WAR North Korea Successfully Tests Road Mobile Musudan IRBM (22 June 2016)

[Housecarl]

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http://www.irishtimes.com/news/irel...ash-course-in-north-korean-missiles-1.2698691

Give Me a Crash Course In . . . North Korean missiles

Pyongyang says its Musudan ballistic missile is a success. It’s only a matter of time before Kim Jong-un’s regime can fire at United States territory

25 minutes ago
David McNeill

What is Pyongyang up to now?

After a string of damp squibs North Korea’s military engineers have something to celebrate this week. An intermediate-range missile launched from the isolated country reportedly reached an altitude of 1,000km and a distance of 400km – halfway to Japan. Experts say it is only a matter of time before the Musudan ballistic missile is able to reach United States territory. In April North Korea appears to have fired a missile from a submarine, giving it “second strike” capabilities if its land-based weapons are disabled.

Why is that a concern?

Pyongyang has conducted four nuclear tests since 2006 and is trying to shrink a nuclear bomb to fit on a ballistic missile. In March Kim Jong-un, North Korea’s leader, boasted that its scientists had done just that – to widespread scepticism. Still, the country has shown great determination, despite endless setbacks. If it succeeds in developing even inaccurate weapons and delivery systems they would pose a threat to cities such as Tokyo and Seoul – and one day, perhaps, the west coast of the United States.

Who is upset?

Almost everyone. “The threat to Japan is intensifying,” warned Japan’s defence minister, Gen Nakatani, after Wednesday’s test. “Complete isolation and self-destruction” wait at the end of North Korea’s “reckless provocation”, according to South Korea’s president, Park Geun-hye. The United States and the United Nations joined the chorus of condemnation. Even nuclear-armed China, Pyongyang’s sole important ally, though more muted in its criticism, is known to be upset by North Korea’s weapons programme – for its own strategic reasons.

So why doesn’t North Korea stop?

Building a bomb and threatening to lob it at its enemies make sense from North Korea’s perspective. Nuclear weapons are the ultimate deterrent, and Kim’s regime wants to deter the United States. North Korea’s national identity hinges around the outcome of the fratricidal US-backed war of 1950-3 that created two irreconcilable regimes, held apart since by a brittle truce. Pyongyang keeps memories of that war vividly alive, and Washington helps to reinforce them.

In what way?

Tensions often spike in spring, during joint US-South Korean military exercises, which Pyongyang considers a prelude to invasion. Tensions are elevated by the very public deployment of American B-52 aircraft, carrying the implied threat of nuclear weapons. Every North Korean child is taught about the last time B-52 bombers were dispatched. For a month in 1976, after a deadly border skirmish, the United States sent bombers along the Korean Peninsula; they veered off at the last moment.

Can North Korea be brought to the negotiating table?

Pyongyang had been demanding a peace treaty with the US since the early 1970s, but cold-war politics blocked it. Since then Seoul and Washington have staged the military drills a few kilometres from the DMZ, or demilitarised zone, that divides the peninsula. The drills include a simulated nuclear strike. Despite a decade of detente in the 1990s, both sides are still held in the grip of mutual suspicion and loathing. North Korea has offered to suspend its missile programme if the drills are stopped, but Washington and Seoul say Pyongyang must make the first move.

So what happens next?

In the absence of a permanent peace treaty North Korea will continue to use nuclear threats until it gets security guarantees. In 2013, after six decades of “slow-motion war thinly covered by the 1953 armistice agreement”, Pyongyang finally snapped, says Leonid Petrov, a North Korea expert at the Australian National University. Kim Jong-un is simply reminding the world “about this unresolved problem inherited from the cold-war era”.

 

[Housecarl]

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http://www.houstonchronicle.com/new...orth-Korea-We-won-t-abandon-nukes-8324201.php

North Korea: We won't abandon nukes

Top official calls on U.S. to stop "military threats, sanctions"

Eric Talmadge, Associated Press | June 24, 2016

PYONGYANG, North Korea - The top North Korean official for U.S. relations said Friday that his country is now a nuclear threat to be reckoned with, and Washington can expect more tests and missile launches like the ones earlier this week as long as it attempts to force his government's collapse through a policy of pressure and punishment.

"It's the United States that caused this issue," Han Song Ryol, director-general of the department of U.S. affairs at North Korea's Foreign Ministry, said in his first interview with an American news organization since assuming the post three years ago. "They have to stop their military threats, sanctions and economic pressure. Without doing so, it's like they are telling us to reconcile while they are putting a gun to our forehead."

Han defended the North's test-launching on Wednesday of two medium-range ballistic missiles. Foreign military experts believe that, once perfected, such missiles could deliver nuclear warheads to U.S. bases in Japan and possibly to major U.S. military installations as far away as the Pacific island of Guam.

The tests indicated technological advances in the North's missile capabilities. They were quickly condemned by Washington, Tokyo and Seoul as a "provocation" and a violation of United Nations resolutions.

State Department spokesman John Kirby said U.S. policy calling for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula hasn't changed.

"The capabilities that the DPRK continues to pursue are doing nothing obviously to get us to that goal," he said. "We urge the North to take the necessary steps to prove that they're willing to return to the six-party talk process, so that we can get to that goal."

Han dismissed the criticism, saying North Korea has no choice but to build up its military deterrent as long as the world's largest superpower - and the country that first developed nuclear weapons - remains an enemy. He noted that the U.S. recently deployed nuclear-powered submarines and strategic bombers capable of dropping nuclear weapons on North Korea to the region, and earlier this year conducted training for precision airstrikes on North Korea's leadership, along with simulations of an advance into the capital, Pyongyang, with the South Korean military during joint annual exercises.

"This launch was a significant and novel step that my country must take to produce a powerful nuclear deterrent," Han said. "The real provocation is coming from the United States. … How can my country stand by and do nothing?"

Han said North Korea has never recognized a longstanding United Nations Security Council ban on its testing of nuclear weapons or long-range missiles, though the world body has ratified the resolutions and imposed heavy sanctions on North Korea for continuing them - including a round of new sanctions imposed after its latest nuclear test in January. North Korea says that test was its first of an H-bomb.

"The United States must see correctly the trend of the times and the strategic position of (North Korea) and must withdraw its hostile policy," he said in the hour-long interview at the Foreign Ministry in Pyongyang. "In the past, my country has been threatened by the United States with its nuclear weapons, but I can now say proudly that the United States is being threatened by my country's nuclear weapons."

He held out the possibility of dialogue with the United States, but only if Washington agrees to "drop its hostile policies," replace the armistice that ended the 1950-53 Korean War with a lasting peace treaty, and withdraw its troops based in South Korea.

