WAR 06-25-2022-to-07-01-2022__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

[Housecarl]

(258) 06-04-2022-to-06-10-2022__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

(259) 06-11-2022-to-06-17-2022__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

(260) 06-18-2022-to-06-24-2022__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

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ALERT - RUSSIA INVADES UKRAINE - Consolidated Thread

Propaganda is nothing new; I'm sure a case can be made that it's been a part of war since Cain and Abel went at it. In fact, to the extent non physical tools of engagement can be used and folks o'ercome without the use o' deadly force, tis even a case to be made that it's a good thing. What's...

www.timebomb2000.com

WAR - Close ally calls on Vladimir Putin to ‘strike London first in WWIII’ on Russian media

**** the Russians. All they do is talk trash. They jump up and down and yell at everyone. Nuclear war has no winners. Russians , Democrats.....same sht, except democrats are an immediate threat

www.timebomb2000.com

INTL - Europe: Politics, Economics, Military- June 2022

From my email inbox The Readout Bloomberg UK June 21 2022 Golden Summer Switzerland imported gold from Russia for the first time since the invasion of Ukraine, showing the industry’s stance toward Russia’s precious metals may be softening. As Bloomberg’s Eddie Spence reports, a shipment of...

www.timebomb2000.com

WAR - Main Persian Gulf Trouble thread

Exclusive: Iran expands advanced centrifuge work underground, IAEA report shows By Francois Murphy 2 minute read The Iranian flag waves in front of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) headquarters, before the beginning of a board of governors meeting, in Vienna, Austria, March 1...

www.timebomb2000.com

ALERT - The Winds of War Blow in Korea and The Far East

PLA Rocket Force In case, the US intervenes militarily, China’s response will be a devastating pre-emptive attack in the first few days. “Many Chinese observers suggest that missile strikes on [US] air bases would be part of the opening salvos of a war,” RAND said in 2019. China will unleash a...

www.timebomb2000.com

WAR - War with Russia and China, from the North, is a distinct possibility…

https://f24.my/8iya Russia and China eye NATO's 'Arctic Achilles heel' Issued on: 23/06/2022 - 08:36 ]No goodbye Lenin: A bust of the Bolshevik leader survived the collapse of the Soviet Union in a Russian enclave on the Norwegian island of Spitsbergen Jonathan NACKSTRAND AFP/File 7 min...

www.timebomb2000.com

WAR - Regional conflict brewing in the Mediterranean

Israel Radar @IsraelRadar_com Israel & Turkey foiled several Iranian attacks in recent weeks: large terror network was plotting major shootings and abductions; Turkish locals recruited by some terror cells; severe Israeli travel warning still in place (via@N12News )

www.timebomb2000.com

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This was in the Russo-Ukraine war thread but such a transfer IMHO deserves to be here as well....HC

Posted for fair use.....

Putin promises Belarus nuclear-capable missiles to counter 'aggressive' West

Russian President Vladimir Putin on Saturday told his counterpart from Belarus that Moscow would supply Minsk with missile systems capable of carrying nuclear weapons, the Russian foreign ministry said.

www.reuters.com

June 25, 20221:34 PM PDT
Last Updated an hour ago

• Europe

Putin promises Belarus nuclear-capable missiles to counter 'aggressive' West

Reuters

2 minute read

• Summary

• This content was produced in Russia, where the law restricts coverage of Russian military operations in Ukraine

MOSCOW, June 25 (Reuters) - Russian President Vladimir Putin on Saturday told his counterpart from Belarus that Moscow would supply Minsk with missile systems capable of carrying nuclear weapons, the Russian foreign ministry said.

At a meeting with Putin in St Petersburg, Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko expressed concern about the "aggressive", "confrontational" and "repulsive" policies of its neighbours Lithuania and Poland.

He asked Putin to help Belarus mount a "symmetrical response" to what he said were nuclear-armed flights by the U.S.-led NATO alliance near Belarus' borders.

Putin said he saw no need at present for a symmetrical response, but that Belarus' Russian-built Su-25 jets could, if necessary, be upgraded in Russian factories.

"We will transfer Iskander-M tactical missile systems to Belarus, which can use both ballistic and cruise missiles, both in conventional and nuclear versions," a foreign ministry summary of the meeting quoted him as saying.

The Iskander-M, a mobile guided missile system codenamed "SS-26 Stone" by NATO, replaced the Soviet "Scud". Its two guided missiles have a range of up to 500 km (300 miles) and can carry conventional or nuclear warheads.

Parts of the meeting between the two men were televised.

"Minsk must be ready for anything, even the use of serious weaponry to defend our fatherland from Brest to Vladivostok," Lukashenko said, putting Belarus and its close ally Russia under one umbrella.

In particular, he asked for help to make Belarus' military aircraft nuclear-capable.

Tensions between Russia and the West have soared since Moscow sent troops into Ukraine four months ago, alleging among other things that NATO planned to admit Ukraine and use it as a platform to threaten Russia.

Russia's move has not only triggered a barrage of Western sanctions but also prompted Sweden and Russia's northern neighbour Finland to apply to join the Western alliance.

In the past week, Lithuania in particular has infuriated Russia by blocking the transit of goods subject to European sanctions travelling across its territory from Russia, through Belarus, to Russia's Baltic exclave of Kaliningrad.

Russia has termed it a "blockade", but Lithuania says it affects only 1% of the normal goods transit on the route, and that passenger traffic is unaffected.

Reporting by Reuters; Editing by Sandra Maler

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use.....

Raytheon, Northrop advance in competition to develop hypersonic weapons interceptor

The Missile Defense Agency awarded contracts to Raytheon and Northrop Grumman to continue development of its Glide Phase Interceptor designed to take out hypersonic threats.

www.defensenews.com

Raytheon, Northrop advance in competition to develop hypersonic weapons interceptor
By Jen Judson
Jun 24, 02:42 PM

This photo provided by the North Korean government, shows what it says a test launch of a hypersonic missile in North Korea Wednesday, Jan. 5, 2022. Independent journalists were not given access to cover the event depicted in this image distributed by the North Korean government. The content of this image is as provided and cannot be independently verified. Korean language watermark on image as provided by source reads: "KCNA" which is the abbreviation for Korean Central News Agency. (Korean Central News Agency/Korea News Service via AP)

WASHINGTON — Raytheon Technologies and Northrop Grumman have each won contracts to continue developing hypersonic weapons interceptors in a Missile Defense Agency-led competition, according to a June 24 Pentagon contract announcement.

Each company was awarded a firm-fixed price modification to a previously awarded contract for rapid prototyping. Each modification is worth roughly $41.5 million, bringing the total contract value thus far to around $61 million each, according to the contract announcement.

In November 2021, the MDA chose the two companies along with Lockheed Martin to design the Glide Phase Interceptor (GPI) for regional hypersonic missile defense. Through other transactional agreements, the companies entered an “accelerated concept design” phase.

The interceptors are intended to counter a hypersonic weapon during its glide phase of flight, a challenge as the missiles can travel more than five times the speed of sound and can maneuver, making it hard to predict a missile’s trajectory.

The interceptors will be designed to fit into the U.S. Navy’s current Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense destroyers. It will be fired from its standard Vertical Launch System and integrated with the modified Baseline 9 Aegis Weapon System that detects, tracks, controls and engages hypersonic threats.

While Lockheed was not awarded a contract to participate in next phase of the GPI competition, it is competing against Raytheon to develop scramjet-powered hypersonic missiles as part of the Hypersonic Air-breathing Weapon Concept (HAWC) program run by the Air Force and DARPA.

And Lockheed is the lead systems integrator for what will be the Navy’s Conventional Prompt Strike offensive hypersonic missile and the Army’s Long Range Hypersonic Weapon. Northrop Grumman designed the motor for both weapons.

Lockheed is also developing the Air Force’s hypersonic AGM-183A Air-launched Rapid Response Weapon.

MDA told Defense News in an email that the agency still has the ability to pull Lockheed back into the GPI effort later “if required.”

Northrop began a push to develop hypersonic missile capability in 2019 when the Pentagon made hypersonic capability a priority. That same year, Lockheed Martin broke ground on a new facility in Alabama geared toward developing, testing and producing hypersonic weapons.

None of the companies immediately responded to requests for comment.

The MDA hit the pause button on its hypersonic weapons interceptor effort in summer 2020 to bring a defensive hypersonic weapon online. But the agency took steps this year to move forward again and received feedback from industry confirming a glide phase interceptor is something that can be done “and we shouldn’t be afraid to go do it,” Vice Adm. Jon Hill, MDA’s director, told Defense News last year.

About a year ago, the agency revamped its approach to hypersonic weapons, opting to focus on taking out hypersonic weapons in the glide phase of flight, where they are most vulnerable, according to Hill.

The agency will first focus on providing a capability to the Navy. “If this is successful,” Hill said, “we can move it to the land-based battery to protect other things against that sort of hypersonic threat.”

The agency has yet to detail the program’s schedule for subsequent phases, but, according to fiscal 2023 Pentagon budget justification documents, the agency plans to reach weapon system and missile systems preliminary design reviews in the fourth quarter of FY27.

About Jen Judson
Jen Judson is an award-winning journalist covering land warfare for Defense News. She has also worked for Politico and Inside Defense. She holds a Master of Science in journalism from Boston University and a Bachelor of Arts from Kenyon College.

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use.....

Putin To Supply Nuclear-Capable Missiles To Belarus Within Months: Why Is He Doing This?

Russian President Vladimir Putin on Saturday announced that Russia would supply Belarus with missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads.

www.benzinga.com

Putin To Supply Nuclear-Capable Missiles To Belarus Within Months: Why Is He Doing This?
by Bibhu Pattnaik, Benzinga Staff Writer
June 26, 2022 12:25 PM | 1 min read

ZINGER KEY POINTS

• Russia would transfer to Belarus Iskander-M tactical missile systems, which can use ballistic or cruise missiles.
• Putin has offered to upgrade Belarusian warplanes to make them capable of carrying nuclear weapons.

Russian President Vladimir Putin on Saturday announced that Russia would supply Belarus with missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads.

While speaking with Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenko in Moscow, Putin said that Russia would transfer to Belarus Iskander-M tactical missile systems, which can use ballistic or cruise missiles, in their conventional and nuclear versions, Reuters reports.

Lukashenko asked Putin to help Belarus mount a "symmetrical response" to what he said were nuclear-armed flights by the U.S.-led NATO alliance near Belarus's borders.

With the soaring tensions in the war against Ukraine, Putin offered to upgrade Belarusian warplanes to make them capable of carrying nuclear weapons.

Also Read: Elon Musk Believes Vladimir Putin Is Richer Than Him: How Wealthy Is The Russian President?

Earlier in February, Russia used Belarusian territory to fight against Ukraine. In addition, Moscow has used Minsk as a satellite base, including for many of Russia's air operations in Ukraine.

"Minsk must be ready for anything, even the use of serious weaponry to defend our fatherland from Brest to Vladivostok," Putin said.

On Saturday, Ukraine claimed that Russian forces had fired multiple missiles on the Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Sumy regions from Belarus.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said that 45 Russian missiles hit broad areas on Saturday, including the country's northern, southern, and western parts.

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use.....

The four horsemen of the apocalypse - opinion

We are nearing the death of the old geopolitical system and of the world order that has kept repeating itself from the medieval ages.

www.jpost.com

The four horsemen of the apocalypse - opinion
We are nearing the death of the old geopolitical system and of the world order that has kept repeating itself from the medieval ages.
By VAS SHENOY

Published: JUNE 25, 2022 15:52
Updated: JUNE 26, 2022 05:33

The powerful Old Testament image of the four horsemen of the Apocalypse has been repeatedly brought back into discussion when humanity has faced peril and war. Ezekiel and Zachariah have often been interpreted as describing the four horsemen as plague, war, famine and finally death.

When I woke up this past week on the morning of 120 days of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war in Ukraine, it struck me that we were nearing death: Death of the old geopolitical system and of the world order that has kept repeating itself from the medieval ages.

Despite much that has happened, Europe and Russia have risen as powers and then crumbled repeatedly. It seems,finally, that this cycle of plague, war and famine will be the last of Western hegemony and the birth of a new world order, a new world order which will probably bring back the balance of power to Asia and Africa, which were the centers of global wealth and power long before the industrial revolution.

Putin’s puzzle
CNN and other news outlets recently condensed Putin’s endgame in Ukraine as the re-establishment of Russia’s imperial, nationalistic identity. However, the Ukraine war seems to be a step in Putin’s plan of global dominance. Western intelligence agencies have often stated that Putin is terminally ill and has nothing to lose.

While war in Ukraine can be explained as a dying man’s desperate bid at carving out a legacy, the actual actions do not really marry this desperation. Despite losing men, weapons, generals and being under extreme sanctions, Putin continues to soldier on.

The question must be asked, what if Ukraine was not the endgame, what if Ukraine was a long game toward weakening the West? When we analyze biblical predictions, we should also analyze a lot of what-if’s.

Usually, what-iffery is a dangerous sport and leads you down paths that are slippery and often without fundamental logic. However, reading tarot cards or tea leaves is easier than reading the intentions of a man such as Vladimir Putin’s. This man is a veteran spy, former head of one of the world’s most determined and resourceful spy agencies, who has not only brought Russia back to power from its days under Yeltsin, but also been a field operative during the Soviet era.

Before Russia’s Ukraine invasion, Putin’s Russia had filled the gaps in conflicts worldwide and almost become a global arbiter in key geopolitical theatres where the US had lost control.

Afghanistan, Syria, Iran, Mali, Chad and Libya: Putin’s Russia was counted as a voice heard on every major decision. Russia had also become the big brother and tried to play peacemaker in South Asia, between India-Pakistan and China. Weeks before the Ukraine invasion, Russia had intervened in a bizarre coup attempt in Kazakhstan and assisted the Kazakh government in pacifying a revolt.

So, what has happened in the past weeks and months that suddenly made Putin risk all that capital built up over the past 20 years to take on Ukraine. Is it national pride or is it a longer-term strategy against the West?

Dragonbear: China/Russia alliance
The dragonbear alliance, of the Chinese dragon and the Russian bear, has not always been a love affair. Historically, Russia has always supported India over China and there has been strong animosity between these neighbors, who share a 4,250 km. land border.

Henry Kissinger’s strategy of empowering China was, in fact, to weaken Russia and now it seems after 50 years, this may have created a beast: a dragonbear that the US may not be strong enough to control.

Since Chinese President Xi Jinping’s rule, the Chinese strongman and the Russian autocrat have developed a strong bond. Both China and Russia have resented the US dominance in global affairs and during former president Donald Trump’s rule, Russia celebrated the fact that China bore the brunt of the erratic president’s ire. Trump’s withdrawal from the international arena allowed Russia’s and China’s global power to grow unchecked.

Then came the first horseman, the plague. The rapid spread of COVID-19 into a global pandemic can be firmly attributed to China’s negligence, lack of transparency and will to cover up. It also brought to light China’s control of international organizations, such as the World Health Organization (WHO), which were as much to blame for the cover-up and spread as the Chinese government was.

Western democracies suffered far more economically and socially than China, a single-party-controlled dictatorship. While western markets were decimated by public perception, China used this time to take firm control of Hong Kong, eliminate the one country-two systems pledge and destroy the power of billionaires who had started challenging Xi Jinping’s authority.

Recommended by
As the West grappled with vaccinations and tried to balance democracy and its citizens’ liberties with the need to protect the lives of their citizens, China stuck to a plan of lockdown and achieving complete political and social control of Chinese society.

What damage COVID did to China, we will never know. How many advocates of liberty disappeared, how many people really died and what really happened will probably be a mystery for generations to come.

On February 4, two men met under the umbrella of the Winter Olympics in Beijing. Putin and Xi announced a no-limits friendship between their two countries. Just when Europe had achieved some sort of control on the pandemic and as inflation surged, Russian missiles rained on Kyiv.

While Mario Draghi and his colleagues in Europe had declared “whatever it takes” to save the European economy, it seems that Putin had declared “whatever it takes” to ruin it. Oil prices hit a historic high and inflation become even steeper. Stock exchanges globally, which had just started recovering to pre-pandemic levels, started crashing again. The second horseman, war, had made his mark.

Famine and death
In October 2021, with heads of states meeting in Rome, at the G20 supply chain resilience was often discussed as a key point to combat Chinese aggression. Most heads of state were worried about electronics and chips, which were China’s domain.

No one was alarmed about food, except the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Food Programme’s (WFP) often ignored warning of drought and famine in Afghanistan, Yemen and the Horn of Africa. We are almost at the third horseman, famine. The world and Europe are on the brink of probably the toughest summer they have faced in generations.

Russia won against Nazi Germany using a scorched-earth policy. It would seem Putin’s strategy to tame Europe is similar. Curiously, the Chinese have been buying grain and stockpiling food since 2021. According to the report of Al Jazeera from February 2022, Russia and Ukraine together produce over 25% of the world’s wheat. Most of the produce of last year’s wheat is either in Russian control or out of Ukraine’s ability to export. As well, China is hoarding maize, soya and other calorie crops, while the supply lines of food to Europe are limited.

Another worrying fact is that while hunger may impact Europe relatively less, due to the EU’s financial resilience, there is a large risk that hunger in Africa will force increased mass migration to Europe by sea. Whether food is available in Africa or not, rising costs will create economic or natural famines in what seems to already be a very hot summer, forcing Africans to head to Europe in unprecedented numbers.

Between China and Russia, both control African politics enough to incentivize this. African Union’s President Senegal’s Macky Sall appealed to the West after his meeting with Putin in early April, to lift sanctions to facilitate wheat and fertilizer exports.

Depending on how this summer will progress, the sanctions on Russia may have to weaken to reduce pressure on the price of oil and gas to reduce inflation and to keep southern Europe’s governments from collapsing from unchecked migration from Africa, due to hunger.

Putin may, with his friend Xi, achieve global dominance through one relatively small war in Ukraine.

Death and a new global order
Ukraine just seems to be the first chapter of the death of the old world order. Russia seems confident it will bring the West to its knees by making oil more expensive in a hot summer where heatwaves will make it impossible to keep air conditioning off. If that isn’t enough, it will by pushing Africa to act on its behalf by creating hunger. After all, if the democracies can’t check inflation and enforce border security, governments in southern Europe will collapse.

Russia is not short of political allies it has developed in European countries, who may return to power on the platform of illegal migration, unchecked price rises, security and unemployment.

“And I looked, and behold a pale horse: and his name that sat on him was Death, and hell followed with him.” While we may be prepared for death, what we now need to understand is how we deal with the hell that follows.

The writer is the president of Glocal Cities. He is a political researcher, consultant and entrepreneur, and has worked in Europe, the Middle East and Africa for two decades. He has interacted with leaders and decision-makers, and has worked closely with people from all walks of life all over the Middle East.

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use..... (For images please see article source. HC)

New Panther – German answer to Russia’s T-14 tank - Asia Times

The war in Ukraine may have heralded the return of large-scale mechanized wars of attrition. While Russia’s huge tank losses early on during its invasion

asiatimes.com

WEAPONRY
New Panther – German answer to Russia’s T-14 tank
Return of industrial wars of attrition may not be a good omen for either country’s high-tech main battle tank
By GABRIEL HONRADA
JUNE 24, 2022

The new Panther. Photo: Rheinmetall
The war in Ukraine may have heralded the return of large-scale mechanized wars of attrition. While Russia’s huge tank losses early on during its invasion have prompted premature calls about the tank’s death, the subsequent attrition fighting has shown tanks bearing the brunt of ground combat once again.

That development has re-emphasized the enduring need for a heavily armed and armored combat vehicle capable of breaking through the toughest of defenses.

However, the dynamics of mechanized warfare that have been unfolding in Ukraine may have validated or invalidated design concepts included in the latest main battle tanks (MBT), such as Germany’s KF51 Panther and Russia’s T-14 Armata.
Not the time for a loaded ride

These advanced tank designs showcase several technologies that may define armored warfare for years – but the tanks themselves might be of only limited usefulness in today’s modern conflicts.

The war in Ukraine has shown that large-scale industrialized wars of attrition are here to stay. Hence, the weapons systems needed in this kind of warfare must be cheap, simply engineered and capable of being quickly mass-produced – and must have available abundant supplies of fuel and ammunition.

The high costs of the KF51 Panther and T-14 Armata ($4 million per unit) are a strong disincentive for mass production. Also, deploying these tanks risks their advanced technologies falling into enemy hands, which may be one reason why Russia has not deployed the T-14 Armata to Ukraine.

Hence, these advanced tanks may become too expensive to mass-produce and too valuable to lose in attrition warfare. Such was the fate of the F-22 Raptor fifth-generation fighter, whose production ended in 2009 with only 195 units produced due to high costs ($125 million per jet) and high maintenance requirements.

The F-22 may be retired without the type ever seeing aerial combat, as its successor, the Next Generation Air Dominance fighter, is already in the works.

Thus, Germany’s KF51 Panther and Russia’s T-14 Armata are most likely to be deployed in elite high-readiness units or as technology demonstrators. In addition, major land powers may use specific design features and technologies to upgrade their existing tanks or incorporate these into more sustainable, cost-effective tank designs.

Read on for details about those bells and whistles.
The German contender

During the expo Eurosatory 2022, one of the showstopper exhibits was Germany’s KF51 Panther MBT. Rheinmetall, the tank’s manufacturer, claims it is an all-new concept not constrained by yesterday’s technology.

It promises the “highest lethality on the battlefield, combined with an integrated survivability concept and connected to NGV (NATO Generic Vehicle Architecture) data backbone to enable next-generation operational capabilities and automation.”

All the KF51’s weapons are connected to the targeting sights and fire control computer through fully-digitized architecture, allowing for hunter-killer and killer-killer operation, enabling instant target engagement that in the future would be supported by AI.

The KF51 Panther has a crew of three (commander, gunner, driver) with an optional crew station for a specialist (company commander, drone operator or wingman pilot). The tank can pass sensor and weapons control assignments between crew members instantly, with the various workstations capable of handling and taking over tasks and roles from each other with no loss of functionality.

In addition, the KF51 Panther provides turret and weapons controls to chassis-based workstations, enabling future upgrades such as unmanned turrets or remote operations.

The KF51 Panther boasts a 130-mm Future Gun System (FGS), which gives a 50% performance increase against 120-mm tank guns in Western service. The FGS can fire kinetic energy (KE) sabot rounds and programmable airburst munitions and comes with an autoloader holding 20 ready rounds.

The tank’s secondary weapons include a .50-calibre coaxial machine gun, a 7.62 remote-controlled weapons station (RCWS) for drone defense and close-in protection, and the HERO 120 loitering munition drone for use against targets that are out of line-of-sight.

The tank features a fully integrated, comprehensive, weight-optimized survivability concept combining active, reactive and passive protection technologies. It has pre-shot detection capability, enabling the tank to destroy threats first.

In addition, the tank’s NGVA architecture enables the addition of more sensors that could detect anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) launch signatures. The tank also has Rheinmetall’s Top Attack Protection System (TAPS), enabling it to defeat top-attack munitions that go for the tank’s top armor, which is usually the thinnest on such vehicles.

Finally, the KF51 Panther has the ROSY Rapid Obscuring System, which creates an instantaneous, large smoke screen capable of blocking the infrared (IR) and visible spectrum to defeat IR-guided, laser-guided, and manually-guided ATGMs.

