WAR 08-15-2020-to-08-21-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

[Housecarl]

(430) 07-25-2020-to-07-31-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****
WAR - 07-25-2020-to-07-31-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****
(427) 07-04-2020-to-07-10-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR**** WAR - 07-04-2020-to-07-10-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR**** (424)...

www.timebomb2000.com


(431) 08-01-2020-to-08-07-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****



WAR - 08-01-2020-to-08-07-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****
(428) 07-11-2020-to-07-17-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR**** WAR - 07-11-2020-to-07-17-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR**** (425)...

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(432) 08-08-2020-to-08-14-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

WAR - 08-08-2020-to-08-14-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

(429) 07-18-2020-to-07-24-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR**** WAR - 07-18-2020-to-07-24-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR**** (427) 07-04-2020-to-07-10-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR**** WAR - 07-04-2020-to-07-10-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR**** (424)...

www.timebomb2000.com

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Hummm........


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US open to nuclear agreement with Russia before including China

Top arms envoy indicates shift in Washington's position on trilateral talks

asia.nikkei.com

Interview
US open to nuclear agreement with Russia before including China
Top arms envoy indicates shift in Washington's position on trilateral talks

Military vehicles carrying DF-21D ballistic missiles roll to Tiananmen Square during a military parade. © Reuters
RYO NAKAMURA, Nikkei staff writerAugust 16, 2020 04:21 JST

WASHINGTON -- The U.S. may move forward with a nuclear agreement with Russia first in a bid to apply pressure on Beijing to sign a weapons treaty, Washington's top arms control negotiator said, despite characterizing China as an "urgent threat."

Marshall Billingslea, the special presidential envoy for arms control, spoke with Nikkei days before traveling to Vienna to meet Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov on Monday and Tuesday for discussions on brokering an accord. Washington had been keen to strike a trilateral agreement with Moscow and Beijing, but is now open to a bilateral agreement with Russia first.

"That is, I think, a very prudent approach, particularly because we may be able to agree to something with Russia that would be the framework which we would want China to join," Billingslea said in a phone interview on Friday.

The Vienna meeting, which Washington also invited China to, will focus on a successor to the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. That accord, also known as New START, was signed in 2010 and expires in February. In addition to nuclear warheads, the treaty limits the deployment of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, strategic bombers and submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

The Trump administration has sought a new treaty with three conditions: it includes China, adds restrictions on all types of nuclear weapons and strengthens and verification.

The U.S. has been particularly adamant about Beijing's participation, but China has so far refused.

"I can assure you, if the U.S. says that they are ready to come down to the Chinese level, China would be happy to participate the next day," Fu Cong, head of the arms control department of Chinese Foreign Ministry, said last month. "But actually, we know that's not going to happen."

Billingslea, while standing by the three conditions, said the process was flexible, breaking from the position that there should be a simultaneous agreement between the United States, China and Russia.

"Our concept is that it is possible to have bilateral negotiations, us and the Russians and the United States and China, as long as the principles of those negotiations lead to a trilateral framework, in the end."

"There is the possibility to extend New START with Russia. The president has signaled that he is open to considering that, provided that we make progress in these other three area," Billingslea said.

Late last month, U.S. President Donald Trump spoke to Russian President Vladimir Putin, and much of the discussion was reportedly spent on nuclear disarmament.

In addition, the U.S. is likely to pressure China to engage in nuclear arms talks by leveraging an agreement with Russia.

Chinese missiles "are capable of carrying nuclear warheads, and so that should be a concern to both us and the Russians," said Billingslea, who has some hopes that Beijing will decide to engage.

"We have heard from China. And we're very cautiously optimistic that perhaps there is a possibility to engage in negotiations with them. Like we are doing with Russia, we would expect those talks to probably be bilateral," he said, adding “at this stage, it is up to the Chinese to come to the negotiating table."

However, many challenges lay ahead to striking a deal with either country.
"Whatever we agree with the Russians must be structured in a way that could, in the future, include the Chinese," Billingslea said.

Even if Russia encourages China to join, there is no guarantee that China will join. Within the U.S. administration, there are some China hawks, such as Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, who may step up their call for immediate Chinese participation. And even in the U.S- Russians negotiations, there are large differences on missile defense and new weapons.

 

[Housecarl]

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Where are the nuclear weapons of India stored? - Defence News India

India’s Nuclear Program is one of the closely guarded secret in the world. Nobody knows anything for sure and globally everyone speculates about quantity and quality of India’s Nuclear Weapons and its delivery system. Figures ranging from 80–250 weapons are being thrown around a lot.

www.defenceaviationpost.com

Defence
Where are the nuclear weapons of India stored?
12 seconds ago
0 1 Less than a minute

India’s Nuclear Program is one of the closely guarded secret in the world. Nobody knows anything for sure and globally everyone speculates about quantity and quality of India’s Nuclear Weapons and its delivery system. Figures ranging from 80–250 weapons are being thrown around a lot.

Having said that, according to one estimate India sits of over 5000 Kgs of Plutonium which is enough to give India over 1,000 devices making it 3rd largest Nuclear Arsenal behind Russia and US. India itself is under-reporting its capabilities both in terms of Nuclear Weapons/devices, types, yield, design, and above all missile delivery systems and range. For example, Agni V is projected as 5000–8000 kms range but similar size/dimension missiles from Russia and China have range of over 10,000 kms.

The India’s Strategic Forces Command (SFC) sometimes called Strategic Nuclear Command is responsible for the management and administration of the country’s Tactical and Strategic Nuclear Weapons stockpile. SFC is headed by Commander-in-Chief, a 3 Star General (Lt. General) or equivalent rank from other forces. First CIC was Air Marshal Teja Mohan Asthana back in 2003.

Baring few individuals in Strategic Forces Command, fewer still would be aware of exact Quantity, location, status, payload and housing of Nuclear Weapons as they are Confidential beyond Top Secret.

 

[Housecarl]

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Iran Threat Sparks UAE-Israel Deal; US & Israeli F-35s Practice Killing SAMs - Breaking Defense

Israel and the United Arab Emirates have announced an historic diplomatic agreement catalyzed by the growing security threat posed by Iran. The United States, concerned about Tehran’s regional and nuclear ambitions, is leading an effort at the UN this week to prevent the Security Council’s arms...

breakingdefense.com

• Air Warfare, Allies, Threats

Iran Threat Sparks UAE-Israel Deal; US & Israeli F-35s Practice Killing SAMs

By Bradley Bowman and Maj. Shane Praiswater on August 14, 2020 at 10:06 AM

Israel and the United Arab Emirates have announced an historic diplomatic agreement catalyzed by the growing security threat posed by Iran. The United States, concerned about Tehran’s regional and nuclear ambitions, is leading an effort at the UN this week to prevent the Security Council’s arms embargo on Iran from expiring on October 18. If the United States does not secure an extension — which looks unlikely — the Islamic Republic of Iran will be able to acquire new and advanced weapons from Moscow and Beijing.

Tehran would likely use these weapons to escalate its attacks on American forces and U.S. partners in the region. The Islamic Republic might also use the new weapons as a means to shield a potential sprint to a nuclear weapons capability. That is a concern for Washington and Jerusalem, of course, but it also is a concern elsewhere in the Arab world.

With these dangers looming, the Department of Defense and the Israel Defense Forces are getting ready for whatever may come.


On August 2, the US and Israel conducted the second iteration of Enduring Lightning, a joint exercise over Israel focused on improving the air-to-air and ground-strike capabilities of U.S. and Israeli Air Force (IAF) F-35 fifth-generation aircraft.

In Enduring Lightning II, F-35Is from the IAF’s 140th Squadron trained alongside U.S. F-35As from the 421st Expeditionary Fighter Squadron, with an Israeli Nachshon command and control aircraft providing support.

The exercise saw substantial improvements over Enduring Lightning I earlier this year. This time, Israeli F-35s conducted air refueling with a KC-10 air refueling tanker from the U.S. 908th Expeditionary Air Refueling Squadron. And the American and Israeli F-35 pilots conducted training on how to operate their communication systems between aircraft.

The exercise pitted U.S. and IAF F-35 “blue air” against IAF F-35 “red air” and simulated surface-to-air threats. This let U.S. and Israeli F-35 pilots practice working together to defeat sophisticated enemy air defenses and fighters before striking ground targets.

That scenario closely mirrors what American and Israeli pilots may confront if Tehran acquires new air defenses and fighters from Moscow or Beijing. In a variety of real-world situations, F-35s would need to defeat Iranian air defenses and fighters to facilitate direct or standoff weapon strikes against ground targets.

This concern regarding growing Iranian military capability is hardly hypothetical.

Iran has already invested in modernized Russian air defense systems, such as the S-300. In 2019, Iran also sought to purchase the S-400, the highly capable Russian mobile surface-to-air missile system. Moscow reportedly rebuffed that request. But if the arms embargo is permitted to lapse, Moscow might relish the opportunity to sell Tehran the S-400 as well as fighters and other weapons.

The Russians are likely to find an eager customer in Tehran. Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Zarif visited Moscow twice in July. And Iranian Ambassador Kasem Jalali said explicitly Iran seeks “to enhance its defense capacities” by purchasing weapons from Moscow.

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By Theresa Hitchens

Beijing will not be idle either. Selling arms to Tehran would allow Beijing to build favor with energy-rich and strategically located Iran while simultaneously threatening U.S. interests in the Middle East. According to a July 22 New York Times report, Beijing and Tehran are looking to finalize a long-term strategic partnership agreement that “calls for joint training and exercises, joint research and weapons development and intelligence sharing.”

That is particularly problematic for Washington, Jerusalem and Abu Dhabi, since Beijing has developed some of the world’s most formidable anti-access area denial (A2AD) capabilities. If Beijing provides those A2AD capabilities to the Islamic Republic, it would dramatically heighten the risk to U.S. and Israeli forces.

As compared to older aircraft, the improved ability of the Israeli F-35s to confront these A2/AD threats by themselves or working with U.S. F-35s is a critical component of deterring Iranian aggression. In an era of great power competition, reliable and capable allies represent a leading asset for the United States.

Iranian President Rouhani has called on Russia and China to resist U.S. efforts to extend the arms embargo. Moscow and Beijing are likely to be glad to honor Rouhani’s request this week.

That will make the Enduring Lightning II exercise—and others like it—more important than ever. Perhaps future U.S.-Israel exercises will include the UAE.

Bradley Bowman is senior director for the Center on Military and Political Power at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, where Maj. Shane Praiswater is a visiting military analyst. Views expressed or implied in this commentary are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Air Force, the Defense Department, or any other U.S. government agency.

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[Housecarl]

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IRGC-led Afghan group releases Syria training camp video | FDD's Long War Journal

Afghan fighters of the IRGC-led Fatemiyoun Division showcased their light infantry and snipers in a Syria training camp video released to commemorate an important Shiite holiday.

www.longwarjournal.org

IRGC-led Afghan group releases Syria training camp video

By Amir Toumaj | August 15, 2020 | a.toumaj@gmail.com | @AmirToumaj

This video portion is a fighter motivating and riling up combatants. A verse of his poem says “if the Shiite army moves and awakes/the head of every ISIS [member] will be on the gallows.” pic.twitter.com/FrveCznc9g
— Amir Toumaj (@AmirToumaj) August 5, 2020

On 4 August, US-designated terrorist group Fatemiyoun Division, a Shiite-Afghan paramilitary unit that answers to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Qods Force, released an “exclusive” video of fighters undergoing “specialized” training at a camp in Syria. The exact date and location of the footage are unclear. The paramilitary group’s Media Center produced and released the footage on its social media channels.

The video showcases light infantry performing drills and close quarter combat training. The snipers are probably wielding AM-50 Sayyad, the Iranian copy of Austrian Steyr HS .50.

The group said the video was released to mark Qadir-e Khom holiday, when Shiites believe Prophet Muhammad designated his cousin and son-in-law Ali ibn Abi Talib, who later became known as caliph and the first Shiite Imam, as successor (Sunnis have a different interpretation of the event).

A portion of the video shows a man, who speaks Persian with an accent from Tehran, addressing and motivating a column of Afghan fighters with a poetry dedicated to Imam Ali. One of the lines said, “if the army of the Shiite moves and awakens/all scoundrel [ISIS] heads will hang.”
Throughout the course of the Syrian war, IRGC used sectarian rhetoric to portray all its Sunni opposition as extremists, and, after 2014, heavily used the ISIS label. The Guard Corps and its proxies have committed atrocities and abuses against Sunnis in Iraq and Syria. ISIS, of course, has used genocidal rhetoric and committed numerous atrocities against Shiites. The IRGC and ISIS cast each other as protectors of their respective Shiite and Sunni communities, and have used one another’s true and imagined atrocities as recruitment. Officially formed in 2013 and constituted by Hazara-Shiite Afghans, the Fatemiyoun Division has been instrumental in the IRGC’s intervention in Syria. Since drawing down troops following the end of 2017 campaign in eastern Syria, the Fatemiyoun has continued to deploy forces to the theater. Since the COVID-19 outbreak, it has frequently featured fighters and members in Syria and Iran participating in pandemic aid, for example producing masks at a factory in Syria.

Amir Toumaj is a independent analyst and contributor to FDD's Long War Journal.

 

[Housecarl]

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$19M in Meth Seized in Single Failed Texas Border Crossing

CBP officers seized a huge load of methamphetamine at a Texas border crossing headed to the streets in American cities across the county.

www.breitbart.com

$19M in Meth Seized in Single Failed Texas Border Crossing
by Bob Price
15 Aug 2020
80 Comments

Rio Grande Valley Sector Customs and Border Protection officers seized another huge load of methamphetamine headed to the streets in American cities across the county. An inspection of a tractor-trailer rig at the Pharr International Bridge that connects Texas and Mexico led to the discovery of nearly a half-ton of methamphetamine.

Video

CBP officers assigned to the Pharr International Bridge on August 7 observed a tractor-trailer approaching the cargo terminal for inspection and entry into the United States. The officers referred the driver, a 29-year-old Mexican national from Reynosa, Tamaulipas, to the secondary inspection area, according to information obtained from Rio Grande Valley Sector CBP officials.

An inspection of the containers of produce from Mexico led to the discovery of 521 packages suspected of containing drugs. Officers tested the drugs and determined them to be methamphetamine.

Officials reported the drugs weighed approximately 992 pounds and valued the shipment at $19,841,000.

“This is another significant strike our officers have made on the methamphetamine smuggling industry,” Port of Hidalgo/Pharr/Anzalduas Port Director Carlos Rodriguez said in a written statement. “Large seizures like this one underscore the severity of the drug threat and show that our officers remain fiercely dedicated to upholding our border security mission.”

The officers seized the narcotics and turned them and the Mexican-national driver over to ICE Homeland Security Investigations special agents to investigate the smuggling operation. CBP also seized the tractor-trailer.

Breitbart Texas’ Jaeson Jones reports that Mexican cartels are flooding the borders with record quantities of methamphetamine — in large part by the manufacturing and distribution capabilities of cartels like Cartel Jalisco New Generation (CJNG) and the Sinaloa Cartel.

“As of July 2020, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection at the ports of entry have seized more than 118,153 pounds of meth, doubling the record year set in 2019,” Jones reported.

Bob Price serves as associate editor and senior news contributor for the Breitbart Texas-Border team. He is an original member of the Breitbart Texas team. Price is a regular panelist on Fox 26 Houston’s What’s Your Point? Sunday-morning talk show. Follow him on Twitter @BobPriceBBTX and Facebook.

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Mexican Border State Governor Orders Bigger Guns to Fight Cartels

The governor of Coahuila, Mexico, is providing more firepower to his police officers to help battle the weapons used by cartel gunmen.

www.breitbart.com

Mexican Border State Governor Orders Bigger Guns to Fight Cartels
by Ildefonso Ortiz and Brandon Darby
15 Aug 2020
203 Comments

The governor of Coahuila, Mexico, is providing more firepower to his police officers to them battle the weapons employed by cartel gunmen. State police officers will be the only ones legally outfitted with the higher caliber weapons as the public’ possession of these types of guns in Mexico is prohibited by law.

The new weapons ordered by the governor will upgrade police firepower from AR-15 type rifles and handguns to also include rifles in 7.62 and .308 caliber. The new weapons will also include the M-249 light machine guns commonly known as a SAW (Squad Automatic Weapon).

Coahuila’s governor, Miguel Angel Riquelme, pushed for the upgrade in weapons following a terror-style attack on November 30. During that attack, approximately 150 gunmen from Cartel Del Noreste faction of Los Zetas rolled into the town of Villa Union where they shot up the city hall, torched vehicles, and clashed with police. At least 23 people died, including 17 cartel gunmen during the gunbattle which lasted for hours. As Breitbart Texas reported at the time, Riquelme said the attack was meant to spread fear among the residents of the northern state.

The Cartel Del Noreste faction of Los Zetas deployed convoys of gunmen in armored trucks for the past several months as its main fighting force. Those gunmen are outfitted with various high powered weapons including .50 caliber rifles and grenades. These weapons outclass, in terms of firepower, the AR-15 and handguns routinely carried by police in Mexico. The CDN-Los Zetas gunmen continue to use these convoys as their main security force in the border city of Nuevo Laredo. Now, they deployed these types of high-powered convoys to other regions east as they fight a turf war with the Gulf Cartel.