 

[Housecarl]

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http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/749650.html

US firmly denies any meeting with North Korean representative at dialogue in Beijing

Posted on : Jun.25,2016 14:51 KST
Modified on : Jun.25,2016 14:51 KST

North Korea’s Choe Son-hui didn’t make definitive statement on whether a meeting took place; Washington says “no”

The US strenuously denied any meeting between its senior representative for the Six-Party Talks and the head of the North Korean Foreign Ministry’s American affairs bureau during their recent visits to Beijing.

During a regular briefing on June 23, US State Department spokesperson John Kirby responded to questions from reporters asking for confirmation after North Korean envoy Choe Son-hui’s curiously remarked that she might have met with the department’s special representative for North Korea policy Sung Kim.

“[Kim] did not meet with [Choe]. I can confirm that,” Kirby replied.

When asked why the two had not met, Kirby said, “There was no planning to have that meeting.”

In response to additional questions on whether Kim and Choe may have exchanged greetings, Kirby curtly replied, “There was no meeting, and as I understand it, there was no group meeting at which the two were equally present.”

Washington’s denial not only of any unofficial meeting but also of any communication at all with the North Korean envoy appears motivated by concerns that it could send to wrong signal to Pyongyang and other countries on its intentions regarding dialogue. Earlier this year, North Korea carried out a fourth nuclear test in the face of objections from the international community. On June 22, it showed substantial progress in a test launch of an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) capable of striking Guam, a US territory.

Both Kim and Choe were present at the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD), a three-day event in Beijing that began on June 21. On June 23, Choe gave a curious reply when asked by reporters before the North Korean embassy in Beijing on whether she had met with Kim.

“Ask the US about that. I will not comment on any sensitive matters,” Choe said by way of an answer.

Despite the strenuous denial from Washington, Japan’s Asahi Shimbun newspaper, citing an unnamed source, reported on June 24 that Kim and Choe had had an unofficial meeting during the dialogue on June 22.

By Yi Yong-in and Gil Yun-hyung, Washington and Tokyo correspondents
Please direct questions or comments to [english@hani.co.kr]

 

[Housecarl]

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http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2016/06/28/26/0301000000AEN20160628000200315F.html

U.S. confirms N. Korea's Musudan missile reaches space

2016/06/28 03:09
By Chang Jae-soon

WASHINGTON, June 27 (Yonhap) -- North Korea's Musudan intermediate-range ballistic missile reached space and then re-entered Earth's atmosphere in its sixth test attempt last week, a U.S. defense official confirmed Monday, saying the launch would be a success if Pyongyang had designed the test that way.

"We saw the missile launch. We saw it go up into space and come back down 250 miles away in the Sea of Japan. If that was their intent, then it was a success. But you'd have to ask them," Pentagon spokesman Capt. Jeff Davis told reporters.

"This might have been, but it's really their test and they knew what the parameters are and only they could say if it met those objectives or not," he said.

It was believed to be the first time the U.S. has confirmed the performance of the North's missile launch.

A day after Wednesday's test of the missile believed to be capable of reaching the U.S. territory of Guam, the North claimed success, saying the missile entered space before successfully re-entering the atmosphere and landing in targeted waters about 400 kilometers away.

The launch marks important progress in the North's missile program as re-entry technology has been considered one of the hardest obstacles the North must overcome before developing a nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missile.

The latest test was the North's sixth attempt to test the missile in about two months beginning April 15. All but the sixth launch failed, with the missile exploding in midair or on a mobile launcher, or crashing seconds after launch.

"From our perspective ... it reminds us of the importance of our alliances with Japan and the Republic of Korea to ensure that we can adequately work together to defend against all kinds of missiles, not just these with an intermediate range, but the ones that could potentially threaten our homeland here," Davis said.

The test also underscored the "reason why we need to continue to put pressure on North Korea to abide by its U.N. Security Council resolutions, its obligations under U.N. Security Council resolutions, and to be a good neighbor in the region, which they're clearly not being," he said.

The official also stressed the U.S. is ready to counter the threats as it always tries to outpace them.

"Long before they ever tested this system, we were already doing things to make sure we are postured in the region. We have Aegis cooperation we do with Japan. We have TPY-2 radars in Japan. Long before they ever paraded out a KN-08, we had already put in ground-based interceptors in Alaska and Hawaii. We've got THAAD in Guam. We have things that we're doing. We're making sure we're outpacing this threat constantly," he said.

jschang@yna.co.kr

(END)

 

[China Connection]

I hear Russia is more advanced!

 

[Housecarl]

I hear Russia is more advanced!

Yeah, the difference is that Kim and his boys in Pyongyang are going out of there way to play the "junk yard dog with rabies" while Putin is playing chess and Xi at this point is playing high stakes poker/magong.

 

[Housecarl]

Hummm.....

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http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2016/06/667_208261.html

Posted : 2016-06-30 10:52
Updated : 2016-06-30 13:41

Give North Korea what it wants

By Oh Young-jin

It's high time for a change in tactics on North Korea. Instead of trying to prevent the North ― more specifically its leader ― from getting what it wants, why not give it exactly this as a horse with a Trojan streak or a chalice lined with poison.


For this strategy, above all, it is important to see what Pyongyang wants.

First, it wants to be recognized by the world as a nuclear weapon state. What does this mean?

The North wants this recognition so badly that it has been written into its constitution.

Striking a different path from his father and grandfather, the 33-year-old leader Kim Jong-un, has worked his state propaganda machine overtime and frequently played the lead role himself in bragging about the latest developments in its missile and nuclear development.

By now, it is clear that Kim has a purpose for trying to get credit for the progress in his country's programs for weapons of mass destruction.

It is a kind of reputation-building effort by Kim, who only has his "royal" pedigree to claim to be dictator-for-life in the gulag state. His father, Kim Jong-il, allegedly stage-managed a series of terrorist attacks and provocations against the South. His grandfather, Kim Il-sung, was the one who led an invasion against the South as a proxy of the now defunct Soviet Union.

The current one doesn't have anything to claim to be his. He obviously dreams of riding on the success of WMD programs, giving himself the legitimacy he lacks.

Now, what would we, the rest of the world, get or pay in return for allowing Kim to claim that he has made the North a nuclear state?

First of all, we could simply let the North rot by not paying attention to it. The North is a country of limited resources ― a fact that can't change just because it has outlived pundits' expectations. Hopefully, it would be a slow-motion death for being dragged into its expensive weapons programs.

Or we can invite Kim, elated over the global recognition, out of his cocoon state, give him a party, hoping he inadvertently lets in the wind of change. The end result is the demise of the North as we know it.

There are two kinds of recognition ― five nuclear states that are recognized by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and those outside it such as Pakistan and India. Israel is presumed to be nuclear capable, although it remains ambiguous on its possession.

