WAR CHINA THREATENS TO INVADE TAIWAN
- Thread starter danielboon
- Start date
Who said anything about launching a "jet".....
danielboon
TB Fanatic
End game did. We would launch a lot more than 1 jet it would be a very bright day if it happens. Let's hope not
My bad, I meant to emphasize the singular quantity as well as the vehicle involved.
AlfaMan
Has No Life - Lives on TB
The Chinese Badgers are their only bombers, essentially. The only ones that could carry any load to speak of. The cruise missiles they currently carry are not much better than a 1950's era Matador.
The ROC will drop the Badger armada like a bad habit.
Posted for fair use.....
www.thedrive.com
Taiwan Displays Air-Launched Cruise Missiles At Air Base In Heart Of Taiwan Strait
Taiwan’s air force is fielding air-launched cruise missiles on the island chain of Penghu, which occupies a strategic position in the Taiwan Strait.
By Thomas NewdickSeptember 22, 2020
TAIWAN TV NEWS SCREENCAP
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During a visit to the Republic of China Air Force’s Makung Air Force Base on the Penghu archipelago, on September 22, 2020, Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen was shown a display of Wan Chien conventionally-armed air-launched land-attack cruise missiles. The weapons are carried exclusively by the air force’s fleet of F-CK-1C/D Indigenous Defense Fighters (IDF) that are deployed to Makung AFB on a rotational basis.
Tsai took the opportunity to praise Republic of China Air Force (ROCAF) aircrew stationed on Penghu for their “heroic performance” in intercepting aircraft from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) over the Strait — an activity that’s become a more regular occurrence in recent weeks.
Chinese Fighters Cross Into Taiwan’s Side Of The Strait As High-Level U.S. Visit Begins
By Jamie Hunter and Tyler Rogoway Posted in The War Zone
Taiwanese F-16s Begin Flying Patrols With Live Harpoon Anti-Ship Missiles To Deter China
By Jamie Hunter Posted in The War Zone
Taiwanese Fighters Drive Off Chinese Jets After Navy Transport Plane Flies Over The Island
By Joseph Trevithick Posted in The War Zone
Taiwan Wants Land-Based Harpoon Anti-Ship Missiles To Counter Growing Chinese Naval Power
By Joseph Trevithick Posted in The War Zone
It's Official! Trump Admin Sends Taiwan F-16 Deal To Congress, Here's What's In It (Updated)
By Tyler Rogoway Posted in The War Zone
“I’m aware that facing the provocative behavior of the communist planes that have encircled the island and damaged regional peace in recent days, your duty at the front line of the airspace in Penghu must be even heavier,” the president told ROCAF personnel at Makung AFB.
TAIWAN TV NEWS SCREENCAP
President Tsai Ing-wen addresses ROCAF personnel in a hangar at Makung AFB on the Penghu Islands.
The significance of the indigenous Wan Chien missile within the ROCAF armory in particular is its ability to be launched from F-CK-1C/Ds operating above the Taiwan Strait and hit targets on the Chinese mainland. Basing jets on Penghu — a group of 64 islands between Taiwan and mainland China — brings them even closer to the PRC and provides a useful forward location to counter any potential invasion from across the Strait. Of course, it is arguable exactly how long the air base at Makung would survive in the case of an all-out attack by the PLA, which is well equipped with ballistic and cruise missiles tailored for just such strikes.
GOOGLE EARTH
Makung AFB on the island of the same name within the Penghu archipelago.
A ROCAF officer at Makung AFB told the Reuters agency that the IDF jets are required to scramble to intercept PLA aircraft within five minutes. Another official confirmed that the fighter jets stationed on Penghu are currently being launched “almost every day” in response to PLA aircraft activity.
Makung AFB is home to detachments of F-CK-1C/Ds drawn from either the 1st Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW) or 3rd TFW, based on the main island of Taiwan and which are usually forward-deployed to Penghu between April and October each year.
View: https://youtu.be/W2dCFUIEqKE
In peacetime, the presence of the Wan Chien missiles on Penghu is in keeping with Taiwan’s strategy of presenting Beijing with a credible deterrent, and should that deterrent fail, they would help defend against a PLA attack and possible invasion, during which their likely targets would include airfields, ports, missile sites, and radar stations. The missile’s standoff capability would allow it to be launched outside the range of many of the PLA’s ground-based air defense systems.
GOOGLE MAPS
The location of Penghu in the Taiwan Strait, between Taiwan and the Chinese mainland.
These missiles, which first entered service in 2018, have a reported range of 155 miles and use GPS guidance. The Wan Chien — the name means ‘ten thousand swords’ — is broadly similar in appearance to MBDA’s Taurus KEPD 350, with similar pop-out wings located at the top of the missile body, but with the air intake for the turbojet motor located below the rear section of the weapon. The missile can reportedly accommodate a range of different warhead options, comprising high-explosive, semi-armor-piercing, or submunitions.
As well as the Wan Chien missiles on display on Penghu, which have a primary land-attack role, live AGM-84 Harpoon anti-ship missiles have also recently been seen carried by ROCAF F-16 fighters, as The War Zone discussed here.
WIKIMEDIA COMMONS
A single-seat F-CK-1C fighter armed with a pair of Wan Chien missiles under the wings.
Produced by the military-run Chung Shan Institute of Science and Technology (CSIST), the Wan Chien missile is an important part of a wide-ranging upgrade program that has been undertaken for the ROCAF F-CK-1 fighter fleet, which numbers 103 single-seat F-CK-1C and 26 twin-seat F-CK-1D aircraft, according to Flight International’s World Air Forces 2020 survey. The upgraded aircraft is officially known as Hsiung Ying, meaning ‘Brave Hawk.’
The president’s visit to the islands was clearly timed as a response to the notable increase in the antagonism between Taiwan and the PRC, as well as a spike in aerial activity by both nations over the Taiwan Strait.
The PRC views Taiwan as a rogue province and both political and military tensions between the island and the mainland have ramped up significantly in recent years.
Under the Trump Administration, the United States has intensified its military relationship with Taiwan. The current U.S. administration has secured unprecedented arms deals with the country, including the purchase of new Block 70 F-16C/D fighter jets for the ROCAF, and further weapons sales are anticipated.
ROCAF
An infographic that the Taiwanese Air Force released in 2019 regarding its future Block 70 F-16C/D Viper fighter jets, with the message "See You Soon!"
The PLA’s recent maneuvers near Taiwan have been seen as a response to the visit to Taipei by Keith Krach, an economic representative from the U.S. government, described as “the highest-level official from the State Department to visit the island in decades.”
Increased Chinese military activity around Taiwan has included high-profile incidents in which PLA aircraft have crossed the median line in the Taiwan Strait that separates the highly sensitive channel and acts as an unofficial airspace boundary between the mainland and the island.
However, Wang Wenbin, a spokesperson for the PRC’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, recently argued that “The so-called ‘median line’ is non-existent,” adding that Taiwan itself “is an inalienable part of China’s territory.”
Taiwan’s Foreign Minister Joseph Wu responded by describing the line as a “symbol of the status quo to avoid cross-strait military conflict and maintain peace and stability.” He further demanded that “the Chinese government stops everything that it has been doing.”
While PLA aircraft entering Taiwanese airspace is not in itself unusual, the latest incidents have involved more assets than in the past and these have been approaching the area from different directions simultaneously.
Apparently in response to Krach’s visit to Taiwan, a force of 18 PLA aircraft crossed the median line on September 18, then entered the island’s air defense identification zone (ADIZ). The PLA aircraft included a pair of PLAAF H-6K bombers, at least one of which was carrying four YJ-12 anti-ship missiles. Also involved were eight J-16 fighter-bombers, four J-10 fighters, and four J-11 fighters.
ROCAF
A PLAAF H-6K from the 10th Bomber Division carrying four YJ-12 anti-ship missiles during a flight over the Taiwan Strait.
Other officials in Beijing have also been reiterating the PRC’s claims to Taiwan, official news agency Xinhua quoting Ren Guoqiang, a spokesperson for the country’s Ministry of National Defense, as saying these exercises are “a necessary move aimed at the current situation in the Taiwan Strait to safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity.” Ren then issued the warning: “Those who play with fire will get burnt.”
In a statement on Twitter, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense called for Beijing to “exercise restraint and refrain from escalating tensions across the Taiwan Straits. PLA’s military intimidation is deplorable and has caused resentment amongst people in Taiwan. We call on PRC cherish peace and maintain regional stability [sic].”
A day later, September 19, the PLA was again back in force in the region, its aircraft crossing the median line and entering Taiwan’s southwest ADIZ. On this occasion, the aircraft involved were 12 J-16s, two J-10s, two J-11s, two H-6s, and a single Y-8 anti-submarine warfare aircraft. The Republic of China Air Force said it responded by issuing radio warnings and scrambling fighters and that it “deployed [an] air defense missile system to monitor the activities.”
TAIWAN MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
Flight paths of the PLA aircraft that crossed the median line in the Taiwan Strait and entered Taiwan’s southwest ADIZ on September 19, 2020.
The massed deployment of aircraft in the region is a tactic that Beijing has used before to demonstrate its displeasure with U.S. activity relating to the island. Back in August 2020, formations of J-10 and J-11 fighters also crossed the median line, on that occasion apparently in response to a high-level visit to Taiwan by the U.S. Health and Human Services Secretary Alex Azar.
Clearly, the war of words between the PRC and Taiwan has escalated and, with it, Taiwan’s eagerness to demonstrate the high-tech weapons that it sees as an essential counterbalance to Beijing’s territorial ambitions.
Contact the author: thomas@the drive.com
Taiwan Displays Air-Launched Cruise Missiles At Air Base In Heart Of Taiwan Strait
Taiwan’s air force is fielding air-launched cruise missiles on the island chain of Penghu, which occupies a strategic position in the Taiwan Strait.
www.thedrive.com
Taiwan Displays Air-Launched Cruise Missiles At Air Base In Heart Of Taiwan Strait
Taiwan’s air force is fielding air-launched cruise missiles on the island chain of Penghu, which occupies a strategic position in the Taiwan Strait.
By Thomas NewdickSeptember 22, 2020
SHARE
During a visit to the Republic of China Air Force’s Makung Air Force Base on the Penghu archipelago, on September 22, 2020, Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen was shown a display of Wan Chien conventionally-armed air-launched land-attack cruise missiles. The weapons are carried exclusively by the air force’s fleet of F-CK-1C/D Indigenous Defense Fighters (IDF) that are deployed to Makung AFB on a rotational basis.
Tsai took the opportunity to praise Republic of China Air Force (ROCAF) aircrew stationed on Penghu for their “heroic performance” in intercepting aircraft from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) over the Strait — an activity that’s become a more regular occurrence in recent weeks.
Chinese Fighters Cross Into Taiwan’s Side Of The Strait As High-Level U.S. Visit Begins
By Jamie Hunter and Tyler Rogoway Posted in The War Zone
Taiwanese F-16s Begin Flying Patrols With Live Harpoon Anti-Ship Missiles To Deter China
By Jamie Hunter Posted in The War Zone
Taiwanese Fighters Drive Off Chinese Jets After Navy Transport Plane Flies Over The Island
By Joseph Trevithick Posted in The War Zone
Taiwan Wants Land-Based Harpoon Anti-Ship Missiles To Counter Growing Chinese Naval Power
By Joseph Trevithick Posted in The War Zone
It's Official! Trump Admin Sends Taiwan F-16 Deal To Congress, Here's What's In It (Updated)
By Tyler Rogoway Posted in The War Zone
“I’m aware that facing the provocative behavior of the communist planes that have encircled the island and damaged regional peace in recent days, your duty at the front line of the airspace in Penghu must be even heavier,” the president told ROCAF personnel at Makung AFB.
TAIWAN TV NEWS SCREENCAP
President Tsai Ing-wen addresses ROCAF personnel in a hangar at Makung AFB on the Penghu Islands.
The significance of the indigenous Wan Chien missile within the ROCAF armory in particular is its ability to be launched from F-CK-1C/Ds operating above the Taiwan Strait and hit targets on the Chinese mainland. Basing jets on Penghu — a group of 64 islands between Taiwan and mainland China — brings them even closer to the PRC and provides a useful forward location to counter any potential invasion from across the Strait. Of course, it is arguable exactly how long the air base at Makung would survive in the case of an all-out attack by the PLA, which is well equipped with ballistic and cruise missiles tailored for just such strikes.
GOOGLE EARTH
Makung AFB on the island of the same name within the Penghu archipelago.
A ROCAF officer at Makung AFB told the Reuters agency that the IDF jets are required to scramble to intercept PLA aircraft within five minutes. Another official confirmed that the fighter jets stationed on Penghu are currently being launched “almost every day” in response to PLA aircraft activity.
Makung AFB is home to detachments of F-CK-1C/Ds drawn from either the 1st Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW) or 3rd TFW, based on the main island of Taiwan and which are usually forward-deployed to Penghu between April and October each year.
In peacetime, the presence of the Wan Chien missiles on Penghu is in keeping with Taiwan’s strategy of presenting Beijing with a credible deterrent, and should that deterrent fail, they would help defend against a PLA attack and possible invasion, during which their likely targets would include airfields, ports, missile sites, and radar stations. The missile’s standoff capability would allow it to be launched outside the range of many of the PLA’s ground-based air defense systems.
GOOGLE MAPS
The location of Penghu in the Taiwan Strait, between Taiwan and the Chinese mainland.
These missiles, which first entered service in 2018, have a reported range of 155 miles and use GPS guidance. The Wan Chien — the name means ‘ten thousand swords’ — is broadly similar in appearance to MBDA’s Taurus KEPD 350, with similar pop-out wings located at the top of the missile body, but with the air intake for the turbojet motor located below the rear section of the weapon. The missile can reportedly accommodate a range of different warhead options, comprising high-explosive, semi-armor-piercing, or submunitions.
As well as the Wan Chien missiles on display on Penghu, which have a primary land-attack role, live AGM-84 Harpoon anti-ship missiles have also recently been seen carried by ROCAF F-16 fighters, as The War Zone discussed here.
WIKIMEDIA COMMONS
A single-seat F-CK-1C fighter armed with a pair of Wan Chien missiles under the wings.
Produced by the military-run Chung Shan Institute of Science and Technology (CSIST), the Wan Chien missile is an important part of a wide-ranging upgrade program that has been undertaken for the ROCAF F-CK-1 fighter fleet, which numbers 103 single-seat F-CK-1C and 26 twin-seat F-CK-1D aircraft, according to Flight International’s World Air Forces 2020 survey. The upgraded aircraft is officially known as Hsiung Ying, meaning ‘Brave Hawk.’
The president’s visit to the islands was clearly timed as a response to the notable increase in the antagonism between Taiwan and the PRC, as well as a spike in aerial activity by both nations over the Taiwan Strait.
The PRC views Taiwan as a rogue province and both political and military tensions between the island and the mainland have ramped up significantly in recent years.
Under the Trump Administration, the United States has intensified its military relationship with Taiwan. The current U.S. administration has secured unprecedented arms deals with the country, including the purchase of new Block 70 F-16C/D fighter jets for the ROCAF, and further weapons sales are anticipated.
ROCAF
An infographic that the Taiwanese Air Force released in 2019 regarding its future Block 70 F-16C/D Viper fighter jets, with the message "See You Soon!"
The PLA’s recent maneuvers near Taiwan have been seen as a response to the visit to Taipei by Keith Krach, an economic representative from the U.S. government, described as “the highest-level official from the State Department to visit the island in decades.”
Increased Chinese military activity around Taiwan has included high-profile incidents in which PLA aircraft have crossed the median line in the Taiwan Strait that separates the highly sensitive channel and acts as an unofficial airspace boundary between the mainland and the island.
However, Wang Wenbin, a spokesperson for the PRC’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, recently argued that “The so-called ‘median line’ is non-existent,” adding that Taiwan itself “is an inalienable part of China’s territory.”
Taiwan’s Foreign Minister Joseph Wu responded by describing the line as a “symbol of the status quo to avoid cross-strait military conflict and maintain peace and stability.” He further demanded that “the Chinese government stops everything that it has been doing.”
