WAR 6/20 - 6/27 ***The***Perfect***Storm***
- Thread starter The Flying Dutchman
- Start date
northern watch
TB Fanatic
Iran to Hold 10 Days of Military Exercises
TEHRAN, Iran June 26, 2011 (AP)
Iranian state television says Tehran will hold 10 days of ground, naval and missile exercises starting this week.
The Sunday report says the exercises, dubbed "The Great Prophet Six," will begin Monday and include tests of long-range missiles such as the Sajjil, which boasts a rang of more than 1,240 miles (2,000 kilometers).
State TV says medium- and short-range missiles, drone aircraft and the country's air defense systems will also take part in the drills.
Gen. Ali Hajizadeh, chief of the Revolutionary Guards' aerospace department, says the exercises come in response to a growing U.S. presence in the region.
Iran regularly holds military exercises, and is pressing ahead with a military missile program that is capable of reaching Israel, U.S. bases in the Gulf and parts of southeast Europe.
http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=13932632
Posted Under Fair Use Discussion
TEHRAN, Iran June 26, 2011 (AP)
Iranian state television says Tehran will hold 10 days of ground, naval and missile exercises starting this week.
The Sunday report says the exercises, dubbed "The Great Prophet Six," will begin Monday and include tests of long-range missiles such as the Sajjil, which boasts a rang of more than 1,240 miles (2,000 kilometers).
State TV says medium- and short-range missiles, drone aircraft and the country's air defense systems will also take part in the drills.
Gen. Ali Hajizadeh, chief of the Revolutionary Guards' aerospace department, says the exercises come in response to a growing U.S. presence in the region.
Iran regularly holds military exercises, and is pressing ahead with a military missile program that is capable of reaching Israel, U.S. bases in the Gulf and parts of southeast Europe.
http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=13932632
Posted Under Fair Use Discussion
Posted for fair use....
http://www.khaleejtimes.com/display...iddleeast_June707.xml§ion=middleeast&col=
Two US soldiers killed in Iraq (AFP)
26 June 2011
BAGHDAD — Two American soldiers were killed in northern Iraq on Sunday, the US military said, making this month the deadliest for American personnel in more than two years.
‘Two US service members were killed today while conducting operations in northern Iraq,’ the military said in a statement.
Since June 1, 11 US soldiers have been killed in Iraq — making it the deadliest since May 2009.
Sunday’s deaths take the overall US death toll since the March 2003 invasion to 4,465, according to an AFP count based on the independent website, www.icasualties.org.
Nearly 50,000 American troops are still in Iraq, down from a peak of more than 170,000 after the invasion.
http://www.khaleejtimes.com/display...iddleeast_June707.xml§ion=middleeast&col=
Two US soldiers killed in Iraq (AFP)
26 June 2011
BAGHDAD — Two American soldiers were killed in northern Iraq on Sunday, the US military said, making this month the deadliest for American personnel in more than two years.
‘Two US service members were killed today while conducting operations in northern Iraq,’ the military said in a statement.
Since June 1, 11 US soldiers have been killed in Iraq — making it the deadliest since May 2009.
Sunday’s deaths take the overall US death toll since the March 2003 invasion to 4,465, according to an AFP count based on the independent website, www.icasualties.org.
Nearly 50,000 American troops are still in Iraq, down from a peak of more than 170,000 after the invasion.
Hummm.....
For links in text please see article source.....
Posted for fair use....
http://blogs.forbes.com/abigailesman/2011/06/26/al-qaedas-corporate-hit-list-are-you-a-target-too/
Al-Qaeda’s Corporate Hit List: Are You A Target, Too?
Jun. 26 2011 - 3:45 pm | 0 views | 0 recommendations | 0 comments
By ABIGAIL R. ESMAN
Image via Wikipedia
Is Al Qaeda after you?
If you haven’t heard directly from the FBI in the past week, probably not; but the terrorist group’s new leaders are now targeting corporate executives, business leaders, and defense contractors, among others – private citizens, in other words, whom Al Qaeda supporters describe as “individuals active in the war of the CrusaderZionist on our Umma: directors of companies supporting the war and lying propaganda media organizations and inciting members of Congress With a focus only on the countries most hostile like America, Britain and France.”
The threat, posted on a closed Internet forum and translated by the Investigative Project on Terrorism (and subsequently confirmed by an independent translator), calls for jihadists and sympathizers to, as noted in the Washington Times, “target and kill 40 prominent Americans at their homes in the U.S.” The authors of the post have also generously provided photographs of twenty-six of those 40 figures, the better to assist eager jihadists (and jihadist wannabes) in identifying their enemies.
Who are those enemies? The majority of those named have some connection to the war in Iraq (Halliburton executives, for instance), or to think tanks such as RAND and MEMRI (the Middle East Media Research Institute) which have engaged in and published vital research about international and domestic jihadist groups. The threat also calls for mail bombs to be posted to the private homes and offices of those on the list. Targets include Bill Utt, CEO of KBR; Christian Garcia, VP Investor Relations at Halliburton; Lockheed Martin Chairman Robert J. Stevens; Newscorp owner Rupert Murdoch; and senior executives of Coca Cola, among others.
According to Jacob Boyd, an assistant at the Investigative Project, “The original threat was a planned mail bombing attack on American and Western targets, focusing on key government, industrial, and media VIPS. It originated on the Shumukh al-Islam web forum, commonly referred to as the official web forum of al-Qaeda, and was later reposted on al-Qaeda affiliated sites like Ansar al-Mujahideen and alqimmah.net (an al-Shabaab web forum). Participants in these forums were asked to submit names and it possible addresses of potential targets, among whom al-Qaida leaders would later select the highest value targets to strike.”
The goal, evidently, is not only to intimidate counterterrorism officials, scholars, and industry leaders, but to encourage and inspire “lone wolf” jihadists in America to take action, in the spirit of Fort Hood attacker Maj. Nidal Malik Hasan. FBI and other Homeland Security officials have expressed particular concern about American Al Qaeda leader Adam Gadahn’s remarks regarding the ease with which guns can be obtained in the US., which he issued alongside a video released earlier this month, calling on US-based Muslims to kill American citizens. “The threat,” according to an Investigative Project on Terrorism bulletin, “has [now] gone viral.”
But is it something to take seriously?
Maybe. In 2004, Mohammed Bouyeri, a Dutch-born Muslim and member of the “Hofstadgroep,” a domestic Islamic extremist group in the Netherlands, stabbed, shot, and attempted to behead writer/filmmaker Theo van Gogh in retaliation for a film Van Gogh had created with activist Ayaan Hirsi Ali, then a member of the Dutch parliament. Before strolling casually away from Van Gogh’s torn and bleeding corpse, Bouyeri stabbed a five page letter into his chest with a butcher knife. In that letter, he warned – by name — those who would be next.
What is particularly frightening in this case is that Van Gogh had previously refused protection, insisting that it was Hirsi Ali who was the real target. And she was; except that she, with 24-hour security, was – and, one hopes, remains — inaccessible to the jihadists who seek her death. FBI officials are presumably keeping an eye out for those whose names appeared on the Al Shumukh al-Islam site; but what about those whose names have not been made so public?
The fact is that groups similar to the Hofstadgroep – and in some cases, more powerful – already exist in the USA. Is there another Mohammed Bouyeri lurking somewhere among them? Or have we become, now, afraid even of our own shadows? Hit lists, after all, are nothing new: is being on a terrorist hit list different, in any real way, from being on a Mafia one?
In certain ways, yes. Mohammed Bouyeri has become a hero, heralded in recent months particularly by Al Qaeda and related groups. And meantime another possible “lone wolf,” a Marine Reservist by the name of Yonathan Melaku who identifies himself as a Muslim, was arrested last week and has been charged in a series of shootings near the Pentagon last year. Noted the Boston Globe,
Federal prosecutors said in court documents yesterday that they found bomb-making materials in Melaku’s backpack and later, inside his home, found a typewritten list of potential bomb components. Investigators also found a video he took of himself firing shots outside the National Museum of the Marine Corps last fall and repeatedly saying the Arabic words “Allahu Akbar,’’ which means “God is Great.”
Yet bizarrely (if predictably), I’m not hearing any Muslim groups – the so-called “moderate” ones, the ones that insist they want to fight extremist Islam and its hijacking of their religion – speaking out against it, or (for that matter) condemning this latest threat against American private citizens. Where, for instance, is the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR)? Where, for instance, is Feisal Rauf, the imam who originally planned to lead Cordoba House/Park 51?
The silence is so loud, you can almost hear a bullet fly.
For links in text please see article source.....
Posted for fair use....
http://blogs.forbes.com/abigailesman/2011/06/26/al-qaedas-corporate-hit-list-are-you-a-target-too/
Al-Qaeda’s Corporate Hit List: Are You A Target, Too?
Jun. 26 2011 - 3:45 pm | 0 views | 0 recommendations | 0 comments
By ABIGAIL R. ESMAN
Image via Wikipedia
Is Al Qaeda after you?
If you haven’t heard directly from the FBI in the past week, probably not; but the terrorist group’s new leaders are now targeting corporate executives, business leaders, and defense contractors, among others – private citizens, in other words, whom Al Qaeda supporters describe as “individuals active in the war of the CrusaderZionist on our Umma: directors of companies supporting the war and lying propaganda media organizations and inciting members of Congress With a focus only on the countries most hostile like America, Britain and France.”
The threat, posted on a closed Internet forum and translated by the Investigative Project on Terrorism (and subsequently confirmed by an independent translator), calls for jihadists and sympathizers to, as noted in the Washington Times, “target and kill 40 prominent Americans at their homes in the U.S.” The authors of the post have also generously provided photographs of twenty-six of those 40 figures, the better to assist eager jihadists (and jihadist wannabes) in identifying their enemies.
Who are those enemies? The majority of those named have some connection to the war in Iraq (Halliburton executives, for instance), or to think tanks such as RAND and MEMRI (the Middle East Media Research Institute) which have engaged in and published vital research about international and domestic jihadist groups. The threat also calls for mail bombs to be posted to the private homes and offices of those on the list. Targets include Bill Utt, CEO of KBR; Christian Garcia, VP Investor Relations at Halliburton; Lockheed Martin Chairman Robert J. Stevens; Newscorp owner Rupert Murdoch; and senior executives of Coca Cola, among others.
According to Jacob Boyd, an assistant at the Investigative Project, “The original threat was a planned mail bombing attack on American and Western targets, focusing on key government, industrial, and media VIPS. It originated on the Shumukh al-Islam web forum, commonly referred to as the official web forum of al-Qaeda, and was later reposted on al-Qaeda affiliated sites like Ansar al-Mujahideen and alqimmah.net (an al-Shabaab web forum). Participants in these forums were asked to submit names and it possible addresses of potential targets, among whom al-Qaida leaders would later select the highest value targets to strike.”
The goal, evidently, is not only to intimidate counterterrorism officials, scholars, and industry leaders, but to encourage and inspire “lone wolf” jihadists in America to take action, in the spirit of Fort Hood attacker Maj. Nidal Malik Hasan. FBI and other Homeland Security officials have expressed particular concern about American Al Qaeda leader Adam Gadahn’s remarks regarding the ease with which guns can be obtained in the US., which he issued alongside a video released earlier this month, calling on US-based Muslims to kill American citizens. “The threat,” according to an Investigative Project on Terrorism bulletin, “has [now] gone viral.”
But is it something to take seriously?
Maybe. In 2004, Mohammed Bouyeri, a Dutch-born Muslim and member of the “Hofstadgroep,” a domestic Islamic extremist group in the Netherlands, stabbed, shot, and attempted to behead writer/filmmaker Theo van Gogh in retaliation for a film Van Gogh had created with activist Ayaan Hirsi Ali, then a member of the Dutch parliament. Before strolling casually away from Van Gogh’s torn and bleeding corpse, Bouyeri stabbed a five page letter into his chest with a butcher knife. In that letter, he warned – by name — those who would be next.
What is particularly frightening in this case is that Van Gogh had previously refused protection, insisting that it was Hirsi Ali who was the real target. And she was; except that she, with 24-hour security, was – and, one hopes, remains — inaccessible to the jihadists who seek her death. FBI officials are presumably keeping an eye out for those whose names appeared on the Al Shumukh al-Islam site; but what about those whose names have not been made so public?
The fact is that groups similar to the Hofstadgroep – and in some cases, more powerful – already exist in the USA. Is there another Mohammed Bouyeri lurking somewhere among them? Or have we become, now, afraid even of our own shadows? Hit lists, after all, are nothing new: is being on a terrorist hit list different, in any real way, from being on a Mafia one?
In certain ways, yes. Mohammed Bouyeri has become a hero, heralded in recent months particularly by Al Qaeda and related groups. And meantime another possible “lone wolf,” a Marine Reservist by the name of Yonathan Melaku who identifies himself as a Muslim, was arrested last week and has been charged in a series of shootings near the Pentagon last year. Noted the Boston Globe,
Federal prosecutors said in court documents yesterday that they found bomb-making materials in Melaku’s backpack and later, inside his home, found a typewritten list of potential bomb components. Investigators also found a video he took of himself firing shots outside the National Museum of the Marine Corps last fall and repeatedly saying the Arabic words “Allahu Akbar,’’ which means “God is Great.”
Yet bizarrely (if predictably), I’m not hearing any Muslim groups – the so-called “moderate” ones, the ones that insist they want to fight extremist Islam and its hijacking of their religion – speaking out against it, or (for that matter) condemning this latest threat against American private citizens. Where, for instance, is the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR)? Where, for instance, is Feisal Rauf, the imam who originally planned to lead Cordoba House/Park 51?
The silence is so loud, you can almost hear a bullet fly.
Hummm...please note that this is published in an Arab paper....HC
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.khaleejtimes.com/Display...le=data/opinion/2011/June/opinion_June135.xml
Time to exit, but wait!
Eric S. Margolis
27 June 2011, 7:22 PM
Far-called our navies melt away On dune and headland sinks the fire Lo, all our pomp of yesterday Is one with Nineveh and Tyre!
Rudyard Kipling Recessional
War is waged to achieve political objectives, not to kill enemies. In this sense, the United States has lost the 10-year Afghan conflict, its longest war. Afghanistan remains the “graveyard of empires.”
The US has failed to install an obedient regime in Kabul that controls Afghanistan. It has made foes of the Pashtun majority, and, in pursuing this war, gravely undermined Pakistan. Claims that US forces were in Afghanistan to hunt the late Osama bin Laden were widely disbelieved.
Last Wednesday, President Barack Obama bowed to public opinion, approaching elections, military reality and financial woes by announcing he would withdraw a third of the 100,000 US troops from Afghanistan by the end of next summer. Pentagon brass growled open opposition.
US allies France and Germany announced similar troops reductions. All foreign troops are supposed to quit Afghanistan by the end of 2014.
Washington currently spends at least $10 billion monthly on the Afghan war, not counting “black” payments, CIA and NSA operations. The US has poured $18.8 billion in development aid into Afghanistan since 2001 with nothing to show for the effort. Pakistan has been given $20 billion to support the Afghan War. The US deficit is heading over $1.4 trillion. The national debt, when unfunded pensions and benefits are added, is likely $100 trillion, according to the chief of PIMCO, the world’s largest bond trader.
Forty-four million Americans now receive food stamps; the national infrastructure of roads, airports, bridges and schools is crumbling from neglect. Unemployment, officially at 9.5 per cent, is probably closer to 20 per cent.
The cry is being heard: “Rebuild America, not Afghanistan.”
In spite of intense pro-war propaganda, over half of Americans now oppose the Afghan War. Even US-installed Afghan president Hamid Karzai calls it, “ineffective, apart from causing civilian casualties.”
So will the US really pull out of Afghanistan? That remains to be seen. There are contradictory signs.
Mid-level talks between the US and Taleban are under way. The US will probably keep some of its remaining 66,000 soldiers in Afghanistan after 2014, rebranding them training troops. The huge US bases at Kandahar and Bagram will be retained.
Billions more will be spent on the Afghan government army and police. They have so far proved ineffective because most are composed of Tajik and Uzbek mercenaries who are hated and distrusted by the Pashtun.
A similar process is underway in Iraq where “withdrawal” means keeping renamed US combat brigades in Iraq, thousands of mercenaries, and US combat forces in neighbouring Kuwait and the Gulf. New US embassies in Baghdad and Kabul – huge, fortified complexes with their own mercenary combat forces – will be the world’s biggest. Kabul will have a staff of 1,000 US personnel. Bin Laden called them “crusader fortresses.”
In addition, the US will still arm and finance allied Tajik and Uzbek militias in Afghanistan. Financing Pakistan’s US-backed regime and Uzbekistan must also continue at around $3 billion yearly. The US appears to be going and staying at the same time. By contrast, Taleban’s position is clear and simple: it will continue fighting until all foreign troops are withdrawn. US Special Forces, drones and hit squads have been unable to assassinate enough Taleban commanders to make the mujahidin stop fighting.
Americans never study history, not even their own. They don’t recall founding father, the great Benjamin Franklin, who said, “there is no good war, and no bad peace.” Or that the Pashtun Taleban and its allies are fierce, dedicated, undefeated warriors. I’ve been in combat with them and remain in awe of their courage and love of combat. The Pashtun mujahidin will keep fighting as always, as long as their ammunition lasts.
America, for all its B-1 heavy bombers, strike fighters, missiles, helicopter gunships and drones, armour, super electronics, spies in the sky and all the other high tech weapons of modern war has failed to defeat some 30,000 tribal fighters with nothing more than small arms and legendary valour.
The US has lost the all important military initiative in Afghanistan. It may linger there, but it cannot win.
Eric Margolis is a veteran US journalist
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.khaleejtimes.com/Display...le=data/opinion/2011/June/opinion_June135.xml
Time to exit, but wait!
Eric S. Margolis
27 June 2011, 7:22 PM
Far-called our navies melt away On dune and headland sinks the fire Lo, all our pomp of yesterday Is one with Nineveh and Tyre!
Rudyard Kipling Recessional
War is waged to achieve political objectives, not to kill enemies. In this sense, the United States has lost the 10-year Afghan conflict, its longest war. Afghanistan remains the “graveyard of empires.”
The US has failed to install an obedient regime in Kabul that controls Afghanistan. It has made foes of the Pashtun majority, and, in pursuing this war, gravely undermined Pakistan. Claims that US forces were in Afghanistan to hunt the late Osama bin Laden were widely disbelieved.
Last Wednesday, President Barack Obama bowed to public opinion, approaching elections, military reality and financial woes by announcing he would withdraw a third of the 100,000 US troops from Afghanistan by the end of next summer. Pentagon brass growled open opposition.
US allies France and Germany announced similar troops reductions. All foreign troops are supposed to quit Afghanistan by the end of 2014.
Washington currently spends at least $10 billion monthly on the Afghan war, not counting “black” payments, CIA and NSA operations. The US has poured $18.8 billion in development aid into Afghanistan since 2001 with nothing to show for the effort. Pakistan has been given $20 billion to support the Afghan War. The US deficit is heading over $1.4 trillion. The national debt, when unfunded pensions and benefits are added, is likely $100 trillion, according to the chief of PIMCO, the world’s largest bond trader.
Forty-four million Americans now receive food stamps; the national infrastructure of roads, airports, bridges and schools is crumbling from neglect. Unemployment, officially at 9.5 per cent, is probably closer to 20 per cent.
The cry is being heard: “Rebuild America, not Afghanistan.”
In spite of intense pro-war propaganda, over half of Americans now oppose the Afghan War. Even US-installed Afghan president Hamid Karzai calls it, “ineffective, apart from causing civilian casualties.”
So will the US really pull out of Afghanistan? That remains to be seen. There are contradictory signs.
Mid-level talks between the US and Taleban are under way. The US will probably keep some of its remaining 66,000 soldiers in Afghanistan after 2014, rebranding them training troops. The huge US bases at Kandahar and Bagram will be retained.
Billions more will be spent on the Afghan government army and police. They have so far proved ineffective because most are composed of Tajik and Uzbek mercenaries who are hated and distrusted by the Pashtun.
A similar process is underway in Iraq where “withdrawal” means keeping renamed US combat brigades in Iraq, thousands of mercenaries, and US combat forces in neighbouring Kuwait and the Gulf. New US embassies in Baghdad and Kabul – huge, fortified complexes with their own mercenary combat forces – will be the world’s biggest. Kabul will have a staff of 1,000 US personnel. Bin Laden called them “crusader fortresses.”
In addition, the US will still arm and finance allied Tajik and Uzbek militias in Afghanistan. Financing Pakistan’s US-backed regime and Uzbekistan must also continue at around $3 billion yearly. The US appears to be going and staying at the same time. By contrast, Taleban’s position is clear and simple: it will continue fighting until all foreign troops are withdrawn. US Special Forces, drones and hit squads have been unable to assassinate enough Taleban commanders to make the mujahidin stop fighting.
Americans never study history, not even their own. They don’t recall founding father, the great Benjamin Franklin, who said, “there is no good war, and no bad peace.” Or that the Pashtun Taleban and its allies are fierce, dedicated, undefeated warriors. I’ve been in combat with them and remain in awe of their courage and love of combat. The Pashtun mujahidin will keep fighting as always, as long as their ammunition lasts.
America, for all its B-1 heavy bombers, strike fighters, missiles, helicopter gunships and drones, armour, super electronics, spies in the sky and all the other high tech weapons of modern war has failed to defeat some 30,000 tribal fighters with nothing more than small arms and legendary valour.
The US has lost the all important military initiative in Afghanistan. It may linger there, but it cannot win.
Eric Margolis is a veteran US journalist
Some ominous under the radar developments in the ME.
Started by Troke, Today 02:43 PM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...minous-under-the-radar-developments-in-the-ME.
Netanyahu Orders IDF To Stop Flotilla From Reaching Gaza…
Started by Wardogs, Today 10:50 AM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...ders-IDF-To-Stop-Flotilla-From-Reaching-Gaza…
Hugo Chávez in Critical Condition In Cuban Hospital
Started by Walrus Whisperer, Yesterday 09:10 PM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...E1vez-in-Critical-Condition-In-Cuban-Hospital
The radicalization of Pakistan’s military
Started by SIRR1, Yesterday 03:32 PM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/showthread.php?385782-The-radicalization-of-Pakistan’s-military
U.S. GOA: 40 Percent of Defense Supply Chain Damaged by Chinese Parts
Started by medic38572, Yesterday 01:29 PM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...Defense-Supply-Chain-Damaged-by-Chinese-Parts
Obama Losing Dems on National Security at Critical Time
Started by Dennis Olson, Yesterday 07:32 AM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...ng-Dems-on-National-Security-at-Critical-Time
House Votes Not to Authorize Mission in Libya - But Then Votes For Funding Of It?
Started by Seeker, 06-24-2011 10:04 AM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...ion-in-Libya-But-Then-Votes-For-Funding-Of-It
Untold Story: Under Obama, U.S. Casualty Rate in Afghanistan Increased 5-Fold
Started by Red Baron, 06-22-2011 02:59 PM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...Casualty-Rate-in-Afghanistan-Increased-5-Fold
South China Sea
Started by northern watch, 06-22-2011 12:25 PM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/showthread.php?385639-South-China-Sea
The Natives in China are restless tonight.
Started by Troke, 06-21-2011 05:59 PM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/showthread.php?385604-The-Natives-in-China-are-restless-tonight.
Started by Troke, Today 02:43 PM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...minous-under-the-radar-developments-in-the-ME.
Netanyahu Orders IDF To Stop Flotilla From Reaching Gaza…
Started by Wardogs, Today 10:50 AM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...ders-IDF-To-Stop-Flotilla-From-Reaching-Gaza…
Hugo Chávez in Critical Condition In Cuban Hospital
Started by Walrus Whisperer, Yesterday 09:10 PM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...E1vez-in-Critical-Condition-In-Cuban-Hospital
The radicalization of Pakistan’s military
Started by SIRR1, Yesterday 03:32 PM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/showthread.php?385782-The-radicalization-of-Pakistan’s-military
U.S. GOA: 40 Percent of Defense Supply Chain Damaged by Chinese Parts
Started by medic38572, Yesterday 01:29 PM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...Defense-Supply-Chain-Damaged-by-Chinese-Parts
Obama Losing Dems on National Security at Critical Time
Started by Dennis Olson, Yesterday 07:32 AM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...ng-Dems-on-National-Security-at-Critical-Time
House Votes Not to Authorize Mission in Libya - But Then Votes For Funding Of It?
Started by Seeker, 06-24-2011 10:04 AM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...ion-in-Libya-But-Then-Votes-For-Funding-Of-It
Untold Story: Under Obama, U.S. Casualty Rate in Afghanistan Increased 5-Fold
Started by Red Baron, 06-22-2011 02:59 PM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...Casualty-Rate-in-Afghanistan-Increased-5-Fold
South China Sea
Started by northern watch, 06-22-2011 12:25 PM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/showthread.php?385639-South-China-Sea
The Natives in China are restless tonight.
Started by Troke, 06-21-2011 05:59 PM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/showthread.php?385604-The-Natives-in-China-are-restless-tonight.
For links in text please see article source....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/natos-libya-campaign-drags-on/2011/06/23/AGSm27kH_story.html
NATO’s Libya campaign drags on
By Michael Birnbaum and Ernesto Londono, Published: June 25
NAPLES — As NATO bombs began to rain on Libya in March, President Obama and other Western leaders assured their war-weary publics that the campaign to protect civilians from Moammar Gaddafi’s crackdown would be over within weeks.
Now the coalition’s springtime incursion has stretched to summer, and Gaddafi’s resilience has startled the leaders who committed to the operation. Calls are growing to end it even as NATO pleads for more time.
