WAR 08-20-2016-to-08-26-2016_____****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
New Russia-China-Iran Alliance Could Push US Out Of Much Of The Middle East
Started by Possible Impactý, Yesterday 07:47 PM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...-Could-Push-US-Out-Of-Much-Of-The-Middle-East

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CONFIRMED: India pledges support for Assad after meeting in Damascus
Started by Possible Impactý, Yesterday 09:21 AM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...s-support-for-Assad-after-meeting-in-Damascus

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http://www.defensenews.com/articles/indian-minister-visits-middle-east-signaling-new-focus-on-region

Indian Minister Visits Middle East, Signaling New Focus on Region

By: Vivek Raghuvanshi, August 18, 2016 (Photo Credit: John Moore/Getty Images)

NEW DELHI -- India's junior Foreign Minister Mobashar Jawad Akbar is visiting the Middle East from Aug. 17 to 23, including Syria, Iraq and Lebanon, and the trip is being interpreted by analysts here as a break away from an earlier policy to keep a distance.

"The visit is part of an effort to bring greater clarity in Indo-West Asian relations," an official of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) said.

Akbar will be the first minister to visit Syria since the eruption of civil war in 2011.

"Having a large Muslim population here in India has so far kept officials away [from such visits], which could be interpreted as taking sides in a sectarian conflict in West Asia. However, Akbar's visit signals a break from the stay-away policy," says defense analyst Nitin Mehta.

"The visit is not strategic in nature but only an attempt to break away from the policy and understand first-hand what is happening on the ground," adds Mehta.

Akbar is scheduled to visit Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and Foreign Minister Walid Al-Moallem.

"India asked its minister to go ahead with the visit to Syria, as the US and Russia -- once at loggerheads over Assad -- are now jointly cooperating against the Islamic State," dubbed IS, Mehta said.

"New Delhi has been avoiding to name IS in public statements, but now openly IS the biggest threat to peace in West Asia," the MEA official said.
 
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Housecarl

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http://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-india-defence-idUSKCN10X29W

World News | Mon Aug 22, 2016 7:05pm EDT

Afghans push India for more arms, despite Pakistan's wary eye

By Sanjeev Miglani | NEW DELHI

India is set to deliver more arms to Afghanistan to help it fight Islamist militants, Kabul's envoy to New Delhi said, even if Pakistan is wary of closer military cooperation between countries lying to its east and west.

India has provided a little over $2 billion in economic assistance to Afghanistan in the last 15 years, but has been more measured in providing weapons in order to avoid a backlash from Pakistan, which sees Afghanistan as its area of influence.

Last December, after years of dragging its feet, New Delhi announced the supply of four attack helicopters in India's first transfer of lethal equipment to the government in Kabul since the hardline Islamist Taliban movement was toppled.

Kabul immediately deployed three of the Russian Mi-25 attack helicopters to go after insurgents, and the fourth will be inducted in the next few weeks.

Shaida Mohammad Abdali, the Afghan ambassador to India, said regional security was deteriorating and Afghan national forces were in dire need of military supplies to tackle the Taliban, Islamic State and other militant groups.

"We are grateful for the four helicopters. But we need more, we need much more. Today we are heading into a situation that is worrisome for everyone in the region including India," he told Reuters in an interview.

On Aug. 29, the head of the Afghan army, General Qadam Shah Shahim, is expected in New Delhi to submit a list of military equipment drawn up in consultation with the U.S. military, Indian defense officials said.

It is not yet clear how much would be paid for and how much would be handed over for free.

The equipment includes more Mi-25s, smaller helicopters used for transporting troops and medical emergencies, and spares for existing Russian-origin aircraft in the Afghan air force fleet.

"The agenda for the army chief's visit is clear. We will be finalizing the enhancement of defense ties," Abdali said. India, he added, had told the Afghans that it would do whatever it could to meet the security forces' requirements.


INDIAN LEADER RANKLES PAKISTAN

The fact that much of the proposed equipment originates from Russia need not be a stumbling block to an agreement, the United States has said, despite Western sanctions against Moscow.

Russia and the United States share a common goal in stabilizing Afghanistan, and India can act as a go-between to help re-equip Afghan forces which fall well short of the capacity required despite billions of dollars in U.S. spending.

The Afghan government lost control or influence of nearly 5 percent of its territory between January and May, the U.S. government's top watchdog on Afghanistan said in a report, highlighting the challenges its forces are facing.

But the move to increase cooperation with Afghanistan is likely to aggravate fears in Pakistan of being wedged between two hostile neighbors.

Relations with both countries have cooled lately.

Afghanistan says Pakistan must do more to stop militants operating on its territory, while India has blamed Pakistan for unrest in the disputed region of Kashmir.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi turned up the dial a notch by making a rare reference to Pakistan's restive Baluchistan province in a recent speech.

Asked about the prospect of closer military ties between Afghanistan and India, a Pakistan foreign ministry spokesman said the government did not comment on bilateral ties between two countries.

But he warned against attempts to destabilize Pakistan, which, like its arch-rival India, has a nuclear arsenal.

"Our expectation is that India should not be allowed to use Afghan soil to create instability in Pakistan."

According to an Indian defense ministry official, discussions with Kabul included the possibility of increasing the number of Afghan officers being trained in Indian military institutions each year from around 800 now.


U.S. SUPPORT

The United States, which has allocated more than $68 billion to train and equip the Afghan security forces since 2002, has welcomed greater Indian military assistance to fill shortfalls in hardware and personnel.

Earlier this month, the commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, General John Nicholson, held talks with Indian officials to find ways in which New Delhi could help the Afghan air force, which is struggling to maintain aging Russian aircraft because of sanctions on Moscow.

Nicholson said donor nations had contributed $4.5 billion to Afghanistan, but those funds could not be used to buy Russian aircraft or spare parts because of the restrictions triggered by the conflict in Ukraine.

India is not constrained by such considerations and can export Russian-made equipment it already owns or source hardware and spares from Russia to send on to Afghanistan.

"Any additional aircraft or spare parts that India can provide Afghanistan would be greatly appreciated and welcomed by them to help build and maintain the Afghan Air Force," Nicholson said at the end of his trip.

A Russian diplomat said Moscow supported efforts to strengthen Afghan forces, even if it cannot directly equip it.

"Our policy is simple; we would not like to be involved directly, but we would support any initiative that strengthens the ability of the Afghan authorities to fight against terrorist groups and stabilize the situation in the country," the diplomat said.


(Additional reporting by Doug Busvine in New Delhi, Josh Smith in Kabul and Tommy Wilkes in Islamabad; Editing by Mike Collett-White)

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Housecarl

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https://newrepublic.com/article/135682/stolen-war

The Stolen War

How corruption and fraud created a failed state in Iraq—and led directly to the rise of ISIS.

By Ken Silverstein
August 22, 2016

A few years ago, when Iraqi prime minister Nuri Al Maliki was still in office, a group of his closest aides traveled to Amman, Jordan, and rented suites in one of the city’s most luxurious hotels. They were there for meetings with foreign businessmen who had flown in to seek a lucrative contract for an energy-related project—one that would help rebuild Iraq’s battered infrastructure. Baghdad, like much of Iraq, remained in a state of chaos, and was thus too dangerous for visitors. Amman also offered greater discretion than the Iraqi capital, which was an essential condition for the meetings: The businessmen had come to offer bribes to Maliki and other senior government officials in return for the contract.

The meetings were presided over by Gata Njeiman Al Rikabi, the prime minister’s chief of protocol. Rikabi and Maliki had a reputation for corruption and ruthlessness. Munir Haddad, head of the special court that handed down Saddam Hussein’s death sentence, filed a complaint in 2014 charging that the two officials had threatened to kill him if he didn’t halt an investigation into their alleged use of the security services to murder political and business opponents. Days after filing, Haddad was the target of a failed assassination attempt; the investigation has not proceeded.

According to one of the businessmen who attended the meetings in Amman, Rikabi’s terms were simple: Whoever won the contract would hand over a 45 percent stake in the deal—plus a hefty payment in advance—to an Iraqi firm controlled by officials close to Maliki. The Iraqi firm would, in turn, use the payment to make kickbacks to various senior politicians—mostly Shias from Maliki’s ruling Dawa Party, but also a few Kurdish officials who needed to give their approval before an energy project could be built in their territory.

“The Shias who ran the company didn’t know anything about the project—they were just eager beavers who wanted to get rich,” the businessman says. “It had nothing to do with technical ability or expertise: Rikabi was just distributing money. As an investor, you might not see any profit for five or six years, if ever. But the politicians had to be paid up front.”

None of the businessmen at the meeting were surprised by the openness or extent of the corruption. Foreign firms bidding to help rebuild Iraq were often ordered to take on Iraqi officials as partners—sometimes multiple subcontractors—in order to secure a deal. U.S. tax dollars sent to arm Iraqi soldiers in the fight against Al Qaeda would frequently vanish into Swiss bank accounts. The weapons would never materialize—or worse, they would end up in the hands of America’s enemies. Graft and fraud were so widespread, in fact, that they helped pave the way for an entirely new threat: The firm that won the energy contract in Amman was unable to complete the project, because the territory where it was located was soon overrun by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, better known as ISIS.

The causes of America’s devastating misadventure in Iraq remain an enduring source of debate. How could the United States, after spending an estimated $1.7 trillion in tax dollars and deploying more than 115,000 soldiers to topple Saddam Hussein and rebuild the country, wind up with a failed state that has given rise to a brutal new brand of terrorism? Was it a failure of military strategy, or of political will? Did we end the war too soon, or wait too long to get out? Did we spend too little on rebuilding the country’s infrastructure, or target our aid in the wrong places?

The answer may be far simpler, and ultimately more humiliating: The men we placed in charge of Iraq robbed us blind. If American resources had been used as mandated, rather than pocketed by our allies, ISIS as we know it would not exist.

“Maliki and his guys had it down to a science,” says the businessman who bid on the energy deal. “You didn’t always know who was getting greased, but it was always government officials, and Maliki got a cut on every deal. They set up an elaborate system that made it look like development was taking place with legitimate contracting and bids, but it was all graft. That’s where a lot of American money disappeared.”

It is hard to overstate the devastating role that corruption has played in the failure of Iraq and the rise of ISIS. According to a report last March by the Iraqi parliament’s auditing committee, the country’s defense ministry has spent $150 billion on weapons during the past decade—but acquired only $20 billion worth of arms. Much of the equipment it did obtain was useless, 1970s-era matériel from former Soviet bloc states that was invoiced at up to four times its actual value. Late last year, well-placed sources tell me, the Pentagon delivered a shipment of new weapons to the Iraqi government, including .50-caliber sniper rifles, which were supposed to be sent to Sunni fighters in Anbar Province. Instead, corrupt officials in the Iraqi ministries of interior and defense sold the arms to ISIS, which is using them to kill Kurdish peshmerga fighters.

“The Kurds are still using equipment we gave them in 2003,” says a former CIA official who spends a good deal of time in Iraq. “They’re forced to buy ammo and weapons that the U.S. government gives to Baghdad from corrupt Iraqi government officials.”

Weapons aren’t the only target for corruption. When it comes to the vast sums of money that have flowed into Iraq for reconstruction and economic development, officials at every level of government have been more focused on lining their own pockets than rebuilding their ruined country. Foreign companies seeking business in Iraq frequently hire well-connected intermediaries, who then bribe senior officials in return for contracts. In one case that recently came to light, several U.S. energy giants, including Weatherford and FMC Technologies, retained a Monaco-headquartered energy-sector firm called Unaoil. As recently as 2012, Unaoil was doling out millions of dollars to senior Iraqi officials, who then awarded contracts to Unaoil clients—frequently with super-inflated profits guaranteed, because the government had agreed to purchase products and services at super-inflated prices. Money that was intended for reconstruction wound up being siphoned off by corrupt officials and private companies.

Internal emails reveal that Unaoil paid its largest bribes to two Iraqi officials code-named M and Teacher. The latter was Hussain Al Shahristani, who served as Maliki’s deputy prime minister and oil minister. (He’s currently Iraq’s minister of education.) M was Kareem Luaibi, who succeeded Shahristani as oil minister. Another recipient of Unaoil’s largesse was Dhia Jaffar Al Mousawi—known as Lighthouse in internal emails—who served as an oil adviser to several prime ministers, including Maliki. He has since been appointed Iraq’s deputy minister for oil refineries.

“Technocrats have been replaced at key ministries by political hacks who are beholden to their parties,” says Erik Gustafson, director of the Education for Peace in Iraq Center. “There’s no competition for government contracts because they go to party favorites.”

A particularly brazen and relatively new form of corruption involves handing out major foreign contracts to phantom companies. In 2013, Maliki’s government signed a $6 billion deal with a Swiss firm called Satarem to build and operate a refinery that could process 150,000 barrels of oil per day. But it turned out that Satarem was a front operation incapable of fulfilling the contract. It was registered to a law firm in the small town of Zug, its owners were anonymous, and its available capital totaled only $450,000. When the scam came to light, Maliki’s government suspended the contract and launched an investigation. But last February, the government quietly reconfirmed the deal, which guarantees the refinery concession to Satarem for 50 years.

“The refinery is never going to be built,” says Ahmed Mousa Jiyad, a former senior official at the Iraq National Oil Company who has served as a consultant to the Commission of Integrity, the independent agency authorized by U.S. officials in 2004 to root out corruption. “This is an unknown company without the necessary financial resources or logistical experience. It’s apparent that the contract was awarded to Satarem because it established relationships with corrupt officials.”

Such corruption isn’t just illegal—it’s a massive impediment to creating a stable Iraq. For all practical purposes, Iraq is no longer a single, unified country. Many analysts predict that it will soon break apart entirely, or devolve into three loosely federated states: a Shia regime controlling everything from Baghdad to Basra; a Kurdish government in the north; and a Sunni rump state, centered in Anbar Province, that will rival Palestine in its misery. The chaos encourages and enables corruption: As ISIS has grown into the world’s most dangerous terrorist organization, the Iraqi government has been paying for huge transactions in the provinces with cash trucked in from Baghdad, and political parties remain free under Iraqi law to accept unlimited funding from foreign countries. “There’s a huge focus on making gains against ISIS, which is understandable,” Gustafson says. “But before ISIS there was Al Qaeda in Iraq. If ISIS were eliminated, another group would replace it. As long as you have corruption and misery on this scale, you’ll have an environment where terrorism can thrive.”

Looting American aid and contracts has enabled Iraq’s elite to enjoy lavish lifestyles more suited to Beverly Hills than Baghdad. Private McMansion-style neighborhoods protected by armed guards have popped up across the country, and freshly minted aristocrats navigate the potholed streets in foreign-made luxury cars, dining at restaurants where the cuisine rivals that found in Western capitals. Corrupt officials and businessmen have moved vast sums to offshore havens in Jordan, Dubai, and Singapore, and into London real estate. According to the Commission of Integrity, $6 billion in funds belonging to the Iraqi government was recently discovered in a basement in Lebanon, and another $14 billion was illegally sent to the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Iran, the United States, and various European countries. Last October, Adil Nuri, a member of parliament and spokesman for the integrity commission, announced that ten former ministers—including those responsible for defense, oil, interior, transportation, and commerce—had committed acts of massive fraud. “We have ministers who are accused of taking $900 million,” Nuri said. “Some fake ministry contracts are worth $1.5 billion.”

Corruption in Iraq reaches across religious and ethnic lines, although those in the Shia majority have reaped the lion’s share of the dirty money. Maliki, who remains the most powerful man in the country, developed an infrastructure of graft during his tenure as prime minister by consolidating control over the defense ministry and the internal security and intelligence agencies, as well as the electoral commission. But corruption also extends to the Kurdish north, where the family of Masoud Barzani, president of the Kurdistan Regional Government since 2005, has looted a massive cut of government revenues. Another prominent Kurdish political leader, Barham Salih, lived modestly in Maryland before the U.S. invasion in 2003. Today he owns a large estate in the Majidi Mall area of Erbil, Iraq, a new enclave for the wealthy. Former Deputy Prime Minister Saleh Al Mutlaq, a member of the Sunni minority, divides his time between Baghdad and Amman, where he has, according to one well-placed source, bought a huge estate with government funds he pocketed. “The government is like a cake,” says Hameed Al Gaood, a businessman from Anbar Province and the son of a Sunni tribal sheikh from the region. “Everyone has a slice of it.”

What is most shocking about the widespread corruption is how brutally the Iraqi government deals with reformers who are fighting fraud and graft—and how the Obama administration has ignored the overt retaliation. Last September, Nathim Naeem, an employee of Iraq’s trade ministry, was killed in a car bombing just as he was preparing to deliver documents to the Commission of Integrity exposing corruption at his agency. (Trade Minister Abdul Kareem was investigated in connection with the murder, but was soon cleared.) Indeed, the integrity commission itself has faced intimidation since its founding. Judge Radhi Hamza Al Radhi, the first head of the commission, received anonymous death threats after Maliki’s government pressured him to ease up on corrupt officials. Radhi resigned and fled to the United States, where he was granted asylum in 2008.

The conventional wisdom is that George W. Bush is to blame for the catastrophe in Iraq, and that Barack Obama has done the best he can to manage the disaster he inherited. But Bush’s tenure as commander-in-chief ended five years after the invasion; Obama has owned this debacle for the past eight. Maliki, the man most responsible for the corruption and sectarian violence that have shattered the country, served six of his eight years as prime minister under Obama. His successor, Prime Minister Haider Al Abadi, has recently made a few stabs at reform, though he has been unable to sweep aside the thousands of corrupt appointees to government ministries. The reality is that corruption is now so thoroughly entrenched in Iraq that it will be almost impossible to excise.

The year before Obama was elected, the chief investigator for the Commission of Integrity, Salam Adhoob, fled to the United States. Like Radhi before him, Adhoob had received death threats, and more than 30 of his co-workers had been murdered. Appearing before the U.S. Senate, he testified that “corruption and waste” were widespread throughout the Iraqi government, especially at the defense ministry, “where cronyism, party favoritism, nepotism, and the lack of even minimal financial controls resulted in the embezzlement, theft, and waste of billions of American taxpayer dollars.”

In one case of fraud among hundreds, Adhoob discovered a shell company called Al Aian Al Jareya that was controlled by Nair Mohammed Ahmed Jummaily, the brother-in-law of Iraq’s defense minister. Jummaily had gotten rich by taking kickbacks from American companies that received contracts from the Iraqi government. Among Jummaily’s clients, Adhoob testified, was AM General, a company based in South Bend, Indiana, which allegedly funneled millions of dollars to Jummaily’s front company as part of a contract to deliver Humvees to the Iraqi army. According to Adhoob, AM General submitted invoices totaling $18.4 million to the Iraqi government for work that was not performed, and delivered fewer than 170 of the 520 Humvees called for in its contract.

Where did all the money go? According to Adhoob, Jummaily was “a well-known Al Qaeda supporter” who funneled some of the cash into Al Qaeda bank accounts in Amman. “I am convinced—beyond a shred of doubt—that American soldiers died because of this corruption,” Adhoob testified. “Iraq never received the armored vehicles it ordered from AM General. Al Qaeda had better weapons than the Iraqi army because of this corruption.”

Jummaily was never prosecuted for the alleged kickbacks. AM General, which denies the charges, remains a major U.S. government contractor. In April, Hillary Clinton, who was seeking to win the Indiana primary, toured its facilities in South Bend and praised its corporate leadership.

With little chance of reform in Washington, Iraqis are taking to the streets in Baghdad. The same month that Clinton toured AM General, hundreds of Iraqis stormed the Green Zone and overran the parliament building. Muqtada al-Sadr, the radical Shia cleric and U.S. antagonist, touched off the demonstrations by calling for “the great popular uprising and the great revolution to stop the march of corrupted officials.”

Demonstrations have continued throughout the summer. In another protest that underscored the cost of corruption, Iraqis marched to express their outrage over an ISIS car bombing that killed more than 200 people in July. The bombers had driven through a security checkpoint—but the guards had scanned the car with bomb detectors that were nothing but fakes. The devices had no batteries or electronic components—just a radio antenna that swiveled. The U.S. and Iraqi governments have known for years that the devices—which Iraqis mockingly call “soup detectors”—are useless. The Iraqi defense ministry spent at least $85 million to purchase them from a British con man named James McCormick, who is currently serving ten years in prison for fraud.


Ken Silverstein is the creator of washingtonbabylon.com, a new political and gossip tabloid. He’s also a contributing editor to Vice and a columnist for the New York Observer.
 

Housecarl

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Posted for fair use.....
http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2016/08/23/0301000000AEN20160823007251315.html

(LEAD) N. Korea lays land mines near border to prevent defection by soldiers: sources

2016/08/23 17:51

(ATTN: TRIMS para 2-3, 9; DATES with UNC reaction in last 3 paras)

SEOUL, Aug. 23 (Yonhap) -- North Korea was seen laying anti-personnel mines along its side of the inter-Korean border, presumably to block potential defection by its own soldiers, a government source said Tuesday.

"Several North Korea military-laid land mines were seen on the northern side of a bridge in Panmunjom last week," the source said. The small bridge known as the Bridge of No Return is located within the truce village and spans the military demarcation line between the two Koreas.

It was the first time North Korea was seen planting mines in Panmunjom since the inter-Korean armistice agreement in July 1953, although two South Korean soldiers were maimed last August in mine blasts blamed on the North in the eastern part of the inter-Korean border.

The source said the North Korean action "appears to be designed to prevent its front-line servicemen from defecting."

Commenting on the issue, another military official said it indicates possible unrest among front-line soldiers. In the past, North Korean soldiers that defected were mostly posted in non-frontline areas.

North Korea reportedly cherry picks frontline servicemen for their loyalty to the regime because they are often exposed to the South Korean military's psychological operations along the demilitarized zone (DMZ).

The DMZ is a four-kilometer wide military buffer zone which bisects the two Koreas.

Following the land-mine attack a year earlier, South Korea's military resumed its broadcast operations along the border area, blasting messages critical of the North Korean regime. It also broadcasts outside news and information to the reclusive country as part of its psychological warfare operation.

The broadcasts lately included news of the recent defection of a senior North Korea diplomat posted in London as well as a group of 13 North Korean overseas restaurant staff, according to military officials.

"In reaction to the anti-North broadcasting operation, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has ordered its military to come up with measures to secure psychological solidness of front-line units," a government official said, asking not to be named. "Kim is very worried about potential ideological unrest among front-line soldiers."

The recent land mines are reportedly part of a larger operation by North Korea, which has been burying mines mainly along routes that can be used by defectors.

More than 4,000 land mines have been buried near the truce village and along the DMZ since April, according to sources.

The United Nations Command (UNC) based in Seoul confirmed the North Korean operation, saying in a press note that "we are aware of the Korean People's Army activity in the vicinity of the Bridge of No Return in Panmunjom."