While PLA aircraft entering Taiwanese airspace is not in itself unusual, the latest incidents have involved more assets than in the past and these have been approaching the area from different directions simultaneously.
Apparently in response to Krach’s visit to Taiwan, a force of 18 PLA aircraft crossed the median line on September 18, then entered the island’s air defense identification zone (ADIZ). The PLA aircraft included a pair of PLAAF H-6K bombers, at least one of which was carrying four YJ-12 anti-ship missiles. Also involved were eight J-16 fighter-bombers, four J-10 fighters, and four J-11 fighters.
ROCAF
A PLAAF H-6K from the 10th Bomber Division carrying four YJ-12 anti-ship missiles during a flight over the Taiwan Strait.
Other officials in Beijing have also been reiterating the PRC’s claims to Taiwan, official news agency Xinhua quoting Ren Guoqiang, a spokesperson for the country’s Ministry of National Defense, as saying these exercises are “a necessary move aimed at the current situation in the Taiwan Strait to safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity.” Ren then issued the warning: “Those who play with fire will get burnt.”
In a statement on Twitter, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense called for Beijing to “exercise restraint and refrain from escalating tensions across the Taiwan Straits. PLA’s military intimidation is deplorable and has caused resentment amongst people in Taiwan. We call on PRC cherish peace and maintain regional stability [sic].”
A day later, September 19, the PLA was again back in force in the region, its aircraft crossing the median line and entering Taiwan’s southwest ADIZ. On this occasion, the aircraft involved were 12 J-16s, two J-10s, two J-11s, two H-6s, and a single Y-8 anti-submarine warfare aircraft. The Republic of China Air Force said it responded by issuing radio warnings and scrambling fighters and that it “deployed [an] air defense missile system to monitor the activities.”
TAIWAN MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
Flight paths of the PLA aircraft that crossed the median line in the Taiwan Strait and entered Taiwan’s southwest ADIZ on September 19, 2020.
The massed deployment of aircraft in the region is a tactic that Beijing has used before to demonstrate its displeasure with U.S. activity relating to the island. Back in August 2020, formations of J-10 and J-11 fighters also crossed the median line, on that occasion apparently in response to a high-level visit to Taiwan by the U.S. Health and Human Services Secretary Alex Azar.
Clearly, the war of words between the PRC and Taiwan has escalated and, with it, Taiwan’s eagerness to demonstrate the high-tech weapons that it sees as an essential counterbalance to Beijing’s territorial ambitions.
Contact the author: thomas@the drive.com
Posted for fair use.....
Hong Niao Series (HN-1/-2/-3) | Missile Threat
The Hong Niao series (HN-1/-2/-3) of short- and intermediate-range cruise missiles began development in the late 1970s. These ground-, ship-, submarine-, and air-launched cruise missiles were initially based on designs of the X-600, similar to the HY-2 Silkworm. The primary goal of the HN series...
missilethreat.csis.org
Hong Niao Series (HN-1/-2/-3)
- Home
- World Missiles
- China
- Hong Niao Series (HN-1/-2/-3)
The Hong Niao series (HN-1/-2/-3) of short- and intermediate-range cruise missiles began development in the late 1970s. These ground-, ship-, submarine-, and air-launched cruise missiles were initially based on designs of the X-600, similar to the HY-2 Silkworm. The primary goal of the HN series was to create a nuclear-capable cruise missile with a range of 3,000 km.1
Hong Niao Series at a Glance
Originated From: People’s Republic of China (PRC)
Possessed By: People’s Republic of China (PRC)
Alternate Name: Hongniao, Red Bird, DH-10, X-600, HN-1A, HN-1B, CJ-10, YH-4, HN-2A, HN-2B, HN-2C, HN-3A, HN-3B, HN-3C, C-602
Class: Subsonic cruise missile
Basing: Ground/ship/air/submarine-launched
Length: 6.4 m (7.2 m with boost motor)
Diameter: 0.5 m
Launch Weight: 1,200 kg
Payload: Single warhead
Warhead: 400 kg HE or submunitions, 20-90 kT nuclear
Propulsion: Turbojet (HN-1), Turbofan (HN-2/-3)
Range: 600-3000 km
Status: Operational
In Service: 1996
Hong Niao 1
The maximum range of the ground-launched version, designated HN-1A, is 600 km. The maximum range of the air-launched version, designated HN-1B, is 650 km. The missile cruises at around Mach 0.8 at an altitude of 20 m. The HN-1A version is believed to be launched from a Transporter-Erector-Launch (TEL) vehicle that is capable of carrying three missiles. The HN-1B version is air-launched from B-6D bombers, each of which carries two to four missiles. Flight tests for the HN-1A started 1988, and is believed to have entered service around 1996. The air-launched HN-1B was first reported in June 2001, and is thought to entered into service a year later.3
Hong Niao 2
The HN-2 is widely believed to be based on reverse engineered U.S. Tomahawk technology. The engine for the HN-2 may be based on the Russian Omsk OKB-designed TRDD-50 engine that is used in both the Kh55 (AS-15) and RK-55 (SS-N-21) missiles. The primary improvement over the HN-1 missiles is an increase in range. The ground and ship-launched versions (HN-2A, HN-2B) both have a range of 1,800 km. A third version, the HN-2C, is submarine-launched and has a range of 1,400 km. Other improvements and changes include the following: a body diameter of 0.7 m, an increase in launch weight to 1,400 kg, an accuracy improvement to 5 m CEP, and an overall improvement of various systems including the guidance, engine, airframe, and wing design.4 The HN-2 was first flight tested in 1995 and entered into service in 2002.5
A U.S. report from 2010 stated that China possesses 200 to 500 nuclear armed operational HN-2 missiles.6
Hong Niao 3
The HN-3 series of cruise missiles is likely based on the Russian AS-15B Kent and U.S. Tomahawk technologies. The HN-3A is a ground- or ship-launched missile with a maximum range of 3,000 km. A second variant, known as HN-3B, is submarine-launched and has a maximum range of 2,200 km. Other improvements and changes include a slight increase in body diameter to 0.75 m, an increased launch weight to 1,800 kg, and an increase in accuracy to 5 m CEP.7 The HN-3 was first flight tested in 1999 and entered into service in 2007.8
Last Updated: 11.26.2019
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Missile Defense Project, "Hong Niao Series (HN-1/-2/-3)," Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 12, 2016, last modified November 26, 2019, Hong Niao Series (HN-1/-2/-3) | Missile Threat.
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YJ-18 | Missile Threat
The YJ-18 is a Chinese cruise missile capable of antiship and land-attack missions. It is reportedly derived from the Russian 3M-54E “Klub” missile.
missilethreat.csis.org
YJ-18
- Home
- World Missiles
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- YJ-18
The YJ-18 (Yingji [Eagle Strike]-18) is a Chinese cruise missile with variants for antiship and land-attack missions. It is reportedly derived from the Russian 3M-54E “Klub” missile and entered service around 2014.1
YJ-18 at a Glance
Originated From: China
Possessed By: China
Alternative Names: CH-SS-NX-13
Class: Cruise Missile
Basing: Ship, submarine, and ground
Length: <8.2 m (inc. booster)
Diameter: 0.514 m
Launch Weight: <1,579 kg
Payload: 140-300 kg
Warhead: High-explosive or antiradiation
Speed: Mach 0.8 (cruising), Mach 2.5-3.0 (terminal)
Guidance: Satellite navigation and radar guidance
Range: 220-540 km
Status: Operational
In Service: 2014
-
YJ-18 fired from Type 052D Destroyer. Photo: Sina News -
The YJ-18 anti-ship missile. Source: PLA -
Possible ground-launched YJ-18 variant spotted in China, 2015. Photo: Sina News
The YJ-18 was developed by the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC) Third Academy starting around the mid-1990s.2 In 2009, references to the YJ-18 program surfaced in Chinese documents exploring metallurgical requirements.3 Among the first U.S. sources to discuss YJ-18 development was an August 2010 report which referred to the missile as the “CH-SS-NX-13.”4 The missile was finalized in 2013 and entered service in 2014.5 China first displayed the YJ-18 on state media in 2014 and again during a military parade in 2019.6
The YJ-18’s specifications represent a notable improvement over China’s older ASCMs, possessing two and three times the range of the earlier 3M-54 and YJ-83, respectively. The YJ-18’s range and lethality supports China’s broader “anti-access, area-denial” (A2/AD) strategy to defeat U.S. forces in a regional military conflict.7 According to one report, the YJ-18 was “specifically designed to defeat the Aegis Combat System.”8 Consequently, the People’s Liberation Army plans to deploy the YJ-18 on its submarines and surface ships. The missile may also replace the YJ-62 fielded by ground-based coastal defense units.9
YJ-18 Specifications
The YJ-18 is an antiship cruise missile bearing a close external resemblance to the supersonic 3M-54E. Though its physical dimensions remain unknown, the YJ-18 likely approximates the 3M-54E’s 8.2 m length, 0.514 m diameter, and 1,579 kg weight, though one report claims it is shorter and lighter.10
Like the 3M-54E, the YJ-18 features a multistage propulsion system, using an air-breathing engine to cruise at Mach 0.8 and a solid rocket booster to travel at Mach 2.5 – 3.0 in a terminal dash to its target.11 The YJ-18 has an estimated range of 220 to 540 km while carrying a 150 to 300 kg payload.12 The missile can fly at sea-skimming altitudes, using a combination of satellite navigation (Beidou) and an active radar seeker for guidance.13
YJ-18 Variants
China has developed several YJ-18 variants, primarily differentiated by their respective launch platforms.
YJ-18
The first production model. It was designed to launch from submarine torpedo tubes for antiship missions, and may have a shorter range than later variants. It entered service in 2015.
YJ-18A
A model designed to fit shipboard vertical launch systems (VLS). It is fitted aboard the Luyang III-class destroyer and Renhai-class cruiser. It entered service in 2015.
YJ-18B
A submarine-launched variant designed for land-attack missions. It fits in VLS tubes aboard the Song-class SS, Yuan-class SSP, and Shang-class SSN. It entered service between 2016-2019.
YJ-18C
A March 2019 report said that China was developing the YJ-18C, a land-attack variant designed to deploy in commercial shipping containers.14 Russia has developed a similar containerized launch system for its 3M-54 Klub-K missile, which fits four missiles into a single container.15
Coastal Defense Variant
Images suggest China also deploys a truck-based YJ-18 variant for coastal defense, although U.S. government sources have not confirmed this development.16 It reportedly entered service around 2015. China may also be developing an aircraft-launched variant as well.17
Service History
In April 2015, the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence confirmed that the YJ-18 entered entered service with the People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN).18 The missile now reportedly equips:19
- Luyang III (Type 052D)-class destroyer
- Renhai (Type 055)-clas cruiser
- Song (Type 093)-class SS
- Yuan (Type 041)-class SSP
- Shang (Type-093)-class SSN
Last Updated: 06.25.2020
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Missile Defense Project, "YJ-18," Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 25, 2020, last modified June 25, 2020, YJ-18 | Missile Threat.
Walrus Whisperer
Hope in chains...
Walrus Whisperer
Hope in chains...
I'm STILL waiting for that damn dam to break!
Can you say "Bataan"/"Task Force Smith"? 4 divisions of a maneuver based military stuck on an island in the nuclear era doesn't bode well unless you're going to openly back it with nukes and give the theater command carte blanc. With the way Beijing is acting you would never get the chance to build up to that.
they've never tested anything, however covertly. hard to believe they could do the entire fuel to weapons process without anyone calling them out on it.
northern watch
TB Fanatic
I do not think that the US has five times the number of nukes that China has. The US has more nukes than China, China is catching up
northern watch
TB Fanatic
There is no way China would allow 4 divisions to be based on Taiwan, the US would be lucky to get a few anti-missile batteries in place before war breaks out
AlfaMan
Has No Life - Lives on TB
We have nuke testing going on on regular basis. And we don't explode a single nuke.
I think the ROC could do it-they had a covert program running for a number of years with (covert) US help.
Yeah. Key historical examples are the South African, Swedish and Swiss nuclear programs as well as the early US program during and post Manhattan, the French and British as well.
i suppose a modern version of a u-235 or smaller little man weapon would be pretty easy if you had the metal. no testing needed really.
danielboon
TB Fanatic
#China declares (again) "Taiwan is an inalienable part of China's territory" and that recent aircraft drills over the Taiwan Straits target "foreign interference & Taiwan independence secessionists." This will likely get uglier sooner rather than later http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2020-09/24/content_9908284.htm
Exactly. Between 1945 and 1952 the "gun type" weapon was shrunk from a 10000 lb "nuclear IED" to an 850 lb artillery shell, both with the same 15 Kt yield. Imagine what you could come up with now.....
Hummm.......
Posted for fair use.....
www.usni.org
Desperate Gambles of Dictators: The Taiwan Strait
Proceedings recently asked several frequent contributors how the next conflict might start. This essay is the latest in the series.
By Captain Sam J. Tangredi, U.S. Navy (Ret.)
September 2020
Proceedings
Vol. 146/9/1,411
March 1982. Buenos Aires, Argentina.
The military junta ruling Argentina was losing the last shred of credibility—and, with it, control. In 1976, the junta had removed Juan Peron’s second wife from power in an attempt to restore political stability and economic prosperity. Six years later, it faced massive popular discontent amid 130 percent inflation, frozen wages, a 5 percent—and accelerating—decline in gross domestic product, crumbling infrastructure, fleeing foreign global investment, international condemnation, and a dirty war against dissidents that may have killed 30,000. Its social compact with the Argentine people was broken.
Seeking to restore public approval and retain power, it chose to forcibly resolve a long-standing nationalist grievance. Calculating it could achieve a fait accompli as the world stood by, the junta ordered elite commandos to lead its armed forces in an invasion of the offshore British territory of the Falkland Islands—“las Malvinas.” The distance between the Falklands and the Argentine mainland is a little more than 320 nautical miles. It was inconceivable to the junta that the United Kingdom, a declining global power, would—despite massive financial costs, reduced military strength, appalling environmental conditions, and low net worth of the islands, and the possibility of failure—mount an 8,000-mile expedition to restore British sovereignty and islander self-determination. Renewed popular support for the junta seemed within reach.
***
September 2035. Beijing, China.
The spiraling cycle of deglobalization was gaining in intensity, along with rage at inequalities of wealth directed at global corporations, financial markets, tech industries, and other nations. The emergence of Covid-34 added a more existential fear.
Countries with strong, potentially self-sustaining domestic economies were able to weather severe but manageable economic declines. Others, particularly those whose prosperity relied on exporting manufactured goods or natural resources, faced successive waves of populism, nationalism, ethnic separatism, depression, and social unrest. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) was hard hit by a shrinking export market, threatening the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
Despite a goal of eventually creating a self-sustaining domestic economy, the financial wealth built over the past four decades was largely directed overseas, through the Belt and Road Initiatives and similar efforts, and these investments had begun to collapse even before the latest pandemic: moribund ports, roads and rails underutilized, money evaporating or siphoned off. Instead of being respected by other developing nations, the poorer parts of the world began to see the “Chinese Dream” as built on exploitation.
Inside China, wealth inequalities between the urban and rural populations, the loss of jobs to artificial intelligence, rampant corruption, pollution, and brutal measures to “let Covid burn itself out”—not to mention the bureaucratic nightmare of the social credit system—began to break down the unspoken compact between the population and the Party that had once been characterized by “We bring you prosperity; you don’t challenge our power.” The CCP perceived dissidents and rivals everywhere, particularly after a handful of former party insiders followed the lead of Cai Xia in denouncing 82-year old president-for-life Xi Jinping. Leaders faced the difficulty of what will restore legitimacy, “the mandate of heaven.”
A festering wound—the one part of China that has defied the party’s control since the civil war of the late 1940s—perhaps offered the solution. Xi Jinping and his cronies looked across the 70–nautical mile Taiwan Strait and saw opportunity.
