WAR 06-13-2020-to-06-19-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

[Housecarl]

Sorry for the delay folks......



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(422) 05-30-2020-to-06-05-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****



WAR - 05-30-2020-to-06-05-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****


(423) 06-06-2020-to-06-12-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

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(420) 05-16-2020-to-05-22-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR**** WAR - 05-16-2020-to-05-22-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR**** (417) WAR - 04-25-2020-to-05-01-24-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR**** (418) 05-02-2020-to-05-08-24-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR**** WAR -...

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Kim Jong Un's Sister Threatens S. Korea With Military Action

• danielboon
• Today at 12:54 PM

--------------------

Hummm.....

Posted for fair use.....

NATO must pay attention to China, Stoltenberg says – DW – 06/13/2020

The head of the military alliance has urged the West not to ignore China's growing military might. He says Beijing's expanding stockpile of nuclear weapons capable of reaching Europe, demands a stronger response.

www.dw.com

NATO's Jens Stoltenberg sounds warning on China's rise

The head of the military alliance has urged the West not to ignore China's growing military might. He says Beijing's expanding stockpile of nuclear weapons capable of reaching Europe, demands a stronger response.







NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg warned Saturday that China's increasing influence had created a "fundamental shift in the global balance of power" that should not be overlooked.

In an interview with Germany's Welt am Sonntag newspaper, that was released in advance, the Norwegian official said that Beijing had the second-largest defense budget in the world after the United States, and was investing heavily in nuclear weapons and long-range missiles that could reach Europe.

"One thing is clear: China is coming ever closer to Europe's doorstep," he said. "NATO allies must face this challenge together."

Read more: China unveils plans to step up military power

New opportunities, new challenges


NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg

NATO's mission has expanded since its creation in 1949 as a counterweight to the power of the Soviet Union. Its security remit is limited to North America and Europe, but the military alliance has also acknowledged that China's rise posed new challenges.

Stoltenberg stressed that no member country was "directly" threatened by the Asian powerhouse, but he did flag several concerns, which he said required a strong NATO response.

He noted Beijing was investing heavily in European infrastructure and cyberspace, as well as expanding its presence in Africa, the Arctic and the Mediterranean.

China has also increasingly sought to boost its claims over parts of the South China Sea, in some cases by hindering ships traveling there in international waters.

Read more: Is China taking advantage of COVID-19 to pursue South China Sea ambitions?



Watch video 01:43

China celebrates itself with a display of military strength

Stoltenberg said he found developments in the sea worrying, calling on Beijing to respect international shipping rules, but added that there was no reason to send NATO troops to the region.

Chinese foreign ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying said earlier this week that China does not pose a threat to any country. "We hope that NATO can continue to hold a correct opinion about us and view our development rationally," she said.

nm/mm (dpa, AFP, Reuters)

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• Date 13.06.2020
• Related Subjects Europe, People's Republic of China, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
• Keywords NATO, China, military buildup, Europe, Jens Stoltenberg
• Feedback: Send us your feedback.
• Print Print this page
• Permalink NATO's Jens Stoltenberg sounds warning on China's rise | DW | 13.06.2020

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• Date 13.06.2020

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use.....

Afghanistan- Taliban violence leaves 89 civilians dead in two weeks

<strong> AT News </strong> KABUL: At least 89 civilians have been killed and 150 others received injures in new wave of attacks carried

menafn.com

Afghanistan- Taliban violence leaves 89 civilians dead in two weeks

Date
6/13/2020 2:23:21 PM

(MENAFN - Afghanistan Times) AT News

KABUL: At least 89 civilians have been killed and 150 others received injures in new wave of attacks carried out by the Taliban group in the last two weeks. The latest bloodshed comes as the Afghan government and the Taliban group is appearing to move closer towards a potential peace talks to end the bloodbath.

Spokesman for the National Security Advisor, Javid Faisal said, 'While the government has continued to advance the cause of peace, the Taliban continued their campaign of violence against the Afghan people during Eid and the weeks after that. In the last two weeks, they killed 89 civilians and wounded 150 across 29 provinces.'

However, the Taliban rejected the report as baseless.

'Most of the civilians were killed and wounded due to roadside bomb blasts placed by the Taliban group,' Mr. Faisal said.

According to him, most of the casualties were occurred in Kandahar, Kabul and Sar-e-Pul provinces.

Targeting civilians is against the religious teachings and war principles, which the Taliban continue, committing such crimes.

The government has released 3,000 Taliban prisoners out of 5,000 to facilitate the intra-Afghan talks. The much delayed talks aimed at ending the conflict are expected to begin once the two sides complete an ongoing prisoner swap, accelerated after a brief ceasefire last month.

MENAFN1306202001690000ID1100319365

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use.....

Rockets hit Iraqi military base north of Baghdad, miss US troops

While there was no immediate claim of responsibility, it was third attack in week to target US troops or diplomats

www.middleeasteye.net

Rockets hit Iraqi military base north of Baghdad, miss US troops

While there was no immediate claim of responsibility, it was third attack in week to target US troops or diplomats

MEE and agencies

Published date: 13 June 2020 21:25 UTC | Last update: 10 sec ago

A rocket attack late Saturday north of Baghdad hit an Iraqi base but missed US-led coalition troops stationed there, Iraq's military and a coalition official said.
A statement from Iraq's security forces said the rockets landed but did not cause any damage to the Taji base, according to AFP.


Iraq and US affirm commitment to American troop withdrawal
Read More »

Reuters cited state media as reporting that two Katyusha rockets fell in Iraq's Taji base, which hosts US-led coalition troops, causing no casualties.
A US-led coalition official confirmed the projectiles fell outside the coalition's part of the base.
While there was no immediate claim of responsibility, it was the third attack in a week to target US troops or diplomats.

Two rockets struck the grounds of the vast Baghdad airport complex on Monday and an unguided rocket hit close to the fortified US embassy two days later.

The attacks follow several weeks of relative respite from more than two dozen similar incidents in recent months.

Since October, at least 30 attacks have targeted American troops or diplomats, severely straining ties between Baghdad and Washington.

Tensions reached boiling point in January when the US killed Iranian general Qasem Soleimani and Iraqi commander Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis in a drone strike in Baghdad.
Washington has accused armed groups backed by Iran, Iraq's powerful neighbour and the US's top regional foe, for the repeated rocket attacks. It has also blamed the Iraqi government for not doing enough to protect US installations.

Washington and Baghdad are hoping for a reset after opening a strategic dialogue this week that aims to better define their military, economic and cultural relationship.
As part of the talks, the US pledged to continue reducing in-country troop levels, which numbered about 5,200 last year.

Iraq, meanwhile, vowed to "protect the military personnel" operating on its territory as part of the US-led coalition fighting remnants of the Islamic State group.


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[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use.....

Daesh’s reappearance puts fragility of Iraq and Syria in focus

IRBIL, Iraqi Kurdistan: An uptick in attacks in Iraq by suspected Daesh militants since the beginning of this year is stoking fears that the militant outfit is regrouping and could again threaten the country’s stability.

www.arabnews.com

Daesh’s reappearance puts fragility of Iraq and Syria in focus

• Terror group has been involved in kidnappings and ambushes in rural areas along the Iraq-Syria border
• Availability of fighters and cash makes Daesh well positioned to threaten Iraq and Syria for years to come

Updated 39 sec ago
Paul Iddon
June 13, 2020 21:56

IRBIL, Iraqi Kurdistan: An uptick in attacks by suspected Daesh militants since the beginning of this year is stoking fears that the militant outfit is regrouping and could again threaten the country’s stability.

On May 28, Daesh spokesperson Abu Hamza Al-Qurayshi released a recording on the messaging app Telegram, saying that the terror group’s fighters will “start to increase their attacks against the Crusaders since the US has withdrawn from Iraq.”

“Greater punishment against Crusaders is coming once the caliphate achieves the victory and is established once again,” Al-Qurayshi said, according to the Iraqi Kurdish news agency Rudaw.

Earlier in May, hundreds of acres of wheat and barley cropland in Iraq’s disputed Kirkuk province went up in flames.

Daesh claimed responsibility for some of the fires. Around the same time, it released a propaganda video vowing to free fellow members from Iraqi jails.

Since 2017, Daesh has taken advantage of security gaps in disputed regions between Iraq and the autonomous Kurdistan region, terrorizing and extorting locals, and mounting hit-and-run attacks against Iraqi and Kurdish forces.

Citing the US Central Command, the most recent Pentagon Inspector General report, which covers the period from Jan. 1 to March 31, warned that Daesh is “regrouping and reforming” in the mountains of Makhmur in northern Iraq, which is inside the disputed territories between Iraq and the Kurdistan region.

Since 2017, Daesh has taken advantage of security gaps in disputed regions between Iraq and the autonomous Kurdistan region, terrorizing and extorting locals, and mounting hit-and-run attacks against Iraqi and Kurdish forces. (Alamy)

According to the report, the US also expects Daesh “to seek to re-establish governance in northern and western areas of Iraq.”

On May 17 the Iraqi military launched an operation to force Daesh out of its sanctuaries. However, if past efforts of this kind are any indication, it is unlikely to inflict long-lasting damage on the group.

Since 2017, Daesh has reverted to the role of lethal non-state actor — as it was before it conquered one-third of northern Iraq in June 2014 and declared the establishment of a “caliphate.”

“Daesh has posed a threat to Iraq, in its various forms, since 2003 and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future,” Michael Knights, a military and security affairs specialist at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, told Arab News.

“It is now part of the Iraqi landscape, like a resilient weed or virus.”

Since 2017, Daesh has taken advantage of security gaps in disputed regions between Iraq and the autonomous Kurdistan region, terrorizing and extorting locals, and mounting hit-and-run attacks against Iraqi and Kurdish forces. (Alamy)

Knights and Alex Almeida, who monitor Daesh’s activities, have detected a 13 percent increase in the militants’ attacks in Iraq this year over the previous year — at least 566 in the first three months of 2020, compared with 1,669 during the entire 2019.

According to Knights, Daesh is again using strategies that worked in the past, including jailbreaks and extorting farmers by threatening to burn their crops.

“In terms of attack metrics, Daesh is back to 2012 levels, but is still only a third of 2013 levels, and it will take more than a year of growth at the current rate to reach 2013 levels of attacks,” he said.

“Also, the insurgency is different at a qualitative level. Today’s Daesh is not really present in the cities, and so far they have turned away from mass-casualty attacks on civilians.”

Nevertheless, the group still poses a threat after transferring its strength from Syria back into Iraq over the past 12-18 months.

Opinion
Hafed Al-Ghwell
Anti-Daesh coalition’s progress threatened by unilateral moves

Read article

“The movement is still very weak compared with its old self in 2017 or 2013, but it is recovering slowly,” Knights said.

He said that if Iraqi and Kurdish forces fail to cooperate quickly, then Daesh “will soon be able to control small villages and rural areas in daylight, and parts of towns at night.”

However, Thomas Abi-Hanna, a global security analyst with US-based geopolitical intelligence platform Stratfor, believes Daesh is a long way from being able to capture and control large swathes of territory as it did in 2014.

The group’s activities today more closely resemble those of the 2011-12 period.

“Iraq’s latest offensive against Daesh is unlikely to have a long-term impact on the group’s trajectory,” Abi-Hanna told Arab News.

Since 2017, Daesh has taken advantage of security gaps in disputed regions between Iraq and the autonomous Kurdistan region, terrorizing and extorting locals, and mounting hit-and-run attacks against Iraqi and Kurdish forces. (Alamy)

“Iraqi security forces are riddled with weaknesses and are unable to firmly hold and control the rural areas where Daesh operates,” he said.

As a result, Daesh is “well positioned” to threaten Iraq and Syria for years to come since it still has thousands of fighters and hundreds of millions of dollars at its disposal.

“While Daesh is not on the verge of being able to seize territory, attacks and other operations the group has launched will threaten civilians and security forces, damage crops and infrastructure, hurt Iraq’s already ailing economy and undermine stability in the country,” Abi-Hanna said.

He believes the surge in attacks is a sign of Daesh’s renewed strength, especially in light of partial coalition military drawdowns from areas where the group is active, Iraq’s internal political crises and the coronavirus pandemic that is consuming most of Baghdad’s attention.

“The attacks are becoming increasingly sophisticated. The group has recently been conducting night-time raids, multi-pronged coordinated assaults and suicide bombings, marking a notable uptick from the typical drive-by shootings, mortar attacks and roadside improvised explosive devices (IEDs) it had done in previous months,” Abi-Hanna said.