But the UNC will not speculate as to why the North is taking these actions, it said, condemning it as conduct "that jeopardizes the safety of all personnel in the DMZ."

"The presence of any device or munitions on or near the bridge seriously jeopardizes the safety of people on both sides of the Military Demarcation Line," it noted.

pbr@yna.co.kr

(END)
 

Housecarl

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http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20160823000749

Korean Army holds joint drill to counter possible N.K. terror attacks

Published : 2016-08-23 14:53
Updated : 2016-08-23 14:53

The South Korean Army on Tuesday conducted a joint military drill with police, government officials and private experts to counter possible terrorist attacks by North Korea, officials said.

South Korea's 2nd Operations Command said that the joint anti-terror exercise was conducted at a football stadium in Daegu, some 302 kilometers south of Seoul, as part of the broader ongoing annual military exercise between South Korea and the United States.

The Army's drill, which involved some 250 personnel and military assets including 21 helicopters, was aimed at building capacity to counter terrorist attacks in non-frontline areas in a speedy manner, officials said.

The move came amid heightened tension on the divided peninsula as North Korea threatened Monday to wage a "preemptive nuclear strike" on South Korea and the U.S. against the allies' Ulchi exercise.

North Korea has long denounced the joint drill as a rehearsal for a northward invasion, a charge denied by Seoul and Washington.

"If a terrorist attack occurs at facilities used by many people such as stadiums, the damage is expected to be huge," said Gen.

Park Chan-ju, commander of the 2nd Operations Command. "We need to actively prepare for such a situation in an aggressive manner." (Yonhap)
 

Housecarl

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http://world.kbs.co.kr/english/news/news_In_detail.htm?No=121291

'N. Korea Produced More Plutonium to Make 2 to 4 Nuclear Warheads'

Write : 2016-08-23 11:05:55 Update : 2016-08-23 16:47:32

Anchor: A U.S. think tank says North Korea resumed reprocessing of spent fuel rods to produce up to eight kilograms of plutonium. That's good enough for at least two additional nuclear warheads. As the North is openly spurring its nuclear weapons program, the South Korean government said the reprocessing of spent fuel rods is in violation of UN Security Council resolutions.
Kim Bum-soo has more.

Report: A U.S. think tank says North Korea has secured additional plutonium, enough to make two to four nuclear weapons through reprocessing spent fuel rods this year.

The Institute for Science and International Security(ISIS) on Monday released its latest report, estimating that North Korea produced five-point-five to eight kilograms of plutonium.

Two to four kilograms of plutonium is needed for a warhead.

The report corresponds to assessments by the International Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA) last week.

Following the North's earlier announcement about its resumption of nuclear activities, the watchdog agency said it detected signs that Pyongyang restarted operations of its Yongbyon nuclear facility in the first quarter of this year.

The U.S. think tank maintained its estimate that the regime has a total of 13 to 21 nuclear weapons in its arsenal, but added there could be two or three more if operations of uranium enrichment facilities in areas outside of Yongbyon are taken into account.

The South Korean government strongly criticized North Korea for producing weapons-grade plutonium and uranium.

The Foreign Ministry released a statement in the wake of the IAEA latest assessment, saying the reprocessing of spent fuel rods are in violation of UN Security Council resolutions and a threat to international peace and the non-proliferation system.

Kim Bum-soo, KBS World Radio News.


Related News


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IAEA: Resumed Activity at N. Korean Nuclear Site

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Gov't Expresses Regret over Plutonium Production

2016-08-18


'N. Korean Reprocessing Violates UN Resolutions'

2016-08-18


Seoul: N. Korean Plutonium Production in Violation of UN Resolutions

2016-08-18


N. Korea Confirms Plutonium Reprocessing

2016-08-17
 

Housecarl

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Interesting that this article was published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists....

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Posted for fair use.....
http://thebulletin.org/dangers-no-first-use9790

Opinion
22 August 2016

The dangers of no-first-use

Franklin C. Miller, Keith B. Payne


Franklin C. Miller

Franklin C. Miller is a principal of The Scowcroft Group. He is a retired civil servant, having...

Keith B. Payne

Keith B. Payne is president and co-founder of the National Institute for Public Policy, and professor and department head at...


The Obama administration reportedly is seriously considering adoption of a no-first-use nuclear policy. Such a declaratory policy would tell the world that the United States would never use nuclear weapons other than in response to an opponent’s nuclear attack. To some, such a policy may seem attractive because it suggests a type of symmetry and proportionality with regard to nuclear weapons.

In fact, however, US adoption of a no-first-use policy would create serious risks without offering any plausible benefit.

Why so? There is no doubt that the US nuclear deterrent has prevented war and the escalation of war in the past. For example, there is considerable evidence from the 1991 First Gulf War that the US nuclear deterrent helped to prevent Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein from escalating to the use of Iraqi chemical or biological weapons of mass destruction—possibly saving tens of thousands of US and allied lives. A US pledge of no-first-use now would encourage current and future opponents to believe that they need not fear the US nuclear deterrent in response to their potential massive use of military force against us or our allies—including the use of advanced conventional weapons, and chemical and biological weapons.

Consequently, declaring a no-first-use policy would degrade the prospective credibility of the US nuclear deterrent—a particularly imprudent step at a time when Russia and China are rapidly expanding their military capabilities, pursuing aggressive policies in Europe and Asia respectively, and issuing explicit threats to US allies in the process. The same applies to North Korea, which repeatedly issues extreme threats against us and our Asian allies while maintaining the world’s fourth largest army and reportedly advanced chemical and biological capabilities. Given these contemporary realities and the stakes involved, degrading the credibility of the US nuclear deterrent by adopting a policy of no-first-use is no small matter. Our goal instead should be to maintain the most effective deterrent possible to such lethal threats.

US adoption of no-first-use would also severely shake allied confidence in our security guarantees to them. In fact, US allies Japan, South Korea, Great Britain, and France reportedly have recently informed the Obama administration that a no-first-use policy would be detrimental to their security. The vast majority of our treaty allies depend, at least in part, on a credible US nuclear deterrence “umbrella” for their security. US adoption of a no-first-use policy would compel some to take steps to mitigate the degradation of the US nuclear deterrent which has heretofore protected them. One such avenue would be the possible acquisition or creation of their own independent nuclear weapons. There already appears to be considerable popular support today for the development of nuclear weapons in South Korea; US adoption of no-first-use would only increase that motivation. A policy of no-first-use now would likely increase the prospect for new nuclear powers in Asia and Europe, which would severely undercut the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and be extremely destabilizing, given the likely severe Chinese and Russian responses.

In short, based on evidence from the past seven decades, the US nuclear deterrent helps deter war and preserve global stability by compelling potential aggressors to consider the possibility of a US nuclear response in any of their prospective plans to attack us or our allies. It also provides enormous support for nuclear non-proliferation by helping to assure over 30 US allies of their security. US adoption of a no-first-use policy would threaten to degrade this critical deterrence of enemies and assurance of allies.

Proponents of no-first-use often assert that US high-tech conventional forces could ultimately defeat an opponent’s massive use of military force, including advanced conventional weapons, and chemical and biological weapons, without the US needing to resort to nuclear weapons—and thereby claim that the US nuclear deterrent threat is unnecessary for this purpose.

This presumption of US military dominance is questionable in some key geographic areas. But more importantly, this claim fundamentally confuses the distinction between deterrence and war-fighting. We and our allies want to deter an opponent’s massive use of force from ever taking place; we do not want to be compelled to wage war, even winning a non-nuclear war, in order to recover lost allies. Fighting such a war would cause unprecedented levels of death and destruction wherever it is fought. That is why US policy for over seven decades has sought to deter war via the US nuclear deterrent, and why every Democratic and Republican administration for over seven decades has rejected a no-first-use policy. Retaining ambiguity regarding the US nuclear deterrent threat appears to be central to the success of that deterrence policy; we do not want a no-first-use policy that inadvertently assures opponents that they may safely ignore a US nuclear response if they themselves launch anything short of a nuclear attack. That is why key US allies also strongly oppose a no-first-use policy.

In light of this, adopting a policy of no-first-use would have to bring powerful benefits to offset the likely harm done to stability. What might these be? Advocates of a US no-first-use policy claim that US adoption of no-first-use would lead other nuclear powers to similarly do so, and thus contribute to nuclear stability.

In truth, however, there is zero evidence that US adoption of a no-first-use policy would lead others to mimic the United States. The idea that the rest of the world follows the United States in this way is itself outdated, arrogant, and contrary to considerable evidence. The failure of President Obama’s Prague Agenda to convince Russia, China, India, Pakistan, North Korea, or other nuclear powers to reduce the role nuclear weapons play in their respective security policies is a powerful testament to this fact.

Russia by its own open statements is now committed to a policy of coercive and unambiguous nuclear first-use threats and possible employment to support an expansionist agenda in Europe—which means it hardly would follow a US no-first-use agenda. Indeed, a senior Russian official recently responded to US arms control overtures by observing that Russian nuclear policies are driven strictly by Russian security needs, not by “mythical universal human values.” Other nuclear powers similarly pursue their own paths and “do not seek to emulate” the United States. And, based on China’s own open statements about its potential use of nuclear weapons, China’s existing supposed no-first-use policy is wholly ambiguous and uncertain; China cannot seriously be considered to have a no-first-use policy.

In 2009, the high level and bipartisan Congressional Strategic Posture Commission, also known as the Perry-Schlesinger Commission, concluded that the United States should not adopt no-first-use. In 2010, the Obama administration’s own Nuclear Posture Review reached the same conclusion. Since then, the international security situation has deteriorated. The spectrum of military threats to the United States and our allies has expanded considerably as Russia and China have pursued military buildups and aggressive policies in Europe and Asia respectively. US adoption of a no-first-use policy now would only reflect willful US detachment from these global realities, and would be perceived as such by friends and foes alike.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://atimes.com/2016/08/will-states-acquire-nuclear-weapons-to-deter-regime-change-by-us/

Will states acquire nuclear weapons to deter regime change by US?

By Christina Lin on August 22, 2016 in Asia Times News & Features, Middle East
Comments 29

America’s senseless pursuit of regime change has destroyed lives and ruined nations in the Middle East and Africa. Drawing lesson from what had happened to former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, countries blacklisted by Pentagon will now go nuclear like North Korea and Pakistan to prevent US from toppling their governments.

In 2011, Christian Science Monitor published an important article on lessons learned from US’ illegal war against Libya. Entitled “A troubling lesson from Libya: Don’t give up nukes”, the implication is that if a state gives up nukes, it risks being invaded by the US.[1]

In 2003, Muammar Gaddafi agreed to dismantle its fledgling nuclear program in exchange for diplomatic recognition and integration into the global political economy. However, in 2011 he was murdered and his country violently destroyed when the US aggressively pursued regime change.

In 1981, Israel destroyed Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor. In 2003, US invaded Iraq and killed Saddam Hussein in another pursuit of violent regime change.

In 2007, Israel destroyed Syria’s Al Kibar nuclear reactor. In 2011/2012, on the heels of its Libyan regime change operation, US began to work with Saudi Arabia//Qatar/Turkey to conduct regime change in Syria.

This begs the question. Would US have been so eager to invade these countries if they had nuclear weapons?

General Wesley Clark, former NATO Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, disclosed that in 2001 the Pentagon actually had a list of seven countries targeted for regime change: Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, Sudan and Iran.[2] He was perplexed that none of them were linked to al Qaeda or Saudi Arabia in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks.

Now with several of the targets already checked off the list, some of the remaining countries may be compelled to seek the ultimate deterrent against regime change. In fact, North Korea cited Libya and Iraq as prime examples of why Pyongyang would never give up its nukes.

In January 2016, when Pyongyang conducted a fourth nuclear test, its official KCNA news agency stated, “the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq and the Gaddafi regime in Libya could not escape the fate of destruction after being deprived of their foundations for nuclear development and giving up nuclear programs of their own accord.”[3]

It is also a twist of irony that after Gaddafi gave up his nuclear program and Tripoli was cited as a model for Iran and North Korea to follow for nuclear disarmament, now it is a model for nuclear armament.

As Doug Bandow argued in The National Interest, US “regime change” foreign policy would now have the unintended consequence of provoking states to seek nukes as a security guarantee, since “no foreign state, no matter how close it might appear to be to Washington at any point in time, can feel secure from a future attempt at regime change.”[4]

Indeed, Turkey may be another state feeling those sentiments. Lauded as a NATO ally for decades, after the recent coup attempt, Ankara could seek the nuclear path to deter future regime change.[5]

As Reza Sanati observed in the Christian Science Monitor, US treatment of Libya and Pakistan differed greatly due to presence of nuclear weapons. Tripoli dismantled its nuclear program and halted support for terrorism in return for western benefits, but it was still attacked. In contrast, nuclear-armed Pakistan hid the world’s most-wanted terrorist Bin Laden for roughly a decade, supported jihadi groups aiding the Taliban, yet suffered no consequences and still enjoys US economic and military aid.

Now, Doug Bandow issued a sober lesson learned that US war against Libya “has done more than destabilize North Africa. The West’s eagerness to overthrow a government that had given up nuclear weapons creates yet another incentive for proliferation. Washington may rue this precedent for years to come.”

However, looking at current policy, one does not get the impression Washington would rue this precedent. If anything, it seems bent on checking off the rest of the regime change list and weaponizing “human rights” as a mean toward that end.

Already the photo of an injured boy in East Aleppo is plastered all over US media in an effort to push for a full-scale invasion of Syria to finish the job of overthrowing the government. However, a similar photo of a little girl in government-controlled West Aleppo, injured by US-backed jihadists’ shelling, never made it into mainstream media.

two faces of Aleppo

Nor did the photo of a little boy refusing to leave his mother buried under rubbles as a result of US/Saudi war against Yemen.[6] Or the photo of a little Yemeni girl struggling to get access to safe water in a country completely destroyed by US/Saudi airstrike campaign.

This type of selective humanity and outrage to further US regime change agenda only prolongs the suffering of all the civilians and especially the children.

As Senator Chris Murphy (D-Conn) told CNN last week: “There’s an American imprint on every civilian life lost in Yemen.” US supplies the bombs, the jetfighters, refuels them midair, and provides intelligence and targeting assistance for the Saudis.”

This also begs the question how serious is US in countering ISIS when it supports the Saudis and their Wahhabism.

As Fareed Zakaria exposed in a clip from CNN, the former Imam of Saudi Arabia’s Grand Mosque stated “We have the same beliefs as ISIS. We share their ideology, but we express it in a more refined way.” [1]

There is also an American imprint on many civilian lives lost in the various countries US has targeted for regime change—Iraq, Libya, Syria. As such, in order to avoid similar fates as failed states and to protect their children, more countries now may indeed seek the nuclear option as the ultimate deterrent against regime change.

Dr. Christina Lin is a Fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations at SAIS-Johns Hopkins University where she specializes in China-Middle East/Mediterranean relations, and a research consultant for Jane’s Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Intelligence Centre at IHS Jane’s.

(Copyright 2016 Asia Times Holdings Limited, a duly registered Hong Kong company. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)

[1] “A troubling lesson from Libya: Don’t give up nukes”, CS Monitor, August 30, 2011, http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary...oubling-lesson-from-Libya-Don-t-give-up-nukes

[2] “General Wesley Clark reveals 2001 US plan to conduct ‘regime change’ in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, Sudan and Iran”, SOTT, May 22, 2011, https://www.sott.net/article/246771...q-Syria-Lebanon-Libya-Somalia-Sudan-and-Iran; https://twitter.com/walid970721/status/751387849140887553

[3] “North Korea cites Libya dictator Gaddafi’s ‘destruction’ as nuke test defence’ The Indian Express, January 9,2016, http://indianexpress.com/article/wo...ar-gaddafis-destruction-in-nuke-test-defence/ http://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=2933884

[4] Doug Bandow, “Thanks to Libya, North Korea Might Neve Negotiate on Nuclear Weapons”, The National Interest, September 2, 2015, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/thanks-libya-north-korea-might-never-negotiate-nuclear-13756

[5] Hans Ruhle, “Is Turkey Secretly Working on Nuclear Weapons?”, The National Interest, September 22, 2015, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/turkey-secretly-working-nuclear-weapons-13898; http://www.thetoc.gr/eng/news/article/die-welt-turkey-secretly-developing-nuclear-weapons

[6] “The US is promoting war crimes in Yemen”, The Guardian, August 18, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/comment...omoting-war-crimes-yemen-saudi-bombing-obama; “Why is the US Aiding and Enabling Saudi Arabia’s Genocidal War in Yemen?” Counterpunch, October 8, 2015, http://21stcenturywire.com/2016/04/...nd-civilians-sanctioned-by-the-un-us-uk-nato/
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
:siren:

http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...lls-bringing-back-compulsory-national-service

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.dw.com/en/germany-mulls-bringing-back-compulsory-national-service/a-19494191

Germany

Germany mulls bringing back compulsory national service

Berlin has said it's considering changing its position on conscription. The country is mulling new strategies to deal with possible security threats.

Date 23.08.2016

Germany's interior ministry is considering taking steps toward bringing back conscription, including compulsory service to support the military. This is according to a report by German news agency DPA, which had access to a confidential copy of a government draft proposal.

The proposal, which the government is set to be vote on Wednesday, comes as the government seeks to push forward a new concept for civilian defense, titled "Support of the Armed Forces."

Germany has been mulling new security strategies in light of recent terror attacks, as well as tensions over Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014. The new proposals are meant in part to prepare the country for the possibility of NATO actions to defend its borders.

Conscription was suspended across Germany five years ago.

All bases covered

The draft proposal also takes into account the infrastructure and accommodations that will be required if compulsory service were to be reintroduced, including the building of lodgings such as barracks.

Military conscription was abolished in 2011 after 55 years, because the government at the time said there was no longer a need for it. However, compulsory military service is still a part of Germany's Basic Law, or constitution. Therefore, it can be easily reintroduced by the government.

Following a series of attacks in Germany in late July, Bavarian Interior Minister Joachim Herrmann said the country should also consider deploying the army, or Bundeswehr, within Germany.

Reactions

The parliamentary representative in charge of the German military, Hans-Peter Bartels, said the unfolding debate was, however, merely hypothetical in nature and not part of an actual agenda.

"Conscription would only be considered if there was a grave, long-lasting situation of danger, such as was the case with the Cold War," he told the daily regional newspaper "Neue Osnabrücker Zeitung."

The parliamentary head of the leftwing "Die Linke" Party Jan Korte meanwhile criticized the government's rekindled debate on the issue, saying it wasn't interior minister Thomas de Maiziere's job to cause panic among the population with talk of conscription, referring to de Maiziere's draft proposal.

blc,ss/jil (dpa)


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OldArcher

Has No Life - Lives on TB
Good Evening, HC,

Sir, do you see this, possible compulsory service in Germany, to be leaning towards return to Nazi aspirations, vis-à-vis, Lebensraum, or defense against unwanted, illegal immigration?

Thanks for all you do, Sir...

GBY&Y's

Maranatha

OA
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...Korea-test-fires-submarine-missile-(23-Aug-16)

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.cnn.com/2016/08/23/world/north-korea-missile-launch/index.html?adkey=bn

S. Korea: North Korea test fires submarine missile

By Azadeh Ansari, CNN
Updated 6:22 PM ET, Tue August 23, 2016


(CNN) — North Korea test fired a submarine-based ballistic missile from the East Sea on Wednesday, said South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff.

North Korea's launch took place in the waters off Sinpo, South Hamgyong Province in the early morning.

This comes amid the annual joint military exercise between US and South Korea, which kicked off on Monday.

The annual drill includes 25,000 US troops, the bulk of which are already stationed in Korea, according to a statement by US Forces Korea.

North Korean has made threats of nuclear retaliation if the two-week drill "show the slightest sign of aggression," a spokesman for North Korea's military was quoted as saying by the country's state media.

CNN's Mohammad Tawfeeq, Ryan Browne and Barbara Starr contributed to this report.

------

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles-idUSKCN10Y2B0

World News | Tue Aug 23, 2016 6:27pm EDT

North Korea test-fires submarine-launched ballistic missile: South Korea


North Korea fired a submarine-launched ballistic missile off its east coast, South Korea's military said on Wednesday, the latest in a string of missile launches by the isolated country in defiance of UN Security Council resolutions.

North Korea test-fired the missile at around 5:30 a.m. (4:30 p.m. ET) near the coastal city of Sinpo, where satellite imagery shows a submarine base to be located, an official at South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff said.

The launch comes two days after rival South Korea and the United States began annual military exercises in the South that North Korea condemns as a preparation for invasion, and has threatened retaliation.

North Korea has become further isolated after a January nuclear test, its fourth, and the launch of a long-range rocket in February brought tightened UN sanctions.

It has launched numerous missiles of various types this year, including one this month that landed in or near Japanese-controlled waters.

Tensions on the Korean peninsula were exacerbated by the recent defection of North Korea's deputy ambassador in London to South Korea, an embarrassing setback to the regime of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un.


(Reporting by Ju-min Park and Jack Kim; Writing by Tony Munroe; Editing by James Dalgleish)
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Good Evening, HC,

Sir, do you see this, possible compulsory service in Germany, to be leaning towards return to Nazi aspirations, vis-à-vis, Lebensraum, or defense against unwanted, illegal immigration?

Thanks for all you do, Sir...

GBY&Y's

Maranatha

OA

One thing is for sure IMHO, this coming on the heels of the German government telling their population to put together 10 days of preps isn't a good sign at all as to "things to come".

As to the Nazis coming back, who said they ever left?
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-massacres-falluja-special-report-idUSKCN10Y1VD

World News | Tue Aug 23, 2016 6:28pm EDT

Special Report: Massacre reports show U.S. inability to curb Iraq militias

By Ned Parker and Jonathan Landay | WASHINGTON

Shi’ite militias in Iraq detained, tortured and abused far more Sunni civilians during the American-backed capture of the town of Falluja in June than U.S. officials have publicly acknowledged, Reuters has found.

More than 700 Sunni men and boys are still missing more than two months after the Islamic State stronghold fell. The abuses occurred despite U.S. efforts to restrict the militias' role in the operation, including threatening to withdraw American air support, according to U.S. and Iraqi officials.

The U.S. efforts had little effect. Shi’ite militias did not pull back from Falluja, participated in looting there and now vow to defy any American effort to limit their role in coming operations against Islamic State.

All told, militia fighters killed at least 66 Sunni males and abused at least 1,500 others fleeing the Falluja area, according to interviews with more than 20 survivors, tribal leaders, Iraqi politicians and Western diplomats.

They said men were shot, beaten with rubber hoses and in several cases beheaded. Their accounts were supported by a Reuters review of an investigation by local Iraqi authorities and video testimony and photographs of survivors taken immediately after their release.

