WAR 08-22-2020-to-08-28-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

[Housecarl]

(430) 07-25-2020-to-07-31-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****
WAR - 07-25-2020-to-07-31-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****
(427) 07-04-2020-to-07-10-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR**** WAR - 07-04-2020-to-07-10-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR**** (424)...

www.timebomb2000.com


(431) 08-01-2020-to-08-07-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****



WAR - 08-01-2020-to-08-07-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****
(428) 07-11-2020-to-07-17-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR**** WAR - 07-11-2020-to-07-17-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR**** (425)...

www.timebomb2000.com






(432) 08-08-2020-to-08-14-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****


WAR - 08-08-2020-to-08-14-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****
(429) 07-18-2020-to-07-24-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR**** WAR - 07-18-2020-to-07-24-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR**** (427) 07-04-2020-to-07-10-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR**** WAR - 07-04-2020-to-07-10-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR**** (424)...

www.timebomb2000.com





(433) 08-15-2020-to-08-21-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

WAR - 08-15-2020-to-08-21-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

(430) 07-25-2020-to-07-31-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR**** WAR - 07-25-2020-to-07-31-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR**** (427) 07-04-2020-to-07-10-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR**** WAR - 07-04-2020-to-07-10-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR**** (424)...

www.timebomb2000.com

----------------------------------

Posted for fair use.....

Russian major general killed in roadside bomb in Syria’s Deir ez-Zor

Maj. Gen. Vyacheslav Gladkikh is the first Russian general reported killed in Syria since 2017.

www.al-monitor.com

Russian major general killed in roadside bomb in Syria’s Deir ez-Zor
Maj. Gen. Vyacheslav Gladkikh is the first Russian general reported killed in Syria since 2017.

A picture taken during a press tour provided by the Russian armed forces shows Russian soldiers standing guard in a central street in Syria's eastern city of Deir ez-Zor, as locals pass by, on Sept. 15, 2017. On Aug. 21, 2020, a Russian major general was killed by a roadside bomb near Deiz ez-Zor. Photo by DOMINIQUE DERDA/AFP via Getty Images.

Jared Szuba

@JM_Szuba

Topics covered

Islamic State

Syria Conflict

Russia in Syria
Aug 21, 2020

A Russian major general was killed in eastern Syria earlier this week by an improvised explosive device, Russia’s Defense Ministry confirmed.

Maj. Gen. Vyacheslav Gladkikh died Tuesday after a roadside bomb detonated under a convoy of Russian soldiers and Syrian pro-regime militiamen in the desert near the city of Deir ez-Zor.

Three other Russian military personnel were wounded, Russia’s state-run Tass news agency reported.

A local commander of Syria’s National Defense Forces, a pro-Assad militia, was also reportedly killed. A spokesperson for the militia did not immediately respond to Al-Monitor’s request for comment.

Video purporting to show the explosion circulated on social media this week. It was the first reported death of a Russian general in Syria since 2017, when a lieutenant general was killed in the same province, reportedly by mortar fire from the Islamic State (IS).

Never miss another story
Sign up for our Newsletter


Deir ez-Zor and nearly all of Syrian territory west of the Euphrates River lie in Syrian government hands, with the major exception of Idlib province, the last rebel enclave in the country’s nearly decadelong civil war.

US-backed and Kurdish-led militias captured IS’ last remaining territory in March 2019, but the desert countryside south and east of Deir ez-Zor on the regime’s side of the Euphrates is rife with IS insurgents who continue to ambush and kill pro-Syrian regime forces.

Syria’s eastern Badia, or desert, remains the country’s last significant hot spot of IS activity. In April, more than two dozen Syrian pro-regime fighters were killed in IS attacks in Badia al-Sukhnah and Badia al-Sham, prompting Russian airstrikes, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights.

Killings of local tribal figures recently rocked the east side of the Euphrates in Deir ez-Zor, which is controlled by the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces. It is not clear who carried out the slayings, though locals have alternatively blamed IS and the Assad regime.

IS insurgents continue to use networks of smugglers to traverse the desert border area between Iraq and Syria southwest of the Euphrates, according to a Syrian rebel source based in the area.

“They’ve changed their tactics there,” said the source, who declined to be named for security reasons. “They do nighttime infiltrations, lay mines and booby traps.”

The source told Al-Monitor via WhatsApp there are “a number of sites” in the Badia that have dozens, possibly hundreds of IS fighters.

A US official told Al-Monitor last month that there could be anywhere from 2,000 to 10,000 IS insurgents in sleeper cells across Iraq and Syria.

Coalition spokesman US Army Col. Myles Caggins III told Al-Monitor earlier this month that the United States recently provided Iraqi authorities with “several million dollars' worth” of border security infrastructure to interdict illicit smuggling in the border area.

The Pentagon says US special forces at the isolated al-Tanf base in the Badia are there to keep pressure on IS in the border area, but rebels have told Al-Monitor that the proximity of Russian and Syrian forces on the roads outside the US-controlled zone make operations outside the area difficult.

The base has also served as an intelligence gathering site on Iran-linked militias crossing the Iraq-Syria border.

More from Jared Szuba


Firefight with US-led coalition leaves Syrian soldier dead, state-run news says
Aug 17, 2020

US seizes multi-million-barrel Iranian fuel shipment bound for Venezuela
Aug 14, 2020

Intel: US engaging with Libya players for possible demilitarization of Sirte
Aug 12, 2020

Read more: Russian major general killed in roadside bomb in Syria’s Deir ez-Zor

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use.....

Iran’s Regime Unveils “Haj Qasem” Missile on Eve of US Decision to Snap Back Sanctions

While the US government decided to restore all the Iranian regime’s sanctions because of the regime’s significant violations of the 2015 nuclear deal (JCPOA),

irannewsupdate.com

Iran’s Regime Unveils “Haj Qasem” Missile on Eve of US Decision to Snap Back Sanctions

• Print
• Email

Published: Saturday, 22 August 2020

Twitter

While the US government decided to restore all the Iranian regime’s sanctions because of the regime’s significant violations of the 2015 nuclear deal (JCPOA),

Tehran in a ridiculous show and just to satisfy the regime’s forces, which have lost hope and motivation in the regime’s future, reported and unveiled two new missiles.

It’s defense Minister Amir Hatami said in a TV speech: “The surface-to-surface missile, called martyr Qasem Soleimani, has a range of 1,400 kilometers (870 miles) and the cruise missile, called martyr Abu Mahdi, has a range of over 1,000 kilometers (620 miles).”

Soleimani and Muhandis, the two persons which the missiles are named after, were killed in a U.S. drone strike outside of Baghdad’s international airport in January. Abu Mahdi Muhandis was sentenced to death by the Kuwaiti Supreme Court in connection with the 1983 Kuwaiti suicide bombings. Qassem Soleimani, the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Qods Force, was notorious as the regime’s mastermind for its oversea terror operations and meddling in other countries leading the wars in Syria, Yemen, Iraq and supporting many of its proxy forces. It was reported that he was the de facto second-in-command in this regime, responsible for the death of many US soldiers.

This picture shows the "Haj Qasem" missile in an undisclosed location in Iran.
The regime’s President Hassan Rouhani noted: “Missiles and particularly cruise missiles are very important for us ... the fact that we have increased the range from 300 to 1,000 in less than two years is a great achievement. Our military might and missile programs are defensive.”

The ballistic missile program of the Islamic Republic of Iran has drawn criticism and concern from the United States and several European countries, including France. Iran has previously said that its current missile range is 2,000 kilometers.

The claims of Iranian military officials have been repeatedly refuted by international experts, and IRGC officials have been accused of showmanship or copying other countries 'equipment or tampering with other countries' military products.

This picture shows the "Abu Mahdi" missile in an undisclosed location in Iran.
Iran asserts that the missiles are equipped with anti-jamming software and low-visibility flight profiles. Whether that is true or not, these missiles do prove the regime's continuing priority development of nuclear strike platforms. Due to its cost and complexity, and the escalation-response its use would entail, Iran's ballistic missile program is specifically focused on nuclear weapons. Iran's interest here goes beyond the defensive. While Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the conservative faction believe their attainment of a credible nuclear deterrent platform would ensure the regime's long-term survival, they also view nuclear weapons for advancing the regime’s so-called Islamic revolution.

It seems that this time too, due to the sensitive situation in the region and the possibility of more comprehensive international sanctions and the isolation of the Iranian government in the region, the Iranian authorities needed such a show of strength. The Iranian regime these days is facing a significant instability inside the country, which is reflected in the nation-wide protests of many of the working classes including the oil and petrochemical workers who are the main income source of the regime.

On social media, the Iranian people mocked the regime’s actions and in protest at spending heavy costs on such useless projects. Some social media messages included:

• What is the use of a rocket in a country where people are looking for food in the trash?
• Qasem Soleimani, a terrorist, deserves that his name is engraved on a rocket. With these missiles, they want to demolish the houses of Syrian children or hit a passenger plane.
• They built the Qasem Soleimani missile, which only hits its own planes.
• They reported that the Qasem Soleimani’s missile is precision-guided and has many capabilities. For example, it pulverizes a passenger plane in the air in a fraction of a second.
• After the funny sculptures of Qasem Soleimani, the Soleimani rocket was unveiled today.
• The IRGC bought and painted several missiles from North Korea and named them Qasem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis.

On August 20, the US Secretary of state Mike Pompeo told a press conference at the UN about the UN snapback sanctions:



“I notified them that the United States is initiating the restoration of virtually all UN sanctions on Iran lifted under UN Security Council Resolution 2231. This process will lead to those sanctions coming back into effect 30 days from today.

“Our message is very, very simple: the United States will never allow the world’s largest state sponsor of terrorism to freely buy and sell planes, tanks, missiles, and other kinds of conventional weapons. These UN sanctions will continue the arms embargo.

“I’m pleased to say, too, that these restored sanctions will also reimpose accountability for other forms of Iranian malign activity that the authors of the nuclear deal foolishly downplayed. Iran will be again prohibited from ballistic missile testing. Iran will be back under sanctions for ongoing nuclear activities – such as the enrichment of nuclear material – that could be applied to a nuclear weapons program.”



Read More:

The JCPOA Fuels Tehran's Warmongering Policy and Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

• Next:Who Is Assadollah Assadi, the Iranian Diplomat on Trial for Terrorism Charges?

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use.....

Arrested ISIS operative had planned terror attack in crowded areas on August 15: Delhi Police

Mustakeem Khan, alias Abu Yusuf, was in direct touch with his ISIS commanders. He had passports made in the name of his wife and 4 children. Earlier, he was being handled by Yusuf Alhindi who was killed in Syria. Later, Abu Huzafa, a Pakistani, was handling him. Huzafa was also later killed in a...

www.dnaindia.com

Arrested ISIS operative had planned terror attack in crowded areas on August 15: Delhi Police
Mustakeem Khan, alias Abu Yusuf, was in direct touch with his ISIS commanders. He had passports made in the name of his wife and 4 children. Earlier, he was being handled by Yusuf Alhindi who was killed in Syria. Later, Abu Huzafa, a Pakistani, was handling him. Huzafa was also later killed in a drone strike in Afghanistan, the DCP Special Cell told reporters.

Written By
DNA Web Team

Source
Zee Media Newsroom
Updated: Aug 22, 2020, 10:46 PM IST

A suspected ISIS operative, who was arrested following a brief exchange of fire, had planned terror strikes in high footfall areas of the national capital, Delhi Police disclosed said on Saturday (August 22, 2020).

Addressing a press briefing, PS Kushwah, DCP (Special Cell), Delhi Police, said, “Two pressure cooker IEDs were recovered from Mohammad Mustakeem Khan, alias Abu Yusuf, a resident of Balarampur in Uttar Pradesh.”

“Khan had planned a terror strike in the national capital on August 15 but could not do so due to heavy security arrangements,” DCP Kushwah said.


Sharing more information, he said, “The Special Cell has arrested the ISIS operative after a brief exchange of fire late night. The 36-year-old man is called Yusuf aka Abu Yusuf. He has various alias. Pressure cooker IEDs have been recovered from him. He was going to install them at heavy footfall area here.’’

“Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, his movement was restricted. Around 15th August, he had an intention to make an attempt (of attack) in Delhi but due to security arrangements here he was not successful,” the DCP Special Cell said.

He said Khan was in touch with ISIS handlers who instructed him to plan terror strikes in India.


Mustakeem Khan, alias Abu Yusuf, was in direct touch with his ISIS commanders. He had passports made in the name of his wife and 4 children. Earlier, he was being handled by Yusuf Alhindi who was killed in Syria. Later, Abu Huzafa, a Pakistani, was handling him. Huzafa was also later killed in a drone strike in Afghanistan, the DCP Special Cell told reporters.

The suspected ISIS operative was arrested by Delhi Police's Special Cell on Friday night from the section of the Ridge Road between Dhaula Kuan and Karol Bagh. The police recovered two Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), weighing approximately 15 kilograms in two pressure cookers, from his possession. Besides, a pistol was also recovered from him post-firing.

Khan had been under watch for the last year, the DCP told reporters. “Our operation had been on for the last one year,” Kushwaha said.

He was remanded to seven-day police custody. According to reports, Special Cell officers are taking him to Balrampur, Uttar Pradesh, for further investigation.

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use.....

Afghanistan: The end game?

In February of this year, the American special envoy for Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad, was able to conclude an agreement with the Taliban movement. It was…

www.thewhig.com

Afghanistan: The end game?

Louis Delvoie
More from Louis Delvoie


Published on: August 22, 2020 | Last Updated: August 22, 2020 2:24 PM EDT

An Afghan man wearing a protective face mask walks past a wall painted with graphic of Zalmay Khalilzad, left, U.S. envoy for peace in Afghanistan, and Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the leader of the Taliban delegation, in Kabul, Afghanistan, on April 13, 2020. The pair had signed an agreement at a ceremony between members of Afghanistan's Taliban and the U.S. in Doha, Qatar, on Feb. 29, 2020. (Mohammad Ismail/Reuters) Mohammad Ismail / REUTERS

In February of this year, the American special envoy for Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad, was able to conclude an agreement with the Taliban movement. It was very widely hailed as a major step on the road to peace in Afghanistan. In effect, it was a rather limited agreement. It provided for a suspension of large-scale Taliban offensive operations, for an exchange of prisoners between the Taliban and the Afghani government, for an undertaking by the Taliban not to allow the use of Afghan soil as a launching pad for terrorist attacks against western countries, and for the progressive withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan. The agreement also foresaw the start of peace negotiations between the Taliban and the Afghan government. How has it all panned out so far?

The Taliban has reduced the tempo and intensity of its attacks on Afghan security forces but has certainly not ended them. The prisoner exchange has been fraught with problems and delays. The Afghan government has been slow to release the 5,000 Taliban fighters it held in captivity. It has been particularly reluctant to release the last 400 who are responsible for some of the bloodiest attacks on Afghan security forces and civilians. President Ashraf Ghani felt it necessary to convene a traditional council meeting called a Loya Jirgse to endorse their release. This was done last week, and a first batch of 80 prisoners have been granted their freedom, with more expected to follow in the days ahead. This has all been accompanied by a slow drawdown in the number of American forces in Afghanistan, which is expected to go from 13,000 to 5,000 by the time of the U.S. presidential election in November.

