WAR 06-13-2020-to-06-19-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

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Housecarl

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Peter Kent Forster
Dr. Forster is a professor emeritus of Security & Risk Analysis in Penn State’s College of Information Sciences and Technology (IST), and an affiliate professor in Penn State’s School of International Affairs. As a member of a number of research centers, he studies risk and crisis management, situation awareness, social network analysis, counterterrorism policies and strategies. His work includes using simulations and tabletop exercises to improve command and control in counterterrorism and engaging government and civil society in addressing terrorist threats. Dr. Forster is the co-chair of the NATO/OSCE Partnership for Peace Consortium Combating Terrorism Working Group (CTWG), co-editor of NATO’s Counter Terrorism Reference Curriculum and co-course academic director of NATO's Defence Against Terrorism course.
Dr. Forster’s primary areas of interest are terrorism/counter-terrorism, risk and crisis management, and national and homeland security. Forster has co-developed a course on cybersecurity for the US government, facilitated international counterterrorism tabletop exercises and led grants exploring process and technology integration to improve law enforcement’s situational awareness. He is the co-author of Multinational Military Intervention, Stephen J. Cimbala & Peter K. Forster 2008 and Cognitive Systems Engineering Michael D. McNeese & Peter K. Forster, 2017, has authored articles on using technology in counter-terrorism, extremist recruitment models in the United States, understanding distributed team cognition in crisis situations, and American foreign policy and interests in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Dr. Forster holds a PhD. in Political Science (International Relations) from Penn State.

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in.reuters.com

Reuters | Breaking International News & Views

Find latest news from every corner of the globe at Reuters.com, your online source for breaking international news coverage.
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World News
June 18, 2020 / 12:27 AM / Updated 15 hours ago
Chinese fighter jets buzz Taiwan again, stoking tensions

2 Min Read

TAIPEI (Reuters) - Chinese air force aircraft approached Taiwan on Thursday for the fifth time in 10 days, before being warned away by Taiwanese fighters, the island’s air force said, in a further ratcheting up of tensions across the sensitive Taiwan Strait.

The Chinese J-10 and J-11 fighter aircraft flew into the southwestern part of Taiwan’s air defence identification zone in the morning, Taiwan’s air force said in a statement.
Taiwanese fighters, which regularly patrol the air space around the Chinese-claimed island, warned the Chinese aircraft over the radio, whereupon they left Taiwan’s air defence zone, it added, without giving further details.

Since June 9, China’s air force has flown at least four other similar missions and were each time chased off by Taiwanese jets, according to Taiwan’s military.

Taiwan has complained that China, which claims the democratic island as its own, has stepped up military activities in recent months, menacing Taiwan even as the world deals with the coronavirus pandemic.

China has not commented publicly on the last week of Chinese air force activity near Taiwan. Beijing routinely says such exercises are nothing unusual and are designed to show the country’s determination to defend its sovereignty.

China has never renounced the use of force to bring Taiwan under its control. One of China’s most senior generals last month said China would attack if there was no other way of stopping Taiwan becoming independent.

China is deeply suspicious of Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen, whom it accuses of being a separatist intent on declaring formal independence. Tsai says Taiwan is already an independent country called the Republic of China, its official name.

Reporting by Ben Blanchard; Editing by Simon Cameron-Moore
 
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AQIM confirms leader’s death | FDD's Long War Journal

AQIM has released an audio message confirming the death of its longtime emir, Abdulmalek Droukdel.
www.longwarjournal.org

AQIM confirms leader’s death

By Caleb Weiss | June 18, 2020 | weiss.caleb2@gmail.com | @Weissenberg7

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After two weeks of silence, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has finally confirmed the death of its emir, Abdelmalek Droukdel.

AQIM released a short audio statement from Abd al Ilah Ahmad, one of the group’s top media officials, earlier today. Ahmad confirms Droukdel’s death in northern Mali, while giving a short background on Droukdel’s long history in jihad. The video includes multiple snippets of archival footage.

Ahmad tries to encourage al Qaeda’s men across North Africa and the Sahel to continue fighting, especially against the French. And the jihadist spokesman uses Droukdel’s life and career as inspiration.

AQIM’s media team includes footage from a July 2010 speech given by Droukdel in order to bolster morale. In that speech, entitled “We Don’t Surrender, We Win or Die,” Droukdel promised a generational fight against those states waging war against AQIM.

Ahmad also warns local governments, primarily Algeria and the Sahelian states, that they will soon meet the same fates of Libya’s Moammar Qaddafi, Tunisia’s Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, and Algeria’s Abdelaziz Bouteflika.

No indication of who might be the new leader of AQIM was made by Ahmad.
Droukdel, who also went by Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud, was killed in a French operation on June 3 in northern Mali. Local reporting has placed the operation near the locality of Talhandak in Mali’s far north, near the Algerian border.

The French tracked Droukdel’s vehicle by drone. After receiving signals intelligence that confirmed his presence, French special forces then intercepted the vehicle alongside several helicopters. According to the French Ministry of Defense, the French troops and the al Qaeda men engaged in a brief gunfight before Droukdel and three of his men were killed.

One jihadist, a local Malian, was captured by the French soldiers and was later handed over to Malian authorities after being interrogated. Footage from the raid obtained by Le Monde also appear to confirm France’s version of events.

Not long after France’s statement, the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) confirmed that it also took part in the operation, providing further drone support overhead.

“U.S. Africa Command was able to assist with intelligence and ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) support to fix the target,” Col. Chris Karns, spokesman for U.S. Africa Command, told CNN’s Ryan Browne.

A follow up statement released by AFRICOM also stated that the United States performed its own independent assessment to confirm Droukdel’s death following the operation.

At the time, Florence Parly, France’s Minister for the Armed Forces, added that France had killed Droukdel and “several of his close collaborators.” One of these individuals is Toufik Chaib, a high-ranking member of both AQIM’s media and administrative wings.

So far it is unclear if Droukdel was already in Mali or if he had a made a special trip to the region from Algeria. French outlets Jeune Afrique and Libération have indicated that his arrival was possibly recent.

Additionally, a local journalist who cited a source close to al Qaeda’s Group for Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) reported that JNIM’s emir, Iyad Ag Ghaly, had recently requested a meeting with Droukdel.

If true, it is possible that Droukdel was in the region to meet with his deputies following increased hostilities with the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, among other concerns.

Caleb Weiss is a contributor to FDD's Long War Journal.
 
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theprint.in

Row over Iran nuclear program escalates as ally China warns of dire consequence

A US-backed resolution calling on Iran to 'fully cooperate' with IAEA requests has triggered a furious backlash from Iranian allies, including China.
theprint.in theprint.in

Row over Iran nuclear program escalates as ally China warns of dire consequence
A US-backed resolution calling on Iran to 'fully cooperate' with IAEA requests has triggered a furious backlash from Iranian allies, including China.
Jonathan Tirone 19 June, 2020 10:27 am IST

Vienna: Diplomacy over Iran’s atomic program erupted into a new level of rancor, with China warning that even a toned-down rebuke of Tehran over its alleged lack of cooperation with inspectors could unravel global efforts to contain the spread of nuclear weapons.

A U.S.-backed resolution drafted by three European powers at the International Atomic Energy Agency calls on Iran to “fully cooperate” with IAEA requests to visit two sites that may have hosted low-level atomic work two decades ago. But it has triggered a furious backlash from Iranian allies, with China submitting a 5-page statement to the Vienna-based IAEA on Thursday arguing the reprimand could demolish “the entire global non-proliferation regime.”


“The root causes of this situation lie in the unilateral and bullying practices of the U.S.,” Beijing envoy Wang Qun said. Should the resolution pass, he said, it could also sound the death knell for the landmark 2015 nuclear agreement between Iran and world powers. The Trump administration exited the deal in 2018 as it ramped up its economic offensive against the Islamic Republic, but other signatories vowed to salvage it.


The row amplifies growing divisions between east and west, with Beijing and Washington engaged in tit-for-tat sniping at each other’s policies and spheres of influence. The U.S. punished Chinese officials this week for imprisoning members of its minority Muslim population. At the same time, officials in China are warming to the idea of another term for President Donald Trump because of the damage his administration has done to traditional U.S. alliances.

“It is time now for us to speak formally and with one voice,” U.S. IAEA ambassador Jackie Walcott said in a statement on Thursday. “The resolution tabled by France, Germany and the U.K. is a balanced and fair reaction to Iran’s alarming actions. While we firmly believe the text could be strengthened, the U.S. accepts and fully supports the resolution and urges all other board members to do the same.

The prospect of a unified position on Iran faded as this week’s quarterly 35-nation IAEA meeting unfolded. Russia’s envoy, Mikhail Ulyanov, lined up with China in questioning the need for a resolution.