The KF21 Panther features a SEOSS 2 panoramic sight and the EMES gunner sight used in the Leopard 2 MBT, allowing both the commander and gunner to scan independently for targets day or night. Both sights feature their laser rangefinders, while a display in the fighting compartment provides 360-degree awareness to the crew.

Integrated drones add to the crew’s situational awareness in urban areas and within the vehicle’s immediate vicinity, allowing the tank to conduct reconnaissance and share the results with others in a networked manner. The tank is also fully hardened against cyber threats.
The Russian competition

Russia unveiled the T-14 Armata main battle tank during the 2015 Victory Day parade in Moscow. The T-14 Armata marks a significant change from contemporary Russian tanks based on Soviet-era designs.

Russia tested the Armata in Syria. Photo: Meta-Defensae.fr
It is part of a family of vehicles built around the Armata universal combat platform, with 28 possible configurations. These include the T-15 heavy infantry fighting vehicle (IFV), Koalitsiya self-propelled gun (SPG) and T-14 Armata MBT. This design approach helps standardize repair kits, tools, and components to replace various subsystems quickly.

An unmanned turret sets the T-14 Armata apart from contemporary tank designs, with the three-man crew (commander, driver, and gunner) inside an armored capsule in the chassis. This design approach isolates the crew from potentially dangerous fuel and ammunition and improves their survivability significantly. In addition, the T-14 Armata can be remotely controlled, turning it into a heavy unmanned ground combat vehicle.

The tank has a 125mm 2A82-1M smoothbore gun, an automatic loader, and 32 ready-to-fire rounds. In addition, it can fire the latest Russian sabot rounds, specifically the Vacuum-1 depleted uranium (DU) and Vacuum-2 tungsten KE sabot rounds. The T-14 also uses gun-launched laser-guided ATGMs allowing it to attack targets beyond the range of its main gun.

The T-14 Armata also has a 12.7-mm coaxial machine gun and an RCWS with a 7.62mm machine gun for secondary weapons. Also, there are plans to arm the T-14 Armata with a 152-mm gun, which is 30% more powerful than its predecessor.

The T-14 Armata features a tiered protection system consisting of passive and reactive defenses and armor. The protection scheme of the T-14 is built around the philosophy that the best tank defense is not to add additional armor but not to get hit in the first place.

To that end, the tank has the Afganit active protection system (APS), which features soft- and hard-kill technologies. The soft-kill component of the suite uses radar and optical sensors to detect an incoming ATGM. In addition, it has various means to disrupt its guidance systems, such as multispectral smoke screens, decoy flares, and radio jamming.

Should threats defeat the soft-kill system, the Afganit’s hard-kill system activates, sending an explosive blast in the direction of the incoming projectile. The Afganit’s hard kill system can destroy ATGMs, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), and KE sabot rounds.

In case incoming missiles still bypass the Afganit APS, Malakhit explosive reactive armor (ERA) covers the tank, which explodes upon being hit to break up KE rounds or disrupt shaped charge warheads before they impact the tank’s hull armor.

Apart from these defenses, the T-14 Armata has radar-absorbing paint and could use Nakidka radar-absorbent R-dampening cloaks to mask the tank’s signature further.

For situational awareness, the T-14 Armata has a 360-degree commander’s sight and the gunner’s sight for the main gun. Both sights have multispectral capabilities, with both thermal and night vision modes. In addition, the driver has a forward-looking infrared camera (FLIR), and the commander has access to several cameras on the tank’s hull, providing 360-degree coverage.

The tank is capable of network-centric operations, designed to operate as part of a self-contained “module” consisting of fighting and support vehicles.

 

[Housecarl]

Hummm......

Posted for fair use.....

Indian Nuclear Missile Proliferation: Effect On South Asian Strategic Stability – OpEd

The nuclear capability of Pakistan is purely security based and depends upon the changing technological developments in the region. Pakistan maintains a posture of credible minimum deterrence and ensures strategic stability in the region. However, India continually pushes Pakistan towards arms...

www.eurasiareview.com

Indian Nuclear Missile Proliferation: Effect On South Asian Strategic Stability – OpEd

June 27, 2022

By Amber Afreen Abid


The nuclear capability of Pakistan is purely security based and depends upon the changing technological developments in the region. Pakistan maintains a posture of credible minimum deterrence and ensures strategic stability in the region. However, India continually pushes Pakistan towards arms race, by the development and induction of new aggressive technology, and incorporation of offensive doctrines.

The proliferation of supersonic and hypersonic weapons, which is echoing in South Asia, could be disastrous for the regional peace and stability. Ever since the mass nuclear power has been invented, the deterrence stability in the region is maintained by keeping the mutual vulnerability intact, which India tries its best to sabotage. The introduction of supersonic and hypersonic weapons could be devastating as it travels with immensely high speed, and the enemy can’t be certain whether it is carrying conventional or non-conventional weapon, hence the chances and risks of nuclear war manifolds.


Recently, Atul Rane, CEO and MD, BrahMos Aerospace said that in five to six years, India will be able to have the first hypersonic missile. Moreover, India has also tested the Supersonic missile assisted torpedo (SMART), which indicates the continuous modernization of its technology. Owing to the volatile situation in south Asia, with the absence of any conflict resolution treaties and agreements, the innovation in technology in South Asia leads to the change in the nuclear doctrines a swell. Pakistan maintains a policy of minimum credible deterrence, but that minimum is directly proportional to the advancements made by the adversary in offensive technology and ultimately in the nuclear doctrine.


The Indian posture of NFU is also questionable, as the statements from the defence minister of India comes otherwise. The recent development indicates India’s move towards a counterforce targeting, which is a highly destabilizing factor for south Asia. The Indian military modernization is far exceeding the ‘minimum’ in minimum credible deterrence, and there is no reasonable justification of credible and minimum in the recent developments. Such doctrines only exist when a country prepares for the offensive first strike targeting and pre-emption strikes, hence leading to a full scale war.


The recent BrahMos Misfire incident into the Pakistan territory indicates the weak command and control structure of India. This is signaling as it indicates India’s poor handling of such sensitive technology. This irresponsible behavior of India needs to be changed as it could result in disastrous consequences. Pakistan has always made efforts for restoring regional peace and stability, which India has always tried to destabilize due to its immature ruling authority. The political elite has always used the aggressive war-prone card against Pakistan in front of public for their political gains, without realizing the repercussions, which shows the ill-mindset of India’s ruling power. Moreover, the world has seen numerous instances of Uranium theft in India, which indicates weak safety and security protocols and weak Command and Control structure in India to handle such precarious technology.


The Indian obsession of acquisition of newer technology could result in the accidental or inadvertent war in South Asia, provided its unproven capability to manage it and war-prone behavior. This shows India being an irresponsible nuclear weapon state and the international community should look into this child state that is incompetent to take-up with nuclear and nuclear-related technology and delivery vehicles, and is thus a threat to the regional and global peace and security.

India doesn’t have any security concern for which it is going for the acquisition of hypersonic weapons or change in doctrine. It doesn’t have any potent threat from the neighboring countries to go for such ventures; hence, the drive is totally out of the prestige factor, as India wants to come at par with US, Russia and China in leading world technologies, without realizing the effect of such technologies on the regional stability. India needs to withdraw its hegemonic ambitions if the stability and regional peace is required or if the arms race needs to be withheld. As a responsible nuclear weapon state, Pakistan always maintains a modest nuclear posture, and any military development is the part of strategic chain in the south Asia, and or because of its allies.

Amber Afreen Abid
Amber Afreen Abid is a Research Officer at Strategic Vision Institute (SVI), Islamabad. She holds an M.Phil degree in Strategic Studies from National Defence University (NDU), Islamabad.

 

[Housecarl]

Hummm......I wonder if that includes "dual key" arrangements?

Posted for fair use.....

Australia Foreign Minister Stresses AUKUS Will Not Create Nuclear Weapons

“… We are talking about nuclear propulsion, not nuclear weapons,” Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong said Tuesday.

thediplomat.com

ASIA DEFENSE | SECURITY | OCEANIA
Australia Foreign Minister Stresses AUKUS Will Not Create Nuclear Weapons
“… We are talking about nuclear propulsion, not nuclear weapons,” Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong said Tuesday.
By Associated Press
June 29, 2022

Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong stressed Tuesday that her country’s security pact with the U.K. and the U.S. will not create nuclear weapons, and said she hoped concerns that it may spark a regional arms race would dissipate over time.

“We are not a nuclear power. There are nuclear powers in this region, but Australia is not one of them,” Wong told a news conference after meeting with her Malaysian counterpart, Saifuddin Abdullah.

Under the agreement, called AUKUS, Australia is to acquire nuclear-powered submarines. Some countries in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, including Malaysia, fear the pact could escalate tensions in hot spots such as the disputed South China Sea, much of which is claimed by China, and have warned the pact will threaten regional stability.

“We remain very clear that we do not seek, nor would we ever seek to arm, (to) have any nuclear capability on our submarines,” she said. “I think sometimes people hear the word ‘nuclear,’ and I understand there’s a response to that, (but) we are talking about nuclear propulsion, not nuclear weapons.”

Malaysian Prime Minister Ismail Sabri has said his government rejects any alliances that share nuclear weapons or related technology.

“We are worried that some other major economies will take advantage of AUKUS,” he said in an interview with Japan’s Nikkei newspaper in May. “For example, if China wants to help North Korea purchase nuclear-powered submarines, we can’t say no because AUKUS has set a precedent.”

Wong said Australia’s new government, sworn in on June 1, is committed to ensuring the region is peaceful, stable and prosperous. “And importantly, a region where rules enable some predictability to state behavior and to the way in which disputes would be dealt with,” she said.

Wong said she explained Australia’s stance to Saifuddin and to her counterparts in Vietnam and Indonesia during visits there. “We hope that over time, you know, people’s concerns will be able to be allayed,” she said.

But Saifuddin said Malaysia’s position remains the same.

“Malaysia highly values the regional peace and security of the ASEAN region, and we want to maintain the South China Sea in particular and the region itself as a region of peace, of commerce, of prosperity,” he said at the same news conference.

Wong is traveling next to Kota Kinabalu, the capital of eastern Sabah state on Borneo island. Wong, who has a Malaysian father, has said she is looking forward to visiting her birth city, where she spent her early years.

 

[jward]

A Strategic Win-Win

Finland and Sweden joining NATO will strengthen the position of the countries, as well as the transatlantic alliance and European security.

Heinrich Brauss

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picture alliance / TT NEWS AGENCY | Anders Wiklund/TT

Current issue
Spring 2022 Issue: Putin’s War

Issue #2/2022 - April

On May 18, 2022, Finland and Sweden submitted their official letters of application to join NATO to Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg. This event marked a complete failure of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s strategy vis-à-vis the transatlantic alliance. Putin’s aim has been to weaken NATO; instead, it will be significantly strengthened. His objective has been to make NATO militarily withdraw from Central and Eastern Europe; now, it is even extending to the whole of Northern Europe. His intention has been constantly to destabilize NATO; now, it is consolidating further.

For many years, both Finland and Sweden were pursuing a policy of military non-alignment in the belief that this would serve their security best. Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, a sovereign, democratic, and peaceful neighbor, has now caused both countries to seek security inside NATO rather than outside, where NATO’s Article 5 collective defense guarantee does not apply.
This historic move is another proof of the validity of NATO’s Open Door policy: It is these two sovereign countries that have decided to join the alliance on their own accord and are making use of their right enshrined in the 1990 Charta of Paris for a New Europe to choose their own security arrangements. They once more put the lie to Putin’s and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s false assertions by showing that NATO membership is not imposed on any nation. And that NATO does not enlarge in order to threaten Russia. Rather, Finland and Sweden are seeking shelter from a potential Russian aggression that can no longer be discounted in light of Putin’s assault on Ukraine and his strategic goals.

Strategic Implications
Putin has torn apart the Euro-Atlantic security order that had emerged since 1990. As a consequence, NATO is further substantially strengthening its deterrence and defense posture. Finland and Sweden’s membership will add a qualitatively new element to that—by furthering the political and military coherence of the Nordic-Baltic region and contributing a broad spectrum of advanced, multi-domain military capabilities.

Both countries are longstanding NATO partners that have exercised and cooperated with NATO forces and applied NATO standards. Since 2014, when Russia annexed the Crimean Peninsula and supported the separatist insurgency in Ukraine’s Donbass region, they have become NATO’s closest partners. There was hardly a meeting of NATO’s foreign and defense ministers without a session in the so-called NATO-plus-two format, where the allies and their Nordic partners consulted on Russia’s strategy and coordinated their responses. In sum, there has already been a high level of common understanding on the security challenges posed to NATO in the Nordic-Baltic region, which will now be fully brought to bear.
Once Finland and Sweden join NATO, the whole Nordic-Baltic region, seen from a geostrategic angle, will become a coherent operational theater that will to a large extent be under NATO’s control. With the exception of the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad and the Saint Petersburg area, all Baltic Sea littoral states will be NATO allies. The Baltic Sea will effectively become a NATO mare nostrum. This will lead to increased mutual information and intelligence sharing, joint planning, effective coordination of military activities, and preparation of collective defense. All of this should result in a joint strategic vision of security for the whole Nordic-Baltic region, with Finland and Sweden becoming key security providers.

Military Capabilities
Both Sweden and Finland bring more financial and military assets to the table than many of the allies that acceded NATO in previous rounds of enlargement. Both have modern ground, air, and naval forces and capabilities, and vibrant defense industrial bases. While participating in quite a number of NATO and EU crisis response missions, both countries have, contrary to most other European states, continued to focus on territorial defense even after the end of the Cold War.
Both countries have modern ground, maritime, and air forces and air defense systems. Sweden’s navy comprises, inter alia, a large number of stealth corvettes for coastal defense, sub-marines, and logistic support ships. Some capabilities could supplement NATO’s Standing Maritime Group 1 that patrols in the North Atlantic, North Sea, and Baltic Sea, thus ensuring continuous maritime awareness in that large area. Finland, for its part, shares a 1,340-kilometer-long border with Russia and has always focused on preparing defense against Russia. It is based on mechanized ground forces and one of the largest artilleries in Europe.

Finland also excels in comprehensive intelligence and analysis of Russia, advanced cyber-defense capabilities, as well as procuring the most modern F-35 combat aircraft. While Sweden relaunched conscription in 2017, Finland has maintained it all the time. As a consequence, Finland is able to mobilize reserves of up to 280,000 troops, and in the case of an emergency up to some 900,000. Finland also hosts the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, which offers special expertise to NATO allies and EU member states on how to improve resilience against Russia’s hybrid warfare.
As a result, NATO’s conventional defense and deterrence by denial capabilities in the Nordic-Baltic region will considerably increase, which in turn will also greatly benefit Finland and Sweden’s security. Finland could become the stronghold of conventional defense of the northeastern part of NATO’s territory, while Sweden will play a key role in attaining sea control by NATO in crisis and conflict, with Gotland as an “unsinkable aircraft carrier.” Together with the Finnish and German navy, it is able to confront Russia’s Baltic fleet and its Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) capability in Kaliningrad with a significant risk.
Hence, both new members will contribute to facilitating the reinforcement of, and bringing in supplies for, the Baltic states by sea and air. The defense of the Baltic region, which otherwise is only connected to NATO territory by land through the narrow Suwałki corridor, will thus get the necessary strategic depth. Hence, Finland and Sweden’s accession will lead to greater NATO air and maritime presence in the Baltic, and Finland will be able to effectively contribute to air defense of the Baltic region.

NATO’s Center of Gravity Shifting?
Sweden and Finland’s accession will likely have implications that go beyond the Nordic-Baltic region proper. It will also connect NATO with the High North. The effect of global warming will likely open up access to natural resources believed to lie below the seabed, as well as an all-year northern sea passage between East Asia and Europe. As a consequence, there is a growing risk that the High North will soon become a contested region between Russia, China (as a self-declared “Near-Arctic State”), and the West.
Russia has been increasing its military presence in the region and expanding its “bastion defense” away down to the Norwegian Sea and the North Atlantic. This has significant implications for NATO’s security, including for the defense of (northern) Norway that is dependent on reinforcement by sea, especially from America, but will in future also be connected to reinforcement by land and air via Sweden and Finland.

Against this background, Sweden and Finland will join Norway in seeking to draw NATO’s strategic attention to the High North and use their political and military leverage to ensure that the Arctic will become a subject of regular consultation and operational planning leading to enhanced maritime and aerial presence. As this could imply that NATO’s focus shifts further to the north, care must be taken to ensure that NATO maintains its so-called 360-degree approach to security that is vital for the cohesion and solidarity of the alliance in its entirety. Collective defense applies to all allies and is directed against all threats from all directions. Sweden and Finland would be well-advised to actively contribute to the relevant planning, exercises, and missions, if needed.
Germany, in turn, as a key European ally located at the center of Europe is nowadays focusing on defense and the reinforcement of its Eastern allies with ground forces. As a Baltic Sea littoral state, however, it will also have to fully engage in joint planning and exercises for, and preparation of, collective defense of the entire Nordic-Baltic region on the ground, at sea, and in the air. It might even be asked to assume the function of, and provide for, a Maritime Component Command in charge of the Baltic Sea, contingent on future NATO planning.

Enhancing European Strategic Responsibility
In light of Russia’s aggression, the United States has significantly enhanced its military presence in Europe. It still provides the majority of the strategic enabling capabilities NATO needs. But for the US, it is China that is the most challenging opponent, a full-spectrum strategic rival. The US is thus shifting its strategic focus to the Indo-Pacific and will designate military forces accordingly.

The Europeans must therefore take on their full share when it comes to ensuring Europe’s security. They must afford a much larger portion of full-spectrum, interoperable high-end forces and capabilities, including major multinational units, for deterrence and defense against Russia, military crisis management in the south, and assisting the US in protecting freedom of navigation. It is against this background that Germany took the decision to launch a fund of €100 billion for the German Armed Forces to attain full combat readiness as well as to ensure the continuous fulfilment of its NATO Capability Targets, which is vital for NATO’s effectiveness. Equally, Finland and Sweden’s militaries will contribute greatly to strengthening the European pillar of NATO.

European allies’ forces and capabilities also essentially generate the EU’s military ability to act on its own. With Finland and Sweden’s accession, the number of nations that are members of both organizations is increasing to 23. They all have only one set of forces and capabilities to be used for the whole mission spectrum, i.e., low-end peacekeeping and high-end defense alike. Relevant NATO and EU staffs should therefore systematically work together to ensure that capability development in both organizations is complementary, resulting in coherent force requirements. And the EU should also use its means such as the European Defense Fund to contribute to developing the technologically-advanced capabilities required to protect Europe, such as air and missile defense and long-range precision strike weapons. Finland and Sweden should actively advocate such an approach.

What Next?
NATO’s new Strategic Concept, to be approved by the Heads of State and Government at their meeting in Madrid at the end of June, leads the way for NATO’s adaptation to a fundamentally changed security environment on a regional and global scale up to 2030 and beyond. The alliance is now working to implement its comprehensive strategic plan for deterrence and defense across NATO’s whole area of responsibility. Finland and Sweden will now be incorporated into that planning. It remains to be seen what exactly that entails in terms of potentially establishing NATO forces and military infrastructure on the territory of these allies-to-be. As things stand, the credibility of NATO’s strategy does not require the deployment of nuclear weapons there.

Moscow’s response to Sweden’s and Finland’s decision to join NATO has been mixed—ranging from announcing “retaliatory steps” to be taken, e.g., by stationing additional forces or (dual-capable) Iskander missiles in the Baltic region, to Putin’s comments that have so far been relatively muted (“no threat”). It is doubtful, in view of the high costs involved in the war against Ukraine, whether Russia can afford any additional deployments in the Baltic region, especially since they would not have any bearing on the effectiveness of NATO’s strategy.
The biggest challenge posed to NATO currently is convincing Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to agree to Finland’s and Sweden’s accession. He has contended that they harbor members of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) that the EU, the US and others consider a terrorist organization. Both Sweden and Finland have rejected this claim. The majority of the Turkish populations supports Erdogan’s policy of weakening and fighting the PKK, wherever possible. But by upholding his veto, Erdogan himself would do great harm to Turkey, as it is increasingly exposed to pressure from Russia in the Black Sea region and beyond and needs NATO’s and the United States’ support.

Heinrich Brauss is a retired lieutenant general in the German Armed Forces. He was NATO Assistant Secretary General for Defense Policy and Planning from October 2013 to July 2018.

A Strategic Win-Win | Internationale Politik Quarterly

Finland and Sweden joining NATO will strengthen the position of the countries, as well as the transatlantic alliance and European security.

ip-quarterly.com

 

[jward]

US Hypersonic Missile Fails in Test in Fresh Setback for Program
Jon Herskovitz, Anthony Capaccio

3-4 minutes


A flight test of a hypersonic missile system in Hawaii ended in failure due to a problem that took place after ignition, the Department of Defense said, delivering a fresh blow to a program that has suffered stumbles.
It didn’t provide further details of what took place in the Wednesday test, but said in a statement sent by email “the Department remains confident that it is on track to field offensive and defensive hypersonic capabilities on target dates beginning in the early 2020s.”

“An anomaly occurred following ignition of the test asset,” Pentagon spokesman Navy Lieutenant Commander Tim Gorman said in the statement.
“Program officials have initiated a review to determine the cause to inform future tests.” he said. “While the Department was unable to collect data on the entirety of the planned flight profile, the information gathered from this event will provide vital insights.”
The trial marked the second unsuccessful test flight of the prototype weapon known as Conventional Prompt Strike. There was a booster failure in its first flight test in October, which prevented the missile from leaving the launch pad. The Conventional Prompt Strike weapon is envisioned to be installed on Zumwalt destroyers and Virginia-class submarines.

The Army is developing a land-based version. Lockheed Martin Corp and Northrop Grumman Corp are the top contractors.
The Pentagon is feeling pressure to deploy hypersonic systems as rivals including Russia, China and North Korea are pressing ahead with the systems designed to evade interception by flying at more than five times the speed of sound and gliding on a maneuverable path to deliver nuclear warheads.
China is investing heavily in hypersonic weapons, putting one in orbit in July of last year that flew 25,000 miles (40,000 kilometers) in more than 100 minutes of flight, according to the top US nuclear commander. In January, North Korea conducted two separate launches of hypersonic missile systems that traveled several hundred kilometers.

For more:
Hypersonic Weapons -- Who Has Them and Why It Matters: QuickTake Hypersonic Sticker Shock: U.S. Weapons May Run $106 Million Each Hypersonic-Missile Delay Puts U.S. Further Behind Russia, China Kim Jong Un’s Hypersonic Missiles Show He Can Hit U.S. Back

Russia debuted a hypersonic air-to-ground missile in its attack on Ukraine. Adversaries don’t have to meet the rigorous standards set under the US defense acquisition system or face public scrutiny over delays and failure.