As the campaign enters its fourth month, NATO officials insist that it is succeeding and that Gaddafi will become the Arab Spring’s third casualty. But that will happen, they say, only in a slow and steady advance on the capital as his troops run out of supplies, not in a flash of pyrotechnics that puts him out of power in an instant.
“The noose is tightening around him, and there’s very few places for him to go,” Gen. Charles Bouchard, the Canadian head of the operations, said Saturday in an interview at his Naples headquarters. But, he added, “You don’t stay in power for 41 years and expect that he’s going to leave at the first sign of stresses.”
Indications of a fraying commitment to the mission were evident in a House vote Friday in which an unusual coalition of anti-war Democrats and tea party Republicans joined to pass a measure to reject Obama’s use of the American military in the operation, even as they declined to strip part of its funding. In Britain, a top commander said last week that if the campaign goes on past September, his forces could crack under the strain. On Wednesday, Italy’s foreign minister called for an immediate end to hostilities.
NATO has flown more than 4,700 strike sorties, pummeling bunkers, depots and vehicles and reducing much of Gaddafi’s army to ruins. It watches his military movements with drones that can remain in the sky for days.
Still, Gaddafi holds on, continuing to cause casualties in the rebel-held city of Misurata, in the mountain towns south of Tripoli and along the front line in the east.
Bouchard said NATO’s extreme caution about civilian deaths — in one case scuttling days of planning because a soccer game was being played next to a target — has slowed the campaign. The upshot, he said, is that there has been only one instance in which NATO thinks it may have caused civilian casualties, and few opportunities for the Libyan government to present evidence of more.
Both sides say that credible allegations of civilian deaths probably are the best weapon Libya can use against NATO. The nervousness was palpable at NATO’s operational headquarters on Friday before major strikes on Brega, a now-depopulated city near the main front line that NATO says government troops have been using as a base.
NATO later said it hit seven command-and-control nodes in the city, along with 28 other targets. Libyan officials said Saturday that the strikes killed 15 civilians, but they did not present evidence to support that number and in the past have exaggerated when saying that civilians were killed in strikes.
Measures that could speed Gaddafi’s departure, such as cutting overland fuel lines to Tripoli, aren’t being carried out because the United Nations mandate does not allow targeting civilian infrastructure, Bouchard said, adding that he is cautious about potentially harming civilians in the process.
One major problem with the campaign has been unrealistic expectations from the outset, analysts said.
“With any use of air power comes this public expectation that airplanes will prove our resolve, that we’ll be able to deter the enemy, that they can’t possibly win and will capitulate,” said Tami Davis Biddle, a military historian at the U.S. Army War College. “But this idea that aerial bombardment equals capitulation is a really flawed equation.”
Rebels have blamed NATO for their inability to make meaningful headway in their advance toward Tripoli, although they also say they are slowly smuggling weapons into the capital to undermine it from within. Rebel leaders based in the east say their grip on the besieged port city of Misurata — the bloodiest and arguably most important front line in the conflict — is fraying. Rebels took control of the city in late April, despite intense shelling and artillery attacks by forces loyal to Gaddafi, but they have been unable to push westward.
Rebel spokesman Mohamed Ali said opposition leaders are mystified by what they perceive as the coalition’s reluctance to more forcefully attack Gaddafi troops on the front lines.
“NATO is a mystery to us,” Ali, who is based in Doha, Qatar, said in an interview via Skype. “This is getting to a stage where it’s getting very, very dangerous.”
NATO officials say they are doing all they can without risking civilian casualties, pointing to Libyan government forces switching tactics since NATO’s operation began. Many have shed their uniforms and are using weapons mounted on the backs of pickup trucks, just like the rebels, officials said. That led NATO to mistakenly target a column of rebel vehicles this month.
In the meantime, poorly trained rebel fighters are taking a beating as government troops lob long-range rockets into Misurata, with NATO unable to stop them, rebels say.
“They could do better,” said Abdul Bassett Swaisi, the commander of a rebel unit of about 150 men outside Misurata. “If the situation continues to be like this, it will take years, not months.”
The debates raging in the West and allied Arab states have made untenable the prospect of deploying ground troops to push out Gaddafi.
Military analysts say that matters a great deal.
“There’s no example of regime change occurring by bombing alone,” said Shashank Joshi, an analyst at Britain’s Royal United Services Institute, a think tank. In Kosovo, he pointed out, where the NATO air campaign was significantly more forceful than it is in Libya, the threat of deploying ground troops was what finally prompted Slobodan Milosevic to surrender.
Although it is difficult to know whether Tripoli residents are being earnest when they speak to Western journalists in the presence of government minders, recent street interviews suggest there is growing anger in the capital about NATO’s campaign.
Abdul Adeem, 44, an electrician who lives near a house leveled after a NATO strike last week, said the bombing campaign has made people rally around Gaddafi.
“All neighbors are afraid,” he said. “They think maybe NATO will do it again tonight.”
Londono reported from Tripoli. Staff writer Karen DeYoung in Washington and special correspondent Portia Walker in Misurata contributed to this report.
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/natos-libya-campaign-drags-on/2011/06/23/AGSm27kH_story.html
NATO’s Libya campaign drags on
By Michael Birnbaum and Ernesto Londono, Published: June 25
NAPLES — As NATO bombs began to rain on Libya in March, President Obama and other Western leaders assured their war-weary publics that the campaign to protect civilians from Moammar Gaddafi’s crackdown would be over within weeks.
Now the coalition’s springtime incursion has stretched to summer, and Gaddafi’s resilience has startled the leaders who committed to the operation. Calls are growing to end it even as NATO pleads for more time.
As the campaign enters its fourth month, NATO officials insist that it is succeeding and that Gaddafi will become the Arab Spring’s third casualty. But that will happen, they say, only in a slow and steady advance on the capital as his troops run out of supplies, not in a flash of pyrotechnics that puts him out of power in an instant.
“The noose is tightening around him, and there’s very few places for him to go,” Gen. Charles Bouchard, the Canadian head of the operations, said Saturday in an interview at his Naples headquarters. But, he added, “You don’t stay in power for 41 years and expect that he’s going to leave at the first sign of stresses.”
Indications of a fraying commitment to the mission were evident in a House vote Friday in which an unusual coalition of anti-war Democrats and tea party Republicans joined to pass a measure to reject Obama’s use of the American military in the operation, even as they declined to strip part of its funding. In Britain, a top commander said last week that if the campaign goes on past September, his forces could crack under the strain. On Wednesday, Italy’s foreign minister called for an immediate end to hostilities.
NATO has flown more than 4,700 strike sorties, pummeling bunkers, depots and vehicles and reducing much of Gaddafi’s army to ruins. It watches his military movements with drones that can remain in the sky for days.
Still, Gaddafi holds on, continuing to cause casualties in the rebel-held city of Misurata, in the mountain towns south of Tripoli and along the front line in the east.
Bouchard said NATO’s extreme caution about civilian deaths — in one case scuttling days of planning because a soccer game was being played next to a target — has slowed the campaign. The upshot, he said, is that there has been only one instance in which NATO thinks it may have caused civilian casualties, and few opportunities for the Libyan government to present evidence of more.
Both sides say that credible allegations of civilian deaths probably are the best weapon Libya can use against NATO. The nervousness was palpable at NATO’s operational headquarters on Friday before major strikes on Brega, a now-depopulated city near the main front line that NATO says government troops have been using as a base.
NATO later said it hit seven command-and-control nodes in the city, along with 28 other targets. Libyan officials said Saturday that the strikes killed 15 civilians, but they did not present evidence to support that number and in the past have exaggerated when saying that civilians were killed in strikes.
Measures that could speed Gaddafi’s departure, such as cutting overland fuel lines to Tripoli, aren’t being carried out because the United Nations mandate does not allow targeting civilian infrastructure, Bouchard said, adding that he is cautious about potentially harming civilians in the process.
One major problem with the campaign has been unrealistic expectations from the outset, analysts said.
“With any use of air power comes this public expectation that airplanes will prove our resolve, that we’ll be able to deter the enemy, that they can’t possibly win and will capitulate,” said Tami Davis Biddle, a military historian at the U.S. Army War College. “But this idea that aerial bombardment equals capitulation is a really flawed equation.”
Rebels have blamed NATO for their inability to make meaningful headway in their advance toward Tripoli, although they also say they are slowly smuggling weapons into the capital to undermine it from within. Rebel leaders based in the east say their grip on the besieged port city of Misurata — the bloodiest and arguably most important front line in the conflict — is fraying. Rebels took control of the city in late April, despite intense shelling and artillery attacks by forces loyal to Gaddafi, but they have been unable to push westward.
Rebel spokesman Mohamed Ali said opposition leaders are mystified by what they perceive as the coalition’s reluctance to more forcefully attack Gaddafi troops on the front lines.
“NATO is a mystery to us,” Ali, who is based in Doha, Qatar, said in an interview via Skype. “This is getting to a stage where it’s getting very, very dangerous.”
NATO officials say they are doing all they can without risking civilian casualties, pointing to Libyan government forces switching tactics since NATO’s operation began. Many have shed their uniforms and are using weapons mounted on the backs of pickup trucks, just like the rebels, officials said. That led NATO to mistakenly target a column of rebel vehicles this month.
In the meantime, poorly trained rebel fighters are taking a beating as government troops lob long-range rockets into Misurata, with NATO unable to stop them, rebels say.
“They could do better,” said Abdul Bassett Swaisi, the commander of a rebel unit of about 150 men outside Misurata. “If the situation continues to be like this, it will take years, not months.”
The debates raging in the West and allied Arab states have made untenable the prospect of deploying ground troops to push out Gaddafi.
Military analysts say that matters a great deal.
“There’s no example of regime change occurring by bombing alone,” said Shashank Joshi, an analyst at Britain’s Royal United Services Institute, a think tank. In Kosovo, he pointed out, where the NATO air campaign was significantly more forceful than it is in Libya, the threat of deploying ground troops was what finally prompted Slobodan Milosevic to surrender.
Although it is difficult to know whether Tripoli residents are being earnest when they speak to Western journalists in the presence of government minders, recent street interviews suggest there is growing anger in the capital about NATO’s campaign.
Abdul Adeem, 44, an electrician who lives near a house leveled after a NATO strike last week, said the bombing campaign has made people rally around Gaddafi.
“All neighbors are afraid,” he said. “They think maybe NATO will do it again tonight.”
Londono reported from Tripoli. Staff writer Karen DeYoung in Washington and special correspondent Portia Walker in Misurata contributed to this report.
If true definitely not their fathers', grandfathers' or greatgrandfathers' Heer....
Posted for fair use....
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/06/26/german-soldiers-can-t-shoot.html
German Soldiers Can’t Shoot
Leaked reports question the competence of the German army, which has thousands of troops serving in Afghanistan.
by Stefan Theil | June 26, 2011 10:30 PM EDT
“German soldiers mostly don’t know how to use their weapons.” They “have no or little experience driving armored vehicles.” For German field commanders, “the necessity and ways [to protect their units from roadside bombs] are to a large extent either unknown or incorrect.”
These are quotes from a series of secret internal reports on the German army, the Bundeswehr, whose 5,000 soldiers in the northern Kunduz sector of Afghanistan were supposed to help the U.S. rout the Taliban and stabilize the country over the past 10 years.
The reports are from 2009 and 2010 and were leaked to the Bild, a German tabloid that is Europe’s highest-circulation newspaper. But they are an indication of the poor state of the Bundeswehr, which only two years ago even started fighting in Afghanistan. Before that, they weren’t allowed to shoot except in self-defense, and only after they had shouted repeated warnings in the local language.
The secret reports bemoan German soldiers’ outdated training and antiquated, insufficient equipment. German forces could not operate if it weren’t for Ukrainian cargo planes and American helicopters and their U.S. Army crews, most crucially the Chinook troop transports and Black Hawk MedEvac helicopters that ensure Bundeswehr soldiers can get into and out of their battles quickly and safely. Considering Obama’s announcement about the beginning of the pullout of U.S. forces, the Bundeswehr couldn’t even fight in terrain like Afghanistan’s if it wanted to. “If the Americans pull out of the north, the Germans will stand there in very short skirts,” says Bundeswehr General and former NATO Commander Egon Ramms.
german soldiers
Matthias Rietschel / AP Photo
Since the concept of actually fighting is still so new for the German army, training and equipment upgrades have only recently begun. It wasn’t until 2010, for example, that the Bundeswehr issued new “small arms guidelines” requiring more live ammo training at close range instead of practicing at long distances from hilltops or trenches.
Years after it first stationed thousands of soldiers in Afghanistan in 2002, the Bundeswehr was still frozen in time, sticking to Cold War scenarios of large battles on the wide-open North German Plain that would involve clashing armies, tank battles, and fighter jets engaged in air-to-air dogfights. Luckily, none of this is the least bit likely to happen. Soldiers now train in the kind of close-range combat involved in battling insurgents. But the transformation takes time. Before it was finally permitted to fight in 2009, the Bundeswehr didn’t have a single officer with combat experience who might provide some practical advice to defense ministry bureaucrats in charge of the reforms.
“
Since the concept of actually fighting is still so new for the German army, training and equipment upgrades have only recently begun.
”
Yet as the Bundeswehr brass inch forward to a more useful and active role for their army, politicians in Berlin are putting the brakes back on. Defense Minister Thomas De Maizière has announced budget cuts that will lower military expenditures to only 1 percent of German GDP in 2015, from 1.3 percent now. That’s nowhere near the 2 percent threshold agreed to for NATO countries, as U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates once again chided Germany and other laggard NATO allies last week (of the 28 NATO allies, only the U.S., Britain, and France, plus tiny Greece and Albania, spend more than the minimum). The cuts also mean that urgent upgrades in equipment and training will either take longer or not happen at all.
Add to that a foreign minister, Guido Westerwelle, who has promised to make Germany "a leader in peace and disarmament," and who has aligned Germany with Russia and China in opposing any help for the anti-Gaddafi forces in Libya, and it’s not so sure German soldiers will be all that much better at shooting any time soon.
June 26, 2011 10:30pm
Posted for fair use....
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/06/26/german-soldiers-can-t-shoot.html
German Soldiers Can’t Shoot
Leaked reports question the competence of the German army, which has thousands of troops serving in Afghanistan.
by Stefan Theil | June 26, 2011 10:30 PM EDT
“German soldiers mostly don’t know how to use their weapons.” They “have no or little experience driving armored vehicles.” For German field commanders, “the necessity and ways [to protect their units from roadside bombs] are to a large extent either unknown or incorrect.”
These are quotes from a series of secret internal reports on the German army, the Bundeswehr, whose 5,000 soldiers in the northern Kunduz sector of Afghanistan were supposed to help the U.S. rout the Taliban and stabilize the country over the past 10 years.
The reports are from 2009 and 2010 and were leaked to the Bild, a German tabloid that is Europe’s highest-circulation newspaper. But they are an indication of the poor state of the Bundeswehr, which only two years ago even started fighting in Afghanistan. Before that, they weren’t allowed to shoot except in self-defense, and only after they had shouted repeated warnings in the local language.
The secret reports bemoan German soldiers’ outdated training and antiquated, insufficient equipment. German forces could not operate if it weren’t for Ukrainian cargo planes and American helicopters and their U.S. Army crews, most crucially the Chinook troop transports and Black Hawk MedEvac helicopters that ensure Bundeswehr soldiers can get into and out of their battles quickly and safely. Considering Obama’s announcement about the beginning of the pullout of U.S. forces, the Bundeswehr couldn’t even fight in terrain like Afghanistan’s if it wanted to. “If the Americans pull out of the north, the Germans will stand there in very short skirts,” says Bundeswehr General and former NATO Commander Egon Ramms.
german soldiers
Matthias Rietschel / AP Photo
Since the concept of actually fighting is still so new for the German army, training and equipment upgrades have only recently begun. It wasn’t until 2010, for example, that the Bundeswehr issued new “small arms guidelines” requiring more live ammo training at close range instead of practicing at long distances from hilltops or trenches.
Years after it first stationed thousands of soldiers in Afghanistan in 2002, the Bundeswehr was still frozen in time, sticking to Cold War scenarios of large battles on the wide-open North German Plain that would involve clashing armies, tank battles, and fighter jets engaged in air-to-air dogfights. Luckily, none of this is the least bit likely to happen. Soldiers now train in the kind of close-range combat involved in battling insurgents. But the transformation takes time. Before it was finally permitted to fight in 2009, the Bundeswehr didn’t have a single officer with combat experience who might provide some practical advice to defense ministry bureaucrats in charge of the reforms.
“
Since the concept of actually fighting is still so new for the German army, training and equipment upgrades have only recently begun.
”
Yet as the Bundeswehr brass inch forward to a more useful and active role for their army, politicians in Berlin are putting the brakes back on. Defense Minister Thomas De Maizière has announced budget cuts that will lower military expenditures to only 1 percent of German GDP in 2015, from 1.3 percent now. That’s nowhere near the 2 percent threshold agreed to for NATO countries, as U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates once again chided Germany and other laggard NATO allies last week (of the 28 NATO allies, only the U.S., Britain, and France, plus tiny Greece and Albania, spend more than the minimum). The cuts also mean that urgent upgrades in equipment and training will either take longer or not happen at all.
Add to that a foreign minister, Guido Westerwelle, who has promised to make Germany "a leader in peace and disarmament," and who has aligned Germany with Russia and China in opposing any help for the anti-Gaddafi forces in Libya, and it’s not so sure German soldiers will be all that much better at shooting any time soon.
June 26, 2011 10:30pm
Posted for fair use....
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2011/06/26/rethinking_the_long_war_110362.html
June 26, 2011
Rethinking "The Long War"
By David Ignatius
WASHINGTON -- Gen. John Abizaid used the phrase "the long war" to describe America's battle with Islamic extremism after Sept. 11, 2001. When I first heard him say it in the dark days of 2004, as Iraq was spiraling downward, I had the feeling that it would last for most of our lifetimes.
Behind this decades-long battle, Abizaid said, was the political modernization of the Islamic world -- the explosive process of change that he likened to the revolutions and anarchic movements that swept across Europe in the 19th century.
This is the overarching conflict from which Barack Obama wants to withdraw American troops -- not because the turbulence is over but because big American expeditionary forces aren't the right answer. He suggested this larger shift Wednesday night. After a "difficult decade," he said, "the tide of war is receding. ... These long wars will come to a responsible end."
You can fault some of the particulars of Obama's policy. I'm scratching my head about the logic of his timetable for reversing the surge he announced 18 months ago: Pulling out 10,000 troops this year is OK, but why yank out another 23,000 in the middle of next year's fighting season? That encourages a battered Taliban to hang on awhile longer, rather than bargain for a truce. It repeats the tip-your-hand mistake I thought Obama made back in December 2009, when he set a date for beginning the withdrawal of his surge forces even as he ordered them into battle.
But on the larger theme, I thought Obama had it right. This period of expeditionary wars does need to come to an end -- not just because America is weary and broke, but because the dialectic of history has brought the world to a new place. If American military might has been shown to have limited effect in shaping events over the past 10 years, so have the terrorist strategies of al-Qaeda and the Taliban.
When Osama bin Laden declared war on the United States in the 1990s, he made two assumptions, both of which turned out to be wrong. He argued that if America were hit hard by a terrorist attack, it would run away, just as it had from Lebanon after the 1983 bombings and from Somalia in 1994. In his last moments, bin Laden surely knew this bet on American softness had been mistaken. "The message," said Obama, quoting an unnamed American soldier, "is we don't forget. You will be held accountable, no matter how long it takes."
Bin Laden's second conviction was that al-Qaeda could supplant the corrupt, autocratic rulers who had perverted governance in the Arab world. They are indeed in retreat -- al-hamdulillah, as Arabs would say -- but not because of al-Qaeda. What's powering the "Arab Spring" are citizen movements for democratic change. Wherever al-Qaeda has tried to impose theocratic "emirates," as in Iraq's Anbar province, it has burned itself out. As for the Taliban, its chief weapon in Afghanistan is raw physical intimidation. This isn't a movement on the rise.
What was striking about Obama's speech was the lack of fanfare and triumphalism that so often accompany U.S. rhetoric about foreign policy. Rather than offering upbeat word pictures about plucky Afghan schoolgirls, he admitted the reality that "we won't try to make Afghanistan a perfect place." While talking about America's "singular role," he wasn't imagining us as a shining city on the hill but as a nation bruised by recent experience -- one that is "as pragmatic as we are passionate." My translation: No more Teddy Roosevelt charges into the fray, at least not for a while.
What worries me, thinking about the future that Obama outlined in Afghanistan, is U.S. reliance on the harshest weapons in our arsenal -- the killing machine that is America's counterterrorism force. With Predator drones and the "capture or kill" night raids of the Joint Special Operations Command, America has found a way to punish its enemies without risking large U.S. casualties.
Obama concluded that this CT side of counterinsurgency works far more reliably than the uncertain, nation-building side of COIN. The embrace of counterterrorism tactics makes sense as an exit strategy from Afghanistan, and as a continuing check against al-Qaeda. But America should understand that this is a dark face of war -- something perilously close to combat by assassination. It needs more debate before it's elevated to a cornerstone of American strategy.
davidignatius@washpost.com
Copyright 2011, Washington Post Writers Group
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2011/06/26/rethinking_the_long_war_110362.html
June 26, 2011
Rethinking "The Long War"
By David Ignatius
WASHINGTON -- Gen. John Abizaid used the phrase "the long war" to describe America's battle with Islamic extremism after Sept. 11, 2001. When I first heard him say it in the dark days of 2004, as Iraq was spiraling downward, I had the feeling that it would last for most of our lifetimes.
Behind this decades-long battle, Abizaid said, was the political modernization of the Islamic world -- the explosive process of change that he likened to the revolutions and anarchic movements that swept across Europe in the 19th century.
This is the overarching conflict from which Barack Obama wants to withdraw American troops -- not because the turbulence is over but because big American expeditionary forces aren't the right answer. He suggested this larger shift Wednesday night. After a "difficult decade," he said, "the tide of war is receding. ... These long wars will come to a responsible end."
You can fault some of the particulars of Obama's policy. I'm scratching my head about the logic of his timetable for reversing the surge he announced 18 months ago: Pulling out 10,000 troops this year is OK, but why yank out another 23,000 in the middle of next year's fighting season? That encourages a battered Taliban to hang on awhile longer, rather than bargain for a truce. It repeats the tip-your-hand mistake I thought Obama made back in December 2009, when he set a date for beginning the withdrawal of his surge forces even as he ordered them into battle.
But on the larger theme, I thought Obama had it right. This period of expeditionary wars does need to come to an end -- not just because America is weary and broke, but because the dialectic of history has brought the world to a new place. If American military might has been shown to have limited effect in shaping events over the past 10 years, so have the terrorist strategies of al-Qaeda and the Taliban.
When Osama bin Laden declared war on the United States in the 1990s, he made two assumptions, both of which turned out to be wrong. He argued that if America were hit hard by a terrorist attack, it would run away, just as it had from Lebanon after the 1983 bombings and from Somalia in 1994. In his last moments, bin Laden surely knew this bet on American softness had been mistaken. "The message," said Obama, quoting an unnamed American soldier, "is we don't forget. You will be held accountable, no matter how long it takes."
Bin Laden's second conviction was that al-Qaeda could supplant the corrupt, autocratic rulers who had perverted governance in the Arab world. They are indeed in retreat -- al-hamdulillah, as Arabs would say -- but not because of al-Qaeda. What's powering the "Arab Spring" are citizen movements for democratic change. Wherever al-Qaeda has tried to impose theocratic "emirates," as in Iraq's Anbar province, it has burned itself out. As for the Taliban, its chief weapon in Afghanistan is raw physical intimidation. This isn't a movement on the rise.
What was striking about Obama's speech was the lack of fanfare and triumphalism that so often accompany U.S. rhetoric about foreign policy. Rather than offering upbeat word pictures about plucky Afghan schoolgirls, he admitted the reality that "we won't try to make Afghanistan a perfect place." While talking about America's "singular role," he wasn't imagining us as a shining city on the hill but as a nation bruised by recent experience -- one that is "as pragmatic as we are passionate." My translation: No more Teddy Roosevelt charges into the fray, at least not for a while.
What worries me, thinking about the future that Obama outlined in Afghanistan, is U.S. reliance on the harshest weapons in our arsenal -- the killing machine that is America's counterterrorism force. With Predator drones and the "capture or kill" night raids of the Joint Special Operations Command, America has found a way to punish its enemies without risking large U.S. casualties.
Obama concluded that this CT side of counterinsurgency works far more reliably than the uncertain, nation-building side of COIN. The embrace of counterterrorism tactics makes sense as an exit strategy from Afghanistan, and as a continuing check against al-Qaeda. But America should understand that this is a dark face of war -- something perilously close to combat by assassination. It needs more debate before it's elevated to a cornerstone of American strategy.
davidignatius@washpost.com
Copyright 2011, Washington Post Writers Group
Yes I know who the author is, but we all need to know each political faction's views....also look at the comments at the bottom of the article source...HC
Posted for fair use....
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/06/24/the_road_home_from_kabul
The Road Home from Kabul
Drawing down troops from Afghanistan is the right move. Now it's time to focus on the real threat in the neighborhood: the one coming from Pakistan.
BY JOHN KERRY | JUNE 24, 2011
This week, President Barack Obama fulfilled a promise he made to the American people in 2009 to begin responsibly ending the war in Afghanistan. His decision to withdraw 33,000 troops from the country over the next year came from a position of strength, thanks in large part to our men and women in uniform and their civilian counterparts who helped break the Taliban's momentum.
