WAR CHINA THREATENS TO INVADE TAIWAN

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Posted for fair use.....

They’re Back: US Subs To Carry Harpoon Ship-Killer Missiles
The effort falls in line with Pentagon efforts to deploy more punch at longer ranges, a clear recognition of the growing ability of China and Russia to keep American and forces at a stand-off distance


By Paul McLeary on February 10, 2021 at 11:41 AM
115 Comments

WASHINGTON: After a 25-year absence, the Navy will start packing Harpoon ship-killer missiles on its attack submarines as the fleet looks for new ways to counter the growing Chinese navy.


The effort falls in line with a range of programs the Pentagon is pursuing to develop ways to deploy more offensive punch at longer ranges, a clear recognition of the growing ability of China and Russia to keep American and allied forces at a distance in any potential confrontation.


The Harpoon work was capped off late last month when the Navy awarded Boeing a $10 million contract to arm Los Angeles-class attack subs with the new Harpoons as soon as this year. The contract follows the successful test firing of a Harpoon from the USS Olympia submarine during the RIMPAC 2018 exercise off the coast of Hawaii, marking the first time the missile had been fired from an American sub since 1997.


The Pentagon has been working on getting its ship-killing prowess back since the Obama administration, when then-Defense Secretary Ash Carter launched the Third Offset Strategy aimed at developing new technologies, and repurposing old ones, to make the force more lethal, at moderate cost — and to do it quickly.


The increased missile range also fits with the emerging Navy strategy which accepts the risk posed by precision weapons and stand-off capabilty developed by China, in particular. A “tri-service” strategy released by the Navy, Marines and Coast Guard in December pointed out the plan is to continue to develop “ready, forward-deployed naval forces [which] will accept calculated tactical risks and adopt a more assertive posture in our day-to-day operations.”


The work began to pay off in the fielding of the over-the-horizon Naval Strike Missile, made by a team made up of Raytheon and Norway-based Kongsberg. The weapon, with a range of about 100 miles (roughly comparable to the Harpoon), has been deployed aboard the Littoral Combat Ship USS Gabrielle Giffords, and will become a mainstay aboard the Constellation-class frigates which begin construction this year.


The entire fleet of more than 30 Littoral Combat Ships will eventually be equipped with the NSM, Navy CNO Adm. Mike Gilday told Breaking Defense recently.


“In today’s in today’s competitive space with China, in particular, you need lethal systems like the Naval Strike Missile on every single and every single LCS that we have. And so in order to and so, I do want those ships deployed in numbers,” Gilday said.



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The Navy and Marine Corps are also looking for ways to get the NSM fitted aboard its amphibious ships, a move that advances the emerging plan to find ways to add more punch to the US fleet as China and Russia push their own long-range weapons out to sea.


“We have these magnificent 600-foot-long, highly survivable, highly LPD 17s,” Marine Maj. Gen. Tracy King, the Navy’s director of expeditionary warfare, told reporters last month. “The LPDs need the ability to reach out and defend themselves and sink another ship. It’s not from the aspect of using them as a strike platform; it will drastically increase their survivability if the enemy has to honor that threat.”


Putting those missiles aboard large, amphibious ships also wielding F-35Bs is in line with the Corps’ efforts to find a way to fire long-range anti-ship missiles from shore-based ground vehicles to support the fleet from dispersed locations. Last year, Raytheon was awarded $48 million to integrate the NSM into the Marine Corps’ force structure, following a year-long study the Corps conducted, where it also considered Lockheed Martin’s new Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile and the Harpoon.


In December, the Navy also fired a new version of the Cold War stalwart Tomahawk missile from the destroyer USS Chafee, giving the surface fleet an expanded ability to target ships and land targets at greater range. The Black V Tomahawk is expected to reach ranges in excess of 1,000 miles with a new warhead that will carry a bigger punch than older versions.