In the months after the attack in November, Riquelme filed a petition with Mexico’s military so his officers could be granted permission to utilize the upgraded weaponry. In Mexico, the Defense Secretariat is the entity tasked with regulating the legal use of firearms. Historically, drug cartels tap into black markets and outfit their troops with equal or superior firepower than that carried by law enforcement.

Ildefonso Ortiz is an award-winning journalist with Breitbart Texas. He co-founded Breitbart Texas’ Cartel Chronicles project with Brandon Darby and senior Breitbart management. You can follow him on Twitter and on Facebook. He can be contacted at Iortiz@breitbart.com.

Brandon Darby is the managing director and editor-in-chief of Breitbart Texas. He co-founded Breitbart Texas’ Cartel Chronicles project with Ildefonso Ortiz and senior Breitbart management. Follow him on Twitter and Facebook. He can be contacted at bdarby@breitbart.com.

Tony Aranda from Breitbart Texas’ Cartel Chronicles project contributed to this report

 

[Housecarl]

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Motivations and Roadblocks for South African Intervention in Mozambique

The need for a military intervention in northern Mozambique is becoming more clear with each passing week, particularly after Islamic State Central Africa Province (IS-CAP) captured the key port of Mocimboa da Praia on August 12 following several days of fighting that killed more than 50...

jamestown.org

Motivations and Roadblocks for South African Intervention in Mozambique
Publication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 18 Issue: 16
By: Brian M. Perkins

August 14, 2020 07:21 PM Age: 1 day

South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, left, with his Mozambican counterpart, President Felipe Nyusi, right (source: dailymaverick.co.za)

The need for a military intervention in northern Mozambique is becoming more clear with each passing week, particularly after Islamic State Central Africa Province (IS-CAP) captured the key port of Mocimboa da Praia on August 12 following several days of fighting that killed more than 50 Mozambican soldiers (Daily Maverick, August 12). It has been nearly three months since the South African Development Community (SADC) first held an emergency session of its Organ Troika on Politics, Defense and Security (consisting of Zimbabwe, Zambia, Botswana) to discuss potential responses to the ongoing IS-CAP insurgency (SADC, May 19). The meeting concluded with no clear directives, and little aside from vague platitudes have been offered since. With the rest of the SADC member states demonstrating indifference or a lack of will to intervene, Pretoria is seemingly mulling the idea of taking on a leading role. The South African government’s motivations for pressing forward in Mozambique are multifaceted, but it will need to tread carefully as it navigates the SADC’s internal politics, conditions on the ground in Cabo Delgado, and the Mozambican government’s reticence as well as the fallout from what has thus far been an ill-conceived strategy for combating the militants.

South Africa has experienced little terrorism over the past ten years, aside from a string of small-scale attacks in Durban in 2018. South Africa, despite bordering Mozambique, is far removed from the insurgency’s heartland in Cabo Delgado province, which itself is worlds away from southern Mozambique economically, demographically, and in terms of nearly every social indicator. Despite largely being spared from terrorist attacks and there being little threat of the violence spreading from Cabo Delgado to South Africa’s borders, the country has served as a transit point and financing hub for international terrorist organizations, including in Mozambique.

IS cautioned South Africa from intervening in Mozambique in an editorial featured in its al-Naba #241 newsletter, stating that South Africa had enough of its own internal problems and threatening to open up a new fighting front within the country’s borders if it intervened (Jihadology, July 2). In addition to this threat, recent arrests have underscored Pretoria’s angst over the country’s internal security and the growth of IS-CAP in neighboring Mozambique. A police raid on an alleged kidnapping ring in Kliprivier led to the arrest of five foreign nationals, including a Somali and an Ethiopian, that are reportedly linked to the cell responsible for the string of attacks in Durban in 2018 (Daily Maverick, July 30). IS flags and videos were found during the raid and sources have indicated the kidnapping cell is also linked to individuals who have travelled from South Africa to fight alongside militants in Mozambique.

The IS threat and the recent arrests provide Pretoria with even more tangible motivation to intervene, but South African President Cyril Ramaphosa—who is also the Chair of the African Union—will need to carefully navigate increasingly complicated relations among many SADC members, as well as the relationship between the SADC and AU as a whole.

President Ramaphosa has faced increasing domestic and international pressure to step in and address rampant reports of human rights violations in Zimbabwe, one of the few SADC member states that has expressed willingness to participate in a regional military intervention in Mozambique (New Zimbabwe, August 8). Making matters even more complicated, officials within the SADC troika have noted that they are facing a significant methodological dilemma, as Mozambican President Felipe Nyusi is allegedly refusing to accept a regional military intervention and prefers a bilateral agreement with Zimbabwe (Zimbabwe Independent, August 7). The Zimbabwean government is in the midst of its own domestic crisis and has stated it would only intervene as part of a regional response or when its interests are directly threatened. Meanwhile, Tanzania is the country most likely to be affected by the insurgency, but has shown little interest in intervening or providing support beyond half-hearted measures to secure its southern border.

Should South Africa or the SADC intervene, they will also have to ensure they intervene with an approach that goes beyond the military dimension and with an understanding of the complex situation on the ground in Cabo Delgado. This feat is made more difficult by the Mozambican government’s reluctance to share intelligence and banning of journalists from entering the area. The government’s heavy-handed response, laden with allegations of human rights abuses, also risks dragging any country that intervenes into a reputational nightmare. With no other SADC member seemingly willing to take charge and given South Africa’s current standing within the AU, the country’s reputation is on the line whether or not it takes the reins to facilitate an intervention.

South Africa is the best positioned to push forward on an intervention plan and should use every SADC and AU mechanism available to promote a strategy at the SADC’s 40th Annual Summit, which will see Tanzania pass the SADC chair to Mozambique.

TM-August-14-2020-Issue.pdf

 

[Housecarl]

Hummmm...akin to the suggestions regarding the F-15 and the new hypersonic AGM-183. But heck, the BrahMos air launched anti-shipping/land attach cruise missile isn't "as yet" nuclear, but it could be made so providd India, orRussia for that matter, chose to make it so.....


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Now Su-30 Jets Become 'Nuclear Capable' With Hypersonic Kh-32 Missiles

Russia is planning to modify its Su-30SM fighter jet to carry the Kh-32 air-to-surface missile. The Kh-32 will have a range of up to 1000km and would be able to strike targets without getting in range of defending jets. Amid US-China Row; Japan To Militarize Mage Islands With Stealth F-35 Jets...

eurasiantimes.com

Now Su-30 Jets Become ‘Nuclear Capable’ With Hypersonic Kh-32 Missiles

Published 12 hours ago on August 16, 2020

By Tim Edwards

Russia is planning to modify its Su-30SM fighter jet to carry the Kh-32 air-to-surface missile. The Kh-32 will have a range of up to 1000km and would be able to strike targets without getting in range of defending jets.

_________

U.S. Awards Whopping $62 Billion Contract To Lockheed Martin For Arming Taiwan Against China?

In a contract released by the US Department of Defense on 14th August 2020, Lockheed Martin Corp. was awarded a $62 billion, ten-year, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity (IDIQ), fixed-price-incentive contract for the production of F-16 Foreign Military Sale (FMS) aircraft. Taiwan’s New ‘Training Jets’ Are Capable Bombers That Can Strike Deep Into China Although the contract does not … Continue reading U.S. Awards Whopping $62 Billion Contract To Lockheed Martin For Arming Taiwan Against China?


EurAsian Times: Latest Asian, Middle-East, EurAsian, Indian News

_________

The SU-30, developed by Sukhoi is considered to be one of the most successful Russian defence export programmes in the past two decades. The Su-30 is the backbone of the Indian Air Force, which operates around 272 Su-30MKI jets, a unique version specifically designed for India.

The Su-30 is in service with about 12 nations including China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Algeria and Venezuela. The Russian Air Force also purchased a version of the Su-30 fighter, called the Su-30SM. The Su-30SM first flew in 2012 and the Russian military has ordered around 116 jets.

US analysts have claimed the Kh-32 missile, which uses radar guidance, would allow Russian aircraft to target US Navy aircraft carriers without getting in range of defending fighters. The US Navy F/A-18 Super Hornets have a maximum combat radius of around 720 Kilometers only.

Kh-32

The Kh-32 can carry either a nuclear or conventional warhead. In its 2018 Nuclear Posture Review document, the US Department of Defence categorised the Kh-32 as a nuclear weapons delivery system.

Konstantin Sivkov, a member of the Russian Academy of Rocket and Artillery Sciences, believes that that Kh-32 also possesses powerful means of breaking through the missile defence system of Aegis Combat System”, equipped with Standard Missile 6 missiles.

The Kh-32 missile is estimated to have a speed of over 3 times the speed of sound, while some Russian media outlets have even claimed it is hypersonic (at least five times speed of sound). The Kh-32 is a heavy weapon, with an estimated weight of nearly six tonnes.

The Kh-32, reportedly, became operational in 2016 and is primarily carried by the Tu-22M3 bomber. Izvestia reported the Kh-32 can be carried on the ‘centreline’ hardpoint under the fuselage of the Su-30SM. Typically, aircraft can carry their heaviest weapons or fuel tanks under the fuselage.

Russia has already mounted hypersonic air-to-surface weapons on a smaller warplane. In 2018, it unveiled the Kinzhal missile, which is believed to have a range of around 2,000km.

The Kinzhal is mounted on the MiG-31 heavy fighter, with the aircraft carrying one missile on its centreline. However, the MiG-31 is an ageing platform, which has been in service since the 1980s.

Adding the Kh-32 to the Su-30SM would bring a considerable boost to the Russian military’s offensive capabilities. Interestingly, it not just Russia which is modifying its Su-30 fighter jet. India is also is modifying the Su-30MKI to carry the air-launched version of the BrahMos cruise missile. Last month, India ordered an additional 12 Su-30s to bolster its defence amidst rising tensions with China.

 

[Housecarl]

Hummm.....

Posted for fair use.....

Trump Hints to Meeting With Putin to Discuss Nuclear Treaty - Hamodia.com

President Donald Trump discussed the possibility of holding a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin before the November 3 election. NBC News

hamodia.com

National
Trump Hints to Meeting With Putin to Discuss Nuclear Treaty

By Sara Marcus
Sunday, August 16, 2020 at 2:13 pm | כ"ו אב תש"פ

WASHINGTON -
President Donald Trump discussed the possibility of holding a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin before the November 3 election. NBC News reported that aides have researched potential opportunities for the two men to meet, with one possibility as early as next month in New York. The summit would be to discuss mutual constraints on nuclear weapons. One possibility would be by extending New START, a nuclear arms treaty between the two countries that is set to expire in 2021.

New START, a 2018 agreement between the United States and Russia, imposed strict limitations on the countries’ abilities to amass nuclear warheads. If it were to lapse, scientists and politicians in America and Europe fear it could renew the nuclear arms race between the military giants.

The State Department announced last week that Special Presidential Envoy for Arms Control Marshall Billingslea would be meeting with Russian Federation Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov later this week in Vienna to continue negotiating an arms control pact between the two countries. Billingslea, representing the Trump administration, has indicated he hopes a future nuclear weapons agreement will include China, which has been building nuclear weapons.

People familiar with the discussions in the administration said President Trump hopes to impress with a very public showing of his ability to make a deal.

However, other White House officials have cautioned the President against a meeting with the Russian leader, as President Trump is widely perceived as being too cozy with President Putin. The officials warn that Trump’s eagerness to meet could encourage Putin’s efforts to divide and weaken Americans.

Since 2016, United States intelligence officials have warned the public that Russian-linked misinformation campaigns have been attempting to manipulate American voters After their private meeting in 2018 in Helsinki, Finland, President Trump announced that he believed Putin’s claim that Russian internet users were not deliberately spreading false information to confuse and deceive American citizens. The Helsinki summit brought President Trump plenty of attention, but much of it was negative and he was accused of being manipulated by Putin.

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[Housecarl]

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US trilateral negotiations subvert int'l consensus on nuclear disarmament: Chinese envoy - China.org.cn

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US trilateral negotiations subvert int'l consensus on nuclear disarmament: Chinese envoy

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The so-called trilateral arms control negotiations raised by the United States subvert the international consensus on nuclear disarmament, a Chinese envoy said Friday.

Wang Qun, Chinese envoy to the United Nations (UN) and other international Organizations in Vienna, made his remarks after U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo urged Beijing to take part in the so-called trilateral talks during his visit to Vienna on Friday.

"The international community has a clear consensus on how to carry out global nuclear disarmament, and a series of international legal instruments have been formed on this basis," said Wang.

He pointed out that these instruments clearly stipulate that the United States and Russia, with the largest nuclear arsenals in the world, bear a special responsibility for disarmament, and should continue to drastically reduce their nuclear weapons in a verifiable, irreversible and legally-binding manner.

When conditions are ripe, other nuclear-weapon states will join the multilateral disarmament negotiation process, said Wang, noting that the maintenance of global peace and stability in the over 70 years after World War II cannot be separated from the above-mentioned consensus and non-proliferation system.

He emphasized that China never evades its international obligations for nuclear disarmament, and has always been a participant, supporter and defender of the existing international non-proliferation mechanisms and the post-war international system.

"We will never be absent from what we should do," said Wang. "But we will only participate in relevant processes on the basis of abiding by the internationally recognized consensus on nuclear disarmament."

Wang dismissed Pompeo's insistence on dragging China into the trilateral negotiations as "wishful thinking," urging Washington to hold serious talks with Russia and stop looking for excuses for withdrawing from international treaties and organizations.

 

[Housecarl]

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Afghanistan- Over 30 Taliban insurgents killed in Badghis

AT News KABUL: Authorities said that at least 30 Taliban fighters were killed and more than ten others wounded in clashes with the Afghan secu

menafn.com

Afghanistan- Over 30 Taliban insurgents killed in Badghis

Date
8/16/2020 2:19:49 PM

(MENAFN - Afghanistan Times) AT News
KABUL: Authorities said that at least 30 Taliban fighters were killed and more than ten others wounded in clashes with the Afghan security forces in northern Badghis province.

Acting Governor of Badghis, Faiz Mohammad Mirzazada said the Taliban staged attacks on the security checkpoints in Moqour and Qads district of the province. He said the Afghan security forces pushed back the militants throughout aerial and ground attacks. Mirzazada said that six security forces were wounded in the clash.

The Taliban has not provided any details in regards.

Head of Provincial Council, Abdulaziz Big said the Taliban has intensified attacks to gain more privilege in the eve of intra-Afghan negotiations. The Taliban has halted the electricity and telecommunication service in the province during one last week, he added.

The intensification of violence in Afghanistan comes amid efforts to lay out the intra-Afghan negotiations in a near future after the Consultative Loya Jirga called for the release of 400 dangerous Taliban prisoners, who are charged with major crimes.

The Afghan government emphasized that ceasefire would be one of its priorities in direct talks with the militants. The intra-Afghan negotiations are set to be held in Qatar's capital, Doha, where the Taliban maintain a political office.

MENAFN1608202001690000ID1100645118

 

[jward]

Russia and China Playing Musical Chairs in Zero Gravity

Jeffrey Edmonds

August 14, 2020

Editor’s Note: This is the fifth article in a series on Sino-Russian defense cooperation organized by the Center for a New American Security. Be sure to read to the first, second, third, and fourth articles in the series.




As SpaceX’s Falcon 9 rocket hurled the Dragon capsule and its two astronauts into orbit, marking the first human spaceflight from U.S. soil since 2011 and the first ever for a commercial company, Russia saw its monopoly on putting humans in space fade rapidly into the background. Coupled with the return of human spaceflight to the United States, China continues its march toward its own sustained human spaceflight with its Long March 5B heavy-lift rocket and new spacecraft initiative. Russia, who is unique in having close ties to both U.S. and Chinese space programs, stands at a crossroads. Russia can seek greater cooperation in space with China and risk losing technology, or risk losing any benefit it could gain from greater cooperation and still watch China pull ahead. Regardless of the trajectory the Sino-Russian relationship takes, there are significant implications for U.S. national security.

Russia and China currently cooperate in space for material benefit, broader strategic foreign policy goals, and potential military benefits. However, their space cooperation, just like defense cooperation, is constrained by a level of mistrust, the need to protect defense-related technologies, and disparities in economic strength and priorities.


That being said, both countries are united in their efforts to counter what they view as America’s growing military capabilities in space. Both countries are especially worried over U.S. space-based capabilities that enhance ballistic missile defense. This perceived shared threat could lead to greater cooperation in counter-space capability. American defense planners need to not overinflate the threat of Russian-Chinese cooperation, but still understand and plan for those areas where their combined efforts might lead to new capabilities.