We brought Osama bin Laden to justice and defeated al Qaeda in Afghanistan. It is now time to reduce the U.S. footprint and for Afghans to take charge of their country and its future. It is time to focus on the real threats in the region: those that emanate from Pakistan.
Much work remains to be done, and the withdrawal should be seen as the beginning of a new path toward success. The steps that the United States, the Afghans, and the international community need to take in the coming months are clear and achievable.
First, we must recognize that we will still be fighting two separate but intertwined wars. The first is against Mullah Omar's Taliban in southern Afghanistan, the group that provided sanctuary to al Qaeda. We must make sure they never do that again. The president's surge gave our military the forces it needed to launch robust operations against the Afghan Taliban, weaken its base, and force its leaders to consider negotiations as a way to survive. Our reconciliation efforts are mostly aimed at this group, which may be driven by a radical interpretation of Islam but whose interests are confined to Afghanistan.
The other war is against those who are likely irreconcilable and dedicated to attacking us, chiefly the Haqqani network and its allies in eastern Afghanistan and western Pakistan. As our troops shift from the south to the east, their mission should shift accordingly from counterinsurgency to counterterrorism. It's the job of the Afghan security forces to win hearts and minds. Along the border with Pakistan, where insurgent groups pose a major threat, we should continue to train and work closely with elite Afghan units and the Pakistani military to root them out once and for all. There will be no rest for those who seek to do us harm.
Second, we must work with Pakistan to satisfy both our interests in Afghanistan and Islamabad's. This won't be easy. Relations between the two countries have deteriorated sharply since bin Laden was killed near Pakistan's premier military academy. American politicians and the public have responded with incredulity to the notion that the world's most wanted man was hiding in plain sight a couple of hours from the capital city of Islamabad, and Pakistan's leaders were angered and embarrassed by the violation of the country's sovereignty. The task is difficult, too, because some insurgent networks have long-standing ties to the Pakistani state, which has used them as proxies in the fight against India and permits them sanctuaries from which they attack U.S. troops in Afghanistan. At the same time, other insurgents have attacked Pakistani security forces and civilians, killing more than 35,000 people.
Despite these differences, there is common ground with Pakistan. We have shared interest in a political deal to end the conflict in Afghanistan and allow the exodus of U.S. troops. We also share an interest in reining in the extremists who are attacking Pakistan and avoiding another Mumbai-style attack that could destabilize Pakistan-India relations. We need to build on these common interests.
Third, we must push for a political settlement in Afghanistan because ultimately there can be no military solution to the country's problems. This is why I am heartened that the Obama administration is seriously pursuing talks with the Taliban. For reconciliation to work and be enforced, we have to listen closely to our Afghan and Pakistani partners to make sure any deal reflects their real interests and has regional support. We also want to make certain that the rights of all Afghans, including women and minorities, are protected. We can help negotiate a regional framework for Afghanistan that includes key players such as Pakistan, India, Russia, Saudi Arabia, neighboring countries in Central Asia -- and even Iran, with which the United States has begun preliminary talks. Tehran's interests and influence in Afghanistan merit a place at the table at some point.
Fourth, we should make sure that the Afghan leaders and people know that the fate of their country now lies in their own hands. President Hamid Karzai has said he will honor the Afghan Constitution and step aside in 2014 as the country holds its next presidential election. This will be a key opportunity for Afghans to chart a new course.
A successful transition will be challenging. We need to rethink how best to build and sustain the Afghan army and police in order to leave behind an effective, targeted security force -- not 350,000 unpaid, armed, and angry soldiers. And we have to take concrete steps to prevent the collapse of the wartime economy we have helped create, such as slowly reducing our assistance and working with other donors to set a standard wage so that we stop hiring so many of Afghanistan's qualified civil servants to work for foreign governments and organizations.
Karzai must do his part, too. This means putting the Afghan economy on track by supporting International Monetary Fund negotiations to develop acceptable banking standards, achieving financial stability, and resolving the Kabul Bank crisis; restoring legitimacy to parliament by overturning the special elections tribunal, which is trying to throw out the results of last year's parliamentary elections; and taking firm steps to combat the predatory corruption that alienates the Afghan people from their government.
The road home from Afghanistan will not be easy. Wars do not end overnight, and we cannot repeat the mistakes of the past by abandoning the region. Even as our troops withdraw, the Taliban and others should understand that the United States remains committed for the long run and will never again tolerate extremist sanctuaries that threaten our interests. But if we focus on what is necessary, achievable, and sustainable, our troops can come home while leaving behind a stable Afghanistan capable of charting its own future.
Posted for fair use....
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/06/24/the_road_home_from_kabul
The Road Home from Kabul
Drawing down troops from Afghanistan is the right move. Now it's time to focus on the real threat in the neighborhood: the one coming from Pakistan.
BY JOHN KERRY | JUNE 24, 2011
This week, President Barack Obama fulfilled a promise he made to the American people in 2009 to begin responsibly ending the war in Afghanistan. His decision to withdraw 33,000 troops from the country over the next year came from a position of strength, thanks in large part to our men and women in uniform and their civilian counterparts who helped break the Taliban's momentum.
We brought Osama bin Laden to justice and defeated al Qaeda in Afghanistan. It is now time to reduce the U.S. footprint and for Afghans to take charge of their country and its future. It is time to focus on the real threats in the region: those that emanate from Pakistan.
Much work remains to be done, and the withdrawal should be seen as the beginning of a new path toward success. The steps that the United States, the Afghans, and the international community need to take in the coming months are clear and achievable.
First, we must recognize that we will still be fighting two separate but intertwined wars. The first is against Mullah Omar's Taliban in southern Afghanistan, the group that provided sanctuary to al Qaeda. We must make sure they never do that again. The president's surge gave our military the forces it needed to launch robust operations against the Afghan Taliban, weaken its base, and force its leaders to consider negotiations as a way to survive. Our reconciliation efforts are mostly aimed at this group, which may be driven by a radical interpretation of Islam but whose interests are confined to Afghanistan.
The other war is against those who are likely irreconcilable and dedicated to attacking us, chiefly the Haqqani network and its allies in eastern Afghanistan and western Pakistan. As our troops shift from the south to the east, their mission should shift accordingly from counterinsurgency to counterterrorism. It's the job of the Afghan security forces to win hearts and minds. Along the border with Pakistan, where insurgent groups pose a major threat, we should continue to train and work closely with elite Afghan units and the Pakistani military to root them out once and for all. There will be no rest for those who seek to do us harm.
Second, we must work with Pakistan to satisfy both our interests in Afghanistan and Islamabad's. This won't be easy. Relations between the two countries have deteriorated sharply since bin Laden was killed near Pakistan's premier military academy. American politicians and the public have responded with incredulity to the notion that the world's most wanted man was hiding in plain sight a couple of hours from the capital city of Islamabad, and Pakistan's leaders were angered and embarrassed by the violation of the country's sovereignty. The task is difficult, too, because some insurgent networks have long-standing ties to the Pakistani state, which has used them as proxies in the fight against India and permits them sanctuaries from which they attack U.S. troops in Afghanistan. At the same time, other insurgents have attacked Pakistani security forces and civilians, killing more than 35,000 people.
Despite these differences, there is common ground with Pakistan. We have shared interest in a political deal to end the conflict in Afghanistan and allow the exodus of U.S. troops. We also share an interest in reining in the extremists who are attacking Pakistan and avoiding another Mumbai-style attack that could destabilize Pakistan-India relations. We need to build on these common interests.
Third, we must push for a political settlement in Afghanistan because ultimately there can be no military solution to the country's problems. This is why I am heartened that the Obama administration is seriously pursuing talks with the Taliban. For reconciliation to work and be enforced, we have to listen closely to our Afghan and Pakistani partners to make sure any deal reflects their real interests and has regional support. We also want to make certain that the rights of all Afghans, including women and minorities, are protected. We can help negotiate a regional framework for Afghanistan that includes key players such as Pakistan, India, Russia, Saudi Arabia, neighboring countries in Central Asia -- and even Iran, with which the United States has begun preliminary talks. Tehran's interests and influence in Afghanistan merit a place at the table at some point.
Fourth, we should make sure that the Afghan leaders and people know that the fate of their country now lies in their own hands. President Hamid Karzai has said he will honor the Afghan Constitution and step aside in 2014 as the country holds its next presidential election. This will be a key opportunity for Afghans to chart a new course.
A successful transition will be challenging. We need to rethink how best to build and sustain the Afghan army and police in order to leave behind an effective, targeted security force -- not 350,000 unpaid, armed, and angry soldiers. And we have to take concrete steps to prevent the collapse of the wartime economy we have helped create, such as slowly reducing our assistance and working with other donors to set a standard wage so that we stop hiring so many of Afghanistan's qualified civil servants to work for foreign governments and organizations.
Karzai must do his part, too. This means putting the Afghan economy on track by supporting International Monetary Fund negotiations to develop acceptable banking standards, achieving financial stability, and resolving the Kabul Bank crisis; restoring legitimacy to parliament by overturning the special elections tribunal, which is trying to throw out the results of last year's parliamentary elections; and taking firm steps to combat the predatory corruption that alienates the Afghan people from their government.
The road home from Afghanistan will not be easy. Wars do not end overnight, and we cannot repeat the mistakes of the past by abandoning the region. Even as our troops withdraw, the Taliban and others should understand that the United States remains committed for the long run and will never again tolerate extremist sanctuaries that threaten our interests. But if we focus on what is necessary, achievable, and sustainable, our troops can come home while leaving behind a stable Afghanistan capable of charting its own future.
Please see article source for links in text....
Posted for fair use....
"U.S. and Pakistan: Afghan Strategies is republished with permission of STRATFOR."
U.S. and Pakistan: Afghan Strategies
June 21, 2011 | 0846 GMT
By George Friedman
U.S. President Barack Obama will give a speech on Afghanistan on June 22. Whatever he says, it is becoming apparent that the United States is exploring ways to accelerate the drawdown of its forces in the country. It is also clear that U.S. relations with Pakistan are deteriorating to a point where cooperation — whatever level there was — is breaking down. These are two intimately related issues. Any withdrawal from Afghanistan, particularly an accelerated one, will leave a power vacuum in Afghanistan that the Kabul government will not be able to fill. Afghanistan is Pakistan’s back door, and its evolution is a matter of fundamental interest to Pakistan. A U.S. withdrawal means an Afghanistan intertwined with and influenced by Pakistan. Therefore, the current dynamic with Pakistan challenges any withdrawal plan.
There may be some in the U.S. military who believe that the United States might prevail in Afghanistan, but they are few in number. The champion of this view, Gen. David Petraeus, has been relieved of his command of forces in Afghanistan and promoted (or kicked upstairs) to become director of the CIA. The conventional definition of victory has been the creation of a strong government in Kabul controlling an army and police force able to protect the regime and ultimately impose its will throughout Afghanistan. With President Hamid Karzai increasingly uncooperative with the United States, the likelihood of this outcome is evaporating. Karzai realizes his American protection will be withdrawn and understands that the Americans will blame him for any negative outcomes of the withdrawal because of his inability or unwillingness to control corruption.
Defining Success in Afghanistan
There is a prior definition of success that shaped the Bush administration’s approach to Afghanistan in its early phases. The goal here was the disruption of al Qaeda’s operations in Afghanistan and the prevention of further attacks on the United States from Afghanistan. This definition did not envisage the emergence of a stable and democratic Afghanistan free of corruption and able to control its territory. It was more modest and, in many ways, it was achieved in 2001-2002. Its defect, of course, was that the disruption of al Qaeda in Afghanistan, while useful, did not address the evolution of al Qaeda in other countries. In particular, it did not deal with the movement of al Qaeda operatives to Pakistan, nor did it address the Taliban, which were not defeated in 2001-2002 but simply declined combat on American terms, re-emerging as a viable insurgency when the United States became bogged down in Iraq.
The mission creep from denying Afghan bases to al Qaeda to the transformation of Afghan society had many roots and was well under way during the Bush administration, but the immediate origin of the current strategy was the attempt to transfer the lessons of Iraq to Afghanistan. The surge in Iraq, and the important political settlement with Sunni insurgents that brought them into the American fold, reduced the insurgency. It remains to be seen whether it will produce a stable Iraq not hostile to American interests. The ultimate Iraq strategy was a political settlement framed by an increase in forces, and its long-term success was never clear. The Obama administration was prepared to repeat the attempt in Afghanistan, at least by using Iraq as a template if not applying exactly the same tactics.
However, the United States found that the Taliban were less inclined to negotiate with the United States, and certainly not on the favorable terms of the Iraqi insurgents, simply because they believed they would win in the long run and did not face the dangers that the Sunni insurgents did. The military operations that framed the search for a political solution turned out to be a frame without a painting. In Iraq, it is not clear that the Petraeus strategy actually achieved a satisfactory political outcome, and its application to Afghanistan does not seem, as yet, to have drawn the Taliban into the political process in the way that incorporating the Sunnis made Iraq appear at least minimally successful.
As we pointed out after the death of Osama bin Laden, his demise, coupled with the transfer of Petraeus out of Afghanistan, offered two opportunities. The first was a return to the prior definition of success in Afghanistan, in which the goal was the disruption of al Qaeda. Second, the departure of Petraeus and his staff also removed the ideology of counterinsurgency, in which social transformation was seen as the means toward a practical and radical transformation of Afghanistan. These two events opened the door to the redefinition of the U.S. goal and the ability to claim mission accomplished for the earlier, more modest end, thereby building the basis for terminating the war.
The central battle was in the United States military, divided between conventional warfighters and counter-insurgents. Counterinsurgency draws its roots from theories of social development in emerging countries going back to the 1950s. It argues that victory in these sorts of wars depends on social and political mobilization and that the purpose of the military battle is to create a space to build a state and nation capable of defending itself.
The conventional understanding of war is that its purpose is to defeat the enemy military. It presents a more limited and focused view of military power. This faction, bitterly opposed to Petraeus’ view of what was happening in Afghanistan, saw the war in terms of defeating the Taliban as a military force. In the view of this faction, defeating the Taliban was impossible with the force available and unlikely even with a more substantial force. There were two reasons for this. First, the Taliban comprised a light infantry force with a superior intelligence capability and the ability to withdraw from untenable operations (such as the battle for Helmand province) and re-engage on more favorable terms elsewhere. Second, sanctuaries in Pakistan allowed the Taliban to withdraw to safety and reconstitute themselves, thereby making their defeat in detail impossible. The option of invading Pakistan remained, but the idea of invading a country of 180 million people with some fraction of the nearly 150,000 U.S. and allied troops in Afghanistan was militarily unsupportable. Indeed, no force the United States could field would be in a position to compel Pakistan to conform to American wishes.
The alternative on the American side is a more conventional definition of war in which the primary purpose of the U.S. military in Afghanistan is to create a framework for special operations forces to disrupt al Qaeda in Afghanistan and potentially Pakistan, not to attempt to either defeat the Taliban strategically or transform Afghanistan politically and culturally. With the death of bin Laden, an argument can be made — at least for political purposes — that al Qaeda has been disrupted enough that the conventional military framework in Afghanistan is no longer needed. If al Qaeda revives in Afghanistan, then covert operations can be considered. The problem with al Qaeda is that it does not require any single country to regenerate. It is a global guerrilla force.
Asymmetry in U.S. and Pakistani Interests
The United States can choose to leave Afghanistan without suffering strategic disaster. Pakistan cannot leave Pakistan. It therefore cannot leave its border with Afghanistan nor can it evade the reality that Pakistani ethnic groups — particularly the Pashtun, which straddle the border and form the heart of the Taliban phenomenon — live on the Afghan side of the border as well. Therefore, while Afghanistan is a piece of American global strategy and not its whole, Afghanistan is central to Pakistan’s national strategy. This asymmetry in U.S. and Pakistani interests is now the central issue.
Continued....
Posted for fair use....
"U.S. and Pakistan: Afghan Strategies is republished with permission of STRATFOR."
U.S. and Pakistan: Afghan Strategies
June 21, 2011 | 0846 GMT
By George Friedman
U.S. President Barack Obama will give a speech on Afghanistan on June 22. Whatever he says, it is becoming apparent that the United States is exploring ways to accelerate the drawdown of its forces in the country. It is also clear that U.S. relations with Pakistan are deteriorating to a point where cooperation — whatever level there was — is breaking down. These are two intimately related issues. Any withdrawal from Afghanistan, particularly an accelerated one, will leave a power vacuum in Afghanistan that the Kabul government will not be able to fill. Afghanistan is Pakistan’s back door, and its evolution is a matter of fundamental interest to Pakistan. A U.S. withdrawal means an Afghanistan intertwined with and influenced by Pakistan. Therefore, the current dynamic with Pakistan challenges any withdrawal plan.
There may be some in the U.S. military who believe that the United States might prevail in Afghanistan, but they are few in number. The champion of this view, Gen. David Petraeus, has been relieved of his command of forces in Afghanistan and promoted (or kicked upstairs) to become director of the CIA. The conventional definition of victory has been the creation of a strong government in Kabul controlling an army and police force able to protect the regime and ultimately impose its will throughout Afghanistan. With President Hamid Karzai increasingly uncooperative with the United States, the likelihood of this outcome is evaporating. Karzai realizes his American protection will be withdrawn and understands that the Americans will blame him for any negative outcomes of the withdrawal because of his inability or unwillingness to control corruption.
Defining Success in Afghanistan
There is a prior definition of success that shaped the Bush administration’s approach to Afghanistan in its early phases. The goal here was the disruption of al Qaeda’s operations in Afghanistan and the prevention of further attacks on the United States from Afghanistan. This definition did not envisage the emergence of a stable and democratic Afghanistan free of corruption and able to control its territory. It was more modest and, in many ways, it was achieved in 2001-2002. Its defect, of course, was that the disruption of al Qaeda in Afghanistan, while useful, did not address the evolution of al Qaeda in other countries. In particular, it did not deal with the movement of al Qaeda operatives to Pakistan, nor did it address the Taliban, which were not defeated in 2001-2002 but simply declined combat on American terms, re-emerging as a viable insurgency when the United States became bogged down in Iraq.
The mission creep from denying Afghan bases to al Qaeda to the transformation of Afghan society had many roots and was well under way during the Bush administration, but the immediate origin of the current strategy was the attempt to transfer the lessons of Iraq to Afghanistan. The surge in Iraq, and the important political settlement with Sunni insurgents that brought them into the American fold, reduced the insurgency. It remains to be seen whether it will produce a stable Iraq not hostile to American interests. The ultimate Iraq strategy was a political settlement framed by an increase in forces, and its long-term success was never clear. The Obama administration was prepared to repeat the attempt in Afghanistan, at least by using Iraq as a template if not applying exactly the same tactics.
However, the United States found that the Taliban were less inclined to negotiate with the United States, and certainly not on the favorable terms of the Iraqi insurgents, simply because they believed they would win in the long run and did not face the dangers that the Sunni insurgents did. The military operations that framed the search for a political solution turned out to be a frame without a painting. In Iraq, it is not clear that the Petraeus strategy actually achieved a satisfactory political outcome, and its application to Afghanistan does not seem, as yet, to have drawn the Taliban into the political process in the way that incorporating the Sunnis made Iraq appear at least minimally successful.
As we pointed out after the death of Osama bin Laden, his demise, coupled with the transfer of Petraeus out of Afghanistan, offered two opportunities. The first was a return to the prior definition of success in Afghanistan, in which the goal was the disruption of al Qaeda. Second, the departure of Petraeus and his staff also removed the ideology of counterinsurgency, in which social transformation was seen as the means toward a practical and radical transformation of Afghanistan. These two events opened the door to the redefinition of the U.S. goal and the ability to claim mission accomplished for the earlier, more modest end, thereby building the basis for terminating the war.
The central battle was in the United States military, divided between conventional warfighters and counter-insurgents. Counterinsurgency draws its roots from theories of social development in emerging countries going back to the 1950s. It argues that victory in these sorts of wars depends on social and political mobilization and that the purpose of the military battle is to create a space to build a state and nation capable of defending itself.
The conventional understanding of war is that its purpose is to defeat the enemy military. It presents a more limited and focused view of military power. This faction, bitterly opposed to Petraeus’ view of what was happening in Afghanistan, saw the war in terms of defeating the Taliban as a military force. In the view of this faction, defeating the Taliban was impossible with the force available and unlikely even with a more substantial force. There were two reasons for this. First, the Taliban comprised a light infantry force with a superior intelligence capability and the ability to withdraw from untenable operations (such as the battle for Helmand province) and re-engage on more favorable terms elsewhere. Second, sanctuaries in Pakistan allowed the Taliban to withdraw to safety and reconstitute themselves, thereby making their defeat in detail impossible. The option of invading Pakistan remained, but the idea of invading a country of 180 million people with some fraction of the nearly 150,000 U.S. and allied troops in Afghanistan was militarily unsupportable. Indeed, no force the United States could field would be in a position to compel Pakistan to conform to American wishes.
The alternative on the American side is a more conventional definition of war in which the primary purpose of the U.S. military in Afghanistan is to create a framework for special operations forces to disrupt al Qaeda in Afghanistan and potentially Pakistan, not to attempt to either defeat the Taliban strategically or transform Afghanistan politically and culturally. With the death of bin Laden, an argument can be made — at least for political purposes — that al Qaeda has been disrupted enough that the conventional military framework in Afghanistan is no longer needed. If al Qaeda revives in Afghanistan, then covert operations can be considered. The problem with al Qaeda is that it does not require any single country to regenerate. It is a global guerrilla force.
Asymmetry in U.S. and Pakistani Interests
The United States can choose to leave Afghanistan without suffering strategic disaster. Pakistan cannot leave Pakistan. It therefore cannot leave its border with Afghanistan nor can it evade the reality that Pakistani ethnic groups — particularly the Pashtun, which straddle the border and form the heart of the Taliban phenomenon — live on the Afghan side of the border as well. Therefore, while Afghanistan is a piece of American global strategy and not its whole, Afghanistan is central to Pakistan’s national strategy. This asymmetry in U.S. and Pakistani interests is now the central issue.
Continued....
Continued.....
When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, Pakistan joined with the United States to defeat the Soviets. Saudi Arabia provided money and recruits, the Pakistanis provided training facilities and intelligence and the United States provided trainers and other support. For Pakistan, the Soviet invasion was a matter of fundamental national interest. Facing a hostile India supported by the Soviets and a Soviet presence in Afghanistan, Pakistan was threatened on two fronts. Therefore, deep involvement with the jihadists in Afghanistan was essential to Pakistan because the jihadists tied down the Soviets. This was also beneficial to the United States.
After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the United States became indifferent to Afghanistan’s future. Pakistan could not be indifferent. It remained deeply involved with the Islamist forces that had defeated the Soviets and would govern Afghanistan, and it helped facilitate the emergence of the Taliban as the dominant force in the country. The United States was quite content with this in the 1990s and accepted the fact that Pakistani intelligence had become intertwined not only with the forces that fought the Soviets but also with the Taliban, who, with Pakistani support, won the civil war that followed the Soviet defeat.
Intelligence organizations are as influenced by their clients as their clients are controlled by them. Consider anti-Castro Cubans in the 1960s and 1970s and their beginning as CIA assets and their end as major influencers of U.S. policy toward Cuba. The Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence directorate (ISI) became entwined with its clients. As the influence of the Taliban and Islamist elements increased in Afghanistan, the sentiment spread to Pakistan, where a massive Islamist movement developed with influence in the government and intelligence services.
Sept. 11, 2001, posed a profound threat to Pakistan. On one side, Pakistan faced a United States in a state of crisis, demanding Pakistani support against both al Qaeda and the Taliban. On the other side Pakistan had a massive Islamist movement hostile to the United States and intelligence services that had, for a generation, been intimately linked to Afghan Islamists, first with whole-hearted U.S. support, then with its benign indifference. The American demands involved shredding close relationships in Afghanistan, supporting an American occupation in Afghanistan and therefore facing internal resistance and threats in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.
The Pakistani solution was the only one it could come up with to placate both the United States and the forces in Pakistan that did not want to cooperate with the United States. The Pakistanis lied. To be more precise and fair, they did as much as they could for the United States without completely destabilizing Pakistan while making it appear that they were being far more cooperative with the Americans and far less cooperative with their public. As in any such strategy, the ISI and Islamabad found themselves engaged in a massive balancing act.
U.S. and Pakistani national interests widely diverged. The United States wanted to disrupt al Qaeda regardless of the cost. The Pakistanis wanted to avoid the collapse of their regime at any cost. These were not compatible goals. At the same time, the United States and Pakistan needed each other. The United States could not possibly operate in Afghanistan without some Pakistani support, ranging from the use of Karachi and the Karachi-Khyber and Karachi-Chaman lines of supply to at least some collaboration on intelligence sharing, at least on al Qaeda. The Pakistanis badly needed American support against India. If the United States simply became pro-Indian, the Pakistani position would be in severe jeopardy.
The United States was always aware of the limits of Pakistani assistance. The United States accepted this publicly because it made Pakistan appear to be an ally at a time when the United States was under attack for unilateralism. It accepted it privately as well because it did not want to see Pakistan destabilize. The Pakistanis were aware of the limits of American tolerance, so a game was played out.