.@Amb_Ulyanov at the #IAEA BoG: Deeply disappointed and concerned that #Tehran and the Secretariat are yet to resolve the issue of access to two locations in Iran that are of interest to the Agency. However there are no reasons whatsoever to overdramatize the situation. pic.twitter.com/G0PIsK1cFX
— Russian Mission Vienna (@mission_rf) June 18, 2020
Click to expand...



Because Covid-19 social distancing measures remain in place, the IAEA meeting has been conducted remotely by video. Should a vote on the resolution be required, it will likely need to take place in person and unfold on Friday.


The IAEA reported last month that while its monitors are still conducting record inspections of Iran’s declared nuclear facilities as set out in the 2015 accord, they want to visit locations where small-scale research with nuclear material may have taken place in the early 2000s. The activity was first revealed in a cache of documents retrieved by Israel. IAEA monitors said they independently corroborated sufficient information to warrant inspecting additional sites.

The situation around the Iran deal “is gloomier than ever,” Iran’s representative to the IAEA, Kazem Gharib Abadi, said in a statement, pointing out the agency conducted 33 snap inspections last year. The ability to make short-notice visits was one of the key powers negotiated by world powers under the beleaguered pact.- Bloomberg

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Turkey Now Has Swarming Suicide Drones It Could Export
This is yet another wake-up call to the threat that low-end weaponized hobby-like drones pose and how widespread they will become.
By Joseph Trevithick
June 18, 2020
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The Turkish military reportedly plans to buy more than 500 quad-copter-type Kargu series loitering munitions, or suicide drones, in the near term. The Kargus, at present, can operate in semi-autonomous or manually-controlled modes, but work is underway to give up to 20 of them the ability to carry out mass attacks as a swarm, which could give Turkey's troops a potentially game-changing new capability.
Turkey's state-run Anadolu Agency news outlet first reported that Defense Technologies Engineering and Trade Inc., also known by its Turkish acronym STM, was expecting to deliver the hundreds of drones to the Turkish armed forces on June 15, 2020. It's not clear if this total order for "over 500" of the drones includes or is in addition to a purchase agreement for 356 Kargus that the Turkish government itself announced in January.



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Meet Israel’s ‘Suicide Squad’ of Self-Sacrificing DronesBy Tyler Rogoway Posted in The War Zone
Israeli Company Allegedly Flew A Suicide Drone On A Real Combat Mission In AzerbaijanBy Joseph Trevithick Posted in The War Zone
America's Startling Short Range Air Defense Gap And How To Close It FastBy Tyler Rogoway Posted in The War Zone
STM introduced the first generation Kargu in 2017 and the Turkish military first began receiving small numbers of the improved Kargu-2 variant last year. Turkish forces have reportedly at least deployed, if not employed, the drones during operations along the country's border with Syria last year.

The manufacturer says that Kargu, a name that literally translates as "hawk" in Turkish, and which is also used to refer to small mountain watchtowers, "has been engineered specifically for anti-terror and asymmetric warfare scenarios." The 15-pound Kargu-2 can fly at up to 90 miles per hour and can remain airborne for up to 30 minutes. It has a line-of-sight control link with a range of around six miles.


The Kargu-2 can also fly higher, has a longer range, and has the ability to remain in a designated area for a longer period of time compared to the earlier models. It also has updated targeting capabilities and improvements to reduce its auditory signature, the latter of which helps reduce the chance that an opponent will spot the drone before it's too late.
An operator on the ground can manually control any of the Kargu series drones and use their onboard sensors, which includes electro-optical and infrared video cameras and a laser imaging system, or LIDAR, to conduct general surveillance and identify and track targets. They can then direct the quad-copters to attack a designated threat, even if it's on the move. The loitering munitions can also safely return to their operators for re-use if no targets are found.
The drones can carry one of three different types of warheads, including a high-explosive fragmentation one for engaging personnel and other unarmored targets in the open, a thermobaric type good for targets in confined spaces such as buildings or caves, and a shaped charge for attacking lightly armored threats. Each one weighs around three pounds. The drone's warhead can also be set to function on impact or airburst above the target, the latter being a feature particularly useful for the fragmentation and thermobaric types.

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STM
A Kargu-2 drone. Its warhead is seen on top in the center.
The operator can also employ the Kargus as a traditional missile against fixed targets. In this method of attack, the drone would use its GPS navigation system to strike the desired location.
The Kargu series of drones can also operate in a semi-autonomous mode, wherein the operator directs the quad-copter to fly to a certain area and then detect and engage targets on its own. As long as the line-of-sight control link remains unbroke, the operator remains in-the-loop throughout the process and can redirect the drone or abort its attack, if necessary. Israel has long been a pioneer of these kinds of man-in-the-loop control systems, which are now the default for most suicide drones and have become increasingly popular on other types of munitions, as well.
Most importantly, however, last year, STM announced it was working to give the Kargu family of drones additional autonomy and the ability to work together in large swarms. The swarming technology is in development as part of a larger Turkish government program known as Kerkes, which is also looking to develop systems to improve the ability of drones to operate in GPS-denied environments, something that is increasingly a very real threat.



It's not clear how heavily networked together the company is expecting to make the armed quad-copters, but even being able to launch more rudimentary massed attacks with up to 20 of them at a time would offer a significant boost in capability.
Tests have shown that a single Kargu with the air-bursting high-explosive fragmentation warhead can effectively engage clusters of personnel within a circle around 20 feet in diameter. More than one working together could evenly engage threats across a relatively wide area. Beyond just being devastating to concentrations of personnel, this could enable quick large scale attacks against other soft targets, including convoys of light vehicles, parked aircraft, radar dishes and sensor systems, ammunition and fuel dumps, and much more. With a mixture of the different warhead options presently available for Kargu, a group of the drones might be able to carry out more complex attacks, as well.
If the swarming Kargus have the ability to operate in a fully-autonomous mode, within pre-set parameters, they could become even more capable. Swarms by their very nature can confuse and overwhelm an opponent's defenses, even those belonging to major militaries, causing havoc even if a significant number of them get shot down before they can reach their targets. This is a very real threat that War Zone has explored in detail on multiple occasions in the past.

Based on its general size and configuration, the Kargus appear to be a relatively low-cost option for providing this capability, which also underscores how low the barrier to entry for this kind of swarming technology is becoming. Beyond more robust military developments with regards to swarming, small quad-copter-type drones flying in large coordinated formations have been employed in the commercial sector for years now, as well.
The swarming technology STM is developing may also be applicable to other drones and loitering munitions it is developing now. Among its other products, the company also offers a fixed-wing tube-launched loitering munition, called Alpagu, which is very similar in form and function to AeroVironment's Switchblade and is now also in Turkish service.


It seems very possible that, in addition to providing these improved Kargus to the Turkish armed forces, STM could also seek to export them, proliferating this capability further around the world. STM has already said that it has received serious inquires about the Kargu series from at least three unnamed potential foreign customers. Turkey, as a whole, has become a powerhouse of drone development and production, employing larger types to great effect in Syria and Libya just this year.
This is precisely the type of weapon we have been warning about for years now. The fact that it is already here and potentially exportable should be yet another wake-up call to the level of threat low-end drones pose to U.S. and allied forces, as well as domestic infrastructure and VIPs.

"I argue all the time with my Air Force friends that the future of flight is vertical and it's unmanned," U.S. Marine General Kenneth McKenzie, head of U.S. Central Command, said at an event hosted by the Middle East Institute last week. "I'm not talking about large unmanned platforms, which are the size of a conventional fighter jet that we can see and deal with, as we would any other platform."

"I'm talking about the one you can go out and buy at Costco right now in the United States for a thousand dollars, four quad, rotorcraft or something like that that can be launched and flown," he continued. "And with very simple modifications, it can make made into something that can drop a weapon like a hand grenade or something else."
The Kargus, and their future swarming capabilities, could very well become the next major Turkish drone success story, for better or worse.
Contact the author: joe@thedrive.com

one video from article...maybe
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View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ue2Xa5dBFM4

posted for fair use
video & photos at source
www.thedrive.com

Turkey Now Has Swarming Suicide Drones It Could Export

This is yet another wake-up call to the threat that low-end weaponized hobby-like drones pose and how widespread they will become.
www.thedrive.com www.thedrive.com
 
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U.S. Air Force to Support Counter Narcotics Operations In Caribbean
Release No: 20-009 June 19, 2020
An E-3 Sentry (AWACS) and E-8 Joint STARS (JSTARS), and a KC-135 Stratotanker aerial refueling aircraft.


