WAR 07-23-2022-to-07-29-2022__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

[Housecarl]

Folks, I've been getting over a case of the Wuhan these last couple of weeks which has limited me to intermittently responding to posts and no real news hounding. I'm going to get the WoW thread back up tonight.

I'd like to thank Jward, Techwreck and Old Archer for keeping the thread going for the last couple of weeks. HC.

(259) 06-11-2022-to-06-17-2022__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

(260) 06-18-2022-to-06-24-2022__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

(261) 06-25-2022-to-07-01-2022__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

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Hummm......

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Will Seoul and Washington make Riyadh nuclear-weapons ready?

The possible sale of South Korean nuclear reactors to Saudi Arabia would make the Kingdom one step further toward a possible nuclear weapon program. Here's why.

thebulletin.org

Will Seoul and Washington make Riyadh nuclear-weapons ready?
By Henry Sokolski | July 26, 2022

Iran’s nuclear program, oil, and human rights dominated Biden’s much-anticipated first presidential trip to the Middle East earlier this month. But there is one topic President Biden chose not to showcase during his visit with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman Al Saud—the Kingdom’s most recent interest in nuclear energy—and the nuclear weapons proliferation concerns that come with it.

Only weeks before Biden’s visit, Riyadh invited South Korea, Russia, and China to bid on the construction of two large power reactors. On that bid, Korea Electric Power Company (KEPCO) is the most likely winner. KEPCO has already built four reactors for Riyadh’s neighbor, the United Arab Emirates, and is the only vendor to bring a power reactor of its own design online in the Middle East. South Korea also is the only government to provide reliable, generous financing, free of political strings—something neither Moscow nor Beijing can credibly claim.

And then, there’s this: Any Korean sale would be covered by a generous 2011 South Korean nuclear cooperative agreement with Riyadh that explicitly authorizes the Saudis to enrich any uranium it might receive from Seoul. Under the agreement, Riyadh could enrich this material by up to 20 percent, without having to secure Seoul’s prior consent.

That should set off alarm bells.

Do the Saudis want a bomb? In 2018, Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman announced that “if Iran developed a nuclear bomb, we will follow suit as soon as possible.” As if to prove the point, late in 2020, word leaked that the Saudis have been working secretly with the Chinese to mine and process Saudi uranium ore. These are steps toward enriching uranium—and a possible nuclear weapon program.

Unlike the Emirates, which legally renounced enriching uranium or reprocessing spent fuel to separate plutonium, the Kingdom insists on retaining its “right” to enrich. Also, unlike most members of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Saudi Arabia refuses to allow intrusive inspections that might help the IAEA find covert nuclear weapons-related activities, if they exist, under a nuclear inspections addendum known as the Additional Protocol.

RELATED:
Will the EU diplomacy revive the Iran nuclear deal or keep spinning in a vacuum?

Saudi Arabia’s enrichment program and refusal to adopt the Additional Protocol, doubled with a possible permissive South Korean reactor sale, could spell trouble. South Korea currently makes its nuclear fuel assemblies using imported uranium, which mainly comes from Australia. This ore is controlled by Australia’s uranium export policy, which requires that the uranium be monitored by the IAEA and that materials derived from it not be retransferred to a third country without first securing Australia’s consent. Yet, if Seoul decides to pass Australian uranium on to Riyadh, the Saudis are free to enrich it up to 20 percent at any time without having to secure anyone’s approval. In addition, Riyadh could proceed to enrich this material without having to agree to intrusive IAEA inspections under the Additional Protocol, making it easier for Riyadh to enrich beyond 20 percent uranium 235 without anyone knowing.

Can Washington block the reactor export? In Washington, the US nuclear industry understandably is miffed that Riyadh excluded Westinghouse from bidding on the Saudi reactors. Meanwhile, State Department officials say that KEPCO can’t sell Riyadh its APR-1400 reactor because it incorporates US nuclear technology that is property of Westinghouse. KEPCO, they insist, would first need to secure US Energy Department approval under US intangible technology transfer controls (known as Part 810 authorizations). This requirement, they argue, gives Washington the leverage it needs to impose nonproliferation conditions on South Korea’s reactor export to Riyadh.

This sounds fine. But there’s a catch. South Korean officials insist that its APR-1400 design, which uses a Combustion Engineering data package that Westinghouse now owns, is entirely indigenous. Focusing on the matter of technology transfer authority also begs a bigger question: Does the Republic of Korea need Washington’s blessing to begin enriching uranium itself or to transfer enrichment technology to other countries, such as Saudi Arabia?

RELATED:
Russian forces now control Chernobyl, inviting speculation and uncertainty

The short answer is no.

South Korea has always been free to enrich uranium and transfer uranium enrichment technology to other countries so long as the uranium it enriched or the enrichment technology it shipped wasn’t of US origin. America’s veto over South Korean enrichment only applies to uranium that comes from the United States. As I learned from a recent interview of the two top negotiators of the 2015 US-Republic of Korea civilian nuclear cooperation agreement, Seoul has always known this. Yet, South Korea asked that Washington explicitly grant it authority to enrich uranium in the 2015 agreement—something Washington has yet to grant. According to the negotiators, South Korean officials preferred to have political permission from Washington to do so, even though they did not legally need it.

South Korea and the United States have a choice. South Korea’s previous administration under President Moon Jae-in announced in 2021 that South Korea would not export reactors to countries that had not yet agreed to adopt the IAEA’s Additional Protocol. Is this pledge one that President Yoon Suk-yeol will uphold? Or will Yoon reverse this policy in his effort to go all out to secure the reactor sale to Riyadh?

Similarly, how committed is the Biden Administration to prevent Saudi Arabia from enriching uranium and reprocessing spent reactor fuel? Previous administrations have tried to keep Riyadh clear of such activities. Will Washington keep Seoul’s and Saudi Arabia’s feet to the fire on this or will the administration’s desire to close ranks with South Korea and Saudi Arabia push these nonproliferation concerns to the sidelines? Anyone interested in preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons in the Middle East should want to know the answers.

 

[Housecarl]

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Analysis: S.Korea doubles down on risky ‘Kill Chain’ plans to counter N.Korea nuclear threat

South Korea is pouring resources into its strategy of deterring any North Korean nuclear attack by preparing for preemptive strikes if necessary, a strategy some experts say may exacerbate their arms race and risks miscalculation during a conflict. South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol, who took...

www.aol.com

Analysis: S.Korea doubles down on risky ‘Kill Chain’ plans to counter N.Korea nuclear threat

JOSH SMITH
July 26, 2022, 5:41 AM

SEOUL (Reuters) - South Korea is pouring resources into its strategy of deterring any North Korean nuclear attack by preparing for preemptive strikes if necessary, a strategy some experts say may exacerbate their arms race and risks miscalculation during a conflict.

South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol, who took office in May, has publicly given new emphasis to the so-called "Kill Chain" system to counter a North Korean nuclear attack.