Material and Programmatic Benefits
Russia has historically valued cooperation in space in part to offset financial and other material requirements, and cooperation with China is no exception. For context, the Russian space program writ large has suffered from the economic downturn following the combination of a drop in crude oil prices in 2014, and the implementation of sanctions by the West in response to the seizure of Crimea and the subsequent invasion of Ukraine. Additionally, quality control issues led to a significant number of launch failures from 2010 to 2017. While many of the challenges Russia is facing in space can only be addressed through internal changes, Russia can benefit from cooperation with China through program cost sharing. Russia and China renewed their pledge to cooperate in space at the August 2017 meeting of the Russian-Chinese Subcommittee on Space Cooperation with the signing of a five-year agreement from 2018 to 2022. The most recent meeting of the subcommittee in 2019 reaffirmed their support for mutual initiatives for lunar and deep-space exploration, remote sensing, rocket engines and launch vehicles, and low-orbit satellite communications systems.

The space initiatives mentioned above could directly benefit either or both sides’ defense-related capabilities both on the ground and in space. Russian cooperation with China that leads to improvements in microelectronics could directly impact Russian military-related technology. For example, the recently announced initiative to create a multi-part interferometer — used in this case to obtain data on astrophysical phenomena, such as gravitational waves — could potentially provide secondary and tertiary advances in technology that could have military implications. Any military benefits, however, are subject to both sides’ reticence to share defense-related technologies and, for Russia, a concern over Chinese technology theft.

An interesting case study in potential material gain from Russian-Chinese space cooperation is the sharing of Russian rocket technology in exchange for Chinese advances in microelectronics. The Russian Federation has suffered in the field of microelectronics since the imposition of numerous Western sanctions targeting Russian dual-use technologies, forcing it to look to sources other than the West for high-tech items that are suitable for use in space, both in weight and shielding.
China has struggled to develop its own heavy-lift rockets, exhibited most recently by the March 16 failure of its new Long March 7A rocket. Given the inherent challenge of developing these systems, along with the possible impacts of sanctions related to U.S. International Traffic in Arms Regulations, Beijing has signaled its willingness to exchange technology with Russia to gain access to Russian rocket technology, and while Russian space officials have suggested there was interest on the Kremlin’s part, the deal has yet to happen. This is in part due to Moscow’s longstanding concerns over Chinese reverse engineering of Russian rocket technology and the implications it could have for the military balance between the two countries. Another constraint is China’s own advancements in heavy-lift rocket design. Despite the recent rocket failure, there is little reason to believe that China will not eventually be successful with the Long March 7A, negating one of the motivations for the rocket-microelectronics exchange.

Strategic Foreign Policy Initiatives
In addition to any material benefits Russia and China may derive from space cooperation, a significant driver of their space programs, and defense cooperation in general, is to further their foreign policy goals as great powers. For Russia, space is intricately tied to a perception of great-power status that extends back to the Soviet Union. The Kremlin sees the current international system as antagonistic to the very idea of a strong Russia. Insofar as Russia’s prominent position among space-faring nations gives it a seat at that table, it will use this position to check what it perceives to be overreaching and hubris on the part of the United States.

Space also plays a role in the growing strategic ties between Russia and China. This burgeoning relationship is arguably driven by their mutual contempt for the United States as well as little opportunity for either country to cooperate with the United States in space. As two of the more developed space-faring nations, Russia and China find themselves in a position of an overlapping space policy that seeks to mitigate and compete with the United States. In an international system perceived to be led by one antagonistic power — the United States — competition in space by the two other competing powers has become mutually beneficial in reinforcing a narrative that offers an alternative to American dominance.

Reactions to U.S. Space Activities
Perhaps most concerning to U.S. policymakers is the potential for direct Russian-Chinese cooperation in the field of space-related military capabilities. Russian and Chinese strategists and policymakers see U.S. policies toward space largely as an attempt to achieve space dominance. In response, Russia and China have both developed programs for attacking and mitigating U.S. space-based capabilities and have sponsored joint Russian-Chinese maneuvers in international fora, such as the United Nations, to limit what they perceive to be Washington’s intent to weaponize space. In particular, both Russian and Chinese policymakers see U.S. space doctrine and space-based defense activities as enhancing U.S. conventional strike and, in particular, missile defense capabilities.

Ever since the U.S. abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2001, Russian policymakers have been apoplectic in their view that the United States is undermining strategic stability by gradually undermining the Russian nuclear deterrent via advances in long-range strike and missile defense. And Beijing seems to fear the same. During the Moscow Conference on International Security in 2017, the Chinese delegation delivered a nearly identical presentation on the destabilizing effect of U.S. missile defense capabilities as the presentation by the Russian Ministry of Defense. The logic is as follows: If current trends continue, American long-range missiles and missile defense could combine to make Russia’s nuclear arsenal so vulnerable that Washington might not be deterred in a future crisis.

U.S. space-based capabilities — those in use as well as potential future capabilities — enhance both long-range strike and missile defense. Space-based assets provide positioning, navigation, and timing information especially critical for targeting moving, fleeting targets at long ranges, such as Russia’s road-mobile nuclear force. With regards to missile defense, space-based assets make it possible to detect launches earlier in the process, which makes intercept of the missile — to include Russian and Chinese hypersonic weapons — more achievable.
From both the Russian and Chinese perspectives, the enhancement of these capabilities and the possibility of the scenario described earlier are highly destabilizing and threatening, and is identified as an area of overlapping national security concern. One need not look much further than Russian President Putin’s March 2018 speech in which he showcased novel nuclear weapons, whose creation was specifically to curtail U.S. missile defense capabilities, and understand the fundamental and visceral role this fear plays in the Russian security psyche.

Defense planners need to look for indications that suggest Russia and China are moving toward cooperation in the counter-space field out of a growing fear of U.S. dominance in space, and what that could mean for both countries’ nuclear deterrent. It is difficult to say what that cooperation might look like, perhaps sharing an understanding of the U.S. space infrastructure and how it supports long-range strike and missile defense, for example.
The possibility of joint Russian-Chinese counter-space exercises should also not be discounted. Although both Russia and China highlight joint exercises and military cooperation, these exercises are generally for show and lack little interoperability. The same would likely be true of space-based defense cooperation. That being said, if both countries perceive the United States to be surging ahead in space-based military capabilities that threaten their core security interests, it is possible that cooperation could eventually be capability-enhancing.

An interesting recent development was Putin’s October 2018 announcement that Russia agreed to assist China with its early warning system. This cooperation, however, is arguably different than other types of cooperation and could lead to enhanced military capabilities and warrant concern from U.S. policymakers. Both Russian and U.S. nuclear security experts and policymakers have long viewed early warning capabilities, and nuclear weapon-related situational awareness in general, as a key to avoiding unintended escalation, crisis instability, and accidental war. The fact that the United States, Russia, and China value clarity in a crisis is especially important in a time of continued and growing tension.

Conclusion
The Russian and Chinese governments have initiated a number of joint space-related ventures ranging from remote sensing of the earth’s surface to human exploration in space. Yet, there is little direct defense-related space cooperation, although activities such as sharing rocket and microelectronic technology could certainly benefit each country’s military capabilities. The constraints on Russian-Chinese cooperation in space stem from an inherent distrust and skepticism over the ultimate trajectory of the relationship and other matters, such as Chinese technology theft. Should Russia increase cooperation with China, perhaps through sharing rocket and other technology, it could see Chinese space capabilities eventually eclipse Russia’s own programs and contribute to unwanted, expanded Chinese military capabilities. However, should Russia continue to be reticent, it may watch China move ahead without any of the benefits of greater cooperation. Regardless of which direction Russia takes, Sino-Russian cooperation in space should remain a significant concern for defense planners.

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Jeffrey Edmonds is a research scientist with the Center for Naval Analyses. He previously served as Director for Russia on the National Security Council during the Obama Administration, detailed there from the Central Intelligence Agency.
Image: Russian Ministry of Defence

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Russia and China Playing Musical Chairs in Zero Gravity - War on the Rocks

 

[jward]

.."the kurds give up on US and join the Rusian umberella"..

Rojava Network
@RojavaNetwork

#Latakia: An informed kurdish-syrian source confirmed that a group of activists, politicians, civil society organizations and Kurdish human rights organizations held a consultative meeting at the Hmeimim base with the aim of granting Kurds cultural, social and political rights.
The meeting also included participation of Kurdish politic parties in the Syrian government in Damascus, in exchange for allying with Russia and support the Russian "project" in Syria.
Informed source: "There was discussion about a new mechanism and new proposals for solving the Kurdish issue in Syria, and a small committee was formed."
Informed source: "this meeting is a preliminary, its purpose is to lay out the guidelines and propose mechanisms for holding the official meeting, as well as suggesting the names of those who will participate in this meeting which will be held soon"
Informed source: "Independent Kurdish personalities from various Kurdish regions participated in this meeting, including Afrin, and from Damascus as well, and Alawite figures from the Syrian coast participated in the meeting"
Informed source: "The Russian proposal is clear, which is to grant the Kurds cultural, social and political rights and their participation in the government in exchange for their support for the Russian project and an alliance with them"

 

[jward]

Russia conducts massive military drills in Kaliningrad exclave

NewsArmy
By Colton Jones

Aug 17, 2020

Modified date: 11 seconds ago


Russia is holding a massive military exercise in Kaliningrad, a sensitive exclave of Russian territory sandwiched between Poland and the Baltics.
Kaliningrad is a tiny Russian enclave sitting between Poland and Lithuania, a Russia’s strategic outpost on NATO’s doorstep.
Missile formations of Russia’s Baltic Fleet have held drills in the Kaliningrad Region for eliminating a notional enemy’s subversive groups and stealthily deploying Iskander tactical missile systems, the Fleet’s press office reported on Monday.

The exercise on destruction of the command posts and other objects of the mock enemy started with the crews of mobile-tactical missile complexes “Iskander” of the Baltic Fleet army corp at the ground in the Kaliningrad region.
Currently, the units of the missile formation have already marched to the designated area to perform a combat training task, during which they repelled attacks by mock sabotage and reconnaissance groups and overcame the contaminated area.

#Видео Расчеты ОТРК «Искандер-М» во время тренировки в Калининградской области выполнили электронные пуски ракет по командным пунктам и узлам связи условного противника, преодолев условно зараженные районы и маневрировав в ограниченном пространстве.В задачи учения входит многократная смена стартовых позиций, отражение нападения условных диверсантов и маскировку пусковых установок.#Минобороны #АрмияРоссии #БалтийскийФлот #ОТРКИскандер #ЗВО #БоеваяПодготовка
Опубліковано Минобороны России Понеділок, 17 серпня 2020 р.

In addition, over 20 crews of aircraft and helicopters of the Baltic Fleet’s naval aviation are involved in tactical flight drills in the Kaliningrad Region.
“During scheduled drills, over 20 crews of Su-27, Su-24 and Su-30SM aircraft, Mi-24 and Mi-8 attack and military-transport helicopters and also of shipborne Ka-27 gunships and An-26 military-transport planes of the Baltic Fleet’s naval aviation are accomplishing a set of various assignments,” the press office said in a statement.
During the drills, the crews are launching airborne missiles and rockets of various classes, firing aircraft guns, dropping bombs weighing from 100 kg to 500 kg and practicing maneuvering elements in an aerial battle and target runs under a notional enemy’s jamming, the statement says.
The crews of Su-24 frontline bombers and Su-30SM multirole fighters will drop bombs on a target field and fire rockets against coastal targets. Su-27 fighters will accomplish the assignments of intercepting notional intruders of the airspace over the Kaliningrad Region and conduct electronic launches against the enemy’s cruise missiles and strategic bombers, the press office specified.
Along with the attack and fighter aircraft, the crews of helicopters will practice missions at combat training ranges to search for and track submarines, provide air support for coastal defense troops, airlift and land a tactical airborne assault force, the statement says.
“The naval aviation pilots are accomplishing combat training tasks both in the daytime and at night. Around 50 combat training sorties have been performed. Overall, the exercise involves about 20 aircraft and also over 400 personnel of an air formation of the Baltic Fleet’s naval aviation,” the press office said.
The tactical flight exercise is aimed at improving the pilots’ flying, combat employment and professional skills, it stressed.
If you wish to report grammatical or factual errors within our news articles, you can let us know by using the online feedback form.

Executive Editor


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Russia conducts massive military drills in Kaliningrad exclave

Russia is holding a massive military exercise in Kaliningrad, a sensitive exclave of Russian territory sandwiched between Poland and the Baltics. Kaliningrad is a tiny Russian enclave sitting between Poland and Lithuania, a Russia’s strategic outpost on NATO’s doorstep. Missile formations of...

defence-blog.com

 

[jward]

Two U.S. drones collide and crash over Idlib, Syria, defense official says

Howard Altman

24 minutes ago

Defense official says two U.S. drones collided and crashed Syria. (image from Twitter purporting to be one of those aircraft).

The U.S. lost two drones over Syria Tuesday after a midair collision, a defense official tells Military Times.

Images of burning aircraft crashing to the ground were posted on twitter Tuesday. There was speculation that the aircraft were MQ-9 Reapers — a remotely piloted aircraft used predominately an armed hunter-killer drone but also capable of surveillance and intelligence collection — and were shot down.

However, the defense official could not confirm the type of drone involved.

Reports indicate there was a collision, the defense official said, but whether they were shot at afterwards – and whether that caused the crash - is unclear.

BTW it seems there two big UAVs were shot down. As we can see above, one is MQ-9, second possible also MQ-9 or another big UAV. pic.twitter.com/f09EVMTyPL
— Yuri Lyamin (@imp_navigator) August 18, 2020

In short, tonight, the #Turkish Soldiers or supported militants from MANPADS shot down an #American (strike) UAV MQ-9.#Americans will not forgive, so we are waiting for the strikes of the Coalition Air Force on Idlib.#Syria pic.twitter.com/mkahU9UmIz
— Sukhoi Su-57 Felon (@I30mki) August 18, 2020

A shootdown of a Reaper is not without precedent.

Houthi rebels in Yemen shot down a Reaper in June of 2019, according to a CENTCOM statement at the time.

posted for fair use

Two US drones collide and crash over Idlib, Syria, defense official says

Defense official says two drones collided over Idlib, Syria.

www.militarytimes.com

________________________
Charles Lister
@Charles_Lister
1h

Gathering from reporting & imagery, it seems likely that a U.S. MQ9 Reaper UAV was shot down over #Idlib today in a #MANPADS strike. That is, unless Wing Loongs are in #Syria now...? It was 1 of at least 2 drone downings today - the other being #Russia-n (a "Forpost").
NEW - military source claims 2 U.S. MQ9 Reaper drones "collided" mid-air and crashed in #Idlib today. The possibility that they were subsequently fired at can't be ruled out... https://militarytimes.com/news/your-mili

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1295831595627159552

View: https://twitter.com/air_intel/status/1295831595627159552?s=20

 

[jward]

The Looming Influx of Foreign Fighters in Sub-Saharan Africa
Austin C. Doctor

August 18, 2020

On June 22, the Islamic State’s affiliate in its “Central Africa Province” killed a U.N. peacekeeper in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The militant group is ramping up its attacks by exploiting security lapses caused by the COVID-19 crisis. It is also expanding its recruitment to fighters living outside its primary areas of operation. In one April 2020 recruitment video posted via WhatsApp, a group member states:

My appeal to you all that are in countries headed by Infidels is that you should come and join us because the medicine for that virus is here with us. All you have to do is emigrate from infidel-led countries to this Islamic State here such that you can fight to save Islam.

Across sub-Saharan Africa, armed conflicts are escalating. In Somalia, al-Shabaab maintains an aggressive operational tempo and is expanding into northern Kenya. The long-simmering Islamist conflict in Mozambique is rising to a low boil. In the Western Sahel (i.e., Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad), an insurgent movement is marked by increased inter-militant competition and intensified violence. Propelled by the West African affiliate of the Islamic State, the conflict in the Lake Chad area is continuing to bleed across state borders and threatens to compound with other regional conflicts. Militant violence in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo continues.


Armed conflict in sub-Saharan Africa is not just accelerating — it is taking a new form. This change is instigated by three factors: the steady propagation of Islamist insurgency, escalating inter-militant competition, and fallout from the pandemic. Combined, they open the door to an increased influx of foreign fighters in sub-Saharan Africa. While they present their share of organizational challenges, foreign fighters tend to make insurgent organizations more resilient to military defeat, expand the range of tactics available to local insurgents, and increase the severity of targeted violence against civilians. Of particular concern is the risk that conflicts in the region will attract veteran “career foreign fighters” who present a greater security threat than one-off foreign fighters. This carries important implications for regional security and, by extension, for global actors with active interests on the continent.

Foreign Fighters in Sub-Saharan Africa
Foreign fighters (i.e., non-citizens of conflict states who join insurgencies during civil wars) are a familiar presence in conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa. Since the end of World War II, Africa has featured the largest proportion of insurgencies with foreign fighters relative to other regions. Nearly half of the African insurgent groups active in this period have recruited foreign nationals into their ranks.
Given the typical policy discussion around these actors, it is important to clarify that a foreign fighter may arrive to an African militant group from any foreign state, regional or otherwise. The term “foreign fighter” may refer to a combatant, for example, traveling from Chad into the Central African Republic, the United Kingdom into Somalia, or the Levant to Burkina Faso.