The battle against Islamic State is the latest chapter in the conflict between Iraq's Shi’ite majority and Sunni minority, which was unleashed by the 2003 U.S.-led invasion. The war ended decades of Sunni rule under Saddam Hussein and brought to power a series of governments dominated by Shi’ite Islamist parties patronized by Iran.

Washington’s inability to restrain the sectarian violence is now a central concern for Obama administration officials as they move ahead with plans to help Iraqi forces retake the much larger city of Mosul, Islamic State’s Iraqi capital. Preliminary operations to clear areas outside the strategic city have been under way for months. Sunni leaders in Iraq and Western diplomats fear the Shi’ite militias might commit worse excesses in Mosul, the country’s second-largest city. Islamic State, the Sunni extremist group, seized the majority-Sunni city in June 2014.


"CENTRAL TOPIC"

U.S. officials say they fear a repeat of the militia abuses in Mosul could erase any chances of reconciling Iraq’s Sunni and Shia communities. "Virtually every conversation that we have had internally with respect to planning for Mosul - and virtually every conversation that we’ve had with the Iraqis - has this as a central topic," said a senior Obama Administration official.

In public, as reports of the abuses in Falluja emerged from survivors, Iraqi officials and human rights groups, U.S. officials in Washington initially played down the scope of the problem and did not disclose the failed American effort to rein in the militias.

Brett McGurk, the special U.S. envoy for the American-led campaign against Islamic State, expressed concern to reporters at a June 10th White House briefing for reporters about what he called “reports of isolated atrocities” against fleeing Sunnis.

Three days before the briefing, Gov. Sohaib al-Rawi of Anbar Province informed the U.S. ambassador that hundreds of people detained by Shi’ite militias had gone missing around Falluja, the governor told Reuters. By the time of the White House briefing, Iraqi officials, human rights investigators and the United Nations had collected evidence of scores of executions, the torture of hundreds of men and teenagers, and the disappearance of more than 700 others.

Nearly three weeks later, on June 28, McGurk struck a measured tone during testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He said reports of abuses had been received in the early days of the operation, “many of which have turned out not to be credible but some of which appear to be credible.”

McGurk declined a request for an interview. Mark Toner, the State Department’s deputy spokesperson, said American officials had expressed “concern both publicly and privately” about reported atrocities. “We find any abuse totally unacceptable,” Toner said, and “any violation of human rights should be investigated with those responsible held accountable.”

Militia leaders deny that their groups mistreated civilians. They say the missing men were Islamic State militants killed in battle.


EXACTING REVENGE

Iraqi government officials also challenged the reports of widespread violence against civilians. In an interview, Iraqi Prime Minister Haider Al Abadi’s deputy national security adviser, Safa al-Sheikh, said there were a few incidents, but added: “There are a lot of exaggerations, and some of the reports didn’t have any basis.”

Iraq’s main Shi’ite militias, trained and armed by Tehran, emerged during the 2003-2011 U.S. occupation and have grown in power and stature. After helping the government defend Baghdad when Islamic State seized Mosul in 2014, the militias became arms of the Iraqi government. Islamic State has slaughtered thousands of Iraqis, of all faiths.

There now are more than 30 Shi’ite militias whose members receive government salaries. The major groups have government posts and parliament seats.

Their might has also been enhanced by some of the more than $20 billion in military hardware the United States has sold or given to Iraq since 2005. Their weaponry includes armored personnel carriers, trucks, Humvees, artillery and even tanks, according to U.S. officials, independent experts and pictures and videos militia members have posted on the internet.

Collectively, the Shi’ite militias are known as the Hashid Shaabi, or Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). The militias officially answer to Abadi. In reality, the main groups answer only to themselves, display their own flags and emblems, and are advised by the Quds Force - Iran’s elite foreign paramilitary and intelligence service.

The Falluja offensive began on May 22. For more than a year, American officials had warned Iraqi officials repeatedly that the United States would suspend air support in areas where militias were operating outside the Iraqi military’s formal chain of command. The policy was designed to prevent American planes from inadvertently bombing Iraqi forces and to restrain militias from entering areas considered sensitive to Sunnis, according to U.S. officials.

In the first two days of the Falluja offensive, reports emerged of militiamen separating males from fleeing families. American, Western and U.N. diplomats pressured Abadi, other top Iraqi officials and militia leaders to stop the abuses.

Abadi and other political leaders publicly called for protection of civilians.


"DON'T BE TREACHEROUS"

The Americans' influence was hindered by the fact they had no forces in Falluja and couldn’t observe specific abuses, according to the Western diplomat who tracked the campaign.

On May 26, Ayatollah Ali Sistani, Iraq's leading Shi’ite cleric, pleaded with combatants to protect civilians. Aid agencies estimated at the time that as many as 100,000 people remained inside Falluja.

“Don't be extreme ... don't be treacherous. Don't kill an old man, nor a boy, nor a woman. Don't cut a tree unless you have to,” Sistani said, citing sayings of the Prophet Mohammed.

Sistani’s pleas and the American threats fell on deaf ears.

The first known instance of systematic abuse by the militias in the Falluja offensive occurred May 27 northeast of the city, in the farming region of Sejar. Militiamen and security forces stopped a group of fleeing Sunnis, pulled aside somewhere between 73 and 95 males aged 15 and older and took them away, according to Gov. al-Rawi of Anbar Province and a Western diplomat who monitored the offensive. Women and children were freed.

“We are still in contact with women and children who were handed to government people,” said the Western diplomat. “They still don’t know where the men are.”

On May 29, militiamen just west of the farming areas of Sejar, separated 20 men from a group of fleeing Sunnis and “started killing them,” said the Western diplomat. “The police arrived when there were three left alive. The police took the three and dumped them” in a camp east of Falluja for people displaced by the civil war.

Terrified that the militias would storm the camp and kill them, the trio arranged protection for themselves in Baghdad, the diplomat said. Gov. al-Rawi confirmed this account.

A Sunni academic said he spoke to three survivors of the alleged massacre, two brothers and their cousin. The men said the killings occurred during fighting between Iraqi federal police forces and Islamic State, according to the academic.


SURVIVOR ACCOUNTS

The three survivors told the academic that they were among some 50 people who had sought shelter in a house when they saw federal police raise the Iraqi flag at a nearby school. The group waved white cloths and was directed to leave the house by the police.

When the group emerged, the three said, the police separated the men from their families. One officer then opened fire and killed 17 men, the academic quoted the survivors as saying, adding that the three were spared when another officer intervened. The shooter was arrested, according to the Anbar governor.

Worse was to come. Shi’ite militiamen seeking vengeance against Islamic State rounded up Sunnis on June 3 from the town of Saqlawiya, according to witnesses interviewed by Reuters, U.N. workers, Iraqi officials and Human Rights Watch.

According to these accounts, more than 5,000 Sunnis, mostly members of the al-Mohamda tribe, left Saqlawiya, a farming community five miles northwest of Falluja. The Sunnis made their way toward what they thought was the safety of government lines marked by Iraqi flags. A gray-haired man described the scene in a video recorded by local officials after he and 604 other men were freed two days later.

“When we arrived there, we discovered they were the Hashid,” the Shi’ite militias, the witness said.

U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Raad al-Hussein, two senior Iraqi officials, and a 69-year-old survivor interviewed by Reuters identified the militiamen as members of Kataib Hezbollah. One of the most powerful Shi’ite paramilitaries, Kataib Hezbollah was organized by and retains close ties to Iran’s Quds Force. Both are deemed to be terrorist groups by the United States.

Kataib Hezbollah denied being involved in abuses in Falluja. "They make these claims based on accusations from politicians that ISIS is depending on," said Kataib spokesman Jaafar al-Husseini. "They are trying to keep us far from the operations of Anbar and Mosul."

The militiamen separated out an estimated 1,500 males aged 15 and older and moved them in groups to different locations, including warehouses and an Iraqi base called Camp Tariq, according to survivors, U.N. investigators and Human Rights Watch.


"FISTS, KNIVES AND CABLES"

The survivors described being crammed into small rooms and halls and denied food and water, straining to breathe in the stifling heat. Militiamen using sticks, pipes and hoses beat the detainees and declared that they were taking revenge for Camp Speicher – a June 2014 massacre by Islamic State of 1,566 Shi’ite and other non-Sunni air force cadets.

A 32-year-old man, one of six survivors Reuters interviewed, said he was packed into a room with dozens of other captives, his hands tied behind his back.

“They started hitting us with their fists, knives and cables,” he said. “When people fainted, we yelled they were going to die, and the guards told us that’s what they wanted.”

The guards, the survivor said, told the captives they were avenging the deaths of hundreds of Iraqi soldiers killed in fighting around Falluja since 2014.

In a video recorded by local officials, another survivor told how men craving water were given bottles in which to urinate and told to drink their own waste.

A 47-year-old survivor described how he watched militiamen repeatedly beat his 17-year-old son and carry off the corpses of 15 men who appeared to have been beaten to death. The man was one of the 605 survivors released on June 5. His son was not among them, he said; the boy hasn’t been seen since.

“We want to know the destiny of our sons,” the man told Reuters. “We consider the Americans responsible for everything that has happened.”


UNACCOUNTED FOR

In all, militiamen killed at least 49 men who were detained in Saqlawiya, four of whom were beheaded, according to the U.N.'s Zeid.

The brutality ended without explanation for some 800 detainees after two days. But 643 Saqlawiya detainees remain unaccounted for. Their names are recorded on a list circulated by local officials to the United Nations, Human Rights Watch and government investigators and reviewed by Reuters.

On June 7, Sheikh Ali Hamad, a leader of the Mohamda, a Sunni tribe, decried on television what he called “a genocidal crime” and the deaths of “tens of our sons.”

The same day, the Anbar governor informed U.S. Ambassador Jones that hundreds of Sunni men were missing. U.N. envoy Zeid issued a statement citing “extremely distressing, credible reports” of abuse, including summary executions of men and boys by militiamen.

On June 9, the day before McGurk’s White House briefing, Human Rights Watch issued a report on the alleged atrocities in Sejar and Saqlawiya.

The regular Iraqi security forces, including the U.S.-trained Counter-Terrorism Service, eventually established safe corridors and guided civilians out of the city. Some 100,000 civilians escaped as a result.


A PIECE OF THE ACTION

Today, the Shi’ite militias are clamoring to join the Mosul offensive, fired by zeal, a desire for revenge and hopes of burnishing their political standing within their sect.

“They will want a piece of the climactic battle,” said Kenneth Pollock, a former CIA analyst now with the Brookings Institution, a Washington policy institute.

Ryan Crocker, a career diplomat who served as U.S. ambassador to Iraq from 2007 to 2009, said the Obama administration has downplayed abuses by both militia and Iraqi forces. “This administration is so determined to be able to declare victory over ISIL (that) they don’t really care about any of the rest of it,” said Crocker.

Over the disapproval of the Mosul provincial government, Abadi and militia leaders have said that militias will participate in the campaign to liberate the city.

The chief PMF administrator is Jamal Ibrahimi. Known by the nom de guerre Abu Mahdi al-Mohandis, he is on the U.S. international terrorist list.

U.S. officials say Ibrahimi is the leader of Kataib Hezbollah, the militia that Iraqi officials, Western diplomats and others hold primarily responsible for the atrocities committed in the Falluja offensive.

Ibrahimi and the militia deny that he heads Kataib Hezbollah.

Abadi’s office has announced that a committee will investigate allegations of rights abuses in Falluja. It is uncertain if the inquiry will find anyone responsible beyond a handful of low-level suspects whose arrests Abadi reported on June 13.

(This version of the story has been refiled to remove word "new" from headline)


(Edited by David Rohde and Michael Williams)

Also In World News
North Korea test-fires submarine-launched ballistic missile: South Korea
With Biden visit, U.S. seeks balance with truculent Turkey
U.S., Russia make 'headway' in Syria talks, but no deal yet -State Dept
As Kerry visits Nigeria, air force says top Boko Haram fighters killed
 

OldArcher

Has No Life - Lives on TB
One thing is for sure IMHO, this coming on the heels of the German government telling their population to put together 10 days of preps isn't a good sign at all as to "things to come".

As to the Nazis coming back, who said they ever left?

Thank-You, Sir, for your rapid response...

One would think that the military infrastructure, personnel, and equipment are seriously lacking, as per the German military... Might take quite some time to spool-up their much needed forces... Don't even know if NATO could give them the needed support, to affect such an evolution... The barn's burned down, and now, they're thinking of locking the smoking remains... *Sigh* Good luck to 'em, as we can't, or won't, help them...

GBY&Y's

OA
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Thank-You, Sir, for your rapid response...

One would think that the military infrastructure, personnel, and equipment are seriously lacking, as per the German military... Might take quite some time to spool-up their much needed forces... Don't even know if NATO could give them the needed support, to affect such an evolution... The barn's burned down, and now, they're thinking of locking the smoking remains... *Sigh* Good luck to 'em, as we can't, or won't, help them...

GBY&Y's

OA

They've got a lot still in storage and their military industrial complex is in "idle mode" at the moment. The DW article said that they were "discussing" the infrastructure expansion and upgrades needed for such a move and that would include gear as well.

This would be the fourth time in a century the Germans remobilized if they follow through with this; they should have it down to an art by now if not a science.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...nti-ISIS-offensive-in-northern-Syria-(8-24-16)

:dot5: :siren: :dot5:

Hummmm......

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.cnn.com/2016/08/24/middleeast/turkish-troops-isis-syria-operation/

Turkish troops launch anti-ISIS offensive in northern Syria

By Euan McKirdy, Mohammed Tawfeeq and Isil Sariyuce, CNN
Updated 4:04 AM ET, Wed August 24, 2016

Istanbul, Turkey (CNN) ¡X Turkey has launched a military operation against ISIS in the north of Syria, Turkish state media has reported.

The aim of the operation, codenamed "Euphrates Shield" is to secure territory along its border with Syria from the ISIS threat, officials told Turkey's semi-official Anadolu agency.

Turkish artillery units and warplanes belonging to the U.S.-led coalition pounded the ISIS-held Syrian town of Jarablus in the early hours of Wednesday.

Turkish tanks and special forces units are also operating along the border, CNN affiliate CNN Turk reported.

Jarablus lies along the west bank of the Euphrates River, less than a kilometer from Turkey. It's the last major town held by ISIS on the Syrian-Turkish border.

Map

Turkey has been hitting targets inside Syria for the past three days, following a mortar attack on residential areas in Karkamis, a town on the Turkish side of the border.

Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said Tuesday that Turkey will "fully support" operations against ISIS positions in Jarabulus.

Troops will create a 90 km by 40 km (55 mile by 25 mile) safe zone for refugees between the towns of Marea and Jarablus, Turkish media said.

Interior Minister Efkan Ala, in an interview with state media, said "we are working together with coalition and moderate opposition. Turkey will not allow terrorist organizations next to us to threaten Turkey. What is indispensable for Turkey is the territorial unity of Syria."

Meanwhile, US Vice-President Joe Biden has arrived in Ankara, the country's capital, where he is scheduled to meet with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Prime Minister Binali Yildirim.

Rocked by terror

Karkamis is in Gaziantep province, whose capital was struck by a devastating bomb attack on a wedding Saturday night that was blamed on ISIS. That attack killed 54 people -- the deadliest in a long string of blasts across Turkey this year.

READ: Understanding Turkey's catalog of enemies

Turkey has vowed to eradicate ISIS from its border regions in the wake of Saturday's atrocity.

"Our border must be completely cleansed of Daesh," Cavusoglu said in televised remarks Monday, referring to ISIS by another name.

War on two fronts

Turkey also shelled Kurdish YPG fighters Monday in northern Syria, attacking them north of Manbij, a city about 40 kilometers (25 miles) south of Jarablus.

US-backed Kurdish forces have been eager to drive ISIS out and to remove the group's access to resupply of materiel and fighters from Turkey. Last month they secured a significant victory in Manbij, driving the terror group from the city and toward the north; now Jarablus is in their sights.

But while Turkey and the Kurdish YPG share a common enemy in ISIS, Turkey remains determined to keep the Kurdish fighters from advancing on its border.

Turkey says the YPG is linked to its own Kurdish insurgents, the outlawed Kurdistan Workers Party, or PKK, who have been blamed for a string of deadly attacks in the country since a ceasefire crumbled last year.

READ: Turkey strikes ISIS, Kurds in northern Syria

CNN's Isil Sariyuce reported from Istanbul and Mohammed Tawfeeq from Atlanta. Euan McKirdy wrote from Hong Kong. CNN's Tim Hume contributed to this report.

„Ý
 
Last edited:

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles-trilat-idUSKCN10Z0AW

World News | Wed Aug 24, 2016 2:30am EDT

Japan, China, South Korea to urge North Korea to stop provocation

By Kiyoshi Takenaka and Xiao Yu | TOKYO

Japan, China and South Korea agreed to urge North Korea to refrain from provocation and follow U.N. Security Council resolutions, after its latest missile launch towards Japan early on Wednesday.

Foreign ministers from the three Asian neighbours also sought to soothe their often-testy relations, and have reached an understanding on a trilateral summit meeting in Japan this year, a Japanese official said.

"We have confirmed that we will urge North Korea to exercise self-restraint regarding its provocative action, and to observe the U.N. Security Council's resolutions," Japanese Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida told a news conference after hosting the meeting with his Chinese and South Korean counterparts.

A North Korean submarine fired a ballistic missile on Wednesday that flew about 500 km (300 miles) towards Japan, a show of improving technological capability for the isolated country that has conducted a nuclear test and as series of missile launches this year in defiance of UN sanctions.

In the face of the North Korean threat, cooperation among Japan, China and South Korea was more important than ever, Kishida said after his meeting with China's Wang Yi and South Korea's Yun Byung-se.

Yun promised South Korea's support to realise a trilateral summit by year's end, as well as to cooperate economically and to achieve a successful summit of the Group of 20 big economies next month in China.

Wang said China opposed North Korea's nuclear and missile programmes and any "words or actions" that cause tension on the Korean peninsula, China's foreign ministry said in a statement.

China will continue to push for the peninsula's denuclearisation, seek a resolution through talks and uphold regional peace and stability, Wang added.

The three ministers share the understanding that Japan will host a trilateral summit this year, though dates have yet to be worked out, a Japanese Foreign Ministry official told reporters.


'MANY PROBLEMS'

Relations between the three big Asian economies are often difficult with the legacy of Japan's wartime aggression affecting ties between it and China and South Korea, territorial disputes hurting links between Japan and China, and Japan and South Korea, and China suspicious of the others' U.S. ties.The meeting marked the first visit to Japan by a Chinese foreign minister since the Japanese government took over three of the tiny islands at the centre of a dispute with China, from private Japanese owners in September 2012.

"Trilateral cooperation is a very important part of East Asian cooperation," Wang told his counterparts at the beginning of the meeting.


Related Coverage
China repeats opposition to anti-missile system in South Korea


"There are many problems existing between the three countries, but China, Japan and South Korea are the three biggest economy entities in Asia. It's our responsibility to promote economic development, lead regional cooperation and maintain regional peace and stability."

China's state-run Xinhua news agency said Wang's willingness to go to Tokyo showed "China's sufficient sincerity to cooperate with Japan and South Korea".

At the same time, it warned Japan and South Korea to "abandon the Cold War mentality and view the peaceful rise of China as vigour to regional development", while avoiding "being the tools for some countries outside the region to undermine regional stability."

Wednesday's meeting had earlier appeared in doubt after a flare-up in Sino-Japanese tension over their dispute over tiny islands in the East China Sea.

South Korea and Japan have a territorial dispute over small islands about half way between their mainlands.

Tensions have also been escalating between South Korea and China over a decision by Seoul and Washington to deploy an advanced anti-missile defence, which the allies say is meant to counter growing threats from North Korea.


(Reporting by Kiyoshi Takenaka and Xiao Yu; Additional reporting by Nobuhiro Kubo in Tokyo and Ben Blanchard and David Stanway in Beijing; Editing by Chang-Ran Kim, Robert Birsel)
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Merde......They did that with the Musudan IRBM test as well....

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.todayonline.com/world/north-koreas-sub-launched-missile-flew-high-angle-yonhap

North Korea's sub-launched missile flew at high angle: Yonhap

Published: 2:20 PM, August 24, 2016

SEOUL - The North Korean submarine-launched ballistic missile fired on Wednesday flew at a high trajectory and has a range of more than 1,000 kilometers (620 miles) at a normal angle, South Korea's Yonhap News Agency said, without citing a source.

The missile traveled about 500 km, South Korean officials said.

The Yonhap report also said North Korea used solid fuel and succeeded in separating first and second stages of the rocket.

South Korea's Defense Ministry was not immediately available to comment. REUTERS
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Now here's a real FUBAR for you.....:shkr:

With this stuff "in the wild" I can see more than a few countries and corporations taking advantage of such a bounty....

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://in.reuters.com/article/france-submarines-india-australia-idINKCN10Z07D

Money News | Wed Aug 24, 2016 2:07pm IST

India investigates damage caused by French submarine data leak

By Matt Siegel and Sanjeev Miglani | SYDNEY/NEW DELHI

India is investigating the extent to which secrets about French Scorpene submarines being built in the country have been compromised, its defence ministry said on Wednesday, after a leak of documents relating to its combat capabilities.

The leak, which was first reported in The Australian newspaper, contains more than 22,000 pages outlining the secret capabilities of six submarines that French builder DCNS has designed for the Indian Navy.

"I understand there has been a case of hacking," Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar told reporters. "We will find out what has happened."

The submarines are being built at a state-run shipyard in Mumbai and the first one was expected to go into service by the end of the year, the first step in the Indian navy's effort to rebuild its dwindling fleet.

The massive leak has also raised doubts about the security of DCNS's submarine project in Australia where it won a A$50 billion ($38.06 billion) contract to build the next generation of the submarines.

DCNS beat out Germany's ThyssenKrupp AG and a Japanese-government backed bid by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Kawasaki Heavy Industries, in a blow to Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's push to develop defence export capabilities as part of a more muscular security agenda.

The leaked documents cover the Scorpene-class model and do not contain any details of the vessel currently being designed for the Australian fleet.

DCNS said it could not immediately authenticate the documents, but would not rule out that the leak was part of an "economic war" waged by the competitors it beat in the contest for the Australian contract.

"For now we don't know if the information is correct," a DCNS spokeswoman said. "The competition is more and more hard and all means can be used in this context.

"There is India, Australia and other prospects, and other countries could raise legitimate questions over DCNS. It's part of the tools in economic war," she said.

Thales, which owns 35 percent of the shipbuilder, could not immediately be reached for comment outside normal European business hours. The French defence ministry declined to make an immediate comment.

Thales was down more than 2 percent in early trading, while the wider French blue-chip index was down 0.75 percent.


MAJOR STRATEGIC PROBLEM

The breadth of detail in the documents creates a major strategic problem for India, Malaysia and Chile, all of which operate the same submarine, an Australian political source with decades of experience in the global arms industry told Reuters.