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A look at the types of the four aircraft the U.S. Air Force will temporarily deploy to Curaçao to support enhanced counter-narcotics operations with international partners targeting illicit traffickers in the Caribbean. Two patrol aircraft, an E-3 Sentry (AWACS) and E-8 Joint STARS (JSTARS), supported by two KC-135 Stratotanker aerial refueling aircraft, will fly detection and monitoring missions in international airspace to help U.S. and international law enforcement authorities disrupt and defeat transnational criminal organizations trafficking illegal narcotics in the region. (Graphic by SOUTHCOM Public Affairs. All images in graphic are U.S. Air Force file photos)


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MIAMI – The U.S. Air Force will temporarily deploy four aircraft and crews to Curaçao to support enhanced counter-narcotics operations with international partners targeting illicit traffickers in the Caribbean.
Two patrol aircraft, an E-3 Sentry (AWACS) and E-8 Joint STARS (JSTARS), supported by two KC-135 Stratotanker aerial refueling aircraft, will fly detection and monitoring missions in international airspace to help U.S. and international law enforcement authorities disrupt and defeat transnational criminal organizations trafficking illegal narcotics in the region. Approximately 200 airmen, including aircrews, maintenance technicians, logisticians and administrative personnel will support the operation.
The aircraft will operate from the Curaçao-hosted Cooperative Security Location (CSL), also commonly referred to as a forward operating location, in Willemstad. U.S. Air Force aircraft have previously conducted similar missions from the CSL under a counter narcotics partnership agreement with the governments of Curaçao and the Kingdom of the Netherlands dating back two decades.

Curaçao is a committed regional partner whose longstanding support for multinational counter-drug operations plays a vital role in stemming the flow of deadly narcotics trafficked globally by violent criminal organizations.
This is a national security issue. President Donald Trump announced the enhanced counter-narcotics operations April 1. Since then, the U.S. has collaborated with international partners in more than a dozen Caribbean interdiction events.
To date, U.S. enhanced counter narcotics operations have resulted in the seizure of more than 49 metric tons of cocaine and almost 13,000 pounds of marijuana, an estimated loss of $1.2 billion to transnational criminal organizations. Law enforcement authorities have also detained more than 160 drug smugglers during the operations.

The airmen followed strict COVID-19 prevention and mitigation guidelines while preparing for the deployment and will continue to do so while deployed to the island. To enter Curacao, all personnel will be held to strict medical standards including appropriate screening, masks, and restricted movement on the island for the first 14 days. The U.S. Forward Operating Location in coordination with the Government of Curacao will ensure close monitoring and robust prevention measures (including social distancing) for all US personnel throughout their stay.
Their deployment demonstrates U.S. Southern Command’s enduring promise of friendship, partnership and solidarity with its partners. Twenty-two countries support counter-narcotics efforts as part of Joint Interagency Task Force-South.

Committed nations contributing to the international effort have been involved in 75 percent of drug interdictions this year.
For decades, transnational criminal organizations have sought to exploit the Caribbean region to traffic narcotics, mainly cocaine, to the United States, Europe and other destinations worldwide. International cooperation against drug trafficking activities in the region denies criminal organizations the ability to establish a foothold, threaten citizen security and undermine lawful communities in the Caribbean.
###​
Additional information:

www.southcom.mil

U.S. Air Force to Support Counter Narcotics Operations In Caribbean

The U.S. Air Force will temporarily deploy four aircraft and crews to Curaçao to support enhanced counter-narcotics operations with international partners targeting illicit traffickers in the
www.southcom.mil


Jose Ruiz

Phone: 305-437-1205

Cell: 305-586-3657
southcom.miami.sc-cc.list.cmd-public-affairs@mail.mil
 
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Talk is cheap
Putin: Russia will soon be able to counter hypersonic weapons

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In this photo taken from undated footage distributed by Russian Defense Ministry Press Service, an intercontinental ballistic missile lifts off from a truck-mounted launcher somewhere in Russia. The Russian military said the Avangard hypersonic weapon entered combat duty. Little on the Pentagon’s drawing board illustrates more clearly the Trump administration’s worry about China and Russia than its work on hypersonic weapons. These missiles and aerial vehicles fly at speeds of a mile a second or faster and maneuver in ways that make them extra difficult to detect and destroy in flight. (Russian Defense Ministry Press Service via AP)

June 17, 2020 | Tags: Military, Russia, Vladimir Putin, World War 3

Russia will soon have the ability to counter hypersonic weapons deployed by adversaries, Russian President Vladimir Putin said Sunday.

Hypersonic weapons fly at speeds at least five times the speed of sound — or Mach 5 — and are widely viewed as a game-changing military technology.

For years specialists and military insiders have warned the U.S. has fallen behind its chief competitors, China and Russia, in the development of the weapons. Catching up and ensuring the U.S. is on par with its foes, and has the capability to defend against hypersonics in the event enemies deploy them, has become a top priority inside the Pentagon.

But Mr. Putin maintained that Moscow remains ahead of Washington in developing new, advanced weapons

“It’s very likely that we will have means to combat hypersonic weapons by the time the world’s leading countries have such weapons,” the president said, as quoted by RIA news agency.

Russia last year deployed its first nuclear-capable hypersonic missile. Mr. Putin unveiled Moscow’s Avangard system in late 2018, and boasted that it can fly at 20 times the speed of sound — or about one mile per second — rendering all current missile defense systems obsolete.

The Pentagon has since launched a new program to counter Russian hypersonic weapons as the military races to keep pace with U.S. foes.

www.endtime.com

Putin: Russia will soon be able to counter hypersonic weapons | Endtime Ministries | The Endtime Show

Russia will soon have the ability to counter hypersonic weapons deployed by adversaries, Russian President Vladimir Putin said Sunday.
www.endtime.com www.endtime.com
 
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www.al-monitor.com

Iraqi base attacks continue as Danes gear up for NATO training lead

Attacks continue to target bases in Iraq hosting international coalition and Iraqi forces. The Danish parliament has, meanwhile, voted to take leadership of the NATO training mission beginning in December and send a frigate to the Strait of Hormuz, a waterway through which much Iraqi oil passes...
www.al-monitor.com www.al-monitor.com

Iraqi base attacks continue as Danes gear up for NATO training lead

Attacks continue to target bases in Iraq hosting international coalition and Iraqi forces. The Danish parliament has, meanwhile, voted to take leadership of the NATO training mission beginning in December and send a frigate to the Strait of Hormuz, a waterway through which much Iraqi oil passes, beginning in late summer.

Shelly Kittleson
Jun 18, 2020

Rockets targeted Iraq’s Camp Taji north of Baghdad on June 13, the latest in a string of attacks widely believed to have been perpetrated by Iran-linked armed groups operating in the country.
No casualties were reported in the latest attack. Two Americans and one British soldier were killed in a previous rocket attack on Camp Taji in March.

The base hosts Iraqi and international forces and is expected to be used by a NATO training mission under Danish command starting in December.

The Danish parliament voted June 11 to take over the mission. Some 285 more Danish military personnel will be sent to Iraq for a year and a half as part of the mission, along with up to three transport helicopters for a year beginning in May 2021.
Meanwhile, a Rudaw news agency report June 10 quoted the US-led coalition as saying that Spain would pull its forces from the Besmaya Range Complex southeast of the capital by the end of the summer. The complex has been one of those used by the training mission.

Coalition spokesman Col. Myles B. Caggins III told Al-Monitor in a June 14 WhatsApp voice message that, in 2018 and 2019, “Military trainers from more than a dozen nations focused on training the Iraqi security forces — and the security forces in Kurdistan Region — on training the trainers. This meant taking junior military leaders and putting them through master instructor courses that were several weeks in length, observing them and evaluating them.”
Now, he said, “We have transitioned from training to mentoring and the next step of this will be with NATO Mission Iraq.”

Denmark will also be sending a frigate to the Strait of Hormuz — the only route to the open ocean for much of Iraq’s oil production and flanked by Iran — four months ahead of taking command of the NATO mission at the end of the year. The frigate will be part of the European-led Maritime Awareness in the Strait of Hormuz, among whose stated objectives is to contribute to regional de-escalation. The ship will have a crew of about 195 and a helicopter.
Attacks on tankers near the strait last year and Iranian threats to close the waterway entirely if Iran is prevented from exporting oil have led to regional tensions.

For about two years until late 2018, Denmark’s highly secretive, elite Jaeger Corps trained, advised and assisted a Qaim militia in the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU), the Aaly al-Furat Brigade.
This journalist was granted an exclusive interview with Jaeger Corps commander Kaare Jakobsen at the Ain al-Asad base in western Anbar the day before the team, which had partnered with the local Sunni PMU fighters, left the country in October 2018. Other Danish forces continued to train Iraqi military troops at the base until early this year.

The Aaly al-Furat Brigade was instrumental in the battle to retake the western Anbar towns of Zawiyah and Sagra from the Islamic State (IS) in January 2017. The brigade went on to help retake all the major cities in the Euphrates River valley stretching to the Syrian border in late 2017.

Iran fired over 20 missiles at the Ain al-Asad base Jan. 8. Denmark is reported to have been warned several hours beforehand that the attack on the base in Iraq’s western Anbar region would take place.
On June 11, the joint statement on the US-Iraq Strategic Dialogue said that over the coming months, the United States would “continue reducing forces from Iraq and discuss with the Government of Iraq the status of remaining forces as both countries” and the “Government of Iraq committed to protecting the military personnel of the International Coalition.”