The Endgame in Afghanistan
That game is now breaking down, not because the United States raided Pakistan and killed bin Laden but because it is becoming apparent to Pakistan that the United States will, sooner or later, be dramatically drawing down its forces in Afghanistan. This drawdown creates three facts. First, Pakistan will be facing the future on its western border with Afghanistan without an American force to support it. Pakistan does not want to alienate the Taliban, and not just for ideological reasons. It also expects the Taliban to govern Afghanistan in due course. India aside, Pakistan needs to maintain its ties to the Taliban in order to maintain its influence in Afghanistan and guard its western flank. Being cooperative with the United States is less important. Second, Pakistan is aware that as the United States draws down, it will need Pakistan to cover its withdrawal strategically. Afghanistan is not Iraq, and as the U.S. force draws down, it will be in greater danger. The U.S. needs Pakistani influence. Finally, there will be a negotiation with the Taliban, and elements of Pakistan, particularly the ISI, will be the intermediary.
The Pakistanis are preparing for the American drawdown. Publicly, it is important for them to appear as independent and even hostile to the Americans as possible in order to maintain their domestic credibility. Up to now, they have appeared to various factions in Pakistan as American lackeys. If the United States is leaving, the Pakistanis can’t afford to appear that way anymore. There are genuine issues separating the two countries, but in the end, the show is as important as the issues. U.S. accusations that the government has not cooperated with the United States in fighting Islamists are exactly what the Pakistani establishment needs in order to move to the next phase. Publicly arresting CIA sources who aided the United States in capturing bin Laden also enhances this new image.
From the American point of view, the war in Afghanistan — and elsewhere — has not been a failure. There have been no more attacks on the United States on the order of 9/11, and that has not been for al Qaeda’s lack of trying. U.S. intelligence and security services, fumbling in the early days, achieved a remarkable success, and that was aided by the massive disruption of al Qaeda by U.S. military operations. The measure of military success is simple. If the enemy was unable to strike, the military effort was a success. Obviously, there is no guarantee that al Qaeda will not regenerate or that another group will not emerge, but a continued presence in Afghanistan at this point doesn’t affect that. This is particularly true as franchise operations like the Yemen-based al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula begin to overtake the old apex leadership in terms of both operational innovation in transnational efforts and the ideological underpinnings of those attacks.
In the end, the United States will leave Afghanistan (with the possible exception of some residual special operations forces). Pakistan will draw Afghanistan back into its sphere of influence. Pakistan will need American support against India (since China does not have the force needed to support Pakistan over the Himalayas nor the navy to protect Pakistan’s coast). The United States will need Pakistan to do the basic work of preventing an intercontinental al Qaeda from forming again. Reflecting on the past 10 years, Pakistan will see that as being in its national interest. The United States will use Pakistan to balance India while retaining close ties to India.
A play will be acted out like the New Zealand Haka, with both sides making terrible sounds and frightening gestures at each other. But now that the counterinsurgency concept is being discarded, from all indications, and a fresh military analysis is under way, the script is being rewritten and we can begin to see the end shaping up. The United States is furious at Pakistan for its willingness to protect American enemies. Pakistan is furious at the United States for conducting attacks on its sovereign territory. In the end it doesn’t matter. They need each other. In the affairs of nations, like and dislike are not meaningful categories, and bullying and treachery are not blocks to cooperation. The two countries need each other more than they need to punish each other. Great friendships among nations are built on less.
When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, Pakistan joined with the United States to defeat the Soviets. Saudi Arabia provided money and recruits, the Pakistanis provided training facilities and intelligence and the United States provided trainers and other support. For Pakistan, the Soviet invasion was a matter of fundamental national interest. Facing a hostile India supported by the Soviets and a Soviet presence in Afghanistan, Pakistan was threatened on two fronts. Therefore, deep involvement with the jihadists in Afghanistan was essential to Pakistan because the jihadists tied down the Soviets. This was also beneficial to the United States.
After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the United States became indifferent to Afghanistan’s future. Pakistan could not be indifferent. It remained deeply involved with the Islamist forces that had defeated the Soviets and would govern Afghanistan, and it helped facilitate the emergence of the Taliban as the dominant force in the country. The United States was quite content with this in the 1990s and accepted the fact that Pakistani intelligence had become intertwined not only with the forces that fought the Soviets but also with the Taliban, who, with Pakistani support, won the civil war that followed the Soviet defeat.
Intelligence organizations are as influenced by their clients as their clients are controlled by them. Consider anti-Castro Cubans in the 1960s and 1970s and their beginning as CIA assets and their end as major influencers of U.S. policy toward Cuba. The Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence directorate (ISI) became entwined with its clients. As the influence of the Taliban and Islamist elements increased in Afghanistan, the sentiment spread to Pakistan, where a massive Islamist movement developed with influence in the government and intelligence services.
Sept. 11, 2001, posed a profound threat to Pakistan. On one side, Pakistan faced a United States in a state of crisis, demanding Pakistani support against both al Qaeda and the Taliban. On the other side Pakistan had a massive Islamist movement hostile to the United States and intelligence services that had, for a generation, been intimately linked to Afghan Islamists, first with whole-hearted U.S. support, then with its benign indifference. The American demands involved shredding close relationships in Afghanistan, supporting an American occupation in Afghanistan and therefore facing internal resistance and threats in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.
The Pakistani solution was the only one it could come up with to placate both the United States and the forces in Pakistan that did not want to cooperate with the United States. The Pakistanis lied. To be more precise and fair, they did as much as they could for the United States without completely destabilizing Pakistan while making it appear that they were being far more cooperative with the Americans and far less cooperative with their public. As in any such strategy, the ISI and Islamabad found themselves engaged in a massive balancing act.
U.S. and Pakistani national interests widely diverged. The United States wanted to disrupt al Qaeda regardless of the cost. The Pakistanis wanted to avoid the collapse of their regime at any cost. These were not compatible goals. At the same time, the United States and Pakistan needed each other. The United States could not possibly operate in Afghanistan without some Pakistani support, ranging from the use of Karachi and the Karachi-Khyber and Karachi-Chaman lines of supply to at least some collaboration on intelligence sharing, at least on al Qaeda. The Pakistanis badly needed American support against India. If the United States simply became pro-Indian, the Pakistani position would be in severe jeopardy.
The United States was always aware of the limits of Pakistani assistance. The United States accepted this publicly because it made Pakistan appear to be an ally at a time when the United States was under attack for unilateralism. It accepted it privately as well because it did not want to see Pakistan destabilize. The Pakistanis were aware of the limits of American tolerance, so a game was played out.
The Endgame in Afghanistan
That game is now breaking down, not because the United States raided Pakistan and killed bin Laden but because it is becoming apparent to Pakistan that the United States will, sooner or later, be dramatically drawing down its forces in Afghanistan. This drawdown creates three facts. First, Pakistan will be facing the future on its western border with Afghanistan without an American force to support it. Pakistan does not want to alienate the Taliban, and not just for ideological reasons. It also expects the Taliban to govern Afghanistan in due course. India aside, Pakistan needs to maintain its ties to the Taliban in order to maintain its influence in Afghanistan and guard its western flank. Being cooperative with the United States is less important. Second, Pakistan is aware that as the United States draws down, it will need Pakistan to cover its withdrawal strategically. Afghanistan is not Iraq, and as the U.S. force draws down, it will be in greater danger. The U.S. needs Pakistani influence. Finally, there will be a negotiation with the Taliban, and elements of Pakistan, particularly the ISI, will be the intermediary.
The Pakistanis are preparing for the American drawdown. Publicly, it is important for them to appear as independent and even hostile to the Americans as possible in order to maintain their domestic credibility. Up to now, they have appeared to various factions in Pakistan as American lackeys. If the United States is leaving, the Pakistanis can’t afford to appear that way anymore. There are genuine issues separating the two countries, but in the end, the show is as important as the issues. U.S. accusations that the government has not cooperated with the United States in fighting Islamists are exactly what the Pakistani establishment needs in order to move to the next phase. Publicly arresting CIA sources who aided the United States in capturing bin Laden also enhances this new image.
From the American point of view, the war in Afghanistan — and elsewhere — has not been a failure. There have been no more attacks on the United States on the order of 9/11, and that has not been for al Qaeda’s lack of trying. U.S. intelligence and security services, fumbling in the early days, achieved a remarkable success, and that was aided by the massive disruption of al Qaeda by U.S. military operations. The measure of military success is simple. If the enemy was unable to strike, the military effort was a success. Obviously, there is no guarantee that al Qaeda will not regenerate or that another group will not emerge, but a continued presence in Afghanistan at this point doesn’t affect that. This is particularly true as franchise operations like the Yemen-based al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula begin to overtake the old apex leadership in terms of both operational innovation in transnational efforts and the ideological underpinnings of those attacks.
In the end, the United States will leave Afghanistan (with the possible exception of some residual special operations forces). Pakistan will draw Afghanistan back into its sphere of influence. Pakistan will need American support against India (since China does not have the force needed to support Pakistan over the Himalayas nor the navy to protect Pakistan’s coast). The United States will need Pakistan to do the basic work of preventing an intercontinental al Qaeda from forming again. Reflecting on the past 10 years, Pakistan will see that as being in its national interest. The United States will use Pakistan to balance India while retaining close ties to India.
A play will be acted out like the New Zealand Haka, with both sides making terrible sounds and frightening gestures at each other. But now that the counterinsurgency concept is being discarded, from all indications, and a fresh military analysis is under way, the script is being rewritten and we can begin to see the end shaping up. The United States is furious at Pakistan for its willingness to protect American enemies. Pakistan is furious at the United States for conducting attacks on its sovereign territory. In the end it doesn’t matter. They need each other. In the affairs of nations, like and dislike are not meaningful categories, and bullying and treachery are not blocks to cooperation. The two countries need each other more than they need to punish each other. Great friendships among nations are built on less.
For links in text and maps please see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110622-obamas-afghanistan-plan-realities-withdrawal
Obama's Afghanistan Plan and the Realities of Withdrawal is republished with permission of STRATFOR.
Obama's Afghanistan Plan and the Realities of Withdrawal
June 23, 2011 | 0857 GMT
The Bin Laden Operation: Tapping Human Intelligence
Special Topic Page
* Special Series: The Afghanistan Campaign
* The War in Afghanistan
Related Link
* Special Report: U.S.-NATO, Facing the Reality of Risk in Pakistan (With STRATFOR Interactive map)
STRATFOR Book
* Afghanistan at the Crossroads: Insights on the Conflict
By Nathan Hughes
U.S. President Barack Obama announced June 22 that the long process of drawing down forces in Afghanistan would begin on schedule in July. Though the initial phase of the drawdown appears limited, minimizing the tactical and operational impact on the ground in the immediate future, the United States and its allies are now beginning the inevitable process of removing their forces from Afghanistan. This will entail the risk of greater Taliban battlefield successes.
The Logistical Challenge
Afghanistan, a landlocked country in the heart of Central Asia, is one of the most isolated places on Earth. This isolation has posed huge logistical challenges for the United States. Hundreds of shipping containers and fuel trucks must enter the country every day from Pakistan and from the north to sustain the nearly 150,000 U.S. and allied forces stationed in Afghanistan, about half the total number of Afghan security forces. Supplying a single gallon of gasoline in Afghanistan reportedly costs the U.S. military an average of $400, while sustaining a single U.S. soldier runs around $1 million a year (by contrast, sustaining an Afghan soldier costs about $12,000 a year).
These forces appear considerably lighter than those in Iraq because Afghanistan’s rough terrain often demands dismounted foot patrols. Heavy main battle tanks and self-propelled howitzers are thus few and far between, though not entirely absent. Afghanistan even required a new, lighter and more agile version of the hulking mine-resistant, ambush-protected vehicle known as the M-ATV (for “all-terrain vehicle”).
Based solely on the activity on the ground in Afghanistan today, one would think the United States and its allies were preparing for a permanent presence, not the imminent beginning of a long-scheduled drawdown (a perception the United States and its allies have in some cases used to their advantage to reach political arrangements with locals). An 11,500-foot all-weather concrete and asphalt runway and an air traffic control tower were completed this February at Camp Leatherneck and Camp Bastion in Helmand province. Another more than 9,000-foot runway was finished at Shindand Air Field in Herat province last December.
(click here to enlarge image)
Meanwhile, a so-called iron mountain of spare parts needed to maintain vehicles and aircraft, construction and engineering equipment, generators, ammunition and other supplies — even innumerable pallets of bottled water — has slowly been built up to sustain day-to-day military operations. There are fewer troops in Afghanistan than the nearly 170,000 in Iraq at the peak of operations and considerably lighter tonnage in terms of armored vehicles. But short of a hasty and rapid withdrawal reminiscent of the chaotic American exit from Saigon in 1975 (which no one currently foresees in Afghanistan), the logistical challenge of withdrawing from Afghanistan — at whatever pace — is perhaps even more daunting than the drawdown in Iraq. The complexity of having nearly 50 allies with troops in country will complicate this process.
Moreover, coalition forces in Iraq had ready access to well-established bases and modern port facilities in nearby Kuwait and in Turkey, a long-standing NATO ally. Though U.S. and allied equipment comes ashore on a routine basis in the Pakistani port city of Karachi, the facilities there are nothing like what exists in Kuwait. Routes to bases in Afghanistan are anything but short and established, with locally contracted fuel tankers and other supplies not only traveling far greater distances but also regularly subject to harassing attacks. They are inherently vulnerable to aggressive interdiction by militants fighting on terrain far more favorable to them, and to politically motivated interruptions by Islamabad. The American logistical dependence on Pakistani acquiescence cannot be understated. Most supplies transit the isolated Khyber Pass in the restive Pakistani Federally Administered Tribal Areas west of Islamabad. As in Iraq, the United States does have an alternative to the north. But instead of Turkey it is the Northern Distribution Network (NDN), which runs through Central Asia and Russia (Moscow has agreed to continue to expand it) and entails a 3,200-mile rail route to the Baltic Sea and ports in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia.
(click here to enlarge image)
Given the extraordinary distances involved, the metrics for defining whether something is worth the expense of shipping back from Afghanistan are unforgiving. Some equipment will be deemed too heavily damaged or cheap and will be sanitized if necessary and discarded. Much construction and fortification has been done with engineering and construction equipment like Hesco barriers (which are filled with sand and dirt) that will not be reclaimed, and will continue to characterize the landscape in Afghanistan for decades to come, much as the Soviet influence was perceivable long after their 1989 withdrawal. Much equipment will be handed over to Afghan security forces, which already have begun to receive up-armored U.S. HMMWVs, aka “humvees.” Similarly, some 800,000 items valued at nearly $100 million have already been handed over to more than a dozen Iraqi military, security and government entities.
Other gear will have to be stripped of sensitive equipment (radios and other cryptographic gear, navigation equipment, jammers for improvised explosive devices, etc.), which is usually flown out of the country due to security concerns before being shipped overland. And while some Iraqi stocks were designated for redeployment to Afghanistan or prepared for long-term storage in pre-positioned equipment depots and aboard maritime pre-positioning ships at facilities in Kuwait, most vehicles and supplies slated to be moved out of Afghanistan increasingly will have to be shipped far afield. This could be from Karachi by ship or to Europe by rail even if they are never intended for return to the United States.
Security Transition
More important than the fate of armored trucks and equipment will be the process of rebalancing forces across the country. This will involve handing over outposts and facilities to Afghan security forces, who continue to struggle to reach full capability, and scaling back the extent of the U.S. and allied presence in the country. In Iraq, and likely in Afghanistan, the beginning of this process will be slow and measured. But its pace in the years ahead remains to be seen, and may accelerate considerably.
(click here to enlarge image)
Continued.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110622-obamas-afghanistan-plan-realities-withdrawal
Obama's Afghanistan Plan and the Realities of Withdrawal is republished with permission of STRATFOR.
Obama's Afghanistan Plan and the Realities of Withdrawal
June 23, 2011 | 0857 GMT
The Bin Laden Operation: Tapping Human Intelligence
Special Topic Page
* Special Series: The Afghanistan Campaign
* The War in Afghanistan
Related Link
* Special Report: U.S.-NATO, Facing the Reality of Risk in Pakistan (With STRATFOR Interactive map)
STRATFOR Book
* Afghanistan at the Crossroads: Insights on the Conflict
By Nathan Hughes
U.S. President Barack Obama announced June 22 that the long process of drawing down forces in Afghanistan would begin on schedule in July. Though the initial phase of the drawdown appears limited, minimizing the tactical and operational impact on the ground in the immediate future, the United States and its allies are now beginning the inevitable process of removing their forces from Afghanistan. This will entail the risk of greater Taliban battlefield successes.
The Logistical Challenge
Afghanistan, a landlocked country in the heart of Central Asia, is one of the most isolated places on Earth. This isolation has posed huge logistical challenges for the United States. Hundreds of shipping containers and fuel trucks must enter the country every day from Pakistan and from the north to sustain the nearly 150,000 U.S. and allied forces stationed in Afghanistan, about half the total number of Afghan security forces. Supplying a single gallon of gasoline in Afghanistan reportedly costs the U.S. military an average of $400, while sustaining a single U.S. soldier runs around $1 million a year (by contrast, sustaining an Afghan soldier costs about $12,000 a year).
These forces appear considerably lighter than those in Iraq because Afghanistan’s rough terrain often demands dismounted foot patrols. Heavy main battle tanks and self-propelled howitzers are thus few and far between, though not entirely absent. Afghanistan even required a new, lighter and more agile version of the hulking mine-resistant, ambush-protected vehicle known as the M-ATV (for “all-terrain vehicle”).
Based solely on the activity on the ground in Afghanistan today, one would think the United States and its allies were preparing for a permanent presence, not the imminent beginning of a long-scheduled drawdown (a perception the United States and its allies have in some cases used to their advantage to reach political arrangements with locals). An 11,500-foot all-weather concrete and asphalt runway and an air traffic control tower were completed this February at Camp Leatherneck and Camp Bastion in Helmand province. Another more than 9,000-foot runway was finished at Shindand Air Field in Herat province last December.
(click here to enlarge image)
Meanwhile, a so-called iron mountain of spare parts needed to maintain vehicles and aircraft, construction and engineering equipment, generators, ammunition and other supplies — even innumerable pallets of bottled water — has slowly been built up to sustain day-to-day military operations. There are fewer troops in Afghanistan than the nearly 170,000 in Iraq at the peak of operations and considerably lighter tonnage in terms of armored vehicles. But short of a hasty and rapid withdrawal reminiscent of the chaotic American exit from Saigon in 1975 (which no one currently foresees in Afghanistan), the logistical challenge of withdrawing from Afghanistan — at whatever pace — is perhaps even more daunting than the drawdown in Iraq. The complexity of having nearly 50 allies with troops in country will complicate this process.
Moreover, coalition forces in Iraq had ready access to well-established bases and modern port facilities in nearby Kuwait and in Turkey, a long-standing NATO ally. Though U.S. and allied equipment comes ashore on a routine basis in the Pakistani port city of Karachi, the facilities there are nothing like what exists in Kuwait. Routes to bases in Afghanistan are anything but short and established, with locally contracted fuel tankers and other supplies not only traveling far greater distances but also regularly subject to harassing attacks. They are inherently vulnerable to aggressive interdiction by militants fighting on terrain far more favorable to them, and to politically motivated interruptions by Islamabad. The American logistical dependence on Pakistani acquiescence cannot be understated. Most supplies transit the isolated Khyber Pass in the restive Pakistani Federally Administered Tribal Areas west of Islamabad. As in Iraq, the United States does have an alternative to the north. But instead of Turkey it is the Northern Distribution Network (NDN), which runs through Central Asia and Russia (Moscow has agreed to continue to expand it) and entails a 3,200-mile rail route to the Baltic Sea and ports in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia.
(click here to enlarge image)
Given the extraordinary distances involved, the metrics for defining whether something is worth the expense of shipping back from Afghanistan are unforgiving. Some equipment will be deemed too heavily damaged or cheap and will be sanitized if necessary and discarded. Much construction and fortification has been done with engineering and construction equipment like Hesco barriers (which are filled with sand and dirt) that will not be reclaimed, and will continue to characterize the landscape in Afghanistan for decades to come, much as the Soviet influence was perceivable long after their 1989 withdrawal. Much equipment will be handed over to Afghan security forces, which already have begun to receive up-armored U.S. HMMWVs, aka “humvees.” Similarly, some 800,000 items valued at nearly $100 million have already been handed over to more than a dozen Iraqi military, security and government entities.
Other gear will have to be stripped of sensitive equipment (radios and other cryptographic gear, navigation equipment, jammers for improvised explosive devices, etc.), which is usually flown out of the country due to security concerns before being shipped overland. And while some Iraqi stocks were designated for redeployment to Afghanistan or prepared for long-term storage in pre-positioned equipment depots and aboard maritime pre-positioning ships at facilities in Kuwait, most vehicles and supplies slated to be moved out of Afghanistan increasingly will have to be shipped far afield. This could be from Karachi by ship or to Europe by rail even if they are never intended for return to the United States.
Security Transition
More important than the fate of armored trucks and equipment will be the process of rebalancing forces across the country. This will involve handing over outposts and facilities to Afghan security forces, who continue to struggle to reach full capability, and scaling back the extent of the U.S. and allied presence in the country. In Iraq, and likely in Afghanistan, the beginning of this process will be slow and measured. But its pace in the years ahead remains to be seen, and may accelerate considerably.
(click here to enlarge image)
Continued.....
Continued.....
The first areas slated for handover to Afghan control, the provinces of Panjshir, Bamiyan and Kabul — aside the restive Surobi district, though the rest of Kabul’s security effectively has been in Afghan hands for years — and the cities of Mazar-e-Sharif, Herat, Lashkar Gah and Mehtar Lam have been relatively quiet places for some time. Afghan security forces increasingly have taken over in these areas. As in Iraq, the first places to be turned over to indigenous security forces already were fairly secure. Handing over more restive areas later in the year will prove trickier.
This process of pulling back and handing over responsibility for security (in Iraq often termed having Iraqi security forces “in the lead” in specific areas) is a slow and deliberate one, not a sudden and jarring maneuver. Well before the formal announcement, Afghan forces began to transition to a more independent role, conducting more small-unit operations on their own. International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troops slowly have transitioned from joint patrols and tactical overwatch to a more operational overwatch, but have remained nearby even after transitions formally have taken place.
Under the current training regime, Afghan units continue to require advice and assistance, particularly with matters like intelligence, planning, logistics and maintenance. The ISAF will be cautious in its reductions for fear of pulling back too quickly and seeing the situation deteriorate — unless, of course, Obama directs it to conduct a hastier pullback.
As in Afghanistan, in Iraq the process of drawing down and handing over responsibility in each area was done very cautiously. There was a critical distinction, however. A political accommodation with the Sunnis facilitated the apparent success of the Iraqi surge — something that has not been (and cannot be) replicated in Afghanistan. Even with that advantage, Iraq remains in an unsettled and contentious state. The lack of any political framework to facilitate a military pullback leaves the prospect of a viable transition in restive areas where the U.S. counterinsurgency-focused strategy has been focused tenuous at best — particularly if timetables are accelerated.
In June 2009, U.S. forces in Iraq occupied 357 bases. A year later, U.S. forces occupied only 92 bases, 58 of which were partnered with the Iraqis. The pace of the transition in Afghanistan remains to be seen, but handing over the majority of positions to Afghan forces will fundamentally alter the situational awareness, visibility and influence of ISAF forces.
Casualties and Force Protection
The security of the remaining outposts and ensuring the security of U.S. and allied forces and critical lines of supply (particularly key sections of the Ring Road) that sustain remaining forces will be key to crafting the withdrawal and pulling back to fewer, stronger and more secure positions. As that drawdown progresses — and particularly if a more substantive shift in strategy is implemented — the increased pace begins to bring new incentives into play. Of particular note will be both a military and political incentive to reduce casualties as the endgame draws closer.
The desire to accelerate the consolidation to more secure positions will clash with the need to pull back slowly and continue to provide Afghan forces with advice and assistance. The reorientation may expose potential vulnerabilities to Taliban attack in the process of transitioning to a new posture. Major reversals and defeats for Afghan security forces at the hands of the Taliban after they have been left to their own devices can be expected in at least some areas and will have wide repercussions, perhaps even shifting the psychology and perception of the war.
When ISAF units are paired closely with Afghan forces, those units have a stronger day-to-day tactical presence in the field, and other units are generally operating nearby. So while they are more vulnerable and exposed to threats like IEDs while out on patrol, they also — indeed, in part because of that exposure — have a more alert and robust posture. As the transition accelerates and particularly if Washington accelerates it, the posture and therefore the vulnerabilities of forces change.
Force protection remains a key consideration throughout. The United States gained considerable experience with that during the Iraq transition — though again, a political accommodation underlay much of that transition, which will not be the case in Afghanistan.
As the drawdown continues, ISAF will have to balance having advisers in the field alongside Afghan units for as long as possible against pulling more back to key strongholds and pulling them out of the country completely. In the former case, the close presence of advisers can improve the effectiveness of Afghan security forces and provide better situational awareness. But it also exposes smaller units to operations more distant from strongholds as the number of outposts and major positions begins to be reduced. And as the process of pulling back accelerates and particularly as allied forces increasingly hunker down on larger and more secure outposts, their already limited situational awareness will decline even further, which opens up its own vulnerabilities.
One of these will be the impact on not just situational awareness on the ground but intelligence collection and particularly exploitable relationships with local political factions. As the withdrawal becomes more and more undeniable and ISAF pulls back from key areas, the human relationships that underlie intelligence sharing will be affected and reduced. This is particularly the case in places where the Taliban are strongest, as villagers there return to a strategy of hedging their bets out of necessity and focus on the more enduring power structure, which in many areas will clearly be the Taliban.
The Taliban
Ultimately, the Taliban’s incentive vis-a-vis the United States and its allies — especially as their exit becomes increasingly undeniable — is to conserve and maximize their strength for a potential fight in the vacuum sure to ensue after the majority of foreign troops have left the country. At the same time, any “revolutionary” movement must be able to consolidate internal control and maintain discipline while continuing to make itself relevant to domestic constituencies. The Taliban also may seek to take advantage of the shifting tactical realities to demonstrate their strength and the extent of their reach across the country, not only by targeting newly independent and newly isolated Afghan units but by attempting to kill or even kidnap now-more isolated foreign troops.