Excerpts published in redacted form on the newspaper's website contained highly sensitive details of the submarine including technical manuals and models of the boat's antennae.

"If it's 22,400 pages, it's a major stuff-up," the source said. "It's a huge deal.

"It allows them to understand everything about the submarines. What speeds it can do; how noisy it is; what speeds the mast can be raised at ... all of that is just devastating."

The Indian Defence Ministry said it was investigating the impact of the leak on the submarine programme which it said had occurred from abroad. It gave no details.

"The available information is being examined at Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence (Navy) and an analysis is being carried out by the concerned specialists," it said in a statement.

"It appears that the source of leak is from overseas and not in India."

Uday Bhaskar, a former naval officer, said that if the leak was established, it would amount to a significant compromise of the credibility of the submarines.

India has a fleet of 13 ageing submarines, only half of which are operational at any time, opening up a major gap with China which is expanding its maritime presence in the Indian Ocean.

Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull sought to deflect concern about the leak, touting the high security standards in Australia, where the submarine will be built. The Australian reported that the leak occurred in France in 2011.

"But clearly, it is a reminder that, particularly in this digital world, cyber security is of critical importance," he told the Seven TV network.


(Additional reporting by Gwénaëlle Barzic in PARIS; Editing by Nick Macfie)
 

doctor_fungcool

TB Fanatic
Thank you H.C. for all the good work and dedication concerning your threads.


That being said, it is my considered opinion that we are just a heart beat away from WWIII.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Thank you H.C. for all the good work and dedication concerning your threads.


That being said, it is my considered opinion that we are just a heart beat away from WWIII.

Thanks. You do a pretty good job on this stuff yourself! :vik:

Yeah, I'd be very hard pressed to completely refute such a conclusion.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37171995

Syria Jarablus: Turkish tanks roll into northern Syria

8 minutes ago
From the section Europe

A dozen Turkish tanks have rolled across the Syrian border after heavy Turkish shelling of an area held by so-called Islamic State (IS).

Military sources told Turkish media 70 targets in the Jarablus area had been destroyed by artillery and rocket strikes, and 12 by air strikes.

Turkish special forces entered Syria earlier as part of the offensive.

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said the operation was aimed against both IS and Kurdish fighters.

Turkey shelled Syrian Kurdish forces in the region this week, determined not to let them fill the vacuum if IS leaves, the BBC's Mark Lowen reports from Gaziantep, near the Syrian border.

The concern in Ankara is that the Kurds could create an autonomous area close to the border which might foster Kurdish separatism within Turkey itself, our correspondent says.

In another development, counter-terror police in Turkey's main city, Istanbul, launched dawn raids targeting IS suspects across the city.

US Vice-President Joe Biden arrived in Turkey on Wednesday in the highest-ranking visit by a Western official since the failed coup on 15 July.

◾Bomb survivor haunted by attacks
◾Turkey v Syria's Kurds v Islamic State
◾How dangerous is the instability in Turkey?
◾Islamic State: the full story

_90888774_syria_turkey_kurds_v6_624map.png

http://ichef-1.bbci.co.uk/news/624/...on/_90888774_syria_turkey_kurds_v6_624map.png

Twin attack

The tanks were followed by pick-up trucks believed to be carrying Turkish-backed Syrian rebels from the Free Syrian Army.

"At 04:00 [01:00 GMT] our forces began an operation against the Daesh [IS] and PYD [Kurdish Democratic Union Party] terror groups," President Erdogan said in a speech in Ankara.

The offensive is aimed at "putting an end" to problems on the border, he said.

The Turkish town of Karkamis - just across the border from Jarablus - was evacuated as a precaution following earlier IS mortar attacks.

Turkey has vowed to "completely cleanse" IS from its border region, blaming the group for a bomb attack on a wedding that killed at least 54 people in Gaziantep on Saturday.

This is Turkey's first known ground incursion into Syria since a brief operation to relocate the tomb of Suleyman Shah, a revered Ottoman figure, in February of last year.

The air strikes are Turkey's first inside Syria since the downing of a Russian jet in November. Moscow and Ankara only mended ties in June after punitive Russian sanctions.

'A buffer against the Kurds'

An unnamed senior US official in Washington told BBC News before the start of the Turkish operation that it was "partly to create a buffer against the possibility of the Kurds moving forward".

"We are working with them on that potential operation: our advisers are communicating with them on the Jarablus plan.

"We'll give close air support if there's an operation."

Fighters from the Syrian Kurd YPG militia - the military wing of the PYD - led the battle to drive IS out of the strategic crossroads town of Manbij earlier this month.

Turkey views the YPG as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), a Turkish-Kurdish rebel group fighting for autonomy since the 1980s, but the YPG is backed by the US as one of the most effective forces battling IS.

On Tuesday the YPG took control of most of the north-eastern Syrian city of Hassakeh. A truce was reportedly brokered there by Russia after recent clashes between the Kurds and Syrian government forces.

President Erdogan said he would press Vice-President Biden for the extradition of US-based cleric Fethullah Gulen, whom he blames for the coup attempt.
◾Turkish arrest warrant for Gulen


Turkish media round on Biden

Several pro-government papers accuse Washington of dragging its heels after Turkey's call for the extradition of US-based Turkish cleric Fethullah Gulen. "Gulen's protector" says a headline in Aksam, which notes his "late" visit in the wake of last month's coup attempt.

Gunes newspaper says pointedly that "the Turkish government and 79 million Turks are waiting for concrete steps" from him, adding that "Biden will be... asked to behave like an ally".

The pro-government Star agrees that Mr Biden will have to explain US support for the "Fetullah Gulen Terrorist Organisation" (FETO). Karar says the visit will open a new chapter in bilateral ties but says Washington must show its support for Turkey.

Pro-government daily Milliyet publishes a column by Mr Biden himself where he praises Turks for thwarting the coup attempt. He also says that claims that Gulen's extradition is simply a political matter are "damaging" for bilateral ties.


More on this story

Turkey plans active Syria role
20 August 2016

Turkey v Syria's Kurds v Islamic State
23 August 2016

Video Agony after wedding bomb
22 August 2016

How dangerous is Turkey unrest?
22 August 2016

Turkey caught in overlapping security crises
14 March 2016
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/201...ered-its-third-decade/130976/?oref=d-mostread

Al-Qaeda’s War on America Just Entered Its Third Decade

By Dominic Tierney
The Atlantic
August 23, 2016

Two decades ago, Osama bin Laden officially launched al-Qaeda’s struggle against the United States. Neither side has won.

Exactly two decades ago, on August 23, 1996, Osama bin Laden declared war on the United States. At the time, few people paid much attention. But it was the start of what’s now the Twenty Years’ War between the United States and al-Qaeda—a conflict that both sides have ultimately lost.

During the 1980s, bin Laden fought alongside the mujahideen in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union. After the Soviets withdrew, he went home to Saudi Arabia, then moved to Sudan before being expelled and returning to Afghanistan in 1996 to live under Taliban protection. Within a few months of his arrival, he issued a 30-page fatwa, “Declaration of War Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places,” which was published in a London-based newspaper, Al-Quds Al-Arabi, and faxed to supporters around the world. It was bin Laden’s first public call for a global jihad against the United States. In a rambling text, bin Laden opined on Islamic history, celebrated recent attacks against U.S. forces in Lebanon and Somalia, and recounted a multitude of grievances against the United States, Israel, and their allies. “The people of Islam had suffered from aggression, iniquity and injustice imposed on them by the Jewish-Christian alliance and their collaborators,” he wrote.

His central lament was the presence of U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia, or “the occupation of the land of the two holiest sites.” Following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, bin Laden had offered to defend Saudi Arabia with his Arab legion. But the Saudi royals decided that the U.S. military would be a better bet. Six years later, American soldiers were still in Saudi Arabia in a bid to contain Saddam Hussein. Bin Laden saw the United States as the power behind the throne: the “far enemy” that propped up apostate regimes in the Middle East. Muslims, he wrote, should abandon their petty local fights and unite to drive the Americans out of Saudi Arabia: “destroying, fighting and killing the enemy until, by the Grace of Allah, it is completely defeated.”

And so began the Twenty Years’ War between al-Qaeda and the United States, which has had five distinct eras to date. The first phase, from 1996-2001, was the phony war marked by intermittent hostilities. It took al-Qaeda two years to organize its first major attack against the United States: the August 1998 bombing of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, which killed 224 people in total, 12 of them American. The United States responded with a quasi-war against al-Qaeda and its state sponsors, which combined a legal indictment of bin Laden with limited military action, including cruise missile strikes in Afghanistan and Sudan in 1998 that killed at least six al-Qaeda personnel. In 2000, al-Qaeda suicide bombers hit the USS Cole at a port in Yemen, killing 17. The following year, the terrorist group brought the war to the American homeland with the 9/11 attacks, which killed nearly 3,000 people.

The second phase of the Twenty Years’ War, from 2001-2003, was the invasion of Afghanistan, which represented the high point of American optimism about victory. George W. Bush seized the sword, declaring a “war against terrorism,” sweeping aside the Taliban regime and al-Qaeda’s training camps in Afghanistan, and installing a new Afghan government under Hamid Karzai. And Bush also grasped the shield, constructing an entire architecture of domestic defense, including the Department of Homeland Security, which was resourced to the tune of tens of billions of dollars every year.

The third phase, from 2003-2006, was the invasion of Iraq, where American hopes evaporated in the Mesopotamian sun. Bush had argued that only war could sever the purported—and it turned out largely imagined—alliance between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda, and liberate an oppressed people. But the overthrow of Saddam’s regime triggered widespread disorder, and led to the rise of an al-Qaeda affiliate, al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), which began a murderous campaign of violence. The quagmire in Iraq also eroded the parallel mission in Afghanistan. With American attention focused on Iraq, and only limited U.S. forces in Afghanistan, the Taliban recovered in the south of the country as well as in sanctuaries in Pakistan.


Read more: This is the War Against al-Qaeda the Next US President Will Inherit
See also: 15 Years After 9/11, Is America Any Safer?


The fourth phase of the Twenty Years’ War, from 2007-2011, was the surge era, a time of fragile recovery. The deployment of U.S. reinforcements in Iraq, together with the “Awakening” movement, which involved Washington allying with Sunni tribes against AQI (by now rebranded as the Islamic State of Iraq), helped to pull Iraq back from the brink of catastrophe. In Afghanistan, Barack Obama ordered a surge of U.S. forces, which nearly tripled troop levels to over 100,000 from 2009-2010. In 2011, U.S. Navy SEALs killed bin Laden in Pakistan. At the end of the year, American troops left Iraq. There was, finally, a sense of closure.

The fifth phase, from 2011-2016, was the era of transformation, as once again, U.S. hopes went unrealized. AQI/ISI evolved into ISIS and moved to the center of the global jihadist movement. Misgovernment and sectarian rule in Iraq had alienated Iraqi Sunnis and breathed new life into the ISI. After Syria collapsed into civil war in 2011, ISI crossed the border; in 2013, firmly ensconced in both Iraq and Syria, ISI changed its name to the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). The following year, al-Qaeda repudiated its former affiliate. But far from collapsing as an organization, ISIS subsequently swept into northern Iraq and declared a global caliphate. Meanwhile, in the often-forgotten war in Afghanistan, American troops were withdrawn and the Taliban made steady gains, with the campaign left teetering between stalemate and failure.

Thus neither side won the Twenty Years’ War. Victory would mean achieving core aims at an acceptable cost relative to the benefits. Al-Qaeda did meet some of its goals: With limited resources, bin Laden gained incredible notoriety and inflicted enormous damage on a great power. In 2003, U.S. troops left Saudi Arabia—the key goal outlined in the 1996 manifesto. In 2004, bin Laden released a video that compared the costs of the 9/11 attacks to al-Qaeda versus the United States: “Al-Qaeda spent $500,000 on the event, while America, in the incident and its aftermath, lost—according to the lowest estimate—more than $500 billion, meaning that every dollar of al-Qaeda defeated a million dollars.”

But in a broader analysis, bin Laden failed. Yes, U.S. forces left Saudi Arabia, but they did so voluntarily, after Saddam was toppled. Crucially, al-Qaeda was unable to mobilize Muslims around a strict Islamist identity that transcended other loyalties. As Charles Kurzman showed in his book The Missing Martyrs, after 9/11, fewer than one in every 100,000 Muslims became jihadist terrorists. The vast majority of Muslims completely reject bin Laden’s ideology. And national, tribal, and other local identities remain profoundly important from the Palestinians to the Pakistanis. From 2003-2011, confidence in bin Laden collapsed in many Muslim-majority countries, falling from 59 percent to 26 percent in Indonesia, and from 56 percent to 13 percent in Jordan. In a 2013 poll taken in 11 Muslim countries, a median of just 13 percent had a favorable view of al-Qaeda, whereas 57 percent had an unfavorable view.

Another key al-Qaeda goal was to assume leadership of the global jihadist movement. Today, al-Qaeda affiliates in North Africa and Yemen remain a threat. But history seems to have moved on. Al-Qaeda was a marginal player in the grand drama of the Arab Spring. Al-Qaeda’s former satellite, AQI, morphed into ISIS, broke away, and seized the mantle of global jihad. According to the State Department, in the face of ISIS’s expansion in 2014, “AQ leadership also appeared to lose momentum as the self-styled leader of a global movement.”

Al-Qaeda and ISIS are very different animals. Al-Qaeda is a loose terrorist network focused on launching spectacular attacks to mobilize Muslims, which sometimes relied on host governments like the Taliban. ISIS is simultaneously a terrorist network, an insurgency, and a quasi-state, with tens of thousands of fighters, widespread territorial control, and extensive funding. ISIS doesn’t need to rely on government patronage—it is the government.

Al-Qaeda offers delayed gratification: ISIS provides instant gratification. Bin Laden saw the caliphate as a distant goal. In his declaration of war, he spoke of harnessing Saudi oil wealth in “the forthcoming Islamic State, by Allah’s Grace”—but this was a utopian and long-term vision. ISIS seized land in Syria and Iraq and made the caliphate real. In his 1996 declaration of war, bin Laden promised that Muslim martyrs would receive 72 pure virgins in heaven. ISIS offers sex slaves right now. Front-loading the rewards proved popular. By 2014, an estimated one thousand foreign fighters were joining ISIS every month, far in excess of new al-Qaeda recruits.

Al-Qaeda’s failure in the Twenty Years’ War, however, doesn’t mean the United States was victorious. War is not a sports match where one team wins and the other team loses. Instead, each side has its own separate tally. In the positive column, Washington can point to the absence of terrorist attacks on anything like the scale of 9/11 in the United States after 2001. Global jihad became a far more challenging endeavor, as Washington and its allies clamped down on terrorists’ opportunity to travel, communicate, and trade money and weapons. The United States also succeeded in capturing or killing the majority of al-Qaeda’s core leadership using a range of innovative tactics, including drone strikes and special-operations raids.

But a sober assessment of the last 20 years suggests that the United States lost the broader war. The country wasn’t occupied and there was no surrender. But Americans have paid an exorbitant price for the two-decade campaign in strategic, economic, and moral terms. When terrorists strike a great power, the destructive potential lies not in the act itself but in the great power’s response to the act. In 1914, Serbian terrorists killed Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife. Austria-Hungary used the attack as a pretext for war against Serbia, triggering a cataclysmic conflict, World War I, in which four empires collapsed—the Russian, German, Ottoman, and Austria-Hungarian. Similarly, in the Twenty Years’ War, America’s response has had far greater consequences than al-Qaeda’s attacks.

Let’s turn first to the United States on offense: the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Recounting the costs is numbing: over 7,000 Americans killed, tens of thousands of soldiers seriously wounded, trillions of dollars expended, and over 100,000 civilian deaths in Iraq alone. And there’s the wider impact of spending on America’s debt, of enhanced interrogation and torture on the U.S. global image and ethical standing, and of seemingly endless quagmires on domestic political unity.

In an interview, Zbigniew Brzezinski, the national security advisor to President Jimmy Carter, told me, “The Iraq War was unnecessary, self-damaging, demoralizing, delegitimizing, and governed primarily by simplistic military assumptions that didn’t take into account the regional mosaic in which Iraq operates and the internal mosaic inside Iraq.”

The eclipse of al-Qaeda by ISIS is a loss for al-Qaeda but not a gain for the United States. ISIS is an even more ruthless and capable adversary.

If we consider the United States on defense, the success of the homeland-security complex in making Americans safer is highly debatable. A trillion dollars has poured into counter-terrorism programs, but to what end? There have been some genuine payoffs. The FBI, for example, has far greater resources to find terrorists before they attack, watch lists and databases of global threats are much improved since 9/11, and aircraft are physically safer with hardened cockpit doors.

But as Steven Brill described in The Atlantic, the spigot of homeland security expenditure also produced a carnival of waste, endless turf wars between bloated federal agencies—and, in many cases, remarkably little additional security. Tens of billions of dollars were poured into programs like FirstNet, a telecommunications system for first responders, which may never be built. After 9/11 there was a vast increase in the number of armed air marshals on planes. But Brill notes that more air marshals have been arrested themselves (for example, for drunk driving), than have carried out arrests in airports or onboard a plane. In 2015, undercover tests found that airport screeners across the country failed to detect explosives and weapons about 95 percent of the time. We can’t rerun the tape of history, but it’s plausible that with a more slimmed-down homeland security apparatus, terrorists would have killed few if any additional Americans.

Another core U.S. goal is to avoid the contest becoming a civilizational clash between the West and Islam. If that happens, the United States will be at war with the entire Muslim world, and very likely, will be facing decisive failure. Bin Laden never succeeded in rallying Muslims into a single internationalist bloc. But in the United States, there’s a creeping Islamophobia that serves to lump Muslims together and could unintentionally advance bin Laden’s vision. After 9/11, George W. Bush visited the Islamic Center in Washington D.C., and declared that “Islam is peace.” But in recent years, the GOP has become more explicitly Islamophobic, epitomized by Donald Trump’s proposal to ban all Muslims from entering the United States.

So if neither al-Qaeda nor the United States won the Twenty Years’ War, who did? The winners were Iran and China. The United States removed not one, but two, of Iran’s adversaries, the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein in Iraq. Tehran subsequently became one of the most influential players in Iraqi politics. The American blood and treasure expended in the Middle East also accelerated the point at which China will catch up to the United States economically.

But the main combatants in the struggle lost for similar reasons: They were hobbled by ideology. Al-Qaeda’s vision of austere Wahhabi Islam and endless global jihad is profoundly unappealing to the vast majority of Muslims. But ideology also shaped U.S. strategy, sometimes in dangerous ways. American idealism is one of the country’s most attractive qualities, central to its moral standing and “soft power.” But idealism also helped to frame the Twenty Years’ War as a struggle between good and evil, which required grandiose goals to topple regimes and build beacons of freedom in the Middle East. It also encouraged Americans to lump terrorists and rogue states together into a big bucket of bad guys. At the same time, Americans are also hostile to the whole notion of nation-building, often seeing stabilization missions as a kind of big-government welfarism, and not something that the country’s warriors should be doing. In a recent foreign-policy speech, Donald Trump said, “ISIS will be gone if I’m elected president,” but at the same time, the United States will be “getting out of the nation-building business.” This combination of beliefs is as American as apple pie.

As a result, the United States is an impatient crusader: eager to smite tyrants and terrorists but unwilling to invest the time and resources needed to win the peace. In Afghanistan and Iraq, Washington went to war with a short-term mindset, set on defeating the evildoers, rather than thinking about how to handle the messy consequences.

After five eras—phony war, optimism, catastrophe, recovery, transformation—it’s a sign of America’s inability to achieve victory that the Twenty Years’ War label will probably only last for one more year. Barring an unlikely collapse of al-Qaeda and ISIS, the contest will enter its 21st year next August.

Al-Qaeda’s extremist beliefs and lack of capabilities meant it was always vulnerable to burning bright and then fading. For the United States, as the vastly greater power, the primary danger was self-inflicted injury. Al-Qaeda can never defeat the United States. Only Americans can do that.

-

There's only one comment posted at the linked source thus far.....

Thomas Roberts • 4 hours ago

An interesting history, but as a strategy discussion it fails to identify what US interests motivated these events. An example is the citation of US Idealism, while noting the often amoral methods employed to eliminate AQ leaders or affect their support populations. Well, the author can't have it two ways at once.

Another gap in this article would be whether the US supported Shiia claims for hegemony and hence Iran's regional influence as a means of opposing AQ in Iraq and Afghanistan. The author cites the events, but fails to tie this decision to a much more complex set of policy decisions than is depicted in the article's monochromatic description of the Twenty Year War with AQ.

Reducing this history to the US versus one religious faction ignores the fact that the vast majority of South Asian deaths in these overall conflicts have been caused directly by internecine violence and not by direct US action, despite the the US getting most of the headlines.
 

Housecarl

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August 24, 2016

"War with China: Thinking Through the Unthinkable"

By Crispin Rovere

Among US analysts, war with China is no longer a taboo subject. RAND Corporation has now tackled the issue head on, publishing a lengthy analysis titled: 'War with China: Thinking through the Unthinkable'. So far, Paul Dibb and Mike Scrafton have provided two excellent assessments on what this means for Australia. This review evaluates RAND’s assessment itself.

RAND presents four conflict scenarios over two different time periods: low-intensity and high-intensity, short and long duration, and occurring either in 2015 or 2025. The low-intensity conflicts are fairly straightforward; however, RAND’s high-intensity 2025 scenario draws a number of contestable conclusions, namely that:

-Escalation to the nuclear level in any US-China conflict, however intense, is very unlikely;

-War would be far more devastating for China, with an estimated 25%-35% reduction in GDP after one year, as opposed to a 5%-10% reduction for the US;

-A long conflict would test the internal stability of the Chinese state; and

-The prospect of major land operations is low, unless the war was on the Korean peninsula.

RAND’s ultimate conclusion is summed up by this quote: 'China could not win, and might lose, a severe war with the United States in 2025.'

The authors note that Chinese policymakers are one of their intended audiences. This aims to ensure that miscalculation owing to overconfidence in China’s military capacity is avoided. Unfortunately, in attempting to enhance the deterrent effect of America’s Pacific forces, RAND makes a number of assertions that paint an overly rosy picture for the US. It must be stressed that these criticisms can only be made due to RAND’s willingness tackle this important subject.

1. RAND seriously underestimates the probability of a high-intensity conflict escalating to the nuclear level

The authors all but exclude the possibility of nuclear use from either side, especially if the US avoids targets that would threaten China’s nuclear deterrent. In reality, China would have significant incentives for nuclear use if it was greatly disadvantaged in a conventional conflict. For instance, China could use nukes as counterforce weapons against US staging areas in the Western Pacific, calculating the US won’t respond at the strategic level. In extremis, China could even detonate a strategic warhead over a civilian population of a non-nuclear US ally (such as Japan) as a direct challenge to US nuclear assurances and to demonstrate absolute resolve, without forcing America’s hand by attacking the homeland directly. Indeed, I would argue that these outcomes are far more likely than what RAND assumes: China accepting total military defeat.