Recommended
Hypersonic Debates Shaped By Politics: Aerospace

“In some ways, it’s too early to say ‘game changer,’ or ‘nothing.’ And I would say, just to put it starkly, each of those positions is probably likely to be untrue or inaccurate,” CSBA’s Tom Mahnken says.
By Theresa Hitchens
 

jward

passin' thru
I wonder what Asian country was sold the cruise missiles?
Indo-Pacific News - Watching the CCP-China Threat
@IndoPac_Info


BREAKING: #Israeli Aerospace Engineers Earned Tens of Millions Illegally Selling Advanced Missiles to #ChinaThe technology involved loitering missiles, which are launched and track a target and wait for the optimal moment to attack. Via
@Byron_Wan

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1360258369219563522
View: https://twitter.com/IndoPac_Info/status/1360258369219563522?s=20
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Hummm.....

Posted for fair use.....

Asia Pacific
Satellite images suggest China’s new tanker aircraft is under production

By: Mike Yeo   9 hours ago


Overhead imagery of an airfield in Xi’an-Yanliang, China shows four Y-20s with the shadows of refueling pods on their outer wings, indicating these are Y-20U tankers. (Courtesy of Planet Labs)


Overhead imagery of an airfield in Xi’an-Yanliang, China shows four Y-20s with the shadows of refueling pods on their outer wings, indicating these are Y-20U tankers. (Courtesy of Planet Labs)

MELBOURNE, Australia — Satellite imagery appears to indicate China has begun serial production of a tanker aircraft based on its indigenous Xi’an Y-20 airlifter, filling a notable gap in the power projection capabilities of its air force.

The overhead imagery of the airfield at Xi’an-Yanliang — taken Dec. 30, 2020, and provided to Defense News by Planet Labs — shows four Y-20s with the shadows of refueling pods on their outer wings clearly visible, indicating that these are Y-20U tankers.

The Y-20U is a tanker variant of the Y-20 and is believed to be fitted with three refueling points, these being located on pods mounted on the outer wings and one more on the rear fuselage.

Overhead imagery of an airfield in Xi’an-Yanliang, China, taken Dec. 30, 2020. (Courtesy of Planet Labs)

Refueling is achieved by the hose and drogue method, with a refueling basket at the end of a retractable hose where receiver aircraft with inflight refueling probes “plug” into the basket before taking on fuel.

The first Y-20U prototype made its maiden flight in 2018, and the appearance of four Y-20U suggests the flight test program is complete or has advanced sufficiently enough for serial production to begin. It is unknown whether the Y-20U will be a dedicated tanker or will retain its cargo capability of the standard Y-20 airlifter.



The four-engine-strong Y-20 and Y-20U are still, however, powered by the Russian Soloviev D-30KP-2 turbofan engines. China is developing the WS-20 high-bypass turbofan for the Y-20 family, although the engine is not expected to enter production before 2024.

A Y-20 strategic transport plane takes flight Oct. 29, 2016, in Zhuhai, China. The Y-20 is China's first domestically developed heavy-lift transport aircraft. (Getty Images)

Three of the four aircraft in the satellite photo are painted in dark gray, while the last aircraft is still in its primer coat. One of the gray aircraft is the prototype, or test bed aircraft, while the other three are likely to be production aircraft.

The four Y-20Us are among 16 Y-20s seen throughout the airfield. Xi’an-Yanliang is where the production facilities of the Xi’an Aircraft Company, or XAC, is located, along with a number of aviation technology companies and research facilities.

It is also home to the China Flight Test Establishment, which is responsible for overseeing flight testing of new aircraft types built by Chinese companies.

Where does China’s refueling capability stand?

The Chinese People’s Liberation Army Air Force, or PLAAF, currently operates about two dozen tanker aircraft. That fleet is mostly made up of H-6U and naval H-6DU tankers based on the Xi’an H-6 bomber, which is itself similar to Russia’s Tupolev Tu-16, which dates back to the Soviet-era of the 1950s.

The PLAAF also operates three Ilyushin Il-78MP tankers acquired from Ukraine and delivered in 2014. The service has encountered issues with securing more of the Russian-built Il-76s airlifters for conversion into tankers or to boost its modest heavy airlift capabilities prior to the Y-20 entering service in 2016.