First developed a decade ago as North Korea ramped up its nuclear development, Kill Chain calls for preemptive strikes against the North's missiles and possibly its senior leadership if an imminent attack is detected.

The system is a logical but highly risky and potentially unreliable way to try to counter North Korea's nuclear threat, some experts and former officials say.

The implicit threat against North Korean leader Kim Jong Un is particularly destabilising, said Ankit Panda of the U.S.-based Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

"I can see why leadership decapitation is tempting for South Korea, but threatening to kill the leadership of a nuclear-armed state is uniquely dangerous," he said.

Jeffrey Lewis, a missile researcher at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), called the plans "the most plausible route to a nuclear war on the Korean Peninsula."

"This is the *military* plan that is most likely to succeed..." he said in a post on Twitter. "But it is also the option most likely to create uncontrollable escalation dynamics and start a nuclear war."

South Korea's Ministry of Defense did not respond to a request for comment on such concerns.

Yoon has previously said boosting the system is vital to making sure North Korea never launches an attack in the first place.

GROWING ARSENAL
This month, Yoon's administration announced the creation of a Strategic Command by 2024 to oversee preemptive and retaliatory strike strategies. It includes a growing arsenal of ballistic missiles, F-35A stealth fighters and new submarines, which have been displayed in increasingly frequent drills.

South Korea is also seeking to develop its own satellites and other technology to detect North Korean targets independently from the United States.

But some experts say it is doubtful a preemptive strike could accomplish its goal.

North Korea in recent months has tested hypersonic missiles and missiles it says could carry tactical nuclear weapons, narrowing the time Seoul would have to respond to a pending attack.

"Kim has ample reason to believe that he can employ his nuclear weapons in a limited way and still survive," Panda said.

A focus on decapitation strikes, meanwhile, may encourage Kim to adopt more dangerous command and control practices in a crisis, such as delegating nuclear authority so North Korea's weapons can be used even if he is killed, Panda added.

U.S. ALLIANCE
At the root of South Korea's strategy is a hedge against U.S. abandonment, European defence researchers Ian Bowers and Henrik Stalhane Hiim said in an academic report last year. "Its deterrent effect, no matter how uncertain, acts as a short-term stopgap if the United States abandons South Korea."

Those concerns were heightened when then-President Donald Trump demanded Seoul pay billions of dollars more to support U.S. troops on the peninsula, and raised the prospect he could withdraw them.

The U.S. deploys around 28,500 troops on the peninsula and retains wartime operational control over the allied forces.

Park Cheol-kyun, who worked on international policy at South Korea's Defense Ministry until May, said developing such capabilities didn't necessarily reflect worries about U.S. commitments.

The new Strategic Command would involve a new operating system and new command structure, bringing "synergy" to the weapons used in the Kill Chain and related systems to enhance deterrent and response capabilities, he told Reuters.

An inconvenient fact for South Koreans wanting to display independent bravado to the North is that any preemptive strike would have to be done in consultation with the United States, a former senior U.S. official with knowledge of the situation said.

"To conduct a preemptive strike would not be an act of self defence, and by definition this would fall under the category of an Alliance decision," the former official said. Firing unprovoked on North Korea would be a "major violation" of the Armistice Agreement in force since the 1950-1953 Korean War ended without an official peace treaty, the official added.

Lt. Colonel Martin Meiners, a Pentagon spokesman, declined to comment on the future deployment of military assets or military planning with South Korea, but said decisions on alliance force posture will be made bilaterally.

"While the United States remains committed to a diplomatic approach, we will continue to take all necessary measures to ensure the security of the United States and our allies," he said.

Self defence is a fundamental principle that includes preemptive strikes if necessary, Mark Esper, a former U.S. secretary of defence under Trump, told Reuters.

"If we had clear intelligence that North Korea was going to launch a nuclear attack on Seoul, that would be a scenario that certainly a preemptive strike might be warranted," he said.

(Reporting by Josh Smith; Additional reporting by Soo-hyang Choi, and Ben Blanchard in Taipei; Editing by Lincoln Feast.)

 

[Housecarl]

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The folly of removing NATO nuclear weapons from Europe - Washington Examiner

Those suggesting major changes to NATO nuclear deterrence might first want to consider Russian nuclear strategy. Former Costa Rican President Oscar Arias and Jonathan Granoff of the anti-nuclear weapons Global Security Institute fail this test. Seeking a negotiated end to the war in Ukraine...

www.washingtonexaminer.com

OPINION
The folly of removing NATO nuclear weapons from Europe
by Tom Rogan, National Security Writer & Online Editor |
| July 25, 2022 03:09 PM

Those suggesting major changes to NATO nuclear deterrence might first want to consider Russian nuclear strategy.

Former Costa Rican President Oscar Arias and Jonathan Granoff of the anti-nuclear weapons Global Security Institute fail this test. Seeking a negotiated end to the war in Ukraine, Arias and Granoff call for NATO's preparation to withdraw "all U.S. nuclear warheads from Europe and Turkey, preliminary to negotiations [over the war in Ukraine]. Withdrawal would be carried out once peace terms are agreed between Ukraine and Russia." Chiming in on Monday, Harvard scholar Steven Pinker suggests that this is a "bold idea" because nuclear weapons are "militarily useless, ineffective deterrents ... [and] recklessly dangerous."

This is surprisingly confident language from someone who evidently knows little about nuclear strategy. After all, the deterrent value of these otherwise terrible weapons isn't hypothetical. It was repeatedly proven by the avoidance of major conventional conflict during the Cold War's moments of highest crisis. Regardless, this peace-for-nukes proposal evinces a great ignorance of Russian nuclear strategy.

At the most basic level, NATO's withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Europe would utterly vindicate President Vladimir Putin's brinkmanship. Far from being penalized for waging the largest war in Europe since 1945, Putin would find a reward for his aggression. He would thus have reason to do more of the exact opposite of what NATO exists to deter: leveraging military force to extract political concessions and diminished democratic security. Indeed, this blackmail agenda is a key concern for Putin in regard to this very same issue of nuclear deterrence.

The removal of ground-stored nuclear weapons would also assist Russian planning over the prospective battlefield use of nuclear weapons. This matters greatly in that Russian nuclear doctrine explicitly identifies the limited use of nuclear weapons as a means of regaining the initiative during a conventional war. It underlines why the U.S. military has invested in capabilities that hold Russia at risk on the battlefield, as well as at the strategic level. The utility of ground-stored nuclear weapons is that they can be deployed where and when they are needed at any one moment. The weapons simply need to be loaded onto aircraft and dropped on the targets where those targets appear. This provides a clear advantage over land-based or submarine-based nuclear missiles, which must be pre-targeted to a specific area and fired from far greater distances.

Top line: The unilateral removal of these weapons from Europe would give Putin a major political and military victory. Russia would have new military space for the pursuit of its limited-use nuclear strategy, confident in NATO's declined ability to counter that strategy. It would be the height of folly, sacrificing proven deterrence at the deluded altar of Putin's better nature.