The scene now seems to be set for the beginning of peace negotiations between the Taliban and the Afghan government, and some are predicting they may start by the end of August. If they do, they will only be the beginning of the really hard part of the process. The talks will bring together sworn enemies who have been fighting each other for 20 years. They are at odds on matters of ideology, religion and politics. And they have radically different views on what the country and its government should look like in the years ahead. These will not be simple peace negotiations, such as those that ended the Second World War where one side was clearly defeated and the other clearly victorious. In the case of Afghanistan, there are no victors, and each side controls roughly half of the country. These negotiations promise to be complicated and protracted.

One of the complicating factors will be a lack of unity of command on both sides of the table. The Taliban is certainly not a unified movement. There is a leadership cadre established in Quetta, the capital of the Pakistani provinces of Baluchistan. These leaders exercise only indirect control of the fighters on the ground. Local commanders are in charge of day-to-day operations and frequently disregard the wishes of the leadership. All too often these commanders are in close alliances with tribal chieftains, who have their own political and military objectives. Getting all of the Taliban to agree to a single set of aims in the negotiations with the government may prove very difficult. As for the government, it, too, is faced with numerous divisions. There are the long-standing rivalries among ethnic groups. The Tajiks and the Uzbeks will resist any solution that gives too much power to the Taliban, who are mainly Pashtuns. There are the regional warlords, who have their own interests to pursue and their axes to grind. And at the top of the government are two leaders, President Ashraf Ghani and Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, who are still engaged in a bitter personal rivalry for control of the state apparatus. In other words, the government, too, will experience great difficulties in coming up with a unified negotiating strategy and a common position.

What are the overarching objectives of both sides in these negotiations? They can probably be boiled down to a few points. The government wants to bring the Taliban insurgency to an end and to establish peace in the country. It also wants to maintain the existing system of government to the greatest extent possible. The Taliban want to see the departure of all foreign forces and the reestablishment of an Islamic caliphate of the kind that existed from 1995 to 2001. The military aspects of these positions are fairly readily achievable. Although it may experience difficulties with local commanders, the Taliban can probably bring an end to its military operations. And given U.S. President Donald Trump’s strong desire to rapidly repatriate American troops, the departure of foreign forces can be envisaged as an achievable near-term objective. It is the political dimension of the opposing positions that are far more contentious. Although the government of Afghanistan as it now exists is a badly flawed democracy, it is nevertheless an essentially secular one, which guarantees the civil rights of its citizens and in particular the rights of women. The Taliban, with their very narrow and sometimes skewed interpretations of the Qur’an and of Sharia Law, would want to end all of that. They want to reimpose limitations on women’s right to go to school and hold a job outside the home, among other things. The quasi theocracy they want to recreate is totally incompatible with the ideals and ideas of a secular state.

Finding common ground between the government and the Taliban will be a Herculean task. It will require long and painful negotiations to determine the terms under which representatives of the Taliban can be integrated into the government. And these negotiations will not be conducted in a void. Outside players will try to play a role. The United States will be intent on seeing that the Taliban do not manage to exercise too much control, for that would be an admission of defeat in an 18-year military campaign that has cost the Americans thousands of lives and billions of dollars. Pakistan, on the other hand, will continue to support the Taliban, for it considers that it is in its national interest to do so. For exactly the opposite reason, India will support the government with which it has established close political and economic ties. And other regional powers such as Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan will all take an interest in the outcome.

Even if the negotiations do lead to a successful outcome, they will not guarantee peace and security in Afghanistan. There will almost inevitably be some regional warlords and local tribal leaders who will maintain their opposition to the government. There are also the forces of the Islamic State, which have gained strength in recent years and are not party to the negotiations. Indeed, the Islamic State may well increase its clout by recruiting dissident members of the Taliban who want to continue the armed struggle. In short, a peaceful and secure Afghanistan still seems a long way off.

Louis A. Delvoie is a retired Canadian diplomat who served abroad as an ambassador and high commissioner.

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use.....

Mexico's Jalisco New Generation Cartel uses drones with homemade bombs

Armed residents from Tepalcatepec, Michoacán, say the Jalisco New Generation Cartel used drones equipped with bombs to attack the city.

www.dailymail.co.uk

Mexico's fastest-growing drugs cartel 'Jalisco New Generation' deploys bomb drones packed with C4 explosives as it battles to dominate town and it's armed residents

• Armed residents from Tepalcatepec, Michoacán, say the Jalisco New Generation Cartel used drones equipped with bombs to attack the city
• They say two drones were recovered following a July attack
• C4 explosives and pellets were placed inside four plastic containers
• Each drone had two containers connected to it to cause maximum damage
• Mexican authorities learned the cartel used the same method of attack during incidents that took place in the states of Puebla and Guanajuato in May

By Adry Torres For Dailymail.com
Published: 14:05 EDT, 20 August 2020 | Updated: 16:11 EDT, 20 August 2020

• 
  
• 
  
• 
  
• e-mail

22 shares

27

View comments



Mexico's fastest growing cartel has allegedly deployed drones packed with C4 explosives as it battles against armed residents for control over a city.

For over a year now, the Jalisco New Generation Cartel has attempted to exert its influence on the western city of Tepalcatepec.

However, a group of armed residents say they have withstood the attacks and are fighting back despite countless deaths and injuries on both sides.

Now the residents say the Jalisco New Generation Cartel, which also has a presence across several cities in the United States, have turned to equipping drones with explosives as part of their menacing strategy.

In interviews with Mexican outlets Noticieros Televisa and La Silla Rota, armed men who form part of Tepalcatepec's auto-defense group showed off some of the homemade bombs they have discovered.

Armed villagers talk fighting back Jalisco New Generation Cartel





Loaded: 0%
Progress: 0%
0:00
Previous
Play
Skip
LIVE
Mute

00:00
Current Time 0:00
/
Duration Time 1:26
Fullscreen
Need Text
Video Quality
576p
540p
360p
270p







Foreground
BackgroundWindow
Font Size
Text Edge StyleFont Family

+6

The Jalisco New Generation Cartel has turned to the use of drones packed with explosive to carry out attacks across Mexico in recent months. Armed villagers in Tepalcatepec, a city in the state of Michoacán found two drones that were packed with C4 explosive and pellets that failed to do any damage during a battle in July

+6

The homemade bombs contained pellets and C4 explosives, which are used by terrorist groups and the military

+6

The explosives each featured a taped wire connected to a detonator attached to the drones
RELATED ARTICLES

• Previous
• 1
• Next

• Paramilitary warlord asks US court to deport him his... Dominican Republic man, 40, 'raped nine-year-old girl who...

'This is the C4 bomb detonator that were on the drones that the Jalisco New Generation Cartel sent to attack our town,' one of the armed men said.
The explosives were were attached to two drones that the men say were recovered following a confrontation with the cartel in July.

The cartel allegedly used C4 explosives, commonly used by the military and terrorist organizations, that was stuffed inside small plastic containers, along with pellets and shrapnel to maximize damage.

+6

A resident from Tepalcatepec, Michoacán, says he has taken up arms to defend his town from continuous attacks launched by the Jalisco New Generation Cartel

+6

Villagers who have united to protect the western Mexico city of Tepalcatepec recently found two drones that had explosives attached to them which failed to go off
A wire dangled out of each taped plastic bowl and was connected to a detonator attached under the drones.

In an interview with La Silla Rota, one of the villagers recalled how in the last war-like battle, the cartel also employed .50 caliber sniper rifles and grenades to attack Tepalcatepec.

The city has a population of some 35,000 people that borders the state of Jalisco, the cartel's home base.

The cartel is led by Nemesio 'El Mencho' Oseguera. The United States has offered a $10 million reward for information leading to his arrest.

'In that moment I started saying my prayer and I said it is the opportunity to show that we are taking care of our town, that they are not going to harm any families,' the man said. 'We experience terrorist moments and bullets come from everywhere.'

It is not the first time the cartel has been accused of using explosives packed into drones.
According to the Mexico Attorney General's Office, the Jalisco New Generation Cartel set off explosions using drones during series of attacks that were carried out earlier this year in the states of Puebla and Guanajuato.

+6

An armed resident from Tepalcatepec, a city of about 35,000 people in the western state of Michoacán, shows off a bomb that was attached to a drone

 

[Zagdid]

U.S.-led troops withdraw from Iraq's Taji base

U.S.-led troops withdraw from Iraq's Taji base
By Maher Nazeh and Thaier Al-Sudani 3 hrs ago

CAMP TAJI, Iraq (Reuters) - United States-led international coalition troops withdrew from Iraq's Taji military base on Sunday and handed it over to Iraqi security forces, Reuters witnesses and the coalition said.

The base, 20 km (12 miles) north of Baghdad, had been the site of frequent rocket attacks by Iran-backed militias targeting U.S.-led troops in recent months.

"The movement of coalition military personnel is part of a long-range plan coordinated with the government of Iraq," the coalition said in a statement, adding that Camp Taji has historically held up to 2,000 coalition members, most of whom have departed this summer.

Remaining coalition troops will depart in the coming days after finalising the handing over of equipment to Iraqi security forces, it added.

This was the eighth transfer of a coalition portion of an Iraqi base back to Iraqi forces, it said.

The withdrawal came days after U.S. President Donald Trump redoubled his promise to withdraw the few U.S. troops still in the country. The United States has had about 5,000 troops stationed in the country and coalition allies a further 2,500.

Iraq's parliament had voted this year for the departure of foreign troops from Iraq and U.S. and other coalition troops have been leaving as part of a drawdown.

The vote came after a U.S. air strike on Baghdad airport killed Iranian general Qassem Soleimani and Iraqi militia leader Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis.

 

[Zagdid]

China Launches Advanced Warship for Pakistan Navy

Development comes as both countries are locked in border tensions with their mutual neighbor India

www.voanews.com

China Launches Advanced Warship for Pakistan Navy
By Ayaz Gul August 23, 2020 01:48 PM

ISLAMABAD - China has launched the first of four “most advanced” warships it is building for Pakistan amid deepening defense and economic ties between the two allied nations.

The development comes as both the countries are locked in border tensions with their mutual neighbor India.
The Pakistan Navy said Sunday that Chinese state-owned Hudong Zhonghua Shipyard in Shanghai held the launching ceremony for the Type-054A/P frigate, with top officials from the service in attendance.

The Navy said in a statement the vessels are state of the art frigates equipped with modern surface, subsurface and anti-air weapons and sensors. “These ships will significantly contribute in maintaining peace and security in our area of responsibility,” it added.

The statement did not mention the cost of military vessels, but reported estimates are more than $350 million each.
Once constructed, the ships will be one of the largest and technologically advanced surface platforms of the Pakistan Navy fleet, boosting its capability to respond to future challenges, the service said.

The Chinese builder is expected to deliver all four units to Pakistan by 2021, which Chinese media said could “double the combat power” of the Pakistan Navy fleet.

Pakistani officials said the Type-054A/P frigate is in service with China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and recognized as its backbone.

China and Pakistan are jointly producing various military-related hardware, including the JF-17 multirole combat aircraft, demonstrating the strong mutual defense ties.

Economic ties
The two allies in recent years have also cemented economic cooperation under Beijing’s global infrastructure Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

The BRI-related China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has brought nearly $30 billion in Chinese investment over the past six years, building Pakistani roads, ports and power plants.

Critics, however, see the investments as a burden on heavily indebted Pakistan.

U.S. officials have termed CPEC loans as a “debt trap” for Islamabad, though Pakistan and China dismiss the criticism, saying it has stemmed from “a lack of information and misunderstandings” about the collaboration.

Chinese President Xi Jinping is due to visit Islamabad later this year that Pakistani officials say will boost the BRI-linked economic cooperation. Xi was expected to visit Pakistan in May but the trip was canceled because of the coronavirus pandemic.

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi last week hosted his Pakistani counterpart, Shah Mehmood Qureshi, for a bilateral “strategic dialogue,” where the two sides agreed to push ahead with new mega projects under CPEC. They include a $6.8 billion railway program to improve Pakistan’s main railway line, known as Main Line 1 (ML1), which runs for nearly 1,900 kilometers.

“Both China and Pakistan reaffirmed the vitality of the time-tested and all-weather strategic cooperative partnership between the two countries,” a post-meeting joint statement said.

 

[Housecarl]

Hummm.....

Posted for fair use.....

Can the INF treaty survive after U.S. withdrawal?

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force treaty (INF) treaty was signed between the United States and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1987. Ronald Reagan and Michael Gaurbachev signed this treaty. Under this treaty, both states were bound to destroy their ballistic and cruise missiles with a...

moderndiplomacy.eu

Defense
Can the INF treaty survive after U.S. withdrawal?

Published
3 hours ago
on
August 23, 2020


By
Abdul Haseeb

• 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  0 Comments

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force treaty (INF) treaty was signed between the United States and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1987. Ronald Reagan and Michael Gaurbachev signed this treaty. Under this treaty, both states were bound to destroy their ballistic and cruise missiles with a range between 500 to 5500 KM. The United States initiated this treaty because, at that time, the Soviet Union had SS-20 missiles, and its waves were able to cover the whole of Europe, so the United States wanted to dismantle it. It was one of the most successful treaties of the Cold War era that has dismantled 2692 missiles of both states, i.e., the Soviet Union dismantled 1846 missiles, whereas America destroyed its 846 missiles. INF treaty started getting weakened by the time when the United States started alleging Russia for violating the obligations of the treaty that Russia has tested missiles had with a range above 500 Km. Nevertheless, Russia denied this allegation and passed the statement that 9M729 missile consists of 480 Km range and does not exceed the treaty limitation. Then, in 2016 Donald Trump became the president of the United States. The suspension of the INF treaty in February 2019 and provided six months to Russia to comply with this treaty. Nevertheless, the US used Russian violation as a pretext and officially declared its withdrawal in August 2019.

In addition to this, the primary reason behind the US withdrawing was to contain China because China was not a part of this treaty. In the contemporary world, China is becoming one of the significant threats for US hegemony. In order to analyze the historical time, the United States has always used its power against those states who have threatened its positions. China is emerging in Asia due to which US hegemony is being threatened and want to contain China by making INF treaty Asia-Pacific centric. The step taken by the US has undermined the mutual trust of the states as well as affected the security of Europe due to which the US is facing criticism from other countries that it has increased the risk of military conflict.