The small number of Il-78s in PLAAF service, as well as the limited fuel offload capability of the H-6 compared to larger aircraft, means China has what could be described as a modest inflight refueling capability.

This shortfall in tanker capacity is likely to ease if more Y-20Us are built, and the increase in the number of these force multiplier aircraft will enable China to extend its reach in airspace and keep its combat aircraft in the air for longer periods of time.
 

1-12020

Senior Member
so many rumors of war and almost conflicts . One day china is going to do it. Same with the crazy Iran. Iran is what I'm paying most attention to, I fully expect to see Damascus blown up. But China might go first with Taiwan it seems like.
Thanks Danielboon for the updates
 

jward

passin' thru
Chris Cavas
@CavasShips


#China is annoyed (again) at the passage 24 Feb of US #destroyer CURTIS WILBUR DDG54 thru the #Taiwan Strait, the 2nd US #Navy transit in Feb. "China is firmly opposed to it," a spox said. Photo shows WILBUR, top, on 19 Feb with Japanese & French ships http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2021-02/2
View: https://twitter.com/CavasShips/status/1364820991877201921?s=20

______________________
Replying to
@CavasShips
That's Japanese supply ship HAMANA 424 and French patrol frigate PRAIRIAL F731 with CURTIS WILBUR. US #Navy statement on the transit is at
View: https://twitter.com/CavasShips/status/1364820995723431936?s=20
 

jward

passin' thru
Oh things could be worse... but we're 'bout thru with the musical chairs portion of the festivities, n ready for the next phase, I'd guess. Wonder who gets to start the dying part o' the events? : (
 

Southside

Has No Life - Lives on TB
#China is annoyed (again) at the passage 24 Feb of US #destroyer CURTIS WILBUR DDG54 thru the #Taiwan Strait, the 2nd US #Navy transit in Feb. "China is firmly opposed to it,"
Then shut the F up and do something!
Oh, your Navy sux. And so does your Air Force. Not so tough, after all, huh?
Listen closely to the sound on your Northern border. Russia hates you. And THAT is why you will do absolutely NOTHING!
Oh, and WWG1WGA. Putin is our pal!

Keep crying. It's all you have.

Southside
 

jward

passin' thru
Indo-Pacific News - Watching the CCP-China Threat
@IndoPac_Info

51m

Commentary: #China is in no position to take #Taiwan by force Unlike his predecessors, #Chinese President #XiJinping has demonstrated greater intensity in the desire for reunification, says Cui Lei from the China Institute of International Studies.
The mainland is unlikely to have any intention to pursue reunification by force anytime soon. One reason is that the domestic political risks are high if the use of force is not successful.
Victory is not yet a forgone conclusion — having prepared for conflict with the mainland for decades, Taiwan has toughened its ability to defend itself. Taiwan’s will is strong. Polls show that 80 per cent of Taiwanese people are willing to defend the island by force.

View: https://twitter.com/IndoPac_Info/status/1365508219037126657?s=20
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Hummm......

Posted for fair use.....

Can the United States Prevent a War over Taiwan?

Robert D. Blackwill and Philip Zelikow

March 1, 2021
Commentary

Taiwan is becoming the most dangerous flashpoint in the world. Events in and involving the small democracy could spark a war that draws in the United States, China, Japan, and possibly others. The administration of President Joe Biden should develop a more credible U.S. strategy to deter such a war.

What even many watchers of world politics could neglect, distracted by so many other global problems and noisemakers, is how much the situation surrounding Taiwan has changed in the last few years. China’s decision to crush local governance and effective rule of law in Hong Kong has had large effects. It changed politics in Taiwan in favor of a president whom China regards as a separatist. Chinese leaders doubled down on xenophobic nationalism and repression, escalating pressure on Taiwan both rhetorically and militarily. Taiwan has begun a significant program of rearmament with a seriousness not seen in a generation, supported by the United States, yet there is a significant window of time before this program can bear sufficient fruit.