The statement noted that another meeting a Strategic Dialogue Higher Coordination Committee meeting will be held in Washington, “likely in July.”

The same day, the Danish Defense Command issued a mission update saying, “The packing up of the Danish areas at the Al Asad air base in Iraq has now entered the final stage” and “most of the areas that the Danish soldiers have used for five years in training the Iraqi security forces have been fully prepared. They will soon be transferred to the US coalition partners when the Danish presence on the base is over.”

The statement added, “Since 2014, Denmark has participated in the international coalition fighting the IS terrorist organization in Iraq and Syria. The contribution, which was primarily based at the Al Asad air base in Iraq, is closing down, so Denmark is ready to take over NATO Mission Iraq.” The statement said Denmark would maintain a reduced contribution in Operation Inherent Resolve.

The NATO training mission website says, “NATO’s advisory activities are conducted in Baghdad” and that “training activities are carried out at the Iraqi military schools in the Baghdad area, Besmaya and Taji.”

Caggins told Al-Monitor via WhatsApp on June 13 that “fewer than 10,000 Coalition troops are in Iraq (about 5,200 US troops).”
In his voice message the following day, he said that the coalition had trained over 240,000 troops in the past five years and that it had “divested more than about 5 billion dollars’ worth of equipment.” He also said, “This includes things that are readily identifiable, including Humvees, weapons, ammunition, uniforms and repair parts to keep the vehicles up and running.”

Caggins stressed that the transfer of equipment is “done on a conditions basis,” requiring that “the units receiving the equipment have missions and operations against Daesh (IS)” and that “the leaders of those units have to be vetted for any human rights violations. And then of course there has to be a plan to secure the equipment and make sure that it is handed over properly and accounted for by the government of Iraq.”

Though much focus has been on the anti-US rhetoric and attacks on US forces in Iraq, other Western forces continue being a potential target for both IS and Iran-linked armed groups as well.

A Danish May 26 unclassified Situational and Threat Assessment noted that the “general situation” had worsened in much of Iraq over the previous eight months, citing Shiite militias as being a “political and military threat to Western interests and presence in the country”.

The assessment noted that “the Taji base in northern Baghdad is particularly vulnerable.”

More from Shelly Kittleson

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Jun 4, 2020
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Read more: Iraqi base attacks continue as Danes gear up for NATO training lead
 
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Revelations about Russia’s Nuclear Deterrence Policy - War on the Rocks

On June 2, the Kremlin published an unprecedented six-page document entitled Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Sphere of Nuclear
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Revelations about Russia’s Nuclear Deterrence Policy

Cynthia Roberts

June 19, 2020

Commentary

On June 2, the Kremlin published an unprecedented six-page document entitled Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Sphere of Nuclear Deterrence. Although this statement of Russia’s official position on nuclear deterrence policy does not overturn current military doctrine, it is notable for identifying the range of threats that Russia seeks to deter with its nuclear forces, clarifying Russia’s approach to nuclear deterrence, and articulating the conditions under which Moscow might escalate to the use of nuclear weapons. Given Russia’s nuclear stockpile of approximately 4,310 warheads and the deteriorating relations between Moscow and the West, such issues are vital to global peace and security.

The set of public statements, or declaratory policy, on nuclear deterrence matters — especially for American analysts — because it gives insight into how the role of Russian nuclear weapons has evolved over time in response to technological innovation, international challenges to the security of Russia’s nuclear deterrent policy, and internal debates in Moscow over the details of military policy and how best to ensure a credible nuclear deterrent posture. Despite sharing some similarities with the deterrence policies of the United States — such as maintaining a nuclear triad to address threats to the survivability of land-based forces and considering limited nuclear options to deter further escalation or de-escalate a conflict — important elements of Russia’s approach to nuclear deterrence are unique.



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Analysts should read Principles of State Policy extremely carefully and with a Russian lens. Importantly, Russia experts should appreciate that Moscow is animated by a persistent fear that Washington seeks to neutralize Russia’s strategic deterrent. As a result, the military is fixated on preemption to prevent a disabling first strike, even as the political leadership has traditionally resisted pre-delegating nuclear authority. The document also shows that Russian nuclear doctrine has focused more on ensuring deterrence and less on nuclear coercion for aggressive aims.

American Views on Russian Nuclear Policy

American strategists need to understand how the contents of Principles of State Policy fit into the larger body of evidence about Russia’s nuclear decision calculus. As a start, the new document indirectly addresses Western concerns that Russian strategy embraces limited nuclear employment in future regional conflicts to signal its resolve and “compel an end to a conventional conflict” that Russia starts. In other words, Moscow would seek to “escalate to de-escalate” “a conflict on terms favorable to Russia.”

U.S. policymakers mistakenly consider this de-escalation concept in primarily coercive terms by which Russia lowers the nuclear threshold to consolidate battlefield success. Then, they elevate this interpretation into an ominous component of Russian military doctrine that must be countered, as reflected in the 2018 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review and other official statements. In fact, “escalate to de-escalate” and other concepts for controlling escalation have been discussed for decades in Russian military journals. However, the phrase appears nowhere in official Russian doctrine. Though Principles is consistent with the Russian preference to leverage the risk and uncertainty of potential nuclear escalation to enhance its deterrence of adversaries, it avoids language that would reinforce U.S. misconceptions.

Experts have speculated about a classified document with almost the exact same title, “Principles of State Policy in the Sphere of Nuclear Deterrence Until 2020,” that was approved by then President Dmitry Medvedev in Feb. 2010 on the same day the military doctrine was issued. That document, unlike either the 2020 Principles or official Russian government doctrine from both 2010 and 2014, reportedly contained references to nuclear preemption. The latest version of official Russian military doctrine, which was released in 2014, states that

The Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and/or its allies, as well as in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is threatened.
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One reason for speculation that the secret doctrine was different from the published text was the 2010 debate on the subject within the Russian leadership. Preemption advocates like Nikolai Patrushev, secretary of the Russian security council, and Gen. Yuri Baluevsky, a former chief of the general staff, saw preemption as a way to counter the threat of America’s conventional prompt global strike capabilities. Detractors, including Col. Gen. Viktor Esin, a former chief of staff of the Strategic Rocket Forces, didn’t see preemption as credible in that role. A decade ago, Russian opponents of preemption apparently won the battle over the 2010 official doctrine. Nevertheless, it remains unclear what was in the secret variant and whether there is a secret version of the new Principles document.

Troublesome incremental changes in Russian nuclear declaratory policy continued to appear, notably in the 2017 naval doctrine, which contends that “demonstrating the willingness and determination to employ force, including non-strategic nuclear weapons” strengthens deterrence in conditions of an escalating military conflict. In 2014 during the Ukraine conflict, President Vladimir Putin and other officials reinvigorated the public discussion on nuclear operational policy and simultaneously launched a nuclear saber rattling campaign to signal Russian national interests while preserving ambiguity about how far their actions would go. Putin again underlined the threat posed by a disarming strike that uses non-nuclear, high-precision weapons against key sites of Russia’s military infrastructure, telling a meeting of the Valdai Club in 2015 that such weapons are “comparable in their effect to nuclear weapons.”

Principles enumerates similar dangers that drive Russia’s need for a nuclear deterrent — none of which are surprising or new. Besides global strike capabilities, the document lists the possession and proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, the deployment of missile defenses, cruise missiles, hypersonic weapons, directed energy weapons, combat drones, and other nuclear-capable systems near Russia, including U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe that are part of NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements.

In Clause 10, Principles also essentially reiterates the language of the 2014 military doctrine, stating that nuclear deterrence is ensured when Russian nuclear weapons, support forces and facilities, as well as command and control systems are maintained at a level of readiness that “guarantees the infliction of unacceptable damage on an aggressor in whatever situation.” Thus, there is no downshifting to a less demanding requirement, such as assured retaliation, for strategic nuclear forces.

What’s New in Russian Nuclear Strategy?

What is new and most striking in Russian nuclear strategy is how Principles handles the possible employment of nuclear weapons if deterrence fails. Section III on “Conditions under which the Russian Federation Transitions to the Use of Nuclear Weapons,” especially Clause 19, specifies four conditions that could lead to nuclear use. The first such condition is the possession of reliable information about the launch of ballistic missiles to attack Russian territory and/or its allies. This situation opens the possibility for Moscow to launch Russian nuclear weapons on warning of a nuclear attack instead of delaying retaliatory action until confirmation that targets are destroyed or alternatively launching while an attack is underway. Developed during the Cold War, the “launch on warning” option was considered by both sides as a means to strengthen nuclear deterrence by helping to guarantee retaliation. But, if adopted, launch on warning is also associated with the significant risk of false warning alerts and an accidental launch. The second condition is the use of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction by an adversary against Russian territory and/or its allies. Next, the third condition has to do with actions taken against Russian critical government or military installations by an adversary that would have the effect of disrupting Russia’s capacity for nuclear retaliation. Finally, the fourth condition in which Russia could employ nuclear weapons is in the event of aggression against Russia using conventional weapons that threaten the very existence of the state.