Though this year the Taliban have demonstrated their ability to strike almost anywhere in the country, they so far have failed to demonstrate the ability to penetrate the perimeter of large, secured facilities with a sizable assault force or to bring crew-served weapons to bear in an effective supporting manner. Given the intensity and tempo of special operations forces raids on Taliban leadership and weapons caches, it is unclear whether the Taliban have managed to retain a significant cache of heavier arms and the capability to wield them.
The inherent danger of compromise and penetration of indigenous security forces also continues to loom large. The vulnerabilities of ISAF forces will grow and change while they begin to shift as mission and posture evolve — and those vulnerabilities will be particularly pronounced in places where the posture and presence remains residual and a legacy of a previous strategy instead of more fundamental rebalancing. The shift from a dispersed, counterinsurgency-focused orientation to a more limited and more secure presence will ultimately provide the space to reduce casualties, but it will necessarily entail more limited visibility and influence. And the transition will create space for potentially more significant Taliban successes on the battlefield.
The first areas slated for handover to Afghan control, the provinces of Panjshir, Bamiyan and Kabul — aside the restive Surobi district, though the rest of Kabul’s security effectively has been in Afghan hands for years — and the cities of Mazar-e-Sharif, Herat, Lashkar Gah and Mehtar Lam have been relatively quiet places for some time. Afghan security forces increasingly have taken over in these areas. As in Iraq, the first places to be turned over to indigenous security forces already were fairly secure. Handing over more restive areas later in the year will prove trickier.
This process of pulling back and handing over responsibility for security (in Iraq often termed having Iraqi security forces “in the lead” in specific areas) is a slow and deliberate one, not a sudden and jarring maneuver. Well before the formal announcement, Afghan forces began to transition to a more independent role, conducting more small-unit operations on their own. International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troops slowly have transitioned from joint patrols and tactical overwatch to a more operational overwatch, but have remained nearby even after transitions formally have taken place.
Under the current training regime, Afghan units continue to require advice and assistance, particularly with matters like intelligence, planning, logistics and maintenance. The ISAF will be cautious in its reductions for fear of pulling back too quickly and seeing the situation deteriorate — unless, of course, Obama directs it to conduct a hastier pullback.
As in Afghanistan, in Iraq the process of drawing down and handing over responsibility in each area was done very cautiously. There was a critical distinction, however. A political accommodation with the Sunnis facilitated the apparent success of the Iraqi surge — something that has not been (and cannot be) replicated in Afghanistan. Even with that advantage, Iraq remains in an unsettled and contentious state. The lack of any political framework to facilitate a military pullback leaves the prospect of a viable transition in restive areas where the U.S. counterinsurgency-focused strategy has been focused tenuous at best — particularly if timetables are accelerated.
In June 2009, U.S. forces in Iraq occupied 357 bases. A year later, U.S. forces occupied only 92 bases, 58 of which were partnered with the Iraqis. The pace of the transition in Afghanistan remains to be seen, but handing over the majority of positions to Afghan forces will fundamentally alter the situational awareness, visibility and influence of ISAF forces.
Casualties and Force Protection
The security of the remaining outposts and ensuring the security of U.S. and allied forces and critical lines of supply (particularly key sections of the Ring Road) that sustain remaining forces will be key to crafting the withdrawal and pulling back to fewer, stronger and more secure positions. As that drawdown progresses — and particularly if a more substantive shift in strategy is implemented — the increased pace begins to bring new incentives into play. Of particular note will be both a military and political incentive to reduce casualties as the endgame draws closer.
The desire to accelerate the consolidation to more secure positions will clash with the need to pull back slowly and continue to provide Afghan forces with advice and assistance. The reorientation may expose potential vulnerabilities to Taliban attack in the process of transitioning to a new posture. Major reversals and defeats for Afghan security forces at the hands of the Taliban after they have been left to their own devices can be expected in at least some areas and will have wide repercussions, perhaps even shifting the psychology and perception of the war.
When ISAF units are paired closely with Afghan forces, those units have a stronger day-to-day tactical presence in the field, and other units are generally operating nearby. So while they are more vulnerable and exposed to threats like IEDs while out on patrol, they also — indeed, in part because of that exposure — have a more alert and robust posture. As the transition accelerates and particularly if Washington accelerates it, the posture and therefore the vulnerabilities of forces change.
Force protection remains a key consideration throughout. The United States gained considerable experience with that during the Iraq transition — though again, a political accommodation underlay much of that transition, which will not be the case in Afghanistan.
As the drawdown continues, ISAF will have to balance having advisers in the field alongside Afghan units for as long as possible against pulling more back to key strongholds and pulling them out of the country completely. In the former case, the close presence of advisers can improve the effectiveness of Afghan security forces and provide better situational awareness. But it also exposes smaller units to operations more distant from strongholds as the number of outposts and major positions begins to be reduced. And as the process of pulling back accelerates and particularly as allied forces increasingly hunker down on larger and more secure outposts, their already limited situational awareness will decline even further, which opens up its own vulnerabilities.
One of these will be the impact on not just situational awareness on the ground but intelligence collection and particularly exploitable relationships with local political factions. As the withdrawal becomes more and more undeniable and ISAF pulls back from key areas, the human relationships that underlie intelligence sharing will be affected and reduced. This is particularly the case in places where the Taliban are strongest, as villagers there return to a strategy of hedging their bets out of necessity and focus on the more enduring power structure, which in many areas will clearly be the Taliban.
The Taliban
Ultimately, the Taliban’s incentive vis-a-vis the United States and its allies — especially as their exit becomes increasingly undeniable — is to conserve and maximize their strength for a potential fight in the vacuum sure to ensue after the majority of foreign troops have left the country. At the same time, any “revolutionary” movement must be able to consolidate internal control and maintain discipline while continuing to make itself relevant to domestic constituencies. The Taliban also may seek to take advantage of the shifting tactical realities to demonstrate their strength and the extent of their reach across the country, not only by targeting newly independent and newly isolated Afghan units but by attempting to kill or even kidnap now-more isolated foreign troops.
Though this year the Taliban have demonstrated their ability to strike almost anywhere in the country, they so far have failed to demonstrate the ability to penetrate the perimeter of large, secured facilities with a sizable assault force or to bring crew-served weapons to bear in an effective supporting manner. Given the intensity and tempo of special operations forces raids on Taliban leadership and weapons caches, it is unclear whether the Taliban have managed to retain a significant cache of heavier arms and the capability to wield them.
The inherent danger of compromise and penetration of indigenous security forces also continues to loom large. The vulnerabilities of ISAF forces will grow and change while they begin to shift as mission and posture evolve — and those vulnerabilities will be particularly pronounced in places where the posture and presence remains residual and a legacy of a previous strategy instead of more fundamental rebalancing. The shift from a dispersed, counterinsurgency-focused orientation to a more limited and more secure presence will ultimately provide the space to reduce casualties, but it will necessarily entail more limited visibility and influence. And the transition will create space for potentially more significant Taliban successes on the battlefield.
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap...qa6zXA?docId=bbeeac786da24415983a75ae1c835489
Moroccans protest for and against new constitution
By ABDELJALIL BOUNHAR, Associated Press – 2 hours ago
CASABLANCA, Morocco (AP) — Tens of thousands of people demonstrated around Morocco both for and against a proposed new constitution on Sunday, just a week before it is to be voted on in a referendum.
In Morocco's largest city, Casablanca, government supporters first blocked then attacked with rocks a march by thousands of activists, wounding many.
King Mohammed VI announced a new constitution June 17 following unprecedented nationwide protests for greater freedoms in the preceding months.
He said the new document would turn the country into a constitutional monarchy and would widen the space for democracy.
The draft proposal gives the prime minister and the parliament greater powers, more independence to the judiciary and guarantees human rights, gender equality and an equal role to the Berber language.
Pro-reform activists, however, say that the draft, which was drawn up by a commission chosen by the king, leaves the monarch's absolute powers intact. Mohammed VI remains the head of the army and country's pre-eminent religious figure.
Backed by the official political parties, the government has launched an energetic media campaign in support of the new constitution ahead of the July 1 referendum.
Supporters of the government are now organizing demonstrations to rival those of the February 20 pro-democracy movement, often resulting in scuffles between the two sides.
In Casablanca, tens of thousands of pro-government demonstrators from all over the country waved the national flag, carried portraits of the king and shouted slogans in support of the new constitution.
On the other end of town, some 5,000 activists from the February 20 pro-democracy movement marched against the constitution in the lower income Hay Mohammedi neighborhood.
Their march, however, was blocked by young government supporters, mostly shirtless in the heat and carrying pictures of the king.
When they were cleared away by riot police, these young men circled through the alleys of the slum and attacked the opposition rally, hurling rocks and provoking a stone-throwing riot.
At least one police commander was seen getting hit by a stone before calm was restored and the march continued.
In downtown Rabat, the capital, a march of at least 2,000 protesting against the constitution was blocked by police and a few hundred government supporters.
The two groups, separated by riot police, chanted rival slogans. Activists reported brief scuffles and some injuries.
"We have decided since they won't let us march we will hold an open-ended sit in until they let us move," said Omar Radi, an activist with the February 20 movement.
Videos posted on the Feb. 20 website also showed demonstrations in the cities of Tangiers, Marrakech and Tetouan.
The official news agency reported that demonstrations supporting the constitution had taken place everywhere around the country Sunday, involving half a million people.
Like other official media organs, the agency did not mention the demonstrations against the constitutional project.
Paul Schemm reported from Paris.
Copyright © 2011 The Associated Press. All rights reserved.
http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap...qa6zXA?docId=bbeeac786da24415983a75ae1c835489
Moroccans protest for and against new constitution
By ABDELJALIL BOUNHAR, Associated Press – 2 hours ago
CASABLANCA, Morocco (AP) — Tens of thousands of people demonstrated around Morocco both for and against a proposed new constitution on Sunday, just a week before it is to be voted on in a referendum.
In Morocco's largest city, Casablanca, government supporters first blocked then attacked with rocks a march by thousands of activists, wounding many.
King Mohammed VI announced a new constitution June 17 following unprecedented nationwide protests for greater freedoms in the preceding months.
He said the new document would turn the country into a constitutional monarchy and would widen the space for democracy.
The draft proposal gives the prime minister and the parliament greater powers, more independence to the judiciary and guarantees human rights, gender equality and an equal role to the Berber language.
Pro-reform activists, however, say that the draft, which was drawn up by a commission chosen by the king, leaves the monarch's absolute powers intact. Mohammed VI remains the head of the army and country's pre-eminent religious figure.
Backed by the official political parties, the government has launched an energetic media campaign in support of the new constitution ahead of the July 1 referendum.
Supporters of the government are now organizing demonstrations to rival those of the February 20 pro-democracy movement, often resulting in scuffles between the two sides.
In Casablanca, tens of thousands of pro-government demonstrators from all over the country waved the national flag, carried portraits of the king and shouted slogans in support of the new constitution.
On the other end of town, some 5,000 activists from the February 20 pro-democracy movement marched against the constitution in the lower income Hay Mohammedi neighborhood.
Their march, however, was blocked by young government supporters, mostly shirtless in the heat and carrying pictures of the king.
When they were cleared away by riot police, these young men circled through the alleys of the slum and attacked the opposition rally, hurling rocks and provoking a stone-throwing riot.
At least one police commander was seen getting hit by a stone before calm was restored and the march continued.
In downtown Rabat, the capital, a march of at least 2,000 protesting against the constitution was blocked by police and a few hundred government supporters.
The two groups, separated by riot police, chanted rival slogans. Activists reported brief scuffles and some injuries.
"We have decided since they won't let us march we will hold an open-ended sit in until they let us move," said Omar Radi, an activist with the February 20 movement.
Videos posted on the Feb. 20 website also showed demonstrations in the cities of Tangiers, Marrakech and Tetouan.
The official news agency reported that demonstrations supporting the constitution had taken place everywhere around the country Sunday, involving half a million people.
Like other official media organs, the agency did not mention the demonstrations against the constitutional project.
Paul Schemm reported from Paris.
Copyright © 2011 The Associated Press. All rights reserved.
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.jpost.com/Headlines/Article.aspx?id=226677
Thousands march in Morocco over king's reforms
By REUTERS
06/26/2011 23:40
CASABLANCA, Morocco - Thousands of people marched through cities in Morocco on Sunday either to protest or to support constitutional reforms proposed by King Mohammed in reaction to unrest inspired by "Arab Spring" uprisings in the Arab world.
Critics of the reforms says they do not go far enough to reduce his powers. The march against the monarch's measures was the latest in a wave of marches in the North African state and comes days before a July 1 referendum on the reform plan.
"We reject the offers made (by the king). They keep the essence of authority in the hands of a non-elected person who will not be subject to any form of accountability," said Hamid, a jobless 38-year-old among 7,000 protesters who marched through a working class suburb of Casablanca, Morocco's largest city.
http://www.jpost.com/Headlines/Article.aspx?id=226677
Thousands march in Morocco over king's reforms
By REUTERS
06/26/2011 23:40
CASABLANCA, Morocco - Thousands of people marched through cities in Morocco on Sunday either to protest or to support constitutional reforms proposed by King Mohammed in reaction to unrest inspired by "Arab Spring" uprisings in the Arab world.
Critics of the reforms says they do not go far enough to reduce his powers. The march against the monarch's measures was the latest in a wave of marches in the North African state and comes days before a July 1 referendum on the reform plan.
"We reject the offers made (by the king). They keep the essence of authority in the hands of a non-elected person who will not be subject to any form of accountability," said Hamid, a jobless 38-year-old among 7,000 protesters who marched through a working class suburb of Casablanca, Morocco's largest city.
Posted for fair use....
http://www.google.com/hostednews/af...ocId=CNG.25958359d6449cfeae5aafcba92ce217.5f1
Sadr supporters ready for attacks on US troops
(AFP) – 1 day ago
NAJAF, Iraq — Supporters of Shiite radical leader Moqtada al-Sadr have offered to carry out suicide attacks against US troops in Iraq, his office said Saturday, as a year-end deadline for a US pullout looms.
"Thank you, my dear friends, and God bless you," Sadr wrote in reply to the offer from loyalists of his disbanded Mahdi Army militia, a statement from his office in the central shrine city of Najaf said.
The message came from "a group from the Mahdi Army who say they are ready to place themselves under his command to carry out suicide attacks to defend Islam and Iraq, targeting the occupying infidels without hitting civilians or public institutions," Sadr's office said.
In April, Sadr threatened to reactivate the Mahdi Army, which he formally disbanded in 2008, if US forces do not withdraw at the end of the year as scheduled under the terms of a bilateral security pact.
Nearly 50,000 American troops are still in Iraq, down from a peak of more than 170,000 after the invasion of 2003.
US officials have repeatedly asked Baghdad if it wants some troops to stay beyond 2011, but threats and pressure from Sadr have made calling for an extension a difficult decision for Iraqi leaders.
The once powerful Mahdi Army, which fought repeatedly against Iraqi and US-led coalition forces between 2004 and 2007, has been identified by the Pentagon as the main threat to stability in Iraq.
Before it was disbanded, the militia numbered some 60,000 fighters with fierce loyalty to Sadr.
The anti-US cleric, who has been pursuing off-and-on religious studies in the Iranian clerical centre of Qom, is the son of revered Grand Ayatollah Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr, who was assassinated by the regime of now executed dictator Saddam Hussein in 1999.
Copyright © 2011 AFP. All rights reserved.
http://www.google.com/hostednews/af...ocId=CNG.25958359d6449cfeae5aafcba92ce217.5f1
Sadr supporters ready for attacks on US troops
(AFP) – 1 day ago
NAJAF, Iraq — Supporters of Shiite radical leader Moqtada al-Sadr have offered to carry out suicide attacks against US troops in Iraq, his office said Saturday, as a year-end deadline for a US pullout looms.
"Thank you, my dear friends, and God bless you," Sadr wrote in reply to the offer from loyalists of his disbanded Mahdi Army militia, a statement from his office in the central shrine city of Najaf said.
The message came from "a group from the Mahdi Army who say they are ready to place themselves under his command to carry out suicide attacks to defend Islam and Iraq, targeting the occupying infidels without hitting civilians or public institutions," Sadr's office said.
In April, Sadr threatened to reactivate the Mahdi Army, which he formally disbanded in 2008, if US forces do not withdraw at the end of the year as scheduled under the terms of a bilateral security pact.
Nearly 50,000 American troops are still in Iraq, down from a peak of more than 170,000 after the invasion of 2003.
US officials have repeatedly asked Baghdad if it wants some troops to stay beyond 2011, but threats and pressure from Sadr have made calling for an extension a difficult decision for Iraqi leaders.
The once powerful Mahdi Army, which fought repeatedly against Iraqi and US-led coalition forces between 2004 and 2007, has been identified by the Pentagon as the main threat to stability in Iraq.
Before it was disbanded, the militia numbered some 60,000 fighters with fierce loyalty to Sadr.
The anti-US cleric, who has been pursuing off-and-on religious studies in the Iranian clerical centre of Qom, is the son of revered Grand Ayatollah Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr, who was assassinated by the regime of now executed dictator Saddam Hussein in 1999.
Copyright © 2011 AFP. All rights reserved.
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.boston.com/news/world/mi...s_leaders_feud_iraqi_government_is_paralyzed/
As leaders feud, Iraqi government is paralyzed
By Michael S. Schmidt
New York Times / June 26, 2011
BAGHDAD — Fifteen months after an election that was supposed to lay the groundwork for Iraq’s future, the government remains virtually paralyzed by a clash between the country’s two most powerful politicians, who refuse to speak to each other.
The paralysis is contributing to a rise in violence, and it is complicating negotiations on the most difficult and divisive question hanging over the country: Whether to ask the United States to keep a contingency force here after the scheduled withdrawal of American troops at the end of the year.
The longer the deadlock persists, the harder it becomes for the US military to reverse or slow the withdrawal of the roughly 48,000 troops, the pace of which will pick up over the next few months.
In December, the two politicians, Ayad Allawi, leader of the Iraqiya bloc, and Nouri al-Maliki, the country’s prime minister, entered into an American-backed power-sharing agreement. But since then, the men have been unable to agree on who should run the Interior and Defense ministries, the government’s two most important departments.
The United States has been unable to end the stalemate, demonstrating to some analysts and Iraqis its waning influence here.
Allawi, whose party received the most votes in last year’s election, has yet to show up in Parliament. Maliki has run the government on his own, and his aides have threatened to sue Allawi for calling them lying tyrants and saying they are supported by Iran.
As the deadlock grinds on, political assassinations and attacks on US bases have increased significantly.
“This is the biggest dispute that has occurred here since 2003, and it will continue to escalate if a solution is not found, and that is our concern,’’ said Jabir al-Jabiri, a member of Parliament from Allawi’s Iraqiya bloc.
Without leaders at the Interior and Defense ministries, decisions have been delayed about whether to single out terrorists, according to US officials.
© Copyright 2011 Globe Newspaper Company.
http://www.boston.com/news/world/mi...s_leaders_feud_iraqi_government_is_paralyzed/
As leaders feud, Iraqi government is paralyzed
By Michael S. Schmidt
New York Times / June 26, 2011
BAGHDAD — Fifteen months after an election that was supposed to lay the groundwork for Iraq’s future, the government remains virtually paralyzed by a clash between the country’s two most powerful politicians, who refuse to speak to each other.
The paralysis is contributing to a rise in violence, and it is complicating negotiations on the most difficult and divisive question hanging over the country: Whether to ask the United States to keep a contingency force here after the scheduled withdrawal of American troops at the end of the year.
The longer the deadlock persists, the harder it becomes for the US military to reverse or slow the withdrawal of the roughly 48,000 troops, the pace of which will pick up over the next few months.
In December, the two politicians, Ayad Allawi, leader of the Iraqiya bloc, and Nouri al-Maliki, the country’s prime minister, entered into an American-backed power-sharing agreement. But since then, the men have been unable to agree on who should run the Interior and Defense ministries, the government’s two most important departments.
The United States has been unable to end the stalemate, demonstrating to some analysts and Iraqis its waning influence here.
Allawi, whose party received the most votes in last year’s election, has yet to show up in Parliament. Maliki has run the government on his own, and his aides have threatened to sue Allawi for calling them lying tyrants and saying they are supported by Iran.
As the deadlock grinds on, political assassinations and attacks on US bases have increased significantly.
“This is the biggest dispute that has occurred here since 2003, and it will continue to escalate if a solution is not found, and that is our concern,’’ said Jabir al-Jabiri, a member of Parliament from Allawi’s Iraqiya bloc.
Without leaders at the Interior and Defense ministries, decisions have been delayed about whether to single out terrorists, according to US officials.
© Copyright 2011 Globe Newspaper Company.
Posted for fair use....
http://www.taiwannews.com.tw/etn/news_content.php?id=1636954
New cracks form in Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood
By MAGGIE MICHAEL
Associated Press
2011-06-27 05:33 AM
Several members of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, including a prominent senior figure, broke off to form a new political party Sunday, exposing further cracks in the influential Islamic group that is expected to be the most formidable contender in Egypt's upcoming elections.
The Brotherhood was the most powerful and organized opposition party before President Hosni Mubarak was ousted Feb. 11 in a popular uprising. It is expected to win big in parliamentary elections set for September.
But the movement also faces new challenges in post-revolutionary Egypt, where the new political openness is taking a toll on the venerable Islamist group. Several factions _ most recently several young members _ have already broken away to form new parties to rival to the Brotherhood's main Freedom and Justice Party.
The Brotherhood is worried enough by the splinter movements that it has threatened to expel members who join competing parties and threw out a leading member who decided to run for president on his own.
The latest breakaway party is spearheaded by members of the Brotherhood's so-called "reformist" camp, which announced Sunday they were forming a separate bloc called al-Riyada, Arabic for The Pioneers.
The new party views Islam as the foundation of Egyptian culture, but not its politics, said Khaled Dawoud, a senior Brotherhood figure now spearheading al-Riyada. "The culture of Egypt is Islamic, why do we need to elaborate?" Dawoud told The Associated Press.
The Brotherhood, in contrast, marches under the banner of "Islam is the solution" and views Islamic Sharia law as the basis of society.
Dawoud criticized the Brotherhood for not making a clear separation between the group's mission as an Islamic preaching organization and its political party. He also criticized what he called undemocratic practices within the group.
"How come you name a party leader before you carry out internal elections?" he asked, in reference to the naming of the party's leadership.
Dawoud originally joined the Brotherhood in the 1970s as part of a generation of young Islamists at a time when the group was badly weakened by a government crackdown under President Gamal Abdel Nasser, who sent thousands of Brotherhood members to prison and executed its top leaders.
Another leading member of the Brotherhood, Abdel-Moneim Abul-Fottouh, has announced his plans to run for the upcoming presidential elections, violating the Brotherhood's decision not to field candidates. Abul-Fottouh has already been expelled for violating the group's rules.
Abul-Fottouh represents the most moderate face of the Brotherhood. In many of his writings, he has interpreted the veil not as Islamic dress code but rather a traditional dress like the Indian Sari, more of a national identity than a religious obligation. He also supports rights of any Egyptian, even atheist.
He has come under attack from hard-liners within the group who over the past years have dominated the Brotherhood's leadership and the decision making body within the group.
Hossam Tamam, an Egyptian expert in Islamic groups, said that the cracks within the Muslim Brotherhood will ultimately weaken the group. "They are the ones who be the losers," he said.
"Al-Riyada is very significant because they are the reformists within the group who were isolated for so long. For the first time, we see an Islamic group that doesn't identify itself through Islamic Sharia. This is very important," he said.
"The group will face a historical moment if it doesn't revise its ideas," he said, adding that the rapid defections are directly related to the action the group took against Abul-Fottouh.
http://www.taiwannews.com.tw/etn/news_content.php?id=1636954
New cracks form in Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood
By MAGGIE MICHAEL
Associated Press
2011-06-27 05:33 AM
Several members of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, including a prominent senior figure, broke off to form a new political party Sunday, exposing further cracks in the influential Islamic group that is expected to be the most formidable contender in Egypt's upcoming elections.
The Brotherhood was the most powerful and organized opposition party before President Hosni Mubarak was ousted Feb. 11 in a popular uprising. It is expected to win big in parliamentary elections set for September.
But the movement also faces new challenges in post-revolutionary Egypt, where the new political openness is taking a toll on the venerable Islamist group. Several factions _ most recently several young members _ have already broken away to form new parties to rival to the Brotherhood's main Freedom and Justice Party.
The Brotherhood is worried enough by the splinter movements that it has threatened to expel members who join competing parties and threw out a leading member who decided to run for president on his own.
The latest breakaway party is spearheaded by members of the Brotherhood's so-called "reformist" camp, which announced Sunday they were forming a separate bloc called al-Riyada, Arabic for The Pioneers.
The new party views Islam as the foundation of Egyptian culture, but not its politics, said Khaled Dawoud, a senior Brotherhood figure now spearheading al-Riyada. "The culture of Egypt is Islamic, why do we need to elaborate?" Dawoud told The Associated Press.
The Brotherhood, in contrast, marches under the banner of "Islam is the solution" and views Islamic Sharia law as the basis of society.
Dawoud criticized the Brotherhood for not making a clear separation between the group's mission as an Islamic preaching organization and its political party. He also criticized what he called undemocratic practices within the group.