This is not to say that negotiation with Russia is impossible or even undesirable. Again, the Cold War proved that the opposite is true. But negotiations with Putin's Russia require a key ingredient that this proposal lacks: The provision of credible strength alongside the offer of compromise. If Russia wants ground-based U.S. nuclear weapons removed from Europe, it must verifiably do the same.

 

[Housecarl]

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Don't Be Shocked if South Korea Wants Nuclear Weapons

South Korea could eventually develop a small, indigenous nuclear weapons arsenal to directly deter North Korea on its own.

www.19fortyfive.com

HERMIT KINGDOM
Don’t Be Shocked If South Korea Wants Nuclear Weapons

By Robert Kelly
Published 3 days ago

In South Korea, the discussion of developing indigenous nuclear weapons is expanding. South Korean public opinion is moving on this issue, as is the national debate (here, here, here, here). What was once a fringe area of discussion is now increasingly debated. At the Asian Leadership Conference in Seoul last week, there was more open discussion of South Korean nuclearization than I have seen in the fourteen years I have taught national security in South Korea. Should North Korea perform another nuclear weapons test this year – as is widely expected – the debate will shift again. The Overton window on the possession of indigenous nuclear weapons in South Korea is moving to the right, and U.S. officials, traditionally hostile to South Korean nuclearization, will need to consider this growing discourse before simply insisting that Seoul not build them regardless of public interest.

Traditional US Opposition
The United States is South Korea’s only treaty ally. While the South has many democratic partners in a general sense, it has poor relations with the other major democracy in its neighborhood – Japan. And the European Union is far away. So the South’s relationship with the US is unique. Indeed, South Korea’s exposure to autocracies like China and North Korea mean that the US alliance is crucial for its security. This is turn gives the US substantial leverage over South Korean foreign policy.

The US used the leverage in the 1970s to derail an earlier South Korean effort to develop nuclear weapons. At the time, the South was governed by a dictator, Park Chung-Hee. Park feared South Korean conventional inferiority to North Korea and that the US might withdraw further from East Asia after it gave up on the Vietnam War in the early 1970s. And indeed, President Jimmy Carter tried to remove US forces from South Korea in the late 1970s. Carter sought to place human rights at the center of US foreign policy, and Park had built a repressive police apparatus.
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Carter’s effort was stymied by Congressional and bureaucratic resistance. But not before the administration of previous President Gerald Ford had forced Park to give up his clandestine nuclear ambitions. In doing so, the US also pushed South Korea into the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The NPT requires non-nuclear signatories to refrain from developing nuclear weapons. North Korea was a member of the NPT too, from 1985 to 2003. So long as it did not have nuclear weapons, South Korea’s willingness to challenge the US to allow it to develop its own nukes was muted.

Why Nukes Now?

That disinterest though seems to be changing. This year – as demonstrated in the polling and scholarly debate – has seen a significant upswing in both the issue’s visibility and the public’s willingness to challenge South Korea’s participation in the NPT. 64% of the South Koreans in polling linked above supported indigenous nuclearization even if it meant – as it certainly would – exiting the NPT.

The core arguments for South Korean nuclearization are well-known by now. Elsewhere, I have argued that there are two core drivers, which American bureaucratic resistance will increasingly find hard to ignore:

First, since 2017, North Korea has had the ability to strike the US mainland with a nuclear missile. This means that if the US should intervene in a Korean contingency, North Korea could strike the US with a nuclear weapon. This in turn might discourage the US from supporting its South Korean ally directly, per treaty requirement. This commitment credibility problem is a well-known issue in alliances. During the Cold War, France and Britain were so skeptical that the US would fight a nuclear war on their behalf (against the Soviet Union), that they built their own nukes. South Korea (and Japan) are increasingly in a similar position regarding Chinese and, especially, North Korean nuclear weapons.

Second, Donald Trump may return to the US presidency in 2025. He was noticeably cool toward US allies, especially South Korea, during his presidency. Indeed, Trump threatened to remove US forces from South Korea altogether if re-elected. This would almost certainly push South Korea to nuclearize immediately.

These two threats drivers for nuclearization have been around for years though, so it is still unclear why nuclearization suddenly became a hot topic this year in South Korea. The most likely answer is the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Russian President Vladimir Putin has very successfully used oblique threats of nuclear escalation to limit NATO involvement in the war. South Korean fears are that North Korean nuclear weapons might do the same here.

Options

The most obvious answer to this tangle is that South Korea develop a small, indigenous nuclear arsenal to directly deter North Korea on its own. That would be a dramatic step though. There would be US and Chinese resistance. Other options include US ‘nuclear sharing,’ the re-introduction of US tactical nuclear weapons, or perhaps, South Korea’s development of only tactical weapons.

For now, the US is adamantly opposed and South Korean officials do not publicly say they want this option. The discussion is limited to ‘track 2’ voices – academics, think-tankers, and former military officials. But that is where new ideas usually come from before they penetrate the formal bureaucracy.

If North Korea tests yet again this – it would be the North’s seventh nuclear test – South Korean public opinion will likely shift to the right yet again, and the nuclearization debate will go fully mainstream. And since North Korea has no intention of stopping its program, it is only a matter of time before this happens. US officials need to start considering how to answer this rising debate.

Dr. Robert E. Kelly (@Robert_E_Kelly; RobertEdwinKelly.com) is a professor of international relations in the Department of Political Science at Pusan National University. Dr. Kelly is now a 1945 Contributing Editor as well.

 

[Housecarl]

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China’s Worst Nightmare: Why More Nuclear Proliferation Is Coming to Asia

If the growing nuclear threats in Asia are not curtailed, U.S. allies, most notably Japan and the Republic of Korea, may have to go nuclear to defend themselves.

nationalinterest.org

July 23, 2022 Topic: Nuclear Weapons Region: Asia Tags: Nuclear WeaponsNuclear ProliferationDeterrenceChinaNorth KoreaPakistanAQ Khan

China’s Worst Nightmare: Why More Nuclear Proliferation Is Coming to Asia
If the growing nuclear threats in Asia are not curtailed, U.S. allies, most notably Japan and the Republic of Korea, may have to go nuclear to defend themselves.

by Peter Huessy

Arms control has been a feature of the U.S.-Russia nuclear balance now for the past half century, starting with the SALT agreements in 1972 and then the START agreements in 1991. For the United States, it has undertaken two cycles of nuclear modernization and is now on the third. The Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations built the first triad of Minuteman missiles, B-52 bombers, and Polaris submarines, a force that President John F. Kennedy twice cited as the key reason the United States beat back deadly serious nuclear threats over Berlin in 1961 and Cuba in 1962.