Risk existed, but the calculations appeared favorable. The People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA’s) antiaccess/area-denial network had increased in strength year-by-year for a decade, and Taiwan was in its range. The network was not perhaps invulnerable to hypersonic missiles, but it was resilient, with considerable hardening. The United States retained an advantage in certain defense technologies, but the PLA Navy and associated China Coast Guard and maritime militia had double the number of ships of the U.S. Navy. The PLA Marine Corps expanded and, though unproven, was well trained. PLA hypersonic missiles could hit Guam and Japan, not to mention Hawaii, and antisatellite weapons were placed in orbit. Finally, nuclear-armed ballistic missiles fired from the Chinese mainland could reach anywhere in the United States—or the world, for that matter. Taiwan’s military might fight, but it was dwarfed in all categories.
If Taiwan could be taken swiftly and cleanly, the CCP would have done what no Chinese dynasty had ever accomplished—unified a Han China from Tibet to Taiwan. Solidifying undisputed power would be worth certain risks, particularly taken against the reaction of what is perceived as a declining power.
The omens were favorable, too. No U.S. Navy carrier strike or surface action groups were at sea in the western Pacific.
Only recently, the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) had announced reduction of the U.S. aircraft nuclear-powered carrier (CVN) inventory to seven to free up funds to harden additional hypersonic missile sites in Hawaii, California, and Guam and to obtain additional artificial-intelligence systems to provide command-and-control assistance.
At the socially distanced remote press conference announcing the reductions, the SecDef excoriated “legacy admirals,” saying: “I don’t ever want to hear the term ‘forward presence.’ Forward presence has gone the way of gunboat diplomacy. With the reach and speed of hypersonic missiles, wars will be over in minutes, and we have all necessary targets in China covered.” The secretary added that the admirals “need to get used to the fact that, if needed at all, we have a ‘surge Navy’ now and stop sending me these ridiculous, over-budget ship-building plans. The Department of Defense is responsible for deterring or winning wars, not conducting so-called naval diplomacy—as pointless as the former freedom-of-navigation exercises always were.” He concluded, “The only maritime forces we need in the region are a few autonomous ISR [intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance] and strike platforms to augment land and air forces.”
***
As the PLA prepared, the U.S. joint artificial intelligence strategic decision recommendation system (JAISDRS) noticed some activity but discounted it, since—although the data analysis was inconclusive—it was illogical that the PRC would pursue political risky actions in an economic crisis. Even so, reports from human intelligence sources in Hong Kong, now renamed Xi City, provoked a National Security Council meeting at the White House Situation Room.
WASHINGTON DC. NSC PRINCIPALS + TREASURY.
0339Z 23 OCT 34.
TS/UMBRA. NOFORN.
[BEGIN TRANSCRIPT]
SECDEF: Madam President, JAISDRS indicates that the potential for war in the Taiwan Strait remains low. Hunts forward by CyberCom indicate no planned cyber attacks evident, although the effectiveness of the decoupled Chinese internet does make our penetration more difficult. The PRC knows very well we can strike any target we wish in mainland China with hypersonics in a matter of minutes, if not seconds. Our forces are always on alert. Challenging our resolve is illogical.
POTUS: I’m still uncomfortable about the reports. We need to have options. We can’t just sit around waiting for war. Can’t we interpose some naval forces? Put them in the Strait to make the PRC recognize our commitment to prevent forcible annexation? If there is an amphibious invasion—can’t we stop it at sea?
SECDEF: We can bring some SSNs forward along with autonomous underwater systems. But, Madam President, you are forgetting that we have shifted to surge. We have replaced the Yokosuka carrier strike group with an unmanned fleet. It’s designated as part of the contact layer. But it is primarily designed to supplement land- and space-based assets. Strike capacity is limited, and it’s not designed to actually patrol the Taiwan Strait.
SECSTATE: But if forcible annexation did take place, it would doom our relationships around the globe—allies, partners. We must do something real, tangible.
SECTREASURY: A PRC move now would destroy what remains of the global financial market. They can’t be as stupid as that, can they? In fact, any movement or even discussion of forces in the vicinity of Taiwan would rattle Wall Street, which is clinging to the remnants of our investments in China, who still own a lot of our bonds.
[INAUDIBLE WHISPER FROM MILITARY AIDE TO CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF (CJCS).]
CJCS: CyberCom is reporting that the PRC severed all ties to the global internet. Worse, Space Force says some type of electromagnetic anomaly has occurred in the western Pacific. GPS is jammed, as are most long-range communications. This has—that is, it’s degraded control of autonomous systems. But, fortunately, most manned sites are still online.
POTUS: How many prompt global strike weapons require GPS or command inputs?
SECDEF: About—70 percent. We made the decision to try to harden GPS rather than convert all the weapons. Despite cuts in other programs, the budget would not—
NSADVISOR: Madam President, I just got a secure text. President Xi Jinping wishes to speak with you right now.
POTUS: Put him on the screen.
XI [PRC] [AI translation]: Madam President, I wish to inform you that we have decided to enforce our antisecession law and bring our long-rebellious province of Taiwan back under our control.
POTUS: You intend to invade.
XI [PRC]: That is why I am contacting you. I wish to assure you that during this operation we intend to conduct no military strike on any land territory of the United States. I know that a prudent U.S. President would consider any missile attack on her land territory a potential nuclear attack. We do not want such escalation to occur.
POTUS: Obviously, neither do we. But you cannot get away with this. We intend to take action to prevent invasion of Taiwan.
XI [PRC]: I thought that might be possible. That is why I also wish to inform you that, as a prudent President of the PRC, I must assume that any American missile strike on the land territory of the People’s Republic could be a nuclear attack and will take retaliatory steps accordingly.
POTUS: You are risking nuclear war!
XI [PRC]: No, Madam President. You are risking nuclear war. If even a single of your prompt global strike weapons hits my country’s territory, we must assume the worse. I cannot foretell what may happen in the Strait itself. Perhaps ships will collide, perhaps even fight. But whatever happens there, we intend to honor our pledge and attack no U.S. territory, including your outlying possessions. As I said, that is because we are prudent and we both must assume a nuclear attack. Again, we recognize that confrontations may happen at sea, where there is no civilian population. That would be unfortunate, but much different than a strike on China. When my daughter, Xi Mingze, studied at Harvard, she learned a cant popular phrase: [SPOKEN IN ENGLISH] “What happens in Vegas, stays in Vegas.” Well, what happens at sea. . . .
[LONG PAUSE] We prefer nothing happen, of course. You liked to send warships through our territorial waters in the past. I am merely speculating that a confrontation might occur in such a case now. But if it does, we must be prudent and not attack each other’s territory. That would be calamitous for many American civilians as well as Chinese. But I am afraid I must go now. Goodbye, Madam President. But remember, if U.S. missiles strike Chinese territory, we must assume the worse.
[LONG SILENCE]
POTUS: Can we strike the PLAN’s ships at sea with the hypersonics?
SECDEF: Well, they—uh—they weren’t designed to do that. Out target set—that is, it’s all ashore. C2 nodes, missile launch areas, air bases. Real threats. We—we do have some antiship weapons, but Guam is out of range for that sort of strike.
CJCS: The mainland targets are definitely covered. Guam hypersonics can be launched in a moment. We will have the mobile launchers scramble on the Big Island. [INAUDIBLE] Vandenberg stands ready.
POTUS: I cannot risk nuclear war. Admiral, can the Navy meet them at sea?
CNO: Madam President, I—I do not control the fleet. That’s in the hands of Indo-PaCom—Admiral Howard. But the strike group out of San Diego can be ready in 24 hours. We kept the crews on board because of Covid. In accordance with the surge policy. It is possible that the ships—manned and unmanned—at Pearl could link up with the Bremerton carrier in, say, 48 to 96 hours. The third Pacific carrier is in drydock, and many other ships are down for repairs. At best we can have the initial force there in about, ah, seven days. Swinging from the Atlantic and Mediterranean—obviously, that’ll take much longer.
POTUS: Are there no warships present there at all?
SECDEF: Warships in the region—we judged them, that is, you agreed they were too easily targetable. As you recall, Madam President, to reallocate funds we—we opted for a surge strategy—
POTUS: I cannot risk nuclear war. But we—we must take some military action. Seven days is a long time, but we must do something. Stop what we can. Our subs and UUVs in theater can hold some of them up, but they have numbers. Obviously, we can mine harbors and conduct air operations, but much of their fleet and the amphibious force must already be ready to sortie. I assume the Air Force is trained for over-water ops?
AIR FORCE COS: That was part of the old Air/Sea Battle concept. But that was . . . downgraded to a joint concept that was defunded. We have focused on the mainland—C2 strikes. Silos. Fixed targets. That kind of thing.
POTUS: How many PLAN carrier groups will our two strike groups face when they get there?
SECDEF: Four. They have four operational. That we know of.
POTUS: Oh my God. Two against four. That we know of. [LONG PAUSE] Admiral, Commandant, what can we expect from our sailors and Marines?
CNO: I know they will give all to their last ounce of strength and courage. But, given the odds and the scenario—are we sailing to Midway or Tsushima? I can’t really say with certainty. It’s a gamble.
SECDEF: I’ll have my staff check the JAISDRS analysis immediately.
POTUS: Don’t bother. I think I know what it will say.
[INAUDIBLE.]
NSADVISOR: Madam President, the Russian President wishes to speak with you right now. About—about averting nuclear war in the Baltic.
[/END TRANSCRIPT]
Posted for fair use.....
Desperate Gambles of Dictators: The Taiwan Strait
Proceedings recently asked several frequent contributors how the next conflict might start. This essay is the latest in the series
Desperate Gambles of Dictators: The Taiwan Strait
Proceedings recently asked several frequent contributors how the next conflict might start. This essay is the latest in the series.
By Captain Sam J. Tangredi, U.S. Navy (Ret.)
September 2020
Proceedings
Vol. 146/9/1,411
March 1982. Buenos Aires, Argentina.
The military junta ruling Argentina was losing the last shred of credibility—and, with it, control. In 1976, the junta had removed Juan Peron’s second wife from power in an attempt to restore political stability and economic prosperity. Six years later, it faced massive popular discontent amid 130 percent inflation, frozen wages, a 5 percent—and accelerating—decline in gross domestic product, crumbling infrastructure, fleeing foreign global investment, international condemnation, and a dirty war against dissidents that may have killed 30,000. Its social compact with the Argentine people was broken.
Seeking to restore public approval and retain power, it chose to forcibly resolve a long-standing nationalist grievance. Calculating it could achieve a fait accompli as the world stood by, the junta ordered elite commandos to lead its armed forces in an invasion of the offshore British territory of the Falkland Islands—“las Malvinas.” The distance between the Falklands and the Argentine mainland is a little more than 320 nautical miles. It was inconceivable to the junta that the United Kingdom, a declining global power, would—despite massive financial costs, reduced military strength, appalling environmental conditions, and low net worth of the islands, and the possibility of failure—mount an 8,000-mile expedition to restore British sovereignty and islander self-determination. Renewed popular support for the junta seemed within reach.
***
September 2035. Beijing, China.
The spiraling cycle of deglobalization was gaining in intensity, along with rage at inequalities of wealth directed at global corporations, financial markets, tech industries, and other nations. The emergence of Covid-34 added a more existential fear.
Countries with strong, potentially self-sustaining domestic economies were able to weather severe but manageable economic declines. Others, particularly those whose prosperity relied on exporting manufactured goods or natural resources, faced successive waves of populism, nationalism, ethnic separatism, depression, and social unrest. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) was hard hit by a shrinking export market, threatening the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
Despite a goal of eventually creating a self-sustaining domestic economy, the financial wealth built over the past four decades was largely directed overseas, through the Belt and Road Initiatives and similar efforts, and these investments had begun to collapse even before the latest pandemic: moribund ports, roads and rails underutilized, money evaporating or siphoned off. Instead of being respected by other developing nations, the poorer parts of the world began to see the “Chinese Dream” as built on exploitation.
Inside China, wealth inequalities between the urban and rural populations, the loss of jobs to artificial intelligence, rampant corruption, pollution, and brutal measures to “let Covid burn itself out”—not to mention the bureaucratic nightmare of the social credit system—began to break down the unspoken compact between the population and the Party that had once been characterized by “We bring you prosperity; you don’t challenge our power.” The CCP perceived dissidents and rivals everywhere, particularly after a handful of former party insiders followed the lead of Cai Xia in denouncing 82-year old president-for-life Xi Jinping. Leaders faced the difficulty of what will restore legitimacy, “the mandate of heaven.”
A festering wound—the one part of China that has defied the party’s control since the civil war of the late 1940s—perhaps offered the solution. Xi Jinping and his cronies looked across the 70–nautical mile Taiwan Strait and saw opportunity.
Risk existed, but the calculations appeared favorable. The People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA’s) antiaccess/area-denial network had increased in strength year-by-year for a decade, and Taiwan was in its range. The network was not perhaps invulnerable to hypersonic missiles, but it was resilient, with considerable hardening. The United States retained an advantage in certain defense technologies, but the PLA Navy and associated China Coast Guard and maritime militia had double the number of ships of the U.S. Navy. The PLA Marine Corps expanded and, though unproven, was well trained. PLA hypersonic missiles could hit Guam and Japan, not to mention Hawaii, and antisatellite weapons were placed in orbit. Finally, nuclear-armed ballistic missiles fired from the Chinese mainland could reach anywhere in the United States—or the world, for that matter. Taiwan’s military might fight, but it was dwarfed in all categories.
If Taiwan could be taken swiftly and cleanly, the CCP would have done what no Chinese dynasty had ever accomplished—unified a Han China from Tibet to Taiwan. Solidifying undisputed power would be worth certain risks, particularly taken against the reaction of what is perceived as a declining power.
The omens were favorable, too. No U.S. Navy carrier strike or surface action groups were at sea in the western Pacific.
Only recently, the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) had announced reduction of the U.S. aircraft nuclear-powered carrier (CVN) inventory to seven to free up funds to harden additional hypersonic missile sites in Hawaii, California, and Guam and to obtain additional artificial-intelligence systems to provide command-and-control assistance.
At the socially distanced remote press conference announcing the reductions, the SecDef excoriated “legacy admirals,” saying: “I don’t ever want to hear the term ‘forward presence.’ Forward presence has gone the way of gunboat diplomacy. With the reach and speed of hypersonic missiles, wars will be over in minutes, and we have all necessary targets in China covered.” The secretary added that the admirals “need to get used to the fact that, if needed at all, we have a ‘surge Navy’ now and stop sending me these ridiculous, over-budget ship-building plans. The Department of Defense is responsible for deterring or winning wars, not conducting so-called naval diplomacy—as pointless as the former freedom-of-navigation exercises always were.” He concluded, “The only maritime forces we need in the region are a few autonomous ISR [intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance] and strike platforms to augment land and air forces.”
***
As the PLA prepared, the U.S. joint artificial intelligence strategic decision recommendation system (JAISDRS) noticed some activity but discounted it, since—although the data analysis was inconclusive—it was illogical that the PRC would pursue political risky actions in an economic crisis. Even so, reports from human intelligence sources in Hong Kong, now renamed Xi City, provoked a National Security Council meeting at the White House Situation Room.
WASHINGTON DC. NSC PRINCIPALS + TREASURY.
0339Z 23 OCT 34.
TS/UMBRA. NOFORN.
[BEGIN TRANSCRIPT]
SECDEF: Madam President, JAISDRS indicates that the potential for war in the Taiwan Strait remains low. Hunts forward by CyberCom indicate no planned cyber attacks evident, although the effectiveness of the decoupled Chinese internet does make our penetration more difficult. The PRC knows very well we can strike any target we wish in mainland China with hypersonics in a matter of minutes, if not seconds. Our forces are always on alert. Challenging our resolve is illogical.
POTUS: I’m still uncomfortable about the reports. We need to have options. We can’t just sit around waiting for war. Can’t we interpose some naval forces? Put them in the Strait to make the PRC recognize our commitment to prevent forcible annexation? If there is an amphibious invasion—can’t we stop it at sea?
SECDEF: We can bring some SSNs forward along with autonomous underwater systems. But, Madam President, you are forgetting that we have shifted to surge. We have replaced the Yokosuka carrier strike group with an unmanned fleet. It’s designated as part of the contact layer. But it is primarily designed to supplement land- and space-based assets. Strike capacity is limited, and it’s not designed to actually patrol the Taiwan Strait.
SECSTATE: But if forcible annexation did take place, it would doom our relationships around the globe—allies, partners. We must do something real, tangible.