Since 2017, Daesh has taken advantage of security gaps in disputed regions between Iraq and the autonomous Kurdistan region, terrorizing and extorting locals, and mounting hit-and-run attacks against Iraqi and Kurdish forces. (Alamy)

Joel Wing, author of the “Musings on Iraq” blog, said that Daesh released a video in May announcing that it was launching a new campaign in Iraq. This followed statements in March by the group vowing to exploit the pandemic.

“The uptick in attacks actually began in April and continued into May, marking the first time Daesh has had two months of increased operations since January-February, 2019,” Wing told Arab News.

“The second week of May had the most incidents since the third week of October 2018, showing renewed strength,” he said.

Since Haider Al-Abadi, the-then prime minister, declared victory over Daesh in Iraq in December 2017, five months after government forces ejected its fighters from Mosul, the group has “focused on preserving its leadership and rebuilding its cadres.”

As a result, Iraq suffered the lowest number of attacks since the Iraq War that began in 2003.

Since 2017, Daesh has taken advantage of security gaps in disputed regions between Iraq and the autonomous Kurdistan region, terrorizing and extorting locals, and mounting hit-and-run attacks against Iraqi and Kurdish forces. (Alamy)

Now, however, Daesh “appears to be flexing some of its new muscle,” Wing said.

He said that the present Daesh campaign differs from previous manifestations since the group is now “a completely rural phenomenon.”

“It has virtually no cells operating in cities carrying out attacks,” he said. “There is not a continuous wave of car bombs that it once carried out or even suicide bombers.”

Wing said that Daesh’s present campaign appears to be aimed at “establishing military control over the countryside, driving people out of rural villages via threats, attacks, burning crops and so forth, so that they might be converted into bases and training camps, and threatening others to pay taxes.”

It is yet to be seen if Daesh can sustain this campaign or whether attacks will decline in a few weeks.

“Either way it will be a sign of how much the group has been able to rebuild so far,” Wing said.

------------------------

@pauliddon

 

[jward]

Amid Escalating Tension With China, Australia and India Strengthen Partnership
A new Australia-India agreement is a sign of regional cooperation to halt Chinese aggression across the Asia-Pacific.

By Joshua Mcdonald

June 12, 2020

In this handout photo provided by the Press Information Bureau, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi speaks during a virtual meeting with Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison, in New Delhi, India, Thursday, June 4, 2020.
Credit: Press Information Bureau via AP

The China-Australian relationship is at an all-time low. Over the past six months, disputes typically kept behind closed doors have leaked into public view. It began with Australia pushing for an independent investigation into the origins of the coronavirus. China responded with threats of economic coercion, and then placed tariffs on Australian barley and banned beef from four major Australian exporters.

Then came warnings from Beijing that Chinese travellers and students should avoid Australia, stating it is unsafe due to racist attacks against Asians during the pandemic. “That’s rubbish. It’s a ridiculous assertion and it’s rejected,” Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison told 3AW. A recent survey has, however, identified an increase in racist incidents, including abuse, physical intimidation, and spitting across the country.

As Australian and Chinese officials continued to battle it out verbally, high up in the Himalayan mountain range, tension between the armies of the world’s two most populous nations, India and China, had also reached a simmering point.

Clashes along the disputed border aren’t unusual but a few days after one particularly fierce fight, in which troops from both sides were injured and had to be evacuated, reports emerged of Chinese troops confronting Indian soldiers across several other checkpoints and of Chinese troops amassing inside Indian territory.

India responded by sending thousands of military personnel to reinforce the area. “Our build up matches the Chinese deployment, if not more, in terms of troops, support elements, force multipliers and aerial support,” said an Indian official. A senior officer stationed in the region told News18 that: “China stabbed us in the back. In the middle of a pandemic, this was not expected.”

https://thediplomat.com/subscriptions/

Beijing and New Delhi have since agreed to “peacefully resolve” the situation while the Australian government has made it clear that it will not be escalating its confrontation with China by entering into a trade war with its largest two-way trading partner.

But Chinese aggression is not limited to border incursions in the Himalayas or diplomatic spats with Australia. In recent weeks, the Chinese Coast Guard rammed and sank a Vietnamese fishing vessel, swarmed and harassed a Malaysian oil rig, and threatened a Philippine Navy ship, all while the Chinese air force continued to exercise close to Taiwan and the government moved to pass laws that restrict Hong Kong’s autonomy and freedoms.

With China’s ditching of soft power, the idea of regional cooperation among its neighbors has begun to pick up momentum. Just last week, Australia and India raised their relationship to a “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership” and issued a joint declaration on a “Shared Vision for Maritime Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific.”

Ahead of the virtual summit between India’s Narendra Modi and Australia’s Scott Morrison, adjunct professor of Asian Studies at the University of Adelaide Purnendra Jain wrote: “While it is unlikely that the ‘C’ word will figure in the talks between Morrison and Modi, China will no doubt loom large in both leaders’ minds.”

“Both countries are members of the so-called ‘Quad,’ a security dialogue framework comprising Japan, India, Australia and the United States,” he wrote. “After being hesitant initially, both have now committed to it. India has signalled a desire to become more involved as Modi has pushed back against China’s influence in the region.”

While much of the new partnership is focused on economic cooperation, with Australia trying to shift its economic dependence away from China and India wanting greater access to Australian goods and services, the maritime cooperation is a key component to both nations’ efforts to respond to China’s intensified interest in the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

Late last year, Indian Navy Chief Admiral Karambir Singh expressed concerns about China’s “presence in the Indian Ocean increasing.” Some of the Chinese vessels are reportedly deploying drones for oceanographic research, potentially gathering critical information needed for submarine deployment. China has carried out similar operations in the Pacific.

The joint declaration states that: “Both countries share a view that many of the future challenges are likely to occur in, and emanate from, the maritime domain.” The agreement will allow Indian and Australian military ships and aircraft to refuel and access maintenance facilities at each other’s bases.

Some regional security experts have flagged the possibility of the maritime agreement growing to include the mutual use of India’s Andaman and Nicobar Islands and Australia’s Cocos Islands for military purposes. This would give both countries the ability to expand their surveillance and security presence beyond their current reach. Such an agreement would give India better access to the Pacific Ocean and Australia better access to the Indian Ocean.

In 2007, under the Quad alliance, Australia participated in exercises with the Indian, American, and Japanese navies but withdrew after China expressed concerns. The U.S., Japan, and India continued the exercises. Australia has reportedly been lobbying to re-join the exercises since as early as 2015. Since then, and much to Australia’s dismay, India has not invited Australia back in, but it seems much more likely with this new maritime agreement now in place.

posted for fair use

Amid Escalating Tension With China, Australia and India Strengthen Partnership

A new Australia-India agreement is a sign of regional cooperation to halt Chinese aggression across the Asia-Pacific.

thediplomat.com

 

[jward]

20 soldiers, 40 civilians killed in attacks Nigeria's Borno state
Islamic State West Africa Province claim twin attacks, which burned down a UN humanitarian hub and police station.

5 hours ago

The Nigerian government has been fighting the armed group, Boko Haram, and its offshoot, <span>Islamic State</span> West Africa Province (ISWAP), for years leaving thousands dead and displacing millions in the country's northeastern region [File: Henry Ikechukwu/EPA]

• COVID-19 in Africa: Virus spreading from urban to rural areasyesterday
• Fighters kill dozens, raze village in Nigeria's Borno state3 days ago
• OPEC+ to meet on Saturday to discuss extending historic cutslast week
• Nigerians take to streets to protest against sexual violencelast week

At least 20 soldiers and more than 40 civilians have been killed, and hundreds have been injured in twin attacks in northeast Nigeria's Borno state on Saturday, residents and a civilian task force fighter said.
The attacks, in the Monguno and Nganzai local government areas, came just days after armed fighters killed at least 81 people in a raid on a village in a third area, Gubio.
More:

• Fighters kill dozens, raze village in Nigeria's Borno state
• Dozens of Boko Haram, ISWAP fighters killed in Nigeria
• The Sahel: Key things to know as security crisis spirals

Two humanitarian workers and three residents told Reuters that armed fighters with heavy weaponry including rocket launchers arrived in Monguno, a hub for international non-governmental organisations, at roughly 11am local time (10:00 GMT).
The fighters then overran government forces, taking some casualties but killing at least 20 soldiers and roaming the area for three hours.
The sources said hundreds of civilians were injured in the crossfire, overwhelming the local hospital and forcing some of the injured to lay outside the facility awaiting help.

Aisha: Boko Haram Huntress | Witness (25:08)

The fighters also burned down the United Nations' humanitarian hub in the area and set on fire the local police station. Fighters distributed letters to residents, in the local Hausa language, warning them not to work with the military or international aid groups.

Fighters also entered Nganzai at about the same time on Saturday, according to two residents and one Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) fighter. They arrived on motorcycles and in pick-up trucks and killed more than 40 residents, the sources said.
A military spokesman did not answer calls for comment on the attacks. UN officials could not immediately be reached for comment.

Boko Haram and its offshoot, Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), have killed thousands and displaced millions in northeastern Nigeria.
ISWAP claimed the two Saturday attacks, and the Gubio attack.


SOURCE: Reuters news agency

posted for fair use
video at source

20 soldiers, 40 civilians killed in attacks Nigeria’s Borno state

Islamic State West Africa Province claim twin attacks, which burned down a UN humanitarian hub and police station.

www.aljazeera.com

 

[jward]

The Mysterious Case Of The Air Force's New Strangely Modified 737 With A Puzzling Past
The aircraft still wears its factory coating and has crude alterations, but its ownership history is just as curious as its configuration.
By Tyler Rogoway
June 14, 2020

• The War Zone

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The Air Force has a robust fleet of 737s. Today, nearly all of them are C-40s, which act as executive and priority passenger transports, but they are not totally alone. For instance, one older NT-43 example that is heavily modified and extremely shy, goes about its shadowy business as an airborne aircraft signature measurement test laboratory. But by and large, the 737's role within the Air Force's stable is well known. Now a strangely modified 737-700 with a civilian registration, but an Air Force owner, has just emerged and its past is just as murky as its current mission.

The aircraft in question carries a civilian registration number N712JM, which is a bit odd for an aircraft owned by the United States Air Force. The Boeing jet came to our attention when it showed up at the Santa Maria Public Airport in Southern California. The images sent to us by an aerospace enthusiast showed the aircraft in detail with its unique, if not crude modifications. It must be stated that this is a busy public airport and no moves were made to hide the aircraft in question.

FAA

It is also a bit interesting that the area has many military base options, but it landed in Santa Maria. This is not unheard of by any means, military aircraft often use private fixed base operators (FBOs) for refueling and to work out of for basic cross country training and other proficiency flights, but this decision will become a bit more puzzling as the story unfolds below. Also, the witness said the crew was wearing t-shirts and very casual attire—not your normal buttoned-down Air Force aircrew, by any means.



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The 737-73W first flew in 2013, but seven years later, it still wears its green zinc chromate coating that it was delivered with. Usually, this is immediately stripped and the aircraft is painted before entering service. I have talked to a number of experts in Boeing airliner products, none of them have ever heard of a Boeing jet wearing its factory coating for so long and it was noted that it appears to be corroding in some areas.
Jon Ostrower, editor-in-chief of the theaircurrent.com, told The War Zone:

"This is definitely an airplane that never made it to a formal finish you’d expect from a commercial airplane. The green finish is a protective coating applied to fuselages during manufacturing to protect from scratches and other damage. It is dissolved during painting. You can also still see the manufacturing (line) number as well that’s from its original trip down the assembly line.
There’s also quite a bit of instrumentation visible with sensor wiring leading into the cabin through the passenger windows. this type of arrangement points to a flight test setup of some kind."

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The plane's history is also highly puzzling. It was originally delivered to a Wells Fargo Bank trustee, a common way to hide the true ownership of an aircraft and a financial tool often used by aircraft owners, in 2013. It stayed this way until April of 2019, when a relatively obscure company named Denmar Technical Services took ownership of it. The company simply describes itself as "providing our customer with superior radar measurement systems and services" and nothing more on its website. Note, it says customer, not customers. They are based in Reno, Nevada, and have relatively minor activity in terms of disclosed government contracts.

The company owned the aircraft for a short period of time, just one year almost to the day, before it was transferred to the USAF. During this time, and a year before it, there was no flight data we could find under its registration until it showed up in Colorado Springs in March of 2020.
The aircraft appears to have been a resident of Sierra Nevada Corporation at Colorado Springs Airport, which is adjacent to a significant Air Force Base that shares its runways, but the mystery 737 wasn't being housed there. SNC is maybe the world's most known aircraft modification company, especially for unique military applications. So, a specially modified 737 is literally right up their alley.