"How come you name a party leader before you carry out internal elections?" he asked, in reference to the naming of the party's leadership.
Dawoud originally joined the Brotherhood in the 1970s as part of a generation of young Islamists at a time when the group was badly weakened by a government crackdown under President Gamal Abdel Nasser, who sent thousands of Brotherhood members to prison and executed its top leaders.
Another leading member of the Brotherhood, Abdel-Moneim Abul-Fottouh, has announced his plans to run for the upcoming presidential elections, violating the Brotherhood's decision not to field candidates. Abul-Fottouh has already been expelled for violating the group's rules.
Abul-Fottouh represents the most moderate face of the Brotherhood. In many of his writings, he has interpreted the veil not as Islamic dress code but rather a traditional dress like the Indian Sari, more of a national identity than a religious obligation. He also supports rights of any Egyptian, even atheist.
He has come under attack from hard-liners within the group who over the past years have dominated the Brotherhood's leadership and the decision making body within the group.
Hossam Tamam, an Egyptian expert in Islamic groups, said that the cracks within the Muslim Brotherhood will ultimately weaken the group. "They are the ones who be the losers," he said.
"Al-Riyada is very significant because they are the reformists within the group who were isolated for so long. For the first time, we see an Islamic group that doesn't identify itself through Islamic Sharia. This is very important," he said.
"The group will face a historical moment if it doesn't revise its ideas," he said, adding that the rapid defections are directly related to the action the group took against Abul-Fottouh.
For links in text please see article source....
Posted for fair use.....
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/2011/06/2011626152713163143.html
McCain: Egypt army wants swift power transfer
US senator says military council wants to hand power to elected government "as soon as possible" during visit to Cairo.
Last Modified: 26 Jun 2011 19:57
John McCain, the US senator and former presidential candidate, has said that Egypt's military rulers want to hand over powers to an elected government "as soon as possible".
"The field marshal [Hussein Tantawi] again indicated his absolute commitment to a transition to a civilian government at the earliest possible time after the elections have taken place," McCain told reporters in Cairo on Sunday.
McCain is part of a US delegation of senators and business leaders visiting North Africa.
The Republican senator was speaking following talks with Tantawi, the head of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces which took power following Egypt's revolution in February.
The US group arrived in Cairo on Saturday and visited Tahrir Square, the epicentre of Egypt's revolt.
US investment
Egypt is looking to establish a stable economic programme following the revolution and McCain told reporters in Tahrir Square that the US was "ready to invest in jobs".
"It is in the United States national security interest to see a prosperous, growing, democratic and free Egypt," he said.
Senator John Kerry, a Democrat and also a former presidential candidate, expressed his admiration for what the Egyptian people are fighting for.
He said: "We are both extraordinarily committed to what is happening here in Egypt. Great respect and admiration for the changes you are fighting for.
"We're honoured to be here with leaders of some of the major corporations in the world and they also have a great interest in the future of Egypt."
'Listen not dictate'
At a news conference at a Coca Cola plant in Cairo on Sunday, the senators said they were visiting Egypt to "listen and not to dictate", Al Jazeera's Ayman Mohyeldin reported from the capital.
Among the issues that the senators discussed were democratic reforms including international observors, military assistance and private investment, said Mohyeldin.
The senators were accompanied by Jeffrey Immelt, chief executive of General Electric, as well as other business leaders from some of the world's biggest corporations, including Coca Cola, ExxonMobil and Boeing.
The delegation met with Essam Sharaf, Egypt's interim prime minister and Samir Radwan, the Egyptian finance minister, on Saturday, as well as Mohamed Abd Elsalam, the head of the country's stock exchange, on Sunday.
Hours after the delegation's arrival in Egypt, Radwan announced that, after revising its budget and cutting the forecast deficit, Egypt would not be borrowing from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund even though a loan had been agreed upon.
In an exclusive interview with Al Jazeera, Radwan said that the country's military rulers did not want to burden the country with debt, and that the government would make up the shortfall by cutting expenditures on some social and public investment projects.
Posted for fair use.....
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/2011/06/2011626152713163143.html
McCain: Egypt army wants swift power transfer
US senator says military council wants to hand power to elected government "as soon as possible" during visit to Cairo.
Last Modified: 26 Jun 2011 19:57
John McCain, the US senator and former presidential candidate, has said that Egypt's military rulers want to hand over powers to an elected government "as soon as possible".
"The field marshal [Hussein Tantawi] again indicated his absolute commitment to a transition to a civilian government at the earliest possible time after the elections have taken place," McCain told reporters in Cairo on Sunday.
McCain is part of a US delegation of senators and business leaders visiting North Africa.
The Republican senator was speaking following talks with Tantawi, the head of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces which took power following Egypt's revolution in February.
The US group arrived in Cairo on Saturday and visited Tahrir Square, the epicentre of Egypt's revolt.
US investment
Egypt is looking to establish a stable economic programme following the revolution and McCain told reporters in Tahrir Square that the US was "ready to invest in jobs".
"It is in the United States national security interest to see a prosperous, growing, democratic and free Egypt," he said.
Senator John Kerry, a Democrat and also a former presidential candidate, expressed his admiration for what the Egyptian people are fighting for.
He said: "We are both extraordinarily committed to what is happening here in Egypt. Great respect and admiration for the changes you are fighting for.
"We're honoured to be here with leaders of some of the major corporations in the world and they also have a great interest in the future of Egypt."
'Listen not dictate'
At a news conference at a Coca Cola plant in Cairo on Sunday, the senators said they were visiting Egypt to "listen and not to dictate", Al Jazeera's Ayman Mohyeldin reported from the capital.
Among the issues that the senators discussed were democratic reforms including international observors, military assistance and private investment, said Mohyeldin.
The senators were accompanied by Jeffrey Immelt, chief executive of General Electric, as well as other business leaders from some of the world's biggest corporations, including Coca Cola, ExxonMobil and Boeing.
The delegation met with Essam Sharaf, Egypt's interim prime minister and Samir Radwan, the Egyptian finance minister, on Saturday, as well as Mohamed Abd Elsalam, the head of the country's stock exchange, on Sunday.
Hours after the delegation's arrival in Egypt, Radwan announced that, after revising its budget and cutting the forecast deficit, Egypt would not be borrowing from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund even though a loan had been agreed upon.
In an exclusive interview with Al Jazeera, Radwan said that the country's military rulers did not want to burden the country with debt, and that the government would make up the shortfall by cutting expenditures on some social and public investment projects.
I wonder how long this will last?....
Posted for fair use.....
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303627104576409480025333602.html
* ASIA NEWS
* JUNE 26, 2011, 5:20 P.M. ET
China Announces Pact With Vietnam on Disputed Sea
* Article
* Interactive Graphics
* Comments (3)
By BRIAN SPEGELE
BEIJING—China said it had reached an agreement with Vietnam to resolve a growing territorial dispute in the South China Sea, though Vietnamese officials didn't comment on the announcement and anti-Chinese demonstrations continued in Hanoi.
The two countries would "peacefully resolve maritime disputes through negotiations and friendly consultations," the Chinese Foreign Ministry said in a statement after state councilor Dai Bingguo met Vietnamese Vice Foreign Minister Ho Xuan Son in Beijing on Saturday.
Disputed Isles
Competing territorial claims have led to maritime disputes off the coast of Asia.
View Interactive
The statement didn't go into any detail on how the countries would resolve the dispute, which has simmered for years and flared again after Vietnam recently accused China of impeding a state-owned oil exploration vessel.
The South China Sea is claimed in whole or part by China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, Brunei and Malaysia, and is thought to hold significant reserves of oil and natural gas, which China in particular needs to fuel its booming economy.
China says disputes with its neighbors need to be handled bilaterally, and responded indignantly last year to statements by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton that the U.S. was prepared to help facilitate multiparty talks to resolve the conflict. U.S. diplomats said this month the U.S. wouldn't take sides in the dispute, but would protect its significant interests in the region.
A senior Chinese diplomat, in unusually stark language, told foreign journalists last week the U.S. needed to stay out of its regional disputes.
"I believe some countries now are playing with fire," said Cui Tiankai, vice minister of foreign affairs. "And I hope the U.S. won't be burned by this fire."
View Full Image
SCHINASEA
EPA
Protests against Chinese claims to territory in the South China Sea continued in Hanoi on Sunday, unimpeded by Vietnamese authorities.
SCHINASEA
SCHINASEA
Mr. Cui met in Hawaii on Saturday with Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell, who told reporters in Washington before the meetings that the U.S. didn't plan to "fan the flames" of the dispute, the Associated Press reported.
Vietnam and the Philippines have appeared to more closely align themselves with the U.S. in the dispute. The U.S. is scheduled to stage joint naval exercises with both countries, though the participants stress they are part of regular cooperation and not a result of the current flare-up of the tensions.
Philippine President Benigno Aquino III last week praised a strong U.S. naval presence in the region, which he said deters aggression and ensures freedom of navigation. Vietnam on Friday issued a joint statement with the U.S. that called for freedom of navigation of the seas, as well as a "collaborative, diplomatic process."
Some security analysts say such efforts to internationalize the conflict have stoked an increasingly belligerent response from China. China is rapidly modernizing its navy and preparing to launch its first aircraft carrier, which some in the region worry will aggravate maritime disputes.
Vietnamese demonstrators in Hanoi on Sunday continued anti-Chinese protests for the fourth straight week, as authorities have allowed them to continue.
About 100 people marched through the capital's streets, some carrying signs accusing China of invading its territorial waters, the AP reported.
Write to Brian Spegele at brian.spegele@wsj.com
Posted for fair use.....
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303627104576409480025333602.html
* ASIA NEWS
* JUNE 26, 2011, 5:20 P.M. ET
China Announces Pact With Vietnam on Disputed Sea
* Article
* Interactive Graphics
* Comments (3)
By BRIAN SPEGELE
BEIJING—China said it had reached an agreement with Vietnam to resolve a growing territorial dispute in the South China Sea, though Vietnamese officials didn't comment on the announcement and anti-Chinese demonstrations continued in Hanoi.
The two countries would "peacefully resolve maritime disputes through negotiations and friendly consultations," the Chinese Foreign Ministry said in a statement after state councilor Dai Bingguo met Vietnamese Vice Foreign Minister Ho Xuan Son in Beijing on Saturday.
Disputed Isles
Competing territorial claims have led to maritime disputes off the coast of Asia.
View Interactive
The statement didn't go into any detail on how the countries would resolve the dispute, which has simmered for years and flared again after Vietnam recently accused China of impeding a state-owned oil exploration vessel.
The South China Sea is claimed in whole or part by China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, Brunei and Malaysia, and is thought to hold significant reserves of oil and natural gas, which China in particular needs to fuel its booming economy.
China says disputes with its neighbors need to be handled bilaterally, and responded indignantly last year to statements by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton that the U.S. was prepared to help facilitate multiparty talks to resolve the conflict. U.S. diplomats said this month the U.S. wouldn't take sides in the dispute, but would protect its significant interests in the region.
A senior Chinese diplomat, in unusually stark language, told foreign journalists last week the U.S. needed to stay out of its regional disputes.
"I believe some countries now are playing with fire," said Cui Tiankai, vice minister of foreign affairs. "And I hope the U.S. won't be burned by this fire."
View Full Image
SCHINASEA
EPA
Protests against Chinese claims to territory in the South China Sea continued in Hanoi on Sunday, unimpeded by Vietnamese authorities.
SCHINASEA
SCHINASEA
Mr. Cui met in Hawaii on Saturday with Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell, who told reporters in Washington before the meetings that the U.S. didn't plan to "fan the flames" of the dispute, the Associated Press reported.
Vietnam and the Philippines have appeared to more closely align themselves with the U.S. in the dispute. The U.S. is scheduled to stage joint naval exercises with both countries, though the participants stress they are part of regular cooperation and not a result of the current flare-up of the tensions.
Philippine President Benigno Aquino III last week praised a strong U.S. naval presence in the region, which he said deters aggression and ensures freedom of navigation. Vietnam on Friday issued a joint statement with the U.S. that called for freedom of navigation of the seas, as well as a "collaborative, diplomatic process."
Some security analysts say such efforts to internationalize the conflict have stoked an increasingly belligerent response from China. China is rapidly modernizing its navy and preparing to launch its first aircraft carrier, which some in the region worry will aggravate maritime disputes.
Vietnamese demonstrators in Hanoi on Sunday continued anti-Chinese protests for the fourth straight week, as authorities have allowed them to continue.
About 100 people marched through the capital's streets, some carrying signs accusing China of invading its territorial waters, the AP reported.
Write to Brian Spegele at brian.spegele@wsj.com
Posted for fair use....
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/18368/china-creates-waves-in-naval-show-of-force
Analysis
China creates waves in naval show of force
By Amando Doronila
Philippine Daily Inquirer
5:34 am | Monday, June 27th, 2011
SINGAPORE—On any given day, up to a thousand ships sail into Singapore’s harbor, arguably the busiest in Southeast Asia.
But on June 19, China’s maritime patrol ship, the Haixun-31, docked in Singapore after sailing through the disputed Paracel and Spratlys archipelagos in the West Philippine Sea (South China Sea), sending waves of anxieties throughout the region as far afield as Japan and the United States, the leading naval power in the Pacific.
The visit of Haixun-31 did not come unnoticed as it took place amid the acrimonious dispute between China and a number of Asian countries, including the Philippines and Vietnam, over territorial claims in the West Philippine Sea.
The visit came as the Philippines deployed its flagship, the Rajah Humabon, to protect the islands it has claimed in the Spratlys group from incursions by Chinese vessels.
The Spratlys and the Paracels are claimed in part or entirely by China and one or five other countries—the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan.
The visit of Haixun-31 touched off a protest from Singapore, which has no claims in the disputed waters, and which demanded a clarification from China of the extent of its claims in the region. Singapore said China’s ambiguity was causing international concern.
The foreign ministry said that while Singapore had no claims of its own, it was a major trading nation whose interest could be affected by issues relating to freedom of navigation in the area.
The Philippines and Vietnam, of all the claimants, have expressed alarm over the increasing aggressiveness of Chinese incursions in areas claimed by Manila and Hanoi as part of their sovereign territories, and interventions in their explorations in the waters for oil and mineral resources.
Beijing refers to the body of water as the South China Sea, but Hanoi calls it the East Sea.
Chinese subterfuge
Singapore was forced to protest not over the aggressive actions of China in the West Philippine Sea but over the subterfuge with which the Chinese carried out the visit in the guise of an innocuous, long-arranged port of call by a civilian ship.
The visit by the Haixun-31, which belongs to China’s Maritime Safety Administration, annoyed Singapore over the fact that it took place amid rising tensions among countries with territorial claims in the West Philippine Sea.
China has come under increasing international criticism over its willingness to use force to pressure rival claimants in the West Philippine Sea to stop them from exploration activities in their claimed areas.
Singapore has criticized China for the ambiguity of its claims which are marked as nine dotted lines covering almost the entire West Philippine Sea. Independent experts point out that it is this U-shaped line that the Singapore government wants Beijing to clarify.
At a conference two weeks ago, Singapore’s former senior minister S. Jakamura said China should clarify its “puzzling and disturbing” nine-dotted lines map of the West Philippine Sea. He said the map had no apparent basis under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Unclos).
Some academics say that according to maritime lawyers, the line is at odds with Unclos for which China proclaims its adherence to freedom of navigation but has not defined its claims under the UN convention.
Provocative
When China’s Maritime Safety Administration requested a port of call, it presented the request as a routine visit. It was supposed to be part of existing technical exchanges on marine safety and environmental protection between the two countries.
The visit turned out to be provocative when the ship sailed through disputed waters in the Spratlys and Paracel archipelagos where it could have encountered activities of the Philippines and Vietnam, which have denounced the Chinese incursions in the United Nations.
The aggressive Chinese intentions were revealed by Chinese media representatives embedded in the voyage.
They reported that the trip was to reinforce China’s sovereignty claims in the West Philippine Sea and to keep watch on foreign oil rigs and ships “in Chinese waters.” A reporter for China National Radio reported from the vessel as it set out from Guangdong province on June 15 that the purpose of the journey was “to protect China’s maritime rights and sovereignty.”
Clarification urged
The next day, the People’s Daily, mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Party, said the Haixun-31 had tasks “beside the usual inspections on routine navigation routes.” They included “checks on oil rigs, stationary ships’ operations in constructions and surveys, and sailors who are sailing close to Chinese waters.”
The report added: “The vessel will also conduct checks on foreign ships navigating, anchored and operating in Chinese waters.”
Sensing the potential for armed clashes posed by this maritime mission, which might encounter navigation activities and constructions in the West Philippine Sea, Singapore issued the statement:
“We think it is in China’s own interests to clarify its claims in the SCS (South China Sea) with more precision as the current ambiguity as to their extent has caused serious concerns in the international maritime community.
“Singapore is not a claimant state and takes no position on the merits or otherwise of the various claims in the SCS. But as a major trading nation, Singapore has a critical interest in anything affecting freedom of navigation in all international sea lanes, including those in the SCS.”
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/18368/china-creates-waves-in-naval-show-of-force
Analysis
China creates waves in naval show of force
By Amando Doronila
Philippine Daily Inquirer
5:34 am | Monday, June 27th, 2011
SINGAPORE—On any given day, up to a thousand ships sail into Singapore’s harbor, arguably the busiest in Southeast Asia.
But on June 19, China’s maritime patrol ship, the Haixun-31, docked in Singapore after sailing through the disputed Paracel and Spratlys archipelagos in the West Philippine Sea (South China Sea), sending waves of anxieties throughout the region as far afield as Japan and the United States, the leading naval power in the Pacific.
The visit of Haixun-31 did not come unnoticed as it took place amid the acrimonious dispute between China and a number of Asian countries, including the Philippines and Vietnam, over territorial claims in the West Philippine Sea.
The visit came as the Philippines deployed its flagship, the Rajah Humabon, to protect the islands it has claimed in the Spratlys group from incursions by Chinese vessels.
The Spratlys and the Paracels are claimed in part or entirely by China and one or five other countries—the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan.
The visit of Haixun-31 touched off a protest from Singapore, which has no claims in the disputed waters, and which demanded a clarification from China of the extent of its claims in the region. Singapore said China’s ambiguity was causing international concern.
The foreign ministry said that while Singapore had no claims of its own, it was a major trading nation whose interest could be affected by issues relating to freedom of navigation in the area.
The Philippines and Vietnam, of all the claimants, have expressed alarm over the increasing aggressiveness of Chinese incursions in areas claimed by Manila and Hanoi as part of their sovereign territories, and interventions in their explorations in the waters for oil and mineral resources.
Beijing refers to the body of water as the South China Sea, but Hanoi calls it the East Sea.
Chinese subterfuge
Singapore was forced to protest not over the aggressive actions of China in the West Philippine Sea but over the subterfuge with which the Chinese carried out the visit in the guise of an innocuous, long-arranged port of call by a civilian ship.
The visit by the Haixun-31, which belongs to China’s Maritime Safety Administration, annoyed Singapore over the fact that it took place amid rising tensions among countries with territorial claims in the West Philippine Sea.
China has come under increasing international criticism over its willingness to use force to pressure rival claimants in the West Philippine Sea to stop them from exploration activities in their claimed areas.
Singapore has criticized China for the ambiguity of its claims which are marked as nine dotted lines covering almost the entire West Philippine Sea. Independent experts point out that it is this U-shaped line that the Singapore government wants Beijing to clarify.
At a conference two weeks ago, Singapore’s former senior minister S. Jakamura said China should clarify its “puzzling and disturbing” nine-dotted lines map of the West Philippine Sea. He said the map had no apparent basis under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Unclos).
Some academics say that according to maritime lawyers, the line is at odds with Unclos for which China proclaims its adherence to freedom of navigation but has not defined its claims under the UN convention.
Provocative
When China’s Maritime Safety Administration requested a port of call, it presented the request as a routine visit. It was supposed to be part of existing technical exchanges on marine safety and environmental protection between the two countries.
The visit turned out to be provocative when the ship sailed through disputed waters in the Spratlys and Paracel archipelagos where it could have encountered activities of the Philippines and Vietnam, which have denounced the Chinese incursions in the United Nations.
The aggressive Chinese intentions were revealed by Chinese media representatives embedded in the voyage.
They reported that the trip was to reinforce China’s sovereignty claims in the West Philippine Sea and to keep watch on foreign oil rigs and ships “in Chinese waters.” A reporter for China National Radio reported from the vessel as it set out from Guangdong province on June 15 that the purpose of the journey was “to protect China’s maritime rights and sovereignty.”
Clarification urged
The next day, the People’s Daily, mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Party, said the Haixun-31 had tasks “beside the usual inspections on routine navigation routes.” They included “checks on oil rigs, stationary ships’ operations in constructions and surveys, and sailors who are sailing close to Chinese waters.”
The report added: “The vessel will also conduct checks on foreign ships navigating, anchored and operating in Chinese waters.”
Sensing the potential for armed clashes posed by this maritime mission, which might encounter navigation activities and constructions in the West Philippine Sea, Singapore issued the statement:
“We think it is in China’s own interests to clarify its claims in the SCS (South China Sea) with more precision as the current ambiguity as to their extent has caused serious concerns in the international maritime community.
“Singapore is not a claimant state and takes no position on the merits or otherwise of the various claims in the SCS. But as a major trading nation, Singapore has a critical interest in anything affecting freedom of navigation in all international sea lanes, including those in the SCS.”
Posted for fair use....
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/new...ng-brinksmanship/story-e6frg6ux-1226082315305
All at sea over Beijing brinksmanship
* Rory Medcalf
* From: The Australian
* June 27, 2011 12:00AM
A MAN-MADE tempest is gathering in the South China Sea. Time and again in recent months, Chinese naval and paramilitary vessels have confronted ships from Vietnam and The Philippines in contested waters rich in energy deposits and fish.
Now the US has entered the ring, signalling it will back Manila if the crisis turns to conflict.
Chinese and US officials met at the weekend to try to break the spiral of mistrust between the two powers. But temperatures remain high, especially between China and Vietnam, with a Chinese state newspaper warning Hanoi that Beijing was ready for war.
All players are making shows of force. The US and The Philippines plan to hold military exercises in the days ahead. China and Vietnam have staged their own rival firing drills and manoeuvres.
The present parade of posturing will probably subside. But a disturbing pattern of brinksmanship is emerging in maritime Asia. If unchecked, it could throw the region into repeated crises, any of which could end in war at sea. This would have ruinous consequences for trade and stability in Australia's wider Indo-Pacific region.
Start of sidebar. Skip to end of sidebar.
Related Coverage
* Chinese free rights activist Hu Jia The Australian, 8 hours ago
* Let's end muddled thinking on China The Australian, 5 days ago
* Chinese naval display may backfire The Australian, 7 days ago
* China patrol ship sparks sea tensions The Australian, 10 days ago
* China 'won't' use force in disputed sea The Australian, 14 Jun 2011
End of sidebar. Return to start of sidebar.
The vital question is: why Beijing's assertiveness? Recent years have brought a spate of dangerous incidents, such as a tangle with a US surveillance ship and cases of close-range harassment of Japanese warships by Chinese helicopters. China has also refused to condemn its ally North Korea's sea attacks on South Korea.
Six months ago, the trouble seemed to ease. The hawks in China's internal strategic debates had spooked their compatriots as well as the region. Beijing's international rhetoric softened, and long-suspended military talks with Washington resumed.
But the respite turned out to be brief. If the situation is to be brought back under control, the world needs to understand the reasons for Beijing's risky deeds at sea. These are more complex than some simple notion of strategic aggression.
To be sure, Beijing is modernising its military, including with offensive capabilities such as anti-ship ballistic missiles. Its navy is ranging further and with increased firepower. An aircraft carrier may begin sea trials soon.
The logic of all of this is partly defensive. China has legitimate reason to protect its trade interests and energy imports. But Beijing also wants the option of taking Taiwan and keeping US forces at bay.
The big security picture in Asia involves changing deterrence and war-fighting strategies by China, the US and Japan. These involve expanded maritime patrols and intelligence-gathering, making more chances for close-range encounters. Meanwhile, nationalism and growing resource needs are reinforcing the value of territorial claims in the East China Sea, disputed by Japan and China, as well as the South China Sea.
Short-sighted internal rivalries compound the risks of conflict. In China, the generals are becoming a force in foreign policy. Some zealous officers may be provoking incidents at sea to advance their careers and prove their patriotism. And sometimes the hardliners are not military: China's fisheries and maritime law-enforcement agencies seem to be running their own expansive agendas.
For now, the risk of a major-power war escalating from maritime incidents centres on China's frictions with the US, Japan and other nations in East Asia.
But the tensions could reach across the wider Indo-Pacific region as the power and interests of China and India expand.
The region is ill-prepared to cope with this threat.
Asia's infrastructure of what the experts call confidence-building measures such as military dialogues, real-time communication channels and formalised "rules of the road" is flimsy and little-used.
Some politicians, scholars and officials wishfully claim that co-operative activities such as ship visits, combined disaster-relief exercises or partnership against piracy will translate into wider strategic trust. But there is little sign this is happening.
Meanwhile, China is showing little appetite in Asia for the diplomatic safety net that helped keep the Cold War cold: continuous hotlines between rival militaries and agreements on managing incidents at sea.
This stems from a difference of views about the point of military diplomacy. And this relates to fundamental clashes of interests, notably over military strategies and sovereignty, hence China's confrontational opposition to US surveillance in its exclusive economic zone. The prevailing view in Beijing is that trust should precede major advances in dialogue. In Washington and elsewhere, the standard view is that confidence-building measures are needed when trust is absent.