In other words, the fact that America enjoys overall nuclear superiority appears to have led to dubious assumptions about US-China nuclear dynamics. It would have been better for RAND to simply assume a high-intensity conflict that does not escalate to the nuclear level, without attempting to justify that assumption. After all, it is just as dangerous for US decision-makers to be presented with an unrealistic appraisal of nuclear risk as it is for Chinese leaders having unjustified confidence in their conventional forces.

2. RAND’s assessment of US economic resilience is unrealistic

RAND calculates the relative harm inflicted on each economy based on the estimated disruption to trade, and the relative reliance on imports for each belligerent. The study notes that China is more reliant on imports, and that trade would be severely curtailed during wartime throughout the Western Pacific. Bilateral trade between the US and China would broadly cease.

While it’s true that China is dependent on seaborne imports and that, from a military standpoint, energy disruption would be a severe hazard for China, RAND’s economic assessment is incomplete.

First, in addition to the cessation of bilateral trade with China, US trade would be adversely affected with every other country whose own economy is dependent on Chinese trade. Moreover, it is not only the raw value of bilateral trade, but the total value of American goods for which Chinese manufacturing is an indispensable component. This would hardly be made up domestically, as any resurgence in domestic manufacturing in the long term would likely to be directly supporting America’s war effort.

Second, and more important, is the impact of cyber-attacks. It is impossible that America’s own cyber weapons would deter such threats if China faced kinetic attacks on its own territory. It must be assumed, therefore, that China would successfully disrupt critical American infrastructure on a large scale, including (but not limited to) transportation, energy, telecommunications, financial services, and research.

The safest assumption (which RAND does make) is that in 2025 China’s cyber capability will be broadly equivalent with that of the US. While the US would be able to respond in-kind, the relative economic impact of cyber warfare would not be the same. America’s economy is larger than China’s due to the productivity afforded by widespread access to high technology. Unrestrained cyber warfare would therefore disadvantage America’s economy disproportionately. Accordingly, it is not possible to accurately predict the relative impact on each country’s GDP after one year of warfighting (as RAND attempts to do), but the overall gap in economic effect between China and the US is likely to be narrower than RAND has assumed.

3. Disruption of China’s internal stability is wishful thinking

RAND’s supposition that a prolonged conflict could precipitate a crisis of stability for the Chinese leadership is unsubstantiated. Certainly a severe military defeat resulting in a harsh peace would present a major crisis of legitimacy for the Communist Party. Indeed, this could militate against the cessation of hostilities, even when faced with a ruinous military situation, and increase the probability of nuclear use. In my view it is highly unlikely, however, that even a prolonged conflict would sufficiently embolden separatist forces in ways that could undermine the integrity of the state while such a war was still ongoing. To the contrary, faced with the memory of ‘the century of humiliation’, the will of the Chinese to resist demands of external powers would likely overwhelm any internal dissent for the foreseeable duration of any conflict.

4. RAND’s conclusion about the use of land forces is incorrect

RAND assumes that a major land conflict is unlikely, occurring only in the event of a war breaking out on the peninsula. RAND bases this on the (correct) assumption that North Korea no longer has the capacity to overrun the South on its own, and because South Korea is likely to avoid being dragged into a war against China otherwise.

Nevertheless, RAND underestimates the likelihood of conflict breaking out on the peninsula during war. This is irrespective of whether hostilities commenced over the South China Sea, East China Sea, or Taiwan.

This is because the North Koreans, seeing their opportunity, would invade the South knowing the Chinese will have no choice but to support them. Were North Korea to be defeated, China would be faced with the intolerable situation of US forces on their border during a time of war.

The correct military decision for China would be to place enough pressure on the South to force America to commit large scale forces to the defence, without overwhelming it immediately and presenting the US with a fait accompli. Once committed, the US would be in a diabolical military situation. Hundreds of thousands of US land forces would be engaged against an enormous number of enemy combatants, supported by vulnerable supply lines in highly contested waters near the Chinese mainland. Indeed, it is perfectly likely a war that started in the Spratlys could be lost by the US at Busan.

Of course the US could simply abandon South Korea, but doing so would end its alliance credibility in the Western Pacific. Here even a military defeat could prove a major strategic victory for China, while occupation of Seoul would be a significant bargaining chip in negotiating a favourable peace.

Conclusion

In addition to these four key areas, RAND makes a number of other assumptions that seem overly generous for the Americans: the willingness of European NATO allies to deter Russian aggression; the extent to which China’s capacity to replenish early losses would be constrained; and the presumed incapacity of China to manage shortages created by disruptions to regional trade. Moreover, other likely Chinese responses have not been considered, such as sponsoring non-state actors hostile to the US, or threatening American interests overland in the Middle East. Finally, the ability of the US to sustain offensive operations in the Western Pacific is questionable given the vulnerability of US aircraft carriers and bases located within the first island chain.

Having said this, it is hard to argue with RAND’s assessment of the overall military balance in 2025. America will enjoy decisive advantages in undersea capability for the foreseeable future, and China’s surface fleet would be unlikely to survive. If China’s primary military objective was to control the South China Sea or the East China Sea, then war with the US would not be successful.

Nevertheless, it is entirely possible that in a lengthy high-intensity conflict, economic losses would be equivalent, decisive military engagements would be elusive, and China’s post-war recovery would be faster. Combined with the benefit of regional proximity and a weakened allied presence in the Western Pacific, this means the possibility of a Chinese strategic victory in 2025 or beyond cannot be excluded.

This article originally appeared at The Lowy Institute Interpreter.
 

Housecarl

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August 24, 2016

The Threatening Space Between Napoleon and Nukes: Clausewitz vs. Schelling

By Olivia Garard

Great theories stand the test of time—shedding light on their subject’s essence despite varying contexts, technological upheavals or mutable human relations. One such work is Carl von Clausewitz’s On War. That said, with the detonation of the atomic bomb and the proliferation of nuclear weapons, many find Clausewitz wanting. How can there be a decisive battle without nuclear annihilation? Nuclear weapons seem to breach our understanding of force, suggesting the need for radically different conceptions of war. Enter Thomas C. Schelling and his work on The Strategy of Conflict—an attempt to comprehend and harness force within the context of nuclear weapons. Surprisingly, both Schelling’s and Clausewitz’s projects are far more similar than their diverging contexts would suggest. Lest we forget, the transformations in war that they bore witness to—Napoleon and nukes—were similarly jarring; despite the difference in potency, the rupture in the traditional form of war corresponds. After the introduction of these methodological and technological terrors, Clausewitz and Schelling spent their time trying to comprehend what these changes meant for war and conflict—in theory and in reality—converging on the problem of delimiting war. While Clausewitz’s problem is limited war and Schelling’s problem is limiting warfare, both turn to the concept of the threat to compensate for the failure of war in reality to realize its theoretical potential. Ultimately the difference between Clausewitz and Schelling lies in the utility of threat.

War can never be perfect in the absolute sense. In On War, Clausewitz begins with the axiom that “war therefore is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will.”[1] He then deduces that in war we should employ the utmost use of force to make our opponent defenseless. Ideally, we employ all our military might in a forceful singularity that necessarily disarms the enemy. As a result, we would not worry about nor even contemplate our opponent’s actions. Rather than a dialogue of forces, there would only be an instantaneous soliloquy expressing war absolutely. Nevertheless, when Clausewitz looks to reality and consults the historical record, he finds that this is anything but the case. Singularity is not possible.[2] War takes time in space giving the opponent a stake in the outcome. Clausewitz makes this clear, writing, “As long as the enemy is not defeated, he may defeat me…he will dictate the law to me as I did to him.”[3] In reality war is interactive; this fact limits war. We have to plan and account for the opponent; if we push, the opponent pushes back. Clausewitz argues, “The Art of War has to deal with living and with moral forces, the consequence of which is that it can never attain the absolute.”[4] Each side is composed of fallible, fickle, and frustrating humans. Just as we are acting and reacting, so too is the enemy. And, as long as there is an enemy then war is not, and never will be, absolute.

War will never be perfect in the absolute sense and neither can it be perfect in the purest sense.[5] In The Strategy of Conflict, Schelling explains that pure conflict is the naturally untenable case of a zero-sum game.[6] An instance of pure conflict—a zero-sum game—is when what is gained for one side is exactly what is lost for the other. Pure conflict emerges when “the interests of two antagonists are completely opposed.”[7] It results when certain variables are held constant, specifically (and similar to Clausewitz) interaction and interdependence with the opponent. Fortunately, pure conflict “is a special case; it would arise in a war of complete extermination, otherwise not even in war.”[8] Instead, “most conflict situations are essentially bargaining situations” in which interaction and interdependence with the opponent is fundamental, a concept that pure conflict eschews.[9] Schelling continues, “The ability of one participant to gain his ends is dependent to an important degree on the choices or decisions that the other participant will make.”[10] Like Clausewitz, Schelling understands the limit toward reaching the purest conception of conflict. Warfare is limited because each choice is dependent on expectations ad infinitum: “Everyone expects everyone else to expect everyone else to expect the result.”[11] If we are expecting something and our opponents are similarly expecting, neither is fully acting. Each relies on the other whose humanity makes war imperfect.[12]

“EVERYONE EXPECTS EVERYONE ELSE TO EXPECT EVERYONE ELSE TO EXPECT THE RESULT.”

According to Schelling, coordination is the process that stabilizes conflict enabling limited warfare while politics functions comparatively for Clausewitz. Schelling worries, “There is no stable focal point except at the extremes.”[13] At the extremes, conflict is a dichotomy of tit-for-tat. With the introduction of coordination—a byproduct of interdependence with the enemy—there is the possibility for stability and limited warfare. It is a precarious balance held in place by cooperation and threats. Likewise, Clausewitz justifies, “If the whole consideration is a calculation of probability based on definite persons and relations, then the political object, being the original motive, must be an essential factor in the product.”[14] Within a limited war, politics reemerges manipulating people and their relations within the scope of the war. Clausewitz’s war cannot express itself as a singularity of force coextensive with the desired political object; instead, politics maintains a leash on war controlling its expression. It is not a question as to whether politics or coordination makes war imperfect, but instead how politics and coordination delimit it. Since war is neither pure nor absolute, coordination and politics are used to bridge the gap that necessarily results when theoretical war is not coextensive with war in reality. It is in this space—between theoretical war and war in reality—wherein politics and coordination maneuver. They become methods that not only compensate for, but also attempt to exploit, the necessary existence of the opponent and their say. Clausewitz and Schelling appeal to the concept of the threat to enable politics and coordination the requisite level of control.

Schelling defines threats as “no more than a communication of one’s own incentives, designed to impress on the other the automatic consequences of his act.”[15] Unpacking this we find that threats are expressive of potentiality of a possible scenario deriving from a future action. Schelling explains that the goal is to “[influence] the other person’s choice, in a manner favorable to one’s self, by affecting the other person’s expectations on how one’s self will behave.”[16] We communicate to our opponent—be it through language or action—that if a certain something happens, then we will react in such a way.[17] This oppositional interdependence is crucial because only when the linkage is active can threats take effect necessarily limiting warfare. Moreover, it is essential that “one must threaten that he will act, not that he may act, if the threat fails.”[18] The threat must resonate with the opponent because “the threat’s efficacy depends on the credulity of the other party, and the threat is ineffectual unless the threatener can rearrange or display his own incentives so as to demonstrate that he would, ex post, have an incentive to carry it out.”[19] Threats only work if our opponent imagines the same (or at least a similar enough) future state based on the threat’s potentiality, would prefer that the future not turn out that way, and believes we will carry out the action invoked by the threat. The difficulty in threatening is convincing the enemy without demonstration. Therefore, Schelling’s threats rest heavily on communication and the coordination that it facilitates, Clausewitz, on the other hand, differs.

While Schelling is far more formal in his explanation of threats, Clausewitz notes their purpose. Clausewitz’s concept emerges when “this influence of the political object is once permitted, as it then must be, there is no longer any limit, and we must be pleased to come down to such warfare as consists in a mere threatening of the enemy and in negotiating.”[20] Here is the clearest expression of limited war begetting threats, but it is unclear what Clausewitz means by “mere threatening.” We must first remember “All action, therefore, takes place on the supposition that if the solution by force of arms which lies at [War’s] foundation should be realized, it will be a favorable one.”[21] How is it possible to reconcile the need for a forceful decision and the political possibility of threats? Clausewitz explains, “If, therefore, the enemy is to be reduced to submission by an act of War, he must either be positively disarmed or placed in such a position that he is threatened with it.”[22] This might seem circular, but we are closer to the understanding Clausewitz’s conception. A threat is the possibility of future military action based on the disposition of the forces at that time. Disarmament of the enemy is still essential to his conception of war, but he allows for human expectation of the probability of certain results based on the disposition of the world, precisely the configuration of military forces. This is conceivable because it is still based on disarmament specifically through “possible combats.”[23] The projection of the “supposition of force” constitutes the threat; threats are “demonstrations.”[24] Just like Schelling, Clausewitz relies on expecting the opponent to think in a certain way about the future and his (possible and probable) future actions. Additionally, the opponent must be receptive to threat. Unlike Schelling, credibility—belief in the actual execution of the action implied in the threat—is based on communication of the inevitable force of combat constructed from the multiplicity of forces in space and time, rather than through language and dialogue.[25] Invoking the fear of the direct clash of force—creating the perception of the inevitability of overwhelming military force—is the Clausewitzian threat.

A CLAUSEWITZIAN THREAT SEEMS LESS LIKE A THREAT, COMMONLY DEFINED, AND MORE LIKE AN INDICATION OF INTENT, A SPECTER OF FUTURE DECISIVE FORCE.

Clausewitz and Schelling diverge on the utility of threats because of their shortcomings and potential for misapprehension. A threat from Clausewitz’s perspective is merely more expedient and cost-effective, but executing the threat should always remain viable and even desired. A Clausewitzian threat seems less like a threat, commonly defined, and more like an indication of intent, a specter of future decisive force. Whereas, Schelling’s threats are actions of a different sort, a coordinated bargaining dance. This difference is most apparent when we consider Schelling’s “threat that leaves something to chance.” Schelling explains, “The key to these threats is that, though one may or may not carry them out if the threatened party fails to comply, the final decision is not altogether under the threatener’s control.”[26] Although Clausewitz accommodates chance within his trinity, threatening without the underscored notion of forceful decision is inherently wrong. Furthermore, Clausewitz would trivialize this threat, because “all action in War…is directed on probable, not on certain, results. Whatever is wanting in certainty must always be left to fate, or chance, call it which you will.”[27] To Clausewitz the threat that leaves something to chance is a tautology. Rather, Clausewitz’s main concern is that our enemy would not respect the limitations and would instead take advantage of the delay—inherent in the nature of a threat—to use force to disarm us. There is always the risk that the enemy will use the trump card of immediate and decisive force. The irony is that fear of escalation is what Schelling believes will build stability in an oppositional relationship advocating “Deliberately raising the risk of all-out war is thus a tactic that fits the context of limited war.”[28] The potential for war to spin out of control—in spite of its limitations—and approach its pure and absolute formulation constitutes Schelling’s threat, and, moreover, this possibility in itself preserves stability just because neither side desires the outcome. Instead, Clausewitz fears the possibility that our opponent will take advantage of limited war and make it not as limited to the extent that we will instead be destroyed. If we consider Clausewitz and Schelling enemies threatening one another, then Schelling would threaten the risk of less limited war, à la nukes, while Clausewitz would respond not with threats, but with force.[29]

In the end, since war in reality is neither pure nor absolute, both Clausewitz and Schelling empower politics and coordination to employ threats to exploit the necessary essential limitations on war. Schelling’s threats are the credible communication of our future actions based on our opponent’s actions. Clausewitz’s threats are based on the configuration of military forces with the implicit expectation of future combat—his definition of strategy.[30] Schelling too finds the strategy of conflict “is the employment of threats, or of threats and promises.”[31] However, the difference lies in the utility of the threat. While Schelling finds the threat to be the beacon of stability and the possibility to limit warfare, Clausewitz is pragmatic and understands that ultimately realistic and executable force must underpin all threats. Schelling would prefer never to have to carry out a threat. A nuclear Clausewitz would have no compunction in their execution provided the requisite political thrust. Whereas, Schelling believes that threats are necessary and sufficient to engage with the enemy, Clausewitz finds threats often necessary, but certainly insufficient without real force and its specter in support.



Olivia A. Garard is an officer in the U.S. Marine Corps, a Featured Contributor to The Strategy Bridge, and an associate member of the Military Writers Guild. The opinions expressed are hers alone and do not reflect those of the U.S. Marine Corps, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

NOTES:

[1] Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Colonel J. J. Graham (New York: Barnes & Noble, Inc., 2004): 3. [Italics original]. I use Graham’s translation over the Paret/Howard version because their translation is predisposed to a nuclear context. Consider their translation of “policy” over “politics” in many instances as a deliberate attempt to further limit war by limiting the theory behind it.

[2] While a Clausewitzian singularity might seem eerily foreboding of the atomic bomb, Schelling and his “second strike capabilities” argument demonstrates that this absolute expression of force is still not possible. The nukes we have are not nuclear enough.

[3] Clausewitz, 6.

[4] Ibid., 17.

[5] Much of Schelling’s work is directed at conflict, broadly defined, rather than only war. This is fine since conflict is inclusive of war. All wars are conflicts, but not all conflicts are wars.

[6] Excluding instances such as chess.

[7] Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Literary Licensing, LLC., 2011): 4-5.

[8] Ibid., 4-5.

[9] Ibid., 5.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Ibid., 91.

[12] This does have potential consequences for autonomous robots in war as Peter W. Singer’s Wired For War suggests. Perhaps programming is sufficient to consider a human in the loop?

[13] Ibid.

[14] Clausewitz, 10.

[15] Schelling, 35.

[16] Ibid., 160.

[17] While there is difference between “a threat intended to make an adversary do something (or cease doing something) and a threat intended to keep him from starting something,” only a threat broadly defined is necessary. [Ibid., 195].

[18] Ibid., 187. [Italics original].

[19] Schelling, 36. [Italics original]

[20] Clausewitz, 698. [Italics original] It is interesting that Clausewitz considers them mutually exclusive, whereas, Schelling would consider them two-sides of the same coin of diplomacy.

[21] Ibid., 32.

[22] Ibid., 6.

[23] Clausewitz, 547. [Italics original]

[24] It is a shame On War is incomplete because we do not have the chapter alluded to on “Demonstrations.” Or even the likely Book VIII Chapter 10, “Plan of War When the Destruction of the Enemy is Not the Object.” [Ibid., 520].

[25] Schelling would permit Clausewitz’s “tacit communication” but not vice versa, unless Schelling’s dialogues were backed up with (impending) force. Note Schelling: “[moves] have an information content, or evidence content” but “of a different character from that of speech” [Schelling 117.]

[26] Ibid., 188.

[27] Clausewitz, 119.

[28] Schelling, 193.

[29] But what happens after that?

[30] Specifically, “Strategy is the theory of the use of combats for the object of the War” [Clausewitz, 71].

[31] Schelling, 15.

This article originally appeared at Strategy Bridge.
 

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Video

US to Move Mobile Land Artillery Weapons to South China Sea

Kris Osborn
Sunday at 11:16 AM

Tactics would involve a new use for artillery weapons which have historically been offensive land-attack weapons

Senior Army and Pentagon strategists and planners are considering ways to fire existing weapons platforms in new ways around the globe ¨C including the possible placement of mobile artillery units in areas of the South China Sea to, if necessary, function as air-defense weapons to knock incoming rockets and cruise missiles out of the sky, senior Pentagon and Army officials told Scout Warrior.

Adm. Harry Harris, the commander of U.S. Pacific Command, has said he thinks the U.S. should think about new ways of using land-based rockets and howitzer systems as offensive and defensive weapons in areas of the South China Sea.

Such a move would better ensure access and maneuverability for U.S. and allied ships, assets and weapons in contested or tense areas, he explained.

Howitzers or Paladins could be used as a mobile, direct countermeasures to incoming rockets, he said. A key advantage to using a Paladin is that it is a mobile platform which could adjust to moving or fast-changing approaching enemy fire.

¡°We could use existing Howitzers and that type of munition (155m shells) to knock out incoming threats when people try to hit us from the air at long ranges using rockets and cruise missiles,¡± a senior Army official told Scout Warrior in an interview.

This consideration comes not long after Pentagon officials confirmed that satellite pictures show the Chinese have placed weapons such as Surface to Air Missiles in areas of the South China Sea.

Having land-based rockets or artillery could give US and allied forces both strategic and tactical assistance.

¡°A Howitzer can go where it has to go. It is a way of changing an offensive weapon and using it in dual capacity,¡± the official explained. ¡°This opens the door to opportunities and options we have not had before with mobile defensive platforms and offensive capabilities."

Mobile air defenses such as an Army M777 or Paladin Howitzer weapon could use precision rounds and advancing fire-control technology to destroy threatening air assets such as enemy aircraft, drones or incoming artillery fire.

Alongside the South China Sea, more mobile artillery weapons used for air defense could also prove useful in areas such as the Middle East and Eastern Europe, officials said. Having mobile counter-air weapons such as the M109 Paladin, able to fire 155m precision rounds on-the-move, could prove to be an effective air-defense deterrent against Russian missiles, aircraft and rockets in Eastern Europe, the senior Army official told Scout Warrior.

Regarding the South China Sea, the U.S. has a nuanced or complicated relationship with China involving both rivalry and cooperation; the recent Chinese move to put surface-to-air missiles and fighter jets on claimed territory in the South China Sea has escalated tensions and led Pentagon planners to consider various options.

Officials are clear to emphasize that no decisions have been made along these lines, yet it is one of the things being considered. Pentagon officials have opposed further militarization of the area and emphasized that the territorial disputes in the South China Sea need to be resolved peacefully and diplomatically.

At the same time, Pentagon officials have publically stated the U.S. will continue ¡°freedom of navigation¡± exercises wherein Navy ships sail within 12 miles of territory claimed by the Chinese - and tensions are clearly on the rise. In addition to these activities, it is entirely possible the U.S. could also find ways to deploy more offensive and defensive weapons to the region.

Naturally, a move of this kind would need to involve close coordination with U.S. allies in the region, as the U.S. claims no territory in the South China Sea. However, this would involve the deployment of a weapons system which has historically been used for offensive attacks on land. The effort could use an M777 Howitzer or Paladin, weapons able to fire 155m rounds.

They would bring a mobile tactical advantage to existing Army air defenses such as the Patriot and Theater High Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD, which primarily function as fixed-defense locations, the senior Army official said.