The aircraft had taken a handful of local flights in May, likely check flights to test its airworthiness and its modifications, before making the trip from Colorado Springs to Santa Maria on the 12th of June.
With the aircraft on the ground there, it brings us up to the time when the photos were taken. They show the aircraft with what appears to be wiring and sensors speed-taped all along the fuselage. The modifications cover nearly the entire length of the airframe and punch through the cabin windows in some areas. The War Zone ran these modifications by a number of airliner experts who, at first glance, didn't notice this particular configuration and found it to be quite unusual.

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Things get even more interesting the next day, when the aircraft in question, under the callsign "STING38,' flew a mission from Santa Maria far out into the SOCAL Range Complex.

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This area, which sits off the Baja Peninsula and San Guadalupe Island, is associated with long-range missile tests and carrier strike group workups, not common test flights of 737s. It was just highly active for the Nimitz Carrier Strike Group's COMPUTEX training, which occurs just prior to deployment. It is a remote and quiet place to also test new capabilities far from areas where they could interfere with populated areas, especially in terms of radio frequency-related trials.

USN
The 737s flight lasted roughly five hours. Whatever it did out there required substantial presence over the area.
So, what the heck is this thing up to? We really have no idea. Is it testing a new electronic surveillance measures suite for large aircraft? The sensors placed around the aircraft would make sense as these systems use interferometry to geolocate emitters, such as active radars and other air defense nodes, as well as communications systems. What about some sort of conformal communications system? Or was this something totally different, like to evaluate 737 airframe durability or some other sort of aerodynamic testing? That would seem odd considering the details we know about this aircraft shadowy ownership, but it is entirely possible.

Some notes on the aircraft's ownership. The Air Force technically owns the fleet of 'Janet Airlines' 737-600s that move folks around to Area 51, Tonopah Test Range Airport, and other sensitive sites. Apparently, Denmar has done some modifications to 'Janet' aircraft in the past, although that was one of the King Airs that are known to move around smaller numbers of people that work at clandestine sites around the American Southwest. Also, this aircraft is a 737-700, not a 600, and the Janets are registered to Hill AFB, not Bolling AFB like N712JM.
It's also worth noting that Bolling AFB is home to the Air Force's Rapid Capabilities Office (RCO), and it appears that the registered address of this aircraft is the exact same address of the RCO. The RCO heads up cutting-edge high-stakes programs such as the X-37B spaceplane and the B-21 Raider stealth bomber. As such, using a 737 to test a new subsystem that is destined for an aircraft like the B-21 would be right within their purview.
Then again, this could be something else entirely, either more mundane or far more exotic, but whatever it is, it is definitely unique, because this aircraft has a life and origin like no other testbed aircraft we know of.
As such, at least for now, N712JM remains very much an enigma.
What do you think? Have you seen modifications like this before? Let us know in the comments below.
UPDATE: 1:00 PM PDT—
She was up in the air again, down in the SOCAL range just like yesterday. This was a six-hour flight:

Adsbexchange.com
Another possibility is flight-testing a system for PNT (positioning, navigation, and timing)—navigation in a GPS denied environment. There are many exotic technologies being examined for this application under an urgent set of initiatives, including using the earth's magnetic field to provide a precise location of an object moving through space and time.
UPDATE: 5:55 PM PDT—
Here are new photos of the aircraft arriving back at Santa Maria Airport after its mission over the Pacific. It is has a trailing instrumented cone which is used a 'clean' source of additional air data during testing.
There is a lot of tape on this jet!

Reader-submitted photo

Reader-submitted photo

Reader-submitted photo

Reader-submitted photo

Reader-submitted photo

Reader-submitted photo

Reader-submitted photo
Contact the author: Tyler@thedrive.com

posted for fair use

The Mysterious Case Of The Air Force's New Strangely Modified 737 With A Puzzling Past

The aircraft still wears its factory coating and has crude alterations, but its ownership history is just as curious as its configuration.

www.thedrive.com

 

[Housecarl]

Hummm.....

Posted for fair use.....

Israel owns 90 nuclear warheads: Report

Swedish peace research institute says 9 countries, including Israel, possess nuclear capabilities - Anadolu Ajansı

www.aa.com.tr

Israel owns 90 nuclear warheads: Report
Swedish peace research institute says 9 countries, including Israel, possess nuclear capabilities
Abdelraouf Arna'out |15.06.2020

JERUSALEM

Israel is believed to possess between 80 and 90 nuclear warheads, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) said on Monday.

In a report, SIPRI said Israel continues to pursue a policy of ambiguity regarding its nuclear program.

It said that the number of nuclear warheads in Israel rose to 90, up from 80 warheads in 2019.

"The nine nuclear-armed states—the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan, Israel and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea)—together possessed an estimated 13,400 nuclear weapons at the start of 2020," the SIPRI report said.

In 2015, the Washington DC-based Institute for Science and International Security said that Israel has produced 115 nuclear warheads since it began making them in 1963.

The true number of Israeli nuclear weapons remains a closely guarded secret.


*Ahmed Asmar contributed to this report from Ankara

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use.....

Turkey Planning on Remaining in Libya through 2 Military Bases

Turkey Planning on Remaining in Libya through 2 Military Bases

Ankara, Cairo – Saeed Abdulrazek and Jamal Jawhar

1 day ago

Vehicles of forces loyal to the GNA are seen outside a checkpoint at al-Watiya airbase southwest of the capital, Tripoli, on May 18, 2020. (Getty Images)

Turkey is continuing its contacts with various effective players in Libya, leading with Russia, amid reports that it was planning on setting up permanent military bases in the North African country.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu are expected in Istanbul on Sunday for talks with their Turkish counterparts on Libya and Syria.

Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar had held a telephone call with NATO chief Jens Stoltenberg on Libya, while President Recep Tayyip Erdogan had received in Istanbul on Friday head of the Libya’s High Council of State Khalid al-Mishri.

Discussions focused on bilateral relations and the need to boost cooperation in all fields. Turkey said it was ready to help Libya build its economy and achieve stability and development.

Turkish presidential spokesman Ibrahim Kalin said contacts are ongoing over reaching a political solution in Libya based on United Nations resolutions and this year’s Berlin conference.

Meanwhile, Turkey’s Yeni Safak daily, which is close to Erdogan, reported that Ankara is planning on setting up permanent military bases in Libya’s al-Watiya airbase and at its Misrata port.

It cited “provocations” from Greece in the eastern Mediterranean, which is raising tensions there and demands the presence of Turkish naval forces in Libyan regional waters.

It cited “regional sources” as saying that military cooperation between Libya and Turkey will rise to “higher” levels after the visit paid to Ankara last week by Libyan Government of National Accord chief Fayez al-Sarraj, who held talks with Erdogan.

Kalin on Friday said Ankara is in favor of a political solution in Libya, reported Yeni Safak.

He said Turkey will not undermine any call for ceasefire but it is important to see where this call is coming from and what is the motive.

Cairo had recently declared an initiative aimed at reaching a ceasefire in the conflict, resuming political talks and electing a leadership council.

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use.....

CENTCOM chief: US troops can't keep up with the flood of cheap drones downrange

U.S. service members deployed to Middle East are unprepared to deal with the rising proliferation of small unmanned aerial platforms among adversaries in the region, the head of U.S. Central Command warned on Wednesday

taskandpurpose.com

CENTCOM chief: US troops can't keep up with the flood of cheap drones downrange
JARED KELLER
JUN 12, 2020 3:44 PM EDT

U.S. service members deployed to Middle East are unprepared to deal with the rising proliferation of small unmanned aerial platforms among adversaries in the region, the head of U.S. Central Command warned on Wednesday, raising the specter of drone swarms as an looming threat to U.S. forces abroad.

"I argue all the time with my Air Force friends that the future of flight is vertical and it's unmanned," Marine Gen. Kenneth McKenzie said during an event hosted by the Middle East Institute. "And I believe we are seeing it now."

Related: Drones are dropping bombs on US troops in Syria, and it's not clear who's doing it

According to McKenzie, the proliferation of commercial, off-the-shelf drone systems has allowed militant groups such as ISIS has increased to the point where it's harder for U.S. forces to defense against these platforms than it is for adversaries to create them.

"I'm not talking about large unmanned platforms which are the size of a conventional fighter jet that we can see and deal with, as we would any other platform," McKenzie said.

"I'm talking about the one you can go out and buy at Costco right now in the United States for a thousand dollars, four quad, rotorcraft or something like that that can be launched and flown. And with very simple modifications, it can make made into something that can drop a weapon like a hand grenade or something else."

"Right now, the fact of the matter is we're on the wrong side of that equation," he added. "We're working very hard to fix it. It concerns me."

U.S. Marine Cpl. Jacob Morrell, an intelligence specialist assigned to Battalion Landing Team, 2nd Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment (BLT 2/6), 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), releases an unmanned aerial system (UAS) quadcopter to survey the surrounding area during Non-combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) riot control training as part of exercise Eager Lion, in Jordan, April 23, 2018
(U.S. Marine Corps/Lance Cpl. Tojyea G. Matally)

This isn't the first time McKenzie has sounded the alarm on small drones in the CENTCOM area of responsibility. In March, he stated that personnel deployed to Syria had in recent months come under attack from drones laden with explosives that were "possibly" operated by ISIS fighters in the region.

"The Russians have had some significant casualties in this regard, as have other nations that are operating there," McKenzie told lawmakers at the time. "So yes, it is a problem. We look at it very hard. It's one of my highest priorities."

According to Business Insider, counter-drone systems were a major part of in CENTCOM's 2020 unfunded priorities list, which contains funding requests not included in the command's fiscal year budget request submitted to Congress.

Hostile drones "have expanded in size, sophistication, range, lethality and numbers" and are being used throughout CENTCOM's area of responsibility, McKenzie wrote, noting that "low velocity and altitude makes them difficult to detect on radar and limited options exist in effectively defeating them."

The unfunded priorities list requested $67.6 million for systems to "help counter these airborne IEDs and intelligence gatherers," Business Insider reported.

The counter-drone mission has gained increasing scrutiny elsewhere in the Pentagon: While the Air Force has whipped up a number of directed energy weapons explicitly to counter small UAS downrange, Defense Secretary Mark Esper in 2019 appointed the Army to lead a joint counter-UAS mission within the Defense Department.

"We're seeing is the emergence of, really, it's not a new form of warfare, but it's a new component of warfare," McKenzie said at the MEI event on Wednesday.

"And eventually, I think you're going to see manned aircraft that are going to be supported by unmanned aircraft flying as parts of that system. This could be a system of systems. But on the ground right now, I worry about our ability to protect against swarms of those craft."

Related: US special operations forces are testing a 'guaranteed hit' smart rifle system in Syria
TAGSNEWSDRONE SWARMSMARINE GEN. KENNETH MCKENZIE JR.IRAQU.S. CENTRAL COMMANDAFGHANISTANDRONESSYRIA

BY
JARED KELLER
Jared Keller is the deputy editor of Task & Purpose. He can be reached at jared@taskandpurpose.com

 

[jward]

Hmm.
Global: MilitaryInfo
@Global_Mil_Info
14m

NEW: 10 million dollars has been placed aside by a Senate panel to accelerate preparations to resume explosive nuclear tests by the United States - Politico

 

[jward]

Japan halts plan to deploy Aegis Ashore missile defense system
Defense minister cites costs and technical problems as the main reasons for the decision

The Aegis Ashore land-based missile defense test complex on the Hawaiian island of Kauai is seen in January last year. | KYODO



The Defense Ministry is halting its plan to deploy the Aegis Ashore land-based missile defense system in Japan, Defense Minister Taro Kono said Monday, citing costs and technical problems.
The move comes a month after the government gave up on deploying the cutting-edge missile defense system to a Self-Defense Forces compound in the city of Akita, following strong opposition from local residents. Kono reported the latest plan to Prime Minister Shinzo Abe last Friday, he said.