One glimmer of hope is that the Chinese view is not monolithic or static. New research is revealing a submerged debate in Beijing about the self-defeating dangers of belligerence at sea. The tragedy is that it is too late for moderates to gain a hearing once the shooting starts.
Rory Medcalf directs the international security program at the Lowy Institute. This article is based on a major Lowy-MacArthur Foundation paper to be released tomorrow
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/new...ng-brinksmanship/story-e6frg6ux-1226082315305
All at sea over Beijing brinksmanship
* Rory Medcalf
* From: The Australian
* June 27, 2011 12:00AM
A MAN-MADE tempest is gathering in the South China Sea. Time and again in recent months, Chinese naval and paramilitary vessels have confronted ships from Vietnam and The Philippines in contested waters rich in energy deposits and fish.
Now the US has entered the ring, signalling it will back Manila if the crisis turns to conflict.
Chinese and US officials met at the weekend to try to break the spiral of mistrust between the two powers. But temperatures remain high, especially between China and Vietnam, with a Chinese state newspaper warning Hanoi that Beijing was ready for war.
All players are making shows of force. The US and The Philippines plan to hold military exercises in the days ahead. China and Vietnam have staged their own rival firing drills and manoeuvres.
The present parade of posturing will probably subside. But a disturbing pattern of brinksmanship is emerging in maritime Asia. If unchecked, it could throw the region into repeated crises, any of which could end in war at sea. This would have ruinous consequences for trade and stability in Australia's wider Indo-Pacific region.
Start of sidebar. Skip to end of sidebar.
Related Coverage
* Chinese free rights activist Hu Jia The Australian, 8 hours ago
* Let's end muddled thinking on China The Australian, 5 days ago
* Chinese naval display may backfire The Australian, 7 days ago
* China patrol ship sparks sea tensions The Australian, 10 days ago
* China 'won't' use force in disputed sea The Australian, 14 Jun 2011
End of sidebar. Return to start of sidebar.
The vital question is: why Beijing's assertiveness? Recent years have brought a spate of dangerous incidents, such as a tangle with a US surveillance ship and cases of close-range harassment of Japanese warships by Chinese helicopters. China has also refused to condemn its ally North Korea's sea attacks on South Korea.
Six months ago, the trouble seemed to ease. The hawks in China's internal strategic debates had spooked their compatriots as well as the region. Beijing's international rhetoric softened, and long-suspended military talks with Washington resumed.
But the respite turned out to be brief. If the situation is to be brought back under control, the world needs to understand the reasons for Beijing's risky deeds at sea. These are more complex than some simple notion of strategic aggression.
To be sure, Beijing is modernising its military, including with offensive capabilities such as anti-ship ballistic missiles. Its navy is ranging further and with increased firepower. An aircraft carrier may begin sea trials soon.
The logic of all of this is partly defensive. China has legitimate reason to protect its trade interests and energy imports. But Beijing also wants the option of taking Taiwan and keeping US forces at bay.
The big security picture in Asia involves changing deterrence and war-fighting strategies by China, the US and Japan. These involve expanded maritime patrols and intelligence-gathering, making more chances for close-range encounters. Meanwhile, nationalism and growing resource needs are reinforcing the value of territorial claims in the East China Sea, disputed by Japan and China, as well as the South China Sea.
Short-sighted internal rivalries compound the risks of conflict. In China, the generals are becoming a force in foreign policy. Some zealous officers may be provoking incidents at sea to advance their careers and prove their patriotism. And sometimes the hardliners are not military: China's fisheries and maritime law-enforcement agencies seem to be running their own expansive agendas.
For now, the risk of a major-power war escalating from maritime incidents centres on China's frictions with the US, Japan and other nations in East Asia.
But the tensions could reach across the wider Indo-Pacific region as the power and interests of China and India expand.
The region is ill-prepared to cope with this threat.
Asia's infrastructure of what the experts call confidence-building measures such as military dialogues, real-time communication channels and formalised "rules of the road" is flimsy and little-used.
Some politicians, scholars and officials wishfully claim that co-operative activities such as ship visits, combined disaster-relief exercises or partnership against piracy will translate into wider strategic trust. But there is little sign this is happening.
Meanwhile, China is showing little appetite in Asia for the diplomatic safety net that helped keep the Cold War cold: continuous hotlines between rival militaries and agreements on managing incidents at sea.
This stems from a difference of views about the point of military diplomacy. And this relates to fundamental clashes of interests, notably over military strategies and sovereignty, hence China's confrontational opposition to US surveillance in its exclusive economic zone. The prevailing view in Beijing is that trust should precede major advances in dialogue. In Washington and elsewhere, the standard view is that confidence-building measures are needed when trust is absent.
One glimmer of hope is that the Chinese view is not monolithic or static. New research is revealing a submerged debate in Beijing about the self-defeating dangers of belligerence at sea. The tragedy is that it is too late for moderates to gain a hearing once the shooting starts.
Rory Medcalf directs the international security program at the Lowy Institute. This article is based on a major Lowy-MacArthur Foundation paper to be released tomorrow
Posted for fair use....
http://www.voanews.com/english/news...for-Salehs-Sons-to-Leave-Yemen-124568214.html
June 26, 2011
Tens of Thousands of Yemenis Call for Saleh's Sons to Leave Yemen
VOA News
Tens of thousands of Yemenis have rallied in the capital, Sana'a, and other cities to demand that the two powerful sons of wounded President Ali Abdullah Saleh leave the country.
Mr. Saleh has been hospitalized in Saudi Arabia since suffering severe wounds in a June 3 attack on his palace, but his sons have retained control of powerful military units, maintaining their father's grip on power.
Many of the opposition activists who marched Sunday chanted slogans calling on Mr. Saleh's sons and other members of his inner circle to get out of Yemen. The eldest son, Ahmed, commands the Yemeni military's elite Republican Guard, while his brother, Khaled, heads a special forces division.
Mr. Saleh has refused to step down despite months of almost daily nationwide protests demanding an end to his 33-year autocratic rule. His deputy, Vice President Abd al-Rab Mansur Hadi, has come under pressure from the opposition and Western powers to begin an immediate transition of power to a democratic system of government.
Yemeni officials said Sunday Mr. Saleh is in "good health." It is unclear when or if he will return to Yemen.
In his absence, the Yemeni military has continued fighting Islamist militants who took control of the southern city of Zinjibar late last month. Yemeni officials say government warplanes struck militant targets Sunday in Abyan province, of which Zinjibar is the capital.
The targets included a regional government headquarters seized by the insurgents.
Officials say the fighting killed at least six militants and two Yemeni soldiers.
http://www.voanews.com/english/news...for-Salehs-Sons-to-Leave-Yemen-124568214.html
June 26, 2011
Tens of Thousands of Yemenis Call for Saleh's Sons to Leave Yemen
VOA News
Tens of thousands of Yemenis have rallied in the capital, Sana'a, and other cities to demand that the two powerful sons of wounded President Ali Abdullah Saleh leave the country.
Mr. Saleh has been hospitalized in Saudi Arabia since suffering severe wounds in a June 3 attack on his palace, but his sons have retained control of powerful military units, maintaining their father's grip on power.
Many of the opposition activists who marched Sunday chanted slogans calling on Mr. Saleh's sons and other members of his inner circle to get out of Yemen. The eldest son, Ahmed, commands the Yemeni military's elite Republican Guard, while his brother, Khaled, heads a special forces division.
Mr. Saleh has refused to step down despite months of almost daily nationwide protests demanding an end to his 33-year autocratic rule. His deputy, Vice President Abd al-Rab Mansur Hadi, has come under pressure from the opposition and Western powers to begin an immediate transition of power to a democratic system of government.
Yemeni officials said Sunday Mr. Saleh is in "good health." It is unclear when or if he will return to Yemen.
In his absence, the Yemeni military has continued fighting Islamist militants who took control of the southern city of Zinjibar late last month. Yemeni officials say government warplanes struck militant targets Sunday in Abyan province, of which Zinjibar is the capital.
The targets included a regional government headquarters seized by the insurgents.
Officials say the fighting killed at least six militants and two Yemeni soldiers.
Well this pretty much tells everyone where the PRC stands on things....
Posted for fair use....
http://www.google.com/hostednews/af...ocId=CNG.2574297d827caea924d9693b72c04e4e.301
China hosts Sudan leader wanted by world court
(AFP) – 1 hour ago
BEIJING — Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir is to arrive in China on Monday for a state visit, with rights groups outraged over the warm welcome for a man accused of genocide and war crimes.
China is a key supporter of Bashir, who is wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for crimes against humanity that occurred in Sudan's war-torn western Darfur region during the country's civil war.
Beijing is also a key military supplier to the regime in Khartoum and the biggest buyer of the country's oil, although the majority of Sudan's oil fields are located in the south, which will become independent next month.
Bashir was expected to arrive in Beijing early Monday morning and meet later in the day with Chinese President Hu Jintao. He is scheduled to leave China on Thursday.
China last week defended the visit as "quite reasonable."
"In recent years President Bashir has made many visits to other countries and was warmly welcomed," foreign ministry spokesman Hong Lei told reporters.
"It's quite reasonable for China to invite the head of a state that has diplomatic ties with China to come for a visit."
The ICC has issued arrest warrants for Bashir for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes in Darfur, where about 300,000 people have died since 2003.
He is the first sitting head of state to be targeted by an ICC warrant.
ICC statutes dictate that any member country should arrest Bashir if he visits. China is not a party to those statutes.
Bashir cancelled plans to attend a summit earlier this month in Malaysia, which declared this year that it intends to recognise the ICC's jurisdiction to show its commitment to fight crimes against humanity.
New York-based Human Rights Watch said Bashir's visit to China was "an affront to victims of heinous crimes committed in Darfur" and urged Beijing to withdraw its invitation -- or arrest Bashir when he arrived.
Amnesty International said earlier this month China risked becoming a "safe haven for alleged perpetrators of genocide" if it hosted Bashir.
Bashir will also hold talks later with other top officials.
Topics on the agenda are likely to include possible fresh aid to Sudan and problems in Abyei, a disputed border area claimed by Bashir's Khartoum-based northern Sudan regime and a rival government in the south.
Khartoum government troops occupied Abyei on May 21 and tens of thousands of people have since fled to the south.
The north and south reached an accord last Monday under which border areas will be demilitarised.
Copyright © 2011 AFP. All rights reserved.
Posted for fair use....
http://www.google.com/hostednews/af...ocId=CNG.2574297d827caea924d9693b72c04e4e.301
China hosts Sudan leader wanted by world court
(AFP) – 1 hour ago
BEIJING — Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir is to arrive in China on Monday for a state visit, with rights groups outraged over the warm welcome for a man accused of genocide and war crimes.
China is a key supporter of Bashir, who is wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for crimes against humanity that occurred in Sudan's war-torn western Darfur region during the country's civil war.
Beijing is also a key military supplier to the regime in Khartoum and the biggest buyer of the country's oil, although the majority of Sudan's oil fields are located in the south, which will become independent next month.
Bashir was expected to arrive in Beijing early Monday morning and meet later in the day with Chinese President Hu Jintao. He is scheduled to leave China on Thursday.
China last week defended the visit as "quite reasonable."
"In recent years President Bashir has made many visits to other countries and was warmly welcomed," foreign ministry spokesman Hong Lei told reporters.
"It's quite reasonable for China to invite the head of a state that has diplomatic ties with China to come for a visit."
The ICC has issued arrest warrants for Bashir for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes in Darfur, where about 300,000 people have died since 2003.
He is the first sitting head of state to be targeted by an ICC warrant.
ICC statutes dictate that any member country should arrest Bashir if he visits. China is not a party to those statutes.
Bashir cancelled plans to attend a summit earlier this month in Malaysia, which declared this year that it intends to recognise the ICC's jurisdiction to show its commitment to fight crimes against humanity.
New York-based Human Rights Watch said Bashir's visit to China was "an affront to victims of heinous crimes committed in Darfur" and urged Beijing to withdraw its invitation -- or arrest Bashir when he arrived.
Amnesty International said earlier this month China risked becoming a "safe haven for alleged perpetrators of genocide" if it hosted Bashir.
Bashir will also hold talks later with other top officials.
Topics on the agenda are likely to include possible fresh aid to Sudan and problems in Abyei, a disputed border area claimed by Bashir's Khartoum-based northern Sudan regime and a rival government in the south.
Khartoum government troops occupied Abyei on May 21 and tens of thousands of people have since fled to the south.
The north and south reached an accord last Monday under which border areas will be demilitarised.
Copyright © 2011 AFP. All rights reserved.
Posted for fair use....
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/indepth/2011-06/26/c_13950833.htm
Al-Bashir commends China as "strategic partner", hopes to boost ties through visit
English.news.cn 2011-06-26 19:09:26
KHARTOUM, June 26 (Xinhua) -- Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir has reiterated that China constituted the strategic partner for his country in various fields, affirming that his visit to China would give a strong boost for the two countries' ties.
"We regard China as the strategic partner for Sudan in various fields, including the political, economic, commercial and cultural fields," said al-Bashir in an exclusive interview with Xinhua.
Talking about his upcoming fourth visit to China, the Sudanese president said: "We are happy to visit China at the invitation of President Hu Jintao. This visit is natural if we consider the relations between Sudan and China. We have kept on exchanging visits at all levels, from the presidential level to the ministerial level and other different levels. This visit is a continuation of the distinguished relations between Sudan and China, which have remained friendly and progressive," said al- Bashir.
Al-Bashir's last visit to Beijing was in 2006, when he participated in a summit of the Forum of China-Africa Cooperation. The Chinese President Hu Jintao visited Sudan in February 2007.
The Sudanese president went on saying that "We are completely satisfied about this relationship which constitutes a living and successful model for the south-south relations. We are convinced that we are moving towards new horizons in the cooperation between the two countries in various fields."
Al-Bashir further enumerated the aspects of cooperation between his country and China, saying that "In the political field, we receive support from China at various international forums, while in the economic field, China is a partner for us in many projects, where it is funding many projects and the Chinese companies are the ones implementing many of our projects."
He further commended the standing cooperation between the two countries in the oil field, noting that "When the American companies refused to work in the oil field and when restrictions were imposed on the Western companies operating in Sudan, we found in China the real partner."
"While the agreements with the Western companies were unfair and a hundred percent in their favor, the agreements with the Chinese companies constituted real exchange of benefits. In fact we have received a better offer from China than that of the Western companies," he added.
"Additionally, the Chinese companies work to train the Sudanese cadres to replace the Chinese cadres, which represent transferring of knowledge in the field of oil industry to the Sudanese side. This did not exist in the previous agreements," he said.
Being established on Jan. 4, 1959, the ties between Sudan and China are based on mutual respect and benefit and have witnessed considerable development in various fields.
The success of the model of the Sino-Sudanese ties has drawn the attention of many countries to the "existence of a real partner and not trends that steal wealth," Al-Bashir said, adding that "the success of this model was a surprise for the Arab and African countries which believed that Sudan, as long as it was sanctioned by U.S., would not be able to extract its petroleum."
The Sudanese president ruled out that the separation of south Sudan, scheduled on July 9, would affect the future relationship between Sudan and China, saying that "We are convinced that this will not affect the relationship."
"Our policy, and also China's, stands on the principle that each country is free to adopt the procedures and build relations in the manner that preserves its interests and relations. Therefore, even if China has established relations with the south Sudan state, that will definitely not be a deduction on its relations with the north. Similarly, its relations with the north will not be a deduction on its relations with the south. This is what really characterizes the relations with China," said al- Bashir.
He also reiterated that the successful experience of the Sino- Sudanese relations should be attributed to the mutual respect and nonintervention in each other's internal affairs. "China does not intervene in the internal affairs of others. The success of the Sino-Sudanese cooperation has pushed the African countries to search for the real and loyal partner."
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/indepth/2011-06/26/c_13950833.htm
Al-Bashir commends China as "strategic partner", hopes to boost ties through visit
English.news.cn 2011-06-26 19:09:26
KHARTOUM, June 26 (Xinhua) -- Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir has reiterated that China constituted the strategic partner for his country in various fields, affirming that his visit to China would give a strong boost for the two countries' ties.
"We regard China as the strategic partner for Sudan in various fields, including the political, economic, commercial and cultural fields," said al-Bashir in an exclusive interview with Xinhua.
Talking about his upcoming fourth visit to China, the Sudanese president said: "We are happy to visit China at the invitation of President Hu Jintao. This visit is natural if we consider the relations between Sudan and China. We have kept on exchanging visits at all levels, from the presidential level to the ministerial level and other different levels. This visit is a continuation of the distinguished relations between Sudan and China, which have remained friendly and progressive," said al- Bashir.
Al-Bashir's last visit to Beijing was in 2006, when he participated in a summit of the Forum of China-Africa Cooperation. The Chinese President Hu Jintao visited Sudan in February 2007.
The Sudanese president went on saying that "We are completely satisfied about this relationship which constitutes a living and successful model for the south-south relations. We are convinced that we are moving towards new horizons in the cooperation between the two countries in various fields."
Al-Bashir further enumerated the aspects of cooperation between his country and China, saying that "In the political field, we receive support from China at various international forums, while in the economic field, China is a partner for us in many projects, where it is funding many projects and the Chinese companies are the ones implementing many of our projects."
He further commended the standing cooperation between the two countries in the oil field, noting that "When the American companies refused to work in the oil field and when restrictions were imposed on the Western companies operating in Sudan, we found in China the real partner."
"While the agreements with the Western companies were unfair and a hundred percent in their favor, the agreements with the Chinese companies constituted real exchange of benefits. In fact we have received a better offer from China than that of the Western companies," he added.
"Additionally, the Chinese companies work to train the Sudanese cadres to replace the Chinese cadres, which represent transferring of knowledge in the field of oil industry to the Sudanese side. This did not exist in the previous agreements," he said.
Being established on Jan. 4, 1959, the ties between Sudan and China are based on mutual respect and benefit and have witnessed considerable development in various fields.
The success of the model of the Sino-Sudanese ties has drawn the attention of many countries to the "existence of a real partner and not trends that steal wealth," Al-Bashir said, adding that "the success of this model was a surprise for the Arab and African countries which believed that Sudan, as long as it was sanctioned by U.S., would not be able to extract its petroleum."
The Sudanese president ruled out that the separation of south Sudan, scheduled on July 9, would affect the future relationship between Sudan and China, saying that "We are convinced that this will not affect the relationship."
"Our policy, and also China's, stands on the principle that each country is free to adopt the procedures and build relations in the manner that preserves its interests and relations. Therefore, even if China has established relations with the south Sudan state, that will definitely not be a deduction on its relations with the north. Similarly, its relations with the north will not be a deduction on its relations with the south. This is what really characterizes the relations with China," said al- Bashir.
He also reiterated that the successful experience of the Sino- Sudanese relations should be attributed to the mutual respect and nonintervention in each other's internal affairs. "China does not intervene in the internal affairs of others. The success of the Sino-Sudanese cooperation has pushed the African countries to search for the real and loyal partner."
Posted for fair use....
http://www.google.com/hostednews/af...ocId=CNG.c92f962cd2eadb85ecab8f1c1e49cd4b.3b1
Militia attacks train carrying south Sudanese: UN
(AFP) – 5 hours ago
KHARTOUM — Misseriya Arab militiamen on Sunday carried out a deadly attack on a train carrying south Sudanese home, just two weeks before their region celebrates full independence from the north, the UN said.
"A train transporting southern returnees from Kosti to Wau was attacked by a Misseriya militia this morning in the area of Meiram, around 50 kilometres (30 miles) south of Muglad," Hua Jiang, a spokeswoman for the UN peacekeeping mission in Sudan, told AFP.
One person was killed and four wounded in the raid, Jiang said.
Meiram lies in north Sudan's embattled state of South Kordofan, just next to Darfur and the tense Abyei border region, while Muglad is the historical capital of the Misseriya tribe.
The heavily armed Arab nomads were a key proxy militia of Khartoum's army during its 1983-2005 conflict with the former southern rebel army, the SPLA.
One of the tribe's chiefs, Omar al-Ansari, confirmed the train attack had happened in a Misseriya area, but denied that his people were responsible.
"The train faced technical problems in a place called Hierika, close to South Darfur, and that was when a group of Darfur rebels attacked it and grabbed some belongings from the passengers," Ansari told AFP by phone.
He said no one was killed.
Tensions are running high between north and south Sudan in the run-up to the south's formal declaration of independence on July 9, driven by conflict in the border areas of Abyei and South Kordofan, and exacerbated by the lack of progress in negotiating key unresolved issues.
Northern troops overran Abyei last month in response to a deadly attack on an army convoy, prompting more than 100,000 residents to flee south, and with the Misseriya reportedly moving in with Sudanese soldiers to fill the vacuum.
Around two weeks later, on June 5, another conflict erupted between the northern army and fighters aligned to the south, in neighbouring South Kordofan, where the United Nations said on Sunday that civilians were among the victims of the latest air strikes on rebel positions.
Copyright © 2011 AFP. All rights reserved.
http://www.google.com/hostednews/af...ocId=CNG.c92f962cd2eadb85ecab8f1c1e49cd4b.3b1
Militia attacks train carrying south Sudanese: UN
(AFP) – 5 hours ago
KHARTOUM — Misseriya Arab militiamen on Sunday carried out a deadly attack on a train carrying south Sudanese home, just two weeks before their region celebrates full independence from the north, the UN said.
"A train transporting southern returnees from Kosti to Wau was attacked by a Misseriya militia this morning in the area of Meiram, around 50 kilometres (30 miles) south of Muglad," Hua Jiang, a spokeswoman for the UN peacekeeping mission in Sudan, told AFP.
One person was killed and four wounded in the raid, Jiang said.
Meiram lies in north Sudan's embattled state of South Kordofan, just next to Darfur and the tense Abyei border region, while Muglad is the historical capital of the Misseriya tribe.
The heavily armed Arab nomads were a key proxy militia of Khartoum's army during its 1983-2005 conflict with the former southern rebel army, the SPLA.
One of the tribe's chiefs, Omar al-Ansari, confirmed the train attack had happened in a Misseriya area, but denied that his people were responsible.
"The train faced technical problems in a place called Hierika, close to South Darfur, and that was when a group of Darfur rebels attacked it and grabbed some belongings from the passengers," Ansari told AFP by phone.
He said no one was killed.
Tensions are running high between north and south Sudan in the run-up to the south's formal declaration of independence on July 9, driven by conflict in the border areas of Abyei and South Kordofan, and exacerbated by the lack of progress in negotiating key unresolved issues.
Northern troops overran Abyei last month in response to a deadly attack on an army convoy, prompting more than 100,000 residents to flee south, and with the Misseriya reportedly moving in with Sudanese soldiers to fill the vacuum.
Around two weeks later, on June 5, another conflict erupted between the northern army and fighters aligned to the south, in neighbouring South Kordofan, where the United Nations said on Sunday that civilians were among the victims of the latest air strikes on rebel positions.
Copyright © 2011 AFP. All rights reserved.
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.google.com/hostednews/af...ocId=CNG.bb9547ce35c8697828233d280f68bf54.ad1
Mauritania troops kill 15 Qaeda suspects: army
(AFP) – 8 hours ago
NOUAKCHOTT — Mauritanian troops killed 15 members of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in a recent battle over the border in Mali, losing two of their own men, senior army officers said Sunday.
"The toll is 15 dead among the criminals, two dead and five wounded on the Mauritanian side," the officers told reporters.
The raid was on a camp inside a forest 110 kilometres (70 miles) from the border with Mauritania, Colonel Brahim Vall Ould Chebani, head of the general staff's operations bureau, and army spokesman Colonel Teyeb Ould Brahim said.
According to the two colonels, the camp was completely destroyed, calling it "a rout, every man for himself, on their side."
Their forces were still combing the forest, searching for the surviving AQIM fighters, they added.
They described the AQIM base as having been converted into a fortress, protected by deep trenches and landmines all around, which posed "a real threat to our country."
"We went to find them, we found them and we have totally destroyed them."
Malian troops meanwhile reported the capture of nine suspected AQIM fighters early Sunday, a military source said, as they continued their joint operation with Mauritanian troops there.
They were captured near the forest in Wagadou, the source said, adding that six of those detained were Mauritanian and three were ethnic Fulanis of unknown nationality.
Mauritanian troops, supported by colleagues from Mali, moved in ahead of the operation and surrounded the forest where the AQIM fighters were still thought to be entrenched, Mauritanian sources said.
Mauritanian warplanes were flying reconnaissance missions over the forest but there had been no major fighting since the battle late Friday, even if there had been some artillery fire, said the sources.
It was the latest development in the operation in Mali's western Wagadou region, where there had been concerns that AQIM was trying to set up a new base in the area.
AQIM, which has its roots in Algeria, has camps in Mali which it uses as a launchpad to carry out armed attacks and kidnappings in the Sahel desert region where the group is also involved in arms and drugs trafficking.
The withdrawal of Mauritanian troops from Mali two months ago has been followed by the establishment of new AQIM units near the border, notably in the forest region.
Earlier this month the neighbours agreed to carry out the joint operation against the group.
The four nations most affected by AQIM operations -- Algeria, Mali, Mauritania and Niger -- work closely together on security and military issues in efforts to crack down on its activities.
Copyright © 2011 AFP. All rights reserved.
http://www.google.com/hostednews/af...ocId=CNG.bb9547ce35c8697828233d280f68bf54.ad1
Mauritania troops kill 15 Qaeda suspects: army
(AFP) – 8 hours ago
NOUAKCHOTT — Mauritanian troops killed 15 members of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in a recent battle over the border in Mali, losing two of their own men, senior army officers said Sunday.
"The toll is 15 dead among the criminals, two dead and five wounded on the Mauritanian side," the officers told reporters.