Realism is the most prominent theory of International Politics. This theory sees the world with a realistic and pragmatic perspective. It deals with the two major concepts of international relations: ‘Security’ and ‘Power.’ For every nation, “security” is the prime interest, and to fulfill this interest, power is the leading source. Power and security can be called as two sides of the same coin. Offensive realism deals with maximization of power rather than security and seeks towards hegemony rather than equality, whereas Defensive realism theorists believe that state must seek power enough for its security rather than accumulating excessive power. The United States is focusing on offensive realism because the hegemon state will use all its power to prevent the rise of competitors in order to stay dominant. Now the US did not bother about the security of European states and withdrew from the INF treaty that has arisen the factor of the arms race in the world. So, there is no central authority that can make concrete decisions due to which states create their self-help system to ensure their survival.

China is emerging and creating a military threat to the United States. So, the United States pulled out of the INF treaty so that it could make itself free from the limitations and make a missile of those ranges that are banned under this treaty only to contain China. Three perspectives could be made on US withdrawal: First, intermediate missiles are inexpensive for the US than air and naval assets, it will be useful to deter China and more survivable than air and sea-based missiles. However, the US did not consult with its Asian allies before withdrawing the treaty, whether they will allow the US to deploy its missiles on their territory. For the US, it would be one difficult task to attain because it is digging itself into one of the most complicated processes, i.e.,a long process of negotiation will take place between the US and its Asian allies.

Japan and South Korea are the two allies of the US in Asia. In order to analyze the situation, it is necessary to understand that both states want good relations with China. The Government of Japan opposed the US decision regarding a withdrawal from the INF treaty, and it is likely that Japan will not allow the US to deploy its missile on its territory. So, public opinion is also playing a role in Japan’s decision making who does not want deployment of missiles in their territory. South Korea and the United States’ relations are becoming weaker after 2016. In 2016 the US deployed Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) in South Korea to counter North Korea missiles. As a result, China retaliated and made sanctions on economic and diplomatic efforts that cost South Korea approximately seven billion dollars.

The US always looks towards its interest if it is fulfilling, then it will follow it otherwise negate it. Offensive realism theory explains that the international system is anarchic not in means of chaos, but lack of central political authority is there that leads states towards self-help system to ensure its survival. Moreover, this is the perspective that the US is continuously using offensive behavior and tried it best to use all its power to prevent the rise of competitors, and thus it withdraws from INF only to increase its power so that it would be able to contain China. The United States has undermined the trust of states. Before taking this step, the US must know that many states have missiles technology. There is no monopoly over it. Now every state will make more missiles to ensure its survival and thus give emergence to a new arms race in the world.

United States decided on withdrawal from the INF treaty very quickly due to a lack of proper planning or policies regarding containing China. First, no strategic planning was done with Asian allies, especially Japan and South Korea. Both states are bound to their administrations for deploying intermediate missiles in their territory. Public perceptions and opinions are also influencing their government policies. The research found that the leadership of Asian states wants good relations with China instead of the United States. Lack of clear strategy regarding containing China will give no success in future as US secretary of states has mentioned that it will deploy its missiles sooner in Asia, but it is time taking process and will take years to implement secondly if Russia was violating the treaty then why shreds of evidence were not disclosed by US government.

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use.....

Outlook India Magazine Online- Read News India, Latest News Analysis, World, Sports, Entertainment | Best Online Magazine India

Outlook covers the latest India news, analysis, business news and long-form stories on culture, money market and personal finance. Read India's best online magazine.

www.outlookindia.com

24 August 2020 Last Updated at 12:25 am | Source: PTI
Iran: UN nuclear chief''s visit to Tehran no link to US push

By Nasser Karimi

Tehran, Aug 23 (AP) Iran said on Sunday that an upcoming visit this week by the head of the UN''s atomic watchdog agency to Tehran has nothing to do with a US push to impose so-called “snapback” sanctions on Iran — even as Tehran acknowledged a recent explosion at a major uranium enrichment site was “sabotage".

The Trump administration last week dismissed near-universal opposition to its demand to restore all UN sanctions on Iran, declaring that a 30-day countdown for the “snapback” of penalties eased under the 2015 nuclear deal between Tehran and world powers had begun.

Both US allies and foes have joined forces to declare the action illegal and doomed to failure.

The US argues that Iran has violated the restrictions imposed on its nuclear program under the 2015 deal, a charge Tehran has dismissed.

Iran''s official IRNA news agency quoted on Sunday Iran''s envoy to the International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA, Kazem Gharibadadi, as saying that the visit this week is “neither related to the snapback mechanism nor the US demand”.

Gharibabadi said the visit by the IAEA chief Rafael Grossi comes within “the framework of Iran''s invitation.” “We do not allow others to manage Iran,” he said, adding that Iran''s trust in the IAEA has been “damaged in recent months”.

He expressed hope Grossi''s visit will lead to building trust. “It is important to assure Tehran that the agency will move based on impartiality, independence and professionalism,” said Gharibabadi.

The IAEA said on Saturday that Grossi will head to Tehran to press Iranian authorities for access to sites where the country is thought to have stored or used undeclared nuclear material. Gharibabadi said Grossi was due to meet with Iranian officials on both Tuesday and Wednesday.

Later Sunday, Iran''s semiofficial Fars news agency quoted the spokesman of the country''s atomic agency, Behrouz Kamalvandi, as saying that "security investigations confirm sabotage” in the July 2 blast at the Natanz nuclear facility. He said details would be released later at the proper time.

Iranian officials had initially downplayed the fire, first raising the possibility of sabotage days later, but have been careful not to directly blame the US or Israel, whose officials heavily hinted they had a hand in the fire.

Kamalvandi also said the IAEA was seeking access and inspection at two “places” near the capital Tehran and central Iranian city of Isfahan.

The landmark 2015 nuclear deal was endorsed by a UN Security Council resolution and includes the snapback provision. President Donald Trump pulled America out of the accord in 2018 and imposed severe US sanctions on Iran.

Last week, Iran''s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif in a letter to the UN Security Council said the US has no right to demand the restoration of UN sanctions, arguing that the US lost the right to make demands when it withdrew from the accord.

The five countries now in dispute with the US administration — Russia, China, Britain, France and Germany — remain supporters of the nuclear deal to rein in Iran''s nuclear program and prevent its development of nuclear weapons. The five nations and Iran will meet in Vienna on September 1. (AP) SCY SCY
Disclaimer :- This story has not been edited by Outlook staff and is auto-generated from news agency feeds. Source: PTI

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use.....

Whispers of 076, China’s Drone Carrying Assault Carrier

What do we know so far about China’s next amphibious assault ship?

thediplomat.com

Whispers of 076, China’s Drone Carrying Assault Carrier
What do we know so far about China’s next amphibious assault ship?
By Rick Joe
August 21, 2020

A Type 075 LHD at sea trials in 2020.

Credit: Sina WeiboADVERTISEMENT

One of the most recent and fast-moving credible rumors to come from the online communities watching the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is a new landing helicopter dock (LHD) type vessel dubbed the 076. This 076 class LHD was first brought to the attention of the community in mid-2020, and in a rather unprecedented fashion a number of official request for proposal documents were found, and some credible insiders with established track records began to speak about the details of 076. It then reached a number of overseas and English language news outlets.

The 076 is described as an LHD – following on from, or perhaps complementing, the 075 class LHD – however, it is believed to be capable of conducting fixed wing flight operations via electromagnetic catapult (EMCAT) and arresting gear. Indeed, the greatest difference between the 076 compared to the 075 LHD, or other LHDs such as the U.S. Navy’s Wasp or America classes, is that the 076 is described as providing a similar capability as the F-35B gave to U.S. Navy LHDs, but without using a vertical short take off and landing (VSTOL) aircraft.

As if it was not already rather jarring to consider an LHD equipped with catapults and arresting gear – essentially making such a ship technically a “CATOBAR” carrier (Catapult Assisted Take Off But Arrested Recovery) – those same insiders then revealed the primary fixed wing complement of 076 would consist of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs, or UCAVs for combat). Specific types of UAVs and UCAVs included a flying wing UCAV (possibly a navalized derivative of the GJ-11, a mockup of which was shown at the 70th anniversary National Day parade in 2019), as well as a conventional high altitude long endurance UAV known as “Wind Shadow,” which has previously been observed at the catapult testing facility at the Chinese Navy’s (PLAN’s) Huangdicun naval air station.

Design and Configuration

Before examining the plausibility, logic, and role of the 076 and its airwing, it is first instructive to review the current body of understanding for the 076’s general characteristics. Many of these are taken from the rare 076 class request for proposal documents found by online sleuths.

Enjoying this article? Click here to subscribe for full access. Just $5 a month.

The propulsion of the 076 will include 21 megawatt gas turbines and diesel engines, as well as a medium voltage direct current integrated power system. It is unclear if the overall ship will feature an integrated propulsion system or a hybrid diesel-electric or gas-electric system. Either way, this system is considered to be somewhat mature and is expected aboard the 054B frigate as well as the eventual 055A class succeeding the 055 destroyer.

A floodable well deck is also explicitly described, enabling the deployment of vehicles and amphibious craft from ship to land. A well deck is one of the cardinal features expected for a ship with an amphibious assault mission, and its inclusion aboard the 076 points to it still deserving the classic “LHD” designation. Furthermore, credible insiders have spoken of the 076 still as an “amphibious assault ship” like 075.

The aforementioned EMCAT and the arresting gear are the most noteworthy subsystems relevant to flight operations. However, other subsystems documented include a munitions elevator and a flight deck elevator capable of supporting a weight of 30 tons. Also mentioned is a “UAV deck.”

ADVERTISEMENT

LHD First or Carrier First?

The immediate area of contention for the 076 LHD is whether its fixed wing capability should be secondary to its function as an amphibious assault ship or if it should be primarily be considered a medium aircraft carrier. Similar debates exist for other navies as well, such as the USN, whose LHDs can function as medium aircraft carriers when operating large complements of VSTOL jets like F-35Bs or Harriers.

However, there are also key differences between an LHD and a proper carrier. The flight deck geometry and area of an aircraft carrier are typically far greater than those of an equivalently sized LHD, and feature greater reinforcement and arrested recovery gear as well. Most international LHD designs in the world conversely do not have their flight decks extend significantly beyond the hull width, whereas a carrier’s flight deck does. Larger flight deck area and “carrier” flight deck geometry enables more efficient and higher tempo fixed wing flight operations. The presence of an angled flight deck aboard aircraft carriers is one of the more obvious examples of this.

Aircraft carriers typically require greater top speeds than LHDs, in turn requiring more powerful prime movers. Finally, an LHD is designed with capacity to carry vehicles and accommodating a floodable well deck for the mission of amphibious assault – roles that carriers do not fulfill. At this stage, it is not known whether the 076 will have an angled flight deck; however the emphasis on its primary LHD role suggests the flight deck will also have more similarities with an LHD than a true aircraft carrier.

DIPLOMAT BRIEF
WEEKLY NEWSLETTER
N
Get first-read access to major articles yet to be released, as well as links to thought-provoking commentaries and in-depth articles from our Asia-Pacific correspondents.
SUBSCRIBE NEWSLETTER
Therefore, the current body of evidence suggests the 076 will be an LHD first, and a CATOBAR carrier second, with its CATOBAR provisions seeking to provide fixed wing aerial capabilities to enable the 076 to carry out its amphibious assault role. The 076 might still be capable of fielding an airwing made up of a large fixed wing aerial complement, but may lack the flight deck area to operate as efficiently as a true medium aircraft carrier.

Why Not VSTOL?

The 076 at present is best thought of as an LHD with catapults and arresting gear to enable CATOBAR fixed wing flight operations. One might then ask why the PLAN would seek to integrate these subsystems onto an LHD to operate fixed wing flight aircraft, rather than going the route of the USN and developing a VSTOL fighter such as the F-35B.

Enjoying this article? Click here to subscribe for full access. Just $5 a month.

Indeed, one might be forgiven for thinking that developing a VSTOL fighter is the most sensible and easiest route to provide LHD sized ships with a fixed wing capability. However, the development of a new VSTOL combat aircraft is far from fast or inexpensive, and given the Chinese aerospace industry has never developed a VSTOL combat aircraft in the past, this would represent a significant undertaking. Indeed, while the Chinese aerospace industry has conducted pre-research into VSTOL, the path to develop a viable VSTOL combat aircraft would be long and costly and fraught with risk and delay.

Furthermore, any VSTOL capable “combat aircraft” must also be sufficiently capable and survivable in the relevant threat environment. For the modern threat environment into the 2020s and decades beyond, such an aircraft would inevitably require a high level of stealth and capable sensors and weapons. Developing a fifth generation strike fighter is within the Chinese aerospace industry’s capability; developing such an aircraft that is also VSTOL capable is something else entirely. Not to mention, such an aircraft would require a sufficiently high performance turbofan to enable VSTOL operations for a large strike fighter with relevant payload, range, and stealth in the first place.

The procurement potential for a dedicated VSTOL fighter is also somewhat limited. Even generously assuming the PLAN eventually pursues a fleet of 10 LHD ships similar to the Wasp or America class capable of operating a hypothetical VSTOL fighter, the total number of VSTOL fighters needed to outfit 10 such ships would number less than 200. Devoting time, expertise, funds and industry to the development of such a unique aircraft with such a relatively limited production run would not make sense, unless other branches in the PLA also procured this aircraft or if China designed this aircraft with export in mind.

ADVERTISEMENT

A Drone First Airwing

The consensus surrounding the 076’s fixed wing complement settled fairly quickly onto UCAVs and UAVs, and a number of pieces subsequently written by Chinese language insiders with established track records further reinforced this idea.

A navalized, stealthy, flying wing UCAV is expected to provide the 076 with its primary fixed wing strike and high intensity surveillance capability, far beyond what could be provided with helicopters. The exact capability of this UCAV will depend on its size; however, any aircraft between the size of a navalized GJ-11 or something larger like the U.S. Navy’s X-47B demonstrator would provide a very credible stealthy strike capability relevant for high intensity conflict scenarios.

Such an aircraft will certainly be inferior to F-35Bs in the air-to-air role, barring some significant advancement in UAV autonomy. However, flying wing UCAVs by virtue of their planform and configuration may have the potential to offer better radar signature reduction compared to contemporary fifth generation fighter planforms. Flying wing UCAVs could also offer competitive or superior range for strike missions, as well as superior time on station and endurance, compared to a medium weight fifth generation manned fighter such as F-35B.

The other type of UAV that the 076 is likely to field would be a more conventional long endurance UAV, such as a variation of the jet powered Wind/Cloud Shadow drone, which adopts a proven platform similar to that of aircraft like Global Hawk, and is thought to have a carrier compatible variant in advanced development. A UAV such as this would likely fulfill a complementary, lower end, long endurance surveillance and datalinking role for the overall task force, and be expected to operate in more permissive environments than a flying wing UCAV.