The slower pace of US hypersonic programs prompted a number of heated exchanges when Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin testified in April before the House Armed Services Committee.
“You recently called in the defense industrial community that were involved in the hypersonics development as to how we can speed that up,” Republican Representative Mike Turner of Ohio said. “We’re behind our adversaries.”
Without denying that, Austin said “we have to be careful” because “hypersonic is a capability, sir, but it’s not the only capability.” He added “I have engaged industry” to “make sure that they’re leaning into” hypersonic development.
— With assistance by Max Zimmerman

US Hypersonic Missile Fails in Test in Fresh Setback for Program

A flight test of a hypersonic missile system in Hawaii ended in failure due to a problem that took place after ignition, the Department of Defense said, delivering a fresh blow to a program that has suffered stumbles.

www.bloomberg.com

 

[jward]

PLA missile interceptor test seen as response to warning from Taipei

• Beijing focused on improving China’s strategic defences rather than building up nuclear arsenal, researcher says
• Interception point said to have been moved closer to Taiwan to ensure it attracted the attention of island’s authorities

Minnie Chan
Published: 10:00pm, 2 Jul, 2022

China is testing land-based mid-course anti-ballistic missile technology. Photo: Weibo

The People’s Liberation Army’s latest test of a ground-based system designed to intercept ballistic missiles indicates China has narrowed the gap in midcourse interceptor technology with the United States and enhanced its strategic deterrence ability, analysts said.
China’s defence ministry announced that the PLA had successfully conducted the sixth test of its land-based anti-ballistic-missile system on June 19 within the country’s borders, said Zhou Chenming, a researcher at the Beijing-based Yuan Wang military science and technology institute.
He said the move indicated Beijing was willing to invest more on missile defence technology similar to the US Ground-based Midcourse Defence (GMD) system, rather than increasing its nuclear arsenal.
“Developing GMD is the most complicated, difficult and costly way to raise the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons, and so far just the US and China are capable of doing that,” Zhou said, adding that China’s ground-based interceptor technology was based on mature US technology and used an intercontinental ballistic missile fitted with a kinetic kill vehicle as the interceptor.

He said China would not drastically increase its arsenal of strategic nuclear warheads to several thousand, as some foreign analysts had speculated, but would focus on developing a comprehensive network of missile-defence systems to protect its infrastructure in the event of a conflict.

Footage reportedly shows test of China’s missile interceptor
While China insists it will never be the first to use nuclear weapons in any conflict, Zhao Tong, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said Beijing would continue to develop a certain number of nuclear warheads to strengthen its capability to hit back after any first strike.

It would be complicated and costly to set up a comprehensive ground-based midcourse anti-ballistic-missile network to cover all of China’s territory, but Beijing could choose to install such systems in some areas where strategic risks are high, Zhao said, pointing to the borders with India and North Korea, as well as the Taiwan Strait.
“China’s improvement of GMD technology has both political and tactical significance, as it will not only upgrade its nuclear deterrence, but also enhance both of its offensive and defensive capabilities in conventional wars,” he said.

“China is facing nuclear threats from India and North Korea, as both are nuclear-armed states, with its border disputes with India and Pyongyang’s intensive missile tests reminding the Chinese leadership that a crisis could happen at any time.”

02:37

North Korea may be preparing for its first nuclear test in 5 years


North Korea may be preparing for its first nuclear test in 5 years
Both India and North Korea have deployed ballistic missiles with ranges of up to 5,000km (3,106 miles), covering all of China.

According to Taiwanese media reports, the speaker of Taiwan’s legislature, You Si-kun, used a speech at an online conference on June 12 to warn the leadership in Beijing to “think twice” before planning to invade Taiwan, saying the self-ruled island’s indigenously developed Yun Feng medium-range supersonic missile could hit Beijing.

Beijing considers Taiwan a renegade province that should be brought into its fold – by force if necessary.
Lu Li-shih, a former instructor at Taiwan’s Naval Academy in Kaohsiung, said the timing of the PLA’s midcourse interceptor test was aimed at responding to You’s “warning”, with the interception moved from airspace above the Xinjiang Uygur autonomous region to a point closer to Taiwan to ensure the island’s authorities noticed it.

“[The mainland] issued a news release to announce the successful test, while a notice to airmen showed the interception had taken place in airspace over Qinghai province’s Gyaring Lake, when a missile was launched from the Taiyuan Space Centre [in Shanxi province] flying towards the southwest and was knocked down by an interceptor fired from the PLA’s Korla Missile Test Complex in Xinjiang,” Lu said.
“The demonstration was aimed at letting the long-range early warning radar systems about 2,530km to the southeast in Leshan [in Hsinchu county, Taiwan] detect it.”
The US Air Force upgraded the radar surveillance system on Leshan Mountain in 2013, extending its range to over 3,000km.

Zhou said Beijing’s space programme, including its lunar exploration missions, had helped China further develop and upgrade its multiple independent re-entry vehicles, making its own ballistic missiles more difficult to intercept.
“China doesn’t need to drastically increase its nuclear stockpile, but will continue upgrading missile technology,” he said.


US, China, Russia, Britain and France pledge to only use nuclear weapons for defence
As the world’s third-largest nuclear power after Russia and the US, China’s nuclear development was highlighted in the Pentagon’s annual report about China’s military in November, which said the country would have up to 700 deliverable nuclear warheads by 2027 and at least 1,000 by 2030.

Viewed alongside satellite images showing the construction of at least 250 new missile silos in northwestern China late last year, the Pentagon estimated that Beijing had a total nuclear warhead stockpile in the low 200s and projected it would at least double over the next decade.
The US currently has more than 3,700 nuclear weapons, while Russia is estimated to have over 4,500, with 3,500 in reserve, according to an assessment published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.
In January, the world’s five leading nuclear powers, the US, Russia, China, Britain and France, released a joint statement reaffirming that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought”.

Videos available at source
Posted for fair use

PLA missile interceptor test seen as response to warning from Taipei

Beijing focused on improving China’s strategic defences rather than building up nuclear arsenal, researcher says.

www.scmp.com

 

[jward]

THE UNITED STATES NUCLEAR
WEAPON PROG.RAM:
ASUMMARYHISTORY

..69 is a tad too much to handle, but you can find everything here:

https://www.osti.gov/opennet/servlets/purl/16086116.pdf

 

[jward]

Dissecting the New Cold War’s rival blocs
Richard Javad Heydarian

9-12 minutes




The United States and China corralled their allies for major summits in recent days, sounding an eerie echo of Cold War-era rival blocs.
On his part, US President Joseph Biden met fellow G7 leaders in Schloss Elmau in southern Germany, where they discussed shared strategic concerns over both Russia and China. Collectively, the seven leading Western nations pledged up to $600 billion to counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in the developing world.
The US president made it clear that the just-launched “Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment” initiative isn’t “aid or charity”, but instead represents a strategic investment so that developing nations see the “concrete benefits of partnering with democracies.”

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen echoed Washington’s ideological line by arguing that the new initiative shows how “Democracies, when they work together, provide the single best path to deliver results for our people and people all over the world.”
On the other side of the divide, China hosted a virtual summit of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) nations, where President Xi Jinping pledged massive investment in South-South Cooperation and called on fellow emerging powers to “support each other on issues concerning core interests” and “reject hegemony, bullying and division.”
In a thinly-veiled swipe at Western powers, Xi criticized “attempt to expand military alliances to seek absolute security, stoke bloc-based confrontation by coercing other countries into picking sides, and pursue unilateral dominance at the expense of others’ rights and interests.”

In a more than 7,300-word joint statement, the so-called Beijing Declaration, the BRICS powers effectively called for a new global order that better reflects the interests of emerging nations.
Facing a barrage of sanctions over its invasion of Ukraine, Russia embraced the event as an opportunity to push back against the West and, accordingly, welcomed the potential membership of like-minded powers such as Iran to the power grouping.

China also invited as many as 13 other developing nations, including Algeria, Argentina, Egypt, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Ethiopia, Malaysia and Thailand to BRICS-related events in a bid to project a united front against the West.
On closer examination, however, it’s clear that the G7 grouping isn’t as relevant or powerful as it used to be, nor is the BRICS a coherent and unified power bloc.
By and large, European nations are divided over how far they’re willing to join an enfeebled America against a resurgent China while emerging powers such as India are mainly interested in enhancing their own voice in the existing international system.

During the previous Cold War, Washington and Moscow, both in possession of thousands of nuclear warheads, rarely competed directly but instead used proxies in the post-colonial world and rival blocs, namely the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact.
The collapse of the Soviet Union, however, ushered in what conservative pundit Charles Krauthammer described as “the unipolar moment”, where “[t]he center of world power is the unchallenged superpower, the United States, attended by its Western allies.”
Academic Francis Fukuyama went a step further by arguing that geopolitics had arrived at “The End of History”, namely the definitive victory of capitalist democracy as the ultimate form of social organization.
It didn’t take long, however, before imperial hubris undermined America’s “hyperpower” status, especially following the George W Bush administration’s neo-conservative-driven destructive interventions in the Middle East.

In fact, the 2000s were a golden era for non-Western powers. Between 2000 and 2005, gross capital inflows into emerging markets rose by 92%, an impressive figure that underwent a five-fold increase in the next half-a-decade.
As investments poured in, and manufacturing and commodity exports boomed, emerging economies doubled their share of global gross domestic product (GDP) in just over a decade.
In recognition of the rapid re-emergence of non-Western nations, Wall Street gurus such as Goldman Sachs Asset Management’s Jim O’Neill began to talk up the so-called “BRIC” nations, namely Brazil, Russia, India, and China.
What began as a catchy phrase among investors soon turned into an actual geopolitical grouping, with Russia hosting the first BRIC Summit in 2009. Later, South Africa, another major emerging economy, was added to the grouping, which now enjoyed globe-spanning membership.

With prominent pundits such as Fareed Zakaria now speaking of a “post-American world”, G7 nations decided to team up with emerging powers to create the G20 grouping, which includes BRICS nations as well as Mexico, Turkey, Indonesia and Argentina.
G7’s fading power: From left to right, Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, US President Joe Biden, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, French President Emmanuel Macron and European Council
China, however, sensed a unique opportunity in nurturing the BRICS into a springboard for its global agenda, namely challenging American dominance of the global order.

To this end, China solidified strategic partnerships with fellow BRIC powers such as Russia and Brazil and even established the New Development Bank, formerly the BRICS Development Bank, as part of a burgeoning Beijing-backed international economic system, which also includes the BRI and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).
During the latest BRICS summit, China tried to expand the grouping by inviting 13 other leading developing nations including Algeria, Argentina, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Senegal, Malaysia and Thailand.
As Ni Lexiong, a Shanghai-based Chinese military analyst, put it, “China has tried to strengthen and expand the BRICS to help Russia, counterbalance the West and offset international pressure…”

At the BRICS business forum, Xi accused the West of “[p]politicizing, instrumentalizing and weaponizing the world economy using a dominant position in the global financial system to wantonly impose sanctions will only hurt others as well as hurting oneself, leaving people around the world suffering.”
During the High-level Dialogue on Global Development, the Chinese leader promised to upgrade the “South-South Cooperation Assistance Fund” to a “Global Development and South-South Cooperation Fund” by expanding the initiatives’ budget to $4 billion.
Just days later, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova announced that leading emerging powers such as Argentina and Iran were also interested in joining the grouping.

“While the White House was thinking about what else to turn off in the world, ban or spoil, Argentina and Iran applied to join the BRICS,” Zakharova wrote on her Telegram account. Still, BRICS powers such as India have fiercely resisted joint efforts by China and Russia to turn the grouping into an anti-Western bloc.
Ahead of the summit in Beijing, Indian officials promised to make sure that “any joint statement out of the summit is neutral and prevent attempts by China and Russia to use the summit to score a propaganda victory against the US and its allies,” according to a Bloomberg report. As a result, the final joint statement ended up extremely watered down, shunning hot button issues altogether.

Wary of China’s rise, with which it has longstanding territorial disputes, India has been adamant on maintaining robust strategic relations with the West. Meanwhile, other emerging powers such as Brazil and South Africa, which are facing huge economic troubles, are neither interested in nor have the wherewithal to confront the West.
Both India and South Africa have eagerly welcomed their inclusion in G7 Plus expanded groupings, otherwise known as G11, which also includes South Korea and Australia.
As Shi Yinhong, an academic based at Beijing’s Renmin University, argued, “The split between China and India over border tensions has left the BRICS largely a talking shop even before the Ukraine crisis when it comes to substantial cooperation rather than empty words.”

Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, US President Joe Biden and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi attend a photo session at the launch of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) in Tokyo, Japan, on May 23, 2022. Photo: Pool
He said the summit ended up “heavy on principles and slogans, but has failed to touch on or offer solutions to those dangerous flashpoints of our time.”
On the other hand, the G7, which has lost much of its global clout in recent decades, is also internally divided on the China question, with Belgian Prime Minister Alexander De Croo openly warning against “turn[ing] our backs to China the way we are turning our backs to Russia.”

As for its $600 billion infrastructure initiative, not only does it pale in comparison with China’s spreading global infrastructure footprint, but it’s unlikely to make much of a dent in the bigger scheme of things.
After all, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) estimates that developing Asia alone needs up to $26 trillion in infrastructure investment over the next decade.

Dissecting the New Cold War’s rival blocs

 

[jward]

Reentry Vehicle Test For America's New ICBM Failed Just After Launch

Emma Helfrich​

Late last night an unarmed test of the Air Force’s new Mk 21A intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) reentry vehicle quickly ended with an explosion 11 seconds after launch at Vandenberg Space Force base in California. Nobody was injured, but the failure is a setback for the LGM-35A Sentinel ICBM program that is intended to replace the aging LGM-30 Minuteman III.

According to a press release, the Minotaur II+ rocket launch was supposed to be centered around “demonstrating preliminary design concepts and relevant payload technologies in operationally realistic environments” for the U.S. Air Force’s new Mk 21A reentry vehicle engineered to be carried on the LGM-35A Sentinel ICBM. The explosion caused by the failed launch occurred at 11:01 p.m. on Wednesday, July 6. An additional release goes on to state that the debris was contained in the immediate vicinity of the launch pad, and the San Luis Obispo Tribune reported that the blast caused a fire to break out on the base which the Vandenberg Fire Department responded to and extinguished by about 1 a.m.

Minotaur II+ rocket. Department of DefenseAerial view of Vandenberg Space Force Base. Google Earth
"We always have emergency response teams on standby prior to every launch," said Col. Kris Barcomb, Space Launch Delta 30 vice commander and launch decision authority for this launch. "Safety is our priority at all times."
Northrop Grumman's LGM-35A Sentinel ICBM was previously known as Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent and is being developed to take the place of Boeing's LGM-30 Minuteman-III beginning in 2029. The Mk 21A reentry vehicle is the product of a joint development effort between the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center and Lockheed Martin that dates back to 2019.

Shown is an illustration of the LGM-35A Sentinel launch silo. U.S. Air Force illustration
"It is essential that Lockheed Martin continue our long-standing ICBM partnership with the Air Force to provide them with advanced solutions,” said John Snyder, vice president of Advanced Strategic Programs for Lockheed Martin in a 2019 press release following the contract award. “We will continue to demonstrate, through this TMRR [Technology Maturation and Risk Reduction], cutting-edge engineering to defeat rogue nation threats."

The LGM-30G Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missile. Credit: Airman 1st Class Aubree Milks/U.S. Air Force
Vandenberg SFB says that an investigative review board has been established to determine the cause of the explosion. However, The War Zone reached out to the Space Launch Delta 30 Public Affairs office to follow up, and no further details regarding the pending investigation or the potential cause of the explosion could be provided at this time. It is also worth noting that Vandenberg’s initial announcement of the test stated that it would be carried out on Thursday morning. Why it was instead conducted late Wednesday night has yet to be elucidated.

The Mk 21A will hold an improved W87-1 warhead, as opposed to the W87 thermonuclear warhead carried by its predecessors, the Mk 21. As reported by Inside Defense, Lockheed Martin is in the process of developing a second Mk 21A prototype as part of the vendor’s contract. Two flight tests were scheduled for the reentry vehicle prototypes, the first being the one that failed last night with the second slated to occur in the second quarter of the fiscal year 2023.
Whether or not the failure of last night’s launch will influence the second prototype’s test scheduled for next year is unclear at present, but The War Zone reached out to Lockheed Martin through phone and email for comment and have yet to hear back. Being that the incident is still developing, we will continue to supplement this report with any updates as they become available.
Contact the author: Emma@thewarzone.com

Reentry Vehicle Test For America's New ICBM Failed Just After Launch

The launch was intended to test the Mk21A reentry vehicle that will carry the Mk87-1 nuclear warhead on the Minuteman III ICBM's replacement.

www.thedrive.com

 

[jward]

Probably the wrong place and presentation, but struck me as rather war related; rather interesting they remember there is supposed to be a border down thattaway, n they're entrusted with it's defense...

EndGameWW3
@EndGameWW3


Interesting, who is going to be launching cruise missiles from the South toward America?


Ryan Chan 陳家翹
@ryankakiuchan

North American Aerospace Defense Command conducted latest iteration of Operation Noble Defender on June 27-30, allowing its units to confirm capabilities designed to defend the southern approach to US from simulated cruise missile threats.
@Aviation_Intel
https://navy.mil/Press-Office/N

 

[Techwreck]

Hypersonic nukes to Belarus.
Chicom and Russkie exercises in South America.

Global chess pieces moving for some reason.

 

[jward]

NATO Recognises Global Power Shift to the Indo-Pacific

Graeme Dobell


The central balance of international power this century will be set in the Indo-Pacific.
So ends a 500-year stretch of history when the central balance was made in Europe and decided by the West. The United States played the decisive role in the last century as an Atlantic power; this century it’ll be as a Pacific power.
Systemic changes don’t come any bigger.

The shift to the Indo-Pacific is an international strategy version of the way the world is turning to new sources of power to deal with climate change. This is to be a century of decarbonisation and lots of de-Westernisation.
Even a world stepping back from peak globalisation won’t slow an Indo-Pacific reality that’s turned from long-term trend to today’s fact. The power balance will be set in the place where most of the world’s people live and where most of the world’s wealth will be created.

The West will matter greatly in determining the central balance that’ll be defined in the Indo-Pacific. But as in much else, no longer will the West dominate.
The message of last month’s NATO summit was that the security of Europe and the security of Asia are joined; that’s why the leaders of Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea attended. As the first Japanese prime minister to attend a NATO summit, Fumio Kishida, observed:

[T]he security of Europe and of the Indo-Pacific is inseparable. Russian aggression against Ukraine is not a problem for Europe alone, but instead an outrageous act that undermines the very foundation of the international order …
Russian aggression against Ukraine clearly announced the end of the post–Cold War period. Attempts to unilaterally change the status quo with force in the background are ongoing in the East China Sea and South China Sea. I feel a strong sense of crisis that Ukraine may be East Asia tomorrow.

The invasion of Ukraine is the galvanising event dramatising the strategic version of tectonic change. Well before Russian President Vladimir Putin delivered war, the end of the old order had shaken everyone’s grand strategy, including Australia’s.
The international rules-based order is under attack by Russia, backed by China. And China is the state that shifts the system. When the rules are broken, the response turns to power. And in the system of states, that’s all about seeking a balance of power. Europe must join the Indo-Pacific in achieving that central balance.
NATO’s Madrid communiqué picked up the description of China as a systemic challenge that has been adopted by key European powers along with the US:

We are confronted by cyber, space, and hybrid and other asymmetric threats, and by the malicious use of emerging and disruptive technologies. We face systemic competition from those, including the People’s Republic of China, who challenge our interests, security, and values and seek to undermine the rules-based international order.

The heads of Britain’s MI5 and the US’s FBI chime in predicting ‘a strategic contest across decades’ with China.
The reality of global power shifting to Asia has been an economic megatrend for many decades, as Japan lifted off in the 1960s and ’70s and Deng Xiaoping lit China’s rocket in 1978.
Offering more precision than history usually grants for megatrends, here’s the moment when the central balance started to shift from the Euro-Atlantic to the Indo-Pacific (or, as it was called at the time, the Asia–Pacific).
Date that transfer moment to midnight on 30 June 1997. On that night of monsoonal storms and choreographed drama, colonial rule came to an end in Hong Kong. Chinese troops standing like statues in the lashing rain rode across the border in the backs of open trucks as Hong Kong’s last governor sailed out of the harbour on the final voyage of Britain’s royal yacht.

Use June 1997 as a final-curtain moment for the European/Western ascendancy in Asia that lasted precisely 500 years. The half a millennium started in July 1497, when Vasco da Gama left Portugal to become the first European to sail around the Cape of Good Hope and reach India.
The Western power that da Gama presaged was part of the geopolitical zeitgeist on that stormy night in Hong Kong as China proclaimed the end of a humiliation. I used that thought in a book on Australian foreign policy a few years later: ‘Asia was at the end of the Vasco da Gama era. The symbolism was exquisitely encapsulated—Asia had suffered five centuries of Western intrusion and command, and Hong Kong’s handover marked the final page.’
A far deeper and still relevant discussion of the end of the da Gama era was offered by one of Australia’s great strategists, Coral Bell, in 2007.

Bell described ‘a landscape with giants: six obvious great powers (the United States, the European Union, China, India, Russia and Japan), but also several formidable emerging powers that are important enough, strategically or economically, to affect the relationships among the great powers’.
Noting the end of ‘the moment of unchallenged US paramountcy’—the unipolar moment she dated from 1991 to September 2001—Bell considered ‘the historically more familiar shape of a multipolar world, a world moreover in which power is more widely distributed than it has been for the past two centuries’. The most important change was ‘the end of Western ascendancy over the non-Western world’.

If the world got lucky, Bell mused, it might achieve a new concert of power for the 21st century based on the basic building blocks of rules (‘deals must be kept’) and sovereignty (‘the ruler gets to make the rules in their own domain’).
If luck soured, Bell wrote, the world faced ‘an inescapable clash of norms, which may for the foreseeable future always limit the level of consensus among governments’.
Russia’s war on Ukraine is a monumental trashing of norms. And China’s support for Russia kills the chances of concert or consensus, even though Beijing’s ‘no limits’ pact with Putin is shifting towards a ‘limited liability’ partnership because Russia becomes such a liability.
Instead of norms, we must seek power balance. And the central balance must be in the Indo-Pacific because that is the centre of the system.

In a vivid Washingtonian turn of phrase, Russia is ‘the hurricane’ coming fast and hard, while China is ‘climate change: long, slow, pervasive’.

In the Indo-Pacific, the great game is in full swing and NATO must come to play.

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2022/07/11/nato_recognises_global_power_shift_to_the_indo-pacific_841736.html

 

[jward]

Thomas NewdickView thomas newdick's Articles
CombatAir




The U.S. Air Force has received a high-energy laser weapon that can be carried by aircraft in podded form. The news came today when Lockheed Martin disclosed that at least one of the weapons, which it developed, has been delivered to the Air Force for test work. This effort falls within the wider framework of still-evolving plans to have laser-armed fighter jets that can engage enemy missiles, and possibly other targets too.

A report today from Breaking Defense confirmed that Lockheed Martin delivered its LANCE high-energy laser weapon to the Air Force in February this year. In this context, LANCE stands for “Laser Advancements for Next-generation Compact Environments.” The recipient for the new weapon is the Air Force Research Laboratory, or AFRL, which is charged with developing and integrating new technologies in the air, space, and cyberspace realms.
Tyler Griffin, a Lockheed executive, had previously told reporters that LANCE “is the smallest, lightest, high-energy laser of its power class that Lockheed Martin has built to date.”
Indeed, Griffin added that LANCE is “one-sixth the size” of a previous directed-energy weapon that Lockheed produced for the Army. That earlier laser was part of the Robust Electric Laser Initiative program and had an output in the 60-kilowatt class. We don’t yet know what kind of power LANCE can produce although there have been suggestions it will likely be below 100 kilowatts.