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Putin and other officials have hinted at launch on warning, but such statements have not previously appeared in official documents. Even then, it is unclear whether the leadership really means launch on warning or the current posture of launch while under attack, supported by the semi-automatic Perimeter system. This system reportedly involves a degree of pre-delegation of authority to ensure that decapitation does not prevent retaliation. The third subclause of Principles’ Clause 19 is also noteworthy as it raises concerns about threats to the nuclear enterprise that are not specified but likely include cyber attacks against command and control infrastructure and/or attempted leadership decapitation.

It’s possible that the debate over a launch on warning and preemptive strikes is not resolved by the new document. It’s also possible that Moscow is concerned about potential U.S. missile deployments in Europe. With the termination of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, Col. Gen. Esin predicted that the United States would return ground-based nuclear missiles to Europe and, because of such missiles’ short flight time to Russian targets of about six minutes, Moscow would “abandon the doctrine of retaliatory strike by ‘launch under attack’ [otvetno-vstrechnyy udar] and move to the ‘doctrine of preemptive strike’ [uprezhdayushchiy udar].” It is curious that Principles only specifies launch on warning for ballistic missile attacks. Is this phrasing intended to fuel Western opposition against the return of Pershing II or similar intermediate-range ballistic missiles to Europe, or is it related to Russia’s geography problem that constrains warning time when U.S. submarine-launched ballistic missiles are launched from the Atlantic Ocean or closer to Russia?

In 2019, the United States tested both a ground-launched, intermediate-range cruise missile and ballistic missile, and dismissed Putin’s proposed freeze on missile deployments (preserving about 100 of Russia’s non-INF Treaty compliant SSC-8/Novator 9M729 ground-launched cruise missiles). However, the United States disavows intentions to return nuclear intermediate-range missiles to Europe. Both sides are also developing conventional and nuclear prompt global attack capabilities, including hypersonic weapons that similarly raise concerns about crisis stability given their greater maneuverability to change direction and avoid defenses. Some experts worry that such weapons may lead states fearing a nuclear attack in a crisis to respond promptly on warning — or even preemptively.

Principles also mentions the role of “uncertainty” in deterrence, which — at one level — is evidently a factor underlying Putin’s nuclear threats. With respect to uncertainty in ensuring a survivable second-strike capability and nuclear command, control, and communications, both Soviet history and U.S. experience are again instructive. Although it invested in a more survivable triad, Washington has faced the vulnerability of its land-based forces and, like Moscow, seeks to maintain a resilient nuclear command, control, and communications system despite myriad challenges, including some from new Russian and Chinese anti-satellite weapons. American policymakers historically debated a launch on warning posture — especially for U.S. ground-based intercontinental ballistic missiles — yet resolved, according to a Reagan administration nuclear employment policy directive, not to irrevocably rely on a launch on warning posture but to “leave Soviet planners with strong uncertainty as to how we might actually respond to such warning.”

From the standpoint of national policy, Principles, which was issued by presidential decree (ukaz), is a reminder that Putin is the most actively engaged Russian leader on nuclear weapons since Nikita Khrushchev. Putin is far more successful than Khrushchev in rebuilding Russian military and nuclear capabilities without breaking the economy or losing power while also perhaps the most nuclear attentive current leader of any contemporary nuclear weapons state. Principles reminds us that, like the American president, the Russian president has the responsibility to decide the use of nuclear weapons. Putin is unusually blunt in signaling Russia’s willingness to exploit its nuclear strength and declares the active deterrent relevance of nuclear weapons such as in the event that the United States or NATO attempt to use force to reverse Russia’s annexation of Crimea. This coercive form of nuclear signaling reflects the Russian emphasis on deterring major powers by means of intimidation and the punishing use of Russian nuclear forces.

Russian Nuclear Forces

Putin has presided over Russia’s most extensive and costly nuclear modernization program since the Cold War, which has led to the development of six new nuclear systems designed to ensure a robust deterrent and capabilities for multiple contingencies. Russia’s exotic new systems — especially the Avangard nuclear-armed hypersonic glide vehicle that will sit atop an intercontinental ballistic missile and the multi-megaton Poseidon, a nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed torpedo with transoceanic range — while not necessarily designed to achieve greater destruction than the current arsenal, are not counted under New START Treaty limits but vividly challenge assertions of U.S. nuclear primacy. They give credence not only to deterrence but also to Putin’s demands to “listen to us now” and take Russian interests seriously. For reassurance, which reflects the other side of the coin that nuclear war is best avoided, Putin embraces the reality of mutual assured destruction, and disavows that Russia would attempt all-out preventive nuclear strikes — but hasn’t ruled out more limited preemptive strikes.

What about a potential Russian fait accompli operation against a U.S. ally or partner that Moscow could terminate with the limited use of low-yield nuclear weapons in accordance with the so-called “escalate to de-escalate” concept? Current and former Western officials infer aggressive intentions from increased Russian deployments of tactical and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, including the SSC-8, from Russia’s aggression towards Ukraine, and from their own confirmation bias in reading Russian military statements about nuclear use for de-escalation. Indeed, the 2018 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review asserts that “Russia has demonstrated its willingness to use force to alter the map of Europe and impose its will on its neighbors, backed by implicit and explicit nuclear first-use threats.” American conflict scenarios start with Russian aggression and shift to the Russian first use of nuclear weapons in either demonstration or small strikes to coerce NATO to abandon allies.

Given Russia’s large and growing stockpile of non-strategic nuclear weapons, providing credible response options to deter limited nuclear attacks is a prudent measure. One such response option involves modifying some W76 Trident II warheads to include survivable low-yield W76-2 warheads on U.S. nuclear ballistic missile submarines. These modifications, which do not increase the total U.S. nuclear stockpile, strengthen the package of available limited nuclear options to demonstrate U.S. credibility and will to respond to even limited Russian nuclear first use, helping ensure that attempted Russian aggression will fail.

On the other hand, U.S. statements and analyses about Russian writings on escalation are frequently problematic or incorrect, relying on quotations out of context or Russian military debates about proposed changes to doctrine. Of course, Russians do not write about how they will seize the Baltic states and lob a few nuclear missiles at NATO allies to convince them to abandon the fight; at the same time, there is no expectation embedded in Russia’s strategy that they can escalate their way out of failed conventional aggression, as U.S. officials frequently allege. Rather, a willingness to escalate is deemed essential for deterrence by providing a means to impose costs, increasing the risk of what comes next, or denying the opponent his objective. The deterrent logic of resorting to escalation with the limited use of nuclear weapons could be to compel the United States and its allies to back down when Russian critical assets are under aerospace attack, as noted in Clause 19. Other than demonstrating a readiness and resolve for deterrence, official Russian doctrine does not specify how Moscow might employ its non-strategic nuclear weapons.

With this detail in mind, Western readers should resist misinterpreting Clause 4 in Section I about “General Principles,” which states that, besides deterring aggression against Russia, the objective “in the event of a military conflict” is to “prevent the escalation of military actions and end them under conditions acceptable” to Russia and/or its allies. In previous official statements, the standard formulation was to end conflict on “favorable” terms; now, it expects only “acceptable” conditions. Perhaps this change is another signal that Russian doctrine should not be erroneously characterized as “escalate to win.” Principles goes on to underscore the defensive nature of nuclear deterrence, the aim for sufficiency in force requirements, and that Russia considers nuclear weapons solely as a deterrent — the use of which would constitute an extreme and necessary measure.

This interpretation is not to deny that Russian planners probably have secret nuclear weapons employment guidance that specifies a range of possible options for integrating conventional and nuclear forces in support of global or regional objectives. However, Principles is not that document. Instead, it outlines Russian ideas about deterrence and only hints at deterrence/employment trade-offs.

Consider the Audience and the Context

Principles of State Policy Nuclear Deterrence is clearly aimed at multiple audiences. The Kremlin seeks to signal its updated declaratory policy to domestic stakeholders — like the Russian military and defense community, as well as diplomats dealing with security and arms control. Moreover, the document is meant to shape opinion among international opponents and potential partners.

Nevertheless, it will not resolve all the debates about Russian nuclear policy. The document’s timing follows Washington’s termination of the INF Treaty after Moscow refused to come back into compliance. It is probably no accident that Principles emerged while the U.S. is engaged in its own nuclear modernization program. Russians perceive further U.S. improvements to strategic forces, both conventional and nuclear, as part of a continuous effort to stalk Russia’s nuclear deterrent and deny Moscow a viable second-strike option.