The North is too open to be treated like Israel. If it is put together with Pakistan and India, we may ask the North to return to the NPT, which will allow a peek into what it really has. Also this status wouldn't give the North much except for recognition of its ownership of nuclear weapons and missiles. Last time it was checked, Pakistan and India were having a hard time in joining the Nuclear Suppliers' Group, empowering them to trade related materials.

There are bound to be complex issues entailing whatever recognition may be given to the North. First, it could be taken as a bad example by which a rogue state is rewarded for egregious behavior, encouraging other rogues to follow the example.

This could lead to the breakdown of the current NPT order, likely triggering a nuclear arms race in Northeast Asia.

Then, the North may threaten its neighbors and extort them by brandishing its nuclear weapons.

The very assumption that time is not on the North's side on these new tactics may be fundamentally flawed. But we can't expect what U.S. President Obama called a "moral revolution" to replace the "logic of fear" in the North anytime soon.

This necessitates the adoption of a new approach because the current approach has not worked. Neither ignoring the North nor slapping sanctions on it has worked.

Giving the North a sense of recognition and bringing it out for dialogue in one big waiting game may be a kind of constructive engagement that we need.

Just recalling what has taken place recently would make it not so bad a deal.

Here is the account.

The world has been reduced to the spectator watching North Korea's missile test as if it is a holiday firework. Last week, the North claimed a success in its testing of intermediate range ballistic missile, so far known as Musudan, and now renamed Hwangsong-2.

As Pyongyang boasted of progress made in re-entry technology, pivotal to striking the U.S. base in Guam, Seoul, Tokyo and Washington as well as the United Nations went through what has now become routine in the case of déjà vu. Seoul repeated its pledge not to accept a nuclear North Korea and threatened to retaliate against any provocations. Japan monitored the trajectory before calling it off, while the U.S. and the U.N. issued condemnation. North Korea praised its young dictator and gave him a pat on its back for going mano-a-mano with the U.S.

It's time to stop shaking our fists to the sky every time the North launched Taepodong or Musudan missiles.

Oh Young-jin is The Korea Times' chief editorial writer. Contact him at foolsdie5@ktimes.com or foolsdie@gmail.com.

foolsdie@koreatimes.co.kr

Kim Jong-un tightens grip on power with new title
N. Korea pledges to bolster nuke deterrence against U.S.
N. Korea vows to improve people's livelihood

 

[Housecarl]

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http://38north.org/2016/06/jschilling062816/

A Partial Success for the Musudan: Addendum

By John Schilling
28 June 2016


North Korea has just released an image of Kim Jong Un posing in front of a Musudan missile (Hwasong-10) with the reentry vehicle removed. In addition to showing the grid fins in their stowed configuration, this view shows us the missile’s guidance package. The resolution is not high enough to positively identify specific components or assemblies, but it clearly isn’t the guidance system from a 1960s-vintage Russian R-27 missile. In the original Russian design, the rather bulkier guidance system was fit into a depressed cavity at the top of the propellant tank; the North Koreans have instead fit the electronics into the narrow space atop a normal tank dome. This means they have rebuilt the tank dome as well as the guidance system, though this comes as no surprise given that the missile’s propellant tanks have been stretched by almost 2.5 meters to increase its range.

http://38north.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/KCNA_Yonhap-2016-06-Musudan.jpg

Even if North Korea obtained complete R-27 missiles from Russia in the 1990s, it is unlikely they would trust 40-year-old electronics to control it. And we know that North Korea has the ability to build their own guidance systems, whether for shorter-ranged Nodong missiles or for Unha satellite launch vehicles. We know from recovered Unha wreckage that they are willing to use modern imported commercial-grade electronics in their missiles, which would explain why their guidance system is smaller than the Russian original.

What we don’t know is how well it performs. Precision components like missile-grade mechanical or laser gyroscopes are difficult to build and difficult to import without it being obvious that one is importing missile parts. Possibly the North Koreans have found a supplier that doesn’t care, or possibly their own technicians have mastered the art of building these systems. At a minimum, the Musudan is capable of completing a flight without tumbling out of control, at least some of the time, and even if it is no more precise than North Korea’s other missiles, it is still almost certainly accurate enough to hit, for example, the island of Guam. Although, hitting specific targets on Guam, like the airbase or port facilities, will likely require additional testing for calibration even if the design is sound and accurate.

For the full assessment of the June 2016 Musudan tests, see “A Partial Success for the Musudan.”

-

Reader Feedback

8 Responses to “A Partial Success for the Musudan: Addendum”

1. Max says:

June 29, 2016 at 11:03 pm

So, is the success rate 16.7% (one out of the six fired) or 100% (only counting the last one fired)? The answer depends on whether the missiles tested were from the current product line or from NOS. If you’ve tested 2007 Mustangs for head collision lately and found five out of the six tested gave the dummy driver a bad head injury, would you say it is safe or would you send out a recall notice? What would you do if you are the GM?

2. Clay Ramsey says:

June 29, 2016 at 8:36 pm

Thanks.

3. Clay Ramsey says:

June 29, 2016 at 4:41 pm

If everything is an assumption, and if the reported high altitude figure is actually true, I’m just going to assume it was done using genuine Russian NOS hardware. It doesn’t matter at all where it came from, Iran, Russia or wherever, just with the understanding that it was not produced in DPRK. A few modifications here and there does not qualify as ‘Made in Korea’.

4. J_kies says:

June 29, 2016 at 2:17 pm

Dr Schilling; Its a bad design regardless of the more ‘up-to-date’ electronics parts. Stretching the R-27 Zydb resulted in a loss of stability; adding the drag of the grid-fins probably doubled the Cd*area product and the lofted shot likely had zero or near zero payload.

Guam at ~3400km range presents a ~50km wide by ~19km object requires ~5mR type angle error and velocity errors < ~ 20 m/s for the burnout state vector. Commercial GPS aided aircraft INS systems are not adaptable for missile use, 'hand-rolling' an IMU and inertial instruments are a much harder problem than mere propulsion.

The electronics packaging and cabling shown is 1980s vintage techniques and would likely be subject to a lot of quality assurance failures due to imperfectly repeated assemblies that never achieve testing prior to flight.

Yes the DPRK program is very reasonably considered to be a hoax as the hypergolic propellant 'mobile' missiles are flat out dumb. If they wish to message us that the missiles are 'credible' they need to announce an aimpoint pre-launch and achieve errors to that aimpoint within nuclear package lethal radius.

5. Clay Ramsey says:

June 29, 2016 at 11:03 am

They obviously want us to believe these missiles are real, but proving it to us would be so easy if they are. Their satellite launch vehicle *is* real, and there is plenty of video, radar and photographic evidence to show so (a lot of it released by DPRK themselves). To me, the release of these kinds of images proves nothing. It makes me wonder why they released images at all since it only provides argument (and often times outright evidence) that the programs are fake. There’s nothing here I couldn’t have put together myself, I could have created an image like this with a moderate budget too. Still waiting for the good stuff, but not holding my breath.