In January 2019, the U.S. agreed to sell two Aegis Ashore missile defense systems and other military equipment to Japan at an estimated cost of $2.15 billion (about ¥231 billion).
The Defense Ministry had planned to install two Aegis Ashore systems in Akita Prefecture in eastern Japan and Yamaguchi Prefecture in western Japan sometime after the fiscal year starting April 2025 so that all of Japan was covered by the missile defense systems.
After giving up the plan to install it in Akita, the government was also facing opposition in and around the planned Aegis Ashore site in the Abu district of Hagi, Yamaguchi Prefecture. The Cabinet decided to install two Aegis Ashore systems in 2017.
RELATED STORIES

• North Korean missiles again flying over Japan 'only a matter of time,' experts say
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• Japan's Aegis Ashore site survey extended again

Installing the Aegis Ashore systems had been touted as a way to ease the burden on the Maritime Self-Defense Force, which has sent Aegis-equipped destroyers and their crews on long-term offshore assignments.
Observers have said the fielding the system would help the administration of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe accomplish two goals — giving Tokyo the ability to track and intercept North Korean missiles and mollifying dissatisfaction from the White House over Japan’s limited role in regional security.

Japan suspends plan to deploy Aegis Ashore missile defense system

Defense Minister Taro Kono cited costs and technical problems as the main reasons for the decision to scrap the plan.

www.japantimes.co.jp

 

[jward]

Al-Qaida and ISIS Turn On Each Other in the Sahel, With Civilians in the Crossfire
Peter Tinti Monday, June 15, 2020



France announced earlier this month that its armed forces had killed Abdelmalek Droukdel, the emir of al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, or AQIM, during a June 3 military operation in northern Mali. The operation, carried out by French troops with the help of intelligence and surveillance aircraft provided by the United States, represents a rare, quantifiable victory for France and its counterterrorism partners in the region as they struggle to contain a bloody insurgency by jihadist groups.
A veteran of Algeria’s brutal civil war in the 1990s, Droukdel’s rise and fall in many ways mirrors the fortunes of the organization he led. As recently as 2012, AQIM was widely considered the most well-financed al-Qaida franchise in the world, reportedly raking in tens of millions of dollars annually through kidnapping for ransom and smuggling contraband. That revenue allowed it to expand its influence throughout the Sahel, as AQIM formed a key component of the jihadist takeover of northern Mali in 2012, only to be subsequently driven from its Malian strongholds by a French-led military intervention in 2013.

Today, AQIM is one of several jihadist factions operating in the region, constituting just one part of a broader al-Qaida-aligned coalition called Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, or JNIM. According to experts, while Droukdel’s death is a direct blow to AQIM, it is not a major setback to the other jihadist insurgencies that are rapidly expanding their influence throughout much of the Sahel. “AQIM have already been in decline, and whoever is going to replace Droukdel would have an impossible mission trying to revive the group in Algeria,” says Rida Lyammouri, a senior fellow at the Policy Center for the New South, a Morocco-based think tank.
Jihadist insurgencies in the Sahel, Lyammouri adds, have largely transitioned away from their origins in North African-led groups like AQIM. JNIM’s two most influential leaders in the Sahel, Iyad Ag Ghali and Amadou Koufa, are both Malian. “Its ability to survive and expand in the Sahel is almost exclusively a result of their influence, and not the influence of Droukdel,” he says.

And while Droukdel’s death represents the end of one chapter in an increasingly complex story of jihadist insurgencies in the Sahel, it also comes at a time when the region’s two main jihadist groups, JNIM and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, or ISGS, have started turning their guns on each other after years of essentially maintaining a truce. In late March and early April, local media as well as civil society organizations reported on numerous clashes between JNIM and ISGS, most notably several in central Mali.
Rhetorical and military rivalries between affiliates of al-Qaida and the Islamic State have played out in other conflict zones, such as Syria and Yemen. But the nature of the clashes between their local affiliates in the Sahel underscores the extent to which jihadist groups in the region are primarily driven by local dynamics rather than ideological disputes.

“Civilians are once again at risk of being collateral victims and paying a heavy price in a war that strangely resembles a fratricidal fight in certain places.”

“Relations between JNIM and ISGS have always fluctuated between mutual distrust and a defense of common interests,” says Ibrahim Maiga, a Mali-based researcher at the Institute for Security Studies, a think tank focusing on conflict and governance in Africa. The relationship seems to have deteriorated earlier this year when local brigades from both groups began fighting over control of local resources. “Tensions are linked to control of spaces and disrespect for respective territories against the backdrop of each group’s desire to expand,” he adds. “These tensions are accentuated by the competition for access and control of pasture areas and bourgoutières,” referring to areas where fodder crops like millet and sorghum are grown. “Behind these group rivalries hides a logic linked to local geopolitics.”

The localized nature of these rivalries is in part a testament to both jihadist groups’ ability to make inroads recruiting local populations who feel increasingly disillusioned with—and in many cases, have faced violent attacks by—government forces. Yet untangling the motivations and reasoning behind a given violent clash between al-Qaida and Islamic State factions is no easy task, especially given the hyper-local dynamics at work. “In some cases, you find people from the same community, ethnic group or even the same family in which one member is with the Islamic State and the other is with JNIM,” Lyammouri says. “The fighting seems to not necessarily be over the ideology of al-Qaida against ISIS, but more of local disputes between the small brigades that represent each group.”
A recent report by the Center for Global Policy, a Washington-based think tank, also found that ISGS has tried to use JNIM’s stated willingness to negotiate with the Malian government as a wedge issue as both sides compete for local recruits throughout the region. A statement by the Islamic State’s spokesman in late May, for instance, accused the “apostates of al-Qaida” of fighting “on behalf of the crusaders in exchange of negotiations.” As the Malian government considers talks with the JNIM, the report noted, the French-led coalition and other force are focusing their military efforts on targeting ISGS in the tri-border area of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger.

While it remains to be seen whether clashes between JNIM and ISGS will increase as both groups seek to expand their influence, experts warn that local populations are likely to bear the brunt of any future violence. “From a security standpoint, the perspective of the U.S. or the French might be to just grab your popcorn and let them go at it,” Lyammouri says. “But the consequences for the civilians and the communities is not something that we should underestimate.”
Communities that have been deliberately targeted by local armed forces and government-backed militias that accuse them of collaborating with jihadists may find themselves caught in the middle of yet more violence. “If it continues to intensify between JNIM and ISGS, we will continue to see repercussions against individuals and communities who are perceived to support one group over the other,” Lyammouri warns.

Maiga adds that already vulnerable civilian populations could be put at even more risk if they have to “position themselves in relation to the groups present”—essentially forced to choose sides. Division among jihadist groups might represent an opportunity for the international community and governments in the region to go on the offensive or pursue a dual approach of military action and opening new lines of dialogue. But there is no guarantee that such an approach will spare civilians.
“In the end,” Maiga says, “civilians are once again at risk of being collateral victims and paying a heavy price in a war that strangely resembles a fratricidal fight in certain places.”
Peter Tinti is an independent journalist and senior research fellow with the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.


posted for fair use

Al-Qaida and ISIS Turn On Each Other in the Sahel, With Civilians in the Crossfire

France announced earlier this month that its armed forces had killed Abdelmalek Droukdel, the emir of al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, or AQIM, during a June 3 military operation in northern Mali. The operation, carried out by French troops with the help of intelligence and surveillance aircraft...

www.worldpoliticsreview.com

 

[jward]

Mali ambush: Gunmen kill 24 in attack on convoy
Malian troops, backed by French forces, are battling a long-running Islamist insurgency

At least 24 soldiers were killed and others are unaccounted for after gunmen ambushed a convoy in central Mali.
The army said eight survivors had been found following Saturday's attack, about 60 miles (100km) from the border with Mauritania.
No group has admitted carrying out the raid but Islamist militants are active in the area.
Mali has been blighted by instability since 2012 when an Islamist rebellion broke out in the north.
Army officials said about 12 vehicles had been in the convoy and four of them were destroyed in Saturday's ambush.
BBC Africa editor Will Ross says that with reports of soldiers missing, it is possible that the death toll could be higher than the military is admitting.

• Al-Qaeda chief in north Africa killed
• Africa's Sahel becomes latest al-Qaeda-IS battleground
• Why France is focused on fighting jihadists in Mali

It is the biggest loss for the military since November last year when more than 50 soldiers died in an attack.
On Saturday two UN peacekeepers were also killed when a logistics convoy was targeted in the north of the country. The UN has 13,000 troops in Mali.
Since 2012, Malian forces have managed, with French help, to regain control of large swathes of territory taken by militants. France has 4,500 troops deployed in the region.
But thousands of lives have been lost as Mali struggles to contain the violence, which has spread to neighbouring Burkina Faso and Niger.
President Ibrahim Boubakar Keita has offered to open dialogue with the jihadists but our correspondent says there seems little hope of that working.

Mali ambush: Gunmen kill 24 in attack on convoy

Gunmen attack a convoy near the border with Mauritania, leaving 24 dead and others unaccounted for.

www.bbc.com

 

[jward]

India says 3 soldiers killed in standoff with Chinese troops
8 minutes ago


SRINAGAR, India (AP) — At least three Indian soldiers, including a senior army officer, have been killed in a confrontation with Chinese soldiers along their disputed frontier high in the Himalayas where thousands of troops on both sides have been facing off for over a month, the Indian army said.

The army said in a statement Tuesday that a “violent faceoff” took place in Galwan valley in the Ladakh region on Monday night “with casualties on both sides.”

There was no immediate comment from China.

“The loss of lives on the Indian side includes an officer and two soldiers,” the statement said. “Senior military officials of the two sides are currently meeting at the venue to defuse the situation.”


The incident is the first such confrontation between the two Asian giants since 1975 in which soldiers have died.

Thousands of soldiers from the two countries, backed by armored trucks and artillery, have been facing off just a few hundred meters (yards) apart for more than a month in the Ladakh region near Tibet. Army officers and diplomats have held a series of meetings to try to end the impasse, with no breakthrough.

Indian officials say Chinese soldiers crossed the boundary in Ladakh in early May at three different points, erecting tents and guard posts and ignoring verbal warnings to leave. That triggered shouting matches, stone-throwing and fistfights, much of it replayed on television news channels and social media.

posted for fair use

India: 20 troops killed in Himalayas clash with Chinese army

SRINAGAR, India (AP) — A clash high in the Himalayas between the world’s two most populated countries claimed the lives of 20 Indian soldiers in a border region that the two nuclear armed neighbors have disputed for decades, Indian officials said Tuesday.

apnews.com

 

[Housecarl]

This op-ed is looking like it is a hair behind events.....

Posted for fair use.....

The shape of Asia's new cold war

Asian leaders should assess the Sino-American conflict across three distinct but related dimensions.

www.japantimes.co.jp

COMMENTARY / WORLD
The shape of Asia's new cold war

BY YOON YOUNG-KWAN

• JUN 15, 2020
  ARTICLE HISTORY

SEOUL – In retrospect, the decision by the Chinese Communist Party to impose a new security law on Hong Kong seems to have been preordained. Historically, rising powers always try to expand their spheres of geopolitical influence once they pass a certain stage of economic development. It was only a matter of time before China would do away with the “one country, two systems” arrangement and impose its laws and norms on Hong Kong — a territory that it considers integral to the motherland.

From China’s perspective, America’s decadence and decline over the last 12 years — from the 2008 financial crisis to Donald Trump’s presidency — have given it an open invitation to accelerate its strategic expansion. Though Chinese President Xi Jinping has long assured the world that the Pacific Ocean is big enough to accommodate both China and the United States, his actual policies have often suggested otherwise. In addition to militarizing the South China Sea, his signature "Belt and Road" initiative aims to make China the nodal point for the entire Eurasian landmass.


Now that Xi has decided to accept nothing less than Hong Kong’s full subservience, he will likely also challenge the status quo with respect to Taiwan, trusting that an isolationist, distracted Trump administration will do nothing. But the U.S. has taken note of Xi’s aggressiveness. After two decades of hoping that China would become a responsible stakeholder in the world economy, U.S. policymakers have finally decided that this will not happen. Since the CCP’s March 2018 decision to abolish presidential term limits, the U.S. foreign policy establishment has abandoned any expectation of normative convergence between Xi’s China and the West.

Meanwhile, with Trump’s trade war having already inaugurated a new, increasingly antagonistic phase in Sino-American relations, the COVID-19 pandemic has lent additional momentum to a more confrontational U.S. policy toward China. Thus, a strategic consensus has emerged across Asia that the region will be the central “battlefield” in a new cold war that has already begun.

To understand the nature of the coming conflict, Asian leaders — along with the rest of the world — should focus on three different but interrelated domains of the Sino-American rivalry: politico-military, economic and ideological.

At the politico-military level, the key question is whether China will seek to expel the U.S. from Asia, thereby becoming the region’s unchallenged hegemon. Short of that, China will try to weaken U.S. security commitments in South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

But if the CCP’s aggressive approach mounts, it might impel neighboring countries to form a new anti-China coalition, aligned in some way with the U.S. Should that happen, it would become extremely difficult for China to establish peaceful coexistence with the U.S. Worse, Asia’s new cold war would be at risk of degenerating into an unintended hot war.