The M777 artillery weapon, often used over the years in Iraq and Afghanistan, can fire the precision GPS-guided Excalibur artillery round able to destroy targets within one meter from up to 30-kilometers or more away. Naturally, given this technology, it could potentially be applied as an air-defense weapon as well.

Using a Howitzer or Paladin could also decrease expenses, officials said.

¡°Can a munition itself be cheaper so we are not making million dollar missiles to shoot down $100,000 dollar incoming weapons,¡± the Army official said.

While Pentagon officials have not formally confirmed the prospect of working with allies to place weapons, such as Howitzers, in the South China Sea, they did say the U.S. was stepping up its coordination with allies in the region.

Strategic Capabilities Office

The potential use of existing weapons in new ways is entirely consistent with an existing Pentagon office which was, for the first time, recently announced publically. It is called the Strategic Capabilities Office, or SCO, stood up to look at integrating innovating technologies with existing weapons platforms ¨C or simply adapting or modifying existing weapons for a wider range of applications.

¡°I created the SCO in 2012 when I was deputy secretary of defense to help us to re-imagine existing DOD and intelligence community and commercial systems by giving them new roles and game-changing capabilities to confound potential enemies -- the emphasis here was on rapidity of fielding, not 10 and 15-year programs. Getting stuff in the field quickly,¡± Carter said.

Senior Army officials say the SCO office is a key part of what provides the conceptual framework for the ongoing considerations of placing new weaponry in different locations throughout the Pacific theater. An Army consideration to place Paladin artillery weapons in the South China Sea would be one example of how to execute this strategic framework.

In fact, the Pentagon is vigorously stepping up its support to allies in the Pacific theater. A 2016 defense law, called the Southeast Asia Maritme Security Initiative, provides new funding to authorize a Department of Defense effort to train, equip, and provide other support to the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand, Urban explained.

"The Secretary (Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter) has committed $425M over Fiscal Years 2016-2020 for MSI (Maritime Security Initiative), with an initial investment of $50M available in fiscal year 2016 toward this effort," a Pentagon official said.

Army Rebalance to the Pacific

While the Army is naturally immersed in activities with NATO to deter Russian movements in Eastern Europe and maintaining missions in Iraq and Afghanistan ¨C the service has not forsaken its commitment to pursuing a substantial Army component to the Pentagon¡¯s Pacific rebalance.


Among other things, this involves stepped up military-to-military activities with allies in the region, coordinating with other leaders and land armies, and efforts to move or re-posture some weapons in the area.¡°The re-balance to the Pacific is more than military, it is an economic question. the Army has its hands full with the Middle East and with Europe and is dealing with a resurgent problem in Europe and North Africa,¡± an Army official said. ¡°We have been able to cycle multiple units through different countries,¡± the senior official said.

Also, the pentagon has made the Commander of Army Pacific a 4-star General, a move which enables him to have direct one-to-one correspondence with his Chinese counterpart and other leaders in the region, he added.


As of several years ago, the Army had 18,500 Soldier stationed in Korea, 2,400 in Japan, 2,000 in Guam, 480 in the Philippines, 22,300 in Hawaii and 13,500 in Alaska. The service continues to support the national defense strategy by strengthening partnerships with existing allies in the region and conduction numerous joint exercises, service officials said.

¡°The ground element of the Pacific rebalance is important to ensure the stability in the region," senior officials have said. Many of the world's largest ground armies are based in the Pacific.

Also, in recent years Army documents have emphasized the need for the service to increase fire power in the Pacific to increased fielding of THAAD, Patriot and the Army Tactical Missile System, or ATACMS in the Pacific region. ATACMS is a technology which delivers precision fires against stationary or slow-moving targets at ranges up to 300 km., Army officials have said. In 2013, the Army did deploy THAAD missile systems to Guam.

Army officials have also called for the development of a land-based anti-ship ballistic missile, directed energy capability, and additional land-based anti-ship fires capabilities such as the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System.

Army officials have also said man support a potential adaptation of the RGM-84 Harpoon and calls for the development of boost-glide entry warheads able to deploy ¡°to hold adversary shipping at risk all without ever striking targets inland.

Boost-glide weapons use rocket-boosted payload delivery vehicles that glide at hypersonic speeds in the atmosphere. An increase in the Army¡¯s investment in boost-glide technology now could fast track the Army¡¯s impact in the Air-Sea Battle fight in the near term, Army papers have stated.

Visit Warrior
ªÌKris Osborn can be reached at Kris.Osborn@Scout.com.
ªÌTo Ask Military Expert KRIS OSBORN Questions, VISIT THE WARRIOR FORUMS.
 

vestige

Deceased
US to Move Mobile Land Artillery Weapons to South China Sea


That is bad to read this early.

It's not like they are being moved because the U.S. has inadequate storage space.

bump for all
 

mzkitty

I give up.
21m
Photo: Smoke rises from scene of explosion, reported attack at university in Darul Aman area of Kabul city, Afghanistan - @1TVNewsAF


13m
Editor's note: American University in Afghanistan had been reopened just a little more than a week before today's attack. The elite, nonprofit school, which has a student body of 1,700, had shut following the kidnapping of two foreign professors on Aug. 7. Their whereabouts remains unclear. - Tricia
End of note


5m
Officials confirm dozens of students, staff remain trapped inside American University in Kabul, Afghanistan - TOLO

http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/26912-university-under-attack-in-kabul
 

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Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Iranian vessels conduct 'high-speed intercept' of US destroyer
Started by WestGardenerý, Today 03:15 PM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...-conduct-high-speed-intercept-of-US-destroyer

Kabul attack: Explosion hits American University of Afghanistan
Started by alchemikeý, Today 08:51 AM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...osion-hits-American-University-of-Afghanistan

------

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2016/08/24/irgcs_plan_to_destroy_israel_109746.html

August 24, 2016

IRGC's Plan to Destroy Israel

By Amir Toumaj

A retired Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commander who was deployed to Syria gave a lengthy interview to a hardline media outlet last week about IRGC operations in the country. Serving with the Afghan Fatemiyoun Division, Brigadier General Mohammad Ali Falaki highly praised the militia. The commander describes the array of IRGC-backed forces fighting in Syria and the Middle East as a unified army – apparently with the ultimate goal of destroying Israel.

The interview with General Falaki is a window into IRGC propaganda. The Iranian public is the primary audience, though the message is also directed towards the outside world. The interviewer recommends the commander’s discussion to “those who want to see the bravery of the Fatemiyoun … from a different angle.” The interview, in other words, introduces itself as a response to the negative perceptions about Afghans forcibly recruited into the militias, and delves into the broader wars of the Middle East.

A veteran of the Iran-Iraq War, Falaki rose through the ranks to command a mechanized brigade of an infantry division. Following the war, he retired and has been involved in various “cultural” activities, including a veterans group.

Falaki lamented about the insufficient support in Iran for Afghan refugees, which he views as an untapped pool of recruits. There are approximately three million Afghan refugees in Iran – a majority of them are Shia Hazaras – and discrimination against them is well documented.

“We go to south Lebanon and support the Shias over there,” Falaki said, and “spend so much money” supporting Shias elsewhere. “We in Iran have sometimes looked at them [Afghans] as drug-dealing criminals, trouble-makers, or construction workers,” he added.

Afghan nationals have participated in the Syrian war as early as 2012. According to interviews with commanders, the first wave from Iran were 25, most of whom were veterans who had fought under the IRGC during the Iran-Iraq War against Saddam, as part of the Abouzar Brigade, and against the Soviets and the Taliban, as part of the Mohammad Corps. The latter dissolved following the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, and its members fled to Iran. These experienced fighters later formed the senior leadership of the Fatemiyoun. None from the first generation of the Fatemiyoun leadership has survived, according to the militia.

Prior to forming a distinct unit in Syria, Shia Afghans fought as auxiliaries of Iraqi militias. The revelations of commanders validate analysis of fatality announcements up to the formation of the Fatemiyoun in late 2013: killed Afghans were named as members of the Iraqi contingent in Syria, the Liwa Abu Fadl al Abbas.

As the ranks swelled, the IRGC Qods Force helped establish, organize, train, and finance a separate Shia Afghan unit. The Fatemiyoun is named after the daughter of Prophet Muhammad, Fatima. Most combatants have been recruited from the diaspora in Iran, and some from Afghanistan and the small diaspora in Syria. An unnamed Fatemiyoun source reportedly told Iranian media last year that the militia was upgraded from a brigade to a division, which is supposed to number more than 10,000 forces.

Falaki claims that the Fatemiyoun has “several brigades,” and that they include some “Sunni brothers.” According to slain Fatemiyoun commander Mohammad Hassan Hosseini (AKA Seyyed Hakim), the militia consists anywhere between 12,000 – 14,000 fighters. Iranian media claim more than 20,000 fight under the Fatemiyoun banner. Analysts and investigators, however, consider these figures to be exaggerations, with the actual number possibly in the several thousands. A former Fatemiyoun combatant told Human Rights Watch that 3,000 – 4,000 fighters are active in Syria.

Falaki denied the “allegation by enemies” that Afghan fighters are mercenaries and guns for hire. “They fight in Syria due to their commitment to Islam, not because of ethnicity … but of their commitment to Shiism,” he claimed.

“Their blood has proven to us that there are 3 million Afghans in this land, and we must have a positive view towards them,” Falaki stated. The accounts of surviving members of the Fatemiyoun and eye-witnesses consistently indicate that Afghan fighters are considered expendable.

Falaki claims that the Afghans are paid $100 per month to fight. Fatemiyoun combatants themselves, however, contradict this. Afghans fighters told the The Wall Street Journal in 2014 that their salaries were $500 per month. The former senior commander Seyyed Hakim told an Iranian outlet prior to his death that Afghan combatants receive $450 per month. Afghan residents of Iran have told The Los Angeles Times in 2016 that some fighters receive up to $800 per month. Recruits from Afghanistan areoffered residency permits in Iran and $500 monthly salary, according to The Guardian, who spoke with a mujiddleman. The IRGC downplays high payments to foreign fighters because the Iranian economy and ordinary Iranians are struggling.

Falaki cites the example of recruiting from minorities during the Iran-Iraq War to strengthen the case for recruiting Afghan refugees.

“During the [Iran-Iraq] War, we were responsible for transforming all ethnicities … and all tribes into combat divisions,” he said. “We never dared to say how many Sunni brothers or how many Afghan brothers have been in this war,” he said, attempting to project an ecumenical outlook of the IRGC. During this period, the IRGC also successfully developed its proxy model abroad in Lebanon: Hezbollah.

Falaki alludes to the experience of recruiting Iranian minorities in the IRGC in the war against Iraq. Resonating with the IRGC’s egalitarian identity, this is a fundamental component of its efforts to expand. The IRGC’s strategy includes recruiting regime loyalists from the local population, and exploiting and perpetuating rifts within communities.

While discussing Afghan recruitment, Falaki interestingly lamented that not many clerics are joining the fight.

“We found Seyyed Hassan Nasrallah in Lebanon, while among all of these revolutionary and active clerics, we have not known a single leader in the field of combat, and we have not organized this massive force,” he noted. Although a handful of Iranian clerics have been killed in Syria, Afghan clerics do not appear to have joined the struggle. Falaki calls for a parallel to Hezbollah’s leader in the Fatemiyoun, serving as the militia’s political, spiritual, and military leader and pledging allegiance to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and velayat-e faghih (guardianship of the jurisprudence). Falaki’s statement may also indicate lingering resentment with lack of more clerical class participation in war. The IRGC was established to protect clerical rule, fundamentally that of the supreme leader. The generation of the Guard including Falaki who fought in the long and devastating Iran-Iraq War returned home to find rich and powerful clerics, while the Guard suffered the horrors of a brutal war.

“Shia liberation army”

The commander claimed that the establishment of the Fatemiyoun facilitated “the formation of a Shia liberation army whose commander is Hajj Qassem Soleimani,” the leader of IRGC’s Qods Force. He proclaimed that the IRGC veterans are creating “unity among ethnicities” and “unity among nations.” According to Falaki, the Fatemiyoun “obey the Leader of the Revolution [Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei].” Indeed, the IRGC and its proxies form a global jihadi network that answers to Tehran.

The commander outlines the array of forces fighting under the Guard’s flag in Syria: the Zeynabiyoun Brigade, a Pakistani militia, and the “Heydarioun brothers who are Iraqi brothers.”

IRGC commanders and Iranian media has given the name “Heydarioun Brigade” to the Iraqi militias in Syria on a more regular basis since roughly 2015. The Iraqi contingent in Syria has called itself Liwa Abu Fadl al Abbas, and was a formidable combat force between 2012 and 2014. Following the incursion of the Islamic State into Iraq in mid-2014, most of the units were called home. IRGC-backed Iraqi militias are still active in Syria, however. The Badr Organization and Harakat al Nujaba have notably participated in recent IRGC-led operations in Aleppo.

Falaki also restated the goal for the destruction of Israel. “Forming the first nucleus of the liberation army has the objective that, God willing, we will not have anything called Israel in 23 years,” he stated. Supreme Leader Khamenei claimed in 2015 that Israel would not exist in 25 years. Falaki boasted that Iranian-led units are already by Israel’s border and that “the Fatemiyoun brothers have established the basis for this fight.”

“Iranian forces are not meant to comprise all of this [international] army,” Falaki said. The IRGC’s emphasis on building local forces creates an organic base of support and helps to spread the revolution in Arab and Muslim lands. The IRGC hopes to project an image of supporting locals, though its recruitment has a distinctly Shia identity. Perpetuating sectarianism and violence serves to bolster the IRGC’s image as a protector of Shias. A foreign legion engaged in several wars abroad, furthermore, elicits less opposition and complaints within Iran, reducing the impact of fatalities and casualties on Iranian society.

Discussing Iran’s military commitments, Falaki noted that Iran’s proxies are fighting on three major fronts: Syria, Iraq, and Yemen.

“One front of this army is in Syria, the other in Iraq, and another in Yemen,” he stated.

The first two are well known, though the claim about Yemen reflects the IRGC’s ultimate goal more than facts on the ground. The Houthis are known to be militarily and politically supported by the IRGC, though the Guard may not exercise full control over the Houthis. The IRGC’s objective is to use the Houthis as a foothold in the Arabian Peninsula, on Saudi Arabia’s southern border. The suspicion of the Houthis being a full Iranian proxy is precisely the reason the Saudis and allies have launched a war in Yemen.

The Houthis, however, are not IRGC proxies like the Fatemiyoun and Iraqi militias. Houthi leaders have publicly complained about IRGC claims of full support. A senior Houthi official in March lashed out at a senior IRGC commander who claimed that the Guard would support the Houthis anyway it could, criticizing Tehran for “exploiting” the Yemeni file.

The Houthis exercise some measure of independence, and do not presently appear to be inclined to serve as the IRGC’s proxy in a perpetual fight against Saudi Arabia, as noted by Yemen scholars.

What is clear is the IRGC’s strategy to exploit the war in Yemen, primarily to be a thorn in Saudi Arabia’s side. They want to perpetuate the perception that Houthis are full Iranian proxies to elicit harsher Saudi reactions. The IRGC hopes that the continuation of conflict will leave the Houthis no choice but to fight and fully embrace the IRGC in order to survive.


Falaki’s deployment to Syria, and IRGC’s pattern of deployment

When the then-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria shocked the world by sweeping through Iraq in June 2014, Falaki and a group of 50 retired, experienced IRGC commanders (the lowest rank of which was battalion commander) volunteered to join the war effort as advisers. He said they wanted to see how they could be “effective.” Falaki went to the airport, but his flight on that day and for the next several days was cancelled. The commander said that a decision came from the top to delay the deployment. This reflects the chaos and uncertainty about on-the-ground developments immediately following ISIS’s expansion into Iraq. Iranian government officials and commanders were indeed scrambling to respond to ISIS’s rapid gains, who soon threatened the gates of Baghdad and advanced closer to Iran’s borders.

According to Falaki, the request came for the group of former IRGC commanders to deploy to Iraq to retake the Mosul dam towards the end of Ramadan in late July 2014. While Falaki declined because “the work was hasty,” Iraqi forces, IRGC-backed militias, Kurdish Peshmerga, and the US Air Force launchedthe operation to retake the dam in early August, claiming it by Aug. 19. A source close to the US special operations community has said that Qods Force operatives were on the ground during the operation.

Falaki waited until mid-2015, when the volume of Iranian forces increased to launch a major offensive in Aleppo province in coordination with Russia’s military intervention in September 2015. Under “Operation Muharram” (as it coincided with the holy Shia month of Muharram), thousands of regular IRGC ground forces and Guard-backed militias participated in a pro-regime offensive in southern Aleppo and captured the major areas of Khan Touman, Afrain, and al Hadher.

By mid-2015, Bashar al Assad was in danger of collapse following a string of rebel successes. The Syrian army was exhausted and depleted of manpower. Iran had overstretched its proxies and had no choice but to deploy its ground forces to save Assad. It also needed additional firepower. Iranian and Russian leaders held secret, high-level meetings from the beginning of 2015 to plan the intervention. Following the July nuclear deal, Qassem Soleimani reportedly traveled to Moscow to personally ink the deal. The Kremlin agreed, exploiting an opportunity to establish a foothold in the Middle East, become a power broker, and expand its strategic arc of influence, providing it with the potential to disrupt America’s freedom of action. Tehran and Moscow succeeded in reversing the rebel momentum – eliminating Assad’s overthrow by military means.

The pro-Assad regime campaign significantly weakened the opposition in southern Aleppo but was not decisive, and the offensive stalled by December 2015. IRGC fatalities had skyrocketed, including more than 100 Guardsmen, a majority of them officers including Brigadier General Hossein Hamedani, the commander of operations in Syria. The IRGC drew down its forces in December, which was interpreted by some Western officials as retreat from Syria. The IRGC, however, was not done fighting.

Falaki claims that the offensive in southern Aleppo facilitated preparations to take northern Aleppo. This suggests that the IRGC may have considered and planned to cut off the opposition’s major supply route to Turkey in the fall. Capturing the rebel-held area of eastern Aleppo while this supply route was still open would have been extremely costly and difficult, with a high chance of failure. The IRGC and its allies thus launched a fresh offensive in northern Aleppo in February 2016.

The Guard again deployed a significant number of its ground forces during that offensive. They continued deploying contingents of ground forces at least through May. That month at Khan Touman in southwest Aleppo, the jihadist-led Jaish al Fatah coalition ambushed and seized the village from the IRGC and Shia forces, killing more than a dozen Guard troops and tens of Shia militiamen. Many of the fatalities were from a ground forces unit stationed in northern Iran. The defeat was widely publicized in Iranian media. The Guard vowed revenge.

The IRGC’s deployment of significant numbers of ground forces between October and May suggestedbroader transformation of the Guard into an expeditionary force. Since that defeat, however, the IRGC has not deployed its regular ground forces in large numbers.

In the successful encirclement of Aleppo in late July, senior IRGC officers were killed, alongside large numbers of Afghans and Pakistanis. After the opposition broke the siege of Aleppo in August, the IRGC reportedly deployed trained Hezbollah and Iraqi militias to bolster the pro-regime front there.

The Guard relies on its preferred model: Guard officers leading operations and proxies serving as the boots on the ground.

“We are looking for boys who can train, organize, and … to go to Syria,” Falaki said, adding that this is an order from highest national security decision-makers in Tehran. Training and organizing local forces can render unnecessary the deployment of large numbers of regular Iranian forces, who may lack the experience and training to succeed against some of the battle-hardened opposition groups.

Indeed, Falaki underscores the Guard’s role in training and strengthening Syrian forces, which had made it “unnecessary for us to take an army over there.” The chief IRGC commander Mohammad Ali Jafari hasclaimed that the Guard has trained 100,000 Syrian National Defense Forces that act as auxiliaries to the Syrian Arab Army, which is still hemorrhaging manpower. Independent sources also estimate the NDF at this number. Falaki claims that “we may be able to destroy the enemies’ occupation in Syria after sometime, just as we did in a year or two in Kurdistan,” but that “controlling the influence of the enemies is at their [locals] hands, and we cannot eliminate this influence.” The IRGC knows full well the quagmire and difficulties of insurgencies facing a foreign army. The Guard, after all, has been at the forefront of assisting and bolstering insurgents, such as in Lebanon and Iraq. The Syrian conflict has flipped the script.

Brigadier General Falaki’s statements may suggest that perhaps some in the senior Guard officer corps were considering large-scale deployment to Syria, though developments on the ground and similar statements by top IRGC commanders indicate the IRGC’s aversion to larger scale deployment and emphasis on developing local forces. The IRGC, however, has not hesitated to deploy ground forces to Syria if the situation demanded it, as they did between October 2015 and at least through May 2016. The Syrian Civil War is as an “existential” matter for senior commanders and policy-makers in Tehran, threatening the “Axis of Resistance” alliance compromised by the Islamic Republic and its allies.

Developing the foreign militias serves the IRGC’s long-term interests and can act as a “Shia liberation army,” extending the Guard’s arms into the region. These forces could return to their home countries and act as Iranian assets there. Although Falaki could exaggerate the existing capabilities as part of propaganda, the IRGC is honing this capability in Syria and Iraq and aspires to develop a capable foreign legion. The war in Syria will certainly be the crucible for the IRGC’s mission to export the revolution and expand its influence in the Middle East.

Amir Toumaj is a research analyst at Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

This article originally appeared at The Long War Journal.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://freebeacon.com/national-secu...ail&utm_term=0_b5e6e0e9ea-eeebbd7130-46005157

China’s Covert Weapons Procurement Revealed in Florida Case

‘Technology spy’ sought advanced jet engines, Reaper drone for reverse engineering

BY: Bill Gertz
August 24, 2016 5:00 am

China’s government covertly tried to obtain advanced U.S. fighter jet engines and a Reaper drone in a high-technology spying operation uncovered by federal authorities in Florida.

A Chinese-born woman, Wenxia Man, was sentenced to 50 months in prison on Friday following her conviction for conspiracy to export restricted American defense articles, namely engines for F-35, F-22, and F-16 jets, and the Reaper, a front-line unmanned aerial vehicle used by the military and intelligence agencies.

Court papers in the case stated that Man, a naturalized U.S. citizen residing in California who is also known as Wency Man, worked with a Chinese government procurement agent, Xinsheng Zhang, in trying to purchase the military items. The Chinese planned to reverse-engineer the U.S. military goods to avoid the costs and time required for indigenous development. Zhang operated from China and remains out of reach of prosecutors.

Michael Walleisa, assistant U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida, asked the judge to impose the maximum sentence of 78 months for the weapons conspiracy conviction.

“There is hardly a more serious case than a case such as this that involves some of our most sophisticated fighter jet engines and unmanned weaponized aerial drones,” Walleisa said in a sentencing memorandum.