As well as being notably small and light, LANCE has reduced power requirements compared to other previous weapons, a key consideration for a fighter-based laser, especially one that can be mounted within the confines of a pod.
If successful in its defensive mission, it’s feasible that LANCE could go on to inform the development of more offensive-oriented laser weapons, including ones that could engage enemy aircraft and drones at longer ranges than would be the case when targeting a fast-approaching anti-aircraft missile, whether launched from the ground or from an enemy aircraft.
LANCE has been developed under a November 2017 contract that’s part of the Air Force’s wider Self-protect High Energy Laser Demonstrator, or SHiELD, program, something that we have written about in the past.
SHiELD is a collaborative effort that brings together Lockheed Martin, Boeing, and Northrop Grumman. While Lockheed Martin provides the actual laser weapon, in the form of LANCE, Boeing produces the pod that carries it, and Northrop Grumman is responsible for the beam control system that puts the laser onto its target — and then keeps it there.

Kent Wood, acting director of AFRL’s directed energy directorate, told Breaking Defense that the various SHiELD subsystems “represent the most compact and capable laser weapon technologies delivered to date.”
Wood’s statement also indicated that actual test work by AFRL is still at an early stage, referring to “mission utility analyses and wargaming studies” that are being undertaken currently. “Specific targets for future tests and demonstrations will be determined by the results of these studies as well,” he said.
Meanwhile, Lockheed’s Tyler Griffin added that the next stage in the program would see LANCE integrated with a thermal system to manage heating and cooling.

At his stage, we don’t know exactly what aircraft LANCE is intended to equip, once it progresses to flight tests and, hopefully, airborne firing trials. However, Griffin said that “a variety of potential applications and platforms are being considered for potential demonstrations and tests.”
Previous Lockheed Martin concept art has shown the pod carried by an F-16 fighter jet. And, while SHiELD is initially concerned with proving the potential for active defense of fighter jets in high-risk environments, officials have also talked of the possibility of adapting the same technology for larger, slower-moving combat and combat support aircraft, too.


Boeing flew a pre-prototype pod shape — without its internal subsystems — aboard an Air Force F-15 fighter in 2019. During ground tests, meanwhile, a representative laser, known as the Demonstrator Laser Weapon System (DLWS), has already successfully shot down multiple air-launched missiles over White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico, also in 2019.
A decision on the initial test platform for the complete SHiELD system will likely follow once a flight demonstration has been funded, which is currently not the case. Similarly, there is not yet a formal transition plan for how LANCE and SHiELD could evolve into an actual program of record.

As it stands, the timeline for all this work is also unclear, AFRL having told Breaking Defense it was yet to make any decisions on when airborne trials might happen.
Back in late 2017, AFRL said it planned to test a laser on a tactical fighter jet by 2021. Then, in 2020, Lockheed Martin said it was planning to have one of its lasers flying on tactical fighters by 2025.
However, the Air Force has run into some problems with these technologies, with the service announcing last year that it had pushed back the schedule for beginning flight testing of a podded laser weapon by two years to 2023. That delay was attributed both to technical difficulties and work slowdowns related to the COVID-19 pandemic.
In February last year, AFRL announced that it was about to take delivery of the Boeing pod for SHiELD and that it hoped to get the remaining components — including LANCE — by July 2021. The reason for the delay this time is not clear although, in the past, AFRL has described the technical challenges involved in getting a directed-energy laser to down a hostile supersonic missile as “tremendous.”

Members of the SHiELD program and their Boeing contractor team inspect the newly arrived SHiELD pod in February 2021. BOEING
In the meantime, Air Force pilots have already been flying simulated missions with podded airborne laser weapons in a virtual reality battlefield environment. You can read more about that wargame here, which is part of the service’s broader efforts to develop virtual testing environments for use in weapon systems development.
SHiELD is intended primarily to demonstrate the potential of a podded laser defense system, suggesting a concept that could eventually become a valuable adjunct to expendable countermeasures such as infrared flares or chaff, or electronic warfare systems.
There are disadvantages to laser defense systems, too, however, including a lack of resilience to atmospheric conditions, which could have an adverse effect on the range and power of the directed-energy beam. Then there is the ability of a laser to only engage a single target at a time, meaning that it would likely complement rather than replace existing decoys and other countermeasures once in service. The reality of what laser weapons can bring to the future battlespace of the future is something we have examined in-depth in the past.

Concept art from Lockheed Martin showing a mature high-energy laser weapon arming a sixth-generation fighter jet. Lockheed Martin
Ultimately, however, a fully mature high-energy laser weapon could actually be used for a variety of roles beyond the defense of aircraft against missiles. Potentially, it could become an offensive weapon, too, engaging hostile aircraft during within-visual-range air combat, swatting down cruise missiles, or even attacking targets on the ground.
While it’s not clear to what degree past issues with the underlying technology have been resolved, the delivery of LANCE earlier this year is clearly a major milestone toward realizing a functional fighter-based laser weapon

Please see source for photos

First Laser Weapon For A Fighter Delivered To The Air Force

The Air Force now has all the major components for its pod-mounted defensive laser weapon, paving the way for first airborne tests.

www.thedrive.com

 

[jward]

The U.S. Just Racked Up Two Successful Hypersonic Missile Tests
After some high-profile setbacks, U.S. hypersonic testing delivers some very good news.
byEmma HelfrichJul 13, 2022 11:16 PM

Emma HelfrichView emma helfrich's Articles

The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, or DARPA, says it has completed the first successful demonstration of the Operational Fires program's ground-launched hypersonic missile system capability. The announcement comes right on the heels of the U.S. Air Force disclosing a second consecutive successful test of its Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon, or ARRW, hypersonic missile booster, which took place yesterday.

A press release from DARPA today explained that the Operational Fires (OpFires) program test was executed at the U.S. Army’s White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico. The DARPA release claims that the system met all of its pre-established test objectives. This included the inaugural use of a U.S. Marine Corps 10-wheel Logistics Vehicle System Replacement (LVSR) truck as a medium-range missile launcher, as well as the demonstration of missile canister egress, stable flight capture, and use of U.S. Army inventory artillery fire control systems to initiate the test mission. All of those steps can be seen demonstrated and annotated in the video of the test included below that DARPA released with the announcement.


The test was conducted in cooperation with lead contractor Lockheed Martin. The complete system includes components from other companies, such as a rocket booster that is designed and supplied by Northrop Grumman. That very rocket booster, paired with the unpowered hypersonic boost-glide vehicle warhead fitted to the top, is then used to propel the boost-glide vehicle until it reaches the intended speed and altitude. Once the parameters are met, the vehicle detaches from the booster and glides along its atmospheric flight path on its way to engage the target at hypersonic speed. While the speed is certainly notable, so is the boost-glide vehicle's relatively level flight trajectory and its ability to maneuver significantly while flying along that path.

Diagram of an OpFires hypersonic missile launch. DARPA
The announcement made by DARPA revealed that this entire process was executed successfully during the test and that other program elements were also validated, including the first stage rocket motor, missile canister, and missile round pallet (MRP). According to the release, the implementation of a palletized launcher is meant to eliminate the need for a custom-built OpFires transporter erector launcher (TEL). This will allow the missile to be ground-launched from other suitable U.S. military trucks beyond the LVSR, which is a goal of the OpFires program. In its press release, DARPA specifically mentioned Army logistics vehicles as future launch platforms, which could include the service's Palletized Load System trucks, a design related to the Marine Corps' LSVR.

A Lockheed Martin rendering of the OpFires launcher installed on a Marine Corps LVSR truck. Lockheed Martin
“This is a promising step toward a TEL on-demand capability for accurately firing medium-range missiles from highly agile, readily available logistics trucks that are already in both the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps inventory,” said Lt. Col. Joshua Stults, the DARPA program manager for OpFires. “Our successful agile hardware development approach prioritizes full-scale flight testing that will inform further design maturation this year.”

A photo taken during the recently announced OpFires test. DARPA
It is also worth noting that the medium-range OpFires weapon is essentially one tier down from the Army's intermediate-range Dark Eagle hypersonic weapon. Dark Eagle is a longer-range ground-launched hypersonic weapon that uses also uses a boost-glide vehicle, but one with a different design from that of OpFires, as you can read more about here.
OpFires wasn't the only program to reach a hypersonic milestone, though. On July 12, the Air Force conducted the AGM-183A ARRW booster test designated as Flight-3 off the coast of Southern California, according to a press release shared by Eglin Air Force Base. The service said that this is the twelfth overall flight for the program, although the majority of these were so-called captive carry tests where the test article stayed attached to the aircraft the entire time and was never intended to be released in any way.

Lockheed Martin rendering of the ARRW on a B-52H Stratofortress. Lockheed Martin
This most recent test acts as the third release demonstration and the second successful booster test in a row to be completed by the Air Force. A previous one conducted in July 2021 was later identified as only a partial failure after the rocket booster failed to ignite and caused the missile to fall into the Pacific ocean. Beneficial data from the launch was nonetheless collected, which resulted in the Air Force regarding it as a half-success. The most recent test, however, is said to have reached hypersonic speeds and that primary and secondary objectives were met.

"This was another important milestone for the Air Force's first air-launched hypersonic weapon,” said Brig Gen. Heath Collins, program executive officer of the armament directorate. “The test successfully demonstrated booster performance expanding the operational envelope. We have now completed our booster test series and are ready to move forward to all-up-round testing later this year. Congratulations to the entire ARRW team, your dedication and expertise are what got us here."

A Lockheed Martin rendering of the ARRW missile before it detaches from the rocket booster. Lockheed Martin
Just as the other tests have been, the July 12 test was completed using an Air Force B-52H Stratofortress aircraft in order to demonstrate the weapon’s ability to launch from under the plane's wing pylon and reach sufficient speed and altitude to release a hypersonic glide vehicle. The launch additionally allowed Lockheed Martin, who is the prime contractor for the AGM-183A ARRW, to collect flight data and validate the missile’s capability to separate from the aircraft and reach its intended release point.
“ARRW is designed to provide the ability to destroy high-value, time-sensitive targets,” read the Air Force’s press release. “It will also expand precision-strike weapon systems' capabilities by enabling rapid response strikes against heavily defended land targets.”

Lockheed Martin rendering of the ARRW glide vehicle. Lockheed Martin
While successful, the recent booster test comes amid a variety of setbacks and failures that have faced the ARRW program. According to the 2022 Government Accountability Office weapons systems annual assessment, the ARRW’s rapid and aggressive prototyping effort has led to “delayed interim milestones” that have prompted the Department of Defense to consider certain timeline tradeoffs “such as reduced residual capability at the completion of the [Middle Tier of Acquisition] effort.”

This means that the two failed attempts to execute the first test in Fiscal Year 2021, along with the booster test failure that occurred in the first quarter of Fiscal Year 2022, delayed the entire program by around 11 months, according to the GAO report. Because of this setback, the Fiscal Year 2022 procurement funding for an additional 12 missiles that was requested by the ARRW program on top of the plan to initiate a new rapid fielding effort was denied through the Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2022. Instead, additional research, development, test, and evaluation funds were provided to support an extension of the testing program.
The GAO report elucidates that the Air Force’s ARRW, which was supposed to be entering production at around this time, is now scheduled for early operational capability sometime within Fiscal Year 2023. All the while DARPA claims that the OpFires program will complete an integrated system critical design review later this year.

However, despite both of the recent tests being dubbed a success, the ways in which either program will continue to progress remains to be seen given the complexities of hypersonic weapon systems. The next step for ARRW will be to actually release its glide vehicle and provide a test that is more representative of an end-to-end use of the system. Regardless, this is a big turnaround for the program, which became something of a sore spot for the Pentagon as it tries to compete with hypersonic developments in China.
We’ll see if the successful tests continue to stack up.

The U.S. Just Racked Up Two Successful Hypersonic Missile Tests

After some high-profile setbacks, U.S. hypersonic testing delivers some very good news.

www.thedrive.com

 

[Housecarl]

The U.S. Just Racked Up Two Successful Hypersonic Missile Tests
After some high-profile setbacks, U.S. hypersonic testing delivers some very good news.
byEmma HelfrichJul 13, 2022 11:16 PM

Emma HelfrichView emma helfrich's Articles

The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, or DARPA, says it has completed the first successful demonstration of the Operational Fires program's ground-launched hypersonic missile system capability. The announcement comes right on the heels of the U.S. Air Force disclosing a second consecutive successful test of its Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon, or ARRW, hypersonic missile booster, which took place yesterday.

A press release from DARPA today explained that the Operational Fires (OpFires) program test was executed at the U.S. Army’s White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico. The DARPA release claims that the system met all of its pre-established test objectives. This included the inaugural use of a U.S. Marine Corps 10-wheel Logistics Vehicle System Replacement (LVSR) truck as a medium-range missile launcher, as well as the demonstration of missile canister egress, stable flight capture, and use of U.S. Army inventory artillery fire control systems to initiate the test mission. All of those steps can be seen demonstrated and annotated in the video of the test included below that DARPA released with the announcement.


The test was conducted in cooperation with lead contractor Lockheed Martin. The complete system includes components from other companies, such as a rocket booster that is designed and supplied by Northrop Grumman. That very rocket booster, paired with the unpowered hypersonic boost-glide vehicle warhead fitted to the top, is then used to propel the boost-glide vehicle until it reaches the intended speed and altitude. Once the parameters are met, the vehicle detaches from the booster and glides along its atmospheric flight path on its way to engage the target at hypersonic speed. While the speed is certainly notable, so is the boost-glide vehicle's relatively level flight trajectory and its ability to maneuver significantly while flying along that path.

Diagram of an OpFires hypersonic missile launch. DARPA
The announcement made by DARPA revealed that this entire process was executed successfully during the test and that other program elements were also validated, including the first stage rocket motor, missile canister, and missile round pallet (MRP). According to the release, the implementation of a palletized launcher is meant to eliminate the need for a custom-built OpFires transporter erector launcher (TEL). This will allow the missile to be ground-launched from other suitable U.S. military trucks beyond the LVSR, which is a goal of the OpFires program. In its press release, DARPA specifically mentioned Army logistics vehicles as future launch platforms, which could include the service's Palletized Load System trucks, a design related to the Marine Corps' LSVR.

A Lockheed Martin rendering of the OpFires launcher installed on a Marine Corps LVSR truck. Lockheed Martin
“This is a promising step toward a TEL on-demand capability for accurately firing medium-range missiles from highly agile, readily available logistics trucks that are already in both the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps inventory,” said Lt. Col. Joshua Stults, the DARPA program manager for OpFires. “Our successful agile hardware development approach prioritizes full-scale flight testing that will inform further design maturation this year.”

A photo taken during the recently announced OpFires test. DARPA
It is also worth noting that the medium-range OpFires weapon is essentially one tier down from the Army's intermediate-range Dark Eagle hypersonic weapon. Dark Eagle is a longer-range ground-launched hypersonic weapon that uses also uses a boost-glide vehicle, but one with a different design from that of OpFires, as you can read more about here.
OpFires wasn't the only program to reach a hypersonic milestone, though. On July 12, the Air Force conducted the AGM-183A ARRW booster test designated as Flight-3 off the coast of Southern California, according to a press release shared by Eglin Air Force Base. The service said that this is the twelfth overall flight for the program, although the majority of these were so-called captive carry tests where the test article stayed attached to the aircraft the entire time and was never intended to be released in any way.

Lockheed Martin rendering of the ARRW on a B-52H Stratofortress. Lockheed Martin
This most recent test acts as the third release demonstration and the second successful booster test in a row to be completed by the Air Force. A previous one conducted in July 2021 was later identified as only a partial failure after the rocket booster failed to ignite and caused the missile to fall into the Pacific ocean. Beneficial data from the launch was nonetheless collected, which resulted in the Air Force regarding it as a half-success. The most recent test, however, is said to have reached hypersonic speeds and that primary and secondary objectives were met.

"This was another important milestone for the Air Force's first air-launched hypersonic weapon,” said Brig Gen. Heath Collins, program executive officer of the armament directorate. “The test successfully demonstrated booster performance expanding the operational envelope. We have now completed our booster test series and are ready to move forward to all-up-round testing later this year. Congratulations to the entire ARRW team, your dedication and expertise are what got us here."

A Lockheed Martin rendering of the ARRW missile before it detaches from the rocket booster. Lockheed Martin
Just as the other tests have been, the July 12 test was completed using an Air Force B-52H Stratofortress aircraft in order to demonstrate the weapon’s ability to launch from under the plane's wing pylon and reach sufficient speed and altitude to release a hypersonic glide vehicle. The launch additionally allowed Lockheed Martin, who is the prime contractor for the AGM-183A ARRW, to collect flight data and validate the missile’s capability to separate from the aircraft and reach its intended release point.
“ARRW is designed to provide the ability to destroy high-value, time-sensitive targets,” read the Air Force’s press release. “It will also expand precision-strike weapon systems' capabilities by enabling rapid response strikes against heavily defended land targets.”

Lockheed Martin rendering of the ARRW glide vehicle. Lockheed Martin
While successful, the recent booster test comes amid a variety of setbacks and failures that have faced the ARRW program. According to the 2022 Government Accountability Office weapons systems annual assessment, the ARRW’s rapid and aggressive prototyping effort has led to “delayed interim milestones” that have prompted the Department of Defense to consider certain timeline tradeoffs “such as reduced residual capability at the completion of the [Middle Tier of Acquisition] effort.”

This means that the two failed attempts to execute the first test in Fiscal Year 2021, along with the booster test failure that occurred in the first quarter of Fiscal Year 2022, delayed the entire program by around 11 months, according to the GAO report. Because of this setback, the Fiscal Year 2022 procurement funding for an additional 12 missiles that was requested by the ARRW program on top of the plan to initiate a new rapid fielding effort was denied through the Joint Explanatory Statement accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2022. Instead, additional research, development, test, and evaluation funds were provided to support an extension of the testing program.
The GAO report elucidates that the Air Force’s ARRW, which was supposed to be entering production at around this time, is now scheduled for early operational capability sometime within Fiscal Year 2023. All the while DARPA claims that the OpFires program will complete an integrated system critical design review later this year.

However, despite both of the recent tests being dubbed a success, the ways in which either program will continue to progress remains to be seen given the complexities of hypersonic weapon systems. The next step for ARRW will be to actually release its glide vehicle and provide a test that is more representative of an end-to-end use of the system. Regardless, this is a big turnaround for the program, which became something of a sore spot for the Pentagon as it tries to compete with hypersonic developments in China.
We’ll see if the successful tests continue to stack up.

The U.S. Just Racked Up Two Successful Hypersonic Missile Tests

After some high-profile setbacks, U.S. hypersonic testing delivers some very good news.

www.thedrive.com

The artist rendering of the B-52 lugging those blivets look like son of Skybolt. Talk about re-inventing the wheel....

 

[jward]

Ahead of Mali withdraw, France prepares future Sahel strategy
July 13, 20226:59 AM CDTLast Updated a day ago

4-5 minutes


E unlimited access to Reuters.com

• Summary

• French troops to leave Mali by end of summer
• Ministers head to Niger, new heartbeat of operations
• Paris consults regional partners, aim for September plan

PARIS, July 13 (Reuters) - French officials head to Niger on Friday to redefine the country's strategy to fight Islamist militants in the Sahel as thousands of troops complete a withdrawal from Mali and concerns mount over the growing threat to coastal West African states.

Coups in Mali, Chad and Burkina Faso have weakened France's alliances in its former colonies, emboldened jihadists who control large swathes of desert and scrubland, and opened the door to greater Russian influence.
Concerns have grown that the exit of 2,400 French troops from Mali - the epicentre of violence in the Sahel region and strongholds of both al Qaeda and Islamic State affiliates - is worsening violence, destabilising neighbours and spurring migration.

With the withdrawal expected to be completed by the end of the summer, France's new Foreign Minister Catherine Colonna and Defence Minister Sebastien Lecornu arrive in Niger on Friday to seal a regional redeployment.
Niger will become the hub for French troops, with some 1,000 soldiers based in the capital Niamey with fighter jets, drones and helicopters. Some 300-400 would be dispatched for special operations with Niger troops in the border regions with Burkina and Mali, French officials told reporters in a briefing.
Another 700-1,000 would be based in Chad with an undisclosed number of special forces operating elsewhere in the region. French troops will no longer carry out missions or pursue militants into Mali once the exit is complete, the officials said.

"Beyond Mali, the democratic decline in West Africa is extremely worrying with successive putsches in Mali twice, in Guinea in September 2021, in Burkina Faso in January of this year. France will nevertheless continue despite these events, this withdrawal from Mali, to help West African armies fight against terrorist groups," Colonna told a parliamentary hearing on Tuesday.

"We are currently consulting with our concerned partners to define with them, according to their requests and their needs, the nature of the support that we can provide them."
A French diplomatic source said the aim was to present a new strategy to President Emmanuel Macron in September.
French officials said the onus going forward would be on regional countries to lead on security, while also focusing more on development, good governance and education. The ministers would announce 50 million euro aid to enhance the electricity network in Niger as well as budgetary support.
A key area of concern is how and whether French and European troops will used to support countries in the coastal Gulf of Guinea nations such Benin, Togo and Ivory Coast, where there has been a rise in attacks. Al Qaeda's regional arm has said it would turn its attention to the region.

French officials said that at this stage there had been no formal request for further military assistance. Some European countries had shown an interest in continuing regional operations post Mali, the officials said.
Lecornu will travel to Ivory Coast, which also hosts French troops, on Saturday, while Macron is likely to travel to Benin at the end of July, Colonna said.

Ahead of Mali withdraw, France prepares future Sahel strategy

French officials head to Niger on Friday to redefine the country's strategy to fight Islamist militants in the Sahel as thousands of troops complete a withdrawal from Mali and concerns mount over the growing threat to coastal West African states.

www.reuters.com

 

[jward]

US floating hot-air balloons to guard against hypersonics
Gabriel Honrada




In a throwback to 19th-century aerial warfare, the US is mulling the use of hot-air balloons for hypersonic missile tracking and aerial surveillance.
Politico reported that high-altitude inflatables flying at 60,000 to 90,000 feet could supplement America’s extensive satellite surveillance network and be used to track hypersonic weapons amid growing US concerns about China and Russia’s growing arsenals of the weapon.
Pentagon documents cited in the report show that the technology is moving from the US Department of Defense’s (DoD) scientific community to the US military.
Budget documents from the last two years show that the Pentagon has spent US$3.8 million on balloon projects, with plans to spend $27.1 million in the fiscal year 2023, marking a slightly more than sevenfold increase in spending for high-altitude surveillance balloons.

In terms of specific systems, the Politico report identifies the Covert Long-Dwell Stratospheric Architecture (COLD STAR) as the balloon program that has just been transferred to the US military. However, it also notes that specific details are unavailable due to the project’s classified nature.
According to Tom Karako, a senior fellow with the Center for International and Strategic Studies (CSIS), a Washington-based think tank, “high or very high-altitude platforms have a lot of benefit for their endurance on station, maneuverability and flexibility for multiple payloads,” as quoted by Politico.
In terms of missile defense, the balloons combine the persistent presence delivered by terrestrial sensors, the wide-area coverage of airborne sensors, and the look-down angle to spot incoming cruise missiles, notes defense publication Tactical Defense Media.
While terrestrial sensors have been the backbone of missile defense since the Cold War, CSIS says they suffer from various inherent limitations.