The unmanned nature of UCAVs and UAVs may also mitigate certain disadvantages of operating fixed wing aircraft aboard an LHD sized ship with a suboptimal flight deck. For example, the longer endurance of unmanned aircraft may reduce the need for higher tempo flight operations and sortie rates that manned aircraft could demand, which an LHD would be incapable of executing in the first place. Furthermore, unmanned aircraft tend to be able to attain greater endurance and range than equivalent weight fifth generation manned fighters as a reflection of their different competing requirements; after all, a flying wing UCAV does not need to sustain a pilot, or be capable of sustaining high Gs, nor is it required to attain supersonic speeds.

In other words, a UCAV with competitive and relevant combat radii, endurance, and payload could enjoy a significantly lighter weight compared to a manned fifth generation fighter, reducing the rating (and thus potentially size and power consumption) of the 076’s EM catapult and arresting gear. For example, a full sized aircraft carrier may be required to launch fully loaded, 30-plus ton manned combat aircraft; however, the 076’s catapults may be less powerful and only capable of launching aircraft up to 20 tons because the ship’s UCAV and UAV airwing will not exceed that weight to begin with.

Finally, a fleet of carrier-borne UCAVs and UAVs would be capable of operating from both 076s as well as future catapult aircraft carriers (003 and onwards). This opens up the potential for a larger production run and cross deck operations and flexibility as well.

A Waiting Game

With the current base of understanding, the 076 is best seen as an LHD capable of fielding a fixed wing high end strike and ISR capability enabled by an unmanned airwing, catapults, and arresting gear. It is not known how many catapults 076 will field, or what its flight deck will look like (such as whether it will include an angled flight deck), nor is it known exactly when construction of the first 076 can be expected or how many 076s will be procured. These are important characteristics that will only be established over time.

One of the most controversial questions surrounding the 076 is whether it will be capable of operating the manned aircraft that the PLAN’s future large deck CATOBAR carriers will field, such as the future FC-31 derived carrier-borne fighter. The expected relatively small size and limited geometry of the 076’s flight deck makes it unlikely the ship will routinely operate manned fixed wing aircraft, and the likely downrated catapults and arresting gear means it will be unable to launch and recover manned aircraft at their maximum loads. However, in theory, the 076 could still launch and recover manned aircraft with reduced loads, and offer the option to operate a limited number of manned aircraft in an ad hoc capacity if a specific mission requires it.

Therefore, the current vision of the 076 represents a markedly different way of providing an LHD with fixed wing aviation capability compared to the U.S. Navy and other Western navies that operate F-35B or Harrier jump jets. Comparisons between the 076 and its Western contemporaries will likely be made in the future, as the 076 emerges as a more visible and concrete project; however, it is valuable early on to recognize that the 076’s airwing will not be designed to fulfill the same variety of air-to-air, strike, and ISR missions in the same supersonic capable package that F-35B is. Instead, the 076’s UCAV and UAV aircraft will likely emphasize longer endurance and longer range strike and ISR missions instead. The value of the two approaches can only be assessed in context of each navy’s own respective naval aviation and amphibious assault strategy.

RELATED
R
JULY 17, 2019
The Future of China's Amphibious Assault Fleet
By RICK JOE
What we know about the 075 Landing Helicopter Dock and other expected additions to the PLAN amphibious assault fleet.
AUGUST 11, 2020
China’s First Type 075 Amphibious Assault Ship Begins Sea Trials
By ROBERT FARLEY
Before long, the PLAN could have the dominant amphibious capability in the Western Pacific.
JULY 12, 2020
The Chinese Navy’s Destroyer Fleet Will Double by 2025. Then What?
By RICK JOE
China is about to finish the current phase of destroyer construction. What comes next?
MAY 19, 2020
The Invisible Threat to China’s Navy: Corruption
By ZI YANG
The arrest of CSIC’s chairman speaks to endemic corruption among China’s military shipbuilders. That spells trouble for the PLAN.

 

[Housecarl]

Hummm......

Posted for fair use.....

Norm Building, National Sovereignty and Arms Control

www.armscontrolwonk.com

NORM BUILDING, NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND ARMS CONTROL
by Michael Krepon | August 24, 2020 | No Comments

Quote of the week:
“How can we account for our present situation unless we believe that men high in this government are concerting to deliver us to disaster? This must be the product of a great conspiracy, a conspiracy on a scale so immense as to dwarf any previous such venture in the history of man. A conspiracy of infamy so black that, when it is finally exposed, its principals shall be forever deserving of the maledictions of all honest men.” — Senator Joseph McCarthy’s attack on former Secretary of State George Marshall, 1951

If the norms of responsible rhetoric are trashed, they can be rehabilitated at the ballot box. If the norms of responsible behavior among states possessing nuclear weapons are weak, remedies are much harder.

A crucial international norm is respect for the territorial integrity and national sovereignty of states. When this norm is broken — especially when it is broken by a state possessing nuclear weapons — several remedies are called for. One is economic punishment for the norm breaker. Another is nonrecognition of territorial gains by military means. Defense ties with friends and allies need to be strengthened. Another is the resumption of proper channels of communication and negotiations to reduce nuclear danger.

Arm control takes a hit when the territorial integrity and national sovereignty of a state are trampled. Arms control is revived because competition between states possessing nuclear weapons in endemic in crisis-prone regions. These crises are inherently dangerous. Competing states that possess nuclear weapons need guardrails for their competition.

Arms control provides the guardrails. It’s possible to walk and chew gum at the same time. We can punish a state that disrespects the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of another while strengthening ties with friends and neighbors. We can strengthen deterrence, but deterrence without reassurance is dangerous. We therefore negotiate with the norm breaker to seek common ground reducing nuclear danger.

Strategic arms control has been tacitly and explicitly linked to the principles of respecting the territorial integrity and national sovereignty of states, as well as on the peaceful settlement of disputes, especially where territorial boundaries are contested.

The first effort to establish these “agreed principles” was explicitly designed to facilitate disarmament measures. This initiative came at the same time as the creation of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency — a linkage that was not accidental. The Kennedy administration official responsible for both was John J. McCloy. McCloy worked with Arthur Dean, another veteran Cold War negotiator, to hammer out this language with Valerian Zorin, a high-ranking Soviet Foreign Ministry official. The McCloy-Zorin “Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations,” was released in September 1961.

Thirteen months after the McCloy-Zorin agreement was announced, Zorin found himself in the awkward position of defending the placement of Soviet missiles in Cuba as the Soviet Union’s Ambassador to the United Nations. Still, Kennedy persisted with negotiations after the crisis was over. The result was a treaty banning nuclear tests everywhere but underground.

These principles were essentially repeated in a statement signed by Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev at the Moscow summit in May 1972 that produced the SALT I Interim Agreement and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Raymond Garthoff called these principles “a charter for détente.”

The 1972 Nixon-Brezhnev Basic Principles Agreement also foundered quickly. During the 1973 Middle East War, Moscow signaled support for friendly Arab states by its naval presence in the eastern Mediterranean, and Washington signaled its support for Israel by raising the alert rate of its strategic forces. Still, Nixon persisted. He sought to cap deployed forces at Vladivostok and signed the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.

The next major milestone for reasserting these principles was the Helsinki Final Act in 1975 that seemingly codified the East-West divide in Europe. President Gerald Ford was flayed for signing it and for selling out the captive nations of Eastern Europe by critics of détente, led by Senator Henry Jackson and Ford’s Republican primary opponent, Ronald Reagan.

As it happened, one of the supporters of the Helsinki Final Act was Mikhail Gorbachev, and in a thoroughly unexpected way, the Helsinki Final Act contributed to the independence of captive nations and peoples.

These principles applied not just to Europe; they were universal in character. The Soviet Union thoroughly trashed the Helsinki Accord’s principles when the Kremlin’s old guard decided to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan to save a friendly but deteriorating regime.

Prospects for the Senate’s consent to ratify SALT II were troubled before the invasion of Afghanistan and were nullified after it. Similarly, prospects for new arms control and reduction accords ground to a halt in 2014 when Vladimir Putin annexed Crimea and conducted hybrid warfare in eastern Ukraine.

Putin’s actions were in direct contravention of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, signed by Presidents Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin, as well as British Prime Minister John Major. The Budapest Memorandum committed Russia to “respect the independence and sovereignty and existing borders of Ukraine” and to “refrain from the threat or use of force” against Ukraine. In response to NATO expansion and another popular revolution threatening to remove Ukraine from Russia’s sphere of influence, Putin disregarded Yeltsin’s pledge.

The United States and many others responded with sanctions. Constructive diplomacy took a short hiatus, just as was the case after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Guiding principles can withstand jockeying for advantage, but not Moscow’s military campaigns across borders.

Competition to seek advantage and to avoid disadvantage is endemic to international relations. This competition makes arms control more, not less, useful. National leaders pursue arms control because a strategic competition without guardrails is too dangerous.

Ronald Reagan resumed arms control talks with Moscow within two years after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Likewise, the Trump administration resumed talks with Moscow after Moscow trashed Ukrainian sovereignty.

Reagan proved that it was possible to negotiate with and penalize Moscow at one and the same time. Trump’s relationship with Moscow has been deeply disturbing and entirely different from any of his predecessors. His successor will revert to past practice, negotiating to reduce nuclear danger while increasing the costs to Moscow for disregarding the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of its neighbor.

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use.....

North Korea’s nuclear weapons pose a greater threat than meets the eye - Washington Examiner

Seventy-five years ago, the United States discovered the atomic bomb, fundamentally changing the strategic calculus of war. By espionage, the Soviet Union quickly developed its own nuclear weapons, leading to the world’s first nuclear stalemate. War planners soon realized that nuclear stalemates...

www.washingtonexaminer.com

OPINION

North Korea's nuclear weapons pose a greater threat than meets the eye

by Cory Evans | August 23, 2020 04:18 AM

Seventy-five years ago, the United States discovered the atomic bomb, fundamentally changing the strategic calculus of war. By espionage, the Soviet Union quickly developed its own nuclear weapons, leading to the world’s first nuclear stalemate. War planners soon realized that nuclear stalemates were unexpectedly stable, a development that later became known by the rather terrifying name of “mutually assured destruction.”

Ever since the discovery that mutually assured destruction produces a stable equilibrium, some strategists have questioned the importance of nuclear nonproliferation. These strategists argue that nuclear weapons are, in practice, unusable, so there is little point in expending military and diplomatic resources to check their spread.

Recently, a few foreign policy experts, such as the Atlantic columnist Peter Beinart, have adopted this approach to North Korea, arguing that the next American administration should ease economic and diplomatic sanctions.

These experts correctly realize that North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un has no intention of ever scrapping his nuclear weapons program. Therefore, by focusing on other issues, they argue that the U.S. might be able to make progress with China and with our ally South Korea, as South Korean President Moon Jae-in has adopted a much more conciliatory approach to the North. South Korea has even recently prosecuted North Korean defectors for acting out against the Kim regime.

This argument is intuitively appealing. But it is wrong — and dangerous.

It remains a vital national security interest of the U.S. to limit, to whatever extent we can, North Korea’s nuclear enrichment program.

There are (broadly) three steps involved in creating nuclear weapons. First, a regime must acquire fissile material, invariably (for the first weapons) Uranium-235, a specific isotope of the metal uranium. Uranium is abundant in nature and produced as a byproduct of civilian mining.

Next, a regime must enrich the uranium, and 99.27% of uranium found in nature is Uranium-238, which cannot sustain a nuclear chain reaction. Only 0.73% or so is in the rarer isotope form of Uranium-235, which can. Engineers must, therefore, separate and purify the U-235.

Enrichment is a difficult and time-consuming process because the two isotopes are so similar. The only practical method for large-scale enrichment so far developed is centrifuge-based. In centrifuge-based enrichment, uranium yellowcake is fitted into canisters. A machine, called a centrifuge, spins the canisters around at very high speeds.

U-238 is very slightly heavier than U-235 (it has three more neutrons). Therefore, at very high speeds, the U-235 is pushed very slightly to the outside of the canister. A machine then separates the outside of the canister from the inside. An engineer is left with an outside portion that has a slightly higher percentage of U-235 than the initial batch.

Repeating this process over and over, on hundreds of centrifuges, eventually enriches uranium to weapons-grade thresholds in excess of 60%.

Finally, once a regime has acquired highly enriched uranium, it must fashion that uranium into a nuclear bomb. Although this sounds complicated, the engineering is now very well understood and (relatively) easy to complete.

It is challenging to interrupt a country at the uranium mining stage, because there are many perfectly legitimate reasons to operate a commercial mine that happens to produce uranium as a byproduct. It is challenging to interrupt a country at the weapons engineering stage, because this process generally takes place secretly in a very small weapons facility that is easily hidden.

In practice, therefore, the international community largely interrupts regimes at the enrichment stage. Enrichment requires enormous blocks of massive centrifuges — instruments with no practical purpose other than uranium enrichment. When intelligence reveals vast new buildings using a lot of electricity, the International Atomic Energy Agency can send snap inspectors pursuant to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. If inspectors find gas-powered centrifuges set to the relevant settings, then the regime has been caught red-handed.

In addition, because centrifuge enrichment requires advanced industrial capacity, terrorist groups have so far been unable to enrich uranium — one of many reasons why terrorist groups have not yet been able to acquire nuclear weapons.

This entire enforcement system relies on the scarcity of highly enriched uranium. A single source of unmonitored, highly-enriched uranium would, therefore, be extraordinarily dangerous. With highly-enriched uranium, a terrorist group could manufacture a nuclear device far more easily, and rogue regimes could more quickly acquire nuclear capacity.

The Soviet Union was profoundly evil. Yet it played by the rules when it came to nuclear materiel. Even during the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Soviet Union permitted only Soviet personnel to handle highly enriched uranium.

North Korea has shown no such reluctance. Already the Kim regime has been caught trying to sell nuclear material to Syria.

Some may hope that Kim’s government, so desperate for cash that it uses its diplomatic missions for narcotics smuggling, will follow international norms nuclear nonproliferation. I am not holding my breath.

Since North Korea seems willing to smuggle and sell its highly-enriched uranium, the North Korean nuclear weapons program remains a grave threat to U.S. national security.

Every day, North Korea continues to enrich uranium. In so doing, North Korea knowingly undermines the entire global nonproliferation system.

For this reason, the continued operation of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program remains a critical security threat to everyone, everywhere. It is vital that the next administration take that threat seriously.

It is hard to know what exactly is the right next step in confronting North Korea. But it is easier to see what would be the wrong next step.

Given the critical security threat posed by its clandestine nuclear program, suspending sanctions against North Korea would be a grave strategic mistake. Let’s hope the next administration avoids it.

Cory Evans is an assistant professor at Baruch College. His research focuses on strategy in East Asia, with a particular focus on Japan’s strategic history.

 

[Housecarl]

Hummm.......

Posted for fair use.....