SECTREASURY: A PRC move now would destroy what remains of the global financial market. They can’t be as stupid as that, can they? In fact, any movement or even discussion of forces in the vicinity of Taiwan would rattle Wall Street, which is clinging to the remnants of our investments in China, who still own a lot of our bonds.
[INAUDIBLE WHISPER FROM MILITARY AIDE TO CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF (CJCS).]
CJCS: CyberCom is reporting that the PRC severed all ties to the global internet. Worse, Space Force says some type of electromagnetic anomaly has occurred in the western Pacific. GPS is jammed, as are most long-range communications. This has—that is, it’s degraded control of autonomous systems. But, fortunately, most manned sites are still online.
POTUS: How many prompt global strike weapons require GPS or command inputs?
SECDEF: About—70 percent. We made the decision to try to harden GPS rather than convert all the weapons. Despite cuts in other programs, the budget would not—
NSADVISOR: Madam President, I just got a secure text. President Xi Jinping wishes to speak with you right now.
POTUS: Put him on the screen.
XI [PRC] [AI translation]: Madam President, I wish to inform you that we have decided to enforce our antisecession law and bring our long-rebellious province of Taiwan back under our control.
POTUS: You intend to invade.
XI [PRC]: That is why I am contacting you. I wish to assure you that during this operation we intend to conduct no military strike on any land territory of the United States. I know that a prudent U.S. President would consider any missile attack on her land territory a potential nuclear attack. We do not want such escalation to occur.
POTUS: Obviously, neither do we. But you cannot get away with this. We intend to take action to prevent invasion of Taiwan.
XI [PRC]: I thought that might be possible. That is why I also wish to inform you that, as a prudent President of the PRC, I must assume that any American missile strike on the land territory of the People’s Republic could be a nuclear attack and will take retaliatory steps accordingly.
POTUS: You are risking nuclear war!
XI [PRC]: No, Madam President. You are risking nuclear war. If even a single of your prompt global strike weapons hits my country’s territory, we must assume the worse. I cannot foretell what may happen in the Strait itself. Perhaps ships will collide, perhaps even fight. But whatever happens there, we intend to honor our pledge and attack no U.S. territory, including your outlying possessions. As I said, that is because we are prudent and we both must assume a nuclear attack. Again, we recognize that confrontations may happen at sea, where there is no civilian population. That would be unfortunate, but much different than a strike on China. When my daughter, Xi Mingze, studied at Harvard, she learned a cant popular phrase: [SPOKEN IN ENGLISH] “What happens in Vegas, stays in Vegas.” Well, what happens at sea. . . .
[LONG PAUSE] We prefer nothing happen, of course. You liked to send warships through our territorial waters in the past. I am merely speculating that a confrontation might occur in such a case now. But if it does, we must be prudent and not attack each other’s territory. That would be calamitous for many American civilians as well as Chinese. But I am afraid I must go now. Goodbye, Madam President. But remember, if U.S. missiles strike Chinese territory, we must assume the worse.
[LONG SILENCE]
POTUS: Can we strike the PLAN’s ships at sea with the hypersonics?
SECDEF: Well, they—uh—they weren’t designed to do that. Out target set—that is, it’s all ashore. C2 nodes, missile launch areas, air bases. Real threats. We—we do have some antiship weapons, but Guam is out of range for that sort of strike.
CJCS: The mainland targets are definitely covered. Guam hypersonics can be launched in a moment. We will have the mobile launchers scramble on the Big Island. [INAUDIBLE] Vandenberg stands ready.
POTUS: I cannot risk nuclear war. Admiral, can the Navy meet them at sea?
CNO: Madam President, I—I do not control the fleet. That’s in the hands of Indo-PaCom—Admiral Howard. But the strike group out of San Diego can be ready in 24 hours. We kept the crews on board because of Covid. In accordance with the surge policy. It is possible that the ships—manned and unmanned—at Pearl could link up with the Bremerton carrier in, say, 48 to 96 hours. The third Pacific carrier is in drydock, and many other ships are down for repairs. At best we can have the initial force there in about, ah, seven days. Swinging from the Atlantic and Mediterranean—obviously, that’ll take much longer.
POTUS: Are there no warships present there at all?
SECDEF: Warships in the region—we judged them, that is, you agreed they were too easily targetable. As you recall, Madam President, to reallocate funds we—we opted for a surge strategy—
POTUS: I cannot risk nuclear war. But we—we must take some military action. Seven days is a long time, but we must do something. Stop what we can. Our subs and UUVs in theater can hold some of them up, but they have numbers. Obviously, we can mine harbors and conduct air operations, but much of their fleet and the amphibious force must already be ready to sortie. I assume the Air Force is trained for over-water ops?
AIR FORCE COS: That was part of the old Air/Sea Battle concept. But that was . . . downgraded to a joint concept that was defunded. We have focused on the mainland—C2 strikes. Silos. Fixed targets. That kind of thing.
POTUS: How many PLAN carrier groups will our two strike groups face when they get there?
SECDEF: Four. They have four operational. That we know of.
POTUS: Oh my God. Two against four. That we know of. [LONG PAUSE] Admiral, Commandant, what can we expect from our sailors and Marines?
CNO: I know they will give all to their last ounce of strength and courage. But, given the odds and the scenario—are we sailing to Midway or Tsushima? I can’t really say with certainty. It’s a gamble.
SECDEF: I’ll have my staff check the JAISDRS analysis immediately.
POTUS: Don’t bother. I think I know what it will say.
[INAUDIBLE.]
NSADVISOR: Madam President, the Russian President wishes to speak with you right now. About—about averting nuclear war in the Baltic.
[/END TRANSCRIPT]
jward
passin' thru
Dire Straits
Should American Support for Taiwan Be Ambiguous?
By Bonnie S. Glaser; Michael J. Mazarr; Michael J. Glennon; Richard Haass and David Sacks
September 24, 2020
Soldiers in Kaohsiung, Taiwan, July 2017
Tyrone Siu / Reuters
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A Guarantee Isn’t Worth The Risk
Bonnie S. Glaser
In their recent article (“American Support for Taiwan Must Be Unambiguous,” September 2), Richard Haass and David Sacks correctly note that China’s coercive tactics and military buildup are eroding deterrence in the Taiwan Strait. But their proposed solution—a U.S. security guarantee for Taipei—would not solve that problem and might even provoke a Chinese attack. To reduce the chances of war, the United States needs to signal credibly that Beijing would pay a high price for invading Taiwan. Washington cannot, however, make its willingness to defend Taiwan unconditional. Rather, the United States should reserve the latitude to judge whether Taipei’s policies are consistent with U.S. interests—and with the region’s peace and security.
If the United States extends an unqualified security commitment to Taiwan today, without the ability to make its threats credible, China could respond by mounting an attack. Chinese President Xi Jinping has taken a tough approach to sovereignty disputes throughout his tenure: in Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and the disputed border with India, he has doubled down in defiance of foreign criticism. The United States might try to head off this reaction by assuring China that it still adheres to its “one China” policy and does not support Taiwan’s independence. But such blandishments would fall on deaf ears, especially if they come from U.S. President Donald Trump, who has little credibility in Beijing. Rather, Xi would likely calculate that failing to take decisive action would open him to domestic criticism and jeopardize his bid to be China’s leader for life. The authors advise U.S. leaders against signing a treaty with Taipei on the grounds that doing so would “force Xi’s hand,” but they don’t explain why an ironclad security guarantee wouldn’t have the same consequence.
That consequence hardly seems worth risking when there is little evidence that China is poised to invade Taiwan. Xi has said that “reunification” of the island with mainland China is “inevitable,” but he has given no indication that he is willing to jeopardize other Chinese interests in order to urgently achieve this goal. Haass and Sacks cite “speculation” that Beijing will force reunification with Taiwan as soon as 2021—but the United States should base a major shift in policy on hard facts, not rumors.
Nor should the United States be shortsighted about the potential intentions of future Taiwanese leaders. Haass and Sacks are confident that the island’s authorities have judged that pursuing independence is contrary to their interests. Current President Tsai Ing-wen has indeed taken a cautious stance toward Beijing and coordinated her approach closely with Washington. But her successors may not do the same. A clear statement of U.S. resolve to defend Taiwan regardless of the circumstances could embolden pro-independence constituencies in Taiwan to promote their cause. The United States should not give Taipei a green light to bend to these forces or to advance policies contrary to U.S. objectives.
U.S. treaty allies have a strong stake in preserving peace in the Taiwan Strait. Japan in particular has a vital interest in averting a Chinese takeover of Taiwan, because the island is located in the middle of the first island chain stretching from Japan to the Philippines and the South China Sea. A Chinese occupation would threaten Japanese sea-lanes. Japan and other U.S. allies in Asia, however, would likely see a U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan against all threats not as evidence that the United States is a reliable partner but as a potential provocation of China. Moreover, such a commitment accompanied by a request that regional allies assist the United States during a Taiwan contingency, as Haass and Sacks propose, would likely lead those allies to fear being dragged into a conflict.
The Taiwan Relations Act requires the U.S. president and Congress to determine “appropriate action” in response to “any threat to the security or the social or economic system of the people on Taiwan and any danger to the interests of the United States arising therefrom.” Therefore, Beijing cannot rule out the possibility of U.S. intervention in the event of an invasion. Still, the United States does need to shore up its ability to deter Chinese aggression in the Taiwan Strait. On this point, Haass and Sacks are spot-on. China has developed “anti-access/area-denial” capabilities that complicate the United States’ ability to defend Taiwan. If the United States is to credibly head off a Chinese invasion, it must find effective ways to counter these capabilities. Taiwan must also do its part to ensure that its military can survive an attack and slow down an enemy force to buy time for the U.S. military to arrive.
The United States should revise its publicly declared policy in a manner that strengthens deterrence, but not by issuing a statement of “strategic clarity,” as Haass and Sacks recommend. U.S. policymakers could issue a warning that any Chinese use of force against Taiwan would be viewed as a threat to peace and stability and a grave threat to the United States. Such a statement would signal U.S. resolve without the downsides of a clear security guarantee. If Beijing looks set to move against Taiwan, the U.S. president could forestall a crisis by privately issuing clear warnings to China’s leader about the consequences of such an action.
Ambiguity has preserved cross-strait stability for decades and can continue to prevent war. To keep the peace, the United States must restore deterrence, not further weaken it.
BONNIE S. GLASER is Senior Adviser for Asia and Director of the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
posted for fair use
www.foreignaffairs.com
Should American Support for Taiwan Be Ambiguous?
By Bonnie S. Glaser; Michael J. Mazarr; Michael J. Glennon; Richard Haass and David Sacks
September 24, 2020
Soldiers in Kaohsiung, Taiwan, July 2017
Tyrone Siu / Reuters
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A Guarantee Isn’t Worth The Risk
Bonnie S. Glaser
In their recent article (“American Support for Taiwan Must Be Unambiguous,” September 2), Richard Haass and David Sacks correctly note that China’s coercive tactics and military buildup are eroding deterrence in the Taiwan Strait. But their proposed solution—a U.S. security guarantee for Taipei—would not solve that problem and might even provoke a Chinese attack. To reduce the chances of war, the United States needs to signal credibly that Beijing would pay a high price for invading Taiwan. Washington cannot, however, make its willingness to defend Taiwan unconditional. Rather, the United States should reserve the latitude to judge whether Taipei’s policies are consistent with U.S. interests—and with the region’s peace and security.
If the United States extends an unqualified security commitment to Taiwan today, without the ability to make its threats credible, China could respond by mounting an attack. Chinese President Xi Jinping has taken a tough approach to sovereignty disputes throughout his tenure: in Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and the disputed border with India, he has doubled down in defiance of foreign criticism. The United States might try to head off this reaction by assuring China that it still adheres to its “one China” policy and does not support Taiwan’s independence. But such blandishments would fall on deaf ears, especially if they come from U.S. President Donald Trump, who has little credibility in Beijing. Rather, Xi would likely calculate that failing to take decisive action would open him to domestic criticism and jeopardize his bid to be China’s leader for life. The authors advise U.S. leaders against signing a treaty with Taipei on the grounds that doing so would “force Xi’s hand,” but they don’t explain why an ironclad security guarantee wouldn’t have the same consequence.
That consequence hardly seems worth risking when there is little evidence that China is poised to invade Taiwan. Xi has said that “reunification” of the island with mainland China is “inevitable,” but he has given no indication that he is willing to jeopardize other Chinese interests in order to urgently achieve this goal. Haass and Sacks cite “speculation” that Beijing will force reunification with Taiwan as soon as 2021—but the United States should base a major shift in policy on hard facts, not rumors.
Nor should the United States be shortsighted about the potential intentions of future Taiwanese leaders. Haass and Sacks are confident that the island’s authorities have judged that pursuing independence is contrary to their interests. Current President Tsai Ing-wen has indeed taken a cautious stance toward Beijing and coordinated her approach closely with Washington. But her successors may not do the same. A clear statement of U.S. resolve to defend Taiwan regardless of the circumstances could embolden pro-independence constituencies in Taiwan to promote their cause. The United States should not give Taipei a green light to bend to these forces or to advance policies contrary to U.S. objectives.
U.S. treaty allies have a strong stake in preserving peace in the Taiwan Strait. Japan in particular has a vital interest in averting a Chinese takeover of Taiwan, because the island is located in the middle of the first island chain stretching from Japan to the Philippines and the South China Sea. A Chinese occupation would threaten Japanese sea-lanes. Japan and other U.S. allies in Asia, however, would likely see a U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan against all threats not as evidence that the United States is a reliable partner but as a potential provocation of China. Moreover, such a commitment accompanied by a request that regional allies assist the United States during a Taiwan contingency, as Haass and Sacks propose, would likely lead those allies to fear being dragged into a conflict.
The Taiwan Relations Act requires the U.S. president and Congress to determine “appropriate action” in response to “any threat to the security or the social or economic system of the people on Taiwan and any danger to the interests of the United States arising therefrom.” Therefore, Beijing cannot rule out the possibility of U.S. intervention in the event of an invasion. Still, the United States does need to shore up its ability to deter Chinese aggression in the Taiwan Strait. On this point, Haass and Sacks are spot-on. China has developed “anti-access/area-denial” capabilities that complicate the United States’ ability to defend Taiwan. If the United States is to credibly head off a Chinese invasion, it must find effective ways to counter these capabilities. Taiwan must also do its part to ensure that its military can survive an attack and slow down an enemy force to buy time for the U.S. military to arrive.
The United States should revise its publicly declared policy in a manner that strengthens deterrence, but not by issuing a statement of “strategic clarity,” as Haass and Sacks recommend. U.S. policymakers could issue a warning that any Chinese use of force against Taiwan would be viewed as a threat to peace and stability and a grave threat to the United States. Such a statement would signal U.S. resolve without the downsides of a clear security guarantee. If Beijing looks set to move against Taiwan, the U.S. president could forestall a crisis by privately issuing clear warnings to China’s leader about the consequences of such an action.
Ambiguity has preserved cross-strait stability for decades and can continue to prevent war. To keep the peace, the United States must restore deterrence, not further weaken it.
BONNIE S. GLASER is Senior Adviser for Asia and Director of the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
posted for fair use
Dire Straits
Experts respond to Richard Haass and David Sacks’ article "American Support for Taiwan Must Be Unambiguous"
Posted for fair use.....
focustaiwan.tw
Cross-Strait
Chinese spy ship leaves waters near Taiwan after 9-day stay
09/26/2020 09:35 PM
Taipei, Sept. 26 (CNA) A Chinese spy ship, which had remained in waters off Taiwan's east coast for more than a week, sailed away from the area Saturday morning after Taiwan's Navy sent a ship to monitor its activity.
According to military sources, the intelligence vessel belonging to China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) had been spotted in waters 38-75 nautical miles off the coast of Hualien County since Sept. 18.
Its appearance coincided with live-fire missile tests conducted by Taiwan along its southeastern coast on Thursday.
On Thursday evening, Taiwan's Navy dispatched a Ching Chiang-class patrol ship, which has counter-intelligence capabilities, to monitor the Chinese ship when it attempted to sail closer to Hualien, sources said.
