. In reality, Ankara has delivered essential support to the GNA resistance against Haftar’s military aggression. Turkey has provided weapons, drones, munitions, and technical support since late April 2019 at least, when the GNA Interior Minister Fathi Bashagha went to Ankara to plea for Turkish help (Libyan Express, April 30, 2019).
This open Turkish activism turned into a sort of wakeup call for the Europeans. All of a sudden, after months of inaction, Germany, France, Italy, and the European Union through its new foreign minister, Josep Borrell, started working restlessly to accelerate the organization of the Berlin conference and to allow the Europeans to regain a role in Libya. Renewed attention due to the developments over the previous nine months prompted several foreign actors to meet in Berlin on January 17 (Deutsche Welle, January 15). However, despite the hype, the conference brought minimal concrete results: the parties involved agreed on a truce, but without a mechanism to sanction arms embargo violations and external interference—the initial rationale of the conference. Its most significant result was the full diplomatic recognition of Haftar. About one week after the meeting, hostilities restarted in Libya, with countries backing both sides providing weapons and military support to their proxies.
Russia and Turkey: Dominating the Scene
The April 4 military operation launched by Haftar opened a new phase of the Libyan conflict, structurally shifting the strategic context of the civil war (see TM, April 5, 2019; The Independent Arabia, November 4). The room for a negotiated political settlement that was supposed to be defined in the national conference in Ghadames scheduled for mid-April 2019 disappeared. Despite the LNA’s confidence in the achievement of a quick victory, the conflict became even more protracted.
Haftar’s historical backers—the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, France—supported his offensive, but none of them ever publicly admitted this support. Strategic opacity has always been a feature of the external countries that were operating in Libya alongside both fronts. These actors were providing weapons and military support, violating the arms embargo that was imposed on Libya in 2011. Then, in November 2019, Turkey went public, announcing its intention to deploy military forces in support of the GNA. For the first time, one of the foreign backers openly said it would intervene in the conflict in favor of one of the sides. The other external parties did not follow suit. Yet, the Turkish actions had a tremendous effect on the conflict.
Russia was also among the countries supporting Haftar. That said, its role is slightly different from that played by other countries. Many noted the Russian role only when Russian mercenaries started appearing on the Libyan battlefront, significantly tilting the balance of power in favor of Haftar’s forces. Highly trained mercenary forces, even in relatively small numbers, made a terrific impact in a war fought mainly by irregular and poorly trained militias mostly composed of youths with little to no experience of war. However, Russia already started increasing its role in eastern Libya years ago. Beginning in 2016, Moscow printed banknotes that later went into circulation in the east, in what is the de facto dual currency regime currently in place in Libya (The Libya Observer, May 25, 2016). On top of this, Russia also managed to maintain open channels with all the parties in the conflict: including Sarraj, as shown by his presence in Sochi, and the Misratans (Libya Herald, September 13, 2017; The Libya Observer, October 24, 2019; Libya Herald, April 19). Groups from Misrata represent the backbone of the GNA resistance, as shown by the centrality that Misratan leaders such as the already mentioned Bashagha or Ahmed Maiteeq played in organizing the GNA resistance. However, once Wagner’s fighters appeared in support of Haftar forces, Russia became more and more influential, although the logic of its support for Haftar is different than that of the UAE—by far Haftar’s most committed supporter—and Egypt. For Russia, Haftar’s advancement is not a goal in and of itself. Instead, it is primarily a tool to increase influence vis-à-vis other actors involved in Libya, not only among those supporting the GNA but also among the other supporters of Haftar.
As previously mentioned, Erdogan went public on Turkey’s intention to help the GNA militarily in late November 2019. This support, however, was not due to historical and cultural elements, though many GNA leaders have family names recalling their Ottoman origins. The argument that depicts the Turkish involvement in Libya as being driven by neo-Ottoman ambitions and historical relations is utterly misleading. Turkey intervened firmly and openly in support of the GNA primarily for economic and geopolitical reasons. Before the signing of the maritime agreement, Turkey had in fact begun de-escalating its military support for the GNA after the summer and especially after it launched operation “Spring of Peace” in Syria. Turkey had to focus on more pressing issues at its borders. The country was growing frustrated with the GNA, and domestic public opinion was, and remains, not very keen on a Libyan engagement.
The willingness of the GNA to sign the agreement on maritime delimitations and to preserve Ankara’s contracts in Libya triggered renewed Turkish support. That the GNA would sign the agreement reflects its isolation and the then desperate situation. Erdogan realized that by pushing the agreement, Turkey could have a valuable asset that would increase pressure on those countries forming an emerging geo-economic bloc in the eastern Mediterranean—Egypt, Israel, Greece, Cyprus, and Italy.