The raid was on a camp inside a forest 110 kilometres (70 miles) from the border with Mauritania, Colonel Brahim Vall Ould Chebani, head of the general staff's operations bureau, and army spokesman Colonel Teyeb Ould Brahim said.
According to the two colonels, the camp was completely destroyed, calling it "a rout, every man for himself, on their side."
Their forces were still combing the forest, searching for the surviving AQIM fighters, they added.
They described the AQIM base as having been converted into a fortress, protected by deep trenches and landmines all around, which posed "a real threat to our country."
"We went to find them, we found them and we have totally destroyed them."
Malian troops meanwhile reported the capture of nine suspected AQIM fighters early Sunday, a military source said, as they continued their joint operation with Mauritanian troops there.
They were captured near the forest in Wagadou, the source said, adding that six of those detained were Mauritanian and three were ethnic Fulanis of unknown nationality.
Mauritanian troops, supported by colleagues from Mali, moved in ahead of the operation and surrounded the forest where the AQIM fighters were still thought to be entrenched, Mauritanian sources said.
Mauritanian warplanes were flying reconnaissance missions over the forest but there had been no major fighting since the battle late Friday, even if there had been some artillery fire, said the sources.
It was the latest development in the operation in Mali's western Wagadou region, where there had been concerns that AQIM was trying to set up a new base in the area.
AQIM, which has its roots in Algeria, has camps in Mali which it uses as a launchpad to carry out armed attacks and kidnappings in the Sahel desert region where the group is also involved in arms and drugs trafficking.
The withdrawal of Mauritanian troops from Mali two months ago has been followed by the establishment of new AQIM units near the border, notably in the forest region.
Earlier this month the neighbours agreed to carry out the joint operation against the group.
The four nations most affected by AQIM operations -- Algeria, Mali, Mauritania and Niger -- work closely together on security and military issues in efforts to crack down on its activities.
Copyright © 2011 AFP. All rights reserved.
Posted for fair use.....
http://washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/columnists/2011/06/us-bound-lose-treaty-roulette
U.S. is bound to lose treaty roulette
By: James Carafano | Examiner Columnist | 06/26/11 8:05 PM.
In a steamy Saigon club, Nick Chevotarevich puts a gun to his head and pulls the trigger.
The Russian roulette scene from 1978's "The Deer Hunter" was meant as a metaphor for the war in Vietnam. Director Michael Cimino thought that, by sending troops to Southeast Asia, the U.S. had engaged in a "game" just as senseless and fatal.
Regardless of what one thinks of the Vietnam War and how it was fought, no one would suggest that a Russian roulette foreign policy makes sense. Yet, that seems to be what's in store for us over the coming months.
The "bullets" in this round are a variety of bad treaties that have languished in the Senate, unapproved, for years -- and with good reason. President Obama seems intent on pushing at least one them through before the election -- another "trophy" for his foreign policy wall.
Pushing through treaties that farm out American sovereignty and security to international organizations and other nations goes to the core of the Obama Doctrine.
The president believes that the U.S. should play a more restrained and humble role in the world. To achieve that goal, he must build up a superstructure of international governance and agreements that substitute for America defending its own interests.
Obama, of course, realizes that there is no free lunch, but he is willing to sacrifice a great deal of American sovereignty to ink an agreement. Waiting for the decision on which bad treaty he'll push has become Washington's version of Russian roulette.
The shot should come soon. Treaties are notoriously difficult to get through the Senate in an election year. Moreover, polls indicate Obama's party may not control the Senate after next year's election. Therefore, this year could be his last best chance to ram a treaty through.
State Department officials indicate the heavy favorite is the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Signing onto the ban would cement Obama's reputation as the "road to zero" president -- the man who did everything possible to rid the world of America's nuclear weapons.
At a recent meeting of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, Rose Gottemoeller, assistant secretary for arms control, verification and compliance, promised, "We will work hard to make it happen."
Unfortunately, few treaties are worse for American national security. That's why Senate rejected it in 1999, and why no president has since brought it up again.
For starters, the treaty isn't even precise on what it bans. The U.S. interpreted the treaty to mean "zero yield," in other words no testing that might release any nuclear energy at all.
Scientists at Sandia National Laboratories labeled the term as "not a technically viable statement" -- i.e., the U.S. interpretation defies physics, as any testing with fissile material will release nuclear energy.
Perhaps that's why other states (Russia and China, to name two) don't agree that the treaty means "zero yield." It's not smart to sign a treaty when the parties disagree on what it means.
Furthermore, the U.S. may well need to test new nuclear weapons in the future. Obama seems perfectly happy to let our nuclear arsenal atrophy and become obsolete, but future presidents may see it differently.
Finally, CTBT has proved an abject failure at stopping nuclear proliferation. In fact, nations like North Korea and Iran see Obama's obsession with getting rid of America's nuclear weapons as a sign of weakness and an opportunity to exploit.
The more the U.S. disarms, the more valuable other nations' weapons become. They're content to watch Obama play Russian roulette as they push full steam ahead with their nuclear programs.
Examiner Columnist James Jay Carafano is a senior research fellow for national security at the Heritage Foundation.
http://washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/columnists/2011/06/us-bound-lose-treaty-roulette
U.S. is bound to lose treaty roulette
By: James Carafano | Examiner Columnist | 06/26/11 8:05 PM.
In a steamy Saigon club, Nick Chevotarevich puts a gun to his head and pulls the trigger.
The Russian roulette scene from 1978's "The Deer Hunter" was meant as a metaphor for the war in Vietnam. Director Michael Cimino thought that, by sending troops to Southeast Asia, the U.S. had engaged in a "game" just as senseless and fatal.
Regardless of what one thinks of the Vietnam War and how it was fought, no one would suggest that a Russian roulette foreign policy makes sense. Yet, that seems to be what's in store for us over the coming months.
The "bullets" in this round are a variety of bad treaties that have languished in the Senate, unapproved, for years -- and with good reason. President Obama seems intent on pushing at least one them through before the election -- another "trophy" for his foreign policy wall.
Pushing through treaties that farm out American sovereignty and security to international organizations and other nations goes to the core of the Obama Doctrine.
The president believes that the U.S. should play a more restrained and humble role in the world. To achieve that goal, he must build up a superstructure of international governance and agreements that substitute for America defending its own interests.
Obama, of course, realizes that there is no free lunch, but he is willing to sacrifice a great deal of American sovereignty to ink an agreement. Waiting for the decision on which bad treaty he'll push has become Washington's version of Russian roulette.
The shot should come soon. Treaties are notoriously difficult to get through the Senate in an election year. Moreover, polls indicate Obama's party may not control the Senate after next year's election. Therefore, this year could be his last best chance to ram a treaty through.
State Department officials indicate the heavy favorite is the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Signing onto the ban would cement Obama's reputation as the "road to zero" president -- the man who did everything possible to rid the world of America's nuclear weapons.
At a recent meeting of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, Rose Gottemoeller, assistant secretary for arms control, verification and compliance, promised, "We will work hard to make it happen."
Unfortunately, few treaties are worse for American national security. That's why Senate rejected it in 1999, and why no president has since brought it up again.
For starters, the treaty isn't even precise on what it bans. The U.S. interpreted the treaty to mean "zero yield," in other words no testing that might release any nuclear energy at all.
Scientists at Sandia National Laboratories labeled the term as "not a technically viable statement" -- i.e., the U.S. interpretation defies physics, as any testing with fissile material will release nuclear energy.
Perhaps that's why other states (Russia and China, to name two) don't agree that the treaty means "zero yield." It's not smart to sign a treaty when the parties disagree on what it means.
Furthermore, the U.S. may well need to test new nuclear weapons in the future. Obama seems perfectly happy to let our nuclear arsenal atrophy and become obsolete, but future presidents may see it differently.
Finally, CTBT has proved an abject failure at stopping nuclear proliferation. In fact, nations like North Korea and Iran see Obama's obsession with getting rid of America's nuclear weapons as a sign of weakness and an opportunity to exploit.
The more the U.S. disarms, the more valuable other nations' weapons become. They're content to watch Obama play Russian roulette as they push full steam ahead with their nuclear programs.
Examiner Columnist James Jay Carafano is a senior research fellow for national security at the Heritage Foundation.
Report: Turkey tells West it might launch offensive against Syria
Started by Michael111, Today 07:32 PM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...-West-it-might-launch-offensive-against-Syria
Kuwaiti Newspaper report nowlebanon: Turkey might launch attack in Syria
Started by kendwell, Today 06:29 AM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...owlebanon-Turkey-might-launch-attack-in-Syria
Started by Michael111, Today 07:32 PM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...-West-it-might-launch-offensive-against-Syria
Kuwaiti Newspaper report nowlebanon: Turkey might launch attack in Syria
Started by kendwell, Today 06:29 AM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...owlebanon-Turkey-might-launch-attack-in-Syria
almost ready
Inactive
Now that's scary!!!! Doesn't NATO have a solid mutual support agreement with TUrkey? THis could be world war before the week is out.
northern watch
TB Fanatic
Iran unveils underground missile silo, poises for US-Turkish attack on Syria. Iron Dome for Haifa
DEBKAfile Exclusive Report June 27, 2011, 9:56 PM (GMT+02:00)
Iran's big Great Prophet Mohammad War Games 6 was launched Monday, June 27, ahead of a Turkish operation against Syria's Assad regime which is anticipated by its military and Revolutionary Guards chiefs. Debkafile reports Tehran expected the Turkish army to have US air and naval support in case of Iranian reprisals against them both. On Day One of the exercise, Iran unveiled its first underground missile silo immune to air strikes. It held what looked like a Shahab-3 ballistic missile.
Israel has responded to Iran's military exercise and the spiraling regional tension by positioning one of its new Iron Dome rocket interceptor batteries in the northern city of Haifa.
Last week, Iranian warships and submarines deployed in the Red Sea tracked the movements of two big US aircraft carriers, the USS Enterprise and USS George H. W Bush, which crossed each other in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait on June 21 heading in opposite directions through this strategic chokepoint between the Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean.
The USS Enterprise, the world's largest aircraft carrier, was on its way from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean via the Red Sea and Suez Canal, while the USS George H.W. Bush, the US Navy's newest carrier with the greatest fire power of any of its warships, left the Mediterranean and headed in the opposite direction for the Persian Gulf with a crew of 9,000 and 70 fighter bombers.
On the same day, Iranian naval surveillance picked up the arrival of the Los Angeles-class USS Bremerton nuclear-powered attack submarine off Bahrain opposite Iran.
Strategists in Tehran see danger in these crisscross movements by US war fleets. According to our military sources, the Enterprise, which is older, slower and has less fire power than the Bush, was moved to the Mediterranean because there it is supported by American air bases scattered across western and central Europe, whereas the Bush was consigned to waters opposite Iranian shores because it is virtually a single-vessel fighting machine capable of operating without support
The Iranian exercise has two primary objectives:
1 To spread Iran's ballistic missiles to their maximum operational extent in support of Iran's signals to Washington and Ankara in the past two weeks warning that an attack on Syria by a US-backed Turkish or NATO force would spark Iranian missile reprisals against Turkish and US military targets on Turkish soil and other parts of the Middle East.
2 Iran has fanned its fighting forces out across the country, with the densest concentrations on its Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea coasts, ready to repel any American attack that might follow an Iranian missile assault on US, Turkish or allied targets.
The ground-air-naval exercise is scheduled to last 10 days – unusually long for a military drill – so that Iran stands ready for a decision in Washington and/or Ankara to attack Syria.
The announcement of the exercise by Revolutionary Guards Aerospace Force commander Gen. Amir-Ali Hajizadeh Sunday, June 26, made Tehran's intentions clear: He said the exercise was being staged in response to the "growing US military presence in the region" and noted that the missiles practiced would include the Saijil and the Fateh 110.
He did not need to spell out the facts that the Saijil-2 has a range of 2,000 kilometers and can reach any point in the Middle East and further - up to the Black Sea region, for instance, where US air and naval units are posted; or that the improved Fateh 110 has been supplied to Syria and Hizballah for use against Israel.
Iran would expect to be joined by both in any military flare-up.
http://www.debka.com/article/21067/
Posted Under fair Use Discussion
My Comments
War may be hours away!
DEBKAfile Exclusive Report June 27, 2011, 9:56 PM (GMT+02:00)
Iran's big Great Prophet Mohammad War Games 6 was launched Monday, June 27, ahead of a Turkish operation against Syria's Assad regime which is anticipated by its military and Revolutionary Guards chiefs. Debkafile reports Tehran expected the Turkish army to have US air and naval support in case of Iranian reprisals against them both. On Day One of the exercise, Iran unveiled its first underground missile silo immune to air strikes. It held what looked like a Shahab-3 ballistic missile.
Israel has responded to Iran's military exercise and the spiraling regional tension by positioning one of its new Iron Dome rocket interceptor batteries in the northern city of Haifa.
Last week, Iranian warships and submarines deployed in the Red Sea tracked the movements of two big US aircraft carriers, the USS Enterprise and USS George H. W Bush, which crossed each other in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait on June 21 heading in opposite directions through this strategic chokepoint between the Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean.
The USS Enterprise, the world's largest aircraft carrier, was on its way from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean via the Red Sea and Suez Canal, while the USS George H.W. Bush, the US Navy's newest carrier with the greatest fire power of any of its warships, left the Mediterranean and headed in the opposite direction for the Persian Gulf with a crew of 9,000 and 70 fighter bombers.
On the same day, Iranian naval surveillance picked up the arrival of the Los Angeles-class USS Bremerton nuclear-powered attack submarine off Bahrain opposite Iran.
Strategists in Tehran see danger in these crisscross movements by US war fleets. According to our military sources, the Enterprise, which is older, slower and has less fire power than the Bush, was moved to the Mediterranean because there it is supported by American air bases scattered across western and central Europe, whereas the Bush was consigned to waters opposite Iranian shores because it is virtually a single-vessel fighting machine capable of operating without support
The Iranian exercise has two primary objectives:
1 To spread Iran's ballistic missiles to their maximum operational extent in support of Iran's signals to Washington and Ankara in the past two weeks warning that an attack on Syria by a US-backed Turkish or NATO force would spark Iranian missile reprisals against Turkish and US military targets on Turkish soil and other parts of the Middle East.
2 Iran has fanned its fighting forces out across the country, with the densest concentrations on its Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea coasts, ready to repel any American attack that might follow an Iranian missile assault on US, Turkish or allied targets.
The ground-air-naval exercise is scheduled to last 10 days – unusually long for a military drill – so that Iran stands ready for a decision in Washington and/or Ankara to attack Syria.
The announcement of the exercise by Revolutionary Guards Aerospace Force commander Gen. Amir-Ali Hajizadeh Sunday, June 26, made Tehran's intentions clear: He said the exercise was being staged in response to the "growing US military presence in the region" and noted that the missiles practiced would include the Saijil and the Fateh 110.
He did not need to spell out the facts that the Saijil-2 has a range of 2,000 kilometers and can reach any point in the Middle East and further - up to the Black Sea region, for instance, where US air and naval units are posted; or that the improved Fateh 110 has been supplied to Syria and Hizballah for use against Israel.
Iran would expect to be joined by both in any military flare-up.
http://www.debka.com/article/21067/
Posted Under fair Use Discussion
My Comments
War may be hours away!
northern watch
TB Fanatic
Iran, Syria sign mutual defense pact
December12, 2009 9:49 | Updated December 12, 2009 23:39
By JPOST.COM STAFF
Iran and Syria signed a defense agreement on Friday, according to an Iranian Press TV report.
The document, signed by Iranian Defense Minister Ahmad Vahidi and his Syrian counterpart Ali Mohammad Habib Mahmoud, aimed to face "common enemies and challenges," the report said.
Vahidi praised Syria's great potential in the defense and military fields and said that "it is natural for a country like Syria - which has an inhumane and menacing predator like Israel in its neighborhood - to be always prepared [against possible foreign aggression]."
His visit to Syria comes a week after Saeed Jalili, Secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, also visited Damascus.
Iran's treaty with Syria comes just as Western countries are warning Teheran that if it fails to respond to overtures intended to make its nuclear program transparent, it will face sanctions.
But as Iran was cementing its ties with Syria, the United States emphasized that its patience in waiting for a diplomatic response from Iran to its overtures is running thin.
In a Wall Street Journal interview published on Friday, White House National Security Adviser Gen. James Jones said that "Iran still controls its destiny on [the nuclear] issue." The door to the diplomatic process would "stay open as long as we could leave it open… but it's not going to stay open much longer."
According to Jones, the parties involved in negotiations with Teheran wish most of all that Iran's leaders would "give a clear statement of policy with regard to their future ambitions concerning the development of nuclear weapons and the delivery means to go with them."
"As long as there's an open question on both of those issues, then Iran is just asking the world to trust them," Jones stated.
"They think they can withstand anything the UN or the coalition of like-minded nations can put together. They might be right.
They might be wrong."
"If Iran pivots and does the right thing, whether it's December 30 or January 20, that's what everybody wants," he concluded.
Earlier this week, US Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton questioned whether Iran had indeed any intention of coming clean on its nuclear program.
Speaking with Al-Jazeera TV of the West's offer of dialogue with Iran, Clinton said "[the Iranians] had first agreed in principle, and then I think because of internal disputes, they backed off from that, raising a lot of questions about what their true intentions are. Obviously, the secret facility at Qom was revealed. They now say they want 10 or 20 new nuclear power plants."
"It's not confidence building, let us say. And I think the international community really still wants to engage with Iran, but people are going to now turn to other routes like more pressure, like sanctions to try to change their mind and their behavior," Clinton said.
http://fr.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost/JPArticle/ShowFull&cid=1260447419513
Posted Under Fair Use Discussion
My Comments
Yes, the date is December 12, 2009, less than two years ago.
My question, Does Russia have a mutual defense pact with Syria?
December12, 2009 9:49 | Updated December 12, 2009 23:39
By JPOST.COM STAFF
Iran and Syria signed a defense agreement on Friday, according to an Iranian Press TV report.
The document, signed by Iranian Defense Minister Ahmad Vahidi and his Syrian counterpart Ali Mohammad Habib Mahmoud, aimed to face "common enemies and challenges," the report said.
Vahidi praised Syria's great potential in the defense and military fields and said that "it is natural for a country like Syria - which has an inhumane and menacing predator like Israel in its neighborhood - to be always prepared [against possible foreign aggression]."
His visit to Syria comes a week after Saeed Jalili, Secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, also visited Damascus.
Iran's treaty with Syria comes just as Western countries are warning Teheran that if it fails to respond to overtures intended to make its nuclear program transparent, it will face sanctions.
But as Iran was cementing its ties with Syria, the United States emphasized that its patience in waiting for a diplomatic response from Iran to its overtures is running thin.
In a Wall Street Journal interview published on Friday, White House National Security Adviser Gen. James Jones said that "Iran still controls its destiny on [the nuclear] issue." The door to the diplomatic process would "stay open as long as we could leave it open… but it's not going to stay open much longer."
According to Jones, the parties involved in negotiations with Teheran wish most of all that Iran's leaders would "give a clear statement of policy with regard to their future ambitions concerning the development of nuclear weapons and the delivery means to go with them."
"As long as there's an open question on both of those issues, then Iran is just asking the world to trust them," Jones stated.
"They think they can withstand anything the UN or the coalition of like-minded nations can put together. They might be right.
They might be wrong."
"If Iran pivots and does the right thing, whether it's December 30 or January 20, that's what everybody wants," he concluded.
Earlier this week, US Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton questioned whether Iran had indeed any intention of coming clean on its nuclear program.
Speaking with Al-Jazeera TV of the West's offer of dialogue with Iran, Clinton said "[the Iranians] had first agreed in principle, and then I think because of internal disputes, they backed off from that, raising a lot of questions about what their true intentions are. Obviously, the secret facility at Qom was revealed. They now say they want 10 or 20 new nuclear power plants."
"It's not confidence building, let us say. And I think the international community really still wants to engage with Iran, but people are going to now turn to other routes like more pressure, like sanctions to try to change their mind and their behavior," Clinton said.
http://fr.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost/JPArticle/ShowFull&cid=1260447419513
Posted Under Fair Use Discussion
My Comments
Yes, the date is December 12, 2009, less than two years ago.
My question, Does Russia have a mutual defense pact with Syria?
The Flying Dutchman
Deceased
6/28 to 7/05 ***The***Perfect***Storm***
=
A public relations clash has broken out over the planned flotilla to Hamas-controlled Gaza. Activists charge that Israel sabotaged a boat at a Greek port and deny IDF accusations that they plan to kill soldiers.
The flotilla, already scaled down following Turkey and Cyprus’ refusal to cooperate, hoped to set sail from Greece Tuesday, but Voice of Israel government radio said it will be delayed at least several days. One boat is stuck in port because of a broken propeller, and activists blamed Israel for the damage, calling it sabotage.
Israel is in the midst of massive diplomatic and information campaign to scuttle the planned attempt to break the maritime embargo, imposed to hamper Hamas’ efforts to smuggle more weapons into Gaza. The government and military have emphasized that all of the goods and merchandise activists want to bring to Gaza can easily enter the region overland via Egypt or Israeli overland crossings.
Flotilla activists denied on Tuesday reports that they intend to kill soldiers, using chemical weapons. IDF spokeswoman Lieutenant Colonel Avital Leibovitz asserted, "There are radical elements on board the American boat who have said they want to kill Israeli soldiers. We also know that one of the boats is carrying dangerous incendiary chemicals that these human rights militants want to use against Israeli soldiers.”
Flotilla activist Dror Feiler told Army Radio that the charges of plots to kill are excuses for the IDF to justify violence.
Last year’s flotilla of six ships was marked by a clash on the Mavi Marmara boat, charted by Turkish IHH terror activists, nine of whom were killed by Navy commandoes, who were brutally clubbed, shot at and kidnapped by IHH members until the Navy was able to overcome the attack.
Most of the travelers on the other five boats were an assortment of doves who were unaware that the IHH, declared a terrorist group in some European quarters, brought chain saws aboard in order to cut off metal bars from the ship and used them to attack Navy commandos, who boarded the Mavi Mamara virtually unarmed.
They also were unaware that the same ship, contrary to announced intentions, was not carrying any aid to Gaza, as was discovered after the Navy guided it to port in Israel.
Nonetheless, Feiler said that there cannot possible be any violence from the activists because the passengers have signed a pledge of non-violence. On the other hand, IHH members, whose Mavi Mamara ship was blocked by Turkish officials from leaving port, are planning to join the flotilla on other ships.
"The moderate elements who were planning to join the flotilla... know that for everyone who wants to help people in Gaza, that there is a legal way to do it," Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman said Tuesday.
"They want to purposely create a provocation, they are looking for a confrontation, they are looking for blood; they are looking for many images on the TV screens” he said. "No one doubts the intention of those people... But I am sure we will cope with them."
=
=
06/28/11, 5:16 PM
Flotilla for War or Peace? Charges of Plot to Kill
by Tzvi Ben Gedalyahu
http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/145257
Flotilla for War or Peace? Charges of Plot to Kill
by Tzvi Ben Gedalyahu
http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/145257
A public relations clash has broken out over the planned flotilla to Hamas-controlled Gaza. Activists charge that Israel sabotaged a boat at a Greek port and deny IDF accusations that they plan to kill soldiers.
The flotilla, already scaled down following Turkey and Cyprus’ refusal to cooperate, hoped to set sail from Greece Tuesday, but Voice of Israel government radio said it will be delayed at least several days. One boat is stuck in port because of a broken propeller, and activists blamed Israel for the damage, calling it sabotage.
Israel is in the midst of massive diplomatic and information campaign to scuttle the planned attempt to break the maritime embargo, imposed to hamper Hamas’ efforts to smuggle more weapons into Gaza. The government and military have emphasized that all of the goods and merchandise activists want to bring to Gaza can easily enter the region overland via Egypt or Israeli overland crossings.
Flotilla activists denied on Tuesday reports that they intend to kill soldiers, using chemical weapons. IDF spokeswoman Lieutenant Colonel Avital Leibovitz asserted, "There are radical elements on board the American boat who have said they want to kill Israeli soldiers. We also know that one of the boats is carrying dangerous incendiary chemicals that these human rights militants want to use against Israeli soldiers.”
Flotilla activist Dror Feiler told Army Radio that the charges of plots to kill are excuses for the IDF to justify violence.
Last year’s flotilla of six ships was marked by a clash on the Mavi Marmara boat, charted by Turkish IHH terror activists, nine of whom were killed by Navy commandoes, who were brutally clubbed, shot at and kidnapped by IHH members until the Navy was able to overcome the attack.
Most of the travelers on the other five boats were an assortment of doves who were unaware that the IHH, declared a terrorist group in some European quarters, brought chain saws aboard in order to cut off metal bars from the ship and used them to attack Navy commandos, who boarded the Mavi Mamara virtually unarmed.
They also were unaware that the same ship, contrary to announced intentions, was not carrying any aid to Gaza, as was discovered after the Navy guided it to port in Israel.
Nonetheless, Feiler said that there cannot possible be any violence from the activists because the passengers have signed a pledge of non-violence. On the other hand, IHH members, whose Mavi Mamara ship was blocked by Turkish officials from leaving port, are planning to join the flotilla on other ships.
"The moderate elements who were planning to join the flotilla... know that for everyone who wants to help people in Gaza, that there is a legal way to do it," Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman said Tuesday.
"They want to purposely create a provocation, they are looking for a confrontation, they are looking for blood; they are looking for many images on the TV screens” he said. "No one doubts the intention of those people... But I am sure we will cope with them."
=