Another reason that Principles should be read through a Russian lens involves Russia’s long preoccupation with forestalling the risk of potentially fatal first blows — from preempting its adversaries in 1914, which led to disaster and defeat in World War I, to the opposite decision in 1941, when Stalin rebuffed the General Staff for advocating a preemptive attack against the German army massing on the border. The German invasion led to catastrophe and near defeat for Russia before its arduous and costly victory in World War II. From this experience, the Russian military learned not to cede the initiative or wait to act until the enemy lands its devastating first blows but, instead, to anticipate and when feasible preempt the enemy. This lesson is arguably not the right one for either the circumstances in 1941 or the nuclear age. Even if it’s only a coincidence that Principles emerged at the beginning of June, in between the 75th anniversary of Russia’s victory in the Great Patriotic War, which was rescheduled because of the novel coronavirus pandemic, and the remembrance of the German attack on June 22, it should be remembered that Russia’s attention to preemption — both as an opportunity and a threat as from a surprise nuclear strike — has strong historical roots.

Looking Ahead

Debate over Russian nuclear intentions will not end with the publication of Russia’s new statement about its deterrence policy — nor should it since both the United States and Russia consider the nuclear deterrence mission as the bedrock of their national security. Nevertheless, U.S. policymakers and analysts should read Russian statements and publications more carefully to avoid succumbing to confirmation bias. A better understanding of Russian intentions and perspectives would help advance critical analyses of the nuclear policy challenges facing the United States and its allies.

It’s doubtful that Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Sphere of Nuclear Deterrence will impact the current stalemate in nuclear arms control, although that may be one of its motivations. The document mentions that Russia’s principles for nuclear deterrence are in compliance with arms control obligations and universally recognized norms of international law. However, there is little in Principles that will likely energize the Trump administration to negotiate an extension of the New START Treaty or settle on a concrete plan to build on it.

What this new document could do is structure future strategic stability talks, which Moscow and Washington agreed to resume in May. Given misconceptions about doctrines, policy directives, and intentions, there is an advantage in seeking improved explanations and airing disagreements, especially in the nuclear realm where miscalculations can have catastrophic consequences.


Cynthia Roberts is a professor of political science at Hunter College, City University of New York, and a senior research scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University.
 
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China’s Strategic Assessment of the Ladakh Clash
Yun Sun

June 19, 2020


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In early May, Chinese and Indian troops confronted each other along their remote, disputed border in the Himalayas. For 40 days, the two sides engaged in a tense standoff, but a fragile peace held. On June 15, all that changed. Fighting with rocks and wooden clubs wrapped in barbed wire, dozens of soldiers were killed in hand-to-hand combat along desolate ridges high above river gorges. Some soldiers reportedly fell hundreds of feet to their deaths.

China and India — the two most populous countries in the world, and both nuclear-armed — are now engaged in the most dangerous border crisis since they fought a war in 1962. For now, hopes that cooler heads would prevail in Beijing and New Delhi appear misplaced.
At issue is the western sector of the disputed border, between Indian-controlled Ladakh and Chinese-controlled Aksai Chin. The escalating troop deployment, tension, and death toll have pushed tensions to their highest levels in over 50 years. While both China and India have shown a clear interest in de-escalation and dialogue — demonstrated by their relatively calm and non-escalatory statements after the deadly skirmish on June 16 — the latest developments mark a new low in bilateral ties. Restoring a fraught peace now will be easier said than done.


The timing and nature of the confrontation in the Himalayas raise critical questions about China’s strategic calculations and tactical objectives. Tactically, China wants to put an end to the infrastructure arms race along the border, but strategically is in no hurry to resolve the disputes as it bogs India down as a continental power. China is pushing for the territory occupied in the 1962 war as a reaction to perceived Indian exploitation of China’s vulnerability due to COVID-19 and deteriorating relations with the United States.
Some outside observers might see antagonizing India as strategically unwise — it may seem imprudent, after all, for Beijing to confront a large, important neighbor over a barren stretch of mountainous terrain — but China believes it needs to stand up to India whatever the cost. How Beijing weighs the pros and cons of its policies toward the disputed border will have significant implications for regional stability and the geopolitical ties among the China, India, and the United States.

Background
China and India currently have three sectors in their border disputes: the eastern (90,000 square kilometers in Arunachal), the middle (near Nepal), and the western (33,000 square kilometers in Aksai Chin/Ladakh). Longstanding disagreements over the border have plagued bilateral ties since the founding of the Republic of India in 1947 and the People’s Republic of China in 1949. Such differences have resulted in at least one war — the China-India war of 1962 on both the eastern and western sectors — and numerous confrontations and standoffs since then.
The situation with the eastern and western sectors is particularly dire for China. The eastern sector — the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh (which the Chinese ambassador to India claimed to be Chinese territory in 2006 ) — includes the Tawang district, the birth place of the 6th Dalai Lama. Any acknowledgement of Indian sovereignty over it will undermine China’s sovereignty over Tibet, as this would imply the Dalai Lama is Indian. The western sector — Aksai Chin — offers the only direct road connection (National Highway G219) between China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and the Tibet Autonomous Region. In the event of major unrest in either area, which is home to millions of ethnic minorities, China will have to rely on G219 for access. Losing Aksai Chin, in other words, would jeopardize the stability of China’s entire western frontier.

Since 2016, China has significantly built up infrastructure on its side of the border. This was done for strategic and tactical reasons. The strategic factor was China’s 13th Five Year Plan (2016 to 2020) and new stipulations on transportation infrastructure development in the border regions announced in 2016. Unlike the previous plans, which focused on the development of intra-regional roads within border regions, the 13th Five Year Plan prioritizes an inter-regional transportation network through the “civil-military fusion strategy.” This mandate requires troops and local governments in the border region to jointly boost road construction outward for transnational networks.
Building infrastructure along the border dovetails with China’s Belt and Road Initiative, President Xi Jinping’s flagship foreign policy initiative involving the use of global infrastructure development to expand Chinese influence. Road construction toward India is listed as one of the five priority areas (others being North Korea, Myanmar, Russia, and Mongolia) stipulated in the 13th Five Year Plan in line with this campaign. However, given the border disputes, road construction in India’s direction has inevitably run into problems. The infrastructure development that led to the 2017 Doklam standoff also originated from the same mandate.

Local and tactical considerations have also animated Chinese decision-making. Traditionally, both China and India have been keen on a solid presence and control in the eastern sector of the border, which can be traced back as early as India’s Assam Rifles and China’s People’s Liberation Army border patrol in the 1950s. The persistent presence has created much less ambiguity in both sides’ actual control in the disputed territory, as well as their mutual understanding of them — as a result, each side has less room for advancement. However, in the western sector, due to the high altitude and harsh weather conditions, neither side is able to permanently station troops in certain areas, leaving ample room for minor changes in force posture and control of territories in the disputed regions. This is why tensions tend to flare up in the western sector much more frequently than in the eastern sector in recent years — there is more room for imagination, advancement, and alterations.

The Trigger: What Line of Actual Control?
The current standoff began on May 5 with physical confrontations near Pangong Lake in Ladakh between 250 Chinese and Indian soldiers. Tussles between another 150 soldiers along the Sikkim-Tibet border followed four days later. Several rounds of meetings have taken place seeking to resolve the standoff, including military officers’ meetings on May 18, 20, 22, and 23; diplomatic consultations in late May and early June; and a senior corps commander-level meeting in Moldo on June 6. Despite the “important consensus” reached at the June 6 meeting, nine days later, the deadly clashes broke out.
The Chinese have attributed the incursions and standoff to Indian construction of roads and air strips in the Galwan Valley, while in reality, China has also been building roads in the nearby region. Such construction not only boosts sovereignty claims, but also strengthens strategic positions and tactical advantages. India has insisted that China’s construction has taken place on Indian territory, or at least on the Indian side of the Line of Actual Control (LAC), or de facto border. But that’s precisely the problem — there is no consensus between the two over a mutually accepted LAC.
Historically, the Chinese consistently stick to the LAC of Nov. 7, 1959 and the Indians stick to the LAC of Sept. 8, 1962. China argues the territory between the two LACs was “unjustly occupied by India” during those three years and was precisely the cause of the 1962 Sino-India War. To date, both sides insist they have been operating within their side of the LAC per these competing definitions.

China’s Three Nos: No Indian Posts, No Clarification of the Line of Actual Control, and No Hurry
Privately, the Chinese see Indian infrastructure development in the area from which China withdrew after the 1962 war as a consistent and repeated effort by Delhi that “needs to be corrected every few years.” According to Chinese government analysts that I’ve spoken with, the precondition for China not to enter the 20-kilometer zone from the 1959 LAC (from which it withdrew in 1962) is that India would refrain from entering as well. However, that Chinese position does not appear to be based on Indian agreement. For the Chinese, the infrastructure arms race in the border region has enabled the repeated incursions and changes to the status quo, and therefore needs to be stopped. Otherwise, all the things China fought for in the 1962 war would have been in vain.
The 2013 Daulat Beg Oldi incident is a good example of such an infrastructure arms race. During that incident, China set up camps in the region, leading to India retaliating with its own encampment. The 20-day standoff ended with the Chinese dismantling bunkers near Depsang, the Indians dismantling bunkers in Chumar, and both sides withdrawing.
Chinese officials do not want to engage in legal and political battles on the clarification of the LAC, which had been a priority with India before 2003 (the year when New Delhi formally recognized Tibet as a part of China). Despite the historical prominence and importance of the LAC, since 2008, clarification of the LAC has been removed from official bilateral documents.