Implementing the military support required by the GNA was nevertheless problematic amid a number of logistic, tactical and strategic constraints to project military power in a country which is 2,000 kilometers away. However, as the Libyan civil war remains a conflict with many weapons, but relatively few local fighters, it does not take much to change the military balance on the ground. Turkey first used groups predominantly consisting of Syrian Turkmen fighters—its historical proxies in the Syrian war—and then slowly built up its military presence in western Libya. The project remains problematic, however, without military bases in countries neighboring western Libya from which to organize military operations.
Russia and Turkey’s deep influence on both sides of the conflict brought the two countries together for a meeting in Moscow, before the Berlin conference. In this meeting, Libyan actors—Fayez al-Sarraj and Khaled al-Mishri (the Chairman of the High Council of State) from the Tripoli side and Khalifa Haftar and Aguila Saleh (the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the internationally recognized Libyan parliament) from the Tobruk side— went to Moscow to sign a ceasefire, although the two delegations did not meet directly. However, while Sarraj and Mishri signed, Haftar did not. This was further proof that while foreign powers are naturally essential in the Libyan conflict, they often have problems in imposing their wishes on local actors, and this has often been the case with Haftar.
The Libyan Civil War as a Function of Other Conflicts
The Libyan conflict has to be seen as a part of the emerging dynamics in the eastern Mediterranean. For years, the conflict was seen as an appendix of Gulf politics, especially following the Qatar blockade; as an arena for intra-European competition, for instance between Italy and France; or intra-Maghrebi, as shown by the duplication of negotiations around 2014 and 2015 involving Algeria and Morocco. However, the nature of the proxy war and its increasingly internationalized nature has now entered a new stage. The linkage with the eastern Mediterranean is now more apparent: Turkey sees influence in Libya as a crucial element to breaking out from its own increasing isolation.
However, over the past few weeks, another regional dynamic emerged with the high potential to influence trends in Libya. On January 28, U.S. President Donald Trump unveiled what he defined as the “deal of the century,” his long-awaited plan to resuscitate the Israeli-Palestinian peace process (Al-Jazeera, January 28). In this context, Egypt remains the crucial element for any arrangement concerning Israeli regional security. Since the Camp David accords in 1978, it has been clear that there cannot be a state-led war against Israel without Egypt. Preserving this strategic reality is a crucial element driving American foreign policy in the region since the 1970s and it obviously remains vital to keeping the current plan alive, at least theoretically, in the coming years. The UAE is essential for this plan. Abu Dhabi said that the project is a “serious initiative that addresses many issues raised over the years” and it is one of the most important Arab countries supporting the plan, especially economically (The National [Abu Dhabi], January 29).
This dynamic will have evident effects on the Libyan theater as well: it reduces, even more, the incentive of the United States to sanction Haftar and intervene in favor of the GNA. Since the outbreak of the conflict in April, it was clear that the U.S. administration had a sort of dual view over Libya. President Trump was leaning in favor of Haftar, while the State Department had a more nuanced view, tilting more towards the GNA. That said, the first proof of this emerging dynamic is the non-reaction from Washington on the ongoing oil blockade in Libya. In the past, the United States made clear that one of the few red lines they had in Libya was oil production: an oil blockade would have been unacceptable, and this was an influential factor preventing Haftar from instrumentally using the control of oil fields and terminals that he secured in the Sirte Basin since 2016 and in the Fezzan from January 2019. The events of the past few weeks, however, suggest this is not a red line for the United States anymore. Libyan production fell from 1.3 million barrels a day before the blockade to 0.2 million as of early February, without causing any response from the United States (OilPrice.Com, February 4).
Conclusion
The new phase of the Libyan civil war initiated in April 2019 has shown how external countries play an ever-growing role in a conflict that was already profoundly internationalized. All the actors involved in supporting both sides maintained a significant degree of strategic opacity, avoiding admitting their role in Libya openly. The military offensive launched by Haftar, destroyed the last hope for a negotiated political settlement. Still, this military operation did not deliver the quick victory Haftar and his supporters hoped. As the conflict became more and more entrenched, two dynamics became apparent—the increasing influence of Russia and Turkey. The latter did so by openly announcing a military deployment in support of the GNA. Turkish activism awoke European countries, which rushed to organize a conference in Berlin that, despite the hype, resulted in an apparent fiasco. As also shown by the diplomatic meeting promoted in Moscow under the auspices of Russia and Turkey, the momentum for a diplomatic settlement of the conflict has disappeared and any political agreement will be the result of military developments on the ground. However, the Turkish actions clearly showed how the conflict in Libya is linked to geo-economic and diplomatic developments in the eastern Mediterranean. Yet, this is not the only external conflict that will play a role in shaping dynamics in Libya. The U.S.-led peace plan for the Middle East will also bear a significant influence on the Libyan landscape, as has already been shown by the lack of response to the oil blockade launched by groups linked to Haftar. The Libyan conflict is thus more and more a function of other regional conflicts, a piece of a wider geopolitical puzzle linking together Gulf dynamics, European politics, Maghrebi rivalries, developments in the Israeli-Palestinian domain and the emerging geopolitical competition in the eastern Mediterranean.