If foreign fighters are already common in sub-Saharan Africa, why does an influx of more foreign fighters matter? With notable exceptions, the recruitment of foreign fighters by African militant organizations has been characterized by two features: Foreigners tend to arrive in small numbers, and most come from neighboring African countries.
First, while African militant groups are more likely to recruit foreign nationals, they also tend to mobilize them in relatively small numbers. (To be sure, reliable data on foreign fighter movements are notoriously difficult to obtain, complicated by the fog of war. But the data that do exist can help inform our understanding of regional security dynamics.) In Mozambique, from May 2017 to March 2018, the government prosecuted 370 individuals associated with the militant group al-Shabaab (not to be confused with the group of the same name in Somalia) active in the northern part of the country. Of that total, 314 were Mozambican, 52 were Tanzanian, three were Ugandan, and one was Somalian. In 2012, “hundreds” of fighters from nearby countries traveled to join the ranks of an al-Qaeda affiliated group in Mali. In Somalia, al-Shabaab has perhaps recruited more foreign fighters than any other militant group in the region. Even in this case, estimates for the number of foreign recruits range from 450 to 2,000 fighters. By comparison, an estimated 10,000 to 35,000 foreign nationals joined the anti-Soviet struggle in Afghanistan during the 1980s. In an extreme case, at least 40,000 foreigners joined the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant between 2013 and 2018.

Second, when African militants recruit foreign nationals they tend to draw primarily from neighboring African countries. David Malet, who directs the Foreign Fighters Project, distinguishes between “regional” and “beyond neighboring” foreign fighters (i.e., those who arrive from contiguous states or those who arrive from distant states). Fighters from Chad and Sudan, for example, routinely staff the ranks of rebels in the Central African Republic. Boko Haram, which has generally avoided selling “its message to a global audience of foreign fighters,” is increasing its recruitment efforts in the greater Lake Chad region, especially in Cameroon.
We are likely to see a shift in both of these trends. Specifically, a larger number of fighters from both regional and extra-regional nations are likely to travel to join local insurgencies in various hotspots in sub-Saharan Africa within the next year.

The Stage Is Set for an Influx of Foreign Fighters
Over the next year, sub-Saharan Africa will likely experience a surge in foreign fighter activity due to unfolding changes in the nature of regional conflicts and the ongoing ripple effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. Armed conflicts and crises tend to generate opportunities. By identifying the structural factors which connect the initial stages of the foreign-fighter lifecycle (i.e., “pre-departure” and “in theater”), we can craft reasonable expectations about the movement of foreign fighters into conflict theaters.
First, sub-Saharan Africa will attract foreign fighters because it is a swiftly expanding front in the transnational jihadist effort. Islamist extremism is ramping up in the region, marked by increased activity in the Sahel, the Lake Chad region, the Horn, and Central Africa. One on hand, the origins and impetus of African Islamist insurgencies are deeply local — and this should not be ignored. On the other hand, many African Islamist groups have continued to establish stronger linkages with transnational extremist networks. The Salafi-jihadi “ecosystem” in the Sahel, in particular, is strengthening rapidly. In the 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment, the U.S. intelligence community emphasized that “jihadist groups in parts of Africa … have expanded their abilities to strike local U.S. interests, stoke insurgencies, and foster like-minded networks in neighboring countries.” To this point, the number of violent events (e.g., armed attacks and battles) related to militant Islamist group activity in Africa increased from roughly 500 in 2010 to approximately 3,500 in 2019.

While al-Qaeda currently boasts a stronger position in a number of sub-Saharan African hotspots, the Islamic State is gaining ground. It is restructuring its regional approach by consolidating decision-making across the organization’s multiple areas of operation. In 2018, over 4,000 Islamic State fighters were active in sub-Saharan Africa, mainly in the Lake Chad region. Since then, recognized and unofficial affiliates of the organization have continued to recruit. A new affiliate of the Islamic State has emerged in its so-called Central Africa Province. A recent letter from the United Nations Security Council estimates that the Islamic State’s Central Africa Province membership consists of 2,000 personnel and includes foreign fighters from Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya, and other nations. From April through June, the Islamic State’s Central Africa Province claimed 25 attacks inside the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Second, growing competition between transnational jihadist militant organizations will lead to more foreign fighters. With over a dozen Islamist militant organizations active in the region, the threat from Islamist extremism in sub-Saharan Africa is hardly monolithic. Indeed, inter-militant competition is occurring on a systematic scale through sub-Saharan Africa, especially among jihadist insurgents. Where al-Qaeda exists, the Islamic State works to prop up its own affiliate, and vice-versa. At this time, al-Qaeda and the Islamic State each have official chapters in Somalia and across the Sahel. And the number of violent interactions between the affiliates of these organizations is on the rise.

In West Africa, competition between affiliates of the Islamic State (Islamic State in the Greater Sahara) and al-Qaeda (Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin) is turning violent. While the organizations have cooperated intermittently in the recent past, recent events suggest relations between the organizations are souring. In June, for example, Islamic State in the Greater Sahara fighters detonated a truck bomb aimed at members of Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, killing several. In Somalia, al-Shabaab became an official affiliate of al-Qaeda in 2012 and has significantly increased its hold over the region since that time. In October 2015, a former ranking member of al-Shabaab broke away to form a new faction and pledged allegiance to the Islamic State soon after. Following global and regional trends, violence between the two factions has been on the rise.

 

[jward]

continued

Violent competition between local rivals produces an incentive for insurgent factions to seek out foreign support. Malet and Victor Asal, for instance, have argued that insurgent groups in rivalry with other insurgent groups, regardless of their ideological positions, are more likely to attract foreign recruits. Adding fuel to the fire, competition between groups nested within a broader network (e.g., Salafi jihadists) increases the strategic and symbolic importance of a conflict theater, which may appeal to potential foreign recruits aligned with each side of the divide.
Islamist militancy is not a new phenomenon in sub-Saharan Africa. Neither is the foreign fighter problem. Gen. (ret.) William E. Ward, former commander of U.S. Africa Command, stated 10 years ago that “the foreign fighter phenomenon is a measurable threat to global peace and security … and, like many places, Africa is vulnerable.” To be sure, jihadists are hardly the only militant organizations that recruit and deploy foreign fighters in Africa. However, the rapid propagation of Salafi jihadism throughout the region and the rising competition between these organizations should be of special interest to the global supply of fighters connected to these networks. As such, it is within regional jihadist groups that we should expect to see the greatest increase in foreign fighter recruitment in sub-Saharan Africa over the next year.
Finally, the COVID-19 crisis has hit sub-Saharan Africa hard. Fallout from the outbreak has threatened state capacity and legitimacy across the region and, thus, the resources available to monitor border security. This will make it easier for foreign fighters to enter and travel within African conflict theaters, thereby connecting demand to supply.

While the novel coronavirus appeared to reach Africa later than other parts of the world, it quickly made up for lost time. The pandemic is crippling many of the region’s economies. Nearly half of working Africans could lose their jobs. As many as 58 million people in the region may fall into extreme poverty. The World Bank anticipates a region-wide recession, the brunt of which may be experienced by the region’s economic leaders, including Nigeria, Angola, and South Africa. Recovery is expected to be slow.
Under conditions of weaker state capacity, as well as the pressing need to invest in public health initiatives, African leaders may struggle to provide sufficient funding to their militaries and security forces. As a result, their ability to monitor and enforce behavior within their own borders will be severely diminished. Border security shapes local insurgents’ ability to bring foreign recruits into the conflict theater. Not all would-be foreign fighters successfully arrive to their intended destination. Some are intercepted by security officials en route.

The outbreak has a number of ripple effects for conflicts and foreign fighters. One is that those interested in entering and moving about in the region — and under the radar — will face fewer obstacles in doing so. This is especially salient to the issue of foreign fighters when one considers the robust industry of clandestine migration already present in the region, with which many extremist militant groups are already directly involved.
Local militants are already working to take advantage of these political and economic lapses. In the initial phase of the pandemic, from mid-March to early May, violent extremist events increased by 28.5 percent in sub-Saharan Africa, according to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset. In recent testimony delivered to the U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence regarding the effects of COVID-19 in Africa, Judd Devermont emphasized that “African extremist groups are outmaneuvering distracted and overstretched domestic and foreign security forces.”
In short, while the pandemic is unlikely to influence the demand for foreign recruits, it has unquestionably weakened state capacity and border security throughout the region. For militant leaders and potential recruits, this will affect their assessment of the risks involved in transporting foreign nationals to African conflict theaters. As a result, the latent regional and global supply of foreign fighters will find it easier to meet any increases in demand throughout the sub-Saharan African region.

Surge in Foreign Fighters Will Make the Militant Challenge Even More Difficult
The influx of foreign fighters to African militant groups makes insurgent organizations more resilient to full-on defeat, introduces new tactics to local insurgencies, and generally increases the level of violence inflicted against civilians.
First, foreign fighters tend to offer a net benefit to local militant organizations by reducing the probability that they experience outright military defeat. This is not to suggest that foreign fighters do not sometimes hinder, rather than help, insurgencies. The arrival of foreign fighters may invite unwanted attention from counter-terrorist forces or the international community, for example. The managerial challenges prompted by these actors may also be formidable. The case of al-Shabaab offers ample evidence of the challenge of integrating foreign fighters into a local insurgency. While the group’s foreign fighter cadre initially served as an important part of its fighting force and mid-tier leadership, non-Somali contingents later clashed with al-Shabaab’s leadership. This led to the killing of many of the group’s foreign recruits, including Omar Shafik Hammami. According to scholars Tricia Bacon and Daisy Muibi, foreign fighters’ influence on the al-Shabaab insurgency has been “limited” and “relatively short-lived.”

More studies are needed to tease out the conditions under which foreign fighters are assets to local insurgent commanders and those under which they are a liability. On the whole, foreign recruits appear to tip the scales, extending the duration of conflict periods and protecting militant actors from complete strategic defeat.
Second, foreign fighters serve as conduits of organizational learning. By expanding the set of violent tools available to the armed groups they join, foreign fighters can enhance insurgents’ mode of warfare at the operational and tactical levels. While many foreign fighters are greenhorns, others are battle-hardened combat veterans of conflicts in the Levant, West Africa, Somalia, Afghanistan, or Yemen. For instance, foreign fighters who returned from Iraq to fight alongside al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb “brought back new terrorist techniques that had not been used previously in the Maghreb, effectively broadening the scope of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s capabilities in terms of casualty rate, lethality, and the execution of multiple, coordinated attacks.” Al-Shabaab now uses improvised explosive devices (including vehicle-borne systems) frequently and to great effect. This skill was originally brought over from veterans of the al-Qaeda campaign in Afghanistan. Foreign recruits also significantly improved al-Shabaab’s sniper operations as well as their anti-tank countermeasures. A Syrian insurgent made a similar point about the arrival of foreigners to his unit:

The [foreign] fighters have brought in rocket propelled grenades and boxes of homemade explosives. And wherever you find improvised bombs, you’re likely to find foreign fighters. They brought a lot of bomb making experience from the insurgency in Iraq. With their help, our bombs have [a] 3–7 kilometer detonation range. Now, we can even set them off by mobile phone.

Tactical innovation does not always translate to changes at the strategic level. However, militant organizations that employ multiple approaches to violence are “more likely to stretch state defenses, achieve tactical success, and threaten state security.” A number of armed technologies (e.g., the adoption of armed drone attacks) which were introduced and refined in other recent conflict theaters, such as those in the Levant and Yemen, may begin to find their way to armed conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa. While groups like Boko Haram have used drones for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance purposes, none have yet conducted armed drone-based attacks. The flow of veteran foreign fighters from regional and extra-regional theaters to other conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa may introduce new technologies to old and new battlefields.
Finally, militant groups with foreign fighters tend to inflict more violence against civilians than insurgent groups without foreign recruits. John Willingham and I, for instance, demonstrate that foreign fighters significantly increase the expected count of rebel-inflicted civilian casualties. This especially true when foreign fighters join militant organizations with more centralized systems of command and control.

Looking Ahead
Recent shifts in the security environment in sub-Saharan Africa — such as the expansion of Islamist militancy in the region, growing hostility between local rival groups, and the fallout from a debilitating pandemic — point to an increased risk that an influx of regional and extra-regional fighters will travel to join the ranks of militant groups in the region. Some of these fighters will likely be combat veterans of conflicts in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, or Libya. The subsequent introduction of new techniques and innovations to battlefields in Africa threaten to make the regional security situation even worse.
Understanding the nature and extent of foreign combatants’ influence on insurgencies can help to shape more effective counter-insurgency strategies. This involves identifying where foreign fighters are likely to emerge in the first place, the conditions which motivate and enable militant organizations to recruit regional and extra-regional foreigners into the rank and file, and the conditions which may limit their willingness or ability to do so. Research on how to limit recruitment is scarce. This presents an opportunity for scholars and analysts to identify actionable countermeasures to stem the flow of foreign fighters to the region.

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Austin C. Doctor is an assistant professor at Eastern Kentucky University. He earned a Ph.D. in political science from the University of Georgia. He writes on militant organizations, armed conflict, and political instability with a regional focus on Africa. You can find him on Twitter @austincdoctor.
Image: African Union Mission in Somalia (Photo by Abukar Albadri)

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The Looming Influx of Foreign Fighters in Sub-Saharan Africa - War on the Rocks

On June 22, the Islamic State’s affiliate in its “Central Africa Province” killed a U.N. peacekeeper in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The militant

warontherocks.com

 

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Mali president announces resignation after mutiny: Live updates
Uncertainty in Mali as UN, AU call for officials' release and opposition protesters again take to streets.

8 minutes ago


more on Africa

• Mali crisis deepens as president, PM detained by mutinous troopstoday
• Mali crisis: From disputed election to president's detentiontoday
• Guns, rumours and celebrations: Mali turmoil in picturestoday
• African Union, UN condemn arrest of Mali's Keita, demand releasetoday

Malian President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita announced early on Wednesday that he is resigning from his post saying that he does not wish blood to be shed following a mutiny in the capital, Bamako.
"Today, certain parts of the military have decided that intervention was necessary. Do I really have a choice? Because I do not wish blood to be shed," Keita said in a brief statement broadcast on national television.
Keita said that he has decided "to give up my duty from now on."
It is unclear if the military is now in charge of the country,
Earlier, Keita and Prime Minister Boubou Cisse have been detained by soldiers in a dramatic escalation of a months-long crisis in the country.

The development came hours after soldiers took up arms and staged a mutiny at a key base in Kati, a town close to Bamako.
The soldiers were expected to deliver a statement later in the day, while countries in West Africa, along with former colonial power France, the European Union and the African Union, denounced the actions of the soldiers and warned against any unconstitutional change of power.
The events came amid a weeks-long political crisis that has seen opposition protesters taking to the streets to demand the departure of Keita, accusing him of allowing the country's economy to collapse and mishandling a worsening security situation.

Mali's years-long conflict, in which ideologically-motivated armed groups have stoked ethnic tensions while jockeying for power, has spilled into the neighbouring countries of Niger and Burkina Faso, destabilising the wider Sahel region and creating a massive humanitarian crisis.
Earlier on Tuesday, opposition protesters gathered at a square in Bamako in a show of support for the soldiers, while foreign embassies advised their citizens to stay indoors.
Here are the latest updates:

23:15 GMT - ECOWAS bloc condemns Mali coup attempt
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has condemned the coup attempt in Mali and has moved to suspend the country from its decision-making body, according to Al Jazeera's Ahmed Idris, who is reporting from Abuja in Nigeria.
In an announcement, the regional alliance also said that neighbouring countries of the West African state are closing its borders and will impose sanctions as the crisis continues.

21:18 GMT - From disputed election to president's detention
Go here to read how Mali's months-long political crisis culminated to Tuesday's events.

Negotiations reportedly underway in #Mali for immediate release of the Pres and PM with a guarantee from the international community that the mutineers will not be prosecuted. Still unclear whether #IBK has/will resign as unconstitutional. What happens next? @AJENews for latest
— Folly Bah Thibault (@follybah) August 18, 2020

20:30 GMT - Guns, rumours and celebrations: Mali turmoil in pictures
See images from the day's events here.

People in Bamako react after the military entered the streets of the capital [EPA]

19:55 GMT - UN chief condemns arrests in Mali
United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres condemned the arrest of Keita and members of the government, calling for their immediate release, spokesman Stephane Dujarric said in a statement.
Guterres called for "the immediate restoration of constitutional order and rule of law in Mali", read the statement.
Read more here.

19:43 GMT - UN Security Council to hold Mali meeting
The UN Security Council will hold on Wednesday afternoon an emergency meeting to discuss the current situation in Mali.
The session was requested by France and Niger and will take place behind closed doors, a senior UN diplomat told AFP news agency on condition of anonymity.

Mali president, prime minister arrested in apparent coup (11:15)

19:25 GMT - EU condemns 'coup attempt' in Mali


The European Union "strongly condemns the coup attempt under way in Mali and rejects any unconstitutional changes," the block's foreign policy chief Josep Borrell said on Twitter.
"This can in no way be a response to the deep socio-political crisis that has hit Mali for several months."