We think the current war danger is half understood, but downplayed due to the invariable human tendency to assume that whatever the commotion, tomorrow will be pretty much like yesterday. This is an old problem. Most international wars come as a surprise, except to those planning them.

In 1962, most experts (though not the CIA director) dismissed the possibility that the Soviets would deploy nuclear missiles to Cuba. In 1973, most experts, including in Israel, dismissed the possibility that Egypt and Syria would launch a war. In 1979, most experts dismissed the possibility that the Soviet Union would invade Afghanistan. In 1990, most experts dismissed the possibility that Iraq would invade Kuwait. In 2014, most experts dismissed the possibility that Russia would invade Ukraine. Notably, in the Iraq case, the lone voice predicting an invasion of Kuwait was the CIA’s national intelligence officer for warning, Charlie Allen. Regional experts, and even regional leaders, discounted the warning. Allen afterward admitted to one of us that he had no particular knowledge of the region, but he and his people were watching the Iraqi military prepare.

To us, this recent history is humbling. We are not arguing a war is imminent or even more likely than not to happen. But what little we can know has led us to the conclusion that the risk of a Chinese war against Taiwan is much higher than it has been in decades.

China is doing what a country would do if it were moving into a prewar mode. Politically, it is preparing and conditioning its population for the possibility of an armed conflict. Militarily, it is engaging now in a tempo of exercises and military preparations that are both sharpening and widening the readiness of its armed forces across a range of different contingencies on sea, air, land, cyber, and in space. As was true of the Israeli reading of Egypt’s intentions in the period before the outbreak of the 1973 war, this level of operational activity also complicates the work of foreign intelligence agencies and makes it harder for them to distinguish ominous signals from the background noise.

At the beginning of 2021, leaders in President Donald Trump’s administration left behind an increasingly dangerous case. Watching the danger grow, the administration spoke much more loudly but carried about the same old stick.

The first step is to stop the bluster. The new Biden administration has soothingly reaffirmed historical U.S. postures on Taiwan, while adding, perhaps fatefully, “Our commitment to Taiwan is rock-solid.” The tone of this statement was indeed “rock-solid.” Yet the underlying substance of “our commitment” is no clearer than it was before. The United States ought to take actions to sustain the political balance and deterrence that has kept the peace for the last 50 years.

Second, the United States should immediately develop a more credible stick. A U.S. strategy to save Taiwan should depend less on U.S. aircraft carriers sailing to the rescue in waters China will dominate, and more on intensified and detailed coordinated planning to deter China and help Taiwan defend itself.

We introduced these arguments in a recent special report published by the Council on Foreign Relations. Since our report was published, some readers have assumed that we simply endorse the status quo, or that we want to see Washington walk back from its interest in the fate of Taiwan. Neither of these assumptions is correct. But our proposal admittedly does not fit neatly into stock arguments about what the United States and its allies should do to prevent a crisis or how they should react if such a crisis unfolds.

In the report, we offer three military scenarios: attacks on Taiwan’s periphery (like an offshore island), a quarantine that screens air and sea travel into Taiwan to prevent unwanted foreign arms supplies or interference, and a direct siege and invasion. We then weigh and cite many detailed public analyses (from the optimistic to pessimistic) evaluating what might happen in these scenarios.

It is no longer politically or militarily realistic to assume that U.S. forces, uncoordinated with allies, can be relied upon to defeat any of these types of Chinese assaults on Taiwan. Nor is it realistic to presume that, during such a clash, the United States would or should simply escalate to general war against China with comprehensive blockades or strikes against targets on the Chinese mainland.

If U.S. campaign plans only offer such unrealistic scenarios, they will likely be rejected by an American president and the U.S. Congress (if the Congress gets to decide, which is doubtful). The resulting U.S. paralysis would not be the result of presidential weakness or timidity. Rather, it could arise because the most powerful country in the world did not have credible options prepared for the most dangerous military crisis facing it.