TM-Feb.-7-2020-Issue.pdf
 
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EndGameWW3
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Tensions rise between Assad's and Turkish forces https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/ne


Tensions rise between Assad's and Turkish forces

The government of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's says its forces have taken control of Saraqeb, a strategic town in Idlib province.

Assad's administration made the announcement through the state-run news agency on Saturday. Saraqeb is located at the junction of major roads in the last stronghold of the opposition forces.

Meanwhile, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights says Turkey, which backs the opposition forces, has set up several military posts near the front line, including in Taftanaz, 15 kilometers north of Saraqeb.

The Turkish government has yet to make an official announcement. But local media reports say the Turkish military is deploying ground forces to Syria.

On Monday, eight Turkish people, including troops stationed in Syria, were killed in an attack by Assad's forces.

The latest developments have raised fears that tensions between the Syrian government and Turkish forces will intensify.
 
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jward said:

EndGameWW3
@EndGameWW3
25m

Tensions rise between Assad's and Turkish forces https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/ne


Tensions rise between Assad's and Turkish forces

The government of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's says its forces have taken control of Saraqeb, a strategic town in Idlib province.

Assad's administration made the announcement through the state-run news agency on Saturday. Saraqeb is located at the junction of major roads in the last stronghold of the opposition forces.

Meanwhile, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights says Turkey, which backs the opposition forces, has set up several military posts near the front line, including in Taftanaz, 15 kilometers north of Saraqeb.

The Turkish government has yet to make an official announcement. But local media reports say the Turkish military is deploying ground forces to Syria.

On Monday, eight Turkish people, including troops stationed in Syria, were killed in an attack by Assad's forces.

The latest developments have raised fears that tensions between the Syrian government and Turkish forces will intensify.
Click to expand...
Tick tock
 
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Housecarl

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danielboon said:
https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1226636745653051394
View: https://mobile.twitter.com/RojavaNetwork/status/1226636745653051394
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Idlib_in_Syria.png



en.wikipedia.org

Turkish military operation in Idlib Governorate - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org en.wikipedia.org
Turkish_Observation_Points_in_Idlib.svg


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english.iswnews.com

Map: Military Situation in Northwest of Syria, 5 February 2020 - Islamic World News

ISWNews Analysis Group: From the beginning of the last phase of the Syrian army operation in Idlib province since 19 December 2019 so far, 1160 km2 occupied lands of Idlib were liberated in 47 days.
english.iswnews.com english.iswnews.com
This definitely isn't going to end well.

Assad can't back down and if Erdogan "goes there" he's going to find himself twisting in the wind with NATO uttering a collective "WTF?!?!".
 
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