L’UE condamne fermement la tentative de coup d’Etat en cours au Mali et rejette tout changement anti-constitutionnel. Ceci ne peut en aucun cas être une réponse à la profonde crise socio-politique qui frappe le Mali depuis plusieurs mois #AUEU Mali: Déclaration du Haut-Représentant/Vice-President Josep Borrell sur la tentative de coup d’Etat en cours
— Josep Borrell Fontelles (@JosepBorrellF) August 18, 2020

19:00 GMT - Govt official: Mutinying soldiers holding president, PM
Keita and Cisse are both being held by rebel soldiers, a senior government official confirmed to the AFP news agency.
"The prime minister and the president were driven by rebel soldiers to Kati in armoured vehicles," said Boubou Doucoure, who works as Cisse's director of communications.
He added that both men were now at Kati. A mutiny in 2012 at the same base led to a military coup that toppled then-President Amadou Toumani Toure and contributed to the fall of northern Mali to fighters.

While the house of the presidents son is being trashed, and the military take president and PM in custody, no sign of the 14000 UN+foreign troops meant to support the Malian state https://t.co/WzaapVT2iz
— Nicolas Haque (@nicolashaque) August 18, 2020

18:50 GMT - Protest movement says detention of president 'not a military coup'
The coalition in Mali behind mass protests calling for Keita to resign said his detention by mutinying soldiers was "not a military coup but a popular insurrection".
"IBK did not want to listen to his people. We even proposed an alternative but he responded with killings," Nouhoum Togo, spokesman for the M5-RFP coalition, told Reuters news agency, referring to Keita by his initials.

Malian soldiers are greeted by protesters as they arrive at the Independence square [Malik Konate/AFP]
18:30 GMT - State television channel taken off line
Mali state television broadcaster ORTM has gone offline after mutinying soldiers detained Keita and Cisse, a journalist at ORTM has said.

18:20 GMT - Chairperson of the African Union Commission condemns arrests
The chairperson of the African Union Commission has condemned the arrests of Keita, Cisse and other officials.
Chairperson Moussa Faki Mahamat also condemned any attempt at "anti-constitutional" change and called on the mutinying soldier’s to respect the state’s institutions.
"I strongly condemn the forced detention of President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita of Mali, the Prime Minister and other members of the Malian government and call for their immediate liberation," he wrote on Twitter.

I strongly condemn the forced detention of President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita of #Mali, the Prime Minister and other members of the Malian govt, and call for their immediate release. My full statement:Statement of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission on the situation in the Republic of Mali | African Union
— Moussa Faki Mahamat (@AUC_MoussaFaki) August 18, 2020

18:00 GMT - Russia says it has information about arrests of president, PM
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov has said that Russia has received information about the arrests of Mali's president and prime minister, RIA news agency reported without providing further details.
He also said, according to the media outlet, that Moscow is concerned about the events in Mali.
17:40 GMT - Catch up on the situation in Mali
Developments are moving fast in Mali. Here are a few stories to get you up to speed with what has been happening in the country in recent weeks.

• Explainer: What has caused Mali's political unrest?
• Can Malian President Keita survive growing anti-gov't protests?
• Mahmoud Dicko: The 'people's imam' challenging Mali's Keita
• Challenges ahead as UN set to extend 'most dangerous' mission

17:30 GMT - President, PM arrested, mutiny leader tells AFP
The AFP news agency, citing a source identified as a leader of the mutiny, said the soldiers have detained Keita and Prime Minister Boubou Cisse.
"We can tell you that the president and the prime minister are under our control," the leader, who requested anonymity, told AFP.

President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita and Prime Minister Boubou Cisse [File: AFP/EPA]
He added that the pair had been "arrested" at Keita's residence in Bamako.
>Another military official, who also declined to be named, said the president and prime minister were in an armoured vehicle en route to Kati.
17:20 GMT - Keita 'arrested' by mutinying soldiers: Reuters
Reuters news agency has reported, citing two security sources, that Keita has been arrested by mutinying soldiers in Bamako.
The arrest came after soldiers mutinied at the Kati army base and rounded up a number of senior civilian and military officials, according to Reuters.

INSIDE STORY: Will Mali's president be forced to step down? (24:35)

17:20 GMT - Elysee: Macron discussed mutiny with Keita


French President Emmanuel Macron discussed the soldiers' mutiny in Mali on Tuesday with his Malian counterpart and other West African leaders, expressing his support for mediation efforts by the ECOWAS regional bloc, the presidency in Paris said.
Macron discussed the unfolding situation with Keita and the leaders of Niger, Ivory Coast and Senegal, and "condemned the attempted mutiny under way," the Elysee Palace said in a statement.
The French presidency did not say precisely when Macron's talks with the African leaders took place.
16:40 GMT - Protesters gather in Bamako
In Bamako, hundreds of people have poured into the square around the Independence Monument, the site of mass protests since June, calling for Keita to quit over alleged corruption and worsening security.
"Whether he's been arrested or not, what is certain is that his end is near. God is granting our prayers. IBK is finished," Haidara Assetou Cisse, a teacher, told Reuters news agency, referring to the president by his initials.
"We have come out today to call for the total resignation of Ibrahim Boubacar Keita. Because we heard there were shots fired by the military and we have come out to help our soldiers get rid of IBK," opposition supporter Aboubacar Ibrahim Maiga said.
Protesters have also attacked the justice minister's personal offices, setting parts of them on fire, a Reuters witness said.

Opposition supporters in the Independence Square in Bamako react to the news of a possible mutiny of soldiers [Rey Byhre/Reuters]
16:07 GMT - Mali PM calls for dialogue
Cisse, the Malian prime minister, called on the mutinying soldiers to stand down and urged dialogue to resolve the situation.
In a statement, he said the mutiny "reflects a certain frustration that could have legitimate causes. The government of Mali asks all the authors of these acts to stand down."
16:04 GMT - France condemns Mali 'mutiny'
France denounced "in the strongest terms" what it described as a mutiny launched by soldiers in Mali.
"France has become aware of the mutiny that has taken place today in Kati, Mali. It condemns in the strongest terms this serious event," Foreign Minister Jean Yves Le Drian said in a statement that also urged the soldiers to return to their barracks "without delay".

A protest movement calling for Mali's president to step down has been ongoing for two months [Rey Byhre/Reuters]
15:50 GMT - ECOWAS urges Mali soldiers to 'return to barracks'
The West African bloc ECOWAS called on the soldiers "to return to their barracks without delay".
"This mutiny comes at a time when, for several months now, ECOWAS has been taking initiatives and conducting mediation efforts with all the Malian parties," the bloc said in a statement.
15:30 GMT: Warnings of possible mutiny
Gunfire was heard at an army base near Bamako, with the Norwegian embassy talking of a possible military mutiny. Soldiers fired their guns into the air in the base in Kati, some 15km (9 miles) from Bamako.
Witnesses said armoured tanks and military vehicles could be seen on the streets of Kati, The Associated Press news agency reported.
Read more here.
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Mali president resigns after military mutiny: Live updates

Mali plunges into political uncertainty as military forces Ibrahim Boubacar Keita out of the presidency.

www.aljazeera.com

SOURCE: Al Jazeera and news agencies

____________________________

Mali coup leaders vow elections amid widespread condemnation

The soldiers in Mali who led the coup that has toppled President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita promised Wednesday to hold fresh elections to return the country to civilian rule, amid swift condemnation of their putsch across Africa and the international community.

www.stripes.com

__________________________

TRT World Now


@TRTWorldNow
7h

Mali's crisis could spill into the restive Sahel region. Bamako-based journalist Mohamed Salaha reports

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1296009008785117189

View: https://twitter.com/TRTWorldNow/status/1296009008785117189?s=20

 

[jward]

Navy Quietly Starts Development of Next-Generation Carrier Fighter; Plans Call for Manned, Long-Range Aircraft
By: Mallory Shelbourne
August 18, 2020 7:27 PM • Updated: August 19, 2020 12:18 PM



An F/A-18E Super Hornet, assigned to the “’olden Warriors’ of Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) 87, launches from the flight deck of the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) on May 26, 2020. US Navy Photo
This post has been updated to clarify comments from Bryan Clark.
After nearly a decade of fits and starts, the Navy has quietly initiated work to develop its first new carrier-based fighter in almost 20 years, standing up a new program office and holding early discussions with industry, USNI News has learned.
The multi-billion-dollar effort to replace the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and electronic attack EA-18G Growlers beginning in the 2030s is taking early steps to quickly develop a new manned fighter to extend the reach of the carrier air wing and bring new relevance to the Navy’s fleet of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers.
Navy acquisition chief James Geurts told reporters last week that the service created a program office for the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) initiative.
“We’re working to outline that program and the acquisition approach and all that as we speak,” Geurts said.
Naval Air Systems Command’s (NAVAIR) recent establishment of the NGAD program office comes as the Pentagon faces a constrained budget environment while trying to adjust to a new defense strategy focused on combatting Russian and Chinese threats in the Indo-Pacific theater.
A New Manned Fighter

An F/A-18F Super Hornet, attached to the ‘Gladiators’ of Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) 106, approaches USS Gerald R. Ford’s (CVN 78) flight deck during flight operations on March 27, 2020. US Navy Photo
The service is likely moving toward the pursuit of a manned fighter aircraft that would include many of the capabilities on the F-35C Lighting II Joint Strike Fighter, but with updated technology and expanded range, Bryan Clark, a naval analyst and senior fellow with the Hudson Institute, told USNI News this week.
“The idea would be that you would take those same capabilities forward and have them be built into an architecture that’s designed around a 21st-century model. So you’d get more seamless fusion and integration of all these sensor inputs, and better ways of interacting with the pilot, and more incorporation of autonomous operations,” Clark said. “So even more so than with the F-35, you’d end up with an aircraft where the pilot is really operating a computer that is flying the airplane and operating its systems, more so than today.”
The Navy plans to seek a wholly new design, rather than a derivative design of aircraft already on the production line, for the sixth-generation fighter, despite the service receiving suggestions to combine Lockheed Martin’s F-35 and Boeing’s F/A-18 designs with modern technology for the future aircraft, Clark said.
“I think that’s not a great idea because it’s going to be inherently more costly than simply a derivative design in an environment where the Navy’s not going to have the kind of budget flexibility that it’s had in the recent past,” Clark said.
Compared to the F-35’s 700 nautical miles of combat radius, Clark said his “impression” is that the Navy hopes to build a new fighter with a radius of more than 1,000 nautical miles.
Accelerated Schedule

An F/A-18F Super Hornet attached to the Gladiators of Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) 106 launches from the aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) during flight operations on March 29, 2020. US Navy Photo
While the service’s objective for fielding the new fighter aircraft had been the 2030s, when the Super Hornets would begin to reach the end of their service lives, the Navy will try to speed up that timeline because the Super Hornets are likely to reach their maximum flight hours sooner than previously anticipated, according to Clark.
The combination of desires for program acceleration and a new design could be difficult for the Navy at a time when the Pentagon is preparing for flat or declining budgets.
“The Navy is trying to accelerate the timeline to get to NGAD so that they can begin fielding the new airplane to replace the Super Hornets, which, … when they want a new design that incorporates what’s probably going to have to be a new engine, they’re driving the technology risk higher. And at the same time they’re going to ask for an accelerated schedule that increases the schedule risk in an environment where they don’t have additional money to cover those,” Clark said.
“Normally, if you increase the level of technological sophistication or you want to accelerate the program, you pay more for it, right, so you just throw more money at the problem,” he continued. “They don’t have more money to throw at the problem, so you’re creating challenges in all three dimensions of a new program: cost, schedule and performance.”
Pentagon and Navy officials have repeatedly referenced impending budget constraints when discussing programs and spending over the last year. In addition to those concerns, the Navy in its Fiscal Year 2021 budget submission sought to curtail the Super Hornet program and make FY 2021 the last year the service would buy the aircraft, at the end of the current multi-year contract in place with manufacturer Boeing. At the time, the Navy said it would save $4.5 billion across its five-year budget plan and put the funds toward the NGAD effort.

While the Navy has not pegged any cost assessments to the NGAD initiative, a January 2020 report from the Congressional Budget Office estimated the service could spend approximately $67 billion to replace the F/A-18E/F fleet from 2032 to 2050 and $22 billion to replace the Growlers.
“That estimate does not include the potentially substantial cost to field new jammer pods or upgrade existing ones that might be carried by a future electronic-attack aircraft,” the report reads. “For example, the Navy currently estimates that 128 Next Generation Jammer pods that it plans to buy for the EA-18G will cost about $4 billion.”
New Program Office

Lt. Rob Morris, from Annapolis, Md., observes a F/A-18F Super Hornet from the “Jolly Rogers” of Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) 103 land on the flight deck of the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) on May 30, 2019. US Navy Photo
After the Navy wrapped up an analysis of alternatives for NGAD in July 2019, the defense secretary’s Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) office issued the AOA’s “sufficiency” in September 2019, Connie Hempel, a spokeswoman for NAVAIR, told USNI News.
To kick off the NGAD initiative, the Navy formally stood up the Next Generation Air Dominance program office, which the service is calling PMA-230, in May and tapped Capt. Al Mousseau to serve as the program manager. Mousseau officially started the job in May, after previously serving as the program manager for the Mission Integration and Special Programs Office, also known as PMA-298.
The Navy has already begun convening industry days for NGAD, according to a source familiar with the ongoing process. Boeing, Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman are the three likely competitors for the manned fighter, USNI News understands.

Asked when the Navy plans to issue a request for information, Hempel said the service is working on underlying documents that would inform future steps and timelines for the program.
The Navy has provided few details in recent years as to what the successor for the Super Hornets and Growlers may look like, but the service in 2016 began forecasting plans to seek a family-of-systems approach, now known as NGAD, instead of buying one fighter aircraft, an initiative known as F/A-XX.

The family of systems approach could see the Navy going down a path similar to the Air Force’s NGAD pursuits, according to Clark, in which the Navy buys a manned fighter and uses different unmanned systems to supplement the mission.
“They could say, ‘well maybe we back off on some of the requirements when it comes to weapons payload, and maybe stealth or something, but so we keep the speed. We keep the range. We keep the C4ISR sophistication, but we relieve some of the requirements in terms of how much it carries and maybe how penetrating it can be into any airspace,’” Clark said. “And we offload those to unmanned systems, so there’s this family of systems now that instead of having five F-35s go do some mission, you’d send two of these new airplanes with some unmanned systems to do the same mission.”

An F/A-18F Super Hornet lands on the flight deck of the aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76) on June 25, 2018. US Navy Photo
Because the new manned combatant would require stealth capabilities, speed, and range, carrying heavy equipment like missiles could fall to the unmanned platforms within the family of systems.
Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Michael Gilday said at a forum in Washington, D.C. late last year that the Navy’s future aviation combatant could include a combination of both manned and unmanned systems, but he conceded he did not yet know what kind of platform would be used to launch the aircraft, leaving open the possibility that they could operate off of something other than today’s nuclear-powered aircraft carriers.
Despite the Navy sketching out a plan for its new fighter aircraft, Clark argued the service still needs to contend with an adversary’s ability to use lower-cost long-range missiles to target aircraft carriers.
“The idea of just continuing to build new manned aircraft with longer ranges to try to overcome the ability of a China or an Iran even or a Russia to shoot long-range missiles at the carrier, it’s sort of a losing game because the missiles are cheap,” he said. “The airplanes are expensive. So you’re in a bad cost exchange situation.”
Combining the manned fighter with unmanned systems could help the service confront this issue.
“That may be a way to get around this cost exchange problem, where maybe the airplane doesn’t need to fly as far,” Clark said.
“You know, the airplane could go a thousand miles, and it doesn’t matter if the enemy has a two-thousand-mile anti-ship ballistic missile because your manned airplane is not going to fly that whole distance. He’s going to stop at a thousand miles and then these unmanned systems go the rest of the way.”

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Navy Quietly Starts Development of Next-Generation Carrier Fighter - USNI News

This post has been updated to clarify comments from Bryan Clark. After nearly a decade of fits and starts, the Navy has quietly initiated work to develop its first new carrier-based fighter in almost 20 years, standing up a new program office and holding early discussions with industry, USNI...

news.usni.org

 

[jward]

Jihadists take hundreds hostage in northeast Nigeria town
AFP , Wednesday 19 Aug 2020

Jihadists have taken hundreds of hostages in a northeast Nigerian town where people had just returned after fleeing their homes, locals and militia sources said Wednesday.
Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) "terrorists" late Tuesday overran Kukawa in the Lake Chad region, the sources said.
They seized those who had returned to the town in a government operation on August 2 after spending nearly two years in displacement camps, said local militia head Babakura Kolo.
"The terrorists attacked the town in 22 trucks around four pm (1600 GMT) yesterday and engaged soldiers guarding the town in a fierce battle," he said.
Kukawa's residents had returned to their homes just 16 days earlier under military escort, on the orders of the Borno state authorities.

They had been living in camps in the regional capital Maiduguri, 180 kilometres (120 miles) away, where they fled following a bloody attack in November 2018.
A local chief who accompanied the residents to the town said the people had returned with the hope of working on their farmlands "only to end up in the hands of the insurgents".
"We don't know what they would do to them but I hope they don't harm them," said the chief, who asked not to be identified for safety reasons.
A security source who confirmed the incident to AFP said fighter jets were deployed from Maiduguri on Wednesday to "tackle the situation", without giving details.