China and New Start: Reading the Strategic Situation

The expiration of the New START Treaty is looming. This arms treaty limits the United States and Russia to 1,550 nuclear warheads on deployed Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), Submarine Lau

www.realcleardefense.com

China and New Start: Reading the Strategic Situation


By Adam Cabot
August 26, 2020

https://assets.realclear.com/images/49/490009.jpg

AP Photo/Ng Han Guan

The expiration of the New START Treaty is looming. This arms treaty limits the United States and Russia to 1,550 nuclear warheads on deployed Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) and strategic bombers. It’s one of a long list of arms treaties designed to prevent an arms race and without renewal, it will expire in February 2021. The sticking point to renewal is that the Trump administration wants China to also be subject to the Treaty. China has so far refused to enter into these negotiations. To understand China's position, let’s examine what influences may impact their strategic nuclear considerations.

The most obvious point to address is the numerical disparity of China’s nuclear force structure compared to the U.S. and Russia. As argued by the highly respected nuclear strategist, Dr. Matthew Kroenig, with his 'Superiority-Brinkmanship Synthesis Theory,' nuclear superiority provides states with geopolitical advantages. Kroenig mounts a solid argument that a robust nuclear force increases a state’s resolve in high-stakes crises, providing it with coercive bargaining leverage and enhancing nuclear deterrence. China has an estimated 320 nuclear warheads, a fraction of the thousands in the U.S. and Russian inventory. In addition to this numerical discrepancy, it’s worth noting that many of the Chinese ballistic missiles are in the INF range, between 500 km to 5,500 km, and are unable to strike the Continental United States. This puts China at a significant disadvantage when up against the U.S. and Russia and may partly explain their reluctance to imposing limits on their force structure.

According to Dr. Vipin Narang, China's nuclear posture appears to have always been an assured retaliation posture. Narang mounts a solid argument and explanation for this with his 'Posture Optimisation Theory'. He argues that China’s relatively small nuclear force, geared towards counter-value targets (population centers) and soft counter-force targets (non-hardened warfighting capability) in addition to its declared 'no first use' policy add weight to China's nuclear forces being utilized solely for deterring a nuclear attack or deterring nuclear coercion through assured retaliation. The pre-requisites for an assured retaliation posture are a survivable second-strike capability and the ability to penetrate enemy defenses. Improved U.S. surveillance, modernization of nuclear structure, and enhanced cyber-capabilities coupled with advances in missile defenses may degrade China's ability to assure retaliation. China may be anxious that the U.S. could have or develop the capability to execute an effective first strike and intercept any remaining ICBMs that survived the strike, making its small nuclear force impotent. The requirement to ensure that its nuclear forces are still able to deal a blow to the enemy after suffering a nuclear strike, in the face of advances in technology, provides effective reasoning for why China may not be content with limitations.

Now we move to China’s present geopolitical situation. Through its aggressive and assertive actions, China has managed to surround itself with potential adversaries should a global conflict arise. If there was a global war, China might find itself fighting on many fronts with little to no allies.

In light of recent events, India is the first country that springs to mind. China and India have been embroiled in a border dispute in the Himalayas for decades. Recently this again turned deadly with troops facing off in the inhospitable conditions. India poses a tangible threat to China. It has the second largest population in the world, it’s the largest democracy and holds annual naval exercises with the US, India is a nuclear weapons power and has deployed the Agni-III Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) capable of striking Beijing. India has also recently received its first delivery of five Rafale nuclear-capable aircraft from France with a further 31 pending. While China’s military is larger than India’s, it must enter Xi Jingping’s calculus as a risk to his Western borders. India is also a valuable customer to Russia, deploying advanced Russian made fighter aircraft, tanks, air-defenses, warships and conventional submarines. This leads us to China’s northern border.

Russia has the largest nuclear arsenal in the world, which it is currently modernizing. Many of these are non-strategic nuclear weapons deliverable on a range of platforms with the capability of striking multiple Chinese targets. Contrary to popular belief, the Russian/Chinese relationship is not a solid and reliable alliance. This is a partnership at best, and I would not predict Russia to put itself in the firing line and risk devastation, economic and otherwise to support China's interests. China and the Soviet Union maintained a solid partnership in the early years of the Cold War, but this soured significantly after Khrushchev denounced Stalin in 1956. To illustrate my point regarding China's reluctance to enter New START negotiations, in 1969, China and the Soviet Union were engaged in a border conflict where the Soviet Union threatened the use of nuclear weapons against China. China had become a nuclear power five years earlier, but its force was far inferior to the Soviet Union’s to an even larger degree than it is today. China backed down in this conflict as it unwillingly agreed to talks with the Soviet Union. Regardless of current arrangements and the quasi-partnership that Putin and Xi are engaged in, Russia will continue to be viewed with suspicion of China's northern approaches.

To China’s East is the power of the United States and its allies, Japan and South Korea. Also to the East is Taiwan, which is not technically allied with the U.S. but is fortified with advanced U.S. military equipment including tanks, air-defenses, artillery, helicopters, warships, and fighter aircraft. China comprehends that any conflict involving these states to its East runs a high risk of U.S. military involvement. The U.S. extends its nuclear security umbrella to Japan and South Korea as well as maintaining a troop presence in these countries. This extended nuclear deterrence means that China risks a U.S. nuclear response in the event of a conflict with these states. North Korea further compounds these risks through its aggression towards South Korea. If a war broke out on the Korean peninsula, China would undoubtedly enter the war if there was a risk that North Korea was going to lose. China is fearful of the concept of a U.S. backed government on its doorstep, which is why it continues to support Kim Jong-un’s Stalinist state.

We now move to the South China Sea, where China has built and fortified islands and flouted international law. China has been increasingly combative in this region, which only acts to push states closer to the U.S. and likeminded countries as opposed to Chinese coercion and aggression. The South China Sea is a major global trade route, but it’s especially important for China, with the major ports of Hong Kong and Guangzhou requiring access to it. If China was denied access to the South China Sea, its economy would be impacted considerably. Conversely, if China controlled access to the South China Sea, it would negatively impact the global economy but provide China with unchecked exploitation of the natural resources within the area. While the artificial islands expand the reach of China’s bombers and missiles and enable the potential for a Chinese ballistic missile submarine bastion, the islands are effectively sitting ducks. Analysts such as Gregory Poling paint a picture that these fortified islands in the Spratlys and the Paracels would be prohibitively costly for the U.S. to neutralize in conflict, but he fails to take into account the non-strategic nuclear option. The low-yield SLBM on selected Ohio class ballistic missile submarines provides the U.S. with more than enough accurate firepower to strike these bases with little to no collateral damage. Yes, the conflict would take a nuclear turn, but if a war was already underway, the use of non-strategic nuclear weapons can’t be discounted.

It’s clear why China would be opposed to limiting its nuclear structure with New START conditions. Whether you're a proponent of 'Superiority-Brinkmanship Synthesis Theory,' ‘Posture Optimisation Theory’, or somewhere in the middle, China’s geopolitical situation and it’s very modest nuclear forces create a situation where it’s unlikely to enter negotiations or reach a consensus. This leaves us wondering what the U.S. should do about the looming New START expiry?

The Trump administration is right to make an attempt to bring China into an agreement. This is a strategically sound policy. The U.S. should not, however, back itself into a corner over this. If attempts are exhausted regarding China, the U.S. and Russia should extend the treaty as it promotes strategic nuclear stability and acts to prevent an arms race that neither country can afford, given the current global economic climate created by the COVID-19 pandemic. Nuclear modernization programs are a crucial but necessary means to ensure a reliable force structure. The U.S. and Russia can avoid adding to these costs with an arms race.

China is also modernizing its nuclear forces, and according to the U.S. Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), it’s likely to at least double its nuclear stockpile over the next decade. With China’s current stockpile at around 320 warheads, a New START extension of five years will not neutralize U.S. nuclear superiority. Let’s not forget that NATO allies, France and the U.K. also possess strategic nuclear forces capable of striking Russia and China should the U.S. be attacked. The hedge against China racing forward unexpectedly and attempting to obtain nuclear superiority over the U.S. is the lack of limitations regarding INF range nuclear forces. The end of the INF Treaty creates opportunities for the U.S. to deploy ground-based nuclear-capable missiles within range of China if it needs to, and these are not subject to New START conditions. Possible bases include Guam and states willing to house them on their territory. China’s aggression only acts to increase the number of states in Asia willing to accept an agreement of this nature.

There are strategic options available to the U.S. without losing another arms treaty. The termination of the INF treaty was Russia's fault and Russia's fault alone. For the U.S. to have maintained this treaty while Russia was violating it, would have been the height of weakness. New START, on the other hand, should be extended while parties are adhering to its conditions. The world is suffering enough with the pandemic, let’s not unnecessarily add a strategic arms race to its worries.

 

[vector7]

According to reporting from @woodruffbets and @laraseligman, 4 American servicemen were injured during an altercation with Russian forces in northeast Syria this week, presumably from the events in this video. https://politico.com/news/2020/08/2
RT 2min

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1298624477014765572

View: https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1298624477014765572

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1298714758548344833

View: https://twitter.com/PhoenixKomrad/status/1298714758548344833

 

[energy_wave]

Beijing 'fires aircraft carrier killer' missile into South China Sea in warning to US

China's military has reportedly fired two powerful missiles - including one known as the "aircraft carrier killer" – as tensions continue to rise in the South China Sea dispute.
Two missiles were fired into the strategically vital waters yesterday morning, the South China Morning Post reports.
The test firings came a day after Beijing said a US Air Force U-2 spy plane entered a no-fly zone without permission during a Chinese naval exercise off its north coast.

China fires 'aircraft carrier killer' missile

China's military has reportedly fired two powerful missiles - including one known as the 'aircraft carrier ...

www.9news.com.au

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use.....

South Korea: The Next Nuclear Weapons State?

Unsurprisingly, there is a renewed call among parts of South Korea’s security establishment to revisit the prospect of acquiring a nuclear deterrent.

nationalinterest.org

August 26, 2020 Topic: Security Region: Asia Blog Brand: Korea Watch Tags: MilitaryTechnologyWeaponsWarKoreaSouth KoreaNuclear Weapons
South Korea: The Next Nuclear Weapons State?

Unsurprisingly, there is a renewed call among parts of South Korea’s security establishment to revisit the prospect of acquiring a nuclear deterrent.

by Mark Episkopos

As the Republic of Korea (ROK) ramps up its ongoing efforts to deter a prospective North Korean strike, the spectre of a limited nuclear deterrent is slowly emerging from a fringe position to an increasingly prominent part of mainstream South Korean political discourse.

Seoul entered the U.S. nuclear umbrella in 1958 when Washington stationed over one hundred nuclear warheads in ROK on the heels of the Korean War and the proliferation of the U.S.-Soviet competition into East Asia. But the ROK never fully abandoned its nuclear ambitions even at the height of the Cold War, actively exploring the prospect of acquiring an independent nuclear deterrent in the early 1970s.

Washington vigorously discouraged South Korea’s nascent nuclear ambitions, conditioning further military aid on the complete cessation of nuclear weapons development. The Park Chung-hee administration caved to US pressure and formally renounced any future plans to acquire nuclear weapons with South Korea’s 1975 ratification of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), but private doubts persisted in Seoul; the Vietnam War, which formally ended that same year, was a particularly stark illustration of the limits of the American security guarantee.

On a wave of misplaced optimism following North Korea’s 1985 accession to the NPT, Washington agreed to withdraw all U.S. nuclear warheads from South Korea in 1991. This was shortly followed by the Joint Declaration of Denuclearization, envisioning a future of North-South reconciliation on a denuclearized Korean Peninsula.

South Korea’s abandonment of nuclear ambitions had been and continues to be, premised on two political tenets of faith: the continued viability of the U.S. security guarantee, and the hope that North Korea will work with ROK in good faith to achieve the full and permanent denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Both of these hopes have proven increasingly ephemeral in the present day. There is a growing consensus among experts, as well as the South Korean population, that North Korea will never willingly surrender its burgeoning nuclear arsenal. The future of the U.S. security guarantee is also murky—although the military alliance is highly unlikely to be abandoned outright, the Trump administration has recurrently indicated its possible intentions to reconsider the scale of U.S. security commitments in East Asia.

Unsurprisingly, there is a renewed call among parts of South Korea’s security establishment to revisit the prospect of acquiring a nuclear deterrent. Former South Korean foreign minister Song Min-soon posed the challenge directly in a 2019 editorial: “It’s necessary for South Korea to move on to a self-reliant alliance from a dependent alliance . . . a defensive nuclear capacity, with a missile range limited to the Korean Peninsula, is justified.” It is rather more surprising that a whopping 60 percent of South Koreans agree with Min-soon’s sentiment, voicing their support for an independent nuclear deterrent in a 2017 Gallup poll. Once a fringe position, nuclear armament has become an increasingly mainstream idea on the heels of several failed rounds of North-South negotiations and decades of North Korean military buildup.

To be sure, ROK’s subtly changing tone on nuclear weapons raises a cascade of difficult policy questions: if it comes to that, can Washington successfully squash South Korea’s nuclear ambitions as it did five decades ago? If the sentiment in favor of nuclearization is formally adopted by Seoul, how would Japan react to such a drastic attempted revision of East Asia’s security architecture?

This ongoing shift in South Korean popular and elite opinion on nuclearization comes at a time when ROK is not only seeking proactive military solutions to contain North Korea but to project power across the East Asia region in light of the increasingly assertive foreign policy stance being taken by Beijing.
Mark Episkopos is a frequent contributor to the National Interest and serves as a research assistant at the Center for the National Interest. Mark is also a Ph.D. student in History at American University.

 

[Housecarl]

Hummm.....

Posted for fair use.....

Strategic Depth: The potential causative factor of post-Taliban Afghan Armed Conflict

Afghanistan is one of the most unfortunate countries on earth that has witnessed decades of seemingly endless armed-conflict. While analyses of the post-Taliban Afghan armed-conflict has assumed it as because of the domestic power structure and in another assumption as US-led Global War on...

moderndiplomacy.eu

Strategic Depth: The potential causative factor of post-Taliban Afghan Armed Conflict


Published 18 hours ago
on August 26, 2020

By Hikmatullah

Afghanistan is one of the most unfortunate countries on earth that has witnessed decades of seemingly endless armed-conflict. While analyses of the post-Taliban Afghan armed-conflict has assumed it as because of the domestic power structure and in another assumption as US-led Global War on Terror (GWoT). However, the geo-strategically important Afghanistan that is known as crossroads of Asia and the heart of Asia has been at the core of the unregulated interest of Pakistani establishment since the earliest. Therefore, the major stakeholder in the post-Taliban Afghan story is Pakistan and the International Relations theory of Strategic Depth suits best to describe Pakistan’s broad objectives in Afghan story.

Strategic depth is a political-military concept. It has been referred to as the distances between the actual or potential front-lines of battle and key cities, population centers, logistic or industrial core areas, or military installations. The concept of strategic depth can be traced back to that of the 19th century when imperial Britain be afraid of an influencing Czarist Russia wanted to safeguard its empire through ensuring Russia would be deprived of a warm-water port and every opportunity to control Afghanistan. Similarly, Russian be afraid of British intentions hooked on Central Asia opposed the growing British commercial involvement in the region and thus Afghanistan becomes an ambition and buffer zone between the two powers.