Anyone analyzing alternative U.S. military strategies for Taiwan now studies a fog. Some assert that current defense plans are adequate, though this readiness may not be evident to the general public. Others claim current strategy is a Potemkin village, wishful assurances from a country that has already displayed this trait so often in recent years, from Iraq to Afghanistan, in pandemics and deep Texan winters. Reacting to our report, some current and former insiders think our worries are dead right: that if the emperor is not naked, his garb is at least threadbare. Others claim we just cannot see the clothes, or the tailors so hard at work. This is, of course, the challenge of debating war plans and defense preparedness without deep access to classified information.

Again, our inference is not to assume the worst. But, humbled by uncertainty and what is at stake, we do not trust such mysteries and vague reassurances. Effective defense plans are rarely mysterious. Their plausibility ought to be evident. In principle, we see four main approaches for how the United States might respond to such a variety of Chinese actions, only the last of which we endorse. All of them assume continued willingness to sell arms to Taiwan to improve its defenses, and strong support for the Taiwan Relations Act.

Approach #1

The United States could continue to sell arms to help Taiwan defend itself, but it would not share responsibility for the direct defense of Taiwan. Also, in a change from current U.S. campaign preparations as we understand them, it would not plan to intervene militarily in a conflict between China and Taiwan.

Continued.....
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Continued.....

Approach #2

The United States would not commit in advance to share responsibility for the direct defense of Taiwan, yet it would work to be ready to do just that. The likely U.S. campaign plan in a Taiwan conflict scenario would remain unclear to enemies and friends alike, and the allies and partners would therefore not join to prepare the coordinated execution of these plans.

The United States would be similarly unclear about whether its direct defense of Taiwan would involve attacks into the Chinese mainland or whether such an extension of the war is necessary or not. These plans might not require significant changes in the current character and deployment of U.S. and Japanese forces, because it is not evident how those forces would be used.

In our view, this was the status quo until the Trump administration, and may be again.

Approach #3

The United States could plan and prepare to share responsibility for the direct defense of Taiwan in a variety of scenarios. It could commit, in advance, to defend the island. These plans might well involve peacetime deployment of at least U.S. military advisers in Taiwan, and U.S. initiation of attacks on the units of the People’s Liberation Army that have used force against Taiwan. This approach would require significant changes in the character and deployment of U.S. and Japanese forces, along with improved joint training and readiness to execute these war plans. American and Japanese readiness to execute such credible war plans would be evident and exercised.

This third approach deserves careful consideration, although we do not endorse it. The presumed strategy for this is one of “denial,” leveraging new missile and sensor technology to create a 21st-century no man’s land in the air and seas surrounding Taiwan. We take account of ongoing defense innovations, and these are discussed in great detail in the sources we cited in our report. Defense experts who support such plans do not argue that the United States currently has the necessary forces and readiness to execute this approach. Rather, they say that their strategy is doable if and only if the United States will, during the coming years, do x, y, and z.

At the same time, on the vital issue of geographic escalation, this approach is vague and open-ended about planned strikes into China. Such vagueness thus significantly heightens the momentum for preemptive attacks from both sides and would raise the risks of general war, which might spread to the U.S. and Japanese homelands, or even to extreme scenarios about nuclear exchanges.

Three years ago, the Trump administration’s National Security Council approved strategic guidance that called on the United States to:

devise and implement a defense strategy capable of, but not limited to: (1) denying China sustained air and sea dominance inside the ‘first island chain’ in a conflict; (2) defending the first island-chain nations, including Taiwan; and (3) dominating all domains outside the first island-chain.

The Trump White House declassified and released this guidance in January 2021. In short, the Trump administration adopted, at least on paper, this third approach described above, which entails political judgments about U.S. vital national interests and political-military judgments about the credibility and viability of such plans — conclusions that should be shared and coordinated at least with Taiwan and Japan.