- Extortion -
Yan St-Pierre, a counter-terrorism consultant for MOSECON (Modern Security Consulting Group), expressed doubts over the strategic value of taking a town.
"Kukawa is of limited value in itself, but the border region of Baga -- on the shores of Lake Chad -- is an important transition zone to Chad and Cameroon, and its control is important to ISWAP... for tactical and economic reasons," he said.
The decade-long jihadist conflict in northeastern Nigeria has forced around two million people from their homes, mostly in the northern part of Borno.

Many have moved into squalid displacement camps in Maiduguri and rely on handouts from international charities.
In the last two years, local authorities have been encouraging the displaced to return home, despite concern by international charities that this is not safe.
Residents have been returned to five major towns since 2018, where they are confined under military protection with trenches dug to try to fend off jihadist raids.
Despite the fortifications, the insurgents have continued to launch attacks.

In a related development, an AFP reporter who visited the town of Magumeri, 50 kilometres outside Maiduguri, on Wednesday saw hundreds flee to escape extortion by ISWAP.
The Islamists had on Tuesday mounted roadblocks in the town, seizing mobile phones, money and footwear.

- 'Hearts and minds' -
The extortion followed clashes between Nigerian troops and the jihadists in the town on Monday in which the insurgents lost men and vehicles.
The troops had mobilised from the nearby town of Gubio when residents alerted them of the invasion of Magumeri by the militants, leading to a gunfight.
ISWAP released a statement on Tuesday taking responsibility for the attack on the military, saying it had killed and wounded an unidentified number of people and burnt Red Cross buildings.
The local authority building in the town and a telecom mast were also burnt in the clashes.
ISWAP on Wednesday claimed on Twitter that its fighters had targeted the Super Camp in Mallam Fatori with five mortar shells.
That claim could not be independently verified.

Security experts say ISWAP -- a splinter group of Boko Haram, which began its jihadist campaign a decade ago -- is extending its grip and influence around Lake Chad, a vast, marshy area also shared by Niger and Chad.
"Under the banner of (ISWAP), insurgents have increasingly focused on a 'hearts and minds' strategy, setting themselves up as an alternative to the federal and local governments," said London-based Janes Group in its latest report.

- 'Suspicious about spies' -
Vincent Foucher, a specialist with France's CNRS research institute said on Twitter ISWAP was frustrating efforts to resettle displaced residents in the area.
"Clearly, ISWAP is not keen on authorities trying to resettle communities," he said.
"They are in a complicated situation," he said. "On the one head, they want to look open to the public... but on the other, they are suspicious about spies, people who use their phone to inform the army."
The United Nations last Friday said 10.6 million of the 13 million people in the conflict-ravaged states of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe would need humanitarian assistance this year.
It said the figures represented a 50 percent increase since last year and the highest tally since the beginning of the joint humanitarian response five years ago.

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Jihadists take hundreds hostage in northeast Nigeria town - Africa - World

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Air Force Eyes Adding Nuclear-Armed Hypersonic Boost-Glide Vehicles To Its Future ICBMs

At present, all other hypersonic weapons of this type that the US military is developing are conventionally armed.

www.thedrive.com

Air Force Eyes Adding Nuclear-Armed Hypersonic Boost-Glide Vehicles To Its Future ICBMs
At present, all other hypersonic weapons of this type that the US military is developing are conventionally armed.
BY JOSEPH TREVITHICK
AUGUST 19, 2020

• THE WAR ZONE

NORTHROP GRUMMAN/GENERAL ATOMICS
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The U.S. Air Force is at least researching what it might take to develop a nuclear-armed hypersonic boost-glide vehicle with a range equivalent to a traditional intercontinental ballistic missile, or ICBM. This vehicle could potentially go on top of the service's future Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent ICBMs, which are now in development. Publicly, the hypersonic weapons programs now in progress across the U.S. military are all conventionally-armed.

Aviation Week was first to report on this potential nuclear hypersonic weapon effort on Aug. 18, 2020, based on information the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center had included in a request for information posted online six days earlier. That document, which was marked "For Official Use Only" and has since been taken offline, outlined seven potential upgrade tracks for an ICBM with a “modular open architecture."



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This is understood to refer to the forthcoming Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD), because the existing Minuteman III IBCM was not designed with these features in mind. One of those areas of interest is “thermal protection system that can support [a] hypersonic glide to ICBM ranges."

"GBSD does have an open architecture. It gives us an ability to incorporate emerging technologies we need to counter whatever threats we face in the future," Air Force Lieutenant General Richard Clark, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration, said in response to a specific question about a potential nuclear-armed hypersonic payload during a virtual event hosted by the Air Force Association's Mitchell Institute on Aug. 19, 2020. "So as we bring the system [GBSD] online, we will ensure that we have the ability to roll different technologies in and incorporate that into GBSD."

In response to a follow-up question from Steve Trimble, Aviation Week's Defense Editor and good friend of The War Zone, Clark explicitly said that a nuclear-armed hypersonic boost-glide vehicle was not in the minimum "threshold" requirements for the GBSD program. However, as Trimble astutely pointed out, this only raises questions about what the program's more ambitious "objective" requirements might include.


Senior Department of Defense officials had told Trimble for his original story that there is a policy in place now that expressly limits hypersonic weapons developments to the non-nuclear realm. Of course, basic research into the requirements for a future nuclear hypersonic weapon would not necessarily violate that policy.

Kingston Reif, the Director for Disarmament and Threat Reduction Policy at the Arms Control Association, a non-partisan organization that works to promote "public understanding of and support for effective arms control policies," also pointed out on Twitter that President Donald Trump's Administrations' 2018 Nuclear Posture Review included passages that could indicate an interest in nuclear-armed hypersonic developments.

"DoD will explore prioritization of existing research and development funding for advanced nuclear delivery system technology and prototyping capabilities," that policy document said. "This will support the U.S. development of hedging options and focus, as necessary, on the rapid development of nuclear delivery systems, alternative basing modes, and capabilities for defeating advanced air and missile defenses."

USAF
Air Force personnel maneuver more traditional reentry vehicles of the kind that found on the service's existing Minuteman III ICBMs.

Interest in hypersonic weapons, in general, both within the U.S. military and elsewhere around the world, is heavily driven by a desire to ensure strikes can successfully make it past increasingly advanced integrated air and ballistic missile defense networks. Hypersonic boost-glide vehicles, a notional design of which is seen at the top of this story, are unpowered and generally use a rocket booster to loft them to an optimal altitude and speed.

Once there, they glide back down to their target at hypersonic speed, defined as Mach 5 or above, following a varying trajectory, as well as maneuvering laterally. This is a much less predictable flight path compared to that of reentry vehicles on traditional ballistic missiles. This, together with the vehicle's high speed, makes it difficult for an opponent to protect against these weapons or otherwise relocate critical assets before it actually hits its target.

This could also be, at least in part, a direct response to developments among potential American adversaries. Russia has already fielded some number of silo-launched Avangard missiles, which are tipped with at least one nuclear-armed hypersonic boost-glide vehicle. China is known to be working on this type of hypersonic weapon, as well, though it's not clear if that country's military envisions a strategic nuclear role for them.





The disclosure that the United States may at all be interested in the development of a nuclear hyperosnic weapon with ICBM range also comes amid tense negotiations between U.S. and Russian government officials over extending the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or New START. The treaty limits how many nuclear warheads each country can have, as well as the total numbers of certain delivery systems. Russia has declared its Avangard missiles as being covered by the treaty, but has said, at least at present, that other novel nuclear weapons, such as a nuclear-powered cruise missile and a long-range nuclear-powered torpedo, are not within that agreement's purview. The U.S. government has also, so far unsuccessfully, tried to bring China into these negotiations to craft some sort of trilateral arms control deal.

The U.S. military has already fielded submarine-launched ballistic missiles with lower-yield nuclear warheads in direct response to concerns about Russia's nuclear modernization efforts and doctrine, especially a potential "escalate-to-deescalate" strategy that could see the Kremlin employ a limited tactical nuclear strike in an effort to effectively settle a tertiary conflict before the United States or its allies could response. Experts dispute whether this doctrine actually exists. Regardless, Russia has made it clear that it will not be able to tell if an incoming weapon has a lower-yield warhead on top and will treat them the same as any other nuclear strike, triggering a massive retaliatory response.

Fielding future GBSDs with nuclear-armed hypersonic boost-glide vehicles might raise a separate discrimination issue in that opponents will very likely not be able to tell if an incoming hypersonic weapon is nuclear or conventionally armed. However, the conventional hypersonic boost-glide vehicles that the U.S. military has in development now will be fire from road-mobile launchers, submarines, and aircraft, which could make it easier to separate them from the silo-launched GBSDs.

At the same time, it remains unclear how far along the U.S. Air Force may be in even considering arming its GBSDs with these hypersonic weapons. The new ICBMs are not set to enter service until the late 2020s or early 2030s. Subsequent upgrades for those missiles, which is how the Air Force framed the possible addition of a hypersonic boost-glide vehicle payload, would likely come sometime after that.

Still, it's notable that the service is exploring the option at all, which would represent a significant new addition to America's nuclear deterrent arsenal.
Contact the author: joe@thedrive.com

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  The U.S. government sent officials to Russia to inspect the weapon system under the terms of a strategic arms control deal.

 

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Belarus’ Crisis and European Security

Predictably and as a last resort, Belarusian President Lukashenka appealed to Russia on August 15, 2020. This appeal to Moscow urged Moscow to share or even take responsibility with him for ensu

www.realcleardefense.com

Belarus’ Crisis and European Security
By Stephen Blank
August 19, 2020
(AP Photo/Dmitri Lovetsky)

Predictably and as a last resort, Belarusian President Lukashenka appealed to Russia on August 15, 2020. This appeal to Moscow urged Moscow to share or even take responsibility with him for ensuring security in Belarus. From his standpoint, that means upholding Lukashenka’s continuing despotism amidst the democratic revolution that is occurring there in protest of his dictatorship and attempted theft of the August 9 election. Lukashenka attempted to force Russian President Putin’s hand by warning that if he did not intervene, the revolutionary tide engulfing Belarus would spread into Russia. Typically he also claimed that the demonstrations are a “color revolution ” instigated by Poland, Ukraine, and the West, i.e., the usual suspects. Of course, this siren song has had a significant audience in Moscow. But it is no truer today than in all the other previous cases used by Putin to justify aggression. Thus, when the chips were down, Lukashenka chose his own power over his country's independence, a common response of dictators in trouble. Meanwhile, there are proliferating reports of Russia readying forces for a potential intervention even if, as of August 16, that has not occurred. And a national general strike has been called for August 17.

Nevertheless, the risk of Russian intervention, either by force, subversion and fraud, or some combination thereof, remains an omnipresent and serious possibility. Indeed, Lukashenka is deploying an airborne brigade to the borders with Lithuania and Poland. Likewise, on August 16, Moscow confirmed its readiness to provide “all necessary assistance” to resolve the security problems in Belarus, following last week’s contested presidential election and “external pressure” on the Belarusian state.” Seen from Moscow, Russia’s kleptocracy's domino theory is vulnerable to democratic movements if their neighbors succumb to that threat lies at the heart of Russian security policy. Almost every aspect of Russian internal and foreign policy aims, in some measure, to prevent democratic resurgence in Russia, its neighbors, and to subvert Western polities so that they will accept Russia’s demand for unchecked autocratic power at home and for a neo-imperial sphere of influence in former Soviet territories. Beyond that, Russia’s “Silovye Struktury” (force structures) have, for years, assiduously built up reservoirs of leverage and influence in the U.S. and Europe as well as the former Soviet republics to subvert democratic processed in these countries, enfeeble them, and secure a lasting lodgment for pro-Russian forces that also argue on behalf of turning a blind eye to Russian imperialism in the former USSR if not elsewhere. Therefore, it must be made clear to Lukashenka and Putin that any use of force will rebound against them and involve Russia in a protracted and ever more costly standoff against the Belarussian people if not disaffected military forces and to greatly enhanced tensions with and military deployments on Belarus’ borders by NATO

Lukashenka’s domino theory instinctively resonates across the Russian elite for whom any manifestation of democracy, particularly in the former Soviet space, is perceived as the greatest possible security threat and as another manifestation of Washington and Europe’s unceasing efforts to undermine the Russian state and thwart its great power ambitions. Indeed, there have already been voices form Moscow calling for some kind of forceful intervention in Belarus, stating that “It is time for the “polite people’ (Russian forces) to impose order.” The West must resist such actions and encourage Belarus to find its own path to security without Russia's forceful intervention. In other words, we must find a way to deter a Russian intervention by bringing home to Moscow the costs and risk it will incur by so acting.

This also means that our governments must understand what the demonstrations in Belarus really mean, not only for the immediate region but also for European security.

First, the demonstrations in Belarus are part of a broader global uprising. They are part of the long-running process of what we saw in Ukraine in 2014. This revolution of dignity is also happening at home here in the Black Lives Matter movement and the massive civil rights demonstrations that have occurred this spring and summer in the U.S. It is also manifest in the continuing demonstrations at the other end of Russia in Khabarovsk against Muscovite high-handedness. We have seen numerous such revolutions in response to autocrats’ efforts to rig elections. As David Kramer and Michael McFaul have observed,

The situation in Belarus is tense and uncertain. The regime could lose its grip on power, as has already occurred in other democratic breakthroughs in Serbia 2000, Georgia 2003 and Ukraine 2004. Most recently, falsified presidential elections in Malawi in mid-2019 triggered massive popular uprisings, the results were annulled, and a rerun of election in 2020 brought to power the opposition challenger.

While Moscow may intervene with force and other instruments to suppress this revolution, it does so (as did its Soviet predecessors in 1968 Czechoslovakia) at the risk of closing off any way to reform its own system. In other words, Putin risks even greater and perpetual stagnation that could easily eventuate in a comparable Russian explosion against his system and regime.

Second, Belarus’ crisis shows that the process of dissolution of the Soviet Union has not yet run its course. Far too many of the post-Soviet regimes that came to power there have shown themselves unable to provide prosperity, security, or peace. Therefore, and they know this, their legitimacy and authority are always to some degree at risk because of their subpar performance and indifference to the needs of the people beyond the small elite groups that are attached to those regimes.

More importantly, Moscow has never accepted the genuine sovereignty and territorial integrity of any of these states and insists that for its own criminalized regime to stay in power, it must enjoy an unchallenged sphere of influence over these states. Therefore, it can only rule at home and exercise dominion abroad by fomenting a permanent state of siege within the CIS, (Commonwealth of Independent States), e.g., the many "frozen conflicts" among them and by supporting autocratic rulers in them while it also manufactures a perpetual state of war against the West. For that reason, there is a great danger that it may believe that using force in Belarus is vital to preserving its power in Moscow and can be done at minimal risk.

As we have noted, Russian autocracy and imperialism are only possible by enforcing a state of siege or war in Europe. Because Putin's regime depends on its durability, power, and ability to keep stealing from the Russian people on the perpetuation of this "besieged fortress" mentality throughout Russia, any autonomous politics in neighboring states, disproves the notion of the so-called Western threat. Worse yet, from Putin's standpoint, it also provides a salutary example to Russians of what they themselves could accomplish. Therefore, if possible, such regimes must be squelched sooner rather than later. Beyond that, since the greatest threat to European security remains Russia's strategy of “cross-domain coercion” against the democratic integration of Europe, any democratic advance undermines Russia's ability to hold Europe hostage to its own atavistic autocratic and imperial proclivities. Conversely, should Belarus' revolution by suppressed or suborned not only would Russian troops now be on the border of the Baltic States, Poland, and Ukraine, the state of siege in Europe would be intensified against Western interests.

Consequently, any invasion of Belarus and stationing there of Russian forces enhance the dangers to Europe by an order of magnitude. As Frederick Kagan writes,

If Putin gains the ability to station Russian ground and air defense forces on the Belarussian side of the gap as well, he can make NATO’s ability to support forces in the Baltics, let alone reinforce them in a crisis, extraordinarily difficult. With ground reinforcements an hour’s drive away, moreover, he can turn Kaliningrad from being a vulnerable exclave into a real knife at NATO’s throat.

In turn, that means a vastly enlarged NATO deployment in Poland, the Baltic States, Germany, and support for Ukraine, who will also have to militarize to meet the new threat to its north from these Russian forces.

At the same time, this crisis has already highlighted some of Moscow's enduring weaknesses. It simply cannot afford to take on the maintenance of Belarus and preserve the Russian economy even at its current level of stagnation that is arousing much popular discontent and also limiting its military capabilities. Second, there are indicators that this crisis also highlights Russia's rising dependence on China. President XI Jinping, not Putin, was the first to congratulate Lukashenko, a week ago, on his "victory." Putin, who reportedly loathes Lukashenka, knew the true situation and anyone, then had no choice but to follow China's lead. Further Russian isolation from the West and risk-taking in Belarus can only increase Moscow’s dependence upon Beijing and in European and Belarusian affairs, hardly the outcome Moscow wants or can easily tolerate.