For example, the Earth’s curvature limits their effectiveness against low-flying threats such as cruise missiles, they have a limited number due to size and cost, their fixed location and significant energy emissions make them potential targets and the loss of one terrestrial station could result in a massive gap in sensor coverage.
In contrast, CSIS notes that balloon-based sensors can detect missile threats at greater ranges compared to terrestrial ones, elevated platforms can carry multiple types of sensors, and they may be more survivable than terrestrial sensors as operators could field them in larger numbers.
These balloons also have a fraction of the cost of satellites. Military Review mentions that one high-altitude balloon has an estimated initial development and operating cost of $100,000 compared to $1.6 billion for one infrared satellite.
However, CSIS also mentions drawbacks for balloon-based sensors, including the need for a more robust and resilient network architecture and reduced sensor fidelity due to size, weight and power limitations.

The Pentagon is transitioning high-altitude balloon projects to the military services. Image: Screengrab

In addition, the US Congressional Research Service (CRS) mentions the potential vulnerability of such balloons to weather and ground fire. The source states that many US and foreign surveillance balloons have been lost in adverse weather, and there are mixed opinions about their vulnerability to enemy fire.
On the one hand, proponents say that such balloons are survivable due to their low radar cross-section (RCS) and can sustain several hits before losing altitude. On the other hand, opponents say they are big targets within the range of several enemy weapons.

Popular Mechanics describes COLD STAR as a balloon that can operate undetected in enemy airspace, featuring autonomous navigation, high fidelity sensors and onboard AI. In addition, the source says that COLD STAR’s balloon is transparent to radar while its gondola can feature stealth shaping by eliminating straight lines and corners that generate strong radar returns.
In a Politico interview, Russell Van Der Werff, engineering director at Raven Aerostar, which manufactures the COLD STAR balloons, said each balloon consists of a flight control unit powered by batteries charged by renewable solar panels. They also have a payload electronics package for flight safety, navigation and communications.
Another system that may be under consideration is the Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Elevated Netted Sensor System (JLENS), which the US DoD describes as featuring advanced sensor and networking technologies to provide persistent, 360-degree, wide-area and precision tracking of land-attack cruise missiles and other air-breathing threats. It consists of a fire control radar system and a wide-area surveillance system.

Each radar system uses a 74-meter tethered balloon, mobile mooring station, radar and communications payload, processing station and associated ground equipment.
The systems can work together or independently and are transportable by road, rail, sea and air. In addition, the JLENS can be integrated with SM-6 and Patriot missile interceptors, as noted in Missile Threat.
However, the source reports that during an October 2015 test, the JLENS fire control balloon broke from its tethers due to a failure in its automatic deflation device and high winds, resulting in the balloon floating over rural Pennsylvania, eventually landing in Moreland Township.

As a result, Politico notes that the US Army decided to drop the JLENS project after spending $2 billion in development co

US floating hot-air balloons to guard against hypersonics - Asia Times

In a throwback to 19th-century aerial warfare, the US is mulling the use of hot-air balloons for hypersonic missile tracking and aerial surveillance.

asiatimes.com

 

[jward]

New B61-12 Bomb’s Precision Unusable By Some Nuclear Strike Jets

The tail kit guidance system is a central feature of the B61-12 nuclear bomb, each one of which costs more than its weight in gold.
byJoseph TrevithickJul 14, 2022 7:34 PM







The U.S. Air Force has confirmed that there are currently no plans for U.S. Air Force or NATO F-16 Viper fighters or Germany's Panavia Tornado swing combat jets to be able to employ the forthcoming B61-12 nuclear bomb in its signature guided mode. At present, there are only requirements for the Air Force's F-15E Strike Eagle combat jets and B-2A Spirit stealth bombers, as well as the service's future B-21A Raider stealth bombers and certain American and NATO F-35 Joint Strike Fighters, to be able to make use of the weapon's precision guidance tail kit.

Information about these restrictions and other details regarding the B61-12 were contained in a redacted copy of a 2019 Department of Defense Inspector General (DODIG) audit of work on the tail kit specifically that The War Zone recently obtained via the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center (AFNWC) subsequently confirmed that the information in the report regarding which aircraft are expected to employ the B61-12 in the guided mode remains current.

Sections discussing the employment of the B61-12 in the guided and unguided modes from the 2019 DODIG report. DODIG via FOIA
"The B61-12 program threshold requirement for guided mode is on F-15E and B-2 aircraft," an AFNWC spokesperson told The War Zone. "The B61-12 program objective requirement for Dual-Capable Aircraft in guided mode is the F-35."
In this context, the term "Dual-Capable Aircraft," or DCA, refers to non-strategic platforms, such as the F-15E, F-35, F-16, and Torando, and does not include the B-2A or the forthcoming B-21A.

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cBeDSbafgQA


"When mated to the F-16, the B61-12 will operate in its unguided mode," the AFNWC spokesperson added in their statement.
The Air Force has been responsible for managing the development and acquisition of the B61-12's inertial navigation system (INS) guidance package, while the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is the lead entity for the rest of the bomb. The 12-foot-long, 825-pound B61-12, each one of which is set to literally cost more than its weight in gold, is a combination of new parts, like the tail kit, and refurbished components from earlier B61-3, -4, -7, and -10 variants. You can read more about the entire B61 family here.

An infographic providing a basic overview of how four existing B61 versions will be consolidated into B61-12 variants. Hans Kristensen/FAS
B61-12s are set to replace all of the remaining examples of those previous versions in the U.S. stockpile, including roughly 150 presently spread across six bases in Europe. This includes bombs prepositioned at facilities in Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands, which the U.S. military could make available to the air forces of those countries during a major crisis as part of a NATO nuclear sharing agreement. B61s at Incirlik Air Base in Turkey, another NATO member state, are intended for American use only. As an aside, the DODIG report notes that the B61-12 meets the requirement to fit inside and otherwise be compatible with existing secure "vaults" at these bases, as demonstrated in the picture below.

Air Force personnel fit check unarmed B61-12 "shapes" inside a secure storage system. Older B61 variants are seen loaded in the top portion of the "vault." USAF via DODIG/FOIA
So, the inability of certain aircraft, especially F-16s and Tornados belonging to the Belgian, German, Italian, and Dutch air forces, to make use of the B61-12 in its guided mode is notable. It was previously disclosed that older NATO F-16s, as well as Germany's Tornados, did not have the appropriate mission systems to make use of the bomb's guidance system in their existing configuration, but it was not entirely clear whether or not there was an expectation that those DCA jets would be upgraded as part of the integration process.

The tail kit is an absolutely central feature of the B61-12 bomb, with the 2019 DODIG report stressing that "the addition of the tail kit assembly increases the bomb's accuracy, allowing for a reduction In its nuclear explosive power." At the same time, it is important to note that accuracy is relative when discussing nuclear weapons, even ones with lower yields.
The B61-12, along with all of the B61 variants it is set to replace, have so "dial-a-yield" capabilities that allow them to be set to detonate with different degrees of explosive force. The B61-12 is expected to have settings for 0.3, 1.5, 10, or 50 kilotons, according to the Federation of American Scientists think tank. This maximum yield setting is lower than the ones understood to be found on the B61-3, -7, and -10 variants (170, 340, and 80 kilotons, respectively), but is actually higher than the reported top option on the B61-4 (45 kilotons).

Beyond that, the years-long delays in the start of the delivery of the new B61-12s, the first production example of which was completed last year, and the time it will now take for the first bombs to be deemed operational, may ultimately render the guidance restriction issue moot. Italy and the Netherlands already operate F-35s, at least some of which could very well eventually be modified to serve in the DCA role. Belgium announced in 2018 that it would buy 34 F-35s, with the first of its jets scheduled to be delivered next year. While there are still some political formalities to clear, Germany is widely expected to go ahead with its own purchase of these stealthy jets, with deliveries starting before 2030.

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q3GYfY9ERWo


Whatever happens in the end, it only seems increasingly likely that U.S. and NATO F-16s, not to mention Germany's Tornados, will never be in a position to employ the B61-12 to the full extent of its very expensive capabilities.
Contact the author: joe@thedrive.com

New B61-12 Bomb's Precision Unusable By Some Nuclear Strike Jets

The tail kit guidance system is a central feature of the B61-12 nuclear bomb, each one of which costs more than its weight in gold.

www.thedrive.com

 

[jward]

CJNG Sicarios Behead Three Pajaros Sierra Gunmen



By Sol Prendido 7/12/2022 10:23:00 PM 49 comments
"Sol Prendido" for Borderland Beat

Several enforcers from the Jalisco New Generation Cartel have appeared in a recently released video online. Three condemned Pájaros Sierra gunmen find themselves kneeling down before them in daylight hours.
A right handed assassin is holding what appears to be a seven inch knife in his palm. The doomed captive’s beheading begins thirteen seconds after this film commences. His pained groans can be heard loud and clear as his head is being removed.

Enslaved male number two is bowing down with his head as low as possible to the ground with clear regret for having been captured. As the execution is happening he falls over on his left side in total defeat and anguish.
The third Pájaros Sierra man is on his knees in complete silence awaiting his turn.
Warning: Graphic Videos

Video translation is as follows:
Sicario #1: We are the absolute 4 letters cartel. And this will be the fate of every Pájaros Sierra bitch. You sons of bitches we’re coming after you Chaparro, Paya, and Viejon.
Sicario #2: We have your men here. Help hold him down, help hold him down, help hold him down. Grab his hand from behind. No, no. Just pull him back with his hand. Pull him back with just his hand. Pull him back, pull him back for leverage. Have you turned him around with his hand? Show no fear on your way towards success. Ok, now place him right there. It’s best if you place the head next to his corpse so that it doesn’t roll away.
Sicario #1: We are the absolute 4 letters cartel.


El Blog de Los Guachos La Masakr3

Posted as grim reminder we have no southern border- and for fair use
Please see source for comments and graphic videos if you're so inclined

CJNG Sicarios Behead Three Pajaros Sierra Gunmen

"Sol Prendido" for Borderland Beat Several enforcers from the Jalisco New Generation Cartel have appeared in a recently released video onlin...

www.borderlandbeat.com

 

[jward]

..talking head in this clip suggest 5 years behind China..
video RT 2.34

Jennifer Griffin
@JenGriffinFNC

US falling behind China on hypersonic weapons development

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1548083018702548993

View: https://twitter.com/JenGriffinFNC/status/1548083018702548993?s=20&t=WsdacClUnLbG4DU2ujR_Uw

 

[OldArcher]

..talking head in this clip suggest 5 years behind China..
video RT 2.34
Jennifer Griffin
@JenGriffinFNC

US falling behind China on hypersonic weapons development

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1548083018702548993

View: https://twitter.com/JenGriffinFNC/status/1548083018702548993?s=20&t=WsdacClUnLbG4DU2ujR_Uw

Don’t worry, folks. IF things continue apace at previous pre-war speeds, we’ll be prepared to be only a few years behind China, Russia, and their proxies, WHEN the next war starts…

OA

 

[jward]

A Modern-Day Frederick the Great? The End of Short, Sharp Wars - War on the Rocks
David Johnson

19-24 minutes


How would the high-tech U.S. military fare in a war against China or Russia? The ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War may provide some answers. It may call into question some deeply held U.S. military axioms. Two of these are particularly important. First, is the belief that future wars will be short, decisive affairs. Second, the complexities of modern warfare demand professional forces in being. The second point is a corollary of the first: If wars are short, then only the forces available at, or shortly after, their inception have utility.

As we shall see, this has become a self-fulfilling prophecy that, if proven false, has potentially disastrous consequences for the United States. Specifically, if future wars with peers are protracted and involve significant attrition, can countries with relatively small, all-volunteer armies and no ready and robust personnel replacement systems prevail?
Although it is too early to tell what the war in Ukraine heralds, the West may be witnessing the end of short wars between states by professional armies. A similar transition last occurred as a result of the French Revolution. This was a real revolution: Power arrangements were forever changed in France, most obviously by the regicide of King Louis XVI and Queen Marie Antoinette. The guillotine was the final political arbiter. Killing nobility was obviously a bad precedent for European monarchies and they mobilized to restore the French monarchy and eradicate the revolution lest it spread. To meet this threat, the French instituted the levée en masse that mobilized the totality of the French nation.

The Frederick the Great Model
The Frederician system of warfare relied on highly trained professional armies made up principally of paid volunteers that were augmented by conscription depending on the practices of the country. These were the days of soldiering for the king’s shilling. The costs of armies coupled with the fact that they were financed by the king meant that they were small. In 1772, Frederick’s peacetime army was the third largest in Europe at 190,000, behind those of Austria (297,000) and Russia (224,000).
Losses in battles, given the tactics and weapons of the day, were high and could be equivalent on both sides. At the April 1741 Battle of Mollwitz, Frederick’s 21,600 soldiers faced 16,000 Austrians. Despite their victory, the Prussians suffered 4,850 casualties to the Austrians’ 4,550. Frederick’s instructions to his officers show why combat in his era was such a deadly affair:

battalions must attack when they are within twenty paces, or better still, within ten paces (at the commander’s discretion), and give the enemy a strong volley in the face. Immediately thereafter they should plunge the bayonet into the enemy’s ribs, at the same time shouting at him to throw away his weapon and surrender.

In Frederick’s day, the solution to sustaining expensive, hard to replace armies was to constrain the demands of war. As Gregory Fremont-Barnes writes, the wars of the anciens régimes were intentionally limited, a “quest for territorial spoil or economic advantage without radically upsetting the existing balance of power between great empires.” Given the limited means of the various monarchies, this was unavoidable. Even so, armies were constantly scouring Europe for new recruits — foreign mercenaries at one point made up over one-third of the Prussian army. Like today’s modulated recruiting bonuses, the supply-and-demand dynamics of the marketplace in Frederick’s day determined how much it took to hire soldiers.

A Real Revolution in Military and Political Affairs
The French Revolution changed everything. Within a year after the August 1793 National Convention issuance of the levée en masse, the French army swelled to an unprecedented 1,500,000 citizens under arms. The Republic was the model of a nation of arms with a citizen-based and self-sustaining military, supported by a mobilized population and industrial base.
Napoleon wielded this instrument ferociously, rampaging across Europe until other states adopted his methods, if not the empowerment of their citizenry, to survive his onslaught. Ironically, responding to France eventually ended the absolute monarchies kings were endeavoring to preserve and changed politics in Europe, as well as military and mobilization methods, forever. Importantly, the levée en masse meant casualties could be replaced annually as a new class of young men came of age. This was the meaning of the refrain in La Mareillaise known by every French citizen: “If they fall, our young heroes, will be produced anew from the ground.”

Conscription enabled Napoleon to regenerate his army despite horrendous casualties. The famous Russia campaign is the starkest example. In June 1812, although accurate numbers are still elusive, some 600,000 men of the Grand Armée marched into Russia. Roughly 120,000 made their way out in December. Nevertheless, the levée en masse responded. By 1815 France had a reconstituted army of 300,000 and Napoleon took 73,000 soldiers into the fateful Battle of Waterloo.
The levée en masse became a universal model across European nations. They had to adopt the system or be woefully outmanned and unable to replace their considerable losses in a timely and predictable manner. These methods of war, organizations, and means of mobilization continued to develop after the Napoleonic wars. Mass armies manned with conscripts and armed by robust industrial bases were the new normal. On the eve of the Great War, armies were of a size Frederick and even Napoleon would have had difficulty imagining. In 1914, France had 4,000,000 men under arms; Germany 3,800,000; and Russia 5,971,000. These armies, whose enormous losses could be replaced with annual classes of new conscripts, would feed the near-insatiable appetites of two protracted world wars.

When the State Is Not in Jeopardy
Until the Vietnam War conscription was viewed as necessary in the United States — given the threats citizens that were being drafted to deter or fight. That war did not pose an existential threat, and sending Americans’ sons off to be killed or maimed in an increasingly unpopular war lost the support of the U.S. people. The war and the draft also ignited public unrest and protest became a political liability until it ended in 1973.

Relatively small (by Cold War standards) volunteer armies now constitute the norm in the United States. Following the end of the Cold War, most Western states have also ended or restricted their conscription practices. This includes China and Russia, who are also transitioning to professional forces, although both maintain active conscription systems. China has not had to rely on conscription, filling its ranks with volunteers. Russia still registers its citizens that come of draft age twice a year, but is moving (unevenly) toward a contract-based active force to increase professionalism. Draftees, after a year of service, enter the reserves to provide a mobilization capacity if needed.
Could the U.S. military stay in the fight with similar losses? The first logical place to look for personnel replacements in the event of a national emergency would be the Selective Service System. Since the end of the draft in 1973, the U.S. selective service infrastructure has atrophied. First, there is no demand from the Department of Defense for a draft. A 2018 Government Accountability Office report noted, “There are no operational plans that envision mobilization at a level that would require a draft.” Those supporting the all-volunteer force believe that “it is far more experienced, motivated, disciplined, and committed than the draft army during Vietnam. It is also considered the most effective fighting force the world has ever seen.” Thus, a return to the draft would reduce military effectiveness.

 

[jward]

Furthermore, in its current state, the Selective Service System principally manages the registration of eligible males, because, despite occasional efforts to include women, they are currently exempt. Indeed, legislation is occasionally put forward in Congress to completely abolish selective service, including even registration by eligible males. More importantly, even if the system works as intended, it cannot begin conscription until Congress and the president authorize a draft. The first inductees would not report for processing until day 193 following the passage of the authorization law. It is worth noting that as of the date of the drafting of this essay, the Russo-Ukrainian War at day 125 is short of that 193-day mark by 68 days and replacing casualties trained personnel is already an issue for both countries. Finally, soldiers are not ready for service until they have successfully completed their initial training. In the case of an infantry soldier, One Station Unit Training is a 22-week program. In a best case, the first group of infantry soldiers would be available in approximately one year to ship out to combat.
There are also those who doubt whether the system could actually accomplish even this modest effort. The services are responsible for training inductees. During interviews for a 2018 Government Accountability Office review of the Selective Service System, military officials expressed doubts about the availability of adequate “training facilities, uniforms or funding to receive, train, equip, and integrate a large influx of inductees in the event of a draft.”

What is the Russo-Ukrainian War Showing?
A first-order observation coming out of the war in Ukraine is that modern major combat operations may not necessarily be short. Even though this war has gone on less than five months, it is still short by the standards of any major large-scale conflict between relatively equally matched adversaries. This suggests that what needs to be fundamentally reexamined is the new American way of war that has emerged since the end of the Cold War: that overwhelming American high-tech capabilities, wielded by superb professionals, will result in unstoppable offensives that will make wars “short, decisive, and accomplished with a minimum of casualties.”

What if this is wrong? Might future great-power wars look like Ukraine, or worse?
We are witnessing a grinding war of attrition taking place primarily on land over territory that both sides covet. This only strengthens the resolve of both combatants. Furthermore, the longer the war continues, it appears the deeper the commitment of both Russia and Ukraine to victory becomes. And the more casualties each will suffer. Ukrainian Brig. Gen. Oleksiy Hromo told ABC News on June 17 that his military is losing 1,000 casualties per day in the heavy fighting in Donbas, with 200 to 500 of those killed on average in action daily. Ukrainian sources (which may not be reliable) hold that 35,000 Russians have been killed between the invasion and June 27, with many more wounded.
Consequently, force preservation, reconstitution of units, and casualty replacement are turning out to be crucial as both sides fight to endure and outlast the other. Accordingly, both Russia and Ukraine are combining depleted units and reaching back into their less well trained reserves and will surely look to its conscripts if the war continues.
Although it is beyond the scope of this current essay, the ongoing high levels of materiel wastage and the insatiable demand for munitions are also daunting challenges in a high-intensity protracted war. Conrad Crane’s article in these pages about the fragility of the U.S. military in attrition warfare is an important warning.

Furthermore, given the geostrategic realities in NATO, might U.S. forces, like the Ukrainian forces, have to operate on the defensive rather than offensive? If so, none of the emerging service and joint warfighting concepts emphasize defensive operations, nor are capabilities being developed to create a U.S. anti-access and area-denial capability. This is clearly at odds with the principal U.S. mission in NATO: to deter aggression. I have suggested that such an approach would demand a strategy of deterrence through denial and supporting concepts and capabilities, which conflicts with the fundamental preference of the U.S. military for offensive operations.
As Crane notes, “When I walk the halls of the Pentagon today, I still hear discussions about the importance of winning the first battle decisively.” More importantly, he believes (as I have also written) that there is a belief “that nothing like that [what is happening to the Russians] could ever happen to them.” This is a toxic mix of hubris and denial that could result in losing not just the first battle, but the war.

Thus far, as I have written in these pages, there seems to be a consensus that the central cause of Russian failures is attributable to a lack of professionalism, resulting from their untrained troops, lack of noncommissioned officers, and incompetent officers. If this is correct, then the U.S. military is in great shape. Move along, nothing to see here. These assessments are not only premature, but they are also exceedingly dangerous. There is a reason the U.S. military loses its first battles. It is not because it planned to do so. It is because it was prepared to fight the war it wanted, not the one that the enemy visited upon it.

That first battle may be protracted and the only one of a war if the United States cannot maintain adequate forces in the fight. Politically, one can only imagine what the NATO reaction would be to losing anywhere near what the Russians or Ukrainians have in just in a few short months of a war that still shows no signs of lessening its intensity. It is a battle the militaries modeled after Frederick the Great could not win until they woke up to the necessity of becoming Napoleonic.
Consequently, we have to look critically at the lessons from Ukraine as a catalyst to make the necessary changes to enable us to prevail against countries who are preparing to defeat us in the next first battle, banking on our inability to continue beyond that initial failure. The inability to keep units in the fight after significant attrition and to replace large numbers of casualties rapidly are in my view the Achilles’ heels of the all-volunteer professional U.S. military.

What to Do, Absent a Modern-Day Levée en Masse?
If in fact the possibility of protracted wars with significant personnel attrition are a possibility identified by the war in Ukraine, then the Department of Defense needs to understand how to meet the demands of force preservation, unit reconstitution, and personnel replacement. Putting one’s hopes in the renewal of the draft is almost surely not, given current national perceptions of the threats facing our country, a realistic near-term solution.
Although there are occasionally calls to institute a system of national service, the goal is to create better citizens and instill national unity, not meet the potential demands of replacing mass casualties. Regardless, these efforts have all failed to gain traction. Even in the face of a growing threat, it is an open question whether U.S. citizens would support conscription. It is worth recalling that the August 1941 bill to extend selective service to begin preparing the U.S. Armed Forces for World War II passed by only one vote in the House of Representatives. This was after Germany had conquered most of continental Europe and was driving deep into the Soviet Union. One could reasonably ask if Congress would authorize conscription before NATO was actually attacked.

Furthermore, increased recruiting efforts are not likely the answer. The services are already having difficulty meeting current goals peacetime objectives. The Army has met only 40 percent of its annual goal and recently announced that it would accept recruits without a high-school diploma or a General Educational Development certificate. This comes after already relaxing its tattoo standards.
How the American people would respond to a new draft as a hedge against great-power war is unknowable. In any case, it is not a viable course of action for the U.S. military to rely upon absent its institution by authorization in law. Therefore, the Department of Defense needs to take steps to reduce its vulnerability to mass casualties. Below are several suggestions that, although certainly not comprehensive, are a necessary beginning.