Similar to Britain and Russia of the 19th century, Pakistan has strategic desires in Afghanistan. Pakistan has considered Afghanistan as a fundamental sphere for its security from a possible Indian incursion. Pakistan from its creation in 1947 is in a struggle with India. The tensions between these two countries have led to some brief wars that resulted in important victories for India, which ultimately led Pakistan to lose entire East Pakistan ‘Bangladesh’. With these strategic defeats, Pakistan followed the British approach and acquired ‘strategic depth’ in Afghanistan to keep trustworthy rear protection for Pakistan in case of future aggression with India, and strengthened the strategic depth as means in Afghanistan to block any pro-Indian regime in Kabul and ensure a pro-Pakistan regime in control of Kabul in order not to be encircled by enemies from two sides. Since then Pakistan is supporting various militant groups in Afghanistan to represent their interest. The rise of the Taliban and taking over almost the entire Afghanistan was in part of direct support from ISI of Pakistan. ISI’s interest with the Taliban was determined predominantly not out of a common Islamic ideology but slightly on ISI’s intentions that it needs to sustain influence in Afghanistan to develop strategic depth. The Taliban who ruled Afghanistan from 1996-2001 is still having strong ties with Pakistan. Pakistan recognized the Afghan Taliban as a valuable asset that could be co-opted and utilized to advance its long-term interest in the region. And still upholding the Taliban Quetta Shura ‘council’ which is blamed for leading all operations in Afghanistan. Thus, the post-Taliban armed-conflict in Afghanistan is due to Pakistan’s hazardous double game, on one hand supporting the US in its GWoT but on the other backing the Afghan Taliban movement to continue fight in Afghanistan. It has in the process destabilized Afghanistan beyond any easy recovery and created huge problems for itself as reflected in the worsening internal security of Pakistan, and burning more resources than possibly it should be. Pakistan all along meddled in Afghanistan and continues to do so to gain ‘Strategic Depth’ to secure their own backyard by keeping off anti-Pakistan forces out of Afghanistan. Pakistan, such deliberate plans to intervene in Afghan politics through supporting militant groupsand to reshape the political scene in Afghanistan have whipped up outrage among the Afghan public. Upholding such undiplomatic strategies, however, are a significant blunder for Pakistan diplomatic image in world politics.

Indeed, this is the reason that any peace initiatives undertaken by Pakistan or proposed by Pakistan is hard to trust and is not free without any mysterious objectives of the Pakistani establishment. While this argument to a great extent is true, that Pakistan used Afghanistan as its strategic depth to block any pro-Indian regime in Kabul. Nonetheless, India continues to have a significant influence in Afghanistan. India’s role in Afghanistan can be categorized with the Constructivism theory of international relations. It has tried to build institutions in Afghanistan and despite facing severe opposition, it has contributed greatly to Afghan reconstruction. India’s effort still had a limited but very important impact on Afghanistan.

Related
The Day Afghanistan Changed Forever
December 18, 2018In "South Asia"
Afghan Peace Process and Indian Involvement
May 30, 2020In "South Asia"
The Importance of China’ s Role in Afghanistan Peace Talks
April 28, 2020In "South Asia"

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use....

Chinese military: Rocket Force drills prepare for possible US nuclear weapons attack

The People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force has stepped up its drills for chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) warfare, in what military experts say is preparation for a possible nuclear attack by the United States.Since April, anti-CBRN exercises have become a major training...

sg.news.yahoo.com

Chinese military: Rocket Force drills prepare for possible US nuclear weapons attack

Minnie Chan
South China Morning Post
25 August 2020

The People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force has stepped up its drills for chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) warfare, in what military experts say is preparation for a possible nuclear attack by the United States.

Since April, anti-CBRN exercises have become a major training focus in the Western Theatre Command and with the PLA’s Rocket Force troops, according to online reports and video footage posted on the WeChat social media accounts of the army’s military mouthpiece, the PLA Daily, and the missile force.

One drill video posted online on August 22 showed four first aid brigades from the Rocket Force called to rescue wounded soldiers from a base under a simulated nuclear weapons at night. The base was more than 2,000km (1,240 miles) away and the medical officers and first aid crews also needed to overcome “accidents” and “raids” on their way to the nuclear battlefield, according to the video.

Get the latest insights and analysis from our Global Impact newsletter on the big stories originating in China.

The other drill – the rocket force’s largest ever anti-nuclear weapon drill involving thousands of soldiers and hundreds of military vehicles – had workers and combat troops wearing chemical protection suits while working in the Gobi Desert, where the temperature is over 40 degrees Celsius (104 degrees Fahrenheit). Medical staff also set up tents as temporary casualty stations for emergency surgery.

China’s navy drills in 4 regions show ability to counter US, observers say

“Taking part in joint cooperation drills with frontline troops can help us understand nuclear accidents and battlefield situations in detail, which is helpful when we are making training plans for specific nuclear-attack treatments,” said Wang Jianan, director of the Rocket Force’s nuclear treatment centre, in the video.

View photos
A PLA drill in the Gobi Desert had more than 1,000 soldiers from the Western Theatre Command and Rocket Force conducting a joint operation simulating countermeasures against attacks. Photo: PLA Daily

Hong Kong-based military commentator Song Zhongping, a retired instructor from the Second Artillery Force, the predecessor of the Rocket Force, said the PLA must improve its anti-CBRN defence, indicating the PLA’s second-strike capability in the event of a nuclear weapons attack, particularly since the US Trump administration had started adding low-yield W76-2 nuclear warheads to the country’s Trident missiles and submarines.

“The US doesn’t give up on taking pre-emptive nuclear strikes. As China’s strategic missile force, the Rocket Force is also the major target of their American rival,” said Song, who is now a commentator for Phoenix Television.

“It’s a must for the Rocket Force to prepare for all worst-case scenarios, including how to self-rescue when being attacked by enemies or a nuke leak happens, as well as other emergency simulation drills.”

Song said the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic had also provided comprehensive actual combat training to the PLA. The Rocket Force had learned and experienced how to perfect its anti-CBRN defence through joint operations with other branches.

Macau-based military observer Antony Wong Tong said the Gobi Desert exercises had seen the PLA’s 77th Army Group mobilise their main battle tanks – such as the Type 89, Type 86 and Type 96A heavy armaments – in the joint operation, indicating that the military had been preparing for a possible nuclear war with the Americans.

View photos
PLA Rocket Force soldiers deal with a nuclear incident drill at night. Since April, anti-CBRN exercises have become a major training focus in China’s Western Theatre Command. Photo: PLA Rocket Force WeChat.

Zhou Chenming, a researcher from the Yuan Wang, a Beijing-based military science and technology institute, said anti-CBRN drills had become a compulsory training subject in other military units of the PLA.

“Anti-CBRN is one of the subjects on scheduled drills that should be counted in annual assessment, related to the future promotion and treatment of officers and soldiers because of its importance in modern warfare,” Zhou said.

More from South China Morning Post:

• Rise of Chinese AI and quantum computing threatens American military tech, says report for US Congress
• Chinese armed forces continue to ramp up coastal exercises by announcing further drills
• Chinese forces focus on combat readiness as US keeps close watch

This article Chinese military: Rocket Force drills prepare for possible US nuclear weapons attack first appeared on South China Morning Post
For the latest news from the South China Morning Post download our mobile app. Copyright 2020.

 

[danielboon]

Tick tick tick..https://mobile.twitter.com/globaltimesnews/status/1299046170149498884

 

[Housecarl]

Hummm.....

Posted for fair use.....

Mali’s Coup Could Destabilize the Sahel

Mali's international allies must take action to save its landmark 2015 peace deal, the Algiers Accord, and support a peaceful transition.

www.foreignaffairs.com

Mali’s Coup Could Destabilize the Sahel
Why a Fraying Peace Deal Is the Country’s Best Hope
By Bisa Williams and John Goodman
August 27, 2020

Malian soldiers attend a rally celebrating the overthrow of President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita in Bamako, Mali, August 2020
Mamadou Keita / Reuters


Weeks of antigovernment protests in Mali came to a head on August 18, when a group of mutinous military officers arrested the country’s president, Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta, and forced him to resign on national television. Many Malians viewed Keïta as uninterested in stemming the decline in social services, rooting out corruption, and stopping the spread of intercommunal and terrorist violence, all while favoring the rise of his son. His fumbled response to the Constitutional Court’s overturning of results in the recent parliamentary elections proved to be the last straw. Although Malian opposition supporters greeted Keïta’s ouster with glee, flooding the streets in celebration, Mali’s international allies did not.
The European Union, France, and the United States quickly condemned the putsch, and the UN Security Council soon followed suit. The African Union declared military coups “something of the past which we cannot accept anymore,” and suspended Mali. Yet these allies are concerned about a power vacuum in Mali that could further destabilize the wider region. They now face the question of how to support a peaceful and constructive outcome of the current crisis.

Mali’s 2015 peace deal with northern rebels, known as the Algiers Accord, needs to remain at the forefront of international efforts—and yet it is in peril of failing. The lack of progress in implementing the agreement fed a sense of stagnation in the lead up to the coup and, because its disarmament and demobilization provisions remain largely unfulfilled, has contributed to Mali’s security crisis. Although the army officers who deposed Keïta have pledged to uphold the accord and facilitate new elections, the ongoing transition still faces numerous challenges, not least of which is the fragile support for the peace deal from the public and in important military and political circles.

Changing course will require Mali’s international allies to shift their approach. If the accord is to help solidify peace and security in Mali, the country’s international allies need to recognize the imperative for them to change their roles in the implementation process. Mali’s partners have not always fulfilled their commitments under the accord. To help save it and support a peaceful transition, now is the time for the international community to act.

THE MALIAN DIKE CRACKS
Since 2011, Mali has emerged as the epicenter of a widening security and humanitarian crisis in the Sahel. The separatist rebellion that began that year, initially led by a coalition of northern ethnic Tuareg and Arab groups, gave Islamist militants abetted by foreign terrorist organizations a chance to establish a foothold in the north. And while the 2015 peace deal effectively ended the rebels’ quest to form a breakaway state, terrorist activity has continued to grow. Terrorist groups based in northern Mali regularly attack civilians as well as Malian and international forces, including UN peacekeepers and French counterterrorism troops. The reach of these terrorist groups has expanded, too—throughout Mali, to western Niger, northern and central Burkina Faso, and northern Côte d’Ivoire. In January, the United Nations warned of a “devasting surge in terrorist attacks against civilian and military targets” in the region, noting that jihadist violence had killed some 4,000 people in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger in 2019, compared with 770 three years earlier. In March, the U.S. Department of State’s top Africa official characterized the situation in the region as “getting much worse by the day” and announced the creation of a new special envoy for the Sahel to coordinate counterterrorism efforts.

The crisis has drawn in Mali’s neighbors as well as the international community. Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, and Niger have launched counterterrorism operations and borne the burden of responding to rising humanitarian assistance needs. The UN mission in Mali, which employs 15,000 peacekeepers and civilian staff, has helped the country avoid a return to civil war in the north. But the price of UN involvement has been steep: the mission has suffered more casualties than any other active UN peacekeeping mission—without bringing Mali much closer to a sustainable peace.

Mali is the epicenter of a widening security crisis in the Sahel.

Since 2015, the Algiers Accord has been minimally implemented. But it isn’t dead yet, and the international community should not give up on it. Signed by Mali’s government and the two main rebel movements in the north—the Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA) and the Platform, both of which are referred to collectively as “the Movements”—the agreement mandated the creation of an independent observer to monitor implementation. Since 2018, the Carter Center, which we both represent, has served as the independent observer of the agreement. The signatories’ creation of an independent body to assess their progress—a first in Africa—attests to the sincerity of their intentions and commitment to transparency, a point often overlooked by the accord’s critics. It also testifies, however, to a high degree of mutual distrust.

Although the Keïta government and the Movements bear the major responsibility for the glacial implementation of the accord since its signing five years ago, the international community is hardly blameless. The accord calls for the UN Security Council, the African Union, and regional states to oversee implementation. Yet so far, faced with the signatories’ foot-dragging, the international community has appeared flummoxed and confused about the role it is to play. UN Security Council sanctions have been levied against a small number of mid-level individuals considered to have impeded implementation, with virtually no impact. There have been few consequences for missed deadlines set by the government and the Movements or for the stalling tactics by all sides. Inside the internationally supervised implementation process, a culture of delay has been normalized, and resistance to disarmament and demobilization by the Movements has been tolerated. We have repeatedly cited these faults in our seven independent observer reports, including the most recent.

To ensure that Mali’s present political transition remains peaceful and to salvage the accord as a mechanism for resolving long-standing, recognized grievances, the international community will need to redouble its efforts to support implementation. Renewed international activism could center around a clear, robust, and effective set of incentives for progress and disincentives for inaction. International partners could also begin focused mediation to overcome persistent roadblocks to the disarmament and demobilization of the CMA and the Platform and the reestablishment of basic social services in the north. Demobilization is only one piece of the puzzle, however; it must be intertwined with political reform, including the decentralization of government—as agreed by all parties to the accord—or both processes will fail. Finally, a much wider swath of Malian society, including representatives from the central region and breakaway paramilitary factions, must be involved in the reconciliation efforts. Without wider public participation in and support for the peace process, the prospects for resolving Mali’s crisis are dim.

THE ILLS OF IMPLEMENTATION
Delays in implementation have been driven in part by a lack of trust. Malian conservatives remain unconvinced of the loyalty of integrated soldiers from the CMA. Accusations of the CMA’s collaboration with jihadist groups, including al Qaeda, the Islamic State (also known as ISIS), and Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), are common, and it is true that some CMA members have not severed all ties with their former jihadist allies. The CMA, in turn, complains that the slow pace of the accord’s implementation demonstrates that the government has not been a reliable partner for peace. The CMA has responded to the terrorist threats and the security crisis by extending its territorial reach in northern and northeastern Mali. While this has unquestionably helped reduce insecurity in the short term (and demonstrated the ability of the Malian military and the Movements to collaborate tacitly when necessary), it undermines disarmament and demobilization efforts and contravenes the peace agreement.

Indeed, the CMA was able to expand its reach in the north precisely because the demobilization process is adrift. The bedrock of the Algiers Accord is the disarmament of rebel combatants and their integration into a new, more inclusive and effective national army capable of confronting the terrorist threat. Despite its centrality to the peace process, demobilization was impeded by the Keïta government’s inability or unwillingness to articulate a plan for integrating ex-rebel combatants into the national security forces. While roughly 1,300 combatants have been integrated, few of the joint units are operational, and many suffer from lack of food, fuel, housing, and weapons. Neither the Movements nor the government has agreed on the total number of combatants to be integrated. The demobilization process, in short, has no clear endpoint or agreed goal. The lack of direction is exacerbated by the fact that neither the CMA nor the Platform has committed to fully relinquishing command of its respective combatants. Continued vacillation by all sides deepens the chasm of distrust among the signatories.