The Chinese see the clarification of the LAC as an impossible, lost cause because the two sides simply do not share the same historical records or perspectives. Attempts to clarify the LAC will not bring clarity, but chaos and complications. Following this logic, the Chinese argue that resolving the border can only come from a political package deal with India, not a technical one. Historically, Premier Zhou Enlai had hoped to trade Indian sovereignty of the eastern section for Chinese sovereignty of the western section, which was rejected by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. From 1960 to 1980 — from Zhou to Deng Xiaoping — Beijing had consistently stuck to that proposal. However, India rejected it until China began to adjust its position in the mid-1980s and treat Tawang district as an uncompromisable issue. That deal is no longer on the table.

A border settlement between China and India is unlikely in the foreseeable future, and Beijing believes it has little incentive to push for a quick resolution. China’s priority remains crisis management and escalation prevention, until India is willing to embrace a package deal which basically follows the earlier trade between the eastern section and the western section, with the exception of Tawang. While the Chinese understand the Indian sense of urgency to resolve issues between the two countries, Beijing sees the unsettled border as leverage to bog down India in the region and undermine its global potential. For China, the Chinese and Indian demands are different and asymmetrical by design. Key concessions India demands from China on the border settlement are hard commitments that cannot be reversed. By contrast, what China seeks from India, such as its neutrality in the U.S.-Chinese strategic competition, is ephemeral and easily adjustable. While New Delhi sees addressing the border issue as a prerequisite for India to trust China, Beijing doesn’t believe that relinquishing its leverage will in any way stop India from conducting hostile actions down the road, such as aligning with America to undermine Chinese interests in the Indian Ocean region.
 
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China’s Strategic Calculations
China’s obstinance and assertiveness in the current standoff came as a surprise to some. In the view of foreign observers, China is pushing India too harshly at a time when China needs to retain India’s friendship, given Beijing’s deteriorating ties with Washington and the reputational damage China has suffered due to its culpability in the global pandemic. This logic holds some truth, but fails to appreciate China’s concern that India is exploiting its vulnerability, particularly at a time when Beijing is grappling with COVID-19. When Chinese officials concluded that India was leveraging China’s weaknesses to make territorial gains in the disputed region, Beijing felt it could not indulge New Delhi, even if it promotes a backlash in Indian amongst a new generation of officials and foreign policy strategists.
Chinese analysts believe that India is taking advantage of Beijing by trying to make tactical gains along the border. While China is trying to ease the seemingly bottomless deterioration of relations with the United States due to the COVID-19 crisis, India’s road-building is seen as “an attempt to stab it [China] in the back while China was trying to deal with” the United States. From the perspective of China, not only is India trying to capitalize on China’s moment of distraction, vulnerability, and overextension in its foreign policy, it also puts China in a dilemma between responding to India’s road construction and being labeled “aggressive and provocative” — or acquiescing to it and losing territory in a time of weakness.

China sees India as being emboldened by its strategic alignment with the United States — articulated by Washington in its Indo-Pacific Strategy. Such emboldening is believed to have directly led to the revocation of Article 370 of India’s constitution in 2019, which removed Ladakh’s limited autonomy and changed it into a Union Territory directly under the central government’s control. The Ladakh Union Territory included Aksai Chin (currently under Chinese authority), and is vital to Chinese control of its “ethnic frontiers” in Tibet and Xinjiang, causing vehement protest by the Chinese Foreign Ministry at the time of its creation. America’s position in the standoff exacerbated Beijing’s suspicion. Then-Assistant Secretary of State Alice Wells criticized China’s “aggression” as “provocative and disturbing” on May 21 and reacted similarly to President Donald Trump’s offer to mediate between China and India several days later. Both China and India rejected Trump’s offer. However, for the Chinese, Modi quickly smoothed over the rejection by having a direct phone conversation with Trump three days later, and accepting Trump’s invitation to the G-7 Summit, a sign of strategic ambiguity and obscurity.

Because of COVID-19 and the sustained criticism China has suffered due to its role in the delayed response globally, officials in Beijing feel particularly vulnerable to perceived attacks on China, both in narratives and in reality. It has been more prone to escalatory and assertive responses, which put the “Wolf Warriors” image on steroids in both diplomacy and military/paramilitary actions. Chinese diplomats and official media have been fully mobilized to defend China’s reputation and attack any critics around the globe. At the same time, China went after the Vietnamese in the South China Sea due to the perception of a Vietnamese exploitation of China’s lockdown in February and March. At this time, Beijing longs for foreign policy victories and has no appetite for any perceived defeat or transgression, for fear of domestic discontent, which was already high due to the COVID-19 crisis.
That gets into another important question: Was the Ladakh standoff pre-meditated? In other words, did China stage the standoff in order to divert domestic attention away from the government’s poor handling of the pandemic in its early stage?

At least three pieces of empirical evidence side against this theory. First, since the beginning of the standoff, the Chinese government has resorted to a low-key approach toward the tensions instead of stoking domestic nationalism with sensational media headlines and organized internet news, which would be indispensable components of a premediated and coordinated campaign. Second, since COVID-19, China has been stirring up tensions to boost internal solidarity, but this has been focused primarily on Taiwan, Hong Kong, the South China Sea, and the United States. One could argue that China has opened too many “fronts” diplomatically, but militarily, China has always been careful to avoid a two-front confrontation with America in the east and India in the west. Given Beijing’s plan to initiate the Hong Kong security law during the parliamentary sessions in May, and the rising uncertainty across the Taiwan strait in light of President Tsai Ing-wen’s second inauguration on May 20, it is unlikely that Beijing intentionally planned for the Ladakh standoff to happen at this time. Third, China’s top South Asia experts were not consulted until roughly ten days after the beginning of the standoff. The late involvement of the policy community suggests that the standoff was not based on advanced planning.
The current crisis was the result of China reacting to the perception that India was stabbing it in the back by its move into territories China sees as off-limits to India. The unique timing of COVID-19, the context of the U.S.-Chinese strategic rivalry and China’s self-perceived vulnerability all contributed to a sense of insecurity amongst officials in Beijing. All of these factors have aggravated China’s response to what would otherwise have been a relatively common interaction in the disputed border.

China’s Tactical Objectives
Some argue it was strategically unwise for China to clash with India in Ladakh. Doing so will inevitably damage China’s reputation among the Indian military, diplomatic corps, and population at large. The move could also drive New Delhi into a closer partnership with Washington. But for Beijing, standing up for its interests and territorial claims is worth the cost. India is believed to be strategically unreliable to begin with and China has no interest in acquiescing to India’s attempt to advance its position on territorial disputes to trade for concessions. That is almost an established rule in China’s India playbook: Having dealt with India in the past, such acquiescence will not be seen as China’s good will, but a concession extracted due to India’s strength. This will only lead to even more aggressive Indian behavior down the road.

If a strategic friendship with India is untenable, it frees up room for tactical gains. In the near term, China’s tactical objective seems clear —to advance its position roughly to the occupation line by the end of the 1962 war, according to pro-Beijing media outlets. This will push the Chinese presence to the intersection of the Galwan river and the Shyok river, making the Galwan Valley off limits to India. The Chinese construction of posts in this location clearly points to this direction. Indeed, the statement from China’s Western Command after the deadline clash on June 16 confirms this position. It claims that sovereignty over the Galwan valley has always belonged to China. Whether this position is sustainable remains unclear, as the Chinese may not be able to station troops at this location during the winter months. However, China sees these actions as military retaliations to India’s persistent infrastructure development in the region, including roads and airstrips, especially the completion of the Darbuk-Shayok-DBO Road in April 2019. They are also retaliations against the creation of the Ladakh Union Territory in August 2019, which included “the Chinese territory in the western sector of the China-India boundary into its administrative jurisdiction” in India’s reissued map.

The good news, if any, is that the turbulence is necessary (but not sufficient) to consolidate a LAC that neither side will like but which both could likely accept in the future. After all, China is not inclined to accept the “clarification of LAC” based on historical evidence, so the LAC can only be “consolidated” on the ground. The eventual solution of the border disputes will have to be based on diplomatic negotiations. Having a mutually accepted LAC will be the beginning of that process.
The bad news is that the process will be long, destabilizing, and could include more casualties. Neither side will easily abandon their tactical objectives. In that sense, the current standoff is unlikely to see a quick resolution. The 2013 Daulat Beg Oldi incident saw a 20-day standoff before the Indians agreed to dismantle bunkers in the Chumar sector and the Chinese withdrew. The 2017 Doklam standoff lasted for much longer — 72 days — and ended with the withdrawal of troops by both sides. If these precedents serve as indicators, China and India will eventually negotiate disengagement and mutual withdrawal. However, it is even more likely that both sides will sneak to return in the next year to encroach in what they both believe to be their rightful territory. The heart of the matter is that India believes the construction it is conducting is on its undisputed territory. But since there is no boundary, the Chinese see the Indian construction as changing the status quo. These two perspectives will be hard to reconcile.