Systems of rotational readiness should be abandoned and the individual replacement system and tiered-unit readiness reinstituted. As Robert Rush convincingly argues in his pathbreaking study Hell in Hurtgen Forest: The Ordeal and Triumph of an American Infantry Regiment, the individual replacement model enabled the U.S. Army to keep units in action. German forces did not have a similar system and their units eventually suffered attrition to the point of combat ineffectiveness. This will once again raise the argument that unit replacement systems result in more cohesive units. That is correct, all things being equal — but they are not. In a protracted war of attrition where battalions are being decimated as they are in Ukraine, the ability to man, train, and equip units will soon fall behind the demands of the war. Finally, replacements can be sent where they are most needed.
The maximum number of forces available at all times at a deployable level of readiness should be the goal for U.S. forces. This had been the enduring model in the Army with the exception of the decision to “modularize” into brigade combat teams to sustain the never-ending deployments to protracted counterinsurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Forces should be permanently based in key areas in Europe and the Pacific. Where there is not adequate infrastructure for families, military members should be assigned on short tours, as they were in Korea for decades.

The focus of combat medical care should be on returning soldiers as rapidly as possible to the fight. The U.S. military also needs to come to grips with two realities. First, its capacity is woefully inadequate for the numbers of casualties being sustained by either side in Ukraine. I led a RAND effort that came to a similar conclusion about conventional combat operations before the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks. Second, in an environment with a significant air defense threat, evacuation by air will likely be impossible. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, praising the heroism of Ukrainian helicopter pilots flying supplies into Mariupol and evacuating wounded, stressed, “We lost a lot of pilots.” As David Barno and Nora Bensahel recently noted in these pages, “The war in Ukraine raises very serious questions about whether and how helicopters can be used effectively — or even survive — on the modern battlefield.” Consequently, there may be no “Golden Hour,” the current U.S. standard for getting wounded to medical treatment in a war, unless major advances are made in unmanned casualty evacuation.
Finally, the American people ought to be prepared for the realities of a war like that in Ukraine. We may assess we are better, but we should accept the reality that the capacity to inflict large casualties at range from Russian systems is very much present.

None of these options would be likely to sustain sufficient replacements for casualties in a long war of attrition. Nevertheless, they are measures the Department of Defense could begin taking action on in the near term that could provide time for the resuscitation of the Selective Service System in response to a crisis. They might buy the year needed to start the flow of replacements into the war zone.
The long-term demands of a protracted war with China or Russia will demand a modern-day American levée en masse with implications far beyond reinstituting conscription. As we are seeing again for the first time since World War II or Korea, the dogs of war have insatiable appetites for people, munitions, and materiel. We are also witnessing in real time the sacrifices this has demanded from Ukraine and Russia. The final question for us as a nation, as we ponder the realities of great-power competition and conflict, is this: Are we up for the same?

David Johnson is a retired Army colonel. He is a principal researcher at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation and an adjunct scholar at the Modern War Institute at West Point. He is the author of Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers: Innovation in the U.S. Army, 1917-1945. From 2012 to 2014 he founded and directed the Chief of Staff of the Army Strategic Studies Group for Gen. Raymond T. Odierno.

A Modern-Day Frederick the Great? The End of Short, Sharp Wars - War on the Rocks

How would the high-tech U.S. military fare in a war against China or Russia? The ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War may provide some answers. It may call into

warontherocks.com

 

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This Is What Top Missile Defense Industry Chiefs Said About UFOs
Some of the top minds in missile defense discussed the UAP topic through their unique lens, especially in terms of defending the homeland.

byDan Parsons, Tyler RogowayJul 15, 2022 8:29 PM



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The U.S. military constantly monitors the airspace over and around the country for threats ranging from wayward Cessnas to truly unidentified craft, primarily using a network of radars, many of which are shared with the FAA, as well as alert fighter aircraft. This ecosystem is increasingly eyed for enhancements as the nature of the threat to the homeland morphs, especially in terms of the danger posed by cruise missile and drone attacks. At the same time, Congress is literally holding public hearings about unidentified aerial phenomena, or UAP, more classically referred to as UFOs. The topic exploded in the media thanks mainly to a media blitz by retired defense intelligence officials. In fact, Congress is now considering providing something akin to blanket immunity to public officials, military personnel, and even contractors, with any info on the UAP topic.

With this in mind, The War Zone thought the Center For Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) gathering yesterday of missile defense managers from top defense contractors that were brought together to discuss homeland cruise missile defense was a great opportunity to get perspective on the highly contentious UAP issue through their unique lens. We had a question about how existing and future airspace-monitoring and air defense systems aimed at countering cruise missiles could be harnessed to address the challenges presented by UAPs and the moderator, Global Business Editor at Defenseone.com, Marcus Weisgerber, was kind enough to present it to the panel.
Before we get to their responses, we need to provide a bit more background.

Executives from most of the top U.S. prime defense contractors sat on the CSIS panel. CSIS
There have been a concerning number of reportedly unauthorized and/or unidentified aircraft or objects over military facilities, near military aircraft and warships, and in designated test and training airspace in recent years. In particular, it is no secret that unidentified objects with small radar cross sections have been detected in military training ranges along both coasts with alarming regularity. The War Zone detailed a rash of encounters by Navy fighter pilots with unidentified craft off the U.S. East Coast over the last decade. There also was a bizarre string of events off Southern California in 2019. While it may be possible that these recent sightings include encounters with objects with extreme or unexplainable abilities, we have yet to see evidence of this. That doesn't mean evidence doesn't exist, though. What we do know for a fact is there have been many sightings that are explainable, but still extremely troubling.

An existing network of sensors monitors these same areas for potential nefarious actions, but upgrading this architecture to be able to better detect low-flying and small radar cross-section cruise missiles and drones is becoming a massive priority. This spurred the upgrade of F-15C/D and F-16C/D jets tasked with homeland defense with active electronically scanned array (AESA) radars, for instance, which can detect small, low-flying targets. The addition of infrared search-and-track (IRST) systems will help these fighters further to detect, identify, and engage these hard-to-spot targets. But these are just some first steps and a much more extensive sensor upgrade will be needed to better surveil the approaches to the continental U.S. and monitor for these threats. These same capabilities could be brought to bear for detecting and classifying UAPs. This includes having networking and sensor fusion capabilities so that even more complex targets – like those employing electronic warfare tactics – can still be detected, understood, and dealt with if need be.


Nick Bucci, vice president of defense systems and technologies at General Atomics, expounded on this idea.
“Maybe something that is designed to spoof one particular sensor can’t spoof another thing,” Bucci said. "So if I can ensure detection from, say, an [eleoctroptical/infrared] sensor or a [radio frequency] sensor, now I can start pulling that picture together better and getting better characteristics because I've looked at it different ways."
“Using passive sensors is another great way to get different information. Why don't we talk about acoustic sensors?" he continued. "There are a lot of really good acoustic sensors out there, which we happen to make – one that has been used for cruise missile defense and counter-UAS. Those are important sensors to now bring into this architecture. So that you can get that broader picture of the characteristics of a particular threat or object so you can tell whether it's a threat, to be sure you're going to do the right thing.”
Creating a multi-spectrum architecture where a sufficient number of sensors of various types are continuously monitoring the airspace is a costly proposition, said Doug Booth, director of radar and integrated air and missile defense at Lockheed Martin. Still, using ground radar installations in conjunction with airborne radars will help to paint a better picture of objects approaching, entering, or transiting the U.S. National Airspace, he said.

“I think there are multiple things that can be done there to help us solve the problem,” Booth said.
Jonathan Casey, director of small-to-medium ground-based air defense mission capability at Raytheon Missiles & Defense, said identifying objects as threats will always be difficult and that increased levels of scrutiny should be applied depending on whether the nation is at war or perceives an imminent national security threat – a point we discussed previously in great detail as it pertains to UAP. In times of war, the military could put less effort into parsing what an object is by assuming every unidentified object detected is a potential threat and treating it as such, he said.




“When there's a very, very high level of alert, do you reduce the level of confirmation you need in terms of combat ID?” Casey said. “I think that's a difficult decision. … Other than getting eyes on the target. It's never gonna be 100 percent. I mean, that's the 100 percent way to do it.”

Artificial intelligence and algorithmic analysis could sift through large quantities of airspace monitoring data to highlight abnormalities for human technicians to consider, Casey said. Social media companies take the same approach when trying to identify bot accounts among the millions of legitimate users and the level of scrutiny could be dialed up or down depending on the current threat alert state, he said.
David McFarland, senior director of missile defense programs at BAE Systems and a retired Navy captain, said the military services already employ different standards for combat identification in the missile defense arena, depending on threat levels. But those standards outlining flight characteristics and electronic emissions of various known enemy missiles can be circumvented, he said. Adversaries can use the crowded U.S. airspace to mask nefarious activity or even attacks, he said.



And crowded it is. We have cataloged and geolocated thousands of official FAA safety reports involving drones from pilots, many of which are unidentified, from across the country in recent years. You can check that out here and read more about our findings here and here.
"When I think about defense of the National Capital Region [NCR], boy, I can make a Tomahawk [cruise missile] kind of fly like a commercial airliner," McFarland said. "I could probably get into squawk mode and code that looks like a commercial airliner. Oh, by the way, there's this nice mountain range ... right outside of D.C. that can mask my approach and come in that way. Squawk and emote and code and looking all great. I can get away with it one time at least right? But that one time matters."

 

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The NCR is the most highly surveilled and defended airspace in the United States. Nothing else exists like in the country in terms of a standing advanced integrated air defense system that includes many types of sensors and surface-to-air missiles. Still, concerns exist regarding its vulnerability to emerging capabilities and asymmetric attacks.

A U.S. Navy Tomahawk cruise missile flies by an isolated industrial complex during a flight test. U.S. DoD
His solution was to thwart missile defense threats before they are within striking range of the U.S. homeland. McFarland used the example of Cold War-era anti-submarine warfare (ASW), in which the Navy would use satellite imagery to count Soviet Oscar class submarines in their homeports. When one was “missing,” the Navy would then dispatch ASW aircraft to go find it, he said.
“Before it becomes an air defense problem, make it an ASW problem,” McFarland said. “We’ve got to start thinking big. We’ve got to start thinking about the battlespace differently. It's now the homeland, which means everything else, you know, we have to be out there with our forward-deployed forces with the mindset that we are defending the homeland.”
The Navy is certainly concerned with the homeland, as it now considers the Atlantic a contested environment, and Russian submarines, some of which are extremely hard to detect, operate untracked in that body of water. China's ability to reach out and put the U.S. at risk of attack is also increasing.
The now infamous videos seen below, taken using ATFLIR targeting pods on U.S. Navy F/A-18s, show examples of unidentified — at least publicly — objects Navy aircraft have encountered in the past. Exactly what these videos show or don't show remains a hotly contested topic.

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6ucDIdX0Z4U

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4fiv-EUrhMM


But the Navy shoulders no official burden to police the U.S. National Airspace. That responsibility lies with the Air Force, which talks a lot about cruise missile defense, but says next to nothing about UAPs. The two issues are almost inextricably linked because an object flying toward or into U.S. airspace must be considered a threat until it can be positively identified as benign.

That requires seamless sensor fusion and split-second data analytics, McFarland said.
"We have to flow information openly," McFarland said. "It all comes back down to data."
The U.S. has sufficiently advanced intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities to identify most aircraft and other objects that enter its airspace, but there are not enough sensors deployed and they must be upgraded on par with threats that could spoof or evade them, said Michael Noble, senior director of advanced missions at Anduril Industries.
“We have fantastic radar,” he said. ”We have fantastic EO [electro-optical], awesome [signals intelligence], etc. It will continue to improve and we need more sensors, absolutely. But I think a key thing to realize here is this is not something we solve. The enemy has a vote here, so the way we do combat ID is going to vary from one target to another and they're going to adjust. … This architecture is going to have to evolve.”

Noble said the future U.S. air defense architecture should include the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS) layered atop other overhead satellite-based sensors, ground radars, and airborne assets. All of those things must be integrated into a single system through which information flows seamlessly, he said.
HBTSS satellites are designed to provide continuous tracking and targeting of enemy missiles launched from land, sea, or air, according to Northrop Grumman, the company developing the system. They are one part of the Overhead Persistent Infrared (OPIR) multi-layered constellation of satellites, “which can sense heat signatures to detect and track missiles from their earliest stages of launch through interception,” one company press release says.

Bucci agreed with Noble's prescribed approach, but said the optimal multi-layered, multi-spectrum airspace defense architecture is far enough in the future that an intermediate plan to handle detection and missile-defense warnings is needed.
"Persistence is what we need,” Bucci said. “You don't have persistence until you get that fully-populated constellation of satellites that gives you 24/7/365 heads-up data. In the meantime, you have search capabilities. You put out medium altitude, high altitude, long-endurance UAVs with the right sensor suites on them to be able to search to where indications and warnings have given you some level of information that I now have a rogue submarine off the East Coast.”

While most people think “flying saucer” and “aliens” when they hear UFO, discussions of unknown airspace intrusions are now mainstream enough to be seriously considered in the halls of power in Washington. The government’s reframing of the issue as unidentified aerial phenomenon is one indication that the debate is moving from the realm of science fiction and conspiracy theory to real-world national security. And there are a multitude of good reasons for this that have nothing to do with hunting for the paranormal or visitors from space invaders. The biggest being that the next big weapons capability breakthrough may very well look and act unlike what came before it — alien in nature, if you will. An adversary could and likely would leverage silly cultural stigmas against reporting unidentified flying objects to their advantage, even making the mundane appear anything but.

Regardless, that a panel of high-ranking defense industry executives fielded a question about UAP with straight faces underlines both the reality that the issue is a serious one and that missile-defense technology is a potential solution to detecting, tracking, and identifying these phenomena.
Ultimately, as they said, solving the UAP issue will require a greater number of more-advanced sensors, signaling a secondary market for the technologies their companies already sell to or could develop for the government to defend the U.S. homeland against enemy missiles. They likely understand that if Congress believes UAP are a threat to national security, dollars will flow toward that problem set. And considering that the Pentagon is already standing up a much more deeply mandated and resourced office dedicated to this issue, and those who hold the purse strings are a driving force behind its establishment, they would be right.
Contact the author: dan@thewarzone.com and tyler@thedrive.com

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This Is What Top Missile Defense Executives Just Said About UFOs

Some of the top minds in missile defense discussed the UAP topic through their unique lens, especially in terms of defending the homeland.

www.thedrive.com

 

[jward]

Russia says its working on carrier-killer hypersonic

Gabriel Honrada​

Russia is working on its own version of a carrier-killer hypersonic missile according to state media reports, a move that likely aims to fortify its naval bastions in the North Atlantic and Northern Pacific amid spiking geopolitical tensions with the United States and wider West.

On July 12, Russian state news broadcaster TASS announced that the country is developing the so-called Zmeevik hypersonic carrier-killer missile. The TASS report claimed that the missile will have similar characteristics to China’s DF-21D and DF-26, and will have a flight range of 4,000 kilometers.
The same report said the weapon could enter service with Russian Navy coastal defense units.
The Zmeevik missile solves the problem of equipping surface warships with weapons capable of attacking aircraft carriers and carrier battle groups, notes military expert Vasily Dandikin in Gazeta.ru.

He states that while existing submarine-launched and shore-based anti-ship missiles are effective within engagement ranges under 1,000 kilometers, operations in the North Atlantic and Pacific Oceans need longer-range systems to deter enemy warships from getting in range to launch cruise missile strikes.
The Zmeevik’s development was spurred by the US’ own hypersonic weapons program, as noted by Alexei Leonkov in a Radio 1 interview. Leonkov, chief editor of the Arsenal of the Fatherland military magazine, said that while the US may have built hypersonic weapons that can reach Mach 5 speeds, they still fly mostly on a ballistic trajectory unlike Russian hypersonics such as the Zmeevik, which feature maneuverability to evade air defenses.

Dandikin notes accordingly that the advent of hypersonic weapons has changed the Russian Navy’s research priorities from submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) to hypersonic weapons such as the Zmeevik.
While carrier battlegroups feature heavily armed warships for fleet air defense, these ships are still potentially vulnerable to missile attacks. Naval News notes the recent sinking of the Moskva cruiser as a case in point. Despite the Moskva having long-range air defense radars and layered anti-air defenses, Ukraine still managed to sink the cruiser using Neptune shore-based anti-ship missiles.
This huge loss undoubtedly had a profound impact on the Russian Navy, which may have highlighted the vulnerability of its large surface combatants against shore-based missile attacks. At the same time, it may have also demonstrated the potential vulnerabilities of US warships to such weapons.
Russia’s Moskva warship lists after a missile attack in April 2022. Image: Twitter / CBS News / OSINT Technical / Screengrab
To be sure, the Moskva has less advanced defenses than US warships, which means that it could be – and was – sunk by an anti-ship missile derived from an existing Soviet-era design. To successfully engage US carrier battlegroups, Russia needs a much more advanced missile.

Should the Zmeevik enter service relatively soon, it may be a potent deterrent against the US and allied naval freedom of action, as the US has not yet developed an effective defense against hypersonic weapons, notes Naval News.
The Zmeevik may become a key asset in Russia’s naval bastion defense strategy, which the NATO Combined Joint Operations from the Sea Center of Excellence (CJOS COE) describes as consisting of a geographically and horizontally layered defense.
The same source notes that a bastion defense features an outer area with sea denial as its primary objective and an inner space that aims for sea control. As such, deploying shore-based missiles like the Zmeevik would increase Russia’s weapons range and expand its anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) blanket within the semi-enclosed waters of the Baltic and North Seas and in the Sea of Okhotsk and Kuril Islands in the Pacific.
However, the Zmeevik may turn out to be vaporware, despite the bold claims being made about its capabilities by Russian military experts. The 1945 military news site notes numerous issues that raise questions about the integrity of Russian claims about the Zmeevik.

First, there have been no verified Zmeevik launch tests, even though the weapon has long been in development, the 1945 report says. This does not mean that a prototype test launch has never occurred, as the former Soviet Union and today’s Russia were and are anti-ship missile technology pioneers.
Second, it is unclear how Russia will integrate the Zmeevik with other systems. Because it is an over-the-horizon missile, it needs integration with maritime reconnaissance aircraft, drones and satellites for effective targeting.
Third, it is unknown how far Russia has actually come with the Zmeevik’s development. Until a successful Zmeevik missile test is verified, reports about the new weapon may be propaganda or disinformation to confuse US and allied defense planners.

Western analysts may dismiss Russian claims about the Zmeevik as empty saber-rattling until the weapon is proven to work, including in the next standoff or engagement between Russia and the West.


Russia says its working on carrier-killer hypersonic

 

[jward]

Superheated race for hypersonic supremacy

Gabriel Honrada​

Hypersonic weapons have spawned a crucial arms race, with the US, China and Russia all striving for supremacy in an armament that could decide who wins and loses a future great power conflict.
Unlike traditional missiles that fly in a predictable ballistic arc that makes interception at least conceptually possible, hypersonics travel at up to five times the speed of sound and feature terminal maneuvering capabilities, making them nearly impossible to stop with current air and missile defense technology.
The US, China and Russia are at the forefront of this emerging weapons technology, with their hypersonic weapons programs aiming to address different strategic and operational requirements.
As pioneers of hypersonic technology, their actions may also set precedents for how the international community addresses the emergence of these potentially game-changing weapons.

China’s ‘Sputnik moment’ hypersonics
China’s hypersonic weapons program drew international attention in October 2021 when the Financial Times (FT) reported that it had tested a nuclear-capable hypersonic missile in August that circled the globe before hitting its target, demonstrating an advanced weapon that reportedly caught US intelligence services by surprise.
Mark Milley, chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, described the test as a “Sputnik moment,” as US military scientists apparently did not understand how the feat was accomplished, the FT stated.
The same report says that China’s test involved an orbital bombardment system, which follows a lower trajectory than ballistic missiles, making it harder to intercept. It can fly over the North or South Poles, with most US missile defenses positioned to defend against attacks from the North Pole.

While the test rang alarm bells in Washington, China had tested hypersonic weapons for some time before last August’s “Sputnik moment” blast. In November 2017, The Diplomat reported that China tested its DF-17 medium-range hypersonic missile, a weapon with a range of 1,800 and 2,500 kilometers capable of delivering nuclear or conventional payloads that may be configured to launch a maneuverable reentry vehicle instead of a DF-ZF hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) as its payload.

The DF-ZF HGV has an assessed range of 1,800 to 2,500 kilometers and can achieve speeds of Mach 5 to 10 with a high degree of accuracy and maneuverability, with the possibility of being fitted on DF-21 and DF-26 ballistic missiles, as reported by the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs.
Missile Threat notes that the appearance of the DF-17 during China’s October 2019 military parade indicated that the hypersonic weapon may have already entered service in the Chinese military.
With a range of potentially a thousand miles or more, the DF-17 could threaten US forces and their allies across the Western Pacific. Photo: Xinhua

To be sure, China’s hypersonic weapons program aims to shift the regional and global strategic balance of power in its favor. At the regional level, China’s hypersonic weapons strategy is aimed at deterring its adversaries in the Western Pacific from interfering with its actions, especially in a Taiwan invasion scenario, notes Ralph Bentley from the US Air University.
Bentley mentions that hypersonic weapons’ strategic effect lies in their ability to hit ships and bases across the region unopposed and with minimal adversary reaction time. He says China would use its hypersonics as intimidation weapons rather than risk an all-out confrontation with the US and its regional allies.
China’s hypersonics can shift the global balance of power in three ways, the Atlantic Council think tank noted in a 2020 report.

First, China’s hypersonics may be a perfect weapon for fait accompli attacks to undermine the logic of extended deterrence that has long-underpinned US alliances. These weapons’ very short flight time and the near-impossible task of intercepting them with current air and missile defenses can potentially undermine US security guarantees and credibility to its allies, including not least Japan.

Second, these weapons may force the US to rethink its force posture, leaving its allies vulnerable to attack. For example, China may use hypersonics for decapitation strikes against a target nation’s leadership, hampering efforts to mount a counterstrike. Hypersonics can also force the US to deploy its forces more dispersedly, making them vulnerable to swarm attacks or hardening their defenses, compromising speed and maneuverability.
China’s hypersonics may also compel the US to rethink its global basing strategy, forcing Washington to move its key capabilities and forward bases farther from the range of these weapons, which opens the possibility of lengthening US response times and risking operational secrecy under the threat of operating under the unacceptable risk of a hypersonic attack.

Third, China’s hypersonics can be redirected in mid-flight at any time. Their maneuver capabilities mean that their flight paths cannot be discerned, which may result in the rapid escalation of any bilateral confrontation. This strategic uncertainty can induce states to coordinate defensive measures with their neighbors in anticipation of a hypersonic attack, creating more regional or global security blocs.

Russia expanding its nuclear options
In a fiery March 2018 address, Russian President Vladimir Putin unveiled six “superweapons” types that can carry nuclear or conventional warheads.
Specifically, these weapons are the Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missile, the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle, the Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile, the Poseidon nuclear-armed underwater drone and the Tsirkon hypersonic cruise missile.
Sanaa Alvira from the Middlebury Institute of International Studies of Monterey notes all of these weapons can be either nuclear or conventionally-armed. She also mentions that offensive weapons such as the Avangard and Burevestnik are designed specifically to defeat US missile defense systems.