Moscow also cannot afford a protracted war anywhere, particularly on its doorstep due to economic consequences of such a war and the ensuing political isolation it would thereby risk incurring. The Armenian revolution of 2018 proceeded unmolested by Russia despite calls form the ousted government for support because it pledged to support membership in the Eurasian Economic Union and the Collective Security Treaty Organization, Russia’s two institutional vehicles for keeping post-Soviet republics in line. Some have argued, therefore, that if Belarus follows this example, Putin will refrain from intervening.

However, it is by no means clear that Belarus can emulate Armenia. The sheer bloody-mindedness of Lukashenka's thuggish police forces in this crisis, his utter neglect of confronting the Covid-19 pandemic, and Belarus' economic stagnation have brought out an enormous number of Belarussians to demonstrate against him on August 16. And those massive demonstrations will continue until he resigns for nothing else is left to him. This massive public support, plus the refusal of elements of the Belarussian Army to support him, impede any forceful Russian military intervention though it does not make it impossible.

For all these reasons, the greater the likelihood of Lukashenka’s fall and demands for democracy, the greater the pressures are on Russia to intervene forcefully. Therefore, the West must take proactive action now to allow Belarus to find its own ‘center of gravity without external intervention. The U.S. and Europe must make clear to Putin the risks and costs of any Russian intervention. Kramer and McFaul have already argued that we should coordinate with Europe to reimpose sanctions on Lukashenka’s regime and demand the release of all political prisoners, warn that if violence continues the sanctions will extend to Lukashenka, his top officials, commanders, and to critical enterprises, particularly in the military-industrial enterprises. They also argue for choosing an American or Western mediating team to bring about a peaceful transition of the government to one based on the elections’ real outcome. Beyond that, they argue for warning Putin that any Russian invasion will trigger sanctions even more potent than those imposed in 2014 because of Ukraine's invasion. And Kagan even argues for a still more draconian imposition of sanctions should Moscow establish military bases there.

However, we should go farther than what they recommend. First, it should be clear that Russian use of force must inevitably entail larger and more permanent deployments throughout Poland, the Baltic States, Germany, and Ukraine's support against Russia. Beyond that, however, we should make it clear to Putin that there will be no summits with Washington or the E.U., something he has been desperately trying to arrange, and that he is putting the current arms control negotiations at risk. Since Moscow insists that it believes little will come out of these talks and that it opposes the Trump Administration’s correct insistence on a Chinese presence there, Russia is doing all it can to reduce the viability of those negotiations. And the resort to war in Europe will undermine any credibility that Russia might have there as a negotiating partner. Intervention in Belarus should make it clear that we will not participate in a futile charade with a state that habitually violates treaties it has signed, guaranteeing its neighbors' borders. In other words, the crisis in Belarus provides an opportunity for Western unity that should be seized in order to prevent another Russian effort to maintain an empire. Putin’s efforts to preserve this atavistic Muscovite imperial formation represent the greatest threat to security in Europe today, including to the Russian people themselves. The valiant people of Belarus' have done and are doing all they can, and it is in their and our interests that we act expeditiously to help them achieve the security, freedom, peace, prosperity, and dignity they seek. For only by doing so do we really advance the cause of peace in Europe and a Europe whole and free.

We should go further.
Stephen J. Blank, Ph.D., is Senior Fellow at FPRI’s Eurasia Program. He has published over 900 articles and monographs on Soviet/Russian, U.S., Asian, and European military and foreign policies, testified frequently before Congress on Russia, China, and Central Asia, consulted for the Central Intelligence Agency, major think tanks and foundations, chaired major international conferences in the U.S. and in Florence; Prague; and London, and has been a commentator on foreign affairs in the media in the U.S. and abroad. He has also advised major corporations on investing in Russia and is a consultant for the Gerson Lehrmann Group. He has published or edited 15 books, most recently Russo-Chinese Energy Relations: Politics in Command (London: Global Markets Briefing, 2006). He has also published Natural Allies? Regional Security in Asia and Prospects for Indo-American Strategic Cooperation (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2005). He is currently completing a book entitled Light From the East: Russia’s Quest for Great Power Status in Asia to be published in 2014 by Ashgate. Dr. Blank is also the author of The Sorcerer as Apprentice: Stalin’s Commissariat of Nationalities (Greenwood, 1994); and the co-editor of The Soviet Military and the Future (Greenwood, 1992).

 

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Iran announces locally made ballistic and cruise missiles amid U.S. tensions

Iran displayed a surface-to-surface ballistic missile on Thursday that Defence Minister Amir Hatami said had a range of 1,400 kilometres and a new cruise missile, ignoring U.S. demands that Tehran halt its missile programme.

www.reuters.com

WORLD NEWS
AUGUST 20, 2020 / 12:30 AM / UPDATED 15 MINUTES AGO
Iran announces locally made ballistic and cruise missiles amid U.S. tensions

Parisa Hafezi
2 MIN READ

DUBAI (Reuters) - Iran displayed a surface-to-surface ballistic missile on Thursday that Defence Minister Amir Hatami said had a range of 1,400 kilometres and a new cruise missile, ignoring U.S. demands that Tehran halt its missile programme.


A new missile unveiled by Iran is launched in an unknown location in Iran in this picture received by Reuters on August 20, 2020. WANA (West Asia News Agency) via REUTERS

“The surface-to-surface missile, called martyr Qassem Soleimani, has a range of 1,400 km and the cruise missile, called martyr Abu Mahdi, has a range of over 1,000 km,” Hatami said in a televised speech.

Pictures of the missiles were shown on state TV, which it said was “the newest Iranian cruise missile that will further strengthen Iran’s deterrence power”.

Soleimani, head of Iran’s elite Quds Force, and Iraqi militia commander Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis were killed in January in a U.S. strike on their convoy in Baghdad airport.

“Missiles and particularly cruise missiles are very important for us ... the fact that we have increased the range from 300 to 1,000 in less than two years is a great achievement,” said Iranian President Hassan Rouhani.

“Our military might and missile programmes are defensive.”

The announcement comes as Washington is pushing to extend a U.N.-imposed arms embargo against Iran, which is due to expire in October under Tehran’s 2015 nuclear deal with world powers.

Tensions have been high between Tehran and Washington since 2018, when President Donald Trump pulled out the United States from the deal and reimposed crippling sanctions on Iran.


Washington says its aim is to force Tehran to agree a broader deal that puts stricter limits on its nuclear work, curbs its ballistic missile program and ends its regional proxy wars. Iran has rejected talks as long as U.S. sanctions remain in place.

U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said on Wednesday Trump has directed him to trigger ‘snapback’ - a return of all U.S. sanctions on Iran - at the U.N. Security Council in New York on Thursday, after the council rejected Washington’s bid to extend Tehran’s arms embargo.

Writing by Parisa Hafezi; Editing by Toby Chopra and Alex Richardson

 

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USAF Rethinks Relationship Between Conventional, Nuclear Weapons | Air & Space Forces Magazine

The Air Force is crafting new policy that envisions more fluidity between conventional and nuclear weapons.

www.airforcemag.com

USAF Rethinks Relationship Between Conventional, Nuclear Weapons

Aug. 19, 2020 | By Rachel S. Cohen

The Air Force is crafting new policy that envisions more fluidity between conventional and nuclear weapons, as well as a broader range of options to keep others from using their own nuclear weapons.

The U.S. has long treated conventional and nuclear warfare as separate concepts, but that’s beginning to change, said Lt. Gen. Richard M. Clark, the Air Force’s deputy chief of staff for strategic deterrence and nuclear integration.

Over the past year and a half, nuclear experts on the Air Staff have crafted an overview of “conventional and nuclear integration,” in which American service members must be able to survive a conflict that involves a nuclear weapon.

“The multipolar world is presenting different challenges for us,” Clark said at an Aug. 19 Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies event. “The lines are a bit more blurred between conventional and nuclear, so that’s driven us to start thinking in ways that may be different than we thought about in the last 20 years or so.”

Video: Mitchell Institute on YouTube
A multipolar landscape, where China also poses a top nuclear threat, is the biggest difference from nuclear policy 30 years ago, when defusing tension with Russia was the singular goal, according to Maj. Gen. Michael J. Lutton, who oversees ICBMs as the head of 20th Air Force.

Now, adversaries see conventional and nuclear options as two points on a broader spectrum of conflict, rather than keeping nuclear warfare largely off-limits. Countries like Russia, China, and North Korea seem to understand they are outmatched by America’s non-nuclear bombs and missiles, and are looking for ways to exploit other weaknesses.

“We have to be able to reconstitute our capability. We have to be able to plan and execute integrated operations, multidomain, whether conventional or nuclear, and most importantly, we have to be able to fight in, around, and through that environment to achieve our objectives,” Clark said.

Russia appears to see so-called tactical nuclear weapons as one way to catch the U.S. off-guard in a regional fight, Clark said.

“It is very clear in their doctrine and in the capability, the non-strategic nuclear weapons that they have amassed over the years, it’s evident that that’s in their planning, that’s in their strategy and their thought process,” he said.

China is upgrading its own nuclear arsenal as well. The country has an “ambiguous no-first-use policy,” Clark said, and the U.S. believes China may walk away from that policy for the sake of self-preservation. He added North Korea is another wild card that could bring nuclear weapons to a conventional fight.

The Navy has in response started deploying its own tactical nukes, or those that have shorter ranges and lower yields than the nuclear missiles and bombs now owned by the Air Force and Navy. Experts disagree over whether a distinction should made between tactical and strategic nukes, given the power and long-lasting consequences either would wield. Proponents say tactical nuclear weapons could be an option without escalating to the all-out, last-resort nuclear war envisioned in policymaking.

This approach is different from the nuclear artillery of the Cold War, Clark added.

“What we’re trying to prepare ourselves to do is to respond with whatever force is necessary in a nuclear environment. It’s not so much to fight tactically. Really, the ultimate goal here is to deter,” he said. “We want to raise that threshold of using nuclear weapons, whether strategic or non-strategic … to the highest level possible.”

To do that, Clark argues the Air Force needs ways to stop others from using nuclear weapons in the first place, and options to retaliate if deterrence fails. Technology, training, and command-and-control requirements all need to be updated to support that approach. Legacy weapon systems are part of the puzzle, not just new designs, he said.

His remarks come as the Air Force marks 50 years since it placed the first Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile—the most recognizable Cold War weapon—on alert at Minot Air Force Base, N.D., on Aug. 19, 1970. Those ICBMs will be replaced starting in the late 2020s with Northrop Grumman’s Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent, a modern nuclear missile that could eventually accommodate steerable, hypersonic warheads.

The Air Force is also spending billions of dollars on new nuclear cruise missiles, gravity bombs, and bomber aircraft to replace aging systems, arguing it would be more costly and less effective to update the existing assets and unsafe to ditch them altogether. It will also add nukes to dual-capable aircraft like the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter for more flexibility.

Clark left open the idea that the Air Force could create a non-nuclear version of the Long-Range Standoff Weapon cruise missile. The service has dismissed that suggestion in the past because it is already buying Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile variants with increasingly longer ranges.

“Whether limited or large-scale nuclear, we have to be able to fight through that along the full spectrum of conflict,” Clark said. “That’s why we, as an Air Force and really the Department of Defense, are looking at this concept so we can be prepared to address the threat.”

The Air Force will send a capstone report to Congress and the Defense Department on its efforts to move conventional and nuclear integration ideas forward, and is shaping its acquisition plans accordingly, he added.

 

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South China Sea: Beijing's 'nuclear weapons plot' in contested region

SOUTH CHINA SEA tensions have resulted in the threat of Chinese nuclear weapons, an expert warned as Beijing pursues supremacy in the region.

www.express.co.uk

South China Sea: Beijing's 'nuclear weapons plot' in contested region revealed
SOUTH CHINA SEA tensions have resulted in the threat of Chinese nuclear weapons, an expert warned as Beijing pursues supremacy in the region.

By Charlie Bradley
PUBLISHED: 15:16, Fri, Aug 21, 2020 | UPDATED: 15:17, Fri, Aug 21, 2020


Several countries claim territorial rights in the South China Sea, which has become one of the most hostile regions on the planet. China and the US have increased their military presence in the region in recent years, but one expert warned of the threat of Chinese nuclear submarines. In 2014, China deployed the Jin-class ballistic missile submarine for the first time, each armed with 12 JL-2 nuclear missiles. Operating from a state-of-the-art base near Sanya, on Hainan island's southernmost tip, Jin class submarines started patrolling the depths of the South China Sea.
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  'Depart immediately!' Beijing issues warning to US in South China Sea as tensions explode

But in order to be within range of the US, they had to be able to break out into the Pacific Ocean.

Roughly contiguous to China's "nine-dash line" territorial claim in the South China Sea, the continental shelf drops to a deep basin of around 4,000m, offering better cover for submarines.

That is why some experts believe the deeper waters of the South China Sea, and China's enhanced anti-submarine efforts there, may offer a bastion for Chinese submarines in the future.

Analyst Alexander Neill warned in 2016 that nuclear submarines are central to China's plans in the region.

South China Sea: Chinese submarine (Image: getty)

South China Sea: Submarines are armed with nuclear weapons (Image: getty)

He said in his BBC article: "Mounting concern within the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) over the vulnerability of its land-based nuclear deterrent and the ability to deliver a retaliatory second strike has prompted China to place some of its nuclear warheads on board submarines."

A similar warning was made in a report by US group Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, studying China's island bases in the South China Sea.

The group says that some buildings "host what are most likely anti-aircraft guns", which have visible gun barrels in satellite images, while others are probably what it terms close-in weapons systems.

READ MORE: South China Sea: Pictures prove 'Beijing is serious' about weapons
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South China Sea mapped (Image: getty)

AMTI said: "These gun and probable close-in weapons systems emplacements show that Beijing is serious about defence of its artificial islands in case of an armed contingency in the South China Sea.

"Among other things, they would be the last line of defence against cruise missiles launched by the United States or others against these soon-to-be-operational air bases."

China's Defence Ministry said its deployment of military equipment was "legitimate and lawful" despite having agreed not to militarise the South China Sea.

The Spratly islands form the epicentre of the complex disputes, as China occupies seven features, and has heavily militarised its portion of the archipelago.
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South China Sea: A base in Spratly Islands (Image: getty)

South China Sea bases mapped (Image: getty)
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But Beijing is not alone on the islands. Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Taiwan have also staked claims in the Spratly chain, making the region the most complex and contested piece of the South China Sea puzzle.

Described by many as "island fortresses", China has engulfed the South China Sea with man made island bases, and has been accused of forming them specifically for military purposes.

The moving of its aircraft carriers, airstrips and weapons into the region has earned the cluster of bases the nickname: "The Great Wall of Sand."

Some photographs showed cargo ships and supply vessels, which the newspaper said appeared to be delivering construction materials to the China-controlled islands.

Others show runways, hangars, control towers, helipads and radomes as well as a series of multistorey buildings that China has built on reefs.

While China continues its relentless surge for military dominance, the US has regularly aggravated China by sending warships and aircraft carriers through waters Beijing deems to be its own.

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[Housecarl]

Hummm....considering this site does a lot of click baiting.....

Posted for fair use.....

Why the U.S. Military Needs Both 'Tactical' Nuclear Weapons and ICBMs

It might seem like a paradox: be ready to fight a limited “tactical” nuclear war and maintain an ability to ensure catastrophic annihilation of an enemy with nuclear weapons to keep the peace. This contradiction in terms, one might say, forms the conceptual basis for the Pentagon’s current...

nationalinterest.org

August 21, 2020 Topic: Security Blog Brand: The Buzz Tags: U.S. MilitaryNuclear WeaponsNuclear WarTactical Nuclear Weapons
Why the U.S. Military Needs Both 'Tactical' Nuclear Weapons and ICBMs

It might seem like a paradox: be ready to fight a limited “tactical” nuclear war and maintain an ability to ensure catastrophic annihilation of an enemy with nuclear weapons to keep the peace. This contradiction in terms, one might say, forms the conceptual basis for the Pentagon’s current nuclear-weapons strategy which not only calls for a new generation of ICBMs, but also directs the development and deployment of several low-yield, tactical nuclear weapons options.


by Kris Osborn



It might seem like a paradox: be ready to fight a limited “tactical” nuclear war and maintain an ability to ensure catastrophic annihilation of an enemy with nuclear weapons to keep the peace.

This contradiction in terms, one might say, forms the conceptual basis for the Pentagon’s current nuclear-weapons strategy which not only calls for a new generation of ICBMs, but also directs the development and deployment of several low-yield, tactical nuclear weapons options.

This includes nuclear-armed cruise missiles, submarine-launched nuclear weapons with low-yield warheads, and scalable air-launched nuclear missiles and glide bombs.

“The central idea is we must be able to survive in a conflict where the environment is characterized by the use of a nuclear weapon,” Lt Gen Richard M. Clark, Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration, told the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace in a video discussion.

The strategic basis for this, Clark maintained, is grounded in what he called CNI, meaning Conventional-Nuclear Integration. Such a tactical aim incorporates the development of dual-use weapons systems such as the emerging Long-Range Stand-Off weapon air-launched nuclear cruise missile which can fire with or without a nuclear payload.