The second nuclear triad modernization started in the 1970s, but with many delays and funding shortfalls. It only gained significant momentum during the Reagan administration, which built the Peacekeeper land-based missile, the B-1 and B-2 bombers and their associated cruise missiles, and the Ohio-class submarine with its associated C-4 and D-5 missiles. Each of the major platforms—the PK, the Ohio, and the B-2—were stopped in the 1990s, coincidental with the assumed end of both the Cold War and the Soviet empire and the implementation of the START I arms control treaty.

The third modernization of the nuclear triad will bear fruit around 2029 with the deployment of the first land-based missiles, followed within two years of both the nuclear-capable B-21 Raider stealth bomber and the Columbia-class submarine, the result of nearly twenty years of concerted development and modernization that started with a December 2010 bipartisan agreement between the U.S. Senate and Obama administration.

Not only does this modernized deterrent prevent the United States from being attacked with nuclear weapons, but it is also designed to serve as an umbrella over America’s allies and friends, most notably in NATO and in the western Pacific. The umbrella provides a nuclear backstop to stop any major military attacks, especially from nuclear-armed Russia, China, or North Korea. Our allies thus need not build their own nuclear deterrent, therefore helping to prevent the proliferation of such weapons, and lessening the dangers of nuclear conflict.

In 1963, Kennedy spoke at American University and warned of the potential for multiple new nuclear powers to emerge unless the atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons was stopped; he later struck an agreement in July 1963 with the Soviets called the Limited Test Ban Treaty. Subsequently, a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was agreed to by most of the world’s nuclear powers to ban even underground tests, but the United States did not sign on. Washington has not tested a nuclear device since 1992.

During the entire nuclear age, even after China exploded its first nuclear device in 1964, it was assumed that the nuclear powers had no interest in seeing more countries build nuclear weapons. That was the adopted narrative for decades, with the dominant view being that China was strongly against proliferation, desired an arsenal of only a few hundred warheads, committed to not using nuclear weapons first, and would always keep its weapons off of alert and stored separately from its missiles—all under an overarching “minimal nuclear deterrent” posture despite the United States and Russia building nuclear arsenals with tens of thousands of warheads and bombs.

This narrative held for many decades. Although the United States and Russia now maintain long-range nuclear arsenals at or near 2,000 warheads, over time both nations reduced their medium-range nuclear-armed missiles and strategic or long-range treaty accountable deployed nuclear weapons by nearly 90 percent under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces and START series of agreements without securing any Chinese buy-in.

Luckily, the only member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that went nuclear after the end of the Cold War has been North Korea, albeit with current fears that Iran might also join the club of rogue nuclear actors (the only other non-NPT members India and Pakistan both exploded weapons for the first time in 1974 and 1998, respectively). Thus, were Kennedy’s fears as stated in his 1963 AU speech overblown?

Not at all, concludes Tom Reed. In his 2009 book, The Nuclear Express, the retired former secretary of the U.S. Air Force and deputy national security adviser to President Ronald Reagan, offered a prescient warning that despite the end of the Cold War and major reductions in Russian and U.S. nuclear weapons, the “other” nuclear power—China—was anything but the peaceful international actor it portrayed itself as. And now with an acknowledgment that China is building some 360 new missile silos capable of deploying over 3,000 warheads, Beijing’s proliferation record is being re-examined.

Although written more than a decade ago, Reed’s warnings about China are now highly relevant. Reed explained that China was a major proliferator of nuclear weapons technology, having created what one might term the Pakistani AQ Khan “Nukes R Us” entity that not only built the Pakistani atomic weapon but in deliberate fashion helped construct a nuclear weapons program for North Korea, Libya, Iran, and Iraq.

Reed explained that in 1982, Deng Xiaoping told a secret group of members of the Politburo that China would actively help its friends build nuclear weapons, and with such proliferation insulate China’s revolutionary activity from pushback. The Khan network was created in Pakistan where Khan, the builder of Pakistan’s first nuclear weapon, worked tirelessly to sell nuclear weapons technology to a series of rogue nations.

North Korea was one successful proliferator, and Pyongyang then helped Pakistan build the ballistic missiles with which to deliver its own weapons. Centrifuges designed by Pakistan and manufactured in Malaysia were later interdicted at sea by Italian Navy forces—preventing them from reaching Libya in 2006—leading to the creation of the American Proliferation Security Initiative that Ambassador Robert Joseph explained took down not only the Libyan nuclear capability but gave the United States and its allies a framework with which to stop more proliferation.

Iraq’s nuclear capability was earlier discovered purely by luck, as the liberation of Kuwait led the U.S. coalition to discover that Iraq was just months away from having a nuclear warhead, a nuclear capability long thought dead because of the Israeli “Operation Opera” bombing of the Osirak nuclear reactor in Iraq in 1981 and the subterfuge Saddam used to fool inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency. Subsequent to the liberation of Kuwait, top UN officials Ambassadors Rolf Ekeus and Richard Butler, responsible for a decade-long inspection of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction mischief, both were surprised by what Saddam had achieved and would repeatedly warn that if Saddam remained in power, he would eventually build another nuclear weapons capability.

Despite U.S. efforts through the Agreed Framework deal of 1994 and the Six-Party Talks started by the George W. Bush administration, no deal to denuclearize North Korea was struck. Commentary often excused North Korea’s behavior, as well as Iraqi and Libyan efforts to build nuclear weapons by asserting these countries had to defend themselves from U.S. aggression, as Iraq (1991 and 2003), Libya (2012), and North Korea (2017) were all attacked or threatened with attack by the United States.

The narrative, especially from the arms control community, further assumed that Libya and Iraq were attacked due to their lack of nuclear arms, while North Korea’s nuclear force prevented any U.S. aggression against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), especially during the Trump administration.

But the recent revelation by former Secretary of State Michael Pompeo that China actively opposed North Korean denuclearization is consistent with Tom Reed’s history of China’s pro-proliferation activity. It is also consistent with China’s push to militarize not only the South China Sea but also its drive to eliminate as much U.S. military capability in the region as possible.

Chinese efforts to assist North Korean nuclear proliferation were designed to force a split between the United States and South Korea. Indeed, a number of analysts have argued that given the increased chances of a nuclear-armed conflict on the Korean Peninsula—which would imperil the U.S. homeland—the United States should withdraw all its forces from the peninsula and avoid having to trade Los Angeles for Seoul, for example, at the outbreak of war.

The Chinese strategy has thankfully not worked—yet—as the South Korean population by upwards of 70 percent supports a stronger U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK) alliance despite domestic U.S. pressure to disengage and some ROK entities pushing for greater cooperation with the DPRK, especially under the previous South Korean president. China’s strategy may also further backfire, as a large majority of the South Korean population now supports the ROK securing its own nuclear deterrent while sentiment in Japan has moved considerably in the pro-nuclear direction—especially should it involve the stationing of U.S. and not Japanese nuclear deterrent forces in Japan.