We know of no credible net assessment that suggests the United States, in light of U.S. defense plans and considering Chinese advances in the same period, is now more ready to accomplish any of those three tasks than it was three years ago when the guidance was secretly issued. Thus, we are convinced that it is past time to devise a U.S. defense and deterrence strategy to deal with the Taiwan challenge as it is in the dangerous present, not as it could be sometime in the wishful future.

It is tempting to believe, like Fitzgerald’s Gatsby, “in the green light, the orgiastic future that year by year recedes before us. It eluded us then, but that’s no matter — tomorrow we will run faster, stretch out our arms farther. … And one fine morning …”

The People’s Republic of China gets to make moves too. It too has an x, y, and z list, as well as fundamental advantages in attention, geography, and sustainment. To paraphrase Donald Rumsfeld, while the U.S. military has been going to school on the People’s Liberation Army, the People’s Liberation Army has also been going to school on the U.S. military, especially in terms of Taiwan contingencies.

There is yet a deeper problem. It may be possible, someday, theoretically, for Taiwan or the United States or Japan to build up the defensive systems, as the Trump administration posited, that will attain enough dominance to thwart Chinese attacks. In an intensely dynamic regional military environment, Beijing could then conclude that it has a shrinking window of advantage — a point we stress in the report. This more confrontational posture of the third option, one that threatens Beijing to watch out because the United States is preparing rapidly to directly defend Taiwan, soon, might more likely cause a war than prevent one.

We conclude that the third approach — to base U.S. planning on a successful direct U.S. defense of Taiwan, coordinated with Japan and other allies — does not seem politically or militarily realistic in the next several years. It is an approach that rests on uncertain military promise with heightened risks of provocation, paralysis, or humiliating defeat.

Approach #4

If China’s window of advantage does shrink over time as the defense of Taiwan improves, what, then, is the right U.S. strategy in the meantime? If time is on the eventual side of those defending peace and freedom, our strategy is designed to buy more of it.

This option that we recommend supports the planning that we describe in the second approach, the status quo, in which the United States has contingency plans to share in the direct defense of Taiwan but will not commit in advance to do so. But in our view, that is not an adequate U.S. strategy to deter war. We believe the United States should, in addition, rehearse — at least with Japan and Taiwan — a parallel plan to challenge any Chinese denial of international access to Taiwan and prepare, including with pre-positioned U.S. supplies, including war reserve stocks, shipments of vitally needed supplies to help Taiwan defend itself.

The United States and its allies, like Japan, should plan to challenge a Chinese quarantine or siege of Taiwan enough to place the burden on China to decide whether to widen the conflict by attacking U.S. or allied forces that were endeavoring to deliver such supplies. If such plans exist now, they are not evident, either in exercises choreographed with allies, in pre-positioned supplies, or in the shipping capacity to carry them out. These plans would probably require significant changes in the character and deployment of U.S. and other allied forces. But these changes, oriented more to helping Taiwan defend itself and less reliant on a rapid build-up of U.S. striking power inside the first island chain, would not menace the People’s Republic of China as much as the strategy envisioned in the third approach.

In this fourth approach, if China did choose to widen the war, the United States and its allies would plan to defend themselves and continue to do what was possible to help Taiwan defend itself. But the United States would not assume that such a war needs to extend to the Chinese, Japanese, or American homelands.

Instead, in another revision to the second approach, the United States and its allies would credibly and visibly plan to react to the attack on their forces by breaking all financial relations with China, freezing or seizing Chinese assets, leading to a severe rupture of the world economy and a likely global financial crisis. Also, the United States and Japan would prepare, visibly and in advance, the massive remilitarization and mobilization measures that they, and perhaps others, would take as the logical consequence of the increased danger of general war. Some critics assert this already is U.S. strategy, but we have seen no such allied economic, political, and military plans on this scale, that would strengthen deterrence.

These plans would be grave to develop and contemplate. They are so serious that it is not credible to threaten them unless China had attacked American and allied forces, in which case such steps are not only credible, they are likely. These measures are not meant as sanctions to force a Chinese retreat. Preparing them, with allies, would demonstrate to China, in advance, what a wider conflict might mean for China and the Chinese Communist Party’s future.