The Pentagon has already deployed a new “low-yield submarine-launched ballistic missile,” armed with a nuclear payload enabled by a modified Trident II D5 re-entry body. The weapon, Pentagon officials tell TNI, is called the W76-2. The Pentagon used to have a nuclear-armed Tomahawk missile, something which seems to introduce some interesting questions about additional applications for low-yield warheads.

The Air Force is now refining a CNI Capstone Concept and report for Congress and the Pentagon leadership on the topic, to ensure that weapons development continues to incorporate a full-spectrum of nuclear-weapons capabilities.

The goal of developing tactical or “lower-yield” nuclear weapons, Clark explained, is quite different than that pursued by the U.S. during the Cold War.

“This is different from a Cold War mentality where we had nuclear artillery, short-range rockets where we had weapons that would allow us to fight tactically in a conflict. Today we are trying to prepare ourselves to respond with whatever force is necessary in a nuclear environment. It is not just to fight tactically but the ultimate goal is to deter,” Clark explained.

Interestingly, some have raised a concern that developing nuclear and conventional variants of the same weapon might lead an adversary to mistake a conventional attack for a nuclear one, therefore causing major unwanted escalation and starting a nuclear exchange. Others also maintain that there should not, in any fashion, be room for the concept of a “tactical” or “limited” nuclear war. Any use of nuclear weapons, the thinking goes, should result in complete and total nuclear destruction of the attacker.

Responding to some of these concerns, Clark maintained that there is a significant need for the U.S. to have and deploy a wide range of nuclear weapons for the specific purpose of ensuring an adversary does not ever “attempt” to use low-yield nuclear weapons by virtue of being assured they would face immediate nuclear retaliation.

“We want to raise the threshold to the highest level possible and let adversaries know we can counter any action that they may take and deliver consequences should deterrence fail. Deterrence is the ultimate goal, and this allows us to deter along the full spectrum of conflict. The ultimate goal is to ensure that the adversary does not miscalculate and think we have a weakness in this area,” Clark explained.

Kris Osborn is the new Defense Editor for the National Interest. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Masters Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University.

 

[Housecarl]

One of these days......

Posted for fair use.....

Pakistan Minister Sheikh Rashid threatens India of nuclear war, says ‘weapons will not target Muslims'

Srinagar: Threatening India of nuclear war once again, Federal Minister for Railways in Pakistan, Sheikh Rashid, has said that there is no scope for conventional war if the country is attacked by India and Pakistan will reply with nuclear weapons which "will save Muslim lives and will only...

freepresskashmir.news

Conflict
Pakistan Minister Sheikh Rashid threatens India of nuclear war, says ‘weapons will not target Muslims’

By News Desk
Posted on August 21, 2020

https://freepresskashmir.news/2020/...ar-war-says-weapons-will-not-target-muslims/#
Comments
Srinagar: Threatening India of nuclear war once again, Federal Minister for Railways in Pakistan, Sheikh Rashid, has said that there is no scope for conventional war if the country is attacked by India and Pakistan will reply with nuclear weapons which “will save Muslim lives and will only target regions.”

On August 19, in an interview with Pakistani media channel Samaa TV, Rashid claimed that Pakistan has very precise weapons which are “small and perfect”.

“If Pakistan gets attacked by India, there is no scope for a “conventional war”. This will be a bloody, final and nuclear war,” Rashid said.

The Pakistan minister also said that the weapons will only target certain regions and even Assam can now come under their range of attack.

He said that Pakistan will have no option in a conventional war and “if something will happen, it will be the end”, indicating a nuclear war.

“If Pakistan gets attacked by India, there is no scope for conventional war. This will be a bloody and nuclear war. It will be a nuclear war for sure. We have very calculated weapons which are small and perfect. Our weapons will save Muslim lives and will only target certain regions. Pakistan’s range now even includes Assam. Pakistan has no option in conventional war; therefore India knows if something happens, it will be the end,” Rashid said during an interview with the news channel.

In 2019, post abrogation of Article 370 that granted special status to Jammu and Kashmir, Prime Minister of Pakistan Imran Khan condemned the move by India at an international platform.

In August 2019, Khan had said that the world must know that when two nuclear countries face-off, the whole world gets harmed.

“I want to tell (Narendra) Modi that our Army is ready for anything. The world should know that when two nuclear countries face-off, the whole world will be harmed. I tell this to everyone I speak with,” Khan said while addressing the ‘Kashmir Hour’ rally on August 30 2019, in Pakistan.

Pakistan observed “Kashmir Hour” to express solidarity with the Kashmiri people after India revoked the special status of JK.

The main event was held at Islamabad’s Constitution Avenue where Khan delivered an address to a flag-waving and slogan-shouting crowd.

 

[Housecarl]

Hummm.....

Posted for fair use.....

USAF Errantly Reveals Research On ICBM-Range Hypersonic Glide Vehicle | Aviation Week Network

The U.S. Air Force’s nuclear weapons managers have started researching a key technology for an intercontinental range hypersonic glider.

aviationweek.com

USAF Errantly Reveals Research On ICBM-Range Hypersonic Glide Vehicle
Steve Trimble August 18, 2020

A February test of an unarmed Minuteman III ICBM yielded a fiery rocket plume into the clouds.
Credit: U.S. Air Force



The U.S. Air Force agency that manages the service’s nuclear arsenal has started research on enabling technology for an intercontinental-range hypersonic glide vehicle, according to a document that was briefly published in error on a public website.

Although the document shows that a U.S. nuclear weapons agency is researching hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) technology, senior Defense Department officials say there has been no change to a policy that “strictly” limits the emerging class of hypersonic gliders and cruise missiles to non-nuclear warheads.

• The Pentagon remains committed to non-nuclear role for hypersonics
• The Air Force removed the document from a public website

A request for information (RFI) published on Aug. 12 by the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center asks companies to submit ideas across seven categories of potential upgrades for ICBMs designed with a “modular open architecture.” The Air Force often describes the future Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) ICBM as featuring a “modular systems architecture,” in contrast with the aging Minuteman III, which does not.

Among the seven items on the upgrade list, the Air Force called for a new “thermal protection system that can support [a] hypersonic glide to ICBM ranges,” according to the RFI, which is no longer publicly available on the government’s procurement website.

The RFI may have disclosed information that the Air Force’s nuclear weapons buyers had not intended to be made public.

Each of the seven items listed in the RFI’s “scope of effort” for ICBM upgrades included a prefix designation of “U/FOUO,” a military marking for information that is unclassified but for official use only. Although not technically a classified secret, information marked as “FOUO” is usually withheld from the general public. The RFI was removed from Beta.sam.gov on Aug. 17 after Aviation Week inquired about the document with the Air Force and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

The Defense Department has three different operational prototypes for HGVs in development now: the Air Force’s AGM-183A Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon, the Army’s Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon and the Navy’s Intermediate-Range Conventional Prompt Strike. Once fired from an aircraft, a ground-launcher or submarine, all three are designed to strike targets with conventional warheads at intermediate range, which is defined as 1,500-3,000 nm by The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.

But the Pentagon has no acknowledged plan to develop an HGV with a range beyond 3,000 nm and maintains a policy that “strictly” prohibits arming any such weapon—regardless of range—with nuclear warheads. The two most senior staffers leading the hypersonic weapons portfolio reiterated that policy during a press conference on March 2.

“Our entire hypersonic portfolio is based on delivering conventional warheads,” said Mike White, assistant director of defense research and engineering for hypersonic weapons.

“Right,” agreed Mark Lewis, the director of defense research and engineering for modernization programs. “Strictly conventional.”

The Pentagon has not changed the policy since March 2, said Lt. Col. Robert Carver, a spokesman for Lewis’ office.

“[The Defense Department] is not developing nuclear-capable hypersonic weapons,” Carver wrote in an email. “There are common technology needs between the nuclear enterprise and hypersonic systems. Particularly in the area of high-temperature materials, we typically collaborate on the development of advanced dual-use materials technology. I will reiterate that our entire hypersonic program portfolio continues to be based on delivering conventional effects only.”

The threshold requirements for the initial version of the GBSD entering service in 2030 do not include an HGV for the reentry system, said Lt. Gen. Richard Clark, the Air Force’s deputy chief of staff for strategic deterrence and nuclear integration. However, Clark, who spoke during an Aug. 19 webinar hosted by the Mitchell Institute, noted that the GBSD is designed with a flexible architecture, allowing future variants to add new capabilities easily.

“GBSD does have an open architecture,” Clark said. “It gives us an ability to incorporate emerging technologies or technologies we need to counter whatever threats we face in the future. If we decide down the road that there’s a particular technology that needs to be incorporated, we will be able to do that.”

Although the Pentagon upholds the conventional-only policy for hypersonic gliders and scramjet-powered cruise missiles, the source of the RFI raises questions, says James Acton, co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

“The fact that [this RFI] is coming from the Nuclear Weapons Center, it makes it sound an awful lot like this would at least be nuclear-armed or conceivably dual-capable,” says Acton.

Although the RFI confirms research is underway, the Defense Department still has no acknowledged plans to proceed from basic research into the acquisition phase of an ICBM-range hypersonic glider, whether carrying a conventional or nuclear warhead. If the thermal-protection system technology is limited only to research, the RFI by the Air Force’s nuclear weapons organization may not violate the Pentagon’s policy, which may apply only to fielded weapons.

“[The Defense Department] does a lot of research on a lot of different things, and the vast majority of these programs never turns into an acquisition,” says Acton. “It could turn into something, but sophisticated observers recognize that it may not.”

The Pentagon’s conventional-only policy for maneuvering hypersonic weapons stands apart from other countries in the field. Russia, for example, has deployed the nuclear-armed Avangard HGV on the SS-19 ICBM. In February, the head of U.S. Northern Command, Gen. Terrence O’Shaughnessy, said in written testimony submitted to Congress that “China is testing a [nuclear-armed] intercontinental-range hypersonic glide vehicle, which is designed to fly at high speeds and low altitudes, complicating our ability to provide precise warning.”

The Pentagon has never had an announced weapons development program for a conventional- or nuclear-armed intercontinental-range HGV but has experimented with air-launched gliders. DARPA’s Hypersonic Test Vehicle 2 program attempted to demonstrate a range of 4,170 nm, but each experimental glider in two tests staged in 2010 and 2011 failed about 9 min. into a planned 30-min. hypersonic glide.

The leading edges of an intercontinental-range HGV could be exposed to temperatures as high as 7,000K (12,000F) on reentry, then endure a prolonged glide phase compared with an intermediate-range system, says Christopher Combs, who researches hypersonic aerodynamics as an assistant professor at the University of Texas, San Antonio.

“The bottom line is it’s just crazy temperatures,” says Combs. “They’re not dealing with space shuttle or Apollo [capsule] temperatures, but it’s still really hot.”

The rescinded RFI, meanwhile, also may provide a rare glimpse into the Air Force’s plans for the new ICBM developed under the GBSD program.

Apart from the thermal protection system for a hypersonic glider, the scope of effort in the RFI sought industry input on a variety of topics, including the following:

• Fusing data from lower-fidelity onboard sensors to improve guidance, navigation and control
• New navigation aids to correct inertial measurement unit drift on long time of flight missions
• A lighter, smaller and more efficient “future fuze” that also could “accept inputs from external subsystems”
• Radiation hardening techniques for advanced microelectronics such as a system on a chip or system in package
• Improved computer hardware and software, including artificial intelligence algorithms
• A more secure architecture and better security sensors for ICBM ground facilities.

The Air Force plans to award the contract to Northrop Grumman by the end of the month to launch the engineering and manufacturing development contract for the GBSD. Northrop remained the sole bidder for the program to deliver more than 600 new ICBMs to the Air Force after a Boeing-led team withdrew from the competition last year.

Steve Trimble
Steve covers military aviation, missiles and space for the Aviation Week Network, based in Washington DC.

 

[jward]

Radiation detections in northern Europe: what we do and don’t know
By Cheryl Rofer, August 21, 2020

On June 22 and 23, the SEP63 radiation-monitoring station in Sweden detected ruthenium 103, cesium 134, and cesium 137—isotopes associated with nuclear fission—at levels higher than usual, but not harmful for human health. The possible source region in the 72 hours preceding the detection is shown in orange. Two Russian nuclear reactors are located within the suspect region. Credit: Lassina Zerbo/Twitter

Alarming events may not be what they initially seem. When an enormous explosion created a mushroom cloud over Beirut on August 4, some people immediately jumped to the wrong conclusion, spreading rumors on social media that a nuclear bomb had gone off. It hadn’t.
Eventually it became clear that the explosion was caused by chemicals stored improperly in warehouses at Beirut’s port. But weapons experts knew from the start that the powerful explosion was not nuclear, because it did not produce a blinding flash of light, or a blast of heat intense enough to set a city on fire. In the hours that followed the explosion, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), which operates a network of monitoring stations around the world, did not detect a telltale spike in atmospheric radiation.

That last clue is how experts are able to narrow down the location of nuclear events, from the smallest accidents to major disasters like Chernobyl, and to make educated guesses about what happened. A release of nuclear material spreads its signature on the wind. But that signature is often incomplete or garbled.
Nuclear experts are still puzzling over a mysterious event that happened in June, when several monitoring stations in northern Europe detected extremely small quantities of radionuclides in the atmosphere. That event was not a nuclear weapons test, because the CTBTO stations did not detect any seismic activity. So what was it? Experts have scrutinized the radiation signature and narrowed down the possibilities. The finger points to Russia.

Radiation alerts. Radioisotope monitoring stations cover most of the globe. The CTBTO runs the biggest network. National radiation safety agencies—for example, in Finland and Sweden—operate other stations. Universities also operate monitoring stations, often in cooperation with the CTBTO or national agencies. Independent monitoring organizations, like the volunteer-driven Safecast, also report radiation measurements.
In early June, Norwegian monitoring stations and a CTBTO station detected iodine 131 in far northern Norway. On June 16 and 17, Finland’s Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) detected cobalt 60, ruthenium 103, cesium 134, and cesium 137 in Helsinki. On June 22 and 23, a CTBTO station in Sweden detected ruthenium 103, cesium 134, and cesium 137.
Radiation is easy to detect at low levels. The iodine 131 readings were around 1 microbecquerel per cubic meter of air. (A microbecquerel is one atomic disintegration per second in one million cubic meters of air.) But our knowledge of the Chernobyl explosion began with measuring small amounts of radionuclides, so any detection raises an alert.

Interpreting the detections. The types of radionuclides detected also provide information. The radionuclides detected in June, except cobalt 60, are produced by nuclear fission. The half-lives of iodine 131 and ruthenium 103 are 8 days and 39 days, respectively, so they must be from recent fission events. These are common fission products from a nuclear reactor. A wider suite of radionuclides would help to pin down what kind of reactor.
The iodine 131 detection is ambiguous, though. It is produced by fission, but it is also used fairly commonly to treat hyperthyroidism, in pet cats as well as people. It is easily sent into the air. So it may come from sewage plants or other sources. The fact that it showed up without the other fission products means that its source may be something other than a nuclear accident.
Cobalt 60 is not a fission product, but rather an activation product of steel that has been in or very close to a nuclear reactor. It doesn’t usually show up with fission products. It could mean that something was broken in the reactor that released the fission products, or it could be that the Finnish reading was in error.

Narrowing down the location. Airborne radionuclides by themselves cannot tell us how or precisely where they were released. The CTBTO tweeted a map indicating the region in northern Europe where the June release may have occurred. This map was probably constructed by tracing the winds during the period just before the radionuclides were detected. A couple of Russian nuclear power plants are located in the area identified, which also covers the location where the United States believes a Russian experimental reactor exploded last summer while it was being raised from the seabed.
Last month’s release was probably a minor incident, like a breach in a filter at a nuclear power plant. But Russia has said that there were no incidents at its nuclear power plants. The presence of cobalt 60 and the location have led some to suggest that the release may have been from a new attempt to raise that experimental reactor.
It’s not possible, with the limited additional data available so far, to do more than guess the origin of the June radionuclides. The source of a similarly ambiguous release of ruthenium 106 in 2017 took two years to identify. In that case, the release of a single fission product suggested a processing facility, and the wind patterns suggested the Mayak facility in Russia. A detailed study of the stable ruthenium isotopes collected with the ruthenium 106 confirmed those early provisional conclusions.

Pinning down the
source.
Last year’s deadly accident seems to have occurred when a reactor for an experimental nuclear-powered cruise missile was being lifted from the seabed. Again, radionuclide readings from monitoring stations some distance from the source gave early warning to the rest of the world. The amounts and numbers of radionuclides were larger than in the recent release, and reporting on the accident, as people were brought to hospitals, provided more information, including radioisotope detection closer to the site, along with satellite photos and, later, photos of the damaged barge. The radioisotopes indicated that a fission source was involved, although early reports from Russia described an “isotopic source,” a phrase usually reserved for single-isotope heat sources, which would be unsuitable for propulsion.
In all three of these cases over the past three years, the radionuclides initially detected by air sampling were ambiguous. Additional information was needed to pin down a source. The best information would come from the country responsible for the release – in all three cases, Russia, which is a signatory to the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident.
Somebody knows what happened in these cases. We need to hear from them.

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Radiation detections in northern Europe: what we do and don’t know

Only the Russians know the source of the small radiation releases detected over northern Europe in June. So far, they aren’t talking.

thebulletin.org