When combined with evidence that China is building some 360 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) silos in western China at a rate that at least matches and may exceed the 130-160 silos per year rate at which the United States deployed the Minuteman I and Minuteman II ICBMs between 1962-66, it is clear that China believes that nuclear weapons are convenient tools of statecraft, to be used for coercion and blackmail, and that the days of China’s “minimal deterrence” and “peaceful rise” are long past.

Legislation introduced in Congress on July 13 to amend the defense bill called for a declaration that China is in violation of its commitments under the 1969 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, has failed to pursue arms control of its own nuclear weapons, and has aggressively pushed proliferation of nuclear weapons to its law-breaking rogue state friends.

Finding China in violation of its nuclear NPT responsibilities may be the first step in revealing China’s true nuclear recklessness and curtailing further proliferation. Unfortunately, as Seung-Whan Choi of the University of Illinois at Chicago believes, the growing Chinese-induced nuclear threat may not be curtailed, and thus U.S. allies in the western Pacific, most notably Japan and the Republic of Korea, may have to go nuclear to defend themselves.

That is the very nightmare about which President Kennedy warned in 1962.

Peter Huessy is Senior Defense Fellow at the Hudson Institute and President of Geo-Strategic Analysis. These views are his own.
Image: Reuters.

 

[Housecarl]

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Germany's Schaeuble calls on Berlin to help fund French nukes - report

Germany should contribute towards the costs of France's nuclear arsenal as the threat of nuclear war with Russia looms over Europe, German political veteran Wolfgang Schaeuble said in an interview published on Saturday.

www.reuters.com

July 22, 202210:54 PM PDT Last Updated 4 days ago

• Europe

Germany's Schaeuble calls on Berlin to help fund French nukes - report

Reuters

2 minute read

BERLIN, July 23 (Reuters) - Germany should contribute towards the costs of France's nuclear arsenal as the threat of nuclear war with Russia looms over Europe, German political veteran Wolfgang Schaeuble said in an interview published on Saturday.

"Now that Putin's accomplices are threatening a nuclear strike every day, one thing is clear to me: we need nuclear deterrence at the European level as well," Schaeuble, a former finance minister who has served as a member of the German parliament for five decades, told the Welt am Sonntag newspaper.

France has such weapons, he said, adding: "In our own interest, we Germans must make a financial contribution to the French nuclear force in return for a joint nuclear deterrent."

The conservative, who has long been a passionate supporter of European integration, became a European household name during the 2012 eurozone debt crisis, when fans hailed him as a guardian of fiscal rectitude even as opponents accused him of imposing damaging austerity on Greece and other indebted countries.

Asked whether his proposal would give Berlin a say on using nuclear weapons, the former conservative minister said France and Germany would have to come to an agreement as neighbours and NATO partners.

Russia's invasion of Ukraine has triggered the most serious crisis in relations between Moscow and the West since the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, when many people feared the world was on the brink of nuclear war.

France - one of three NATO members with nuclear weapons, alongside the United States and Britain - has around 300 nuclear warheads in its arsenal, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

 

[Housecarl]

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South Koreans offer Aussies new subs in 7 years to close Collins gap - Breaking Defense

As conversations at the Thursday dinner with the Korean ambassador, Jeong-sik Kang, and several senior Korean defense officials made crystal clear, any one defense program is less important to the Koreans than is building a broader and deeper defense relationship with Australia.

breakingdefense.com

• GLOBAL, LAND WARFARE, NAVAL WARFARE

South Koreans offer Aussies new subs in 7 years to close Collins gap
As conversations at the Thursday dinner with the Korean ambassador, Jeong-sik Kang, and several senior Korean defense officials made crystal clear, any one defense program is less important to the Koreans than is building a broader and deeper defense relationship with Australia.

By COLIN CLARK
on July 25, 2022 at 6:13 AM

CANBERRA: At a large dinner here attended by its ambassador and a host of senior acquisition officials, South Korea made clear its eagerness to deepen defense ties with Australia, making the bold offer of building advanced conventional attack submarines in “seven years from signature to delivery.”

The reason South Korea is making this play is simple: Australia may face a capability gap if its Collins class submarines can’t operate until the first Australia-made nuclear attack submarines deploy. The Collins are now expected to sail safely until 2030 or so, but few experts believe Australia can get its first nuclear-powered attack boat into the water until closer to 2040. The Albanese government plans to announce by March whether Australia will use US or British nuclear sub designs as the centerpiece of the AUKUS agreement, and when these would hit the water.

It’s reasonable to expect that the government will also decide by then whether Australia will need an interim capability.

South Korea is already deep into a campaign here to win the first contract for as many as 450 Redback Infantry Fighting Vehicles for the Australian Army. South Korean defense giant Hanwha is widely viewed as having the best chance to win the big contract instead of Germany’s Rheinmetal. In addition, Hanwha Defense Australia plans to manufacture 30 self-propelled howitzers and 15 armored ammunition resupply vehicles at the Avalon Airport in Victoria, Australia, where the biennial air show is held, in a new 32,000 square meter center. The company netted the $1 billion AUD ($700 million US) in December and started work on the new facility earlier this year.

RELATED: House advances bill to train Australian submariners alongside US counterparts

But, as conversations at the Thursday dinner with the Korean ambassador, Jeong-sik Kang, and several senior Korean defense officials made crystal clear, each program in and of itself is less important to the Koreans than building a broader and deeper defense relationship with Australia.
They came armed with glossy brochures, big submarine tie clips, much of the embassy’s defense staff and a host of Korean company officials. Over three-and-a-half hours, nine speakers discussed the Redback offer, last week’s first flight of the supersonic and sort of fifth-generation KF-21 fighter, the sub, a Low Earth Orbit national communications system, and even passenger trains that Korea is selling Australia.

To receive the Korean officials were more an estimated 20 Australian defense officials; William Paterson, a former Australian ambassador to Korea; and, for effect, several defense journalists. Before sitting down to dinner, a Korean civilian defense official was eager to show Breaking Defense a table with two models of Korea’s proposed KSS-III, billed as the world’s largest and quietest conventionally powered attack submarine, as well as the first Air Independent Propulsion-powered sub that can handle SLBMs, or submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

The Koreans were almost ebullient in their presentation during the dinner, referring to the large lithium battery that powers the AIP system. The 3,700 ton boat’s cruise range grows because of the combination of the advanced diesel engines used for long-distance cruising and AIP, as illustrated in the chart below. The Koreans also said the sub boasts comfortable quarters in a deliberate attempt to boost crew morale and effectiveness. That could be a selling point for Australia, which has had issues attracting enough submariners to man their boats at times, so this may be aimed at allaying those concerns.

A slide from the South Korean presentation. (Credit Colin Clark/Breaking Defense)
But despite the enthusiastic pitch, the consensus of three Koreans and two Australians involved with defense procurement at the dinner was that before Australia accepts any bids from South Korea, Australia must decide if there is a capability gap, how long it will be and whether, most importantly, Australia can afford to build and support a nuclear submarine enterprise at the same time.

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use.....