“The potential for harm to the safety of our fighter pilots, military personnel, and national security which would occur had the defendant been successful is immeasurable, particularly where, as here the clear intent of the co-conspirators was to enable the People’s Republic of China to reverse engineer the defense articles and manufacture fighter jets and UAV’s.”

The conspiracy revealed that China was seeking to “increase its military capabilities and might to the potential detriment of the United States,” Walleisa said.

The U.S. government imposed an arms embargo on China in 1990 following the Chinese military’s massacre of unarmed pro-democracy protesters in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square a year earlier.

Between 2011 and 2013, Man and Zhang worked together to solicit three sets of General Electric and Pratt and Whitney turbofan engines for the F-35, F-22, and F-16 jets, as well as a General Atomics Reaper drone and technical details of the equipment. The Chinese were prepared to pay $50 million for the embargoed items.

Authorities launched an investigation of the case after Man contacted a defense industry source who alerted U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Homeland Security Investigations unit in Miami. The Pentagon’s Defense Criminal Investigative Service also investigated the case.

Man used a company called AFM Microelectronics, Inc. in trying to buy the military equipment. She disclosed to an undercover federal agent in 2012 that the jet engines were meant for the Chinese government and that she knew it was illegal to export them, according to court papers.

China is engaged in a major military buildup that includes two new advanced stealth jet fighters that U.S. intelligence agencies say benefitted from stolen American aircraft technology.

The attempt to buy embargoed jet fighter engines highlights what military analysts say is China’s major technology shortfall—its inability to manufacture high-quality jet engines. Turbofan engines require extremely precise machine work and parts because of the high speeds of their spinning engine fans.

Zhang was described by the government in court papers as a “technology spy” working for China’s military-industrial complex. The Chinese government buys arms and military technology from Russia and other states “so that China can obtain sophisticated technology without having to conduct its own research,” the indictment in the case states.

The name of the Chinese entity was not disclosed. China’s government defense industry group is SASTIND, an acronym for State Administration for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense.

Zhang sought to buy the operating system and aircraft control system for the MQ-9 Reaper as well as the unmanned aerial vehicle itself and the technical design data for the aircraft. The drone sought was an armed version capable of firing Hellfire missiles.

Man, 45, was convicted of one count of conspiracy to export defense goods with a license.

At sentencing on Friday, U.S. District Judge Beth Bloom told the court that Man hoped to get a $1 million commission on the illegal export and that she wanted to help China compete with the United States militarily.

“I’m innocent,” Man told the judge, the South Florida Sun-Sentinel newspaper reported. “This is my country, too.” She plans to appeal the conviction that was reached after a jury trial in June.

Michael Pillsbury, a China specialist at the Hudson Institute, said the Man case highlights China’s large-scale technology theft program.

“The scope and the ambition of their technology intelligence collection is breathtaking,” said Pillsbury. “They’re not after petty secrets.”

The Man case is similar to an earlier Chinese technology acquisition operation headed by Chi Mak, another naturalized Chinese citizen. In 2007, Mak, an electrical engineer at the U.S. firm Power Paragon, was convicted of conspiracy to export sensitive electronics defense technology to China.

Mak was a long-term technology spy who operated for 20 years. U.S. officials believe Mak provided China with secrets to the Aegis battle management system, the heart of current Navy warships.

China has deployed a similar version of the Aegis ship, known as the Type 052D warship.
 

AlfaMan

Has No Life - Lives on TB
The ChiComs have a real problem with high thrust turbofan engines. They had problems reverse engineering the engines from a Mig-29; engine development is their Achilles heel. They didn't get our engine technology-good! But, there's any number of F-16 operators in the world (say Venezuela) that might sell them an engine or two. And, if they have tech spies here one can rest assured there are spies in Germany (MBB engines) France (SNECMA engines) and Russia .
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
The ChiComs have a real problem with high thrust turbofan engines. They had problems reverse engineering the engines from a Mig-29; engine development is their Achilles heel. They didn't get our engine technology-good! But, there's any number of F-16 operators in the world (say Venezuela) that might sell them an engine or two. And, if they have tech spies here one can rest assured there are spies in Germany (MBB engines) France (SNECMA engines) and Russia .

You're forgetting Pakistan (F-16 A/B/C/D)...
 

Housecarl

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http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/show...ernment-announce-end-to-decades-long-conflict

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http://www.dw.com/en/farc-colombian-government-announce-end-to-decades-long-conflict/a-19501358

South America

FARC, Colombian government announce end to decades-long conflict

The Colombian government has reached a historic truce with the armed rebel group. An insurgency has been ongoing in the country for decades, leaving hundreds of thousands of people dead.

Date 24.08.2016

Negotiators from both the government side and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) announced that a deal had been reached on Wednesday evening in Havana, Cuba, effectively ending Latin America's last major guerrilla war.

The two sides have been working in recent weeks to finalize the last details of the accord, which early details suggest commits the government to carry out radical land reform, overhaul its anti-narcotics strategy and expand the state into various neglected areas of the country. The final text of the accord has yet to be published, however.

After several years of a government campaign to weaken the FARC militarily, negotiations started in November 2012, but were stymied for some time by distrust built up during decades of war propaganda on both sides.

A breakthrough came last September when Santos traveled to Havana to lay out a framework for investigating atrocities, punishing guerrillas for involvement in those abuses and offering compensation to victims.

Kolumbien Präsident Juan Manuel Santos
President Juan Manuel Santo has hailed the agreemet as "historic"

'Historic' deal

The war, which began in 1964, is the last major armed conflict in the Americas. It has killed 260,000 people, uprooted 6.8 million and left 45,000 missing.

"Today I hope to give historic, very important news to the country," President Juan Manuel Santos said earlier in the day.

The accord must now be ratified by voters in a plebiscite, which could take place as early as next month. Polls show Colombians would likely endorse any deal in a simple yes or no vote.

Low voter turnout is a concern because a minimum of 13 percent of the electorate, or about 4.4 million voters, must vote in favor for the accord to be ratified.


Watch video 06:35

Colombia: With FARC rebels in the jungle

Lingering concerns

The opposition is also reportedly likely to try to convert the vote into a referendum on Santos, whose approval rating plummeted to 21 percent in May according to a Gallup poll, the lowest since he took office in 2010.

Various polls have indicated that most Colombians associate the FARC with narco-terrorism due to its heavy involvement in the cocaine trade. The FARC for its part has retained a Cold War-era view of Colombia's political and economic establishment as "oligarchs" at the service of the US.

Many Colombians are horrified that the guerrillas who confess their crimes won't spend any time in prison and will instead be allowed to serve out reduced sentences of no more than eight years helping rebuild communities hit by the conflict.

Meanwhile, the government is still fighting a smaller rebel group, the National Liberation Army (ELN), whose ongoing kidnappings have derailed efforts to open peace negotiations.

jbh, blc/kl (dpa, AP, AFP)

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Colombia: With FARC rebels in the jungle

Date 24.08.2016
Keywords FARC, Colombia, Bogota, guerrilla
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Date 24.08.2016
 

Housecarl

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Hummm......

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Posted for fair use.....
http://thediplomat.com/2016/08/pakistans-role-in-the-syria-conflict/

Pakistan's Role in the Syria Conflict

How Pakistan wound up on the same side as Iran in the Syria conflict.

By Samuel Ramani
August 24, 2016

On May 2, 2016, the Iranian government passed a law allowing families of deceased foreign Iranian Revolutionary Guard fighters to gain Iranian citizenship. Iran’s new citizenship legislation applies chiefly to relatives of Afghans and dissident Iraqis who fought for Iran against Saddam Hussein’s regime during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War. However, the law has also been extended to include foreign volunteers assisting Iran’s anti-Islamic State (ISIS) campaign in Syria.

Pakistanis are likely to be a major beneficiary of Iran’s new citizenship legislation. Since the start of the Syrian civil war in 2011, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard has recruited Pakistani volunteers to participate in its pro-Assad military campaign in Syria. Meanwhile, the Pakistani government has maintained a strong alliance with embattled Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. The strength of the Islamabad-Damascus alliance is counter-intuitive;Pakistan is a Sunni majority country and a close ally of Saudi Arabia, which has repeatedly called for Assad’s overthrow.

Pakistan’s ongoing loyalty to Baathist Syria can be explained by historical legacies, and Islamabad’s disdain for Western interference in Syria’s internal politics. However, Pakistan’s support for Assad comes with considerable risks. The Pakistani government’s alliance with a Shiite Syrian regime could inflame sectarian tensions within Pakistan and cause Saudi Arabia to distance itself from Islamabad in favor of closer ties with India.

The Foundations of the Pakistan-Syria Geopolitical Alliance

Even though air force cooperation between Pakistan and Syria already began during the 1960s, the Islamabad-Damascus partnership has been defined by the strong alliance between the Assad and Bhutto families. During the 1970s, Syrian President Hafez al-Assad forged a close relationship with his Pakistani counterpart, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. This friendship caused Assad to become the first Syrian head of state to visit Pakistan during the 1974 Organization of Islamic Cooperation summit in Lahore.

The strength of the Bhutto-Assad alliance was revealed by Assad’s fierce condemnations of Bhutto’s execution in 1979. Immediately after the 1978 military coup that propelled General Mohammed Zia ul-Haq to power, Hafez al-Assad urged Zia to spare Bhutto’s life. Zia’s defiance of Assad’s advice ruptured Pakistan’s burgeoning partnership with Syria. After Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s execution, some left-wing Pakistanis who supported Zia’s overthrow took refuge in Damascus. Syria also granted asylum to three Bhutto family members in 1979.

Even though Syria and Pakistan normalized relations in 1987, Hafez al-Assad strongly supported Benazir Bhutto during the 1988 Pakistani presidential election campaign. Assad was convinced that Bhutto’s victory would strengthen Pakistan’s relationship with Syria’s principal international ally, the Soviet Union. Assad also believed that Bhutto advocated left-wing principles that resembled those of the Syrian Baath Party. The alliance between the Assad and Bhutto families was revived in 2008, as Bashar al-Assad and Benazir Bhutto’s husband, Asif Ali Zardari, expanded Pakistan-Syria cooperation in the economic and security spheres.

Even though Nawaz Sharif replaced Zardari as prime minister of Pakistan in 2013, Islamabad’s commitment to Assad’s survival has not wavered. Pakistan’s pro-Assad stance has corresponded closely with Islamabad’s anti-Western foreign policy tilt. Pakistan has condemned the United States’ willingness to violate Syria’s sovereignty. Sharif’s government also echoed Russia’s calls for peace talks that include all major political factions in Syria.

After the Syrian military’s alleged use of chemical weapons in 2013, Pakistan strongly opposed a potential U.S.-led military intervention in Syria to remove Assad. The Pakistani government argued that Assad’s fall would make Syria a terminal failed state. Pakistan’s emphasis on maintaining the status quo in Syria has strengthened its relationships with Russia and China, the leaders of the pro-Assad bloc in the United Nations (UN).

Pakistan has also criticized international sanctions against the Syrian government. The Syrian economy’s collapse has disrupted trade links between Damascus and Islamabad. Before the Syrian civil war’s outbreak, Pakistan regularly sold large quantities of wheat and cotton to Syria in exchange for subsidized Syrian crude oil. Pakistan hopes to revive these economic deals by ensuring that a negotiated solution to end the Syrian conflict is implemented on Assad’s terms.

Geopolitical Risks Associated with Pakistan’s Pro-Assad Position

Pakistan’s pro-Assad stance has reaffirmed Islamabad’s importance as an arbiter in Middle East conflicts. However, the Pakistani government’s Syria policy is accompanied by many risks. There are two main reasons why Nawaz Sharif’s handling of the Syrian crisis could destabilize Pakistan.

First, Pakistan’s support for Assad could exacerbate sectarian tensions between Shiites and Sunnis in Pakistan. Pakistani Shiite military volunteers have joined the Iranian Revolutionary Guard in Syria, under the umbrella of the Zeinabiyoun unit. Supporters of Islamabad’s Syria campaign argue that these recruitments will help unite Pakistan, as they give Pakistan’s historically marginalized Shiite minority a rare opportunity to participate in politics.

Iran’s recruitment of military volunteers from Pakistan has also boosted the economic prospects of some Pakistani Shiites. Iranian recruiters offer Pakistani Shiite men aged 18-35 a monthly salary of 120,000 Pakistani rupees ($1,100). Iran has also offered to pay for the education of the children of Pakistani soldiers killed in Syria and has agreed to fund annual pilgrimage trips to Iran, Iraq, and Syria for the families of fallen soldiers.

Many Sunnis view Sharif’s alignment with Assad as blatant pandering to Pakistani Shiites. Some members of Pakistan’s Wahhabi community have turned to Islamic extremism, and the Pakistani Taliban has sent militants to join the fight against Assad in Syria. To prevent unrest amongst the Wahhabi community, Pakistani officials have insisted that Pakistan’s cooperation with Iran in Syria has not jeopardized Islamabad’s alliances with Saudi Arabia and other Sunni Arab states.

To demonstrate the limits of the Pakistan-Iran partnership, the Pakistani government remained neutral during the January 2016 Riyadh-Tehran diplomatic standoff. However, this neutral stance did not appease Wahhabi community leaders in Pakistan. Pakistani Wahhabis wanted Sharif to unconditionally support Saudi Arabia and condemn the Iranian government for its alleged role in the attack on the Saudi embassy in Tehran. Dissatisfaction amongst Pakistani Wahhabis could increase ISIS recruitment in Pakistan and weaken the loyalty of Islamists in the Pakistani military to Sharif’s government.

Second, Sharif’s alliance with Assad could cause Saudi Arabia to rebalance its foreign policy in a way that threatens Pakistan’s internal stability and vital interests. Many Saudi officials views Pakistan’s refusal to contribute troops to Riyadh’s air war in Yemen, while supporting Iran’s objectives in Syria, as a betrayal of a long-standing alliance. Pakistan’s refusal to contribute ground troops to Saudi Arabia’s 34- nation Islamic military alliance or participate in the U.S.-led anti-ISIS campaign have further entrenched Riyadh’s negative perceptions of Pakistan’s involvement in Middle East affairs.

However, Saudi Arabia’s discontent with Pakistan’s Syria policy is unlikely to result in a suspension of the long-standing Riyadh-Islamabad security partnership. Pakistan has been a major manufacturer and exporter of arms to Saudi Arabia for decades. Many analysts also believe that Pakistan would sell nuclear weapons to Saudi Arabia if Iran were to violate the terms of the nuclear deal.

Even though Saudi Arabia still wants to maintain a diplomatic partnership with Pakistan, tensions over Syria have caused Riyadh to look for alternative trade and security partners in South Asia. In recent months, Saudi Arabia has strengthened its security links with India. Saudi officials believe that India is a rapidly developing country that can help Riyadh contain Iran’s increasingly assertive foreign policy.

A deepening Saudi Arabia-Pakistan rift could cause Riyadh to pressure Pakistan to suspend military activities that India believes are contributing to terrorism. If Sharif complies with Saudi pressure to accommodate India’s interests, the risk of a military coup in Pakistan could increase considerably.

To appease Saudi Arabia, Pakistan has downplayed its support for Assad by maintaining an official stance of “strict neutrality” in the Syrian conflict. As Pakistan’s military cooperation with Iran in Syria has grown dramatically in recent months, Saudi diplomats have become increasingly skeptical of Islamabad’s neutrality pledge. Unless Saudi Arabia’s relationships with Russia and Iran drastically improve, Sharif might be forced to soften his pro-Assad stance to ensure the survival of his government.

Pakistan’s pro-Assad stance in the Syrian civil war is Islamabad’s most extensive foray into a Middle East conflict in modern times. So far, Pakistan’s intervention in Syria has had mixed results. Sharif’s support for the Assad regime has strengthened Islamabad’s alliances with Iran and Russia. Yet these diplomatic gains have countered by stronger Saudi Arabia-India ties and the rising tide of Sunni Islamic extremism in Pakistan. Therefore, Nawaz Sharif faces an uphill struggle to ensure that holding his ground in Syria does not cause Pakistan to spiral downwards toward political instability and Sunni extremist violence.

Samuel Ramani is a DPhil Candidate in International Relations at St. Antony’s College, University of Oxford. He is also a journalist who contributes regularly to the Washington Post and Huffington Post. He can be followed on Twitter at samramani2 and on Facebook at Samuel Ramani.
 

Housecarl

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For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world...success/ar-BBvZqdZ?li=BBmkt5R&ocid=spartanntp

North Korea's Kim praises submarine launch test as a success

By HYUNG-JIN KIM, Associated Press
5 hrs ago

SEOUL, South Korea (AP) — North Korean leader Kim Jong Un said Thursday that his country had achieved the "success of all successes" in launching a missile from a submarine, saying it effectively gave the country a fully equipped nuclear attack capability and put the U.S. mainland within striking distance.

Kim's comments, carried by Pyongyang's official Korean Central News Agency, came a day after South Korean officials said a ballistic missile fired from a North Korean submarine was tracked flying about 500 kilometers (310 miles), the longest distance achieved by the North for such a weapon.

North Korea already has a variety of land-based missiles that can hit South Korea and Japan, including U.S. military bases in those countries. But its development of reliable submarine-launched missiles would add a weapon that is harder to detect before launch.

The KCNA said Kim watched from an observation post as the test-firing happened, which the agency said was carried out without "any adverse impact" on neighboring countries.

The North's official Rodong Sinmun newspaper published several photos that showed the missile, with the name Pukguksong printed on its side, soaring into the sky, and Kim smiling and embracing with one of the North Korean officials accompanying him from what appeared to be an observation deck.

The KCNA quoted Kim as saying the successful test showed that North Korea had joined the "front ranks" of military powers fully equipped with nuclear attack capabilities. Kim also said it is undeniable that the U.S. mainland and key operational areas in the Pacific were within North Korea's striking distance.

"I do not guess what ridiculous remarks the U.S. and its followers will make about this test-fire, but I can say their rash acts will only precipitate their self-destruction," the KCNA quoted Kim as saying.

The KCNA said the test was aimed at evaluating the stability of the underwater launching system, the flight features of the solid-fuel missile, the reliability of the control and guidance system, and the accuracy of the warhead in hitting targets after it re-enters the atmosphere.

Wednesday's launch came two days after the U.S. and South Korea began their 12-day Ulchi Freedom Guardian exercises, prompting North Korean threats of retaliation for the military drills, which it views as an invasion rehearsal. North Korea usually responds to regular South Korea-U.S. military drills with weapons tests and fiery warlike rhetoric.

The United Nations Security Council agreed at an emergency meeting late Wednesday requested by the United States and Japan to consider issuing a statement on the missile launch.

Malaysia's U.N. Ambassador Ramlan Bin Ibrahim, the current council president, told reporters after the closed meeting that "there was a general sense of condemnation by most members of the council."

He said the United States is drafting the text of a press statement "and we will have a look at it."

State Department spokeswoman Elizabeth Trudeau said in a statement that the U.S. strongly condemned the launch and called on North Korea to "refrain from actions and rhetoric that further raise tensions in the region." She said the missile launch marked the latest in an "accelerating campaign" of missile tests that violate multiple U.N. Security Council resolutions.

South Korea's military condemned the launch but acknowledged it was an improvement over previous tests of similar missiles.

North Korea fired two missiles from submarines earlier this year, but South Korean defense officials believe they exploded in midair after flying less than 30 kilometers (18 miles).

The missile, fired from a submarine off the eastern North Korean coastal town of Sinpo, reached into Japan's air defense identification zone, according to Seoul and Tokyo officials. Its longer distance puts all of South Korea within its range if it is fired near the border.

Missiles of such capability could also potentially strike parts of Japan, including U.S. military bases on the island of Okinawa, considering the operational range of North Korea's Sinpo-class submarines, said analyst Kim Dong-yub at Seoul's Institute for Far Eastern Studies.
 

Housecarl

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1800 killed in Philippines war on drugs
Started by blackjeepý, Yesterday 05:03 PM
http://www.timebomb2000.com/vb/showthread.php?498476-1800-killed-in-Philippines-war-on-drugs

For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2...udicial-killings-duterte-drug-war-unseen-1987

CHR: Magnitude of extrajudicial killings in Duterte drug war unseen since 1987

(philstar.com) | Updated August 25, 2016 - 8:51am

MANILA, Philippines — Commission on Human Rights (CHR) Chair Jose Luis Martin Gascon said the rights body has not experienced having extrajudicial killing cases of this magnitude since it was established in 1987.

He said this on Wednesday during a budget briefing at the House of Representatives.

Gascon added that the CHR Special Task Force was only able to look into less than 20 percent of more than a thousand cases of extrajudicial killings.

He cited Philippine National Police (PNP) chief Director General Ronald Dela Rosa’s report that 1,160 deaths recorded in the past 55 days are still “under investigation,” while more than 700 persons have been killed in legitimate police operations.

“We are not able to respond to every single case at this point,” Gascon said.


READ: Duterte decries UN's 'attribution' of killings to gov't


The CHR task force is reviewing or investigating a total of 103 cases of extrajudicial killings linked to the government's war on narcotics.

Gascon also urged the PNP’s Internal Affairs to investigate “every incident of death resulting from ostensibly legal police operations.”

“These should all be treated as crime. Therefore, the full force of the law should be directed at investigating these cases and ultimately uncovering the perpetrators and bringing them to justice,” he said.

The CHR chairman raised the possibility of the International Criminal Court exercising its jurisdiction over the rampant extrajudicial killings if such scenario still persists.


RELATED: Int'l court may take over cases of killings, says CHR


He admitted that the CHR’s response and resolution methods are not at an “optimal” status, but he welcomed the proposed budget for 2017 of P496 million, which would be primarily used to augment personnel services to respond to mounting challenges faced by the commission.

Interventions include increasing the number of special investigators per region, as well as creating a digitized docket system where all of the investigators can input cases. — PNA
 

Housecarl

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For links see article source.....
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http://thediplomat.com/2016/08/chinas-growing-arms-sales-to-latin-america/

China’s Growing Arms Sales to Latin America

What does Beijing stand to gain from its new defense deals in the Western hemisphere?

By Allan Nixon
August 24, 2016

In recent years China has asserted itself as a key player in the global arms trade. Not only have both export volume and weapons quality increased rapidly, the range of customers China has been supplying has also expanded greatly over the course of the past decade. Latin America is one of the key regions into which Chinese arms have begun to pour. Yet while commentators of the past have doubted the strategic significance of China’s arms sales to this region — pointing to their relatively meager quantity and the fact that most Latin American states still rely on more established suppliers for their most important military hardware (see here, for instance) — there are signs that things may be changing.

With next to no arms sales to the region before 2005, China is now a key supplier to Latin America. Venezuela continues to lead in China’s Latin American arms sales, with the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimating that between 2011 and 2015 Venezuela purchased $373 million of Chinese weaponry. A $500 million deal in 2012 for weaponry including armored personnel carriers and self-propelled artillery ensures that this arms relationship is set to continue flourishing into the future.