Many Malians consider the accord to be a self-serving project of political elites.

Implementation of the accord has also been handicapped by the fact that the process is inherently exclusive rather than inclusive. While the accord calls for support from “civil society, particularly women and young people, the media, and traditional and religious authorities,’’ it provides no means for them to participate. Civil society has been shut out of implementation, which largely takes place in the capital, Bamako. The result is that civilian priorities, particularly the urgent need to address insecurity but also the economic development and justice provisions of the accord, are almost entirely neglected. An ever-growing number of Malians have come to consider the accord to be a self-serving project of political elites.

International efforts to facilitate implementation have largely failed to overcome these obstacles. The signatories stress that the international community’s commitment, both political and economic, convinced them in 2015 that this agreement would be distinct from failed past accords. Yet diplomatic engagement, led by Algeria as chair of the international mediation team, has been inconsistent, marked by contradictory evaluations about the state of progress and alternating between a hands-off approach focused on intra-Malian dialogue and high-level, one-day interventions that attempt to overcome critical impasses. When significant roadblocks have emerged, the international community has been unsuccessful in impressing upon the signatories the urgency of finding meaningful solutions or proposing consequences if they do not.

FINDING A WAY FORWARD
Mali’s current political crisis, coming just after the five-year anniversary of the accord, certainly raises the risk of a power vacuum that could further unravel the country, but it also offers an opportunity to shift course. It is critical that the signatory parties come to a shared understanding of what constitutes sufficient implementation. As the agreement itself anticipates, forging such a consensus will require intensive international facilitation. The international community's inclination thus far to treat the peace agreement as a matter left largely for the Malian signatories to execute, while focusing on the regional terrorist threat centered in Mali, has not worked. International engagement will need to tie bilateral and multilateral political, military, and economic support more effectively to specific steps by the government and the Movements.

International engagement on the demobilization process must focus on the key issues: the number of ex-rebel combatants to be included in the national security forces; their ranks and areas of deployment; the timetable for the full demobilization of the CMA and Platform militias; the provisions for those who choose to enter civilian life or are deemed ineligible for the process; and the nature of subnational security entities, such as the anticipated northern regional police force. A centerpiece of this effort could be regular military-to-military talks between the signatories, assisted by UN military experts. A specially appointed facilitator for this effort would give it the best chance of success. No current mechanism in the implementation process consistently allows the signatories’ top-level military figures to build trust and dialogue about shared security objectives.

Finally, the international community needs to increase its engagement on the political reform provisions of the agreement—and see effective decentralization through—while also pressing the signatories to ensure that more Malians, representing a broader swathe of Malian society, are involved in the implementation process. The roots of the 2012 rebellion lay in the disaffection of part of the northern population from Malian national political life, and security reforms alone will not address that issue. Greater public ownership of the process—achieved by directly involving more citizens in the work of implementation and arranging more exchanges between and among the parties, the international mediation team, and Malian citizens—could give the agreement new life and Mali a fresh start.

Amid the country’s multiple crises—and given the lack of progress in implementation—the Algiers Accord has begun to slip slowly off the international radar. It should not. The agreement provides the best available framework for addressing the conflict in northern Mali and the wider grievances about governance that have helped to fuel violence for years. Success is still possible; the stakes are sustainable peace in Mali. Focused action by Mali’s international allies is urgently required to avoid a still wider and even graver crisis for Mali and the Sahel region as a whole.

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use.....

Africa File: Common threads in Mali, Libya, and Mozambique

www.criticalthreats.org

Africa File

A biweekly analysis and assessment of the Salafi-jihadi movement in Africa and related security and political dynamics. Each edition begins "At a Glance." Country-specific updates follow.


Author: Emily Estelle

5 hours ago


Africa File: Common threads in Mali, Libya, and Mozambique
[Notice: The Critical Threats Project frequently cites sources from foreign domains. All such links are identified with an asterisk (*) for the reader's awareness.]

Three failing African states took dramatic turns in the past two weeks—one toward uncertain progress and two even further from stability. The trajectories of Mali, Mozambique, and Libya will shape the African Salafi-jihadi movement and will interact with other negative trends—including destabilizing geopolitical competition—to fuel conflicts with regional and extra-regional implications.

In Mali, a military junta assumed power following a coup d’état against the democratically elected president, Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta, on August 18, marking the country’s second coup in the past decade. The coup follows long-running protests calling for Keïta’s resignation due to corruption and poor governance. Keïta’s administration has also been blighted by its inability to contain a spreading Salafi-jihadi insurgency in northern and central Mali, where militants have helped stoke cyclical intercommunal violence.

This Salafi-jihadi insurgency is a likely beneficiary of Mali’s unrest. With attention focused on the capital, Salafi-jihadi groups will deepen their de facto control of vulnerable communities in northern and central Mali with little resistance. They will likely also expand in other West African states, several of which may soon face their own political crises. Mali’s coup will likely hamper international counterterrorism efforts in Mali, removing the pressure that has disrupted Salafi-jihadi groups’ leadership even while failing to stop their entrenchment and spread.

The political crisis in Mali is already taking on a regional dimension as the junta angles to delay the transition to civilian control sought by regional leaders. The Mali crisis may intensify an emergent trend of growing external involvement in the Sahel. The region risks falling victim to destabilizing competitions that have militarized the Horn of Africa and prolonged the Libya conflict. Turkey’s recent military agreement with Niger and Russia’s deepening ties to Sahel states are warning signs that the Russo-Turkish competition, and Turkey’s rivalry with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, will intensify in West Africa.
For more on the Sahel, read:

• Katherine Zimmerman, “Interactive graphic: Salafi-jihadi ecosystem in the Sahel.”
• Emily Estelle, “How Ansar al Islam gains popular support in Burkina Faso.”
• Katherine Zimmerman and Alix Halloran, “Warning from the Sahel: Al Qaeda's resurgent threat.”

In Libya, a proxy conflict pitting Turkey against Russia, Egypt, and the Gulf states nearly transformed the country’s civil war into an overt regional war in June. Libya’s rival eastern and western administrations separately declared cease-fires on August 21, lowering the immediate risk of conflict. The cease-fire announcements are in part the product of intensive diplomatic efforts by the US and others but also reflect Russia’s use of private military contractors to deter a Turkey-backed advance.

The Libya cease-fire is unstable. The self-described Libyan National Army, long bolstered by its foreign backers, lost clout following military defeats but retains the ability to spoil a national cease-fire. A cease-fire may also crumble at the subnational level as the UN-recognized administration struggles to manage popular protests and control semi-independent militias.

The terrorism threat has faded to the background as Libya’s war has grown more international. Prolonged instability has allowed the Islamic State in Libya to begin rebuilding following major counterterrorism losses since 2016, however, and Libya’s trajectory creates favorable conditions for the Salafi-jihadi movement to renew its base in the country in the coming years.

For more on Libya, read:

• Emily Estelle, “Warning update: Egypt’s Libya threat risks larger Mediterranean war.”
• Emily Estelle, “Don’t let Russia dominate Libya.”
• Emily Estelle, “A strategy for success in Libya.”

In Mozambique, the Salafi-jihadi movement has made a rapid rise. The country’s military is preparing to recapture a port city in northern Mozambique from Islamic State-linked insurgents. Militants seized Mocímboa da Praia on August 12, their third and longest period holding the city. The insurgency draws on local grievances that the military campaign to recapture the city will likely exacerbate. These grievances are fueling militants’ efforts to control populated areas and establish governance. The Islamic State will likely leverage Mozambique as a propaganda victory, demonstrating the continued resonance of its message despite its losses in the Middle East and North Africa.

The Mozambique insurgency will likely have regional effects. Salafi-jihadi activity may spillover into neighboring Tanzania, where the government has already begun to respond to the deteriorating security situation. The conflict may also draw in South Africa. The Mozambican government’s inability to address the insurgency increases the likelihood that neighboring countries and other external players will become embedded in the conflict.
For more on East Africa, read:

• James Barnett, “A Salafi-jihadi insurgency could spread to Tanzania.”

Mali, Libya, and Mozambique demonstrate to different degrees the intersection among state fragility, geopolitical competition, and the Salafi-jihadi threat. Mali and Mozambique risk becoming hosts to disruptive rivalries like those that have prolonged and deepened Libya’s war. Collapsing governance across all three countries will help the Salafi-jihadi movement establish enduring havens that will strengthen the movement globally.

For more on the relationship between damaging geopolitical rivalries and the Salafi-jihadi movement, see CTP Research Manager Emily Estelle’s new report “Vicious cycles: How disruptive states and extremist movements fill power vacuums and fuel each other.”

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use.....

Taliban kill four survivors of Afghanistan flash floods

Reuters
Taliban kill four survivors of Afghanistan flash floods

Duration: 01:15 5 hrs ago

• 
  
• 
  
• 
• 
  

Taliban fighters killed four civilians on Thursday during clashes with Afghan forces in the central province of Parwan, amid rescue work after flash floods claimed more than 150 lives, officials said. Lauren Anthony reports.

More From Reuters

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use.....

Japan’s Rokkasho reprocessing plant postponed again - Nuclear Engineering International

Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited (JNFL) has announced that it will again postpone the scheduled completion of Rokkasho nuclear fuel reprocessing plant.Construction of the plant began in 1993 and was scheduled to be completed by 1997, but persistent...

www.neimagazine.com

Japan’s Rokkasho reprocessing plant postponed again
27 August 2020


Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited (JNFL) has announced that it will again postpone the scheduled completion of Rokkasho nuclear fuel reprocessing plant.

Construction of the plant began in 1993 and was scheduled to be completed by 1997, but persistent troubles forced the timeline to be pushed back 24 times.

In 2017, it was discovered that JNFL failed to carry out necessary inspections on an area of the plant for 14 years, resulting in nearly a tonne of rainwater pouring into a building housing an emergency diesel generator.

JNFL applied for the safety checks in January 2014, and the Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) approved its measures in May 2020. NRA then sought feedback from the public and concerned parties prior to formal approval. The feedback was largely critical, with some saying the country’s nuclear fuel recycling policy is already deadlocked, according to the NRA’s secretariat. The total project cost of the Rokkasho plant, from construction to its eventual decommissioning, is estimated to be JPY13,900bn ($130 billion).

In July, JNFL received NRA approval for modification of safety measures at Rokkasho “to meet new regulatory requirements about design criteria and severe accidents”. JNFL said that, considering the construction period to implement safety measures such as the protection of the cooling towers from tornados, “we have decided to change the timing of the expected completion from the first half of Japanese Fiscal Year 2021 to the first half of Japanese Fiscal Year 2022”.

JNFL said that its mox Fuel Fabrication Plant that is under safety review by NRA is planned for completion in the first half of Fiscal Year 2022. “We will update and explain the entire schedule including the construction period necessary to implement safety measures after receiving permission from NRA”.

Elaborating on the new safety measures, JNFL said that, since August 2019, it is required to install steel protective nets to both outdoor cooling towers to protect them from tornados with the maximum wind speed 100m/s. “One of the cooling towers is on the roof of the head-end building. If a steel protecting net is installed on it, the seismic capacity of the building is affected because of the weight increase, so, it is decided to build a new cooling tower equipped with a steel protective net on the ground. It takes time to design, manufacture and construct it. Also, there will be the final self-inspection by JNFL to confirm if the plant design complies with new regulatory requirements, and confirmation of the inspection result by NRA.”

JNFL noted that regular operation of the Rokkasho plant “has not been conducted for a long time”. In order to maintain and improve operators’ technical ability and maintain performance of equipment under long term suspension, JNFL drew up an action plan which is being implemented in preparation for the startup of facilities and processes. “After completion, as soon as local communities agree to the start of Rokkasho, we will begin operation. However, JNFL added that no shearing of used fuels is planned in FY2022 and the quantity of plutonium will not increase.

Japan currently has over 40 tons of plutonium stockpiled, raising international concerns about the country’s possession of the material, which can be converted into nuclear weapons. If it opens, the plant will be able to take up to 800 tons of used fuel a year and extract about 8 tons of plutonium, which will be used to produce mox. Meanwhile, there are approximately 3000 tonnes of used nuclear fuel at Rokkasho and the plant has been unable to accept any more for the past four years.

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use.....

Sweden steps up Baltic defence in ‘signal’ to Russia

Sweden's defence minister has said his country is carrying out military exercises in the Baltic Sea to 'send a signal' to countries including Russia.

www.thelocal.se

Sweden steps up Baltic defence in 'signal' to Russia

Swedish troops on the Baltic Sea island of Gotland. Photo: Joel Thungren/Försvarsmakten/TT

AFP/The Local

news@thelocal.se
@thelocalsweden

26 August 2020

07:49 CEST+02:00


Sweden's defence minister has said his country is carrying out military exercises in the Baltic Sea to 'send a signal' to countries including Russia.



The so-called "high readiness action" means the Swedish army, navy and air force are currently more visible in the southeastern and southern Baltic Sea and on the island of Gotland.
No details have been disclosed about the number of troops involved in the action.
Sweden is "sending a signal both to our Western partners and to the Russian side that we are prepared to defend Sweden's sovereignty," Hultqvist told news agency TT.

Ground troops on Gotland. Photo: Bezhav Mahmoud/Försvarsmakten/TT

"There is currently extensive military activity in the Baltic Sea, conducted by Russian as well as Western players, on a scale the likes of which have not been seen since the Cold War," the Swedish Armed Forces' Commander of Joint Operations, Jan Thörnqvist, said in a statement.
"The exercise activities are more complex and have arisen more rapidly than before. In addition, the coronavirus pandemic has caused global anxiety and uncertainty. Over all, the situation is more unstable and more difficult to predict," Thörnqvist said.

A Visby-class corvette and two Jas Gripen jets in the air. Photo: Antonia Sehlstedt/Försvarsmakten/TT
Hultqvist said Sweden was also monitoring developments in Belarus "very closely".
Non-Nato member Sweden, which has not been to war in two centuries and which slashed military spending at the end of the Cold War, reopened a garrison on Gotland in January 2018 amid concerns about Russian intentions in Europe and the Baltic.

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use.....

New START's Demise Could Cost DoD $439B, Or Nothing: CBO - Breaking Defense

The study finds that 1 B-21, with 10 Long-Range Stand-Off (LRSO) cruise missiles and eight nuclear warheads, would cost $500 million, and $40 million a year (in 2020 dollars) to maintain.

breakingdefense.com

• Air Warfare, Congress, Nuclear Weapons, Threats

New START’s Demise Could Cost DoD $439B, Or Nothing: CBO
The study finds that 1 B-21, with 10 Long-Range Stand-Off (LRSO) cruise missiles and eight nuclear warheads, would cost $500 million, and $40 million a year (in 2020 dollars) to maintain.

By Theresa Hitchens on August 25, 2020 at 5:49 PM

WASHINGTON: The demise of the New START treaty that limits US and Russian nuclear forces could wind up costing the United States as much as $439 billion in modernization costs, plus another $28 billion annually for maintenance of a souped-up nuclear arsenal, finds a new study by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO).