The PLA ship moved southward last night before sailing out of sight of Taiwan's Navy this morning, according to military sources, but its deployment was the longest continuous stay by a Chinese military ship in the area in recent years.
Taiwan's military expects the PLA's intelligence vessel to return as another missile test will be conducted in the eastern side of Taiwan next Tuesday.
In another military maneuver, a Chinese Y-9 intelligence aircraft challenged both Japan and Taiwan on Friday.
According to a chart issued Friday evening by Japan's Defense Ministry, the Y-9 flew in a southeast direction through the Miyako Strait (between Okinawa and Miyakojima) and then in a southwest and then west direction to just over 100 kilometers away from Hualien before turning around and following the same path back to China.
Oddis Tsai (蔡榮峰), a researcher at the government-funded Institute for National Defense and Security Research (INDSR), told CNA that the moves by the PLA were not new, but they were significant because of the timing.
"The PLA spy vessel's deployment to waters near Hualien is something that happens whenever there's a missile test by Taiwan," he said.
The Miyako Strait, a key waterway for China's Navy to get outside the first island chain of defense that includes Taiwan, serves multiple purposes in the PLA's Anti-access/Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities, he said.
He felt that the Y-9's flight put more pressure to Tokyo than Taipei because it followed the inauguration of Yoshihide Suga, Japan's new prime minister, on Sept. 16 and Suga's first phone call with Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) the same day.
Tsai speculated that Beijing may have intended to use the military maneuver as a way to press Tokyo to invite Xi for a visit.
What is now worth watching, Tsai said, is how close the PLA's assets come to Taiwan and whether they reach within Taiwan's contiguous zone, which extends roughly 24 nautical miles from its coastline.
"Should the PLA operate inside Taiwan's maritime borders in the east and its air defense identification zone (ADIZ) in the southwest at the same time, this would inevitably further complicate the situation," Tsai said.
"By doing so, the PLA would be signaling its attempt to control both the Miyako Strait and the Bashi Channel," he said.
(By Tyson Lu, Yang Ming-chu and Emerson Lim)
Enditem/ls
Chinese spy ship leaves waters near Taiwan after 9-day stay - Focus Taiwan
A Chinese spy ship, which had remained in waters off Taiwan's east coast for more than a week, sailed away from the area Saturday morning after Taiwan's Navy sent a ship to monitor its activity.
focustaiwan.tw
Cross-Strait
Chinese spy ship leaves waters near Taiwan after 9-day stay
09/26/2020 09:35 PM
Taipei, Sept. 26 (CNA) A Chinese spy ship, which had remained in waters off Taiwan's east coast for more than a week, sailed away from the area Saturday morning after Taiwan's Navy sent a ship to monitor its activity.
According to military sources, the intelligence vessel belonging to China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) had been spotted in waters 38-75 nautical miles off the coast of Hualien County since Sept. 18.
Its appearance coincided with live-fire missile tests conducted by Taiwan along its southeastern coast on Thursday.
On Thursday evening, Taiwan's Navy dispatched a Ching Chiang-class patrol ship, which has counter-intelligence capabilities, to monitor the Chinese ship when it attempted to sail closer to Hualien, sources said.
The PLA ship moved southward last night before sailing out of sight of Taiwan's Navy this morning, according to military sources, but its deployment was the longest continuous stay by a Chinese military ship in the area in recent years.
Taiwan's military expects the PLA's intelligence vessel to return as another missile test will be conducted in the eastern side of Taiwan next Tuesday.
In another military maneuver, a Chinese Y-9 intelligence aircraft challenged both Japan and Taiwan on Friday.
According to a chart issued Friday evening by Japan's Defense Ministry, the Y-9 flew in a southeast direction through the Miyako Strait (between Okinawa and Miyakojima) and then in a southwest and then west direction to just over 100 kilometers away from Hualien before turning around and following the same path back to China.
Oddis Tsai (蔡榮峰), a researcher at the government-funded Institute for National Defense and Security Research (INDSR), told CNA that the moves by the PLA were not new, but they were significant because of the timing.
"The PLA spy vessel's deployment to waters near Hualien is something that happens whenever there's a missile test by Taiwan," he said.
The Miyako Strait, a key waterway for China's Navy to get outside the first island chain of defense that includes Taiwan, serves multiple purposes in the PLA's Anti-access/Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities, he said.
He felt that the Y-9's flight put more pressure to Tokyo than Taipei because it followed the inauguration of Yoshihide Suga, Japan's new prime minister, on Sept. 16 and Suga's first phone call with Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) the same day.
Tsai speculated that Beijing may have intended to use the military maneuver as a way to press Tokyo to invite Xi for a visit.
What is now worth watching, Tsai said, is how close the PLA's assets come to Taiwan and whether they reach within Taiwan's contiguous zone, which extends roughly 24 nautical miles from its coastline.
"Should the PLA operate inside Taiwan's maritime borders in the east and its air defense identification zone (ADIZ) in the southwest at the same time, this would inevitably further complicate the situation," Tsai said.
"By doing so, the PLA would be signaling its attempt to control both the Miyako Strait and the Bashi Channel," he said.
(By Tyson Lu, Yang Ming-chu and Emerson Lim)
Enditem/ls
danielboon
TB Fanatic
Tick tick...
northern watch
TB Fanatic
US, Japan to hold 'Keen Sword' exercise amid fears of China attack on Taiwan
US, Japan will hold military exercises as expert warns China may attack Taiwan during November's US elections
By Keoni Everington, Taiwan News, Staff Writer
2020/09/26 12:13
USS Ronald Reagan (left), Japanese helicopter destroyer JS Hyuga (right) sail in formation. (USN photo)
TAIPEI (Taiwan News) — The U.S. military announced that it will stage exercise "Keen Sword" with Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) in Japan amid fears China could exploit distractions caused by the U.S. presidential election on Nov. 3.
On September 17, Seth Cropsey, a former naval officer, and a senior fellow at the Washington-based think-tank the Hudson Institute wrote an op-ed in The Hill titled, “There may never be a better moment for China to strike than the week of November 3.” However, on Thursday (Sept. 24), the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command announced it will be holding joint military exercises involving at least 46,000 troops with the JSDF and Royal Canadian Navy, including amphibious landings on several Japanese islands beginning Oct. 26.
In his op-ed, Cropsey wrote that since the Wuhan coronavirus (COVID-19) spread worldwide in April, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has sent warplanes to encroach on Taiwan's air defense identification zone (ADIZ), dispatched its aircraft carrier battle group through the Miyako Strait, and conducted large-scale exercises near the Taiwan Strait. Cropsey warns these are "not just a complex form of political-signaling," but rather are preparations for an attack on Taiwan, with the goal being to "subjugate it before the U.S. and its allies can respond."
Currently, hostility between the two main political parties over the U.S. presidential election is intensifying, as President Donald Trump is refusing to commit to a peaceful transition. Cropsey argues that if the U.S. becomes embroiled in a fight over the transfer of power caused by a contested election, the country will be much less willing to engage in a "high-end great-power conflict."
Therefore, from China's point of view, 'there may never be a better moment" for it to strike than the week of November 3, asserts Cropsey. However, the announcement by the U.S. military that it will be holding joint exercises from Oct. 26 to Nov. 5 with both Japan and Canada, complicates the calculus for Beijing.
According to a report by Minaminihon Broadcasting (MBC), JSDF will deploy approximately 37,000 troops, 20 warships, and 170 aircraft during the biennial war drills. The U.S. side will dispatch approximately 9,000 personnel from the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, Army, and Air Force, while a Royal Canadian Navy Halifax-class frigate will take part in sea exercises.
During the exercises, U.S. forces will train with their Japanese counterparts from military bases across mainland Japan, Okinawa Prefecture, and "their surrounding territorial waters." Goals listed for the operation include training for realistic scenarios, "enhancing readiness, interoperability, and building credible deterrence."
www.taiwannews.com.tw
US, Japan will hold military exercises as expert warns China may attack Taiwan during November's US elections
By Keoni Everington, Taiwan News, Staff Writer
2020/09/26 12:13
USS Ronald Reagan (left), Japanese helicopter destroyer JS Hyuga (right) sail in formation. (USN photo)
TAIPEI (Taiwan News) — The U.S. military announced that it will stage exercise "Keen Sword" with Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) in Japan amid fears China could exploit distractions caused by the U.S. presidential election on Nov. 3.
On September 17, Seth Cropsey, a former naval officer, and a senior fellow at the Washington-based think-tank the Hudson Institute wrote an op-ed in The Hill titled, “There may never be a better moment for China to strike than the week of November 3.” However, on Thursday (Sept. 24), the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command announced it will be holding joint military exercises involving at least 46,000 troops with the JSDF and Royal Canadian Navy, including amphibious landings on several Japanese islands beginning Oct. 26.
In his op-ed, Cropsey wrote that since the Wuhan coronavirus (COVID-19) spread worldwide in April, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has sent warplanes to encroach on Taiwan's air defense identification zone (ADIZ), dispatched its aircraft carrier battle group through the Miyako Strait, and conducted large-scale exercises near the Taiwan Strait. Cropsey warns these are "not just a complex form of political-signaling," but rather are preparations for an attack on Taiwan, with the goal being to "subjugate it before the U.S. and its allies can respond."
Currently, hostility between the two main political parties over the U.S. presidential election is intensifying, as President Donald Trump is refusing to commit to a peaceful transition. Cropsey argues that if the U.S. becomes embroiled in a fight over the transfer of power caused by a contested election, the country will be much less willing to engage in a "high-end great-power conflict."
Therefore, from China's point of view, 'there may never be a better moment" for it to strike than the week of November 3, asserts Cropsey. However, the announcement by the U.S. military that it will be holding joint exercises from Oct. 26 to Nov. 5 with both Japan and Canada, complicates the calculus for Beijing.
According to a report by Minaminihon Broadcasting (MBC), JSDF will deploy approximately 37,000 troops, 20 warships, and 170 aircraft during the biennial war drills. The U.S. side will dispatch approximately 9,000 personnel from the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, Army, and Air Force, while a Royal Canadian Navy Halifax-class frigate will take part in sea exercises.
During the exercises, U.S. forces will train with their Japanese counterparts from military bases across mainland Japan, Okinawa Prefecture, and "their surrounding territorial waters." Goals listed for the operation include training for realistic scenarios, "enhancing readiness, interoperability, and building credible deterrence."
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Just thinking,
If there ever was a scenario for a nuclear exchange between the U.S. and Communist China, why not at sea? It would be, all things considered, preferable to a nuclear attack on China or Taiwan itself.
Nuking mainland Taiwan doesn't really accomplish anything for Communist China. China wants "reunification" with the wayward Taiwan Nationalist Republic, not an irradiated nuclear wasteland to preside over.
The biggest threat to Chinese expansionism are our submarine and carrier forces.
What happens if China believes that they have good intel on our sub and carrier group locations and decide to use theater level nuclear weapons against our assets either as a prelude to an invasion of Taiwan or as a decisive retaliation if our naval forces decide to disrupt an invasion?
It might be a very intoxicating rationalization for Chinese war planners if they convince themselves that a nuclear exchange could be limited to just naval forces by the doctrine of "proportional response".
If there ever was a scenario for a nuclear exchange between the U.S. and Communist China, why not at sea? It would be, all things considered, preferable to a nuclear attack on China or Taiwan itself.
Nuking mainland Taiwan doesn't really accomplish anything for Communist China. China wants "reunification" with the wayward Taiwan Nationalist Republic, not an irradiated nuclear wasteland to preside over.
The biggest threat to Chinese expansionism are our submarine and carrier forces.
What happens if China believes that they have good intel on our sub and carrier group locations and decide to use theater level nuclear weapons against our assets either as a prelude to an invasion of Taiwan or as a decisive retaliation if our naval forces decide to disrupt an invasion?
It might be a very intoxicating rationalization for Chinese war planners if they convince themselves that a nuclear exchange could be limited to just naval forces by the doctrine of "proportional response".
this is what i think might happen. they take the island or they don't but we have a ?long nuclear oceanic naval conflict with them. marines taking islands,etc, blockades . . .
Bright Blessings,
China's high tech weapons, that were created in part by American designs and money, may have an initial win, vis-a-vis American bases in theater, and unfortunately, with possible sinking of carrier battle groups. This does not mean that they will win overall... There are weapons systems and units that neither the American people, nor our enemies, even have knowledge of. The Chinese, and all of America's other enemies, will not know what hit them, when TSHTF... Their end is nigh...
OldArcher, Witch
Hummm........
Posted for fair use.....
The Painful, but Necessary, Next Steps in the U.S.-Taiwanese Relationship
Michael A. Hunzeker and Dennis L. Weng
September 24, 2020
Commentary
China is once again rattling its saber at Taiwan. This past weekend, Beijing repeatedly sent fighter jets and bombers across the so-called median line, which has long served to unofficially demarcate Chinese and Taiwanese airspace over the Taiwan Strait. Chinese leaders were ostensibly reacting to U.S. Undersecretary of State Keith Krach’s trip to the Taiwanese capital, a move that Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs held up as a symbol of the growing relationship between Washington and Taipei. Yet China’s hard-line Global Times hinted at an even more unsettling motive. It called the exercise a dress rehearsal that showed the speed with which China could strike Taiwan if it so chose.
Regardless of the specific message Chinese leaders wanted to send, Taipei and Washington will see the move as yet another indicator that Beijing is considering military action to bring the island under its control. Indeed, Friday’s “exercise” is just the latest example of Beijing’s increasingly bellicose rhetoric, policies, and actions at home and abroad.
Chinese aggression is also propelling a tectonic shift in U.S.-Taiwanese relations. As views toward China harden across the American political spectrum, prominent commentators are calling for an end to strategic ambiguity — Washington’s long-held policy of deterring a war over Taiwan’s status by remaining vague about whether it might intervene. The U.S. government recently announced that it intends to sell Taiwan $7 billion in coastal defense missiles, drones, and mines on top of the nearly $11 billion in weapons it sold the island in 2019. U.S. officials are even considering a potential bilateral trade deal. Meanwhile, U.S. Navy ships have passed through the Taiwan Strait at least 10 times since January.
Such a reassessment of U.S. policy toward Taiwan is overdue. At the same time, there are better and worse ways to approach the next phase in bilateral relations, especially since many Americans will be skeptical about adding yet another commitment to their country’s already imposing portfolio of alliances and defense pacts. American voters will want to know that Taiwan is already doing everything in its power to prepare for a potential cross-strait conflict before Washington extends any new security commitments. The United States should make its security guarantee conditional on Taiwan embracing an asymmetric defense posture vis-à-vis China, reinstating universal military conscription, and holding bilateral training exercises.
From Capability to Resolve
In recent years, a consensus emerged among military experts that the best way for Taiwan to offset China’s growing military advantages is to heavily invest in asymmetric weapons, such as anti-ship missiles, air defenses, and drones. They argue that Taiwan cannot afford to buy enough “traditional” weapons — platforms like surface ships and advanced fighter jets — to keep up with the Chinese military. However, by using its limited resources to acquire large numbers of relatively inexpensive weapons, Taiwan could make it more costly for China to project power across the Taiwan Strait and harder for China to achieve a quick military victory.
Last week’s proposed arms deal shows that Taiwan is serious about improving its defensive capabilities. By buying the sorts of asymmetric weapons included in this package (e.g., coastal defense missiles and mines) instead of flashier, high-profile platforms like main battle tanks or advanced fighter jets, President Tsai Ing-wen is making it clear that the country is serious about addressing the island’s actual security needs.
Acquiring the “right” military capabilities to defend against Chinese aggression represents an essential first step. The next step should involve strengthening Taiwanese resolve. After all, even the best weapons in the world will not make a difference if the people are not willing to fight.
Unfortunately, recent public opinion surveys suggest that many in Taiwan do not yet take the risk of a war with China seriously. In early August, a poll commissioned by the Chinese Association for Public Opinion Research found that only 20 percent of the Taiwanese public believed a military confrontation over Taiwan’s status might happen. It also revealed that less than half of those polled would be willing to fight if such a war did happen.