AI, Autonomy, and the Risk of Nuclear War - War on the Rocks

Will emerging technologies like AI increase the risk of nuclear war? We are in an era of rapid disruptive technological change, especially in AI.

warontherocks.com

AI, AUTONOMY, AND THE RISK OF NUCLEAR WAR

JAMES JOHNSON
JULY 29, 2022
COMMENTARY

Will emerging technologies like AI increase the risk of nuclear war? We are in an era of rapid disruptive technological change, especially in AI. Therefore, the nascent journey to reorient military forces to prepare for the future digitized battlefield is no longer merely speculation or science fiction. “AI technology” is already fused into military machines, and global armed forces are well advanced in their planning, research and development, and, in many cases, deployment of AI-enabled capabilities.

AI does not exist in a vacuum. In isolation, AI is unlikely to be a strategic game changer. Instead, it will likely reinforce the destabilizing effects of advanced weaponry, thereby increasing the speed of war and compressing the decision-making timeframe. The inherently destabilizing effects of military AI may exacerbate tension between nuclear-armed powers, especially China and the United States, but not for the reasons you may think.

How and to what degree does AI augmentation mark a departure from automation in the nuclear enterprise, which goes back several decades? How transformative are these developments? And what are the potential risks posed by fusing AI technology with nuclear weapons? While we can’t answer these questions fully, only by extrapolating present trends in AI-enabling capabilities can we illuminate the potential risks of the current trajectory and thus consider ways to manage them.

The Emerging AI-Nuclear Nexus
It is worth considering how advances in AI technology are being researched, developed, and, in some cases, are deployed and operational in the context of the broader nuclear deterrence architecture — early-warning and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; command and control; nuclear weapon delivery systems; and non-nuclear operations.

Early-Warning and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
AI machine learning might, in three ways, quantitatively enhance existing early-warning and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems. First, machine learning, in conjunction with cloud computing, unmanned aerial vehicles (or drones), and big-data analytics, could be used to enable mobile intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms to be deployed in geographically long ranges, and in complex, dangerous environments (e.g., contested anti-access/area-denial zones, urban counterinsurgency, or deep-sea) to process real-time data and alert commanders of potentially suspicious or threatening situations such as military drills and suspicious troop or mobile missile launcher movements.

Second, machine-learning algorithms could be used to gather, mine, and analyze large volumes of intelligence (open-source and classified) sources to detect correlations in heterogeneous — and possibly contradictory, compromised, or otherwise manipulated — datasets. Third, and related, algorithmic processed intelligence could be used to support commanders to anticipate — and thus more rapidly preempt — an adversary’s preparations for a nuclear strike. In short, AI could offer human commanders operating in complex and dynamic environments vastly improved situational awareness and decision-making tools, allowing for more time to make informed decisions with potentially stabilizing effects.

Nuclear Command and Control
Compared to intelligence and early-warning systems, the impact of AI is unlikely to have a material impact on nuclear command and control, which for several decades have synthesized automation but not autonomy. As we have seen in these pages, algorithms that underlie complex autonomous systems today are too unpredictable, vulnerable (to cyber attacks), unexplainable (the “black-box” problem), brittle, and myopic to be used unsupervised in safety-critical domains. For now, there is a broad consensus amongst nuclear experts and nuclear-armed states that, even if the technology permitted, AI decision-making that directly impacts nuclear command-and-control functions (i.e., missile-launch decisions), should not be pre-delegated to AIs. Whether this fragile consensus can withstand mounting first-mover advantage temptations in a multipolar nuclear order is less certain. Whether human commanders — predisposed to anthropomorphize subjects, cognitive offloading, and automation bias — can avoid the temptation to view AI as a panacea for the cognitive fallibilities of human decision-making is also unclear. The question, therefore, is perhaps less whether nuclear-armed states will adopt AI technology into the nuclear enterprise, but rather by whom, when, and to what degree.

Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Missile Delivery Systems
AI technology will likely affect the nuclear weapon delivery systems in several ways. First, machine-learning algorithms may be used to improve the accuracy, navigation (pre-programed guidance parameters), autonomy (“fire-and-forget” functionality) of missiles, and precision — mainly used in conjunction with hypersonic glide vehicles. For example, China’s DF-ZF maneuverable hypersonic glide vehicle is a dual-capable (nuclear and conventionally armed) prototype with autonomous functionality.

Second, it could improve the resilience and survivability of nuclear launch platforms against adversary countermeasures such as electronic warfare jamming or cyber attacks — that is, autonomous AI-enhancements would remove the existing vulnerabilities of communications and data links between launch vehicles and operators.

Third, the extended endurance of AI-augmented unmanned (i.e., unmanned underwater vehicles and unmanned combat aerial vehicles) platforms used in extended intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance missions — that cannot be operated remotely — can potentially increase their ability to survive countermeasures and reduce states’ fear of a nuclear decapitation. This is especially the case in asymmetric nuclear dyads, such as United States-Russia, India-Pakistan, and United States-China. AI and autonomy might also strengthen states’ second-strike capability — and thus deterrence — and even support escalation management during a crisis or conflict.

Conventional Counterforce Operations
AI could be used to enhance a range of conventional capabilities, with potentially significant strategic implications — especially strategic non-nuclear weapons used in conventional counterforce operations. Machine learning could increase the onboard intelligence of manned and unmanned fighter aircraft, thus increasing their capacity to penetrate enemy defenses using conventional high-precision munitions. Moreover, increased levels of AI-enabled autonomy might allow unmanned drones — possibly in swarms — to operate in environments hitherto considered inaccessible or too dangerous for manned systems (e.g., anti-access and area denial zones, or deep-water and outer space environments). The 2021 Azerbaijani-Armenian war and the recent Ukrainian-Russian conflict have demonstrated how smaller states can integrate new weapon systems to amplify their battlefield effectiveness and lethality.

Machine-learning techniques could materially enhance missile, air, and space defense systems’ ability to detect, track, target, and intercept. Though AI technology has been integrated with automatic target recognition to support defense systems since the 1970s, the speed of defense systems’ target-identification — because of the limited database of target signatures that an automatic target recognition system uses to recognize its target — has progressed slowly. Advances in AI and particularly generative adversarial networks could alleviate this technical bottleneck, generating realistic synthetic data to train and test automatic target recognition systems. Besides, autonomous drone swarms might also be used defensively (e.g., decoys or flying mines) to buttress traditional air defenses.

AI technology is also changing how (both offensive and defensive) cyber capabilities are designed and operated. On the one hand, AI might reduce a military’s vulnerability to cyber attacks and electronic warfare operations. AI cyber-defensive tools and anti-jamming capabilities — designed, for example, to recognize changes to patterns of behavior and anomalies in a network and automatically identify malware or software code vulnerabilities — could protect nuclear systems against cyber intrusions or jamming operations.