Our favored approach has its flaws. It puts a burden on Taiwan to do as much as it can, with outside help, to realize its potential capacity to defend itself. Yet our proposal adds choices that seem more realistically attainable and more credible as a deterrent to protect Taiwan than the alternatives. This fourth approach takes the escalation that could very well happen after the conflict begins and converts that foreseeable reality into preparations that are visible to China’s leaders before the conflict.

We stress that our proposal could not be successful in the absence of advance coordination and preparation with, at a minimum, Taiwan and Japan. That means the United States must listen to their preferences. If they argue for other approaches, then they have to recognize, accept, and be willing to act upon the responsibilities and risks that go with those approaches. On the other hand, if they join the United States to prepare the further plans envisioned in our fourth option, that joint planning would help unite their societies in more common readiness for joint action.

One concern we have heard is that our report is overly worried about Chinese military dangers. Instead, we should focus on “gray zone” ways China might pressure Taiwan, since these are more likely. Yet we notice that China tried incremental pressure in Xinjiang, but it was counterproductive, and the People’s Republic of China then finally decided to wield the hammer. We notice that China tried incremental pressure in Hong Kong too, but it was counterproductive, and Beijing then finally decided to wield the hammer. Now we notice that China is trying incremental pressure in Taiwan, but it has had counterproductive effects in Taiwan’s politics. And China will now … ?

We would like to be wrong about the possible seriousness of a coming Taiwan crisis. We hope we have exaggerated the danger. We just cannot convince ourselves that the ominous clouds we see gathering are not really there.


Robert D. Blackwill is the Henry Kissinger Senior Fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations. Philip Zelikow is a professor of history and of governance at the University of Virginia. Former career diplomats, they worked in senior policy positions in U.S. administrations from Ronald Reagan through Barack Obama.
 
Just move things along and build a carrier port in Taiwan, if the chicomz do nothing but moan and groan then all will be well for a long time.
 

danielboon

TB Fanatic
Chinese military in South China Sea landing drill as Taiwan tension persists
  • TV footage of the drill is undated but it is reported to have been held in recent days as the People’s Liberation Army begins a month of exercises
  • Broadcast follows a Taiwanese drill simulating an attack on its reefs by the mainland Chinese military
Liu Zhen

Liu Zhen
in Beijing
Published: 12:00pm, 4 Mar, 2021




Footage of China conducting a joint landing drill in the disputed South China Sea was shown on state television on Wednesday. Photo: Weibo

Footage of China conducting a joint landing drill in the disputed South China Sea was shown on state television on Wednesday. Photo: Weibo
China has released footage of its military conducting joint landing drills in the disputed
South China Sea
, days after US reconnaissance operations and a
Taiwanese exercise
simulating a mainland Chinese attack on its reefs.
Mainland China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) sent navy, army and marine corps and air force troops to take part in a war game around Triton Island, in the Paracel Islands, “to explore the tactics and methods of joint warfare”, state broadcaster CCTV reported on Wednesday.
The Paracel Islands are also claimed by Vietnam and Taiwan. The United States Navy’s vessels have conducted frequent “freedom of navigation” operations in the region, most recently last month.
The CCTV report showed several Type 726 “Wild Horse” air-cushioned landing craft sailing off a Type 071 amphibious transport dock and rushing onto a beach, each with a Type 96A main battle tank and fully armed marine corps soldiers on board.


Why has the relationship between the Chinese mainland and Taiwan taken a turn for the worse?
A Type 052D guided-missile destroyer, a Type 054A guided-missile frigate and a support ship kept guard off the coast, while an Su-30MKK fighter and an H-6K bomber provided air cover.


In the scenario for the assault exercise, PLA marine corps troops landed from vessels and helicopters, then faced strong fire resistance before the army tank team sent vehicles forward and destroyed enemy bunkers.

The report did not specify the time of the exercise, but said that it was conducted in recent days. It was broadcast after the
PLA kicked off a month-long military exercise
in the South China Sea on Monday, at a time when the United States has stepped up reconnaissance operations.