The poll also asked respondents whether they thought the United States would send troops to defend the island from attack and how they thought Taiwan should react to a war between China and the United States. Nearly 60 percent said they had faith that the United States would intervene in a cross-strait conflict. Yet a mere 20 percent indicated that Taiwan should return the favor by fighting alongside the United States in a war against China. In contrast, two-thirds indicated that Taiwan was better off remaining on the sidelines.
It is worth pointing out that these sorts of public opinion polls should always be taken with a grain of salt. Minor differences in framing and wording can yield major differences in how those surveyed respond. Moreover, in Taiwan’s case, these surveys do not take place in a vacuum. Rather, they occur under the omnipresent shadow of potential violence. Respondents know Chinese officials will pay attention to the results, so they face incentives to strategically misrepresent their true views.
Nevertheless, some scholars and pundits will invariably overreact by taking all of this to mean that the United States should abandon Taiwan alongside strategic ambiguity. The fear is that unambiguous support for the island will irrevocably undermine U.S.-Chinese relations, while risking a war that the United States has little chance of winning.
We disagree. It is far from evident that abandoning Taiwan will yield a sudden improvement in U.S.-Chinese relations, let alone reduce regional tensions. After all, China would be far from the first great power in history to respond to accommodation by deciding it wants more.
Instead, we think American policymakers should look for ways to build Taiwanese resolve and resilience, especially in light of the fact that the Taiwanese public may be both overly confident that the United States can intervene and overly pessimistic about its own ability to fight. Washington can dampen this quixotic optimism, while helping to improve Taiwan’s faith in its own warfighting abilities, by making its security guarantees conditional on continued defense reform, and by playing a more active role in training Taiwanese military forces.
Crucially, the United States should take these steps before it can begin to seriously contemplate abandoning strategic ambiguity. After all, the risk of war increases to the degree that Beijing thinks it might have a window of opportunity to act while U.S.-Taiwanese relations are in flux. If Chinese President Xi Jinping and his advisers sense that Taiwan’s deterrence posture rests on shaky foundations, the United States could easily find itself fighting the very war it had hoped to deter.
Improving Resilience and Resolve
The United States can start by ensuring any future security guarantees are predicated on a clear understanding of the painful, but necessary, reforms it expects Taipei to undertake. In particular, the United States should insist that any new commitments to the island will be contingent on Taipei’s continued willingness to invest in truly asymmetric capabilities. Even though last week’s proposed arms sale suggests this shift is already underway, defense reforms are always difficult, costly, and controversial. Previous Taiwanese governments faced public pressure to reduce defense spending. And some senior Taiwanese defense officials oppose the idea of embracing asymmetric weapons and capabilities. By placing conditions on its commitments, Washington can help elected officials in Taipei undertake politically and financially expensive long-term change by allowing them to credibly claim that their hands are tied.
By linking its security commitments to Taiwan’s defensive reforms, the United States can also give Taiwan the external push it needs to reintroduce two-year compulsory military service. Doing so would ensure Taiwan can field an active-duty force that is large enough to meet its defensive needs while also sending a clear signal to leaders in China and voters in America that the Taiwanese people are willing to make major sacrifices to provide for their own defense. Prior to 2000, all Taiwanese men were required to spend two years in the army. The government slowly reduced this obligation as part of an attempt to transition to an all-volunteer force. Conscription still technically exists, because Taiwan’s military has struggled to recruit enough volunteers to join the military. Nevertheless, conscripts now spend only four months in uniform. Even the reduced training is seen as a “waste of time” in the eyes of many young Taiwanese. Taiwan’s active-duty units likewise see conscripts as a burden, not a force multiplier. Combat readiness suffers as a result.
More appropriate weapons and a fully manned military represent urgent first steps. Yet missiles and men alone may not convince many Taiwanese voters that the island is ready to stand up to China in a conflict.
Thus, if and when Washington decides to drop the curtain on strategic ambiguity, the U.S. military will also need to actively help Taiwan’s armed forces prepare for war. At a minimum, U.S. forces should be ready to immediately begin hosting and participating in high-profile bilateral training exercises with their Taiwanese counterparts. The U.S. Army and Marine Corps can also play an instrumental role helping Taiwan organize a territorial defense force. Such a force would consist of reservists, volunteers, or both, trained and equipped to wage a guerrilla campaign against an invasion force. Several NATO allies, including Estonia, Lithuania, and Poland, have created similar forces to deter Russian aggression.
Organizing a territorial defense force in and around the neighborhoods it will exist to defend and letting it train alongside combat-tested U.S. Army and Marine units can help enhance resolve and resilience across Taiwanese society. After all, highly visible, demanding, and realistic training will make the Taiwanese military more combat capable while demonstrating the same to the Taiwanese people. Deterrence and defense are enhanced to the degree Taiwanese families believe they are sending their sons and daughters to fight for a winning cause, not die for a hopeless one.
High-profile, bilateral military exercises also yield two additional benefits. First, they will help make America’s security commitments to Taiwan more credible. Indeed, U.S. training units can serve as a de facto tripwire, especially if they maintain a “constant rotational” presence on the island.
Second, a robust training effort will help reassure Taiwan that the United States is serious about its newly clarified security commitments to the island. Although it is always important to reassure allies you can and will come to their defense, it is doubly important in Taiwan’s case. After all, even if Taiwan embraces an asymmetric defense posture, its geographic location and size mean it can hold for only so long in the absence of an intervention by the United States and potentially other partners.
Beijing will undoubtedly take umbrage at any increase in U.S.-Taiwanese military cooperation. This inevitable reaction makes it all the more imperative and urgent that American and Taiwanese policymakers begin taking these steps while China’s military still faces major gaps and obstacles that would prevent it from undertaking an invasion.
What Comes Next
Our suggestions are undoubtedly provocative. They should be. America’s ambiguous posture toward defending Taiwan is decades old, and embracing our recommendations would upset the status quo. However, strategic clarity cuts both ways, and neither American policymakers nor Taiwanese voters can afford to delude themselves into acting like China is a paper tiger that will fold at the first sign of resistance. Deterrence is costly and talk is cheap. If Washington truly believes that it is in America’s national interest to deter China from attacking Taiwan, Washington should also be willing to pay the price — and assume the risks — associated with credibly enhancing Taiwan’s deterrence posture. Arms sales are only the first step toward this end. The next steps — implementing defense reforms, reinstating military conscription, and holding bilateral training exercises — will be harder.
U.S.-Taiwanese relations are changing, but change takes time. Time, unfortunately, is not necessarily something Taiwan has in abundance. Therefore, as policymakers on both sides of the relationship contemplate what comes next, they should be clear about what it will take — and how long it will take — to prepare the Taiwanese military and people for war. Peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait could well depend on it.
Michael A. Hunzeker (@MichaelHunzeker) is an assistant professor of political science at George Mason University’s Schar School of Policy and Government, where he is also associate director of the Center for Security Policy Studies. His book on wartime learning in World War I is forthcoming with Cornell University Press. He served in the Marine Corps from 2000 to 2006.
Dennis L. Weng (@DennisWeng) is an assistant professor of political science at Sam Houston State University, where he teaches comparative politics and international relations with a focus on East Asia. He currently serves as the Conference Group on Taiwan Studies coordinator at the American Political Science Association.
Posted for fair use.....
The Painful, but Necessary, Next Steps in the U.S.-Taiwanese Relationship - War on the Rocks
China is once again rattling its saber at Taiwan. This past weekend, Beijing repeatedly sent fighter jets and bombers across the so-called median line,
warontherocks.com
The Painful, but Necessary, Next Steps in the U.S.-Taiwanese Relationship
Michael A. Hunzeker and Dennis L. Weng
September 24, 2020
Commentary
China is once again rattling its saber at Taiwan. This past weekend, Beijing repeatedly sent fighter jets and bombers across the so-called median line, which has long served to unofficially demarcate Chinese and Taiwanese airspace over the Taiwan Strait. Chinese leaders were ostensibly reacting to U.S. Undersecretary of State Keith Krach’s trip to the Taiwanese capital, a move that Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs held up as a symbol of the growing relationship between Washington and Taipei. Yet China’s hard-line Global Times hinted at an even more unsettling motive. It called the exercise a dress rehearsal that showed the speed with which China could strike Taiwan if it so chose.
Regardless of the specific message Chinese leaders wanted to send, Taipei and Washington will see the move as yet another indicator that Beijing is considering military action to bring the island under its control. Indeed, Friday’s “exercise” is just the latest example of Beijing’s increasingly bellicose rhetoric, policies, and actions at home and abroad.
Chinese aggression is also propelling a tectonic shift in U.S.-Taiwanese relations. As views toward China harden across the American political spectrum, prominent commentators are calling for an end to strategic ambiguity — Washington’s long-held policy of deterring a war over Taiwan’s status by remaining vague about whether it might intervene. The U.S. government recently announced that it intends to sell Taiwan $7 billion in coastal defense missiles, drones, and mines on top of the nearly $11 billion in weapons it sold the island in 2019. U.S. officials are even considering a potential bilateral trade deal. Meanwhile, U.S. Navy ships have passed through the Taiwan Strait at least 10 times since January.
Such a reassessment of U.S. policy toward Taiwan is overdue. At the same time, there are better and worse ways to approach the next phase in bilateral relations, especially since many Americans will be skeptical about adding yet another commitment to their country’s already imposing portfolio of alliances and defense pacts. American voters will want to know that Taiwan is already doing everything in its power to prepare for a potential cross-strait conflict before Washington extends any new security commitments. The United States should make its security guarantee conditional on Taiwan embracing an asymmetric defense posture vis-à-vis China, reinstating universal military conscription, and holding bilateral training exercises.
From Capability to Resolve
In recent years, a consensus emerged among military experts that the best way for Taiwan to offset China’s growing military advantages is to heavily invest in asymmetric weapons, such as anti-ship missiles, air defenses, and drones. They argue that Taiwan cannot afford to buy enough “traditional” weapons — platforms like surface ships and advanced fighter jets — to keep up with the Chinese military. However, by using its limited resources to acquire large numbers of relatively inexpensive weapons, Taiwan could make it more costly for China to project power across the Taiwan Strait and harder for China to achieve a quick military victory.
Last week’s proposed arms deal shows that Taiwan is serious about improving its defensive capabilities. By buying the sorts of asymmetric weapons included in this package (e.g., coastal defense missiles and mines) instead of flashier, high-profile platforms like main battle tanks or advanced fighter jets, President Tsai Ing-wen is making it clear that the country is serious about addressing the island’s actual security needs.
Acquiring the “right” military capabilities to defend against Chinese aggression represents an essential first step. The next step should involve strengthening Taiwanese resolve. After all, even the best weapons in the world will not make a difference if the people are not willing to fight.
Unfortunately, recent public opinion surveys suggest that many in Taiwan do not yet take the risk of a war with China seriously. In early August, a poll commissioned by the Chinese Association for Public Opinion Research found that only 20 percent of the Taiwanese public believed a military confrontation over Taiwan’s status might happen. It also revealed that less than half of those polled would be willing to fight if such a war did happen.
The poll also asked respondents whether they thought the United States would send troops to defend the island from attack and how they thought Taiwan should react to a war between China and the United States. Nearly 60 percent said they had faith that the United States would intervene in a cross-strait conflict. Yet a mere 20 percent indicated that Taiwan should return the favor by fighting alongside the United States in a war against China. In contrast, two-thirds indicated that Taiwan was better off remaining on the sidelines.
It is worth pointing out that these sorts of public opinion polls should always be taken with a grain of salt. Minor differences in framing and wording can yield major differences in how those surveyed respond. Moreover, in Taiwan’s case, these surveys do not take place in a vacuum. Rather, they occur under the omnipresent shadow of potential violence. Respondents know Chinese officials will pay attention to the results, so they face incentives to strategically misrepresent their true views.
Nevertheless, some scholars and pundits will invariably overreact by taking all of this to mean that the United States should abandon Taiwan alongside strategic ambiguity. The fear is that unambiguous support for the island will irrevocably undermine U.S.-Chinese relations, while risking a war that the United States has little chance of winning.
We disagree. It is far from evident that abandoning Taiwan will yield a sudden improvement in U.S.-Chinese relations, let alone reduce regional tensions. After all, China would be far from the first great power in history to respond to accommodation by deciding it wants more.
Instead, we think American policymakers should look for ways to build Taiwanese resolve and resilience, especially in light of the fact that the Taiwanese public may be both overly confident that the United States can intervene and overly pessimistic about its own ability to fight. Washington can dampen this quixotic optimism, while helping to improve Taiwan’s faith in its own warfighting abilities, by making its security guarantees conditional on continued defense reform, and by playing a more active role in training Taiwanese military forces.
Crucially, the United States should take these steps before it can begin to seriously contemplate abandoning strategic ambiguity. After all, the risk of war increases to the degree that Beijing thinks it might have a window of opportunity to act while U.S.-Taiwanese relations are in flux. If Chinese President Xi Jinping and his advisers sense that Taiwan’s deterrence posture rests on shaky foundations, the United States could easily find itself fighting the very war it had hoped to deter.
Improving Resilience and Resolve
The United States can start by ensuring any future security guarantees are predicated on a clear understanding of the painful, but necessary, reforms it expects Taipei to undertake. In particular, the United States should insist that any new commitments to the island will be contingent on Taipei’s continued willingness to invest in truly asymmetric capabilities. Even though last week’s proposed arms sale suggests this shift is already underway, defense reforms are always difficult, costly, and controversial. Previous Taiwanese governments faced public pressure to reduce defense spending. And some senior Taiwanese defense officials oppose the idea of embracing asymmetric weapons and capabilities. By placing conditions on its commitments, Washington can help elected officials in Taipei undertake politically and financially expensive long-term change by allowing them to credibly claim that their hands are tied.
By linking its security commitments to Taiwan’s defensive reforms, the United States can also give Taiwan the external push it needs to reintroduce two-year compulsory military service. Doing so would ensure Taiwan can field an active-duty force that is large enough to meet its defensive needs while also sending a clear signal to leaders in China and voters in America that the Taiwanese people are willing to make major sacrifices to provide for their own defense. Prior to 2000, all Taiwanese men were required to spend two years in the army. The government slowly reduced this obligation as part of an attempt to transition to an all-volunteer force. Conscription still technically exists, because Taiwan’s military has struggled to recruit enough volunteers to join the military. Nevertheless, conscripts now spend only four months in uniform. Even the reduced training is seen as a “waste of time” in the eyes of many young Taiwanese. Taiwan’s active-duty units likewise see conscripts as a burden, not a force multiplier. Combat readiness suffers as a result.
More appropriate weapons and a fully manned military represent urgent first steps. Yet missiles and men alone may not convince many Taiwanese voters that the island is ready to stand up to China in a conflict.
Thus, if and when Washington decides to drop the curtain on strategic ambiguity, the U.S. military will also need to actively help Taiwan’s armed forces prepare for war. At a minimum, U.S. forces should be ready to immediately begin hosting and participating in high-profile bilateral training exercises with their Taiwanese counterparts. The U.S. Army and Marine Corps can also play an instrumental role helping Taiwan organize a territorial defense force. Such a force would consist of reservists, volunteers, or both, trained and equipped to wage a guerrilla campaign against an invasion force. Several NATO allies, including Estonia, Lithuania, and Poland, have created similar forces to deter Russian aggression.
Organizing a territorial defense force in and around the neighborhoods it will exist to defend and letting it train alongside combat-tested U.S. Army and Marine units can help enhance resolve and resilience across Taiwanese society. After all, highly visible, demanding, and realistic training will make the Taiwanese military more combat capable while demonstrating the same to the Taiwanese people. Deterrence and defense are enhanced to the degree Taiwanese families believe they are sending their sons and daughters to fight for a winning cause, not die for a hopeless one.
High-profile, bilateral military exercises also yield two additional benefits. First, they will help make America’s security commitments to Taiwan more credible. Indeed, U.S. training units can serve as a de facto tripwire, especially if they maintain a “constant rotational” presence on the island.
Second, a robust training effort will help reassure Taiwan that the United States is serious about its newly clarified security commitments to the island. Although it is always important to reassure allies you can and will come to their defense, it is doubly important in Taiwan’s case. After all, even if Taiwan embraces an asymmetric defense posture, its geographic location and size mean it can hold for only so long in the absence of an intervention by the United States and potentially other partners.