Btw hacking my phone was kind of a rude thing to do, I know now it wasn’t so benign after all. Curiosity is one thing, but destructiveness is another. I did occur to me though, it’s possible that the ones monitoring these posts (and hacking stuff) have never even seen a musudan, or KN-08 or SLBM anything ever in their lives and know nothing about it at all. My posts may genuinely seem like nothing more than spitefulness to them (since they have no reason to doubt the missiles existence). Hardly, imho the missile programs are deceptions and I based that solely on the photos *they* themselves released. I mean, that launch photo just looks to me as an all solid launch, but the engines mysteriously are hypergolic. If you don’t know anything about propulsion, you won’t even know what I’m talking about but don’t just assume my assessment is irrational, it’s not. The lighting is wrong, everything is wrong. Is it impossible for it to be real, maybe not, carbonized material in the exhaust jet could produce that effect, but I’m sure not going to jump to that conclusion since it just looks so photoshopped. *That’s* the kind of thing I’m talking about! You’re shooting your own foot off and getting pissed at me for doing it.

6. John Schilling says:

June 29, 2016 at 9:40 am

The North Koreans are fairly explicit about their nuclear arsenal as being a deterrent. And you can’t deter anyone with a secret weapon – they have to know about it, and they have to know that it works. So it does matter, and it is probably because it matters that they are showing us the details.

Outside of North Korea, there is a persistent minority opinion that the entire North Korean missile program is basically a hoax. And even those of us who take the matter seriously, have called out North Korea for carefully editing and even photoshopping their launch imagery so as to exaggerate their capabilities. So earlier this year, they started showing us technical details like this along with hard-to-fake closeup images of ground test activities.

Apparently, they don’t care if we find out exactly how they lay out the various black boxes that make up a guidance package, but they do care that we understand these are actual DPRK-built ballistic missiles that actually work (sometimes).

7. Kostadinov says:

June 29, 2016 at 7:13 am

Obviously this weapon only value is as nuclear deterrent.
This is explicitly highlighted in the official statement: “The real foe our nuclear force has to confront is a nuclear war itself…”

8. Rudiger Frank says:

June 29, 2016 at 2:22 am

Can anybody tell me why the NKs are showing off such technical detail? Is it because they know that we know anyway so it doesn’t matter? Or is it a deliberate provocation? Misinformation? Stupidity? Or proof that they indeed see the primary value of these weapons in deterrence, not actual use?

 

[Housecarl]

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http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2016/06/30/editorials/musudan-missile-launches/#.V3XuF4-cHIV

Editorials

Musudan missile launches

Jun 30, 2016
Article history

With its latest ballistic missile launch tests, North Korea has continued to defy repeated international condemnations and resolutions by the United Nations Security Council. North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, who hailed the tests last week as a success, should realize that his regime’s nuclear weapons and missiles development programs will only deepen the country’s international isolation and economic woes. Kim’s nuclear weapons policy could eventually lead to a collapse of his regime instead of making it stronger.

Pyongyang launched two Musudan intermediate-range ballistic missiles on June 22, which landed in the Sea of Japan. The first launch is regarded as a failure as it flew only 150 km before disintegrating. But the launch of the second missile, which flew some 400 km, is largely seen as a success. The second missile reached an altitude of more than 1,000 km — with the state-run Korean Central New Agency claiming 1, 413.6 km — before impacting the sea.

Prior to the June 22 launches, North Korea carried out five ballistic missile tests in April and May. For a country that can’t feed its own people to conduct so many ballistic missile launch tests in such a short span of time is abnormal. As the Security Council pointed out in its press statement after last week’s launches, North Korea “is diverting resources to the pursuit of ballistic missiles while” its “citizens have great unmet needs.”

In its first party congress in 36 years held in May, the Workers’ Party of Korea — whose power is supreme and even outranks the constitution — named Kim to the newly created post of chairman of the ruling party and upheld the policy of simultaneously pursuing development of nuclear weapons and economic development. This is the wrong path for North Korea to take if it wishes to become a prosperous country. It should take the criticism in the Security Council statement seriously and abandon its nuclear weapons and missiles programs.

Given Pyongyang’s position and its repeated missile tests, the United Nations will have no other choice but to have its member states strictly implement economic sanctions against the North. Kim should consider the long-term impact the sanctions will have on his country and its people. Pyongyang would be making a misjudgment if it thinks that it has ways to circumvent the sanctions and successfully pursue economic development. Kim must realize that the more destitute a county’s people are, the weaker the state’s foundation becomes. This is what happened when Eastern European states in the Soviet bloc collapsed in the early 1990s.

Assessing North Korea’s latest tests, the Defense Ministry said that the Musudan missile has “a certain degree of functions” as an intermediate-range ballistic missile and that the North’s missiles pose a serious concern to Japan’s security. John Schilling, a U.S. aerospace engineer and analyst of North Korea’s missile program, says the latest test “finally demonstrated the full performance of the missile’s propulsion system and at least a minimally functional guidance system” although “the trajectory was not representative of an operational launch and so leaves open questions about the performance of the re-entry vehicle.” If the Musudan missile becomes operational, it is expected to be capable of flying about 3,500 km, putting the United States’ Andersen Air Force Base on Guam — and its B-52 strategic bombers — within range.

In view of North Korea’s moves, the Japanese government’s National Security Council has decided to push the production and deployment of the SM-3 Block II A missile, a new sea-launched missile to counter ballistic missiles that use a high altitude trajectory. But the program will take several years before it becomes operational. Another option would be to introduce a ground-based Terminal High Altitude Area Defense missile (THAAD). Both projects, however, may face budgetary problems.

The U.S., meanwhile, is planning to introduce the THAAD system in South Korea. North Korea’s continued development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles together with the pursuit of missile defense systems by the U.S., Japan and South Korea, and China’s naval buildup, increases the risk of an arms race in Northeast Asia. Leaders of the governments concerned as well as the U.N. Security Council need to make serious efforts to reduce regional tensions.

It is possible that international sanctions and coordinated actions by the U.S., Japan and South Korea will only persuade North Korea to step up its provocative acts. The countries concerned should continue to emphasize to Pyongyang that only by abandoning its nuclear weapons and missile programs will North Korea be able to enjoy stability and prosperity.

The Security Council statement says that its members “expressed their commitment to a peaceful, diplomatic and political solution to the situation.” The U.S. and China — the sole ally of Pyongyang — must play a leading role in these efforts.