At the minimum, a mutual withdrawal will de-escalate the current tension. Understanding that both sides will return to change the status quo and improve their position, Beijing is stringing New Delhi along, bogging it down, and forcing it to eventually “accept reality,” and make compromises on the border demarcation. The trick for Beijing is to maintain the struggle on the ground without triggering a war, of course. It’s a long process of friction and attrition. The tactical objective of returning to the occupation line by the end of the 1962 war could be one move to inflate China’s negotiation position and force India to accept the fait accompli.
Conclusion
The Ladakh clash should not have been a surprise. Similar events have been happening along the disputed border between China and India for years, but only the few most heated ones make the news. Beijing believes India is exploiting a temporary period of Chinese weakness and is responding forcefully as a result. Strategically, it may not help China’s desired goal to keep India neutral. But since Beijing sees a neutral India as untenable to begin with, tactical gains that can bog India down along the disputed border, frustrate New Delhi’s regional and global ambitions, and remind India of the eventual need for compromise may not be the worst case in China’s cost-benefit analysis. Tactically, China appears to be aiming for what it achieved in the 1962 war. Despite what the outsiders might see as China’s mistake, China is unlikely to change its current strategic assessment. China and India will eventually find a face-saving mutual compromise to end the Ladakh standoff, as neither wants a war. However, the unsettled border will continue to destabilize, fester, and brew more clashes down the road.

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Yun Sun is the Director of the China Program at the Stimson Center.
Image: Flickr (Photo by Nick Irvine-Fortescue)

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warontherocks.com

China’s Strategic Assessment of the Ladakh Clash - War on the Rocks

In early May, Chinese and Indian troops confronted each other along their remote, disputed border in the Himalayas. For 40 days, the two sides engaged in
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Zagdid

Zagdid

Veteran Member
www.nationalheraldindia.com

Is India ready for a bigger war with China? India can dominate the skies and the sea

There is a Chinese saying that to scare away the monkeys, sometimes you need to skin a cat. While the PLA may dominate over land, India can dominate the skies and the sea
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Is India ready for a bigger war with China? India can dominate the skies and the sea
Mohan Guruswamy Published: 20 Jun 2020, 1:20 PM

In 1976 China attacked Vietnam at the province of Lang Son; the NVA withdrew about twenty kilometers inside. The PLA poured into the breach and were crowing about their quick victory, when Vietnamese military commander General Van Tien Dung closed the trap and battered the PLA with deadly artillery fire.

Incidentally, then Indian Foreign Minister who was visiting Beijing had to hurriedly return home. If he stayed back for a few days he would have absorbed an important lesson from the Vietnamese, that is to let the military decide its strategy and battlefield tactics. The tactical sacrifice of territory to inflict a painful damage to the enemy is more important.

Unfortunately in India, we are obsessed with territory. Even after the Galwan and Pangong Tso incidents what our commentators and politicians mostly point to is “loss of territory”. We seem unconcerned about the military tenability of ‘Lines of Actual’ or imagined control.

Has anybody considered the military viability of the “fingers” territory on the north bank of the Pangong? Will a general be allowed to marshal his resources at a place of his choosing, like Van Tien Dung did at Lang Son?
The question we need to ponder over is are we ready for a bigger conflict with China?

Let’s take the Galwan situation. The PLA was seeking to establish dominance over the vital Darbuk-Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO) road, our only link with what we call Sub-Sector North (SSN). This is a long road of over 230 kms and goes alongside the Shyok river, which in turn flows southward alongside a spur of the Karakorum, till it bends along the Chip Chap river to end at DBO.

The Depsang Plains lie inside the crook of this elbow. The PLA effectively dominates Depsang which is just south of Aksai Chin, now with China. The road effectively ends at DBO, unless you want to go via the Karakorum Pass a few kilometers ahead and then to Yarkand in Xinjiang.

To my mind the disputed Fingers 4-8 area north of the Pangong Tso is a side show.

This does not have the strategic significance of the Darbuk-DBO road. The PLA is now at its closest ever to this road and can even bring it under mortar and machine gun fire. By interdicting this road the PLA will effectively cut off SSN from Ladakh. India literally has its back to the wall here, with a spur of the Karakorum range on the left and the LAC on the right.

In the outbreak of a larger conflict what is the survivability of this road? Do we invest huge forces to defend this area or do we learn from Lang Son?

To really beat back the PLA India needs to bring the IAF into play early. If the PLA has the upper hand on the land, the IAF has dominance in the second dimension. Its major bases are nearby on the plains and it can launch its fighter-bombers with full fuel and weapons loads.

The PLAAF on the other hand operating from high altitude airfields has limitations on fuel and weapons loads. The dominance of the battlefield depends on how much force one can bring to bear on it. Here India has the advantage. But first we must stop equating military success with territory lost or gained.

If the second dimension comes into play, it won’t be long before the third dimension- the sea is put into play. With 70% of its oil on sea-lanes running about 300-500 kms from its shore, India can effectively interdict Chinese foreign trade with the region. The PLAAN will be loath to engage the Indian Navy in an area where the leading Indian Ocean power, the US Navy also dominates.

War between nuclear powers will not be without consequences to the ever increasingly inter-dependent world and hence international pressure to terminate conflicts before they expand and/or spiral out of control is only to be expected. How many nuclear weapons a country has does not matter, as for the world outside even the use of one will not be without huge collateral consequences.

Thus, while China will be interested in keeping any conflict limited and restricted to one dimension, it will be in India’s interest that it quickly escalate to the other two dimensions where it can bring its superior disruptive power into play.
The time window for such a conflict, if there is one, will be very narrow.

Thus, at best the two countries can fight a very limited war that does not cause irremediable loss of face to either one. It will be very important for both countries to have their nations believe that they have not emerged worse-off in the conflict.

Face then becomes everything. The national mood, not territory, is what the next conflict should be about. This kind of a conflict requires quick escalation to high kinetic levels before the conflict is forced to a halt by outside powers. The illusion of victory has to be created in this very limited space.

Victory will be a matter of perception. There will be no time and place for strategic victories. The sum of tactical victories will be the ultimate perception of victory. We have seen how soon air power came to be deployed over Kargil.

The terrain and array of forces on both sides of the India-China border suggests that air power come into play fairly early to score the wins that will influence perceptions.

India’s arms build-up and preparations make it apparent that a conflict will not be confined to the mountains and valleys of the Himalayas but will swirl into the skies above, on to the Xinjiang and Tibetan plateaus and the Indian Ocean.

It will be logical for India to extend a Himalayan war to the Indian Ocean, particularly as India’s geographical location puts it astride the sea-lanes that carry over two thirds of China’s oil imports. To pay for this oil, 41% of China’s exports are now to the MENA region.

Asia is now the most dynamic economic region in the world. Six of the world's 10 fastest-growing major economies in the coming decade (including China and India) will be Asian countries. India has so far been careful about not semaphoring its capability too overtly, but it is sometimes useful to overtly convey this.

But there is an old Chinese saying that to scare away the monkeys, you sometimes have to skin a cat.

(The views expressed are the author’s own)
 
jward

jward

passin' thru
U.S. bombers spotted near Korean Peninsula amid heightened tensions

All Headlines 21:30 June 19, 2020





SEOUL, June 19 (Yonhap) -- Two U.S. strategic bombers have been spotted near the Korean Peninsula, a flight tracker said Friday, amid heightened tensions after North Korea threatened South Korea over the sending of anti-Pyongyang leaflets.
The two B-52Hs were seen flying over northern Japan on Friday, according to Aircraft Spots. It did not provide other details such as exactly when the bombers were spotted.
This marked the second time that the heavy bombers have flown near the Korean Peninsula this week. Two B-52Hs participated in a joint drill on Wednesday with Japan over the East Sea, according to the U.S. Pacific Air Forces.
The United States sent the bombers amid heightened tensions after North Korea repeatedly threatened a series of retaliatory steps against South Korea over its failure to prevent activists from sending anti-Pyongyang leaflets into the communist state.
North Korea blew up a liaison office in its border town of Kaesong on Tuesday. It also threatened to send troops to border regions and reestablish guard posts removed from the Demilitarized Zone separating the two Koreas.
On Wednesday, an aviation tracker said that an aircraft used by North Korean leader Kim Jong-un flew from Pyongyang to the eastern part of the country, sparking speculation that he could have gone to the east coast for provocative events, such as the launching of a new ballistic missile submarine.
(END)
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en.yna.co.kr

U.S. bombers spotted near Korean Peninsula amid heightened tensions | Yonhap News Agency

SEOUL, June 19 (Yonhap) -- Two U.S. strategic bombers have been spotted near the Korean Pe...
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