At the same time, the Kinzhal and Tsirkon appear to be developed to match US precision-strike capabilities. She also notes that Poseidon was first designed to dissuade the US from further developing its missile defense systems. However, it has since evolved into a multipurpose system against ships and submarines.
Roger McDermott, a defense analyst with the Jamestown Foundation, notes that Russia’s conventional hypersonic weapons are a vital asset in its “active defense” strategy, as stated in its 2014 Military Doctrine.
Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the Russian Armed Forces General Staff, describes active defense as involving pre-emptive actions, identifying vulnerabilities and creating threats of unacceptable damage to capture and retain the strategic initiative. He also stressed the importance of developing nuclear and non-nuclear forms of deterrence as part of Russia’s military strategy.

Vladimir Putin is leveraging his hypersonic weapons to make new nuclear threats. Image: Twitter
In fitting hypersonic weapons into Russia’s active defense strategy, McDermott mentions that Russia’s conventional hypersonics may add to its standoff strike capability to evade air defenses or implement non-nuclear deterrence by threatening to inflict unacceptable damage to command centers and enemy missile platforms.
A 2021 Atlantic Council report notes Russia’s multifaceted motivations in developing its hypersonic weapons and other types of superweapons.

First, Russia’s hypersonics aim to ensure its nuclear deterrent’s survivability, as it believes that the US nuclear arsenal and missile defenses are designed to undermine its second-strike capabilities. In addition, hypersonics are not yet covered by any international arms control agreements, which allows Russia to build a capable nuclear deterrent without the constraints of present arms control agreements.

Second, Russia may use its hypersonic weapons to raise nuclear fears with the West, which it has done in the war in Ukraine. Alarmist reporting about Russia’s hypersonics and superweapons has raised the specter of a nuclear standoff, which Moscow clearly believes will make the US less willing to escalate any direct or proxy conflict with Russia.

Third, Russia could use its hypersonics and other superweapons to signal a nuclear threat to the West and US. For example, Russia could send its Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile to fly over Western targets and back, or position Poseidon nuclear-armed underwater drones near Western and US coastal targets. Such a deployment can increase uncertainty and nuclear escalation risk.

Fourth, Russia’s hypersonics could help deter US hybrid threats holding the latter’s mainland at risk. The calculus is that threatening to hit the US mainland can potentially prevent US attempts to interfere with Russia’s internal politics. This motivation is rooted in Russian fears of US-backed regime change efforts, despite the US not apparently having any specific plan or program in this regard.

Fifth, Russia may use its hypersonics and superweapons in a decapitation strike against the US. Hypersonics, maneuverable cruise missiles and nuclear-armed underwater drones may strike the US leadership and command and control systems with little warning. While this is an extreme scenario, Russia has developed contingency plans for full-scale nuclear war with the US and NATO.

US as a hypersonic laggard
US hypersonic research efforts date back to the 1960s. Yet recently its hypersonic weapons program has been struck with a string of highly-publicized failures leading to concerns that the country is losing its former edge against near-peer competitors China and Russia.

Current US interest in hypersonic weapons may be traced to the Prompt Global Strike program that was conceptualized during the George W Bush administration.
The concept calls for US capability to deliver conventional strikes anywhere in the world in approximately an hour, as described by the Institute for National Strategic Studies. Hypersonic weapons are well suited for this mission, as the 2007 Prompt Global Strike plan calls for using hypersonic glide weapons to implement the concept.
Currently, the US is developing the AGM-183 Air-launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW) for the Air Force, the Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW) for the Army, and the Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) missile for the Navy.
Notably, the LRHW and CPS weapons are designed around a Common Hypersonic Glide Body (CHGB), which the US Department of Defense says will comprise these weapons’ conventional warhead, guidance systems, cabling and protective shield.

The LRHW is designed be able to travel at speeds of over 1.7 kilometers per second, or 3,800 miles per hour, dodge above the atmosphere and hit targets anywhere in the world within minutes. Credit: Lockheed Martin
Yet the US does not seem to have a doctrine or strategy for its hypersonic weapons. A 2021 Congressional Research Service (CRS) report asks pointed questions about what missions would hypersonics potentially be used, how cost-effective would they be for such tasks and how could they be incorporated into current joint operational doctrine and concepts.
The CRS report also asks about the strategic implications of hypersonic weapons. By implication, the US is still in the process of determining the impact of hypersonic weapons on its doctrine and operations.
However, the CRS report also notes that since most US hypersonic weapons are not armed with nuclear warheads, they require greater accuracy and will be more challenging to develop than Chinese or Russian weapons. Thus, the report suggests US hypersonics will have a more tactical role than those of China and Russia.

Long-term hypersonic trends
The great power race to develop hypersonics may ultimately trigger three long-term and crucial trends.

First, the proliferation of hypersonics may lead to a full-blown arms race while simultaneously accelerating the development of asymmetric countermeasures. On the one hand, the proliferation of hypersonics may cast doubt on the capabilities of existing missile defense systems and the survivability of second-strike capabilities at the strategic level.
On the other hand, this may spur the development of asymmetric technologies to blunt any advantage hypersonics offer such as stealth technology to conceal targets, directed-energy weapons to shoot down in-flight hypersonics, or capabilities that go for vulnerable hypersonic kill chains to prevent a successful launch such as cyberwarfare, electronic warfare and anti-satellite warfare capabilities.
By implication, global strategic stability will rely on technological advances in hypersonics and countermeasures.

Second, future arms control agreements may seek to impose restrictions on hypersonics. These agreements may range from an outright ban on hypersonics, restrictions on who may own them, limitations on their range and other capabilities, or a cap on the number of hypersonic weapons states are allowed to possess.
An artist’s rendering of a hypersonic weapon in flight. Image: Twitter
However, getting major military powers to agree on restrictions on any capability that affords them a significant advantage against near-peer adversaries is and will be a hard sell, especially since hypersonics have a strategic-level impact on the highest levels of national security.

Third, states may view hypersonics as a must-have prestige weapon to shape the perceptions of their adversaries and international audiences. For many reasons, maintaining a perception of power is essential for states such as North Korea, Iran, India and Pakistan.
These may include demonstrating state capabilities and cohesion to mobilize resources to pursue such costly weapons, thus projecting an image of self-sufficiency and defiance in the face of external sanctions, maintaining credible deterrence against potential adversaries and showcasing national techno-scientific prowess on the international stage.

Superheated race for hypersonic supremacy - Asia Times

Hypersonic weapons have spawned a crucial arms race, with the US, China and Russia all striving for supremacy in an armament that could decide who wins

asiatimes.com

 

[Housecarl]

Superheated race for hypersonic supremacy
Gabriel Honrada​

Hypersonic weapons have spawned a crucial arms race, with the US, China and Russia all striving for supremacy in an armament that could decide who wins and loses a future great power conflict.
Unlike traditional missiles that fly in a predictable ballistic arc that makes interception at least conceptually possible, hypersonics travel at up to five times the speed of sound and feature terminal maneuvering capabilities, making them nearly impossible to stop with current air and missile defense technology.
The US, China and Russia are at the forefront of this emerging weapons technology, with their hypersonic weapons programs aiming to address different strategic and operational requirements.
As pioneers of hypersonic technology, their actions may also set precedents for how the international community addresses the emergence of these potentially game-changing weapons.

China’s ‘Sputnik moment’ hypersonics
China’s hypersonic weapons program drew international attention in October 2021 when the Financial Times (FT) reported that it had tested a nuclear-capable hypersonic missile in August that circled the globe before hitting its target, demonstrating an advanced weapon that reportedly caught US intelligence services by surprise.
Mark Milley, chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, described the test as a “Sputnik moment,” as US military scientists apparently did not understand how the feat was accomplished, the FT stated.
The same report says that China’s test involved an orbital bombardment system, which follows a lower trajectory than ballistic missiles, making it harder to intercept. It can fly over the North or South Poles, with most US missile defenses positioned to defend against attacks from the North Pole.

While the test rang alarm bells in Washington, China had tested hypersonic weapons for some time before last August’s “Sputnik moment” blast. In November 2017, The Diplomat reported that China tested its DF-17 medium-range hypersonic missile, a weapon with a range of 1,800 and 2,500 kilometers capable of delivering nuclear or conventional payloads that may be configured to launch a maneuverable reentry vehicle instead of a DF-ZF hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) as its payload.

The DF-ZF HGV has an assessed range of 1,800 to 2,500 kilometers and can achieve speeds of Mach 5 to 10 with a high degree of accuracy and maneuverability, with the possibility of being fitted on DF-21 and DF-26 ballistic missiles, as reported by the Georgetown Journal of International Affairs.
Missile Threat notes that the appearance of the DF-17 during China’s October 2019 military parade indicated that the hypersonic weapon may have already entered service in the Chinese military.
With a range of potentially a thousand miles or more, the DF-17 could threaten US forces and their allies across the Western Pacific. Photo: Xinhua

To be sure, China’s hypersonic weapons program aims to shift the regional and global strategic balance of power in its favor. At the regional level, China’s hypersonic weapons strategy is aimed at deterring its adversaries in the Western Pacific from interfering with its actions, especially in a Taiwan invasion scenario, notes Ralph Bentley from the US Air University.
Bentley mentions that hypersonic weapons’ strategic effect lies in their ability to hit ships and bases across the region unopposed and with minimal adversary reaction time. He says China would use its hypersonics as intimidation weapons rather than risk an all-out confrontation with the US and its regional allies.
China’s hypersonics can shift the global balance of power in three ways, the Atlantic Council think tank noted in a 2020 report.

First, China’s hypersonics may be a perfect weapon for fait accompli attacks to undermine the logic of extended deterrence that has long-underpinned US alliances. These weapons’ very short flight time and the near-impossible task of intercepting them with current air and missile defenses can potentially undermine US security guarantees and credibility to its allies, including not least Japan.

Second, these weapons may force the US to rethink its force posture, leaving its allies vulnerable to attack. For example, China may use hypersonics for decapitation strikes against a target nation’s leadership, hampering efforts to mount a counterstrike. Hypersonics can also force the US to deploy its forces more dispersedly, making them vulnerable to swarm attacks or hardening their defenses, compromising speed and maneuverability.
China’s hypersonics may also compel the US to rethink its global basing strategy, forcing Washington to move its key capabilities and forward bases farther from the range of these weapons, which opens the possibility of lengthening US response times and risking operational secrecy under the threat of operating under the unacceptable risk of a hypersonic attack.

Third, China’s hypersonics can be redirected in mid-flight at any time. Their maneuver capabilities mean that their flight paths cannot be discerned, which may result in the rapid escalation of any bilateral confrontation. This strategic uncertainty can induce states to coordinate defensive measures with their neighbors in anticipation of a hypersonic attack, creating more regional or global security blocs.

Russia expanding its nuclear options
In a fiery March 2018 address, Russian President Vladimir Putin unveiled six “superweapons” types that can carry nuclear or conventional warheads.
Specifically, these weapons are the Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missile, the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle, the Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile, the Poseidon nuclear-armed underwater drone and the Tsirkon hypersonic cruise missile.
Sanaa Alvira from the Middlebury Institute of International Studies of Monterey notes all of these weapons can be either nuclear or conventionally-armed. She also mentions that offensive weapons such as the Avangard and Burevestnik are designed specifically to defeat US missile defense systems.

At the same time, the Kinzhal and Tsirkon appear to be developed to match US precision-strike capabilities. She also notes that Poseidon was first designed to dissuade the US from further developing its missile defense systems. However, it has since evolved into a multipurpose system against ships and submarines.
Roger McDermott, a defense analyst with the Jamestown Foundation, notes that Russia’s conventional hypersonic weapons are a vital asset in its “active defense” strategy, as stated in its 2014 Military Doctrine.
Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the Russian Armed Forces General Staff, describes active defense as involving pre-emptive actions, identifying vulnerabilities and creating threats of unacceptable damage to capture and retain the strategic initiative. He also stressed the importance of developing nuclear and non-nuclear forms of deterrence as part of Russia’s military strategy.

Vladimir Putin is leveraging his hypersonic weapons to make new nuclear threats. Image: Twitter
In fitting hypersonic weapons into Russia’s active defense strategy, McDermott mentions that Russia’s conventional hypersonics may add to its standoff strike capability to evade air defenses or implement non-nuclear deterrence by threatening to inflict unacceptable damage to command centers and enemy missile platforms.
A 2021 Atlantic Council report notes Russia’s multifaceted motivations in developing its hypersonic weapons and other types of superweapons.

First, Russia’s hypersonics aim to ensure its nuclear deterrent’s survivability, as it believes that the US nuclear arsenal and missile defenses are designed to undermine its second-strike capabilities. In addition, hypersonics are not yet covered by any international arms control agreements, which allows Russia to build a capable nuclear deterrent without the constraints of present arms control agreements.

Second, Russia may use its hypersonic weapons to raise nuclear fears with the West, which it has done in the war in Ukraine. Alarmist reporting about Russia’s hypersonics and superweapons has raised the specter of a nuclear standoff, which Moscow clearly believes will make the US less willing to escalate any direct or proxy conflict with Russia.

Third, Russia could use its hypersonics and other superweapons to signal a nuclear threat to the West and US. For example, Russia could send its Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile to fly over Western targets and back, or position Poseidon nuclear-armed underwater drones near Western and US coastal targets. Such a deployment can increase uncertainty and nuclear escalation risk.

Fourth, Russia’s hypersonics could help deter US hybrid threats holding the latter’s mainland at risk. The calculus is that threatening to hit the US mainland can potentially prevent US attempts to interfere with Russia’s internal politics. This motivation is rooted in Russian fears of US-backed regime change efforts, despite the US not apparently having any specific plan or program in this regard.

Fifth, Russia may use its hypersonics and superweapons in a decapitation strike against the US. Hypersonics, maneuverable cruise missiles and nuclear-armed underwater drones may strike the US leadership and command and control systems with little warning. While this is an extreme scenario, Russia has developed contingency plans for full-scale nuclear war with the US and NATO.

US as a hypersonic laggard
US hypersonic research efforts date back to the 1960s. Yet recently its hypersonic weapons program has been struck with a string of highly-publicized failures leading to concerns that the country is losing its former edge against near-peer competitors China and Russia.

Current US interest in hypersonic weapons may be traced to the Prompt Global Strike program that was conceptualized during the George W Bush administration.
The concept calls for US capability to deliver conventional strikes anywhere in the world in approximately an hour, as described by the Institute for National Strategic Studies. Hypersonic weapons are well suited for this mission, as the 2007 Prompt Global Strike plan calls for using hypersonic glide weapons to implement the concept.
Currently, the US is developing the AGM-183 Air-launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW) for the Air Force, the Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW) for the Army, and the Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) missile for the Navy.
Notably, the LRHW and CPS weapons are designed around a Common Hypersonic Glide Body (CHGB), which the US Department of Defense says will comprise these weapons’ conventional warhead, guidance systems, cabling and protective shield.

The LRHW is designed be able to travel at speeds of over 1.7 kilometers per second, or 3,800 miles per hour, dodge above the atmosphere and hit targets anywhere in the world within minutes. Credit: Lockheed Martin
Yet the US does not seem to have a doctrine or strategy for its hypersonic weapons. A 2021 Congressional Research Service (CRS) report asks pointed questions about what missions would hypersonics potentially be used, how cost-effective would they be for such tasks and how could they be incorporated into current joint operational doctrine and concepts.
The CRS report also asks about the strategic implications of hypersonic weapons. By implication, the US is still in the process of determining the impact of hypersonic weapons on its doctrine and operations.
However, the CRS report also notes that since most US hypersonic weapons are not armed with nuclear warheads, they require greater accuracy and will be more challenging to develop than Chinese or Russian weapons. Thus, the report suggests US hypersonics will have a more tactical role than those of China and Russia.

Long-term hypersonic trends
The great power race to develop hypersonics may ultimately trigger three long-term and crucial trends.

First, the proliferation of hypersonics may lead to a full-blown arms race while simultaneously accelerating the development of asymmetric countermeasures. On the one hand, the proliferation of hypersonics may cast doubt on the capabilities of existing missile defense systems and the survivability of second-strike capabilities at the strategic level.
On the other hand, this may spur the development of asymmetric technologies to blunt any advantage hypersonics offer such as stealth technology to conceal targets, directed-energy weapons to shoot down in-flight hypersonics, or capabilities that go for vulnerable hypersonic kill chains to prevent a successful launch such as cyberwarfare, electronic warfare and anti-satellite warfare capabilities.
By implication, global strategic stability will rely on technological advances in hypersonics and countermeasures.

Second, future arms control agreements may seek to impose restrictions on hypersonics. These agreements may range from an outright ban on hypersonics, restrictions on who may own them, limitations on their range and other capabilities, or a cap on the number of hypersonic weapons states are allowed to possess.
An artist’s rendering of a hypersonic weapon in flight. Image: Twitter
However, getting major military powers to agree on restrictions on any capability that affords them a significant advantage against near-peer adversaries is and will be a hard sell, especially since hypersonics have a strategic-level impact on the highest levels of national security.

Third, states may view hypersonics as a must-have prestige weapon to shape the perceptions of their adversaries and international audiences. For many reasons, maintaining a perception of power is essential for states such as North Korea, Iran, India and Pakistan.
These may include demonstrating state capabilities and cohesion to mobilize resources to pursue such costly weapons, thus projecting an image of self-sufficiency and defiance in the face of external sanctions, maintaining credible deterrence against potential adversaries and showcasing national techno-scientific prowess on the international stage.

Superheated race for hypersonic supremacy - Asia Times

Hypersonic weapons have spawned a crucial arms race, with the US, China and Russia all striving for supremacy in an armament that could decide who wins

asiatimes.com

What the author skips around is the likely option in reply by the United States and its allies to backstop their forces and planning with the deployment and use of nuclear weapons as well as taking measures to strengthen the command and control of them in the counter intuitive measures like giving sub commanders back the launch authority they used to have until Clinton.

 

[jward]

United States: end of an illusion of omnipotence

Manlio Graziano​

“I do not accept second place for the United States of America.” That simple statement, delivered to rousing effect by Barack Obama in his first State of the Union, in January 2010, managed to summarize the current American strategic horizon in a single sentence.

For decades, the United States has been in relative decline, facing the prospect of someday being overtaken by a rival power. Its main problem, however, is not the relative decline itself – it’s a natural phenomenon occurring as companies, sectors, regions and countries grow at uneven rates. Instead, its main problem is a failure to recognize this condition, whether out of pride, electoral calculation or simple lack of awareness.
In 1986, in his masterful The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, Paul Kennedy explained that great powers rise and fall precisely because of their uneven growth: it is therefore the relationship between their varying growth rates that – “in the long run” – is decisive.

Slow relative decline
Apart from a few brief periods of recession, the United States has never stopped growing. Since the 1950s, however, it has grown at a slower rate than most of the rest of the world: thus, it has been in relative decline.
Between 1960 and 2020, its real GDP (i.e., in constant dollars) grew by a factor of five and a half times, but, in the same period, the GDP of the rest of the world was multiplied by eight and a half times: so while the US economy continued to grow in absolute terms, those of its rivals grew at a faster pace.
Moreover, if we compare the United States to its main rival, China, the growth gap is abysmal: while the US economy was growing by five and a half times, China was growing by 92 times.

Put another way, in 1960, the US economy was equivalent to that of 22 Chinas; yet by 2020, it “weighed” only as much as 1.3 Chinas. In culinary terms, the cake has become much bigger for everyone, but the slice that goes to the United States has become relatively smaller.
This relative decline in economic and productive weight ultimately results in a narrowing of the margins for political action, due to the phenomenon of “overstretching,” the phenomenon at the origin of the fall of some great empires (from the Roman Empire to the Russian). Kennedy – in 1986 – explained it in this way:

“Decision-makers in Washington must face the awkward and enduring fact that the sum total of the United States’ global interests and obligations is nowadays far larger than the country’s power to defend them all simultaneously.”

That is, the global interests and obligations that the United States could afford to defend with a GDP of nearly $3.46 trillion in 1960, could not all be defended simultaneously in 1986 with a GDP of $8.6 trillion, and even less so today despite a GDP approaching $20 trillion. This paradox is only apparent: while the GDP of the United States in 1960 was almost half (46.7%) of the GDP of the rest of the world, by 2020 it had become less than a third (30.8%).
Kennedy’s prescient analysis unfortunately suffered from a case of bad timing. Three years after the release of his book, the pro-Russian regimes in Europe collapsed; four years later, the first of Japan’s “lost decades” began; five years later, the Gulf War (for which Washington assembled one of the largest military coalitions in history) broke out; and, at the end of that same year, 1991, the Russian Empire, in its Soviet version, imploded.

Myth of the American “hyperpower”
With the world’s second economic power (Japan) experiencing a sharp slowdown, and the Soviet Union disappearing, the relative decline of American GDP enjoyed a trend reversal, albeit a slight and short one. As a result, Kennedy’s book, when not mocked, was often forgotten.
Then began a period of US intoxication with being the “single superpower” in a “unipolar world,” the “hyperpower,” in which Americans thought they could reshape the world in their image despite no longer having the strength to do so and even as new competitors were beginning to flex their muscles.
America’s relative decline did not depend solely on Japan’s rise, and certainly not on the USSR, but on the ineluctable tendency to uneven development; in Aristotelian terms, Japan and the USSR were the “accident”, and relative decline was the “substance.”

US Army soldiers discuss mission plans before moving to a simulated objective during training at Pohakuloa Training Area, Hawaii, Oct. 18, 2021. Photo By: Army Spc. Rachel Christensen.
Nonetheless, some US leaders took advantage of the accident to deal with the substance: the Gulf War was one episode; another was the intervention in Bosnia; and the enlargement of NATO to the east was yet another, just to recall the main stages (not to mention the progressive reopening to China after the Tiananmen Square massacre, seen as an Eldorado of easy and abundant profits).
The NATO enlargement of the 1990s has recently been thrust back into the center of international debate, following the Russian invasion of Ukraine. For the Russians and their friends, this enlargement is the “original sin” from which everything sprang, placing responsibility, they say, for Vladimir Putin’s “special military operation” entirely on Washington’s shoulders.

The (eternal) US-Russian confrontation
As in all ideologies, there is a pinch of truth (which make them plausible), which is greatly simplified and de-contextualized before being served to the masses as a soup of propaganda. The pinch of truth comes precisely from Washington’s unilateral decision to position itself, through NATO, in Central and Eastern European nations newly freed from the Russian yoke.
For context, however, we must look to the expansion into those very same territories by the European Union. NATO’s expansion preceded that of the EU; by five years in the case of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary (in 1999); a few months (in 2004) for Slovenia, Slovakia and the three Baltic states; and three years (still in 2004) for Bulgaria and Romania.
The buffer states between Russia and the heart of Europe, which lay at the center of American concerns after the two world wars, were again of burning topicality: those states could not be left to the exclusive control of Europe, because otherwise they would cease to be a buffer.
Now, if the United States has an incontrovertible strategic objective, it is precisely to prevent Europe (or, to be realistic, Germany and/or any group centered on Germany) from establishing a cooperation of any kind with Russia.