-----

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http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2016/07/485_208375.html

Posted : 2016-07-01 13:05
Updated : 2016-07-01 13:05

Seoul rebukes N. Korea for sticking to claim on nuclear state

South Korea on Friday condemned North Korea for making nuclear threats, warning that Pyongyang will face deeper isolation if it does not give up its illusion that it is a nuclear power state.

Seoul's reaction came a day after the North's state committee on inter-Korean affairs claimed that Pyongyang is a nuclear weapons state equipped with smaller, lighter and diversified nuclear warheads.

A spokesman at the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification warned the United States and South Korea that the more desperately they resort to sanctions and pressure, the more accurately the North will target them with its ultra-modern strike means.

Seoul's unification ministry called North Korea's insistence on calling itself a nuke state sophistry, urging Pyongyang to give up its nuclear weapons program.

"North Korea should awaken from the illusion that it is a nuclear state and take actions to show the commitment to denuclearization," ministry spokesman Jeong Joon-hee said in a regular press briefing.

He warned that if the North sticks to its nuclear arsenal, it will face deeper international isolation.

The North's committee issued its first statement on Thursday after it was elevated to a state-level organization at the country's parliamentary meeting held the day before.

Since the party congress ended in May, the North has proposed holding military talks with South Korea on several occasions.

But Seoul has rejected the North's dialogue offer as a propaganda ploy, saying that denuclearization steps should be prioritized as a precondition for dialogue. (Yonhap)

 

[Housecarl]

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http://www.eurasiareview.com/02072016-the-current-north-korean-issue-analysis/

The Current North Korean Issue – Analysis

By Modern Diplomacy July 2, 2016
By Giancarlo Elia Valori*

Pending the periodical transformation of the North American political system, the Korean issue is surfacing again. It is a complex issue which is crucial to the strategic balance in Southern Asia. Moreover, it is precisely in the Korean region that the US (and also the European) balances with China and the Russian Federation are determined.

Since February 2016, Russia has always had excellent relations with the North Korean regime, but exactly in that phase the United States called for sanctions against North Korea within the UN Security Council. These sanctions have been primarily designed to damage the economic and strategic interests Russia has in the region.

Russia voted in favor of the sanctions, but I do not believe it can go beyond that level of warning against North Korea.

Russia is no longer willing to accept the nuclear and military autonomy of North Korea, which is now seen as a free rider in the Asian context.

The Russian Federation, however, wants to preserve the North Korean regime, which prevents the important Korean peninsula from falling under the US influence. Certainly it does not want military pressure against North Korea, which could endanger its security structures in Central Asia and the Pacific region.

Nevertheless Russia will certainly continue to preserve the high volume of trade with North Korea, amounting to one billion dollars a year – trade which is also based on the ruble.

It is also likely for the UN Security Council to block the project of an “Asian trading house” between Russia and North Korea, open to the other Asian countries and viewed by Russia as an axis for its penetration into Southern Asia.

China is no longer interested in keeping a North Korean system which puts pressures only on South Korea and the United States, but it plans to keep on using North Korea as the Southern pivot of its Belt and Road Initiative southwards and westwards.

This is the reason why China needs to “punish” Kim Jong-un (President Xi Jinping has not yet paid a visit to Pyongyang), but also to use him so as to avoid the Americanization of the terrestrial-maritime hub of the Yalu River and the Yellow Sea, which is essential for China’s military autonomy.

In this context, North Korea conveys two different sets of messages to Western countries and South Korea: the will of a slow but peaceful reunification and the rejection of the dismantling of its regime according to the techniques of the “orange revolutions” or the internal coup and even conventional war.

Finally, the North Korean regime shows its intention not to give up its nuclear-missile arsenal, which could also be managed by an agreement to be defined and reached from scratch.

The signs exist in the North Korean narrative and they only need to be interpreted with strategic wisdom, without regarding the North Korean regime as “irrational” or “unreasonable” or, even worse, run by an unpredictable leader.

Kim Jong-un is not an irrational man. He has a clear and reasonable plan in mind, but he wants to discuss it with reliable partners that do not wish, first and foremost, the destruction of his regime and his country.

Basically North Korea wants the United States to sit around a peace negotiating table which can definitely acknowledge its regime and define close and stable cooperation with South Korea.

The North Korean reaction to the South Korean block of the “reunification package” in Parliament and of the June 15 joint event of the whole Korean Nation, must be interpreted in this sense.

The celebration to be held in Kaesong, North Korea, did not take place due to the unilateral choice made by South Korea’s government.

Hence South Korea wants to play its own autonomous and independent role in the Asian region and fully exploit its new excellent relations with China and the Russian Federation, as well as probably wait for an implosion of the North Korean regime so as to do what West Germany did with East Germany, by incorporating it into its industrial system, almost at zero cost, while also avoiding competition thanks to the parity between the West German mark and the East German mark.

The South Korean President, Park Geun-hye, has gladly accepted the sanctions imposed by the United States on North Korea last February and has particularly emphasized that the economic crisis will tend to make North Korea implode if it does not give up its nuclear program.

Nevertheless it is precisely this military-civilian nuclear system which will enable North Korea to negotiate – maybe directly with the United States – a slow but stable softening of the regime and its return into the mainstream of the world-market.

I do not believe that Russia and China intend to support the US design of a controlled collapse of North Korea, which would destabilize the Chinese province of Liaoning and the whole Yalu River delta, as well as the 78 islands on the river controlled by China.

Russia has no interest in the collapse of the North Korean regime, but it does not even intend to support the US and South Korean pressures to definitively intimidate North Korea.

China has accepted the UN Security Council Resolution 2270 sanctioning Pyongyang. It has also set aside, for posterity, Kim Jong-un’s execution of his uncle Jang Song-Thaek, the privileged channel for relations with China. Finally it does not wish to witness an increase of North Korea’s nuclear technological potential – a system which could even threaten China in the future.

Nevertheless it does not want to run out of cards to be played in the debate on the future of the Korean peninsula, where the United States already have South Korea and China could remain without a point of reference in the region.

Currently winds of war are also blowing on the Korean peninsula.

On June 17 last, North Korea reported the preparation of a long-range military exercise in the US Andersen base in Guam, consisting of a formation of B-52H strategic bombers equipped with nuclear weapons.

Currently the presence of American forces in South Korea amounts to 28,500 soldiers and officers, while the South Korean Armed Forces have a staff of 3,600,000 units with 700,000 active soldiers.

According to the latest data available, North Korea’s armed mass is approximately 1.2 million units.

All analysts agree that a conventional war between South and North Korea would end quickly and easily with the North Korean defeat, since North Korea has almost no air force and has less advanced and refined weapon systems than South Korea’s, possibly supported directly by US forces.

However, it is precisely for this reason that North Korea has developed its nuclear system, so as to make the final attack on its regime difficult or impossible.