The naval flotilla also practised training objectives including air defence, anti-missile operations, and helicopter take-off and landing at night, according to the TV report and PLA statements.
 
Last edited:

jward

passin' thru




Janes
@JanesINTEL


How to quickly and easily understand activity in the South China Sea. https://hubs.la/H0Hzb0t0 #southchinasea #casestudy #threatassessment #defense #intelligence #OSINT #events #capabilities #equipment #military #threat #unclassified #opensourceintelligence #opensource
 

Freeholder

This too shall pass.
Just move things along and build a carrier port in Taiwan, if the chicomz do nothing but moan and groan then all will be well for a long time.

If we were planning to build a new port, how much of the materials would have to be sourced from mainland China? And would they cooperate?

Kathleen
 

jward

passin' thru
:hmm:

Indo-Pacific News - Watching the CCP-China Threat
@IndoPac_Info



China could invade Taiwan by 2027: US admiral https://taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4146897
China could invade Taiwan by 2027: US admiral
Admiral says Chinese 'accelerating their ambitions to supplant' US, conflict possible within decade

1810


By Keoni Everington, Taiwan News, Staff Writer
2021/03/10 14:57

PLA soldiers and missile vehicles. (Weibo image)


PLA soldiers and missile vehicles. (Weibo image)

TAIPEI (Taiwan News) — Admiral Philip Davidson, commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, on Tuesday (March 9) said China could take military action against Taiwan within the next six years.

Before a hearing of the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee held to review the Defense Authorization Request for 2022 and future defense programs, Davidson warned that China's highly aggressive behavior over the past year appears to show it is accelerating its timeline to "supplant the United States." He warned that China's substantially enhanced military capabilities coupled with recent provocative actions in the Taiwan Strait point to a plan to use force against Taiwan within the decade.

Dan Sullivan (R-AK) noted that over the past year, under the leadership of Chairman Xi Jinping (習近平), China has exhibited aggressive behavior, evidenced by non-cooperation during the coronavirus outbreak, the India-China border conflict, cyberattacks against India, the trade embargo on Australia, the crushing of dissent in Hong Kong, and "very aggressive military actions in the Taiwan Strait, South China Sea, [and] Japan's EEZ." He then asked Davidson what impact this has on a timeline for potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait.

Davidson said there are concerns of such a conflict occurring "in this decade," not only because of the ships, aircraft, and rockets that the PLA is fielding but "the way they are advancing those capabilities as well." He said these concerns have been compounded by all the recent Chinese actions cited by Sullivan.

He said he is "worried that they are accelerating their ambitions to supplant the United States in our leadership role in the international rules-based international order." Davidson added that Chinese leaders have set a goal of surpassing the U.S. by 2050 and that he is worried that "they will move that target closer."

Davidson stressed that Taiwan is "clearly one of their ambitions" before 2050. The admiral warned that he believes a military move against Taiwan could take place within the decade: "in fact, within the next six years."

Senator Rick Scott (R-FL) asked whether Davidson agreed that "We've got to prevent communist China from controlling Taiwan. It's a strategic necessity for the United States, and a loss would devastate our ability and the ability of Japan to counter Chinese aggression." Davidson said that as the Indo-Pacific commander, he has an obligation to support the Taiwan Relations Act and that from a geostrategic point of view, it is "critically important to the United States' global status."

Scott then said he had introduced the Taiwan Invasion Prevention act to "end the strategic ambiguity about Taiwan" and state "clearly that the United States is not going to allow communist China to invade Taiwan." Davidson responded that 40 years of strategic ambiguity has helped keep Taiwan in "its current status," but he indicated that he was open-minded to reassessing the policy: "These things should be reconsidered routinely. I'd look forward to the conversation."

When Scott asked Davidson if the U.S. would be able to defend Taiwan if China invaded, Davidson said that it will require continued support by the U.S. and the "key to that is persistent and consistent arms sales to Taiwan."
 
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