Beijing will undoubtedly take umbrage at any increase in U.S.-Taiwanese military cooperation. This inevitable reaction makes it all the more imperative and urgent that American and Taiwanese policymakers begin taking these steps while China’s military still faces major gaps and obstacles that would prevent it from undertaking an invasion.
What Comes Next
Our suggestions are undoubtedly provocative. They should be. America’s ambiguous posture toward defending Taiwan is decades old, and embracing our recommendations would upset the status quo. However, strategic clarity cuts both ways, and neither American policymakers nor Taiwanese voters can afford to delude themselves into acting like China is a paper tiger that will fold at the first sign of resistance. Deterrence is costly and talk is cheap. If Washington truly believes that it is in America’s national interest to deter China from attacking Taiwan, Washington should also be willing to pay the price — and assume the risks — associated with credibly enhancing Taiwan’s deterrence posture. Arms sales are only the first step toward this end. The next steps — implementing defense reforms, reinstating military conscription, and holding bilateral training exercises — will be harder.
U.S.-Taiwanese relations are changing, but change takes time. Time, unfortunately, is not necessarily something Taiwan has in abundance. Therefore, as policymakers on both sides of the relationship contemplate what comes next, they should be clear about what it will take — and how long it will take — to prepare the Taiwanese military and people for war. Peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait could well depend on it.
Michael A. Hunzeker (@MichaelHunzeker) is an assistant professor of political science at George Mason University’s Schar School of Policy and Government, where he is also associate director of the Center for Security Policy Studies. His book on wartime learning in World War I is forthcoming with Cornell University Press. He served in the Marine Corps from 2000 to 2006.
Dennis L. Weng (@DennisWeng) is an assistant professor of political science at Sam Houston State University, where he teaches comparative politics and international relations with a focus on East Asia. He currently serves as the Conference Group on Taiwan Studies coordinator at the American Political Science Association.
Here's one view on that......
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Why there’s no such thing as ‘tactical’ nuclear weapons
No one knows if using low-yield or tactical nuclear weapons will trigger a full-scale nuclear war.
taskandpurpose.com
Why there’s no such thing as ‘tactical’ nuclear weapons
Jeff SchogolSep 19, 2020 11:15 AM EDT
The commander of the U.S. military’s nuclear forces recently acknowledged that no one knows if using low-yield or tactical nuclear weapons will trigger a full-scale nuclear war.
Ever since the Cold War, commanders have considered whether it is possible to conduct a limited nuclear war. That’s why the United States developed “tactical nuclear weapons,” which were originally conceived to be used against specific troops and installations instead of completely destroying the other side.
In May 1953, the Army tested “Atomic Annie,” a cannon that could fire a shell with a 15-20 kiloton nuclear warhead up to 20 miles. It quickly became obsolete and was withdrawn from service in the 1960s.
Other tactical nuclear weapons were meant to be carried by U.S. troops behind enemy lines, such as the B-54 Special Atomic Demolition Munition, which could fit in a backpack. (Special Forces soldiers were required to stay within visual range of the target to make sure the bomb actually went off.)
First produced in 1968, B61 nuclear gravity bombs continue to be in the U.S. military’s arsenal. They are being updated with GPS so they can function more as smart bombs.
Under former President George W. Bush, the Defense Department looked into whether bunker busting bombs could be fitted with nuclear warheads, but in 2005 Congress killed funding for the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator. (Although the Energy Department was considering using a bomb with a 1-megaton warhead, so this bunker buster could have been considered a strategic weapon.)
More recently, the Navy in February fielded the W76-2, a low-yield nuclear warhead for submarine-launched ballistic missiles. This is likely the new secret nuclear weapons system that President Donald Trump bragged about when talking to author Bob Woodward for the book Rage, although he could have been referring to the planned W93 warhead.
The return to the idea of limited nuclear war is relatively recent. At the moment, the U.S. military feels that it needs relatively small nuclear weapons to prevent potential adversaries – particularly Russia – from using any of its own low-yield nuclear weapons in the belief that they can escape U.S. retaliation.
One scenario envisioned by the Trump administration in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review is that Russia could use tactical nuclear weapons at the very start of a war because they believe the United States would not launch its intercontinental ballistic missiles or use other strategic nuclear weapons in response.In other words, if the Russkies have baby nukes and we only have big nukes, Ivan might exploit the baby nuke gap as part of their unscrupulous doctrine of “Escalating to De-escalate.”
If this sounds a little nutty to you, please keep in mind that the military has had far wackier ideas in the past. In 1994, the Air Force proposed building a bomb that would make enemy troops so “sexually irresistible” to each other that they would focus on the physical act of love instead of fighting, a weirdly offensive weapon dubbed the “gay bomb” at the time.
While the United States has leaned into tactical nukes in recent years, the Russians have made clear that they would view any nuclear attack as the start of a war, regardless whether the U.S. uses a tactical or strategic nuclear weapon.
“Those who like to theorize about the flexibility of American nuclear potential must understand that in line with the Russian military doctrine such actions are seen as warranting retaliatory use of nuclear weapons by Russia,” said Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova in April.
The debate over ‘tactical’ nukes, it seems, is a matter of semantics. Even former Defense Secretary James Mattis, who has supported developing nuclear-tipped cruise missiles, told Congress that the word “tactical” is not applicable when describing nukes.
“I don’t think there is any such thing as a ‘tactical nuclear weapon,’” Mattis told Congress in February 2018. “Any nuclear weapon used any time is a strategic game-changer.”
Since both sides seem to agree that once the button is pushed there is no running away, the W76-2 seems kind of useless. It’s not as if Vladimir Putin would say: “Those clever Americans have used a ‘tactical’ nuclear weapon. Now my hands are completely tied!”
When Navy Adm. Chas Richard, the head of U.S. Strategic Command, came to the Pentagon on Sept. 14, Task & Purpose asked if he believed the United States could actually use the W76-2 against Russia or China and escape a full retaliation.
Richard said the W76-2 is meant to deter anyone else from using low-yield nuclear weapons in the first place so that the United States doesn’t get into a nuclear exchange with another country. When Task & Purpose asked Richard if a nuclear war could be confined to low-yield weapons – and if tactical nuclear weapons even exist – the admiral’s answer was both brutally honest and slightly terrifying.
“The answer is nobody knows if that's the case,” Richard replied. “But I do think it's an obligation for the United States to do everything in its power should a nuclear weapon be used by somebody else to stop the exchange as soon as possible, to limit damage to the U.S. to the maximum extent possible, and to end it on terms favorable to the United States.”
“The short answer to your question is, is that nobody knows,” he continued. “Fortunately we don't have any real-world experience in that, and I would just as soon keep it that way.”
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Jeff Schogol covers the Pentagon for Task & Purpose. He has covered the military for 15 years and embedded with U.S. troops in Iraq and Haiti. Prior to joining T&P, he covered the Marine Corps and Air Force at Military Times. Comments or thoughts to share? Send them to Jeff Schogol via email at schogol@taskandpurpose.com or direct message @JeffSchogol on Twitter.
jward
passin' thru
PLA conducts recon on both sides of Taiwan to gather intel for real combat: experts
By Liu Xuanzun Source: Global Times Published: 2020/9/27 17:47:58
Intel-gathering prepares for real combat: experts
A KJ-500 airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft attached to a naval aviation regiment under the PLA Southern Theater Command taxies on the runway before takeoff during a round-the-clock flight training exercise on August 19, 2020.Photo:China Military
During its real combat-oriented exercises and combat-readiness patrols in the Taiwan Straits since last week, the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) has conducted intensive aerial and maritime reconnaissance missions of the island of Taiwan from both its west and east, with the number of operations surpassing that of fighter jets and bombers.
The operations, aimed at gathering intelligence on the forces of Taiwan, the US and Japan including their submarine activities, troop deployments and military facility situations, will prepare the PLA for a possible future battle, Chinese mainland experts said on Sunday.
Since Taiwan's defense authority has started publishing PLA aircraft activities near the island with detailed information, photos and flight paths on September 17 and as of press time on Sunday, it has announced 10 sorties by Y-8 anti-submarine warfare aircraft on six different days. All flew above the waters to the southwest of the island.
This type of aircraft again approached the island on Sunday morning, with a KJ-500 early warning aircraft flying off the coast of Shantou, South China's Guangdong Province, Taiwan media reported on Sunday, citing an open source aircraft tracking service. This marks the 12th consecutive day the PLA has entered the island's self-declared air defense identification zone, it said.
By comparison, the island's defense authority only recorded two days of PLA activities involving fighter jets and bombers.
On the other side of the island, on Friday, a Y-9 reconnaissance aircraft flew through the Miyako Strait from the north, turned west and headed toward the east of Taiwan, before returning by the same flight path, according to a press release by Japan's Defense Ministry Joint Staff on the same day.
This is the first time a PLA warplane is known to have been spotted to the east of Taiwan since the PLA announced the exercises on September 18.
Also, a PLA intelligence-gathering ship has been operating to the east of Taiwan since last week, Taiwan media reported on Sunday.
The PLA has been increasing the intensity of patrols, searching and reconnaissance in order to gain more intelligence, with the goal of providing basic information and creating advantageous conditions for its future maritime activities and combat operations, Li Jie, a Beijing-based naval expert, told the Global Times on Sunday.
Particularly, the eastern waters of Taiwan were less known to the PLA, including its geological and hydrological information as well as the Taiwan military's ongoing activities, Li said, noting that the PLA would need to carry out missions in all directions around Taiwan.
The Y-8 anti-submarine warfare aircraft, the Y-9 reconnaissance aircraft and the KJ-500 early warning aircraft are all special mission aircraft developed based on the Y-8 tactical transport aircraft.
The Y-8 anti-submarine warfare aircraft is apparently equipped with an air-to-surface search radar to conduct reconnaissance on warships, and a magnetic anomaly detection tube and sonobuoys to search for submarines. Li said it can gather intelligence on submarine activities by Taiwan, the US and Japan, while also gaining knowledge of maritime geological and hydrological characteristics.
The Y-9 reconnaissance aircraft can gather intelligence on hostile troops deployments, the situation in hostile bases, ports and airfields, and eventually find patterns, Li said.
On Saturday, the US sent an EP-3E and a P-8A reconnaissance aircraft near the Chinese mainland over the South China Sea, according to information released by Beijing-based think tank the South China Sea Strategic Situation Probing Initiative (SCSPI) on the same day.
The SCSPI noted that the EP-3E was only 47.81 nautical miles from Guangdong, leading Taiwan media to claim it is a new record for a US warplane to conduct close-up reconnaissance on the Chinese mainland, and that the US was "putting pressure on the PLA."
Recently, the US and Taiwan have been keeping stepping on the red line with frequent interactions, but the PLA will not just sit by and watch, Fu Qianshao, a Chinese mainland military aviation expert, told the Global Times.
Increasing the intensity of military drills and normalized training in the Taiwan Straits is a clear warning to Taiwan secessionists: If they don't stop now, they are bound to be smashed into pieces, Fu said.
posted for fair use
By Liu Xuanzun Source: Global Times Published: 2020/9/27 17:47:58
Intel-gathering prepares for real combat: experts
A KJ-500 airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft attached to a naval aviation regiment under the PLA Southern Theater Command taxies on the runway before takeoff during a round-the-clock flight training exercise on August 19, 2020.Photo:China Military
During its real combat-oriented exercises and combat-readiness patrols in the Taiwan Straits since last week, the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) has conducted intensive aerial and maritime reconnaissance missions of the island of Taiwan from both its west and east, with the number of operations surpassing that of fighter jets and bombers.
The operations, aimed at gathering intelligence on the forces of Taiwan, the US and Japan including their submarine activities, troop deployments and military facility situations, will prepare the PLA for a possible future battle, Chinese mainland experts said on Sunday.
Since Taiwan's defense authority has started publishing PLA aircraft activities near the island with detailed information, photos and flight paths on September 17 and as of press time on Sunday, it has announced 10 sorties by Y-8 anti-submarine warfare aircraft on six different days. All flew above the waters to the southwest of the island.
This type of aircraft again approached the island on Sunday morning, with a KJ-500 early warning aircraft flying off the coast of Shantou, South China's Guangdong Province, Taiwan media reported on Sunday, citing an open source aircraft tracking service. This marks the 12th consecutive day the PLA has entered the island's self-declared air defense identification zone, it said.
By comparison, the island's defense authority only recorded two days of PLA activities involving fighter jets and bombers.
On the other side of the island, on Friday, a Y-9 reconnaissance aircraft flew through the Miyako Strait from the north, turned west and headed toward the east of Taiwan, before returning by the same flight path, according to a press release by Japan's Defense Ministry Joint Staff on the same day.
This is the first time a PLA warplane is known to have been spotted to the east of Taiwan since the PLA announced the exercises on September 18.
Also, a PLA intelligence-gathering ship has been operating to the east of Taiwan since last week, Taiwan media reported on Sunday.
The PLA has been increasing the intensity of patrols, searching and reconnaissance in order to gain more intelligence, with the goal of providing basic information and creating advantageous conditions for its future maritime activities and combat operations, Li Jie, a Beijing-based naval expert, told the Global Times on Sunday.
Particularly, the eastern waters of Taiwan were less known to the PLA, including its geological and hydrological information as well as the Taiwan military's ongoing activities, Li said, noting that the PLA would need to carry out missions in all directions around Taiwan.
The Y-8 anti-submarine warfare aircraft, the Y-9 reconnaissance aircraft and the KJ-500 early warning aircraft are all special mission aircraft developed based on the Y-8 tactical transport aircraft.
The Y-8 anti-submarine warfare aircraft is apparently equipped with an air-to-surface search radar to conduct reconnaissance on warships, and a magnetic anomaly detection tube and sonobuoys to search for submarines. Li said it can gather intelligence on submarine activities by Taiwan, the US and Japan, while also gaining knowledge of maritime geological and hydrological characteristics.
The Y-9 reconnaissance aircraft can gather intelligence on hostile troops deployments, the situation in hostile bases, ports and airfields, and eventually find patterns, Li said.
On Saturday, the US sent an EP-3E and a P-8A reconnaissance aircraft near the Chinese mainland over the South China Sea, according to information released by Beijing-based think tank the South China Sea Strategic Situation Probing Initiative (SCSPI) on the same day.
The SCSPI noted that the EP-3E was only 47.81 nautical miles from Guangdong, leading Taiwan media to claim it is a new record for a US warplane to conduct close-up reconnaissance on the Chinese mainland, and that the US was "putting pressure on the PLA."
Recently, the US and Taiwan have been keeping stepping on the red line with frequent interactions, but the PLA will not just sit by and watch, Fu Qianshao, a Chinese mainland military aviation expert, told the Global Times.
Increasing the intensity of military drills and normalized training in the Taiwan Straits is a clear warning to Taiwan secessionists: If they don't stop now, they are bound to be smashed into pieces, Fu said.
posted for fair use
northern watch
TB Fanatic
Hummm......
Posted for fair use.....
www.lowyinstitute.org
The unfinished Chinese civil war
John Culver
Many frame China’s options against Taiwan as peace or invasion. This is a dangerous oversimplification.
Published 30 Sep 2020 14:00 0 Comments
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The Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) war with the Kuomintang (KMT, or Nationalist Party) started in the 1920s, hit pause during the decade of anti-Japanese war and the Second World War, then culminated in an immediate post-war period with the remnants of the KMT fleeting to Formosa/Taiwan in 1949. The Chinese civil war has never ended – it has just shifted means, modes and tempo, and the “war” has continued to the present day.
The US has been enmeshed in this civil war almost since its inception, through acts and decisions not to act. It has played a decisive role at every juncture, even while professing an official position of not taking a position, other than that the two sides work to resolve the issue peacefully. The US decision not to support unpopular, deeply corrupt KMT leader Chiang Kai-shek – a Second World War ally – in his fight on the mainland hastened the CCP’s victory there, but only marked the beginning of the next phase of the Chinese civil war.