Furthermore, on June 13 last, the US nuclear submarine “Mississippi” was spotted in the South Korean port of Pusan.

Also this presence has been interpreted – and not fully unreasonably – as the direct threat of an act of war against North Korea.

The reactions of North Korean nuclear counterattack on the US system are related to the missile control over the Andersen base in Guam and over the other North American bases in the Pacific and to a series of precise counteractions: particularly the use of the KN-08 missile, which can reach the US territory, all the bases of the South Korean Armed Forces, the US bases in the Pacific and the Japanese territory.

Basically North Korea does not want the negotiations to be based on the threat of a conventional war or a US nuclear counterattack to a limited action of North Korea against South Korea.

In this case there is no “proportionality of force” or “reaction,” while the North Korean strategic objective is to be integrated permanently and stably into the market-world without losing its own political autonomy.

Is it possible? I think so. Kim Yong-un’s aim is to bring the United States around the final negotiating table.

Hence the United States could seek support from Russia – which does not want the collapse of North Korea, but its strategic downsizing – and from China, which has no interest in a hypernuclearized North Korea (but the North Korean bombs are often “made in China”) nor in a region experiencing a free-fall economic collapse along its borders.

Hence a new strategic equation is possible, not waiting for the crisis in North Korea as a good opportunity to seize, but managing the soft landing of North Korea in the new system of Asian equilibria.

About the author:
*Professor Giancarlo Elia Valori is an eminent Italian economist and businessman. He holds prestigious academic distinctions and national orders. Mr Valori has lectured on international affairs and economics at the world’s leading universities such as Peking University, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Yeshiva University in New York. He currently chairs “La Centrale Finanziaria Generale Spa”, he is also the honorary president of Huawei Italy, economic adviser to the Chinese giant HNA Group and Khashoggi Holding’s advisor. In 1992 he was appointed Officier de la Légion d’Honneur de la République Francaise, with this motivation: “A man who can see across borders to understand the world” and in 2002 he received the title of “Honorable” of the Académie des Sciences de l’Institut de France.

Source:
This article was published by Modern Diplomacy

TOPICS:ChinaEast AsiaForeign PolicyMilitaryNorth KoreaSouth KoreaUnited States.

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About the Author

Modern Diplomacy

The Modern Diplomacy is a leading European opinion maker - not a pure news-switchboard. Today’s world does not need yet another avalanche of (disheartened and decontextualized) information, it needs shared experience and honestly told opinion. Determined to voice and empower, to argue but not to impose, the MD does not rigidly guard its narrative. Contrary to the majority of media-houses and news platforms, the MD is open to everyone coming with the firm and fair, constructive and foresighted argumentation.
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1 Comment on "The Current North Korean Issue – Analysis"


Hari Sud | July 2, 2016 at 10:42 am | Reply


Korea was artificially divided and kept apart by US military presence and huge propaganda. If US were to leave Korea, there will be one Korea sooner than later. All artificial hostility will disappear. It happened twenty years back when hostile east and west Germany combined. The same could happen in Korea. The key is US departure from Korean Peninsula.



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[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-N...itary-bases-in-latest-messages/4881467743736/

North Korea threatens U.S. military bases in latest messages

The missives are an indication Kim Jong Un is cementing the authority of his regime.

By Elizabeth Shim Contact the Author | July 5, 2016 at 3:17 PM

SEOUL, July 5 (UPI) -- North Korea has increased the number of threats it has issued against the United States, but it has also sent 95 emails and faxed messages to the South requesting a joint conference on unification in August.

Pyongyang's state-controlled news agency KCNA said Tuesday the United States and Japan launched a "criminal joint nuclear attack training exercise" in May, citing the presence of B-52 Stratofortress bombers near South Korea in June.

The United States is set on "maximizing" the risk of nuclear war on the Korean peninsula and therefore is in no position to advocate denuclearization, Pyongyang said.

An article published Saturday in the Workers' Party Rodong Sinmun read, "Even if our sovereignty and right to exist are interfered with at the slightest, we will turn the U.S. imperialist military bases into seas of fire."

North Korea propaganda outlet DPRK Today has also uploaded videos of medium-range ballistic missile launches, and simulations of attacks against the U.S. mainland or U.S. military bases, Yonhap reported.

Ahn Chan-il, a North Korean defector and head of the World Institute for North Korea Studies, said the rising verbal attacks are a sign the Kim Jong Un era has officially begun, and to mark the period of his rule, Pyongyang is "showing off" its foreign and South Korea policy.

Threats, however, have also been accompanied by overtures to Seoul, calling for talks on unification to commemorate the 71st anniversary of independence from Japanese colonial rule.

According to the unification ministry, the government has received 95 messages calling for talks, but the North must first show a willingness to stop provocations and move toward denuclearization, Seoul said.

Video

 

[Housecarl]

Does the phrase "yo yo" come to anyone else's mind?.....

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.ibtimes.com/north-korea-...south-korea-accept-pyongyangs-demands-2389790

North Korea Offers Denuclearization Plan If US, South Korea Accept Pyongyang's Demands

By Suman Varandani @suman09
On 07/07/16 AT 6:56 AM

North Korea has offered a denuclearization plan for the Korean Peninsula if the United States and South Korea accept Pyongyang's demands, Rondong Sinmun newspaper reported Thursday. The report comes a day after the Obama administration slapped sanctions on Kim Jong Un and other North Korean officials over human rights abuses in the reclusive country.

A North Korean government spokesman said that "a major breakthrough is possible" if the U.S. and South Korea give Pyongyang guarantees on five matters, which include providing information about Washington's nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea and pulling out nuclear weapons from bases there, TASS news agency reported, citing Rondong Sinmun.

Pyongyang also demanded a U.S. guarantee that it will not deploy offensive nuclear weapons in South Korea and neighboring countries and will not use them against North Korea.

Neither the U.S. nor South Korea "have any reasons to turn down these fair demands of Pyongyang if they are really interested in solving the nuclear problem of the Korean Peninsula," the spokesman said in a statement, adding that if Washington and Seoul implement these demands, North Korea "will take reciprocal measures promoting denuclearization of this region."

If the demands are not met, Pyongyang will continue to build up its nuclear forces both in terms of quality and quantity, the statement read.

Earlier this week, North Korea criticized the U.S. for its joint military drills with South Korea held between June 13 and 20.

The U.S. sent two B-52 Stratofortress equipped with long-range nuclear air-to-ground missiles, to fly over the skies near South Korea during the drills, which also included the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force. Pyongyang’s official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) said that Japanese planes took part in the exercises targeting North Korea.

Last month, the North Korean foreign ministry accused the U.S. of continuing its “hostile acts” against Pyongyang and pushing it to strengthen its nuclear deterrence against Washington. The foreign ministry said that the country “will continue taking a series of steps for bolstering up the nuclear deterrent for self-defense both in quality and quantity to cope with the ever-escalating U.S. hostile acts against the former.”