On the other hand, advances in AI machine learning (notably an increase in the speed, stealth, and anonymity of cyber warfare) might enable identifying an adversary’s “zero-day vulnerabilities” — that is, undetected or unaddressed software vulnerabilities. Motivated adversaries might also use malware to take control, manipulate, or fool the behavior and pattern recognition systems of autonomous systems such as the Project Maven — for example, using generative adversarial networks to generate synthetic and realistic-looking data poses a threat to both machine learning and rules-based forms of attack detection. In short, AI technology in the nuclear domain will likely be a double-edged sword: strengthening the nuclear systems while expanding the pathways and tools available to adversaries to conduct cyber-attacks and electronic warfare operations against these systems (e.g., AI-augmented “left of launch”).

Continued.....

 

[Housecarl]

Continued.....

Finally, advances in AI technology could contribute to the physical security of nuclear weapons, particularly against threats posed by third-party and non-state actors. Autonomous vehicles (e.g., “anti-saboteur robots”) could be used, for example, to protect states nuclear forces, patrol the parameter of sensitive facilities, or form armed automated surveillance systems (e.g., South Korea’s Super Aegis II robotic sentry weapon that includes a fully autonomous mode), along vulnerable borders. AI technology — in conjunction with other emerging technologies such as big-data analytics and early-warning and detection systems — might also be harnessed to provide novel solutions to support nuclear risk and non-proliferation efforts; for example, removing the need for “boots on the ground” inspectors in sensitive facilities to support non-interference mechanisms for arms control verification agreements.

The 2025 “Flash War” in the Taiwan Straits
How might AI-powered capabilities intensify a crisis between two nuclear-armed adversaries? Consider the following fictional counterfactual: On the morning of Dec. 12, 2025, political leaders in Beijing and Washington authorized a nuclear exchange in the Taiwan Straits. Independent investigators into the 2025 “flash war” expressed sanguinity that neither side deployed AI-powered “fully autonomous” weapons nor intentionally violated the law of armed conflict.

In an election dominated by the island’s volatile relations with Communist China in 2024, President Tsai Ing-wen, and in another major snub to Beijing, pulled off a sweeping victory, securing her third term for the pro-independence Democrats. As the mid-2020s dawned, tensions across the Straits continued to sour, as both sides — held hostage to hardline politicians and hawkish generals — maintained uncompromising positions, jettisoning diplomatic gestures, and inflamed by escalatory rhetoric, fake news, and campaigns of mis/disinformation. At the same time, both China and the United States deployed AI to support battlefield awareness, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, early-warning, and other decision-support tools — to predict and suggest tactical responses to enemy actions in real time.

By late 2025, the rapid improvements in the fidelity, speed, and predictive capabilities of commercially produced dual-use AI applications, persuaded great military powers not only to feed data-hungry machine learning to enhance tactical and operational maneuvers but increasingly to inform strategic decisions. Impressed by the early adoption and fielding by Russia, Turkey, and Israeli of AI tools to support autonomous drone swarms to outmaneuver and crush counterterrorist incursions on their borders, China synthesized the latest iterations of dual-use AI, sacrificing rigorous testing and evaluation in the race for first-mover advantage.

With Chinese military incursions — aircraft flyovers, island blockade drills, and drone surveillance operations — in the Taiwan Straits marking a dramatic escalation in tensions, leaders in China and the United States demanded the immediate fielding of the latest strategic AI to gain the maximum asymmetric advantage in scale, speed, and lethality. As the incendiary rhetoric playing out on social media — exacerbated by disinformation campaigns and cyber intrusions on command-and-control networks — reached a fever pitch on both sides, a chorus of voices expounded the immediacy of a forced unification of Taiwan by China.
Buoyed by the escalatory situation unraveling in the Pacific — and with testing and evaluation processes incomplete — the United States decided to bring forward the fielding of its prototype autonomous AI-powered “Strategic Prediction & Recommendation System” (SPRS) — supporting decision-making in non-lethal activities such as logistics, cyber, space assurance, and energy management. China, fearful of losing the asymmetric upper hand, fielded a similar decision-making support system, “Strategic & Intelligence Advisory System” (SIAS), to ensure its autonomous preparedness for any ensuring crisis.

On June 14, 2025, at 06:30, a Taiwanese coast guard patrol boat collided with and sank a Chinese autonomous sea-surface vehicle conducting an intelligence recon mission within Taiwan’s territorial waters. On the previous day, President Tsai hosted a senior delegation of U.S. congressional staff and White House officials in Taipei on a high-profile diplomatic visit. By 06:50, the cascading effect that following — turbo-charged by AI-enabled bots, deepfakes, and false-flag operations — far exceeded Beijing’s pre-defined threshold, and thus capacity to contain.

By 07:15, these information operations coincided with a spike in cyber intrusions targeting U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and Taiwanese military systems, defensive maneuvers of orbital Chinese counter space assets, automated People’s Liberation Army logistics systems were activating, and the suspicious movement of the PLA’s nuclear road-mobile transporter erector launchers. At 07:20, U.S. SPRS assessed this behavior as an impending major national security threat and recommended an elevated deterrence posture and a powerful demonstration of force. The White House authorized an autonomous strategic bomber flyover in the Taiwan Straits at 07:25.

In response, at 07:35, China’s SIAS notified Beijing of an increased communication loading between U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and critical command and communication nodes at the Pentagon. By 07:40, SIAS raised the threat level for a preemptive U.S. strike in the Pacific to defend Taiwan, attack Chinese-held territory in the South China Seas, and contain China. At 07:45, SIAS advised Chinese leaders to use conventional counterforce weapons (cyber, anti-satellite, hypersonic weapons, and other smart precision missile technology) in a limited preemptive strike against critical U.S. Pacific assets including U.S. Air Force Base, Guam.

Chinese military leaders, at 07:50, fearful of an imminent disarming U.S. strike and increasingly reliant on the assessments of SIAS, authorized the attack — which SIAS had already anticipated and thus planned and prepared for. At 07:55, SPRS alerted Washington of the imminent attack and recommended an immediate limited nuclear strike to compel Beijing to call off its offensive. After a limited U.S.-China atomic exchange in the Pacific, leaving millions of people dead and tens of millions injured, both sides agreed to cease hostilities.

In the immediate aftermath of the deadly confrontation — lasting only a matter of hours — killing millions and injuring many more, leaders on both sides were dumbfounded about what caused the “flash war.” Both sides attempted to retroactively reconstruct a detailed analysis of decisions made by SPRS and SIAS. However, the designers of the algorithms underlying SPRS and SIAS reported that it was not possible to explain the decision rationale and reasoning of the AI behind every subset decision. Besides, because of the various time, encryption, and privacy constraints imposed by the end military and business users, it was impossible to keep retroactive back-testing logs and protocols. Did AI technology cause the 2025 “flash war”?