Yet China has also made significant inroads into many other countries in the region. The socialist-leaning “ALBA” states (Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América, or “Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America”) have shown a particular interest in Chinese military hardware. Bolivia, for example, has secured deals worth $58 million and $108-113 million in 2009 and 2012, respectively, for China’s Karakorum trainer jets and Panther helicopters. Non-ALBA states, too, have been increasingly interested in procuring Chinese armaments in recent years. Interestingly, in 2009, Peru — a key economic partner for the United States in the region and supporter of the U.S.-led Trans-Pacific Partnership — purchased 15 of China’s FN-6 portable surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) in a $1.1 million deal, along with ten more of its SAMs. Then, in 2013, it bought 27 multiple rocket launchers in a $39 million deal.

While the upward trend in sales to the region may suggest a growing trust in Chinese military hardware in the region, sales outside of the well-established Venezuelan arms sales relationship have still been made up of mostly small deals for secondary equipment, such as radars and trainer jets. Yet a crucial juncture came early last year, when then-President of Argentina Christina Fernández de Kirchner announced that her government intended to purchase almost $1 billion in Chinese weapon systems during her visit to China in February 2015. The equipment the Kirchner administration intended to buy included 110 armored personnel carriers, five Malvinas-class ocean patrol vessels, and 14 JF-17 Thunder multi-role fighters — a stark change in the volume and quality of equipment normally sought by China’s Latin American buyers. However, with Kirchner’s defeat in the November 2015 election to Mauricio Macri and the likelihood that Macri will want to pull Argentina away from his predecessor’s geopolitical alignment with Russia, China, and the ALBA alliance, the status of these and other potential orders is currently unknown and perhaps now unlikely to go through.

While these sales to Argentina may not come into fruition, they may nevertheless signal a turning point. There is little doubt that China remains behind its competitors in a couple of key military production areas — an indigenously-produced turbo fan engine for its fighter jets constituting a notable persisting failure. Yet this Argentinian interest in China’s premium military equipment suggests that Chinese equipment is nonetheless reaching a level of sufficient quality to draw bigger and more lucrative Latin American deals in the future. Further, with their low prices and the fact that arms deals with Chinese defense companies notoriously come with very few strings attached (unlike their American counterparts), purchasing arms from China could prove an increasingly enticing prospect for countries in the region.

Why China’s defense companies are so vehemently seeking to expand into this region is not readily apparent. Of course, the prestige of being a “top tier” arms supplier aids China’s long-term goal of securing great power status. The goal of boosting sales revenue certainly play a part, too. Yet with Latin America making up only around 6 percent of the total global arms transfers from 2011-2015, it is unlikely that sales revenue is the central motivating factor, here. Instead, the attainment of strategic economic goals and building Chinese influence through “soft power” image-building are more likely the key motivating factors behind these sales.

Looking at China’s arms sales relationship with sub-Saharan Africa, a number of striking similarities are evident. Like Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa is a relatively new market for Chinese arms; both regions, until recently, have historically played a relatively minor role in Chinese foreign policy considerations due to their geographical remoteness to China. Also, at under 8 percent of total global arms sales, sales revenue from sub-Saharan African nations is inevitably limited, too. Nevertheless, these factors have not stopped Chinese defense companies from embarking on a mammoth campaign of scattering its weaponry across sub-Saharan Africa in recent years.

Indeed, SIPRI estimates that Chinese sales in the region from 2011-2015 made up 22 percent of the total arms sales to the region during that period. Further, the Aviation Corporation of China (AVIC), one of China’s largest state-owned defense enterprises, stated last year that at least 80 percent of the trainer aircraft fleet operated by African air forces now are Chinese-made. And while the vast majority of these sales have been for less sophisticated equipment (such as its armored personnel carriers and trainer aircraft), these sales have nevertheless helped China secure a key strategic goal in the region of developing and diversifying its energy imports from many resource-rich nations in the region. These sales have also helped China’s successful attainment of another strategic goal of building influence in the region through “soft power” image-building (a poll in 2014 showed that China’s favorability among sub-Saharan nations is higher than in any other region in the world, with no surveyed country in the region having less than 65 percent of respondents reporting positive views).

Accordingly, in light of China’s strategic interests in Latin America of enhancing its economic ties and building its soft power to boost its political influence, a similar arms sales strategy seems to be in operation in Latin America. However, with Latin American states generally having larger defense budgets than those in sub-Saharan Africa, China’s defense companies will have to sell more than simply trainer jets and armored personnel carriers if Beijing is to build a similar level of influence over its Latin American partners.

If Chinese defense companies are able to convince more Latin American leaders like Kirchner that even their most advanced export hardware is of a sufficient quality, their low prices and unobtrusive arms deal conditions may help them pry a number of key deals out of the grasp of the United States, Russia, and other key suppliers in the region, allowing China to take even greater chunks of the market share. In the long run, this could pave the way for China to reap the benefits of enhanced diplomatic relations and economic ties, such as helping secure the lucrative energy deals it so doggedly seeks. Perhaps more worryingly for the United States, China’s influence-building endeavors through these sales would likely negatively impact U.S. influence over the long term in the process.

With Chinese officials typically tight-lipped over their arms sales activities and goals, it remains unclear the extent to which these sales to Latin America are a product of calculated Chinese strategy, or merely a highly advantageous byproduct of their defense companies’ successful engagement with the global arms trade. Nevertheless, whether these trends are out of strategy or serendipity, what is clear is that the sizable benefits to both China and its defense companies suggest that China is set to continue eating its way into the Latin American arms market — and into the United States’ influence in the region — into the future.

Allan Nixon has a master’s in International Relations from the International University of Japan, specializing in East Asian security studies and arms proliferation.
 

Housecarl

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For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenth...-but-lacks-the-money-to-prepare/#69c5ae64397f

Loren Thompson
Contributor

I write about national security, especially its business dimensions.
Opinions expressed by Forbes Contributors are their own.

Washington 8/24/2016 @ 11:50AM 63,169 views

U.S. Army Fears Major War Likely Within Five Years -- But Lacks The Money To Prepare

Nothing focuses the mind like fear. What’s focusing the minds of U.S. Army leaders right now is the fear that they will be in a major war within five years. They know they’ll be fighting terrorists and insurgents for the foreseeable future, but what really preoccupies them is the likely return of large-scale conventional conflict — maybe with Russia in Eastern Europe, or Iran in the Middle East, or North Korea in Northeast Asia. Maybe in all three places.

Senior Army officials are circumspect about discussing the danger in open forums — they don’t want to advertise U.S. vulnerabilities — but it seems clear that the Obama administration’s “pivot to the Pacific” announced in 2012 has created a geopolitical vacuum stretching from the Baltic Sea to the Persian Gulf that Russia and Iran are trying to fill. Meanwhile, the unpredictable government of North Korea continues its bellicose behavior toward the South, which the U.S. is pledged to defend.

There isn’t much appetite for new wars in Washington, but U.S. leaders would have little choice if these countries sought to impose their will by force in neighboring nations. Whether aggression took the form of subversion or outright invasion, the U.S. would have to respond, because success for the attackers would drastically alter the global landscape to America’s detriment. It doesn’t take much imagination to see what it would mean if Russian forces were back in the heart of Europe, or Iran controlled most Middle East oil, or North Korea overran the South.

606px-Stryker_ICV_front_q-e1472053761996.jpg

http://blogs-images.forbes.com/lore.../606px-Stryker_ICV_front_q-e1472053761996.jpg
The Army’s Stryker armored troop carrier built by General Dynamics has performed well against insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan, but in a fight with Russian forces it would require a more powerful gun and better underside protection in the form of a double-V shaped hull to dissipate blast energy. (Retrieved from Wikipedia)

What worries Army planners is that their service isn’t adequately prepared for any of these scenarios — much less a situation in which more than one unfolded simultaneously. Not only have U.S. ground forces been drawn down in Europe and Asia as Washington sought to rely more on air power and sea power for regional security, but investment in new technology for land combat is at a low ebb. The Army’s entire budget for developing and producing new equipment, from tanks to missiles to helicopters to howitzers, amounts to barely two days of federal spending annually.

The level of spending is almost unbelievably low. The Army spends less on procuring wheeled and tracked vehicles in a year than General Motors generates in sales each week. Its $3.6 billion budget request for helicopter procurement, about eight hours worth of federal spending at current rates, is focused mainly on upgrading Reagan-era rotorcraft because it can’t afford to buy new ones. Its ammunition budget ($1.5 billion) isn’t much more than what Americans spend on fireworks each year (around $1 billion).

So Army leaders aren’t exaggerating when they say they have no major modernization initiatives planned until the next decade. Problem is, they expect a major war before then. In fact, it could start tomorrow. Having shrunk by over 100,000 active-duty troops since fighting in Iraq peaked, they are determined to level off at the minimal level of 450,000 required to respond to overseas contingencies. They are also determined to keep the troops trained. But they have achieved these goals by slashing spending on ammo and weapons to a point where they have very little new investment going on.

There are all sorts of pie-in-the-sky plans for “recapitalizing” aging combat systems, but if major conflict is a near-term prospect, then the service needs to focus on remedying those shortfalls that can be fixed fast. Here are a few obvious examples. Its stocks of precision-guided (“smart”) munitions have been depleted, and at current levels of spending can’t be restored. Doubling the munitions budget by a few hours of federal spending annually might help deter the danger that Army planners see looming in coming years.

Another immediate priority should be to provide so-called active protection systems to tanks and troop carriers, since those would be on the front line of any near-term conflict in Europe or elsewhere. Active protection systems complement armor and air power in protecting tanks by intercepting incoming antitank rounds before they reach the vehicle. Systems like Raytheon's “Quick Kill” technology use radars and fast-reacting munitions to provide affordable 360 degree protection against attackers, even overhead threats, without harming friendly troops.

A third near-term need is to accelerate the pace at which better capabilities are being fielded. For instance, the Army is installing blast-dissipating “double-V” hulls on the underside of its Stryker armored troop carriers and also providing more powerful guns for Strykers deployed in Europe. But too little money is available to upgrade all the Strykers in the force. Similarly, the pace at which more agile battlefield communications systems such as the Warfighter Information Network – Tactical are being fielded is glacial, and needs to be speeded up.

Getting the latter system into the field faster would help the Army cope with vulnerability to cyber attacks in future wars, since it is configured for easy upgrades of security features. The service also needs to reconstitute its electronic warfare skills and upgrade air defenses — capabilities that were allowed to languish in over a decade of fighting insurgents. Even the insurgents now understand how to jam GPS signals and use off-the-shelf drones for surveillance, so imagine what an adversary like Russia or Iran might be planning.

The simple fact is that the Army has spent all its time since 9-11 fighting foes who look a lot different from the more capable enemies it might encounter in the near future. So it needs more money than it is currently getting from Congress to make some quick investments in technology areas where it is deficient. Moving money around within an already under-funded budget isn’t the answer. The Army needs additional funds to buy better equipment fast, not only to avoid defeat in a near-term war with Russia, Iran or North Korea, but also to deter aggression and thereby make war less likely.

(Several of the Army’s equipment suppliers are contributors to my think tank and/or consulting clients.)
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
For links see article source.....
Posted for fair use.....
http://www.thestrategybridge.com/the-bridge/2016/8/25/defeating-anti-access-area-denial

Defeating Anti-Access/Area Denial in the West Pacific

Ben Wermeling · August 25, 2016

Reviewing Operational Concepts

In recent years, a major focus of China’s military has been the development of an operational concept to deny or make costly access to areas of the Western Pacific for potential adversaries. This concept is commonly referred to in the United States defense planning community as anti-access/area denial (A2/AD).[1] It emphasizes the use of long range striking power aided by sensors, largely in the form of ballistic and cruise missiles, to hit naval surface forces and fixed targets on land. Surface-to-air-missiles and fighter planes guard these weapons from enemy air strikes while stealthy diesel submarines and missile-equipped surface ships pose an additional threat to naval forces operating in the area. The A2/AD concept also envisions strikes on enemy space-based sensors and communications. This system is designed to destroy or prevent enemy forces entering a given sea or air space.

Such capabilities could threaten America’s ability to access the oceans near East Asia, hindering American trade and ability to project military force in the region. China’s growing A2/AD capabilities combined with the country’s increasing assertiveness in the disputed waters of the South and East China Seas are interrelated. Greater A2/AD abilities could be used to coerce other East Asian countries in Beijing’s territorial disputes. Creating artificial islands in turn have the potential to strengthen China’s A2/AD capability as they could provide a location for missiles, aircraft, or sensors.[2]

Although China and the United States are not at war, American defense planners have spent several years debating what sort of operational concept would be most suitable to defeat an A2/AD campaign in the Pacific. A range of solutions have been suggested by the military, academia, and think tanks. This article provides an overview of the counter-A2/AD concepts suggested and ends with a recommendation regarding the most effective concept.

Counter-A2/AD Concepts

Broadly speaking, the ways in which strategists suggest the United States fight an open, high-intensity war with China in the Western Pacific can be placed into three categories: destroying China’s A2/AD capabilities, creating a counter A2/AD zone, or enacting a distant blockade. These proposed strategies have overlapping components, and elements of all three could be used in a campaign against China. Writers have tended to emphasize policies revolving around one of the three options, though.

Destroy Chinese A2/AD Capabilities

The operational concept predicated on destroying China’s A2/AD capabilities directly is best exemplified by the Air/Sea Battle concept envisioned by the United States Navy and Air Force.[3] Air/Sea Battle and similar strategies plan to destroy Chinese forces that make an A2/AD campaign possible. The fight to regain access includes destroying the missiles, ships, submarines, and aircraft that deny access, synchronized with a campaign to disable the communications and sensors that contribute to the lethality of long range strike systems.[4] Defensively, this concept also requires increased survivability of platforms operating within the A2/AD zone as well as American sensors and communications systems supporting the complex operations needed to destroy Chinese A2/AD abilities.

An operational concept that aims to destroy China’s A2/AD abilities offers promising results in that it could eliminate the threat altogether, but its feasibility is questionable. Striking through the Chinese A2/AD zone to destroy missile launchers presents a number of difficulties. It could be done with aircraft that penetrate the A2/AD zone to strike targets. The aircraft would be at a disadvantage, though, in finding mobile launchers that can utilize the cover and concealment provided by the Earth’s terrain. They would also need to contend with Chinese fighters and air defense networks. To ensure the concept’s feasibility, particularly in the long-term, new technology and investments would need to be made. Particularly, this would be needed to protect expensive but vulnerable platforms the United States relies on to project force. Also important would be the ability to see and strike over long distances into the Chinese mainland. Given the continued growth of the Chinese economy, it cannot be assumed that the United States will be able to outspend China in such an arms competition.

Creating a Counter A2/AD Zone

A second plan envisions the creation of a counter anti-access zone by the United States and allies in the region, effectively denying China access to its near seas. The major difference compared to the previous option is that this does not seek to regain access into China’s zone of denial through brute force. Instead, a counter A2/AD zone denies China many of advantages of its own A2/AD zone while applying economic pressure on China to end the conflict. Dr. Aaron Friedberg has proposed a Maritime Denial operational concept representative of concepts in this category.[5] In principle, Maritime Denial creates a “no man’s land” off the coast of China. If Chinese ships and aircraft cannot safely move through the counter A2/AD zone, aggressive actions by China against its neighbors, such as landing and sustaining soldiers on disputed islands, would be difficult. Chinese commerce traveling through the zone could also be targeted to add pressure to end the conflict.[6] Creating the counter A2/AD zone could be done using a variety of weapon systems. Dr. Friedberg emphasizes the potential of submarines, manned and unmanned, to sink Chinese ships entering the counter A2/AD zone due to China’s relatively weak anti-submarine warfare capabilities. Drs. Biddle and Oelrich mention the use of longer range anti-ship missiles to strike targets in the “no man’s land” in addition to longer range anti-radiation missiles to help limit the extent of China’s own A2/AD zone.[7]

Implementing the operational concept would bring many benefits. The Chinese economy is dependent on seaborne trade, particularly for energy. Shipping would struggle to reach China through a no man’s land in the West Pacific, creating economic pressure to end the fighting. In addition to coercive pressure, counter A2/AD would deny China many of the advantages of its own A2/AD zone related to power projection and coercive pressure within their protected zone. If China cannot benefit from coercive force within its A2/AD zone, Beijing’s strategy loses much of its purpose. It would also be easier to achieve than the direct destruction of Chinese A2/AD capabilities, as it would involve attacking more exposed targets within range of a greater number of US weapons. Counter A2/AD would still grant China an A2/AD zone of its own, though, with the potential to hinder friendly seaborne trade or power projection. Technology procurement to ensure the plan’s feasibility in the long term and associated costs vary depending on the specific propositions. Improved, longer-ranged anti-radiation and anti-ship missiles, unmanned underwater vehicles, more submarines, as well as redundant and/or more resilient sensor and communication arrays, would all be beneficial, but incur additional costs. Except perhaps for improved UUVs, which the US is investing in already, these technologies are incremental improvements over existing capabilities. As such the procurements would likely be cheaper than the broader procurement of more revolutionary systems likely needed to ensure Air Sea Battle’s continued feasibility.[8]

Distant Blockade

A final choice is to implement a coercive blockade, a choice described in some detail by T.X. Hammes.[9] As mentioned above, the Chinese economy is heavily dependent on seaborne trade, particularly for energy. A blockade stationed outside most of China’s A2/AD reach could interdict trade going to China. The economic damage from the blockade could force China to stop whatever acts of aggression were being carried out. American forces would likely be stationed to interdict seaborne traffic near the Lombok, Sunda, and Malacca straits to accomplish this mission. To implement the operational concept, the US and its military allies would need to be able to control traffic at these major choke points while also defeating Chinese sorties outside of their A2/AD zone that attempt to reopen sea lines of communication.

The blockade strategy is relatively feasible and cheap compared to the other options. Few new resources would be needed in order for it to be implemented.[10] Some smaller ships for stopping and inspecting trade bound for China would be a potential investment, but these would not need to be sophisticated platforms to perform the mission. Re-opening sea lines of communication would require China to engage the United States outside the protection of its A2/AD zone where it would be at a severe disadvantage. The American fleet has carrier-based aviation, while Chinese land-based fighters would at best be at the end of their operating ranges. When traveling longer distances, the nuclear-powered American submarines can be quieter than the diesel/electric submarines of China. The superior training and experience of the US Navy would also provide an advantage, particularly at greater distances from the Asian mainland where the Chinese Navy is less experienced at conducting operations. On the other hand, it does little to address China’s ability to exert pressure within the zone. For example, a blockade would not force Beijing to relinquish control of a disputed island in the short-term. There is also the question of political feasibility, considering that trade with China is in the economic interest of other countries and the possibility that China may be willing to bear the costs of a distant blockade. A country under attack by China may support a blockade strategy, and others worried about future Chinese threats might also. Other countries, particularly those with economic ties to China could be reluctant to support the blockade depending on their circumstances, particularly in the absence of extreme or blatant acts of aggression on China’s part.

Recommended Course of Action and Concluding Thoughts

Ideally, the United States will never need to fight a war against China. The economic harm would be immense, as would the loss of life. As long as China continues its increasingly aggressive behavior in East Asia that goes against the interests of America and its allies, though, there will be a reason to plan to defeat an A2/AD campaign. At the moment, it appears that emphasizing the counter A2/AD operational concept is the ideal approach to prepare for conflict in the West Pacific. Unlike the direct destruction of Chinese A2/AD abilities, this approach would not require radical new expenses and it would be more feasible in the long term. The counter A2/AD zone incorporates the coercive economic pressure of the blockade strategy, but it also denies China advantages of its own A2/AD zone. Counter A2/AD would likely be more expensive to implement than a blockage, but still feasible. If the choice of a counter A2/AD approach endures, the next steps will be deciding what defense research to fund and what equipment to buy. The US should also work to incorporate regional allies into the plan of operation. This would allow the US to share the burden of regional security while adding more military capabilities for creating the counter A2/AD zone. Given the emphasis the American government has placed on its role in Asian affairs, such preparation should be a high priority.


Ben Wermeling is a recent graduate of the George Washington University’s Security Studies Program. He is interested in conducting research on a variety of warfighting and national security topics.

Notes:

[1] Harry Kazianis, “America’s Anti-Access Nightmare Coming True.” Real Clear Defense. May 21st, 2013. For an in-depth discussion of A2/AD and its history see: Sam Tangredi, Anti-Access Warfare: Countering Anti-Access and Area Denial Strategies. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2013).

[2] Hannah Beech, “What’s New on China’s Artificial Islands? Basketball Courts.” Time. May 22nd, 2016. The pictures showing the evolution of the islands are of particular note.

[3] U.S. Department of Defense, AirSea Battle: Service Collaboration to Address Anti-Access and Area Denial Challenges (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, May 2013); Jan Van Tol. et al., Air Sea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2010); Maj. William H. Ballard, Col. Mark C. Harysch (retired), Col. Kevin J. Cole (retired), and Byron S. Hall, “Operationalizing Air-Sea Battle in the Pacific.” Air and Space Power Journal, January-February 2015 (the name Air-Sea Battle has been changed to Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons, in part to emphasize the need for all types of forces to participate); Sam LaGrone “Pentagon Drops Air Sea Battle Name, Concept Lives On.” USNI News. January 20, 2015.

[4] For a succinct summary of the concept, see: U.S. Department of Defense, AirSea Battle: Service Collaboration to Address Anti-Access and Area Denial Challenges


[5] Aaron L. Friedberg, Beyond Air-Sea: The Debate Over US Military Strategy in Asia (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2014); See also: Stephen Biddle and Ivan Oelrich, “Future Warfare in the Western Pacific.” (Paper Prepared for Presentation to the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, San Francisco, September 6, 2015).

[6] Aaron L. Friedberg, Beyond Air-Sea: The Debate Over US Military Strategy in Asia, 116-118.

[7] Ibid. 125. Also: Stephen Biddle and Ivan Oelrich, “Future Warfare in the Western Pacific.” 26-30.

[8] Stephen Biddle and Ivan Oelrich, “Future Warfare in the Western Pacific.” 29,30.

[9] T.X. Hammes, “Offshore Control: A Proposed Strategy for an Unlikely Conflict.” National Defense University Strategic Forum. June 2012, No. 278; See also: Sean Mirski, “Stranglehold: The Context, Conduct and Consequences of an American Naval Blockade of China.” Journal of Strategic Studies. 2013, Vol. 36.

[10] Sean Mirski, “Stranglehold: The Context, Conduct and Consequences of an American Naval Blockade of China.” Mirski argues that the force structure needed to implement a blockade would be modest, perhaps no new major purchases would be needed for the blockade strategy.


Tagged: A2/AD, Anti-Access, Area Denial, Offshore Balancing, Destroy, Counter, Distant Blockade, Hammes, Biddle, Friedberg, China
 
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