 

[Housecarl]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://allthingsnuclear.org/dwright/12349

Blog > All Things Nuclear

Analysis of North Korea’s Musudan Missile Test–Part 2

David Wright, co-director and senior scientist | July 5, 2016, 3:04 pm EDT

In my previous post, I looked at what we could learn about North Korea’s Musudan (Hwasong-10) missile from the lofted flight it launched on June 21. In this post, I look at some other aspects of the test.

Intentionally lofted?

One question has been whether the lofted trajectory the North Korean launch followed was intentional. The Korean news agency KCNA implied it was, saying in a statement “The test-fire of Hwasong-10 was carried out by the high-angle fire system under the simulation of its maximum range.”

In addition, Dave Schmerler at the Monterey Institute pointed out to me that the computer screen on the far right of this photo of Kim Jong Un celebrating after the successful test, shows the lofted trajectory.

http://allthingsnuclear.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Kim-celebrating-test-6-21-16.png

From a higher resolution version of the image, Dave was able to read off two sets of parameter values—one set that appears to be the values intended for the launch and the other the actual values achieved in the launch. They are close to each other and close to the values I find in my calculation of the trajectory. Unless this information was planted in the photo after the launch to hide a malfunction, this strongly suggests this was the intended trajectory.

It’s worth noting again that based on the performance of the missile on this trajectory, it would not have the range to reach Guam. If flown on a standard trajectory, this missile would have a range of roughly 3,000 km, which is less than the 3,400 km distance to Guam. It’s interesting to note that the KCNA statement quoted above says the test simulated the missile’s maximum range.

Testing the heatshield

The lofted trajectory allowed North Korea to test the missile’s guidance and control system, and also to test the reentry heatshield under conditions similar to those the missile would experience during reentry on a standard 3,000 km range trajectory. Those conditions, however, would be significantly less severe than for reentry of a 10,000 km range missile. So based on this test Pyongyang could gain confidence that its reentry vehicle (RV) would work on a 3,000 km range missile, but it would not know whether the heatshield would work on a long-range missile.

Fig. 2 compares the reentry heating on several different trajectories.

http://allthingsnuclear.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Heating-comparison-7-2-16.jpg
Fig. 2 This figure plots ñV3 for reentry in four different cases, where ñ is the atmospheric density and V is the RV’s speed. This quantity is roughly proportional to the heat absorbed per area and per second by the RV. Here â is the ballistic coefficient of the RV. The time scales on the x-axis are the same for the four curves, but the flight time of the missiles is different so the time at which they reenter is different for each missile. “MET” is “minimum-energy trajectory,” which is the standard trajectory used to maximize range.

A reentering warhead accelerates under the force of gravity until it gets low enough in the atmosphere that drag starts to slow it down. The kinetic energy that is lost as it slows is transformed into heating of the air around the warhead. This leads to intense heating of the surface of the RV and causes heat to flow into the interior the RV toward the warhead. The RV heatshield has to be designed to accommodate the very high temperatures at the surface and limit the heat flow to the warhead, which could cause damage.

The rate of heat transfer to the RV goes roughly as ñV3, where ñ is the atmospheric density and V is the velocity of the RV. Since longer range missiles reenter at higher speeds, the heating rate increases rapidly with missile range. In particular, the maximum value of V3 is more than four times larger for reentry of an RV on a 10,000 km range trajectory than on a 3,000 km range trajectory.

Fig. 2 shows plots of ñV3 against time for three different trajectories and two RVs. The peak of the curves gives the maximum heating rate and is related to the maximum temperature the surface of the RV is subjected to. The length of time significant heating occurs is related both to how much heat the RV absorbs and how long the heat has to flow inward from the surface toward the warhead. The other quantity of interest is the total amount of heat absorbed during reentry, which is related to the area under the curves in Fig. 2. That quantity is a measure of the total heat load the heatshield is required to withstand.

The red curve corresponds to the Musudan test on the lofted trajectory. Fig. 2 shows that this trajectory subjects the RV to a somewhat higher peak heating than the Musudan on a standard 3,000 km range trajectory (labeled MET). However, the heating occurs over a somewhat shorter time for the lofted trajectory compared to the standard trajectory, so the total heating is nearly the same in the two cases: 1.1 x1011 J/m2 for the 3,000 km range trajectory compared to 0.93 x1011 J/m2 for the lofted trajectory. So if the heatshield worked on the lofted trajectory it should work on the 3,000 km range trajectory.

However, the same RV on a 10,000 km trajectory (3rd curve from the left) would experience much higher peak heating than the red curve. Its total heating of 2.5 x1011 J/m2 is more than two and a half times larger than experienced by the Musudan.

North Korea could reduce the heating on a long-range missile by making the RV much more blunt, so that the higher drag would slow it at higher altitudes. That would mean the atmospheric density ñ would be small when the velocity V is largest.

In particular, North Korea could design an RV with a lower weight-to-drag ratio, also called the ballistic coefficient (â). The calculations for the three curves on the left in Fig. 2 assume â = 1000 lb/ft2 (48,000 N/m2), which appears to be a good estimate for the RV seen in pictures of the Musudan (this assumes a mass of 650 kg and drag coefficient at high speeds of about 0.15). If instead the North increased the drag of the RV to give â = 400 lb/ft2 (19,000 N/m2), the total heating on a standard 10,000 km range trajectory would be 1.0 x1011 J/m2, which is similar to the heating on the Musudan above.

However, increasing the drag can significantly reduce the accuracy of the missile since its slower reentry speed means the atmospheric forces that pull the RV off its intended trajectory act on the RV for a longer time. The resulting inaccuracy could be many tens of kilometers, which may still be adequate for hitting a large city but could reduce confidence in using the missile.

Instead, to reduce the inaccuracies of a long-range missile, North Korea would likely want to reduce the drag and increase â to allow the RV to pass through the atmosphere more quickly. Modern US RVs have values of â in the range of 2,000-3,000 lb/ft2 (100,000-150,000 N/m2). However, if North Korea increased â for its long-range missile warhead to 1500 lb/ft2 (72,000 N/m2) the peak heating would be much higher and the total heat would increase to 3.6 x1011 J/m2; this case is shown by the curve on the right in Fig. 2. (The total heat for a given range scales roughly with â.)

(For more information on atmospheric heating at high speeds, see here, p. 149-50).