Controlling the world’s “heartland”
Since replacing the United Kingdom as the world hegemonic power, the Americans have inherited the “heartland” theory formulated by Sir Halford Mackinder. It essentially holds that if Eastern Europe (read Germany) takes control of the heartland (read Russia) its dominion over Eurasia, and therefore over the world, will ensue.
The theory reflects the constant British concern over a possible Eurasian continental union capable of contesting, and ultimately overthrowing, London’s hegemony. This is why the British intervened three times on the continent to prevent its unification: once against France and twice against Germany.
Mackinder’s thesis was revived during World War II by Nicolas Spykman, a Dutch-born Yale political scientist, who transformed it into the theory of “rimland”, that is, a “ring” of countries that could surround the heartland. In Spykman’s formulation, control of this ring becomes crucial for world control, a thesis later translated into the policy of containment, that is, of a cordon sanitaire around Russia.

NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg gives a press conference during a NATO summit at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization headquarters in Brussels on June 14, 2021. Photo: AFP / Olivier Hoslet
Containment was nothing more than the expansion to the Asiatic front of the first postwar system of buffer states, though it was deliberately misrepresented throughout the Cold War: its purpose, in fact, was not to “contain” Russia, which posed no serious threat, given its extreme weakness (George Kennan himself, “father” of containment, wrote in 1947 that “Russia will remain economically a vulnerable, and in a certain sense, an impotent nation”), but to contain Germany and Japan – that is, to cut off the legs of the pro-Russian factions in these two countries, leaving the cast-iron border control of the rimland to Stalin’s tanks.
The concern over a possible Eurasian continental union capable of challenging, and ultimately overthrowing, their world hegemony had passed from the British to the Americans. As Henry Kissinger openly confirmed:

“In the first half of the 20th century, the United States fought two wars to prevent the domination of Europe by a potential adversary… In the second half of the 20th century (in fact, starting in 1941), the United States went on to fight three wars to vindicate the same principle in Asia – against Japan, in Korea, and in Vietnam.”

Farewell to the notions of “a civilizing mission,” “the defense of freedom,” “an arsenal of democracy,” or a war on militarism, fascism or communism… Once the ideologies evaporate, the reality of the great powers’ relations of force remain, in which the strongest dictates the rules, rewrites history and forges the ideologies that everyone is bound to believe.
In 2011, Vladimir Putin launched his proposal for a Eurasian Union (one of the many attempts to recompose the Russian empire), intended to become an “essential component of Greater Europe… from Lisbon to Vladivostok,” the American secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, reacted promptly and frankly:

“There is a move to re-Sovietize the region. It’s not going to be called that. It’s going to be called a customs union, it will be called Eurasian Union and all of that… But let’s make no mistake about it. We know what the goal is, and we are trying to figure out effective ways to slow down or prevent it.”

If the risk, feared by Mackinder, Spykman, Kennan, Kissinger, Brzezinski and Clinton, is that of a possible union of forces between a great industrial power and the Russian heartland, it is evident that the threat to the United States today comes more from China than from Europe or Japan.

Driving a wedge between China and Russia
The attempt to drive a wedge between China and Russia is undoubtedly one of the strategic priorities of the United States, if not the strategic priority. With the war that began on February 24, Russia has rendered two great services to the United States:

• It has reunited, enlarged and rearmed NATO, removing the possibility of an agreement with Europe or even with just some European countries.
• It has heightened Beijing’s distrust of Moscow.

Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin pose for a group photo during the G-20 summit in Osaka, Japan, on June 28, 2019. AFP via Getty / Dominique Jacovides
Americans get the benefit, but a strategy cannot be built on the blunders of an adversary, and herein problems arise.
Meanwhile, the fact that there is an objective strategy (avoiding “second place for the United States,” in Obama’s words) does not necessarily mean that it becomes a subjective strategy, that is, consciously organized, planned, and implemented by a ruling class.

“There is no favorable wind for the sailor who does not know where to go,” Seneca wisely said; and the United States looks like that sailor: its relative decline has yet to be identified as such, and its political division means that any possible strategic hypothesis risks being modified – or even overturned – every four years.
Moreover, much of the country’s political class, drunk on ideologies, still feeds on the tale told by George W Bush’s advisor Karl Rove nearly 20 years ago: “When we act, we create our own reality”; and while specialists are scrambling to study or decipher that reality, “we’ll act again, creating other new realities.”

The several thousand “Roves” present in the American political class render their country the same service that Putin’s advisers, drunk on ideologies, render to theirs: with their good intentions and their stubborn and proud ignorance of geopolitical constraints, they pave the way to hell.

United States: end of an illusion of omnipotence - Asia Times

“I do not accept second place for the United States of America.” That simple statement, delivered to rousing effect by Barack Obama in his first State of

asiatimes.com

 

[jward]

OpsFires blast US back into the hypersonic race

Gabriel Honrada​

After a series of failures in its hypersonic weapons program, the United States conducted two separate successful hypersonic tests this month, a positive turn in its well-documented struggle to keep pace with rivals China and Russia.
On July 18, the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) announced a second successful test of the Hypersonic Air-breathing Weapon Concept (HAWC) in partnership with the US Air Force (USAF). A first successful hypersonic weapons test was conducted by the two in September 2021.

According to DARPA, air-breathing weapons use air captured from the atmosphere to achieve sustained propulsion, giving hypersonic weapons the speed and maneuverability needed to avoid air defenses and conduct quick strikes.
DARPA says that this month’s second HAWC test used data from last year’s successful test. After release from the launch aircraft, the weapon’s first stage boosted it to the speed required to start its scramjet motor, propelling it to Mach 5 for 300 nautical miles at an altitude of 60,000 feet.
DARPA notes that flight data from this successful test will inform future air-breathing hypersonic weapons development for the US Navy (USN) and USAF.
A few days earlier, on July 13, DARPA also announced that it had conducted last week a successful test of the Operational Fires (OpFires) hypersonic missile at the White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico.
DARPA said that a USMC logistics truck with the Palletized Load System launched the OpFires missile, making any vehicle in the US inventory with the system a potential launch platform. DARPA also highlighted that the test used US Army artillery and fire control systems to launch, opening the potential for inter-service joint operations, reinforcing systems compatibility and simplifying logistical requirements.

“This is a promising step toward a transporter erector launcher on-demand capability for accurately firing medium-range missiles from highly agile, readily available logistics trucks that are already in both the US Army and US Marine Corps inventory,” noted Lieutenant Colonel Joshua Stults, the DARPA program manager for the OpFires project.
Lockheed Martin, the main contractor for the OpFires weapon, stated that it features a unique throttleable rocket booster that can change its thrust to deliver payloads at medium range without energy bleed maneuvers, reducing the airborne time of the weapon and its vulnerability to anti-air defenses.
Design image of the launcher of the ground-based hypersonic medium-range missile system Operational Fires (OpFires) using a standard heavy military truck Oshkosh HEMTT LVSR (10×10), equipped with a system of loading/unloading and transportation of palletized cargo PLS (Palletized Load System) type “multilift” Image: Lockheed Martin
As previously reported in Asia Times, the US appears to lack a strategy or doctrine for its hypersonic weapons. The US has not released information on the weapons’ use, how cost-effective they would be or how they would be incorporated into a joint or combined doctrine and operations.

However, an article by Alan Cummings in the War on the Rocks defense publication notes the possible strategic goals the US aims to achieve with its hypersonic weapons.
First, he notes obviously that the US may deploy hypersonics to deter adversaries and reassure allies. The initial low numbers of such weapons send a potent message about US priorities and redlines in such deployments. He also notes that low-visibility deployments using land-based launchers that can be quickly surged and recovered may benefit this end.
Second, hypersonics can pressure US adversaries into signing new arms control agreements. For the US to negotiate from a position of strength and pressure near-peer rivals China and Russia to take arms control negotiations seriously, it must also develop the hypersonic capabilities that the latter are developing.
Third, hypersonics may provide new US response options against evolving counter-space capabilities. Cummings notes the US’ disproportionate dependence on space-based systems for command and control, communications, intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance makes these assets inviting targets.
Hypersonics can be used to take out enemy anti-satellite capabilities before they could be brought to bear or inflict damage before space-based systems are lost.
As most US hypersonics are armed with conventional warheads, this implies that they may be used in more tactical roles than those of China and Russia. These roles may include island defense and suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) missions.

Asia Times has previously reported on the USMC’s plans to acquire land-based Tomahawk cruise missiles, noting the advantages of land-based launchers in the South China Sea.
However, the Tomahawk is an aging 1970s subsonic design, which may not be effective against newer air defense systems. The USMC may thus opt to replace it with the OpsFires.
Land-based launchers are more survivable and cost-effective than ship-borne systems. When fielded in the territory of US allies, any strike against US land-based launchers would mark a significant escalation of hostilities.
Moreover, land-based launchers can complement air and naval power by serving as a near-constant presence in contested areas, providing operational and tactical cover for freedom of maneuver for the US and its allied forces.
In line with low-visibility deployments using mobile land-based systems, Asia Times has also reported that SEAL teams could be used for strategic reconnaissance missions, acting as covert eyes and ears for over-the-horizon targeting for land-based launchers.

For example, a SEAL team deployed on one of the South China Sea’s many features can use advanced sensors and targeting capabilities against passing enemy warships, relaying targeting data to land-based launchers, which would open fire on the target.
In such scenarios, land-based hypersonics would help penetrate enemy air defenses in the South China Sea, enabling the destruction of critical enemy targets. This March, Asia Times reported that China has fully militarized three of its islands in the South China Sea, arming them with anti-ship and anti-aircraft weapons.
The China-occupied Fiery Cross Reef in the South China Sea. Image: People’s Daily
Defense Post reported previously that China had deployed its advanced HQ-9B air defense system on Fiery Cross Reef, Subi Reef, and Mischief Reef in the South China Sea. According to the source, the HQ-9B is effective against supersonic aircraft, helicopters, cruise missiles and drones at an altitude of up to 30,000 meters, making it one of the most advanced weapons of its type.

US air-launched hypersonics may also figure prominently in SEAD missions, given their purported ability to evade current and future air defense systems by going against these systems themselves.
According to an article in the National Defense magazine, the US is looking into how to deliver air-launched cruise missiles against high-end integrated missile defense systems, says Mike White, principal director for hypersonics in the Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering.
Similarly, in an article in Air Force Magazine, US Army Chief of Staff General James McConville mentioned that hypersonics could destroy enemy air defenses and pave the way for subsequent USN and USAF aircraft strikes.
The HAWC fitted with a radiation-seeking seeker head can potentially replace or supplement the current AGM-88 Homing Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM) in US service, currently the US mainstay weapon for SEAD missions.

OpsFires blast US back into the hypersonic race

 

[jward]

US spending big on hypersonic-tracking satellites


The US has announced plans to spend US$1.3 billion on the development of advanced satellites designed to track hypersonic weapons, a move that underscores Washington’s rising concern about China and Russia’s hypersonic threats.
According to Derek Tournear, director of the Space Development Agency (SDA), the US does not operate satellites designed to monitor hypersonic weapons, stating “we have limited capability to do that tracking aspect,” and “clearly, we don’t have zero capability to do tracking,” as quoted in the South China Morning Post.

However, Tournear mentioned that the US’ new satellites would enable it to detect and track hypersonic missiles, predict where they are headed, and provide data to friendly forces to launch interceptor missiles.
C4ISTAR reports that L3Harris Technologies and Northrop Grumman Strategic Space Systems are the primary contractors for the project. Both defense contractors are producing prototype 14 satellites for the Tranche 1 Tracking Layer, which will eventually consist of hundreds of satellites in a low-earth orbit (LEO) constellation.
As mentioned in the South China Morning Post, Tournear notes that this project represents a fundamental shift in America’s space-based missile defense sensor architecture. US space-based missile defense sensors rely on a few large, expensive satellites that stay in orbit for 15 or more years.
The US aims to replace this legacy architecture with a two-tiered system operating in low-earth (LEO) orbit at 1,000 kilometers and medium-earth orbit (MEO) at 10,000 to 20,000 kilometers using cheaper satellites that are replaceable every five years. He also mentioned that a batch of 54 satellites will likely follow the first 28 satellites of the US’ new missile defense satellites.

A June 2022 study by the US Mitchell Institute notes China and Russia’s advances in hypersonic and anti-satellite weapons and mentions that current US space-based sensors lack defenses against these threats because they are locked in predictable orbits, which increases their vulnerability.
As previously covered in Asia Times, China is developing sophisticated anti-satellite weapons such as AI-powered hunter-killer satellites capable of deception maneuvers to capture enemy satellites and satellite-mounted directed energy weapons such as lasers and high-powered microwaves that aim to burn out enemy satellites.
Artist’s illustration of a satellite under attack by a directed-energy weapon. Photo: Facebook / Defense One
In addition, The Space Review reported this month that Russia is developing a new ground-based anti-satellite laser at its space observation center in the Northern Caucasus. The weapon, known as Kalina, is designed to blind the optical sensors of enemy satellites passing over Russian territory.

The same source also noted that Russia is developing satellite-mounted lasers designed to burn out the seeker heads of incoming anti-satellite missiles but may be adopted for offensive use against other satellites.
Given these threats, the Mitchell Institute study recommends that a new US space-based missile defense sensor network must provide persistent warning and precise tracking for ballistic and hypersonic threats while at the same time mounting defensive measures such as onboard defensive weapons with maneuver capabilities and decoys.
It also mentions that the US must use technologies to increase the maneuverability of satellites to increase their survivability, evade threats and fill in sensor coverage gaps in a post-anti-satellite attack scenario.
Asia Times has previously reported on US plans to use nuclear thermal propulsion in its satellites, giving them maneuver capabilities to confound enemy targeting, increase their operational flexibility for offensive and defensive operations, and evade anti-satellite weapons.

These threats and technological advances will likely be factored into any planned US missile defense system against hypersonics. For example, a February 2022 report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) think tank mentions that the US Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and SDA are developing several space-based sensors to track hypersonic weapons.
The report describes a two-tier early warning system against hypersonic weapons. The first tier of this system, called the Tracking Layer, is being developed by the MDA. It employs a constellation of wide-field-of-view sensor satellites in LEO to warn against hypersonic weapons launches.
Simultaneously, the SDA is developing the second tier called the Hypersonic and Ballistic Tracking Space Sensor (HBTSS) satellite constellation in MEO, capable of high-fidelity and latency performance to support hypersonic interception missions.

This early warning system against hypersonics would rely on a minimum of 50 small satellites to reduce unit cost while having proliferation and redundancy to provide resilience against anti-satellite attacks. Apart from proliferation, the report also mentions deploying additional sensors in MEO to further confound adversary anti-satellite warfare efforts.
The two-tiered system works by detecting hypersonics within LEO while maintaining track of hypersonic glide vehicles to relay targeting data to interceptor systems.
In an Air Force Magazine article, Tourney mentions that LEO satellites can track the heat signature of hypersonic weapons during their launch and that of HGVs as they maneuver towards their targets. Thus, the LEO-level Tracking Layer will be the primary system to detect and track hypersonics during their initial launch, glide, and terminal phases, which happen within the atmosphere.

The HBTSS detects the launch and separation of the first and second stages of a hypersonic weapon’s motors, continuously relaying satellite data to track hypersonic glide vehicles (HGV) to interceptor systems such as the Aegis shipboard missile defense system, as stated by Seapower Magazine.
However, the SM-6 Standard missile, the Aegis system’s latest interceptor, may be insufficient against hypersonic threats. US Vice Admiral Jon Hill stated in The Warzone that the SM-6 is the only weapon in the US arsenal that has some capability to take on such threats and described the missile’s capability as “nascent,” implying that it has only marginal interception capability against hypersonics.
The limitations of the SM-6 may have spurred the US to develop hypersonic interceptor missiles. Space.com reports that the MDA has awarded $60 million worth of contracts to Northrop Grumman and Raytheon to develop prototypes of a Glide Phase Interceptor (GPI), a next-generation interceptor missile against hypersonics.
As quoted in the same source, Northrop Grumman says that the GPI will ensure that the US can outpace and defeat evolving missile threats. At the same time, Raytheon stated that they would use digital engineering tools and build on existing technologies for faster and cost-efficient development.
The CSIS report also notes the limitations of an LEO/MEO-based satellite constellation for defense against hypersonic weapons.

Smaller satellites possess less power generation capability to mount more sophisticated sensors and communications equipment for hypersonic weapons tracking. Also, integrating sensor data from multiple satellites in different orbits will require parallel advances in satellite communications technology, signal processing and edge computing to reduce reliance on vulnerable terrestrial data centers.
Despite US advances in hypersonic weapons and defenses, it is unclear whether the US has a coherent strategy to defend against these new weapons or a sound rationale to research defensive technologies. A 2021 US Congressional Research Service report asks whether the acceleration of hypersonic weapons research, enabling technologies and defense options are necessary or even feasible.

A test launch of Russia’s Tsirkon hypersonic missile. Image: Twitter
Hypersonic weapons may not be the game-changing weapons they are touted to be. In a Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) article, senior analyst Dominika Kunertova notes that the military effectiveness and reliability of hypersonics are still unknown, that policymakers tend to exaggerate the capabilities of hypersonics and that the race to develop such weapons seems to be driven more by national pride than actual military advantages.
Kunertova also mentions that hypersonic weapons are not necessarily a “game-changer” because there are no effective defenses against conventional ballistic missiles, let alone hypersonic weapons which promise to evade the same unreliable defenses. She also says that hypersonic weapons’ tradeoffs between speed, range and accuracy require further research to understand fully these new weapons’ effects.
Furthermore, China and Russia may use hypersonics to circumvent existing arms control treaties. An article by the Union of Concerned Scientists notes that the New Strategic Arms Control Treaty (New START) does not explicitly restrict hypersonic weapons.

The source notes that New START was crafted with existing ballistic missile systems in mind and could be easily circumvented by putting nuclear warheads on new delivery systems such as HGVs or some other new rocket technology. Despite these doubts and counter-arguments against hypersonics, the US is not taking a zero-sum view of these weapons due to their potential threat to strategic security and stability.
The US 2019 Missile Defense Review notes the advantage that space-based sensors’ sizeable viewable area has in tracking and destroying hypersonic weapons. Space-based sensors can detect and track missile launches from any part of the globe, do not require complicated legal procedures for basing rights and could also be armed with interceptors to increase the chances of a successful intercept.

US spending big on hypersonic-tracking satellites - Asia Times

The US has announced plans to spend US$1.3 billion on the development of advanced satellites designed to track hypersonic weapons, a move that underscores

asiatimes.com

 

[jward]

Ukraine could push Japan, S Korea to go nuclear

Christoph Bluth​

The war in Ukraine called into question many of the fundamental pillars of the international order. The European security system that has developed since the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact has received a shattering blow. A war of aggression by a major power intent to destroy a neighboring state and annex significant territories has broken with major taboos, not to mention international law.
Apart from the obvious tragedy for the people of Ukraine, another potential casualty is the nuclear nonproliferation system which has existed since 1970. Putin’s blatant breach of the Budapest Memorandum, signed in 1994 by Russia, the UK and US relating to the accession of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), has upended security guarantees in Europe.

The memorandum was an assurance of territorial integrity for Ukraine after it agreed to dismantle the large nuclear arsenal that remained on its territory after the break up of the Soviet Union. By signing the memorandum, Russia – along with the US and the UK – agreed not to threaten Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan with military force or economic coercion. This has proved to be worthless.
And there’s the danger. If we now live in a world where major powers are fully prepared to embark on a full-scale war to achieve their territorial ambitions, then the assumptions of the NPT, according to which non-nuclear states can rely on the security assurances from the major powers, may no longer be valid. Many countries may think it prudent to go nuclear to avoid Ukraine’s fate.

Anxiety in Asia
This doesn’t stop in Europe. Allies of the US in Asia are wondering the extent to which the principle of “extended deterrence” (the protection afforded by America’s nuclear umbrella) is still viable. China’s increasingly aggressive pursuit of its foreign policy aims in recent years has been a major concern for Taiwan, where many question Washington’s policy of “strategic ambiguity” about how and to what extent the US would support the country.

China’s activities in the South China Sea, where it pursues its claims on maritime territories not accepted in international law, have also raised major concerns throughout the region. Japan and China have been at loggerheads for some years over a number of disputed territories including the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands.
Another concern is obviously North Korea’s nuclear program and its regular testing of ballistic missiles which could carry nuclear warheads and have a range which could easily threaten Japan and South Korea. If and when Pyongyang develops the capacity to hit targets in the continental US, this could well test America’s nuclear guarantee in Asia.

A nuclear South Korea?
There is increasing support within South Korea for the development of its own nuclear deterrent. A survey taken earlier this year found that 71% approved of South Korea going nuclear. This was in line with similar polls over recent years.
While the new South Korean government led by Yoon Suk-yeoul does not endorse such a policy and remains committed to the US-ROK alliance, there have been persistent voices in South Korea supporting a shift towards nuclear self-reliance.

There is also considerable pressure in Japan to abandon the post-war “Peace Constitution” which banned the country from maintaining anything stronger than a self-defense force – and the country recently doubled its military budget.
Japan has the technological capacity to develop nuclear weapons quickly – but the experience of US atomic attacks during the second world war remains a powerful restraint.
In March 2022 the late prime minister, Shinzo Abe, called for US nuclear weapons to be based on Japanese territory, presumably to deter both China and North Korea. This – predictably enough – provoked an angry reaction from Beijing, which asked Japan to “reflect on its history.”

Fragile security
For now, the US nuclear guarantee remains credible in the eyes of its Asian partners and the strategic situation on the Korean peninsula remains stable – despite the wrangling already described. It’s a very different situation from what is happening in Ukraine. The US already has forces on the Korean peninsula and is committed to South Korea’s defense.
North Korea is much more vulnerable than the US under any nuclear war scenario. If Pyongyang ever launched a nuclear strike, it would risk rapid and complete obliteration.
An obvious way to address the extended deterrence problem would be to redeploy US nuclear forces in South Korea, similar to Abe’s suggestion for Japan.

That would considerably enhance the credibility of a US security guarantee and would complicate China’s calculations, even with respect to Taiwan – despite all the noises from Beijing about reunification.
But South Korea faces the European dilemma – which is that the more credible its own capabilities become, the less the US will feel the need to commit its resources. While South Korea’s conventional capabilities are more than a match for the North Korean army and its obsolete equipment, it has no answer to the North’s weapons of mass destruction.
So far South Korea seems to have struck a sensible balance – going nuclear could upend all of that as it may cause Washington to withdraw entirely.

It seems that despite the flagrant violations of the security assurances by Russia and the increasing capabilities of the North Korean nuclear arsenal, the commitment to the NPT remains firm.
But this could change if the security environment in Europe and Asia continues to deteriorate and Russia and China become increasingly perceived as serious and realistic military threats.
If the reliability of the US as a security guarantor is weakened it could result in a fatal erosion of the assumptions of the NPT. This would make the pressure for indigenous nuclear arsenals – both in Asia and the Middle East – irresistible. This is something the “Great Powers” have taken pains to prevent since 1945.

Christoph Bluth is Professor of International Relations and Security, University of Bradford
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Ukraine could push Japan, S Korea to go nuclear - Asia Times

The war in Ukraine called into question many of the fundamental pillars of the international order. The European security system that has developed since

asiatimes.com