Human Solutions to the Machine Problem
In the final analysis, the best way to prepare for the AI-nuclear future may be to adhere to a few basic principles to guide the management of nuclear weapons in their interactions with emerging technology. First, nuclear weapon systems should avoid being unduly complex, entangled, or overcomplicated. Second, these systems must be fortified and robust enough to withstand traditional threats and increasing new threats emerging in the digital domain. Third, nuclear weapons must be disentangled and, where possible, distinctly separate (both physically and doctrinally) from non-nuclear capabilities and command, control, communications, and intelligence systems. If this principle was followed it would likely rule out the existence of the kind of dual-use systems described in the “flash war” vignette.

Towards these lofty ends, AI could also support defense planners’ design and run wargaming and other virtual training exercises to refine operational concepts, test various conflict scenarios, and identify areas and technologies for potential development. For instance, AI-ML techniques — modeling, simulation, and analysis — might complement counterfactuals and low-tech table-top wargaming simulations to identify contingencies under which nuclear risk might arise. As Alan Turing wrote in 1950: “We can only see a short distance ahead, but we can see plenty there that needs to be done.”

BECOME A MEMBER

James Johnson is a lecturer in strategic studies at the University of Aberdeen. He is also an honorary fellow at the University of Leicester, a non-resident associate on the European Research Council-funded Towards a Third Nuclear Age Project, and a mid-career cadre with the Center for Strategic Studies Project on Nuclear Issues. He is the author of Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Warfare: USA, China & Strategic Stability. His latest book project with Oxford University Press is AI & the Bomb: Nuclear Strategy and Risk in the Digital Age. You can follow him on Twitter: @James_SJohnson.
Image: U.S. Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt. Patrick Harrower


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[jward]

Always my pleasure to lend you a hand, or two, with things : )
..n I'd like to thank You for all you do around here!

Folks, I've been getting over a case of the Wuhan these last couple of weeks which has limited me to intermittently responding to posts and no real news hounding. I'm going to get the WoW thread back up tonight.

I'd like to thank Jward, Techwreck and Old Archer for keeping the thread going for the last couple of weeks. HC.

 

[jward]

Army Is Falling Dangerously Short on Recruitment. Here’s What We Can Do About It.
Thomas Spoehr
​

The Army is falling far short of its 2022 target end strength, the maximum number of personnel permitted by Congress in each military service.
A recent news report noted the Army will “fall about 10,000 soldiers short of its planned end strength for this fiscal year,” and has only achieved 50% of its recruiting goal of 60,000 soldiers with only two and a half months left in this fiscal year.
The projected total force for this year is 466,400 soldiers, down from the expected 476,000, and next year it could be as low as 445,000. The Army is already the smallest it has been since 1940, prior to World War II.
This is shaping up to be the worst recruiting year for the Army since the advent of the all-volunteer force in 1973, and it’s not a transitory issue. If the recruiting crisis is not turned around soon, it could seriously affect U.S. national defense long-term—at a time when readiness is crucial.

And it isn’t just the Army. All the other services have reported recruiting challenges and might not make their goals either.
What’s the impact of a recruiting crisis?
When the military services have fewer airmen, special operators, sailors, Marines, and soldiers, they must take what they have and stretch them thinly to cover their requirements. That results in units being deployed too frequently and a shortfall in ready combat units.

This is occurring at a time when American interests are being challenged by a belligerent Russia, an aggressive China, and the perennial threats from Iran and North Korea.
Apart from the idea that a lack of volunteers affects our national security, the other misfortune in this crisis is that young people are missing out on the opportunity to serve their country, to learn leadership, and to grow as citizens. Studies show veterans make better citizens: They volunteer, vote, and serve as community leaders at a greater rate than the general population.

So, what then is causing this recruiting crisis?
The percentage of Americans eligible for service dropped from an already discouraging 29% of Americans to 23%. On top of this bleak statistic, only 9% of Americans, when asked, express a willingness to serve in the military, according to Department of Defense polling data.
The Army is also still recovering from the COVID-19 pandemic. Recruiters could not meet potential recruits face-to-face at fairs, large public events, and after-school programs for two years. At the same time, students who missed in-person schooling are scoring lower on required qualification tests.
Army recruiters are most effective when they have boots on the ground and are active in local communities, which until recently was extremely limited.

To that end, the factor of COVID vaccination requirements have further complicated recruiting in the post-pandemic world. No matter how you feel about it, it’s clear the vaccine requirement is both keeping some young people from volunteering and at the same time causing the military to discharge tens of thousands of otherwise eligible troops.
Furthermore, the labor market has become more competitive as the unemployment rate shrunk to 3.6%, and the private sector has offered suitably competitive compensation and benefits programs. Companies such as Amazon and Starbucks are offering $15 an hour for new employees, making these jobs more appealing for young people.
There are also fewer and fewer veterans every year to inspire military service in the next generation. Moreover, the largely misplaced perception that veterans are not taken care of and struggle with post-traumatic stress disorder and other mental and physical injuries does more to instill fear and caution about military service than inspire the next generation to follow in their footsteps.

The military is often viewed as a “family business” —79% of new recruits have a family member who served. Thus, if you do not have a family member who has served, it’s less likely you will consider service in the military.
In other words, the military has an exposure problem—meaning, fewer and fewer youths are exposed to the military through family members, veterans, or Junior ROTC programs (only 10% of schools have these programs), and we know exposure to military service equals more recruits.
So, what can we do about it?

We need more JROTC programs: 49% of new recruits (who did not have a family member serve) attended a school with a JROTC program even if they did not participate in the program themselves. The more we expose the youth to military service, the more they are interested in service, so the Army should focus on expanding those programs.
The military needs to focus on tailoring competitive compensation and benefit programs to this generation. While Starbucks and Amazon offer cash incentives, military recruiting must offer that, too—and more. Military service opens doors to a variety of careers, travel, and education. To compete with the private sector, recruiting should highlight the opportunities that are unique to military service.
The military also should support after-school sports programs to increase eligibility and address the long-term issue of obesity and poor health in America. Furthermore, the military should resource preparatory programs where recruiters help young people prepare for entrance exams and lose weight, so that those who display a willingness to serve are not limited by physical or academic shortcomings.

American schools can assist in this effort by assuring recruiters have access to students. Military service is a great opportunity for young people in America, and schools could do more to help recruiters meet interested potential volunteers. Many recruiters report, however, that some high schools don’t let them step inside the front door.
Finally, we must foster a culture that values military service and encourages our youth to join the service. This will require the buy-in of coaches, teachers, public servants, and parents to motivate the next generation to selflessly serve their country.

We are in a “war for talent,” according to Army Chief of Staff Gen. James McConville, and we must act accordingly. Our ability to defend our nation in an increasingly unstable world is at stake.
This piece originally appeared in The Daily Signal

Army Is Falling Dangerously Short on Recruitment. Here’s What We Can Do About It.

The Army is falling far short of its 2022 target end strength, the maximum number of personnel permitted by Congress in each military service. A recent news report noted the Army will “fall about 10,000 soldiers short of its planned end strength for this fiscal year,” and has only achieved 50%...

www.heritage.org