 

[Possible Impact]

NorthKoreaRealTime ‏@BuckTurgidson79 2h
DPRK broadcasted indecipherable five-digit number segments
during a radio segment on Friday, not done in 16 years
http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/Article.aspx?aid=302147 …



NorthKoreaRealTime ‏@BuckTurgidson79 3h
Kyodo reports DPRK to conduct 5th nuke test this month,
notes installation of an observatory facility at test site
http://world.kbs.co.kr/english/news/news_IK_detail.htm?No=120457&id=IK …

 

[Ractivist]

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://allthingsnuclear.org/dwright/12349

Blog > All Things Nuclear

Analysis of North Korea’s Musudan Missile Test–Part 2

David Wright, co-director and senior scientist | July 5, 2016, 3:04 pm EDT

In my previous post, I looked at what we could learn about North Korea’s Musudan (Hwasong-10) missile from the lofted flight it launched on June 21. In this post, I look at some other aspects of the test.

Intentionally lofted?

One question has been whether the lofted trajectory the North Korean launch followed was intentional. The Korean news agency KCNA implied it was, saying in a statement “The test-fire of Hwasong-10 was carried out by the high-angle fire system under the simulation of its maximum range.”

In addition, Dave Schmerler at the Monterey Institute pointed out to me that the computer screen on the far right of this photo of Kim Jong Un celebrating after the successful test, shows the lofted trajectory.

http://allthingsnuclear.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Kim-celebrating-test-6-21-16.png

From a higher resolution version of the image, Dave was able to read off two sets of parameter values—one set that appears to be the values intended for the launch and the other the actual values achieved in the launch. They are close to each other and close to the values I find in my calculation of the trajectory. Unless this information was planted in the photo after the launch to hide a malfunction, this strongly suggests this was the intended trajectory.

It’s worth noting again that based on the performance of the missile on this trajectory, it would not have the range to reach Guam. If flown on a standard trajectory, this missile would have a range of roughly 3,000 km, which is less than the 3,400 km distance to Guam. It’s interesting to note that the KCNA statement quoted above says the test simulated the missile’s maximum range.

Testing the heatshield

The lofted trajectory allowed North Korea to test the missile’s guidance and control system, and also to test the reentry heatshield under conditions similar to those the missile would experience during reentry on a standard 3,000 km range trajectory. Those conditions, however, would be significantly less severe than for reentry of a 10,000 km range missile. So based on this test Pyongyang could gain confidence that its reentry vehicle (RV) would work on a 3,000 km range missile, but it would not know whether the heatshield would work on a long-range missile.

Fig. 2 compares the reentry heating on several different trajectories.

http://allthingsnuclear.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Heating-comparison-7-2-16.jpg
Fig. 2 This figure plots ñV3 for reentry in four different cases, where ñ is the atmospheric density and V is the RV’s speed. This quantity is roughly proportional to the heat absorbed per area and per second by the RV. Here â is the ballistic coefficient of the RV. The time scales on the x-axis are the same for the four curves, but the flight time of the missiles is different so the time at which they reenter is different for each missile. “MET” is “minimum-energy trajectory,” which is the standard trajectory used to maximize range.

A reentering warhead accelerates under the force of gravity until it gets low enough in the atmosphere that drag starts to slow it down. The kinetic energy that is lost as it slows is transformed into heating of the air around the warhead. This leads to intense heating of the surface of the RV and causes heat to flow into the interior the RV toward the warhead. The RV heatshield has to be designed to accommodate the very high temperatures at the surface and limit the heat flow to the warhead, which could cause damage.

The rate of heat transfer to the RV goes roughly as ñV3, where ñ is the atmospheric density and V is the velocity of the RV. Since longer range missiles reenter at higher speeds, the heating rate increases rapidly with missile range. In particular, the maximum value of V3 is more than four times larger for reentry of an RV on a 10,000 km range trajectory than on a 3,000 km range trajectory.

Fig. 2 shows plots of ñV3 against time for three different trajectories and two RVs. The peak of the curves gives the maximum heating rate and is related to the maximum temperature the surface of the RV is subjected to. The length of time significant heating occurs is related both to how much heat the RV absorbs and how long the heat has to flow inward from the surface toward the warhead. The other quantity of interest is the total amount of heat absorbed during reentry, which is related to the area under the curves in Fig. 2. That quantity is a measure of the total heat load the heatshield is required to withstand.

The red curve corresponds to the Musudan test on the lofted trajectory. Fig. 2 shows that this trajectory subjects the RV to a somewhat higher peak heating than the Musudan on a standard 3,000 km range trajectory (labeled MET). However, the heating occurs over a somewhat shorter time for the lofted trajectory compared to the standard trajectory, so the total heating is nearly the same in the two cases: 1.1 x1011 J/m2 for the 3,000 km range trajectory compared to 0.93 x1011 J/m2 for the lofted trajectory. So if the heatshield worked on the lofted trajectory it should work on the 3,000 km range trajectory.

However, the same RV on a 10,000 km trajectory (3rd curve from the left) would experience much higher peak heating than the red curve. Its total heating of 2.5 x1011 J/m2 is more than two and a half times larger than experienced by the Musudan.

North Korea could reduce the heating on a long-range missile by making the RV much more blunt, so that the higher drag would slow it at higher altitudes. That would mean the atmospheric density ñ would be small when the velocity V is largest.

In particular, North Korea could design an RV with a lower weight-to-drag ratio, also called the ballistic coefficient (â). The calculations for the three curves on the left in Fig. 2 assume â = 1000 lb/ft2 (48,000 N/m2), which appears to be a good estimate for the RV seen in pictures of the Musudan (this assumes a mass of 650 kg and drag coefficient at high speeds of about 0.15). If instead the North increased the drag of the RV to give â = 400 lb/ft2 (19,000 N/m2), the total heating on a standard 10,000 km range trajectory would be 1.0 x1011 J/m2, which is similar to the heating on the Musudan above.

However, increasing the drag can significantly reduce the accuracy of the missile since its slower reentry speed means the atmospheric forces that pull the RV off its intended trajectory act on the RV for a longer time. The resulting inaccuracy could be many tens of kilometers, which may still be adequate for hitting a large city but could reduce confidence in using the missile.

Instead, to reduce the inaccuracies of a long-range missile, North Korea would likely want to reduce the drag and increase â to allow the RV to pass through the atmosphere more quickly. Modern US RVs have values of â in the range of 2,000-3,000 lb/ft2 (100,000-150,000 N/m2). However, if North Korea increased â for its long-range missile warhead to 1500 lb/ft2 (72,000 N/m2) the peak heating would be much higher and the total heat would increase to 3.6 x1011 J/m2; this case is shown by the curve on the right in Fig. 2. (The total heat for a given range scales roughly with â.)

(For more information on atmospheric heating at high speeds, see here, p. 149-50).

You gotta love that pic. Instead of a variety of displays, we have lighted dots on the wall........ looks cool.

He may trigger some things. It's more likely he does it from a container launched nuke or three.... and then a couple others.