Or, it could cost almost nothing at all, says the CBO report, mandated by Democrats on the Senate and House Armed Services Committees.

“DoD’s one-time costs could range widely, from zero if the United States chooses not to make any changes to its current plans, to about $100 million to $172 billion if it expanded its (nuclear) forces to START II levels, to $88 billion to $439 billion if it expanded to START I levels,” CBO’s press release about the study, “The Potential Costs of Expanding U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces If the New START Treaty Expires,” says.


The estimates only cover costs to DoD for weapons platforms that deliver nukes (called Strategic Delivery Vehicles or SDVs), however. They don’t include development and manufacture costs of any new nuclear warheads, which are built and maintained by the Energy Department. But the study’s cost estimates for each scenario involving a build-up of the arsenal represent new costs — I.e. extra costs beyond currently planned spending for DoD on its on-going nuclear modernization effort. (CBO in January estimated the modernization effort will cost a total of $234 billion over the next 30 years.)

“The report shows that the already excessive and unsustainable financial costs to maintain and modernize the U.S. nuclear arsenal could soar even higher if the treaty expires in five months with nothing to replace it and the United States choses to increase the size of the arsenal,” Kingston Reif, director of disarmament and threat reduction policy at the Arms Control Association, told Breaking D in an email today.

The problem with calculating funding requirements is simply that there is no way to judge what a future president might decide about how many and what types of nuclear weapons platforms are needed because we won’t know as much about the size of the Russian arsenal once New START expires, the study explains.

That said, experts say that eventually the momentum toward a US nuclear build-up would become almost unstoppable. Indeed, the need for transparency into each other’s nuclear force structure to serve as a brake on a run-away arms race was the entire reason behind the US-Soviet arms control treaties in the first place.

“If the Russians start building up, our history suggests that our reaction will be to do the same. And in fact, if we thought the Russians were starting to build up — because of course we won’t know anymore because we can’t verify — then history would suggest that we would also build up. So I think there will be some real pressures to build up,” said one long-time arms control analyst.

“Ever-increasing spending on nuclear weapons without an arms control framework that bounds U.S. and Russian nuclear forces is a recipe for budget chaos, undermining strategic stability, and damaging the health of the global nonproliferation regime,” Reif said.
Because there is no way to predict the size of a future US nuclear arsenal — and just as importantly the mix of ICMBs, bomber and nuclear submarines making it up — CBO chose to price out cost ranges for arsenal sizes based on weapons caps included in three former US-Russian treaties: the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) I; the 1993 START II; and the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT, but more commonly called the Moscow Treaty).

“The lower end of each of those ranges reflects a lower-cost, less-flexible approach that emphasizes loading more warheads on each missile and buying fewer new systems; the upper end reflects a more-flexible, higher cost approach that emphasizes keeping warhead loadings on missiles similar to what the United States deploys today,” CBO’s release explains.

Recommended Israel Juggles Arms Exports As UAE Opening Ripples Across Mideast
TEL AVIV: The diplomatic opening between Israel and the UAE has had two contradictory effects. On the one hand, Israel sees the emirates as a potential customer for Israeli-developed weapon systems. On the other, Jerusalem is pressing Washington to keep Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge (QME), Meanwhile, the U.S is mediating diplomatic normalization agreements with…
By Arie Egozi

The study does note that expanding the nuclear arsenal could take many years. “Available warheads could be uploaded relatively quickly, but additional delivery systems and warheads would probably not be available before the late 2030s or early 2040s. Most of the additional costs of expanding forces would thus occur a few decades from now.”
The study found:

• Expanding forces to Moscow Treaty limits (1,700 to 2,200 warheads) would not increase the Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) costs relative to its current plans, which call for fielding a new generation of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles to replace the current generation. CBO estimates that DoD’s production costs (not including development or operation costs) for implementing its current plans would total $240 billion over the next few decades.
• Expanding forces to START II limits (3,000 to 3,500 warheads) or to START I limits (6,000 warheads) could be accomplished by increasing the number of warheads on each missile (which CBO refers to as the lower-cost approach) or by increasing the number of delivery vehicles (missiles, submarines, and bombers), which CBO refers to as the more flexible approach, or by some combination of the two.
  • Increasing warhead loadings to reach the START II limits would incur about $100 million in onetime costs for DoD. Increasing the number of delivery vehicles while maintaining current warhead loadings would increase DoD’s onetime costs by up to $172 billion over several decades and annual operating costs by $3 billion to $8 billion. (All costs are in fiscal year 2020 dollars.)
  • If DoD expanded forces to START I limits using the lower-cost approach, its onetime costs would rise by $88 billion to $149 billion and its annual costs by $4 billion to $10 billion. Under the more flexible approach, DoD’s onetime costs could increase by $410 billion to $439 billion and its annual costs by $24 billion to $28 billion. Total production costs would be nearly triple what DoD is currently planning to spend on production over the next few decades.

In addition, to aid future analysts as decisions are made about purchasing new platforms, CBO provided estimates for buying additional delivery platforms equipped for carrying their maximum number of warheads (i.e., one additional SSBN ballistic missile submarine, one B-21 bomber, and 10 new Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) silos.) For example, the study finds that 1 B-21 with 10 Long-Range Stand-Off (LRSO) cruise missiles and capable of launching eight nuclear warheads would cost $500 million, and $40 million a year (in 2020 dollars) to maintain.

New START, currently the only remaining US-Russia treaty capping nuclear weapons arsenals, will expire in 2021. The treaty limits Russia and the US each to no more than 1,550 deployed strategic warheads and 700 deployed strategic delivery vehicles (meaning ICBMs, submarines and bombers).

As Breaking D readers know, the Trump Administration has been publicly waffling on whether it will pursue a five-year treaty extension to avoid New START’s demise. Instead, President Donald Trump has ordered his staff to begin work on a possible new trilateral nuclear arms control treaty that he hopes include China and cover sub-strategic weapons (of which the Russians have more than the US) that are not covered by New START. Such a multilateral treaty is widely considered pie-in-the-sky by nuclear arms control experts.
Indeed, in a press briefing June 24 following a meeting with Russian counterparts in Vienna, Trump’s top arms control envoy Marshall Billingslea laid out conditions for any US agreement to extend New START that arms control experts say simply cannot be met. (Billingslea, a protégé of former National Security Advisor John Bolton, is, like his mentor, famous for his distaste for nuclear arms control.) These conditions include: China joining the treaty; expanding coverage to non-strategic weapons; and new verification clauses.
“Russian officials have reiterated their readiness to extend New START now. Amb. Billingslea’s conditions will thwart extension for the foreseeable future. That’s unfortunate. By not extending New START, the Trump administration forgoes a simple action that would strengthen U.S. national security and make Americans safer,” wrote Steven Pifer, a former State Department Russia hand and arms control negotiator now an affiliate at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), on CISAC’s website June 30.

• Topics: arms control, B-21 Bomber, China, Congressional Budget Office, Ground Based Strategic Deterrent GBSD, Marshall Billingslea, New START Treaty, nuclear submarines, nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons modernization, Russia

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use.....

New details emerge of Russian hypersonic weapons and intended deployments

Russia’s recently announced Kh-32 upgrades will provide Russia with expanded hypersonic strike capability, with the dual-use missile to be deployed as an anti-ship weapon to complement the hypersonic Kinzhal’s primary use against land-targets.

www.army-technology.com

28 August 2020

Comment
New details emerge of Russian hypersonic weapons and intended deployments

Russia’s recently announced Kh-32 upgrades will provide Russia with expanded hypersonic strike capability, with the dual-use missile to be deployed as an anti-ship weapon to complement the hypersonic Kinzhal’s primary use against land-targets. With a range of up to 1000km and a high explosive warhead which can pierce the hull of most warships, and the potential to overcome ship-based air-defense systems.

The revelation that this solution is Kh-32 based indicates Russian hypersonic weapons use will be very specifically targeted in roles and deployments, in addition to pointing to the stop-gap nature of this particular solution, says William Davies, Associate Analyst at GlobalData. This particular Kh-32 upgrade being launched from modified SU-30s means this is a viable hypersonic air-launched munition for other Su-30 operators such as China, India, Vietnam, Malaysia, Algeria, with the platform being significantly more widely proliferated than the MiG-31 that carries the Kinzhal.

In particular, the upgrade will provide frontal aviation units deploying SU-30s with the capability to strike naval vessels including aircraft carriers from outside their defensive umbrellas. The development of the Kh-32 as a widely deployed anti-ship missile would strengthen Russia’s area-denial capabilities, complementing the use of other hypersonic solutions. The Kh-32 is initially being deployed on Su-30s but it could potentially be deployed on other modified platforms and could provide a number of other frontline aircraft with hypersonic strike capabilities, such as the Su-34 and Su-24.

Russia has previously mounted the Kinzhal on the MiG-31K, but despite it having a larger range, it was designed for use on land targets making the upgraded Kh-32 a significant boost to Russia’s offensive hypersonic capabilities. The Kh-32 can be employed with nuclear or non-nuclear warheads, but given its application as an anti-ship missile, its application is likely to be non-nuclear in nature despite the DoD categorizing it as a nuclear weapons delivery system.

 

[Housecarl]

Great...............Merde.........

Posted for fair use.....

The Revolutionary Guards Are Poised to Take Over Iran

But does the paramilitary force have what it takes to govern?

www.foreignaffairs.com

The Revolutionary Guards Are Poised to Take Over Iran
But Does the Paramilitary Force Have What It Takes to Govern?

By Ali Reza Eshraghi and Amir Hossein Mahdavi
August 27, 2020

A new saying is making the rounds in Iran: power is being sucked away from heads to toes, which is to say, from men who wear turbans to men who wear boots. Iran’s new parliament furnishes the most recent evidence. Its speaker, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, is a former brigadier general of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Two-thirds of the parliament’s presiding board are either former members or still affiliated with the IRGC and its auxiliary organizations. Many in Iran and in the United States have long foreseen an IRGC takeover of the Iranian government; the next step toward that outcome would be for a candidate affiliated with the IRGC to be elected president in 2021.

The Islamic Republic of Iran is a bifurcated state, with elected institutions running the daily affairs of state in the shadow of the more powerful office of the supreme leader, to which security organizations, including the IRGC, ultimately answer.

(Rest behind subscription wall....)

 

[jward]

Russia Declassifies Video From 1961 of Largest Hydrogen Bomb Ever Detonated
The blast was over 3,000 times bigger than the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima

The mushroom cloud from Tsar Bomba was 42 miles high, about seven times the height of Mount Everest (Rosatom)
By Theresa Machemer
smithsonianmag.com
August 28, 2020



Hydrogen bombs are so destructive, their impact has been described as unthinkable throughout history. Recently declassified Russian footage of the 1961 Tsar Bomba hydrogen bomb test shows why.


The 40-minute documentary, which was posted on YouTube on August 20, shows footage of the largest bomb ever detonated on Earth, Thomas Nilsen reports for the Barents Observer. Video footage shows the blast from several angles, sometimes struggling to show the entire mushroom cloud in the frame. Later, the documentary compares the ice-covered archipelago before the blast to the scorched, red and brown landscape left behind afterward.

The Soviet Union tested the 50-million-ton hydrogen bomb, officially named RDS-220 and nicknamed Tsar Bomba, in late October 1961, Matthew Gault reports for Vice. This test occured during the height of the Cold War, when the Soviet Union and the United States competed to build the largest and most destructive nuclear weapons.

“There was a megatonnage race — who was going to have a bigger bomb,” atomic age historian Robert S. Norris tells the New York Times’ William Broad. “And the Soviets won.”

The bomb was 26 feet long and almost seven feet tall. It was so large that engineers had to modify the bomber aircraft used to carry it by removing the plane’s bomb bay doors and some of its fuel tanks, according to Vice. The documentary adds to other information that Russia has declassified, but nuclear historian Alex Wellerstein tells the New York Times that the video carefully avoids revealing technical details “despite appearing to show the innards.”

The bombers used a parachute to slow Tsar Bomba’s descent to Earth so that they could detonate it relatively high in the atmosphere and reduce its impact on the ground, according to the video. But the blast created a mushroom cloud 42 miles high, about seven times the height of Mount Everest.

"A mushroom cloud forms when an explosion creates a very hot bubble of gas. In the case of a nuclear detonation, the bomb emits a blast of x-rays, which ionize and heat the surrounding air; that hot bubble of gas is known as a fireball,” Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory physicist David Dearborn told Scientific American in 1999 of smaller blasts.

“The fireball from an H-bomb rises so high that it hits the tropopause, the boundary between the troposphere and the stratosphere… [then] the fireball flattens out; it can no longer expand upward, so it expands to the side into an exaggerated mushroom cap.”

But the Tsar Bomba mushroom cloud expanded through the stratosphere and formed its cap in the atmospheric layer above it, the mesosphere.

The Soviet Union detonated Tsar Bomba just months after the construction of the Berlin Wall, and days after a tense 16-hour standoff between U.S. and Soviet troops at the wall’s Checkpoint Charlie.

The Tsar Bomba detonation went in history as the largest bomb ever detonated on Earth. It had a destructive force over 3,000 times as destructive as the bomb used by the U.S. to destroy Hiroshima. And it was three times as large as the biggest bomb ever detonated by the U.S., dubbed Castle Bravo.

The Barents Observer reports that military border guards on Jarfjord Mountain in northern Norway reported seeing the flash. The documentary claims that the flash could be seen about 620 miles away, about the distance between Washington, D.C., and Chicago, Illinois.

The documentary also claims that radiation levels around the blast site were negligible, and it even shows people getting out of their vehicles and walking around the scorched landscape. But as the Barents Observer reports, radioactive fallout swept over Scandinavia and drew international condemnation on the Soviet Union.

But the United States was largely dismissive of the development of the giant bomb, Norris tells the New York Times. Days before the test, the 1961 deputy secretary of defense Roswell Gilpatric said in a speech that American nuclear experts had determined that the value of such a large weapon was “so questionable that it was not worth developing.” Instead, nuclear development continued on a path toward miniaturization, which allowed weapons to be placed on the tips of missiles and transported on trucks and submarines.

From a different perspective, as Carl Sagan wrote in former President Jimmy Carter's farewell address, this same technology has been used to launch rockets into space.

"Nuclear weapons are an expression of one side of our human character,” Sagan wrote at the time. “But there's another side. The same rocket technology that delivers nuclear warheads has also taken us peacefully into space. From that perspective, we see our Earth as it really is—a small and fragile and beautiful blue globe, the only home we have. We see no barriers of race or religion or country. We see the essential unity of our species and our planet. And with faith and common sense, that bright vision will ultimately prevail."

posted for fair use

Russia Declassifies Video From 1961 of Largest Hydrogen Bomb Ever Detonated

The blast was over 3,000 times bigger than the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima

www.smithsonianmag.com