The second area of concern is economic. Any confrontation at the politico-military level is bound to accelerate a decoupling process, transforming the region’s positive-sum economy into a negative-sum one. Many Asian countries have benefited economically from deeper ties with China, even as they continue to depend on the U.S. for their security. For these countries, a full-fledged break from China would be especially costly, complicated and dangerous. That will make them likely to resist U.S. efforts to hasten a comprehensive decoupling, in favor of a more limited approach that targets sensitive security-related and high-tech industries.

Uncertainty about the U.S. position doesn’t help matters. Asian policymakers have been left wondering when the U.S. will share a clear, comprehensive vision of the post-decoupling era that it seeks. The Trump administration has indicated that it wants to create a new “Economic Prosperity Network” in the region. But it remains to be seen if this arrangement would be governed by the same unilateral, transactional, “America first” approach that has defined all other U.S. policies under Trump.

If so, Asian governments will be less inclined to sign up. By squandering much of Asia’s goodwill toward America over the past three years, Trump has significantly reduced the scope for a meeting of minds on security issues.

While the politico-military dimension is the new cold war’s determining factor and economics the dependent factor, the ideological confrontation will play a reinforcing role. Again, the key question is how far China will go in promoting its model of “authoritarian capitalism” as a “superior” alternative to liberal democracy.

If China pushes its model as aggressively as the Soviet Union once did, the new cold war will have all the ingredients — and all the myriad tensions — of the original Cold War. The more assertive China is in selling its own model, the more likely democratic countries will be to unite against it in the name of their own ideological system.

To be sure, the world’s leading democracies have not acquitted themselves well in the current crisis. But democratic principles — such as a respect for human rights, civil liberties and the rule of law — are universal values that still attract broad-based support among Asians, particularly when compared to authoritarianism. China’s inherently extractive state will struggle to create the conditions in which individuals can realize their full potential, and that structural limitation will stand in the way of its aspiration to supersede the U.S. as the world’s most advanced economy.

It remains to be seen precisely how the three dimensions of the conflict will interact. Asia’s leaders will need to be prudent, recognize that the situation is fluid and plan for different scenarios. And it certainly wouldn’t hurt the U.S. or China to show a bit more humility. That character trait, sadly, does not come to mind when one thinks of Trump or Xi. But it will be absolutely essential for avoiding an accidental catastrophe.

Yoon Young-kwan, a former South Korean foreign minister, is a professor emeritus of International Relations at Seoul National University. Project Syndicate, 2020. www.project-syndicate.org

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use.....

In Xi Jinping's effort to make China No. 1, he's forgotten the basics

There are some laws that can never be ignored - Newton's third law of physics for example.

www.smh.com.au

OPINION
In Xi Jinping's effort to make China No. 1, he's forgotten the basics

Peter Hartcher
Political and international editor for The Sydney Morning Herald
June 16, 2020 — 12.00am

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Xi Jinping has set China the goal of leading the world in cutting edge technology, but has overlooked the very basics. While the regime is pursuing quantum computing, artificial intelligence and space dominance, it has neglected one of the founding concepts of physics. Isaac Newton's third law says that for every action, there is an equal and opposite reaction.
As Xi pushes harder and harder for global dominance, he is provoking a growing pushback. Not just from the US. A growing number of people, countries and organisations are realising that Xi's China is not the China they thought they knew.

The China that had followed Deng Xiaoping's dictum to "hide your brightness, bide your time" for the preceding four decades was given a new direction by Xi: "Strive to achieve." It's no sin to strive. But when you are striving to take territory from your neighbours, sovereignty from your friends, and liberties from people everywhere, you are going to ruffle a few feathers.

Among the latest to awaken is the secretary-general of NATO, Jens Stoltenberg. The North Atlantic Treaty Alliance was forged to protect Europe from Russia. But Stoltenberg has now named China as a threat, too. China was too big a threat for America to manage by itself, the former Norwegian Labour prime minister said in a remarkable speech last week. Beijing was now a threat to democratic values everywhere and a global military force to be reckoned with.

The rise of China is "multiplying the threats to open societies and individual freedoms and increasing the competition over our values and our way of life," he said in remarks to a conference on NATO's purpose for the next decade.

China was not the enemy, he said, yet it was a clear and present danger: "They already have the second-largest defence budget. They are investing heavily in modern military capabilities, including missiles that can reach all NATO-allied countries." As The Economist magazine headlined its report: "NATO sets its sights on China."

And China was no longer an Asia-only military force, according to the NATO chief. China was "coming closer to us", he said, and "we see Chinese forces in the Arctic, in Africa. We see them investing in our critical infrastructure. And they are working more and more together with Russia. All of this has a security consequence for NATO".

There's no doubt that Stoltenberg was seeking to cut NATO's cloth to fit the political imperative of the times. And because the US is the alliance's principal member, Stoltenberg would know that he'd win Washington's favour by naming China as a security concern.

But it's not just Washington. The major powers of western Europe have grown alarmed about Beijing's intentions too. Germany has toughened its laws to protect companies against Chinese takeover, for instance.

And Britain is rethinking its embrace of China's cyber champion, Huawei. Government MPs have been angered by Beijing's behaviour over the pandemic and forced Prime Minister Boris Johnson to review whether the company will be allowed any part in its 5G network.

But whatever the politics, putting Beijing at the centre of NATO's concerns is a historic shift. And this point from the secretary-general would be uncomfortable for any American president to hear: "Compared to China, even the US is not the biggest one. Soon China will have the biggest economy in the world, they are leading in investing in a lot of advanced technologies, and including parts of artificial intelligence, quantum computing and so on, then it's even more important that we stand together, North America and Europe together, because we cannot manage this alone."

Stoltenberg said that NATO needed to work more closely with the developed democracies in the Asia-Pacific, "like Australia, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, to defend the global rules and institutions that have kept us safe for decades".
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The G7 is another international outfit that traditionally was unconcerned with China, but it's increasingly worried, too. The group of seven leading industrialised democracies is an Atlantic-centric shop that traditionally talks economics. But last week Japan's Prime Minister Shinzo Abe reportedly proposed that the G7's next summit issue a statement condemning Beijing's plan to extinguish Hong Kong's autonomy.

At the same time, the European Union published a report naming China and Russia for using the pandemic to "cause harm" by launching a "massive wave" of health care hoaxes, online scams, hate speech and coronavirus conspiracy theories on social media.

In the same vein, Twitter last week killed 170,000 Chinese government-linked accounts that were used to push fake news about the Hong Kong protests, coronavirus and the Black Lives Matter demonstrations. Twitter was prompted by research by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.

Xi could be forgiven for thinking that he could get away with an aggressive campaign for dominance. For years, he did as he pleased, broke international laws and encountered no real resistance.

When Barack Obama told him to stop seizing disputed maritime territories from China's neighbours, Xi ignored him and paid no price. When pressed, he promised Obama that China would not militarise those territories in the South China Sea. He went ahead anyway. And paid no price.

He found that he could build a complex of concentration camps for the persecution of a million of the Uighur people of Xinjiang, and yet continue to be courted in capitals across the world.

And who knows? Perhaps he will get away with a great deal more yet. But day by day, the world is awakening and Xi's thrusts are generating a wider resistance and even some pushback. It's only physics.

Peter Hartcher is international editor.

 

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China's Evolving Taiwan Policy: Disrupt, Isolate and Constrain

Although China's official policy is still one of peaceful reunification with Taiwan, the island's political evolution and shifting international relations are pushing Beijing down a more coercive

www.realclearworld.com

China's Evolving Taiwan Policy: Disrupt, Isolate and Constrain
By Rodger Baker
June 14, 2020

This article is republished with permission from Stratfor Worldview.

• Although China's official policy is still one of peaceful reunification with Taiwan, the island's political evolution and shifting international relations are pushing Beijing down a more coercive path.
• China has a variety of toolkits to draw from as it seeks to shape the political and social dynamics in and around Taiwan, but events over recent years are shifting China away from conciliatory tools and toward an expansion of coercive measures.
• Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-Wen's continued refusal to recognize the so-called 1992 Consensus, and more overt U.S. backing for Taiwan, are testing Beijing's perception that it has time on its side.
• Should there be stronger political moves in Taiwan toward independence, or if U.S. military capability and political will appear significantly weak, Beijing may weigh the cost of inaction as exceeding the cost of unification by force.

For China's leadership, the unification of Taiwan is more than a symbol of the final success of the Chinese Communist Party or an emotional appeal to some historic image of a greater China. It is a strategic imperative driven both by Taiwan's strategic location, and by the rising antagonism between the United States and China. Taiwan is the “unsinkable aircraft carrier” off the Chinese coastline, splitting China's near seas, and bridging the arc of islands stretching southwest from Japan with those from the Philippines south through Indonesia. Taiwan is crucial for both any foreign containment strategy, and for China's confidence and security in the East and South China seas — areas critical to China's national defense, food security and international trade.

China's Management of Taiwan
For decades, China has seen Taiwan reunification as an issue that can be delayed so long as Beijing could constrain the emergence of strong pro-independence forces. To achieve this, China has relied on a combination of tools, from conciliatory political and economic policies to more coercive military activities and international diplomatic isolation. For several years, particularly during the 2008-2016 administration of Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou, China eased off its more overt coercive measures, and instead sought greater economic and social interactions with Taiwan. This was intended to tie the islands' economic status so tightly to the mainland that it would tamp down political sentiment that bucked the cooperative trend, and perhaps ultimately lead to a peaceful unification under a “one country, two systems” model.

But the election, and then re-election, of President Tsai Ing-Wen — combined with the resurgent power of her Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which leans more pro-Taiwan than pro-unification, and the island's changing demographics — have effectively erased any lingering expectation of Taiwan giving up its sovereignty and willingly joining with the mainland. Tsai and the DPP reject the 1992 Consensus, an arrangement between Taiwan and China that they would agree there is only one China (though each was able to have their own interpretation of whether that was the current communist People's Republic of China or the past Nationalist Republic of China), thus forming the framework for cross-strait interactions. More recently, Beijing has stepped up its link between the 1992 Consensus and the “one country, two systems” concept, thus asserting that any consensus is a recognition that mainland Communist China is the only China. In this context, even the island's Kuomintang party has backed away from the 1992 Consensus amid increasing political pressure inside Taiwan.

With President Tsai calling for a committee to review Taiwan's constitution, and pursuing a more assertive policy to sign trade deals with Western powers and expand relations with Southeast Asian states, Beijing is concerned that Taiwan may be laying the groundwork to move from de facto to de jure independence, even if not immediately. Taiwan's apparent success in battling the COVID-19 pandemic, and the unfolding events in Hong Kong, are raising international sympathies for Taiwan at a time when Beijing is trying to tighten the island's political isolation. The United States' public recognition of Tsai's re-election and request for new arms sales, as well as its increased patrols in the South China Sea and through the Taiwan Strait, all point to a potential change in Taiwan's security and international status — and one that Beijing sees as a clear violation of its claimed sovereignty and a threat to its strategic security.

China's Taiwan Toolkits
China has five main toolkits it draws from for its Taiwanese policy: incentivize, disrupt, isolate, constrain and force. The first three (incentivize, disrupt and isolate) are largely a combination of economic and political tools, while the latter two (constrain and force) move more heavily into the military space. During Taiwan's previous administration under President Ma, China relied largely on the first tool (incentivize) while selectively drawing from the second two (disrupt and isolate).

But given the changes inside Taiwan, and in Taiwan's international ties, Beijing no longer sees the first as having much relevance, and is now shifting heavily toward the second two. At no time is China not using the fourth tool (constrain), shaping the future battlespace to limit Taiwan's options and ability to rely on external powers. The fifth, direct military action, is one Beijing wishes to avoid but sees as potentially necessary over the next decade due to the pace of change in Taiwan and shifting U.S. regional interactions.

1) Incentivize: Using primarily economic, social/cultural and political tools to encourage greater integration with the mainland to highlight the benefits of cooperation and eventual reunification. Examples include:

• Offering economic benefits for Taiwanese companies operating in China.
• Opening sectors of the Chinese economy to Taiwan, such as agricultural products.
• Suspending “dollar diplomacy” competition between the Mainland and Taiwan.
• Loosening opposition to Taiwanese presence in select international forums.
• Encouraging tourism between Taiwan and the mainland.
• Emphasizing Chinese cultural ties, and the strength of the Chinese market and economy.

2) Disrupt: Using economic, political and informational tools to disrupt social and political unity in Taiwan, and thus prevent the formation of a strong pro-independence bloc. Examples include:

• Selectively applying regulations to Taiwanese business operations on the mainland.
• Engaging in disinformation campaigns in Taiwan and countries sympathetic to Taiwan.
• Carrying out cyber espionage and cyber attacks.
• Adding complications to trade and tourism to create uncertainty, delays and economic loss.
• Using military statements or exercises to create a sense of a less stable Taiwan.

3) Isolate: Reducing the “international space” for Taiwan to operate by influencing global organizations and foreign nations in ways that limit their interaction with Taiwan, or keep such interaction within tightly prescribed boundaries. Examples include:

• Blocking Taiwanese participation in international forums, as it did in the recent World Health Assembly meeting.
• Threatening or carrying out economic action against businesses from third-party countries that do not adhere to Chinese convention labeling Taiwan a province of the People's Republic, or that assist in Taiwan's defense.
• Threatening or carrying out economic action against countries that either recognize Taiwan, or conduct political, economic or military actions that appear to support Taiwanese autonomy or independence.
• Accelerate dollar diplomacy efforts to strip away Taiwan's remaining formal diplomatic ties.

4) Constrain: Shaping the physical environment around Taiwan and in China's near seas to increase Beijing's strategic posture vis-a-vis Taiwan, and increase the cost of intervention by foreign powers if China should shift to military action to coerce or conquer Taiwan. Examples include:

• Increasing China's air, surface and subsurface maritime capabilities and reach.
• Increasing missile range and deployments to raise the cost of foreign intervention in China's near seas.
• Dominating key features in the South and East China seas and along strategic routes.
• Weakening regional U.S. alliance structures through economic, political and military coercion and concessions.
• Enhancing China's Marine Corps and military amphibious capabilities.
• Increasing and regularizing Chinese naval operations in the waters around Taiwan.

5) Force: Using military force to isolate Taiwan from international economic and security connections, eroding Taiwan's governed space, disrupting or damaging critical Taiwanese infrastructure, degrading Taiwanese military capabilities, and/or (in the extreme) invading and occupying Taiwan. Examples include:

• Disrupting key supply lines to Taiwan, including raw materials, machinery.
• Conducting cyber attacks on Taiwanese government and critical infrastructure.
• Naval blockade of Taiwanese ports.
• Closing the Taiwan Strait and/or airspace around Taiwan.
• Seizing outlying Taiwanese-controlled islands.
• Selective missile/drone strikes.
• Amphibious assault and occupation.

The Military Option
Although Beijing would prefer to avoid a military confrontation over Taiwan, it has never taken the military card off the table. The pace of China's military developments have far exceeded Taiwan's, and the balance has clearly tilted in favor of China, including even in several scenarios where the United States intervenes in a cross-strait conflict. But for Beijing, a potential victory in a military action to take Taiwan does not necessarily outbalance the numerous costs. An invasion risks not only jeopardizing Chinese soldiers and equipment, but prompting a global economic and political backlash.

Even If the United States was deterred from intervening in a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, Beijing would encounter a significant international economic and political response. And it is not clear a successful invasion would translate into a successful occupation, or the ability to capitalize on Taiwan's own economic capacity. So long as China retains some negative influence in Taiwan sufficient to deter active moves toward formal independence or foreign military occupation, it will likely delay direct military action.

That does not mean, however, that China is not actively preparing the battleground, both in the political realm to demonstrate the futility of Taiwanese independence, and as a concrete way to increase the likelihood of victory if there is a shift to open hostilities. This shaping takes several forms. First, China uses its economic heft to dissuade any significant foreign support for Taiwanese international space. Second, it similarly uses its political pressure to shape foreign companies and countries in their interaction with Taiwan. By isolating Taiwan diplomatically, China limits the strength of Taiwan, and reduces the potential for foreign intervention as Beijing shapes the physical environment.

It is the third component, the physical military space, that has been most notable in recent years. Beijing's construction and militarization of artificial islands in the South China Sea create a Chinese defensive ring around Taiwan, allowing China to interfere with key maritime routes foreign powers would take to intervene in cross-strait tensions. Expanding the Marine Corps, increasing the supply of amphibious ships, and stepping up the training cycle provides the conceptual force for occupying outlying Taiwanese islands and for an invasion force of the main island. China's developments of anti-ship missiles, including work on hypersonics, further increases the cost of intervention by foreign powers. At the same time the United States is sailing ships and flying aircraft to assert freedom of navigation around Taiwan, China is also honing its capacity to deny the water and airspace to foreign powers. China will match these efforts to shape the future battlespace with continued activities to spread disunity within Taiwan through economic, political and informational means.

A More Contentious Region
For now, it is unlikely that Taiwan will seek formal independence, despite the ruling DPP. Taiwan is, however, seeking a larger international environment and is reaching out to Europe, Southeast Asia and India for improved economic ties. Taiwan is also seeking the weapons systems necessary to increase its own ability to counter-strike should China invade, including the ability to strike into the mainland to increase the cost of any Chinese military action. While reunification is largely off the table in Taiwan, the island's strongest propensity is for a continuation of the status quo of de facto, rather than de jure, independence.

We can anticipate, then, that China will pursue a policy to disrupt, isolate and constrain Taiwan over the next few years, offering very few conciliatory incentives unless there are clear opportunities provided by political or economic dynamics in Taiwan. This will include shoring up the current artificial islands in the South China Sea that serve as forward basing and interdiction of key maritime routes (there are rumors of Beijing even considering the use of floating nuclear reactors to both reduce resupply problems and disincentivize foreign military action against these military outposts); deploying more anti-ship and anti-air missiles in and around China's near seas, including hypersonic missiles; increasing training for its carrier battle groups and marine corps amphibious operations; and using its civil maritime and aviation organizations to maintain a consistent presence in its claimed areas to demonstrate effective control. We may, at times, even see China experiment with various forms of loose blockades to disrupt foreign economic and security connections to Taiwan.

 

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Hong Kong leader urges people not to 'demonize' security law

HONG KONG (AP) — Hong Kong leader Carrie Lam said Tuesday that she hopes opponents of a new national security law being imposed by China do not “demonize and stigmatize” the legislation because doing so would mean pitting themselves against residents of the semi-autonomous Chinese territory.

apnews.com

Hong Kong leader urges people not to ‘demonize’ security law
By ZEN SOO
an hour ago

HONG KONG (AP) — Hong Kong leader Carrie Lam said Tuesday that she hopes opponents of a new national security law being imposed by China do not “demonize and stigmatize” the legislation because doing so would mean pitting themselves against residents of the semi-autonomous Chinese territory.

“The people of Hong Kong want to see stability again, they want a safe environment where they can work and live,” Lam told reporters.

She said people were “sick and tired” of violence in Hong Kong and intervention by foreign forces in the city.

China’s ceremonial parliament in May approved the decision to enact a national security law in Hong Kong, aimed at curbing subversive, secessionist, terrorist and foreign intervention activities in the city following months of anti-government protests last year.

“We are part of the People’s Republic of China, but we don’t have a mechanism to protect national security,” Lam said. “This is a risk not just to over 7 million people in Hong Kong, it’s also a risk to 1.4 billion people in the country.”

Lam spoke ahead of a meeting this week by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, which exercises legislative power in China. The law is not on the meeting’s agenda, but Hong Kong delegate Tam Yiu Chung said in an interview Monday that items could be added.

Critics consider the imminent legislation an attack on the “one country, two systems” framework in which China promised Hong Kong a high degree of autonomy and freedoms not found on the mainland when the former British colony was returned to Chinese control in 1997. They fear that the law will be used to curb any dissent in Hong Kong.

Details about the law have not been disclosed, though Lam said the specifics will be established. She said people “don’t need to worry” about this because at the end of the day, it is for Hong Kong’s authorities to enforce the law.”

“Please accept and understand why we have to do it,” she said. “The only purpose of this task is to protect Hong Kong and the country.”

The anti-government protests had subsiding during coronavirus restrictions, but have returned to the city in recent weeks, even though social distancing measures remain in place.

Lam said Hong Kong will relax its measures gradually.

“It would be risky if we completely lift the measures,” she said. “In recent times in some cities such as Beijing, we have seen imported cases and some countries have seen an influx of cases after relaxing measures.”

Hong Kong’s secretary for food and health, Sophia Chan, said Tuesday that the ban on public gatherings will be relaxed from eight to 50 people.

Restaurants will no longer be limited by capacity. For establishments such as bars and karaoke lounges, the maximum number of guests per table will be doubled from eight to 16.

“The relaxation is made in light of the easing of the epidemic. We also realize that certain activities must resume,” said Chan, who stressed that there was “no political consideration” involved in limiting the number of people allowed in public gatherings.

Separately, a group of over 50 protesters gathered in a shopping mall in the city’s Causeway Bay shopping district despite heavy riot police presence, shouting slogans and holding up flags that said “Liberate Hong Kong, Revolution of our times.”

Police stopped and searched several people near Victoria Park, where protests were initially supposed to take place but were later canceled. They did not appear to make any arrests.

 

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Violence surges in Yemen after coronavirus truce expires

The Saudi-led coalition fighting in Yemen said it intercepted and destroyed a ballistic missile fired by the Iran-aligned Houthi movement towards the south of the kingdom on Tuesday after intercepting several drones launched the previous night. A coalition statement said the missile was...

ca.news.yahoo.com

Violence surges in Yemen after coronavirus truce expires

Reuters
June 16, 2020

DUBAI (Reuters) - The Saudi-led coalition fighting in Yemen said it intercepted and destroyed a ballistic missile fired by the Iran-aligned Houthi movement towards the south of the kingdom on Tuesday after intercepting several drones launched the previous night.

Violence has surged between the Western-backed alliance and the Houthi group after a six-week ceasefire prompted by the coronavirus pandemic expired last month.

A coalition statement said the missile was launched towards the southern region of Najran. It earlier said that it had destroyed several armed drones fired towards the southern city of Khamis Mushait late on Monday.

A Houthi military spokesman said in a Twitter post that the Khamis Mushait attack was in response to coalition air strikes. There was no immediate confirmation of the missile attack.

On Monday, the Houthi health minister said in a Twitter post that a coalition air strike killed 13 people, including four children, in Saada province. A coalition spokesman did not immediately respond to a Reuters' request for comment.

In the Houthi-held capital Sanaa on Tuesday, several residents said coalition warplanes struck military sites south and west of the city.

The Houthis ousted the Saudi-backed government from Sanaa in late 2014, prompting the coalition to intervene.

The uptick in violence comes as Yemen combats the spread of the novel coronavirus among an acutely malnourished population.

The United Nations says the virus is spreading unmitigated in a country with shattered health systems and inadequate testing capabilities and that infections are likely much higher than official reports.

The Saudi-backed government based in the south has announced 834 cases, including 208 deaths. The Houthis, who control most big urban centres, have not provided figures since May 16 when authorities said there were four cases, with one death.

(Reporting by Reuters Yemen team; Writing by Lisa Barrington, Editing by William Maclean)

 

[Housecarl]

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Scientists just found the 'chemical fingerprint' of an alleged nuclear accident that went undeclared in Russia

Radiation found by a group of scientists known as the "Ring of Five" has been shown to have come from a Russian nuclear facility.

www.businessinsider.com

Scientists just found the 'chemical fingerprint' of an alleged nuclear explosion that went undeclared in Russia
Aria Bendix
16 hours ago

• A group of scientists known as the "Ring of Five" detected unusual levels of radiation in Europe in 2017.
• A new study offers "irrefutable proof" that the radiation came from nuclear waste reprocessing.
• The study lends further evidence to the claim that Russia failed to disclose an accident at the Mayak nuclear facility in September 2017.

For the past three years, a group of scientists called the "Ring of Five" has been inching toward the conclusion that an undisclosed nuclear accident took place in Russia in 2017.

In July 2019, the group released evidence that an explosion may have occurred at the Mayak nuclear facility — once the center of the Soviet nuclear-weapons program. Mayak was also the site of the 1957 Kyshtym explosion, the world's third-worst nuclear accident behind Fukushima and Chernobyl.

In late 2019, the scientists suggested that, given the large amount of radiation admitted on the date, the accident took place on September 26, 2017. The radiation seemed to spread from Russia's Southern Urals region (where the Mayak facility is located) toward central Europe, Scandinavia, and Italy.

A third study, released Monday, offers "irrefutable proof" that the explosion was linked to nuclear waste reprocessing — a method that separates plutonium and uranium from spent nuclear fuel. The Mayak facility is the largest nuclear reprocessing facility in the region. That makes it the most likely, if not the only possible, origin site — though Russia has never acknowledged a nuclear accident at the facility in 2017.

"We should not forget that Mayak is a military facility — and, of course, the Russian Federation is very reluctant when it comes to talking about military facilities," Georg Steinhauser, a professor at the University of Hanover in Germany and one of the study's authors, told Business Insider in August. "I presume this would not be much different for other superpower nations."

An 'unexpected' discovery in 2017
The Ring of Five has been monitoring Europe's atmosphere for elevated levels of radiation since the mid-1980s. The group originally hailed from five countries: Sweden, Germany, Finland, Norway, and Denmark. But after the Chernobyl disaster in 1986, the team enlisted the help of other nations to expand their efforts. It now includes researchers from 22 countries.

On October 2, 2017, Italian scientists sent an alert to the Ring of Five about elevated levels of ruthenium-106, a radioactive isotope, in Milan. The discovery marked the first time that ruthenium-106 had been found in the atmosphere since Chernobyl.

"We were stunned," Steinhauser said. "We did not have any anticipation that there might be some radioactivity in the air. We were just measuring air filters as we do on a weekly basis, 52 times a year, and suddenly there was an unexpected result."

Steinhauser said the explosion was the "single greatest release from nuclear-fuel reprocessing that has ever happened."

But Russia has not responded to any findings from the Ring of Five. In December 2017, Russian officials attributed the radiation to an artificial satellite that burned up in the atmosphere. The scientists' latest study excludes that possibility.

'A tipping point for an already turbulent mixture'
The study is the first direct evidence that the ruthenium-106 came from nuclear waste reprocessing. It identified a unique "chemical fingerprint" among samples of the isotope collected in 2017.

Within those samples, the scientists found signs of two chemicals commonly associated with nuclear waste reprocessing: ruthenium(III) chloride and ruthenium(IV) oxide. This provided "direct evidence that fuel reprocessing was the origin of the 2017 environmental release," the scientists wrote.

The Techa River, where the Mayak nuclear complex has reportedly dumped waste from spent nuclear fuel. Katherine Jacobsen/AP Photo
Under normal circumstances, they added, nuclear facilities would wait at least three years before reprocessing spent nuclear fuel. But in this case, it appears that reprocessing took place after just two years. That means the reprocessing activity was bound to be exothermic, or release heat, according to the study.

"The spent fuel was unusually young with respect to typical reprocessing protocol," the scientists wrote. "It is likely that this exothermic trapping process proved to be a tipping point for an already turbulent mixture, leading to an abrupt and uncontrolled release."

The radiation might not threaten human health
Scientists don't consider the release of ruthenium-106 to be an immediate threat to people's health, but the long-term consequences are unknown. In 2018, France's Institute for Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety determined that the levels of ruthenium-106 in the atmosphere do not pose danger to human health or the environment.

The nuclear release was "nothing compared to Chernobyl," Steinhauser said in August. The Chernobyl explosion released about 5.3 million terabecquerels (a measurement of radioactivity) of radioactive material into the atmosphere, a 2013 analysis found. The alleged accident at Mayak facility, by contrast, released an estimated 250 terabecquerels of ruthenium.

But Steinhauser said there could be reason to monitor food safety near the Mayak facility if radiation leaked into the soil and water.

"We would like to get some more in-depth information on what actually happened," he said. "There's a good chance that we'll catch every single accident — but, in the present case, surprise was on our side."

 

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https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2020-06-16/europeans-push-for-iran-rebuke-at-nuclear-watchdog-over-inspections

Europeans Push for Iran Rebuke at Nuclear Watchdog Over Inspections

By Reuters, Wire Service Content June 16, 2020, at 5:37 a.m.

VIENNA/PARIS (REUTERS) - Major European powers want to admonish Iran at the U.N. nuclear watchdog over its ongoing refusal to give access to inspectors at sites suspected of activities that may have been part of a nuclear weapons programme, a draft resolution showed.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has issued two reports this year rebuking Iran for failing to answer questions about nuclear activities almost two decades ago before its 2015 nuclear deal at three sites and for denying it access to two of them.

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Trump Administration Reportedly Pulls Iran Nuclear Deal Sanction Waivers
A draft resolution, seen by Reuters and dated June 10, put forward by Britain, France and Germany calls on Iran to cooperate fully and promptly with the IAEA.

It asks Tehran to provide access to the locations specified and implement obligations under the Additional Protocol, referring to texts governing the IAEA's mission and activities.

"The Europeans couldn’t sit back and not do anything," a Western diplomat said.

U.S. intelligence agencies and the IAEA believe Iran had a secret, coordinated nuclear weapons programme that it halted in 2003. Israel's obtaining of what it calls an "archive" of past Iranian nuclear work has, however, given the IAEA extra information on Iran's previous activities.

"If the three countries take such steps, Iran will have no other choice but to react accordingly," Iran's IAEA representative Kazem Gharibabadi was quoted as saying by the semi-official Fars news agency.

The IAEA has also reported that Iran remains in breach of many of the restrictions imposed by its nuclear deal.

Iran began breaching the accord after the United States withdrew in May 2018 and reimposed economic sanctions on Tehran.

Britain, France and Germany, which remain in the deal, have accused Iran of violating the terms of its 2015 agreement, but hope to persuade Tehran to reverse course rather than join a U.S. maximum pressure campaign it imposed since withdrawing from the accord in 2018.

Russia and China, the other participants in the deal, are likely to oppose the resolution. It would be put forward this week at the IAEA board of governors meeting for approval either by consensus or a vote.

The COVID-19 outbreak has complicated the process with the 35 countries meeting virtually. Some member states, including Russia, have said decisions should be made when a physical meeting can take place.

(Reporting by John Irish and Francois Murphy; Editing by Giles Elgood)

 

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“None of This Is Going to Matter if You’re Dead”: Modernizing Integrated Air and Missile Defense Must Remain Army’s Top Prior

www.realcleardefense.com

“None of This Is Going to Matter if You’re Dead”: Modernizing Integrated Air and Missile Defense Must Remain Army’s Top Prior
.
By David L. Mann, Roger F. Mathews & Francis G. Mahon
June 16, 2020

"None of this is going to matter if you're dead. And that's why you need air defense." General Mark Milley, then U.S. Army Chief of Staff, said those words as he defined the Army's six modernization priorities in October of 2017. General Milley's remarks are spot-on and recent combat operations in the Ukraine, Syria, and Southwest Asia validate them. His words clearly state that air and missile defense (AMD) is No. 5 on his list of six modernization priorities, but air and missile defense is not his second to last priority - it is the pre-eminent priority, on a list of few, which mandates resourcing. That is a point which must resonate with all.

America's adversaries have invested in low-cost, simple air forces and capabilities. All the while, the U.S. has neglected our ground-based air defense force, in the belief that our air forces were omnipotent.

Combat operations have proven our assumptions to be wrong. We have accepted extreme risk in the air and missile defense force and must ensure its modernization does not become a COVID-19 fatality. Another Army Chief of Staff often said, “You can't fix a problem, once the crisis has begun.” We have an air and missile defense problem that requires priority in resourcing now, before we find ourselves in a crisis with inadequate defensive capability.

Current Environment
Today, if you cannot defend yourself from aerial observation or attack, you will not survive and all of the tanks, artillery, and aircraft the Pentagon has invested in will be of little value or use. If the warfighter cannot defeat a complex aerial attack, the U.S.' strategic, operational, and tactical assets and objectives, are at extreme risk. Without air and missile defense, a force cannot enter or effectively operate in any combat environment. It is fair to say the threat is presently focusing more on relatively inexpensive air and missile systems than on major land, sea, and air programs of the past.

In fact, the air and missile threat has continued to expand at both ends of its operational spectrum. Unmanned aerial systems (UAS) are common use by near-peers, as well as non-state actors. The rocket is the indirect fire weapon of choice for most non-state actors, and the U.S. simply cannot ignore the Houthis' use of ballistic and cruise missiles.

We cannot disregard the lessons of the 2019 cruise missile and UAS attack on the Saudi ARAMCO facility, nor dismiss Iran's ballistic missile attacks on U.S. bases at Al Asad and Erbil. Were those intentional misses or the randomness of circular error probabilities? If intentional misses, then the lesson is that the adversary has fairly accurate missiles. If the impact points were simply the result of circular error probabilities, we must note that those warheads pack a serious punch and that the U.S. was lucky.

Do we want to rely on luck in the future?
The variety of threats is increasing, enabling more complex attacks, and challenging our defense designs. We are vulnerable to 360-degree attacks. In addition, the warfighter must counter high- and low-altitude attack profiles, presented by small, low-radar cross section long-range aerial reconnaissance and weapon systems, while simultaneously defeating maneuvering ballistic missiles with closing velocities measured in thousands of meters per second. Our forces must also ensure our aviation and air forces can safely operate in the airspace.

Put simply, one-trick-ponies, operating in isolation with stove-piped architectures, will not survive in today's air and missile fight, nor do they enhance friendly air operations.

Importantly, challenges facing the U.S. military go beyond technology. They include force structure. The Peace Dividends of the 1990s decremented the Army and its air and missile defense force. The airbase defense units and all of the Cold War's HAWK battalions no longer exist. Further exacerbating things, in 2004, the Army used the air and missile defense force as a bill payer to create more brigade combat teams as it designed the Modular Force for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. That decision reduced the total short-range air defense force by more than 60 percent and halted its modernization, as constrained budgets and combat operations stymied modernization across the air and missile defense force. Today, the Army has very-limited capacity or capability to provide air and missile defense to the joint force - which is one of its core functions.

Today's environment requires an integrated approach to air and missile defense. Air and missile defense operations are inherently joint and combined, requiring a versatile and flexible architecture that leverages all available information and engagement capabilities. An integrated approach enables us to achieve the tenets of air defense: unity of command, unity of effort, centralized planning and direction, and decentralized execution. Stove-pipe systems and parochialism are obstacles to achieving these tenets, as are foreign disclosure policies that prohibit allies and partners from seamlessly operating in our architecture.

Forward Progress and the New Challenge
General Milley also said in 2017, "We will reform our entire battlefield air and missile defense capability...which has tragically atrophied over the years.” As one of the Army's original six modernization priorities, the Army has moved aggressively to rebuild the Army's air and missile defense capabilities. Key initiatives include reestablishing a short-range air defense (SHORAD) force and capability, while continuing to improve capabilities to counter the cruise and ballistic missile threat; addressing the 360-degree threat aspect; and achieving an integrated air defense command and control capability which optimizes capabilities, while simultaneously mitigating the potential for fratricide.

Now, as the Department of Defense faces a potential budget reduction to pay for COVID-19 response, the Army will have to make tough decisions. As the Army weighs its decisions, it should not lose sight of General Milley's words, nor ignore the excessive risk it has accepted by allowing its air and missile defense capability to "tragically atrophy." The Army has made significant progress on many air and missile defense initiatives and must continue to focus and resource those programs to ensure it can open, operate, and survive in any combat theater.

Fixing Short Range Air Defense (SHORAD)
The Maneuver-SHORAD (M-SHORAD) capability is critical to forward area and maneuver force operations and begins to fill the gap past modularity efforts created. Its on-board sensor suite and ability to network across platoon-operations and into the division's air defense network represents the tactical level of integration and is essential to defeating today's forward area threats. In support of General Milley's priorities, the Army must reestablish this capability across all Army maneuver divisions, not just the four it has currently funded.

The Avenger air defense system entered the Army inventory in 1988 and has not seen a major upgrade since 2004. It is a rear-area air defense system, not designed to support a maneuvering force, and it would not survive nor be effective in defending a heavy force on the move. M-SHORAD is the right solution to solving this operational need.

The Sentinel-A4 sensor upgrades are essential to countering the UAS and cruise missile threat; in building the forward area's integrated air picture; and contributing information to the joint air picture. This sensor plays a key role in fratricide mitigation, while also providing SHORAD units early warning and situational awareness. Sentinel is also a key sensor in the homeland's air defense architecture and will be M-SHORAD's area sensor. Additionally, the A4-upgrades will improve Sentinel's contribution to the counter-rocket, artillery, and mortar (C-RAM) mission.

In 2005, after only one year of development and testing, the Army fielded a C-RAM intercept capability to protect our modular forces in OIF basecamps. It is not an impressive looking weapon system, and its initial test grades were only in the 'C-range of an alphabetical grading scale', but as one Army General Officer commented to one of this paper's authors, "When you don't have any capability, a C is a pretty good grade."

C-RAM deployed to Iraq in the summer of 2005 and demand for its capabilities has ensured near, back-to-back deployments to Iraq or Afghanistan for the two U.S.-based active-duty SHORAD battalions and occasionally requiring augmentation from the National Guard. C-RAM has been improved over time, and it recently deployed with Patriot and Avenger units to Iraq. In 2005, it was far from exquisite, but it was good enough, and it is still on-mission, 15 years later.
The advent of the C-RAM mission led to the development of the Indirect Fire Protection Capability program (IFPC). Unfortunately, the threat is dynamic, and the counter-unmanned aerial systems and cruise missile capability gap took precedence, morphing IFPC into IFPC Increment-2 to close those critical gaps. IFPC Increment-2 (hereafter referred to as IFPC) was envisioned to be a non-developmental item, leveraging a multi-missile launcher - developed by Army laboratories and produced in Army depots - which employed existing interceptors and missiles to defeat cruise missiles and UASs The Sentinel radar is IFPC's primary sensor, and the Army's Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command System (IBCS) would serve as its command and control center and gateway into the integrated architecture.

IFPC is envisioned to replace Avenger as the rear-area air defense system capable of dealing with the cruise missile and UAS threat, and eventually, the rockets, artillery, and mortar threats. IFPC has been challenged - in some cases by technology and possibly by operational requirements plated with "un-attain-ium."

The U.S.’ counter-UAS and cruise missile defense capability gap is real, as is our military's ability to deploy a layered defense against these threats or to adequately defend assets in a maneuver force's rear area or airbases. IFPC's contribution to filling those gaps and achieving the air and missile defense's Principles of Mass and Mix - as well as setting the basis for establishing a layered defense - is critical. The Army cannot walk away from this requirement, and the Army's Fiscal Year 2021 IFPC Shoot-Off is a solid approach to solving the challenge. We do not need an exquisite solution - we need effective weapons.

Continued.....

 

[Housecarl]

Continued.....

The Foundation of Army Air & Missile Defense
The venerable Patriot air defense system has been the mainstay of Army air and missile defense for more than 35 years. Patriot batteries were the first U.S. ground forces to deploy for Desert Shield in 1990, and for almost 30 years, Patriot has had a continuous mission in Southwest Asia. Patriot is a tactical weapon with strategic value and impact. As a U.S. Air Force Lieutenant General, in the U.S. Embassy in Israel, commented to one of this paper's authors in December 2002, as the 69th ADA Brigade was deploying into Israel, "if you park an aircraft carrier in a region it sends a powerful signal. However, positioning a purely defensive Patriot battery forward in a partner nation sends an equally powerful signal of our national intent."

Today, more than nine of the Army's 15 battalions are forward-deployed, with at least five of them in Southwest Asia. Continually improved through software upgrades and technology insertion, and with a family of versatile and effective interceptors, Patriot is expected to remain in our force for another 20 years.

Patriot is the only true air and missile defense system in the Army inventory, and 16 partner nations employ it. Designed to fight as integrated battalions, Patriot was intended to integrate with THAAD and operate as an air and missile defense task force. Unfortunately, this requirement was lost during the transition of THAAD's development from the Army to the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and is just now being pursued.

Patriot's continued improvement is essential, as is integration with THAAD, and other joint and combined AMD capabilities. Additionally, the U.S. should leverage cooperative development opportunities with our partners, as Patriot and THAAD foreign military sales are continuing to increase. Building partner capacity and capability means you have a path to integrating the partners into the defense and operating as a combined-integrated air defense force.

The Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense Sensor (LTAMDS) will greatly improve Patriot's performance and contribute to the joint air and missile defense fight. LTAMDS replaces Patriot's sectored radar with a 360-degree radar, using Gallium Nitride (GaN) technology, to provide greater range, precision, and search volume. A 360-degree search and track capability, coupled with its increased sensitivity, counters the challenges posed by today's unmanned aerial and cruise missile threats and offers a modern platform to counter the emerging hypersonic threat.

The ability to search and track an aerial threat in 360-degrees is not a "nice to have capability" - it is essential to surviving on today's battlefield, and it cannot become budget fodder. A 360-degree radar is also critical to expeditionary operations, where individual, early-entry forces arrive in an immature theater and must execute their mission, as other theater capabilities arrive. Case in point: one has to wonder how different last September's attack on the Saudi ARAMCO facility might have been if the Kingdom's air and missile defenses had a 360-degree sensor with LTAMD's capabilities?

LTAMDS is the Army's wide-area air and missile defense sensor and a key contributor to fighting as an integrated air and missile defense force. Its demonstrated performance in a 2019 sensor competition and rapid acquisition path will provide four sensors for testing by the fall of 2022 and initial fielding in 2025. It has momentum and promise and needs to remain at the forefront for resourcing.

The final element in the Army's air and missile defense reformation is its Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command System (IBCS). Command and control systems are referred to as "the glue that binds a family of systems - the element that melds capabilities to create synergies and greater capabilities which could not be realized if capabilities operated in isolation." IBCS is that command and control system, which has demonstrated the ability to

1. accept data from a joint family of sensors (including the F-35) to generate a single integrated air picture, which provides enhanced situational awareness and enhanced protection for friendly aircraft;
2. provide an integrated fire control network which optimizes the single air picture, thereby allowing the optimal weapon to engage a threat and enable earlier engagements, potentially multiple engagements (if necessary), and defend in depth;
3. perform integrated defense planning, to minimize gaps in cover; and
4. provide automated battle management aids to operations.

IBCS got off to a rocky start, but it has made tremendous progress and now exemplifies the Army's 2019 Modernization Strategy's language, "[we] may not succeed on the first demonstration and experimentation...but we will learn and rapidly adjust."3 IBCS has had five successful flight tests, and its development has been informed by Soldier Check-Out Events, which put soldiers on the system much sooner than traditional acquisition programs. As it executes this summer's Limited User Test (LUT) and the Army weighs a production decision, it will be important to not only assess how well IBCS performs on the test but to assess the operational value of its performance and how early fielding of this capability improves air and missile defense operations and force protection. Rolling out IBCS capabilities as soon as possible, while addressing lessons from the LUT, is essential.

IBCS has demonstrated joint integration and the ability for a Patriot battery to defeat multiple cruise missiles, at extended range, by utilizing Sentinel radar track data. During a recent test, the Patriot battery's radar never saw or tracked the cruise missiles - it executed the engagement from the fire control network's composite track data, with the intercepts occurring at a never before demonstrated range. This is the power of fighting as an integrated air and missile defense system.

Imagine this: Sentinel radars operating in the forward area with M-SHORAD detect and track a flight of cruise missiles inbound but outside the range of M-SHORAD or a forward area IFPC battery. Those tracks are passed via the integrated fire control network to Patriot units well in the division's rear area for engagement. Patriot executes an engagement, intercepting a portion of the cruise missile flight. Simultaneously, the cruise missile data is passed to an Air Force control and reporting center, which directs F-35s to execute a second engagement against the flight of cruise missiles, again defeating a portion of the flight. Finally, the few remaining cruise missiles are defeated by IFPC, which is defending the Division's aviation brigade, the cruise missile's intended target, in the division's rear area. All the while, LTAMDS and Patriot are providing ballistic missile defense to the division's critical assets, contributing vital data to the single integrated air picture, and providing air tracks to the control and reporting center for engagement.

Way Ahead
Integration is powerful - and this kind of integration is necessary. Integration turns point defense weapons into a networked system to provide area defense. It enables a layered defense and defense in depth. It allows for earlier target evaluation, weapon assignment, and engagement, and it greatly reduces the potential for uncoordinated engagements and interceptor wastage. Integration overcomes the challenges of earth curvature, which confounds terrestrial sensors, mitigates terrain masking, and enables the joint or combined mission commander to apply the best weapon options. It also closes the seams - which all operators hope to exploit.

Integration made possible by IBCS is not service specific. It crosses into joint and combined operations. Countless wargames and tabletop exercises point to the need for an integrated air and missile defense command and control system. Unfortunately, the Army is only funded to integrate its systems. That plan must expand to include THAAD, AEGIS, and other AMD capabilities and those of our partner nations, and must do so as soon as possible.

In 2003, 95 percent of our Patriot force was deployed, with most of it committed to Operation Iraqi Freedom. Partner nations contributed 16 additional Patriot batteries to this operation, but collectively, only 50 percent of the Joint Force Commander's critical assets were defended. An integrated defense would have increased that 50 percent value and improved the defense's effectiveness, most likely defeating the five Iraqi cruise missiles fired into Kuwait and preventing the two fratricides. Integration is one of the four, doctrinal air and missile defense principles and has been a commander's planning task since World War II, and maybe even World War I.

Today, we stand on the cusp of being able to operate in an integrated manner. IBCS's upcoming LUT will inform the Army's fielding decision for only Army systems. There is no plan or funding to integrate THAAD, or AEGIS, or any element of the homeland's air and missile capabilities. Success in this summer's test and the decision to field IBCS should be the catalyst to develop and fund a plan to integrate those systems and open the door to partners. It will also be important to address any latency issues associated with the integration of various systems while ensuring cyber protection for the overall integrated air and missile defense architecture.

Congress has a tough job as it attempts to battle and pay for the COVID-19 response, and decrementing the defense budget may be necessary. If lawmakers make defense a bill payer, they should do so with language that safeguards the Army's air and missile defense capabilities and initiatives and sets the plan for an integrated air and missile defense capability to expand beyond the Army.

If COVID-19 has taught our nation anything, it should be that you cannot fix a problem once you are in the crisis. The U.S. has clear gaps in air and missile defense capabilities, and we have a plan to address those gaps. Leaders in the Pentagon and in Congress need to resource, execute, and expand that plan before our warfighters find themselves in a crisis and without the capabilities to meet its challenges.

The Poor Man's Air Force is now much more than just ballistic missiles. It is unmanned aircraft, rockets, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles. Today, there are more Poor Men with Air Forces than there ever were before. Our adversaries always go to the path of least resistance, exploiting our capability gaps for their advantage. The Army has accepted extreme risk in air, and missile defense and its capability gaps are serious and are prime for successful exploitation by an adversary.

None of our other modernization initiatives will matter if we are all dead. And the likelihood of that increases the longer the holders of the federal purse strings constrain and delay modernization of our air and missile defense force. The U.S. simply cannot let the pursuit of the perfect solution be the enemy of one that is good enough - especially when good enough improves today's capabilities and is ready to be fielded. You cannot fix a problem once the battle has begun - and we have a significant problem.
Lieutenant General David L. Mann (U.S. Army, Ret.), is the former Commanding General of the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command. His air and missile defense assignments also included Commanding General, Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense (USSTRATCOM), Commanding General, 32nd Army Air and Missile Defense Command, and Commanding General, White Sands Missile Range. Dave has over 35 years of experience in all aspects of space and air and missile defense operations. He has commanded U.S. Army air and missile defense forces in Iraq, Southwest Asia, and throughout the U.S. Dave is currently an independent aerospace defense contractor and a Stellar Advisor for Stellar Solutions, Inc.
Major General Roger F. Mathews (U.S. Army, Ret.), is a former Deputy Commanding General of U.S. Army-Pacific. His air and missile defense assignments also included Commanding General of the 94th Army Air & Missile Defense Command, Commandant U.S. Army Air Defense Artillery School, Deputy Commanding General U.S. Army Air Defense Center. Roger has over 36 years of experience in all aspects of Joint and Combined Integrated Air and Missile Defense. He has commanded U.S. Army AMD forces and conducted operations in Israel, Germany, and the United States. Roger is currently an independent aerospace defense contractor and a Stellar Advisor for Stellar Solutions, Inc.
Major General Francis G. Mahon (U.S. Army, Ret.), is a former Director for Strategy, Policy, & Plans at NORAD-U.S. Northern Command. His air and missile defense assignments also included Director for Test at the Missile Defense Agency, Commanding General of the 32nd Army Air & Missile Defense Command, and Deputy Commanding General of the U.S. Air Defense Artillery School & Center. Fran has over 34 years of experience: in joint, combined, and inter-agency operations; developing operational requirements; testing and integrating new technologies; and developing tactics, techniques, and procedures for AMD operations. He has commanded U.S. Army air and missile defense forces in Southwest Asia, Korea, Germany, and the United States. Fran is currently an independent aerospace defense contractor and a Stellar Advisor for Stellar Solutions, Inc.
Notes:

1. <Don’t Dumb Down This US Army Radar