The deployment of the US Navy’s Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait in 1950, after the start of the Korean War, effectively checked any plans by China to mount an invasion. Taiwan remained a military dictatorship until 1987, when Chiang’s son, Chiang Ching-kuo, lifted martial law and began the transition to a vibrant tech-led economic growth and popular elections to strengthen the island’s attractiveness to non-autocrats and counter its growing isolation. Even then, the official policy of the Republic of China on Taiwan was reunification under the KMT, not independence from China.
At the height of US-ROC relations, prior to President Richard Nixon’s 1972 visit to China, the US maintained a mutual defence treaty. The US stationed troops on Taiwan, kept nuclear weapons there, and US combat troops fighting in Vietnam would travel to Taiwan for R & R. On Kissinger’s first secret visit to negotiate Nixon’s trip to China, a key Chinese requirement was US agreement to remove its nuclear weapons from Taiwan. Taiwan would launch the first of its repeated efforts to develop its own nuclear weapons, all of them uncovered and stopped by the US government and the international community.
For the past 40 years, in part because of the US commitment neither to support Taiwan independence nor to abandon its former ally, China shifted priorities for its war with Taiwan to building cross-strait relations, and strengthening the basis for stable US-China relations. When tensions flared and China staged military demonstrations, its goal was to maintain this status quo. In many instances, the principal target of the CCP threats and military demonstrations during periods of tension (typically around a Taiwan election cycle) was to put pressure on the US to constrain Taiwan rather than act directly on Taiwan itself. And the US frequently performed this role (e.g., public comments by presidents or senior US officials viewed by Taiwan voters as critical of the candidate of the Democratic Progressive Party, the party typically regarded as most sympathetic to independence).
The primary political goal of the CCP’s struggle from roughly 1979 until now has been to preserve the possibility of political unification at some undefined point in the future. Tellingly, China’s 2005 law laying a foundation for the use of force is an “anti-secession” law, not a “reunification law”, a distinction that was actively debated for the two years prior to its passage.
But in a very real sense, over decades of relative peace, a massive expansion of economic, tourist and people-to-people ties between Taiwan and the mainland, the Chinese civil war has continued. China has been conducting an “all of regime” strategy for reunification for decades that has remained at low to moderate intensity, employing non-military means because successive administrations on Taiwan, and in the US, have not pressed the issue. China has been able to sustain its immediate goal of preserving the possibility of political compromise under a framework that it can call “reunification” as Beijing built China’s composite national power and controlled the risk of war through deep integration with Taiwan, the US and the international system.
Those closely watching this situation for the past several decades will understand that China has a political strategy for unification, which has a military component.
Most US analysis reverses this and frames China’s options as peace or war, and if war, the only military option they consider is invasion. This is a dangerous oversimplification.
Many of the understandings, military factors and ambiguous positions that enabled decades of peace, prosperity and democracy on Taiwan are now eroding, due to China’s burgeoning economic and military power, Taiwan’s consolidating democracy led by the pro-autonomy DPP, and burgeoning US determination to play the “Taiwan card” in its strategic rivalry with China.
If military conflict comes to the Taiwan Strait in the next few years, the past will not serve as prologue for China’s modes, means and goals. The unfinished Chinese civil war will re-emerge as not only a military contest. And it’s likely that, from the moment the shooting starts, it will cease being the unfinished Chinese civil war and will become the China-US war. Taiwan would be the first battlefield of intensive combat operations between the world’s two most powerful military forces in a war that would quickly cease to be primarily about Taiwan’s autonomy, prosperity or the lives and livelihoods of its 24 million people.
For China, the first and most important goal would not be to quickly “win” in a conventional military sense. Instead it would be to “not lose”.
For the CCP, such a conflict would be about its legitimacy and survival, and the return of China as the dominant power in East Asia. Not contesting probably would not be an option for the CCP – indeed, it seems convinced that it has an asymmetrical interest in the outcome compared to the United States.
For Washington, it would present a Hobbesian choice: intervene in open-ended, financially ruinous conflict with another nuclear power for the first time and risk unprecedented combat losses, or be seen as standing aside in the face of an assault on a vibrant democracy and its 24 million citizens. US allies and partners would be torn by the cost of picking a side versus the potential ramifications of not countering Chinese aggression.
In a crisis to compel unification, the scope and intensity of China’s means, modes and measures could increase exponentially. It probably does not need to invade the island quickly, and if successful (by no means assured), then fight a ruinous counterinsurgency for decades. For China, the first and most important goal would not be to quickly “win” in a conventional military sense. Instead it would be to “not lose” while it sets the conditions for eventual victory – a victory that the CCP will frame in political rather than strictly military terms.
The CCP probably could afford to continue to be patient as it executes a series of strategic campaigns. It will be prepared for this war to last for months, perhaps years, and even for a decade if necessary. It will be analogous to other struggles for national unification – those in Vietnam, Korea, Germany and even the US Civil War.
If the Chinese civil war becomes a kinetic conflict, the key distinction that China will make is that East Asia is in a condition of “not peace”, along with all the economic and security ramifications of that new reality. The region that has driven global economic growth for the past several decades would become a war zone, breaking global supply chains, transportation links and financial systems.
The second key condition China will seek to impose is that US military presence, and access to bases, waters and airspace make enabling countries targets for multiple domains of Chinese aggression. Rather than being the “security guarantor of the Western Pacific”, China will seek to make the US the “insecurity guarantor” disrupting the region’s (and the world’s) trade, prosperity and peace, and to create doubt and gaps between the US and its allies and partners.
For China, its adversaries’ centre of gravity isn’t their purely military capacity to blunt an invasion. Instead, it’s the will of the Taiwan people and military to fight, and the will and capacity of the US to intervene decisively and maintain a posture to do so for a long time. Military operations almost certainly would not be binary – bluster or invade – but a wide spectrum that can be intensified or reduced at China’s choosing.
China can, early in a conflict, use long-range strikes to destroy all of Taiwan’s key military and leadership facilities, power generation and telecommunications. It can embargo all of Taiwan’s oil imports and cut or compromise via cyber all high-bandwidth connectivity to the outside world. And it likely can sustain this indefinitely. It can seize all Taiwan-held offshore islands, including the Penghus and Pratas, and use these as mobilisation and embarkation bases for future landing operations on Taiwan, and as chokepoints against US intervention, while burnishing nationalist domestic support early in the conflict.
And perhaps most importantly, it can seek the right time and conditions to demonstrate to the people of Taiwan – and Japan, Australia and the US – that the US military cannot prevent or undo China’s actions, and either will not put its major military assets into harm’s way, or having done so, will suffer surprising and politically devastating losses. Beijing would strive to portray the US position as analogous to victoryless wars in Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, albeit at far higher potential human and financial costs for the US and its allies.
In such a scenario, what China would want – and what the CCP would need – is an end to the Chinese civil war on terms that it can call “reunification”. Its best outcome would be one negotiated by Taiwan political authorities that cannot be negated by US military, economic or diplomatic action. Arguably, from the CCP’s perspective, the most effective way to bring about a negotiated outcome could be to deter or defeat the US military as a primary line of operations, rather than invade Taiwan, and then take advantage of the psychological impact on Taiwan to press for negotiations.
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The unfinished Chinese civil war | Lowy Institute
Many frame China’s options against Taiwan as peace or invasion. This is a dangerous oversimplification.
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The unfinished Chinese civil war
John Culver
Many frame China’s options against Taiwan as peace or invasion. This is a dangerous oversimplification.
Published 30 Sep 2020 14:00 0 Comments
Follow @JohnCulver689
The Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) war with the Kuomintang (KMT, or Nationalist Party) started in the 1920s, hit pause during the decade of anti-Japanese war and the Second World War, then culminated in an immediate post-war period with the remnants of the KMT fleeting to Formosa/Taiwan in 1949. The Chinese civil war has never ended – it has just shifted means, modes and tempo, and the “war” has continued to the present day.
The US has been enmeshed in this civil war almost since its inception, through acts and decisions not to act. It has played a decisive role at every juncture, even while professing an official position of not taking a position, other than that the two sides work to resolve the issue peacefully. The US decision not to support unpopular, deeply corrupt KMT leader Chiang Kai-shek – a Second World War ally – in his fight on the mainland hastened the CCP’s victory there, but only marked the beginning of the next phase of the Chinese civil war.
The deployment of the US Navy’s Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait in 1950, after the start of the Korean War, effectively checked any plans by China to mount an invasion. Taiwan remained a military dictatorship until 1987, when Chiang’s son, Chiang Ching-kuo, lifted martial law and began the transition to a vibrant tech-led economic growth and popular elections to strengthen the island’s attractiveness to non-autocrats and counter its growing isolation. Even then, the official policy of the Republic of China on Taiwan was reunification under the KMT, not independence from China.
At the height of US-ROC relations, prior to President Richard Nixon’s 1972 visit to China, the US maintained a mutual defence treaty. The US stationed troops on Taiwan, kept nuclear weapons there, and US combat troops fighting in Vietnam would travel to Taiwan for R & R. On Kissinger’s first secret visit to negotiate Nixon’s trip to China, a key Chinese requirement was US agreement to remove its nuclear weapons from Taiwan. Taiwan would launch the first of its repeated efforts to develop its own nuclear weapons, all of them uncovered and stopped by the US government and the international community.
For the past 40 years, in part because of the US commitment neither to support Taiwan independence nor to abandon its former ally, China shifted priorities for its war with Taiwan to building cross-strait relations, and strengthening the basis for stable US-China relations. When tensions flared and China staged military demonstrations, its goal was to maintain this status quo. In many instances, the principal target of the CCP threats and military demonstrations during periods of tension (typically around a Taiwan election cycle) was to put pressure on the US to constrain Taiwan rather than act directly on Taiwan itself. And the US frequently performed this role (e.g., public comments by presidents or senior US officials viewed by Taiwan voters as critical of the candidate of the Democratic Progressive Party, the party typically regarded as most sympathetic to independence).
The primary political goal of the CCP’s struggle from roughly 1979 until now has been to preserve the possibility of political unification at some undefined point in the future. Tellingly, China’s 2005 law laying a foundation for the use of force is an “anti-secession” law, not a “reunification law”, a distinction that was actively debated for the two years prior to its passage.
But in a very real sense, over decades of relative peace, a massive expansion of economic, tourist and people-to-people ties between Taiwan and the mainland, the Chinese civil war has continued. China has been conducting an “all of regime” strategy for reunification for decades that has remained at low to moderate intensity, employing non-military means because successive administrations on Taiwan, and in the US, have not pressed the issue. China has been able to sustain its immediate goal of preserving the possibility of political compromise under a framework that it can call “reunification” as Beijing built China’s composite national power and controlled the risk of war through deep integration with Taiwan, the US and the international system.
Those closely watching this situation for the past several decades will understand that China has a political strategy for unification, which has a military component.
Most US analysis reverses this and frames China’s options as peace or war, and if war, the only military option they consider is invasion. This is a dangerous oversimplification.
Many of the understandings, military factors and ambiguous positions that enabled decades of peace, prosperity and democracy on Taiwan are now eroding, due to China’s burgeoning economic and military power, Taiwan’s consolidating democracy led by the pro-autonomy DPP, and burgeoning US determination to play the “Taiwan card” in its strategic rivalry with China.
If military conflict comes to the Taiwan Strait in the next few years, the past will not serve as prologue for China’s modes, means and goals. The unfinished Chinese civil war will re-emerge as not only a military contest. And it’s likely that, from the moment the shooting starts, it will cease being the unfinished Chinese civil war and will become the China-US war. Taiwan would be the first battlefield of intensive combat operations between the world’s two most powerful military forces in a war that would quickly cease to be primarily about Taiwan’s autonomy, prosperity or the lives and livelihoods of its 24 million people.
For China, the first and most important goal would not be to quickly “win” in a conventional military sense. Instead it would be to “not lose”.
For the CCP, such a conflict would be about its legitimacy and survival, and the return of China as the dominant power in East Asia. Not contesting probably would not be an option for the CCP – indeed, it seems convinced that it has an asymmetrical interest in the outcome compared to the United States.
For Washington, it would present a Hobbesian choice: intervene in open-ended, financially ruinous conflict with another nuclear power for the first time and risk unprecedented combat losses, or be seen as standing aside in the face of an assault on a vibrant democracy and its 24 million citizens. US allies and partners would be torn by the cost of picking a side versus the potential ramifications of not countering Chinese aggression.
In a crisis to compel unification, the scope and intensity of China’s means, modes and measures could increase exponentially. It probably does not need to invade the island quickly, and if successful (by no means assured), then fight a ruinous counterinsurgency for decades. For China, the first and most important goal would not be to quickly “win” in a conventional military sense. Instead it would be to “not lose” while it sets the conditions for eventual victory – a victory that the CCP will frame in political rather than strictly military terms.
The CCP probably could afford to continue to be patient as it executes a series of strategic campaigns. It will be prepared for this war to last for months, perhaps years, and even for a decade if necessary. It will be analogous to other struggles for national unification – those in Vietnam, Korea, Germany and even the US Civil War.
If the Chinese civil war becomes a kinetic conflict, the key distinction that China will make is that East Asia is in a condition of “not peace”, along with all the economic and security ramifications of that new reality. The region that has driven global economic growth for the past several decades would become a war zone, breaking global supply chains, transportation links and financial systems.
The second key condition China will seek to impose is that US military presence, and access to bases, waters and airspace make enabling countries targets for multiple domains of Chinese aggression. Rather than being the “security guarantor of the Western Pacific”, China will seek to make the US the “insecurity guarantor” disrupting the region’s (and the world’s) trade, prosperity and peace, and to create doubt and gaps between the US and its allies and partners.
For China, its adversaries’ centre of gravity isn’t their purely military capacity to blunt an invasion. Instead, it’s the will of the Taiwan people and military to fight, and the will and capacity of the US to intervene decisively and maintain a posture to do so for a long time. Military operations almost certainly would not be binary – bluster or invade – but a wide spectrum that can be intensified or reduced at China’s choosing.
China can, early in a conflict, use long-range strikes to destroy all of Taiwan’s key military and leadership facilities, power generation and telecommunications. It can embargo all of Taiwan’s oil imports and cut or compromise via cyber all high-bandwidth connectivity to the outside world. And it likely can sustain this indefinitely. It can seize all Taiwan-held offshore islands, including the Penghus and Pratas, and use these as mobilisation and embarkation bases for future landing operations on Taiwan, and as chokepoints against US intervention, while burnishing nationalist domestic support early in the conflict.
And perhaps most importantly, it can seek the right time and conditions to demonstrate to the people of Taiwan – and Japan, Australia and the US – that the US military cannot prevent or undo China’s actions, and either will not put its major military assets into harm’s way, or having done so, will suffer surprising and politically devastating losses. Beijing would strive to portray the US position as analogous to victoryless wars in Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, albeit at far higher potential human and financial costs for the US and its allies.
In such a scenario, what China would want – and what the CCP would need – is an end to the Chinese civil war on terms that it can call “reunification”. Its best outcome would be one negotiated by Taiwan political authorities that cannot be negated by US military, economic or diplomatic action. Arguably, from the CCP’s perspective, the most effective way to bring about a negotiated outcome could be to deter or defeat the US military as a primary line of operations, rather than invade Taiwan, and then take advantage of the psychological impact on Taiwan to press for negotiations.
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#Taiwan scrambles fighter jets after #PLA spy plane enters air defence zone #Taipei issues warnings as #Chinese military surveillance aircraft is spotted close to Pratas Islands in southwest sector of its ADIZ
The PLA Air Force Y-8 surveillance aircraft entered the southwest sector of the zone close to the Pratas Islands the defence ministry said. Latest reconnaissance mission comes on National Day holiday, but PLA ‘doesn’t take days off’, military observer says
View: https://twitter.com/IndoPac_Info/status/1312240049010864128?s=20
@IndoPac_Info
#Taiwan scrambles fighter jets after #PLA spy plane enters air defence zone #Taipei issues warnings as #Chinese military surveillance aircraft is spotted close to Pratas Islands in southwest sector of its ADIZ
The PLA Air Force Y-8 surveillance aircraft entered the southwest sector of the zone close to the Pratas Islands the defence ministry said. Latest reconnaissance mission comes on National Day holiday, but PLA ‘doesn’t take days off’, military observer says
View: https://twitter.com/IndoPac_Info/status/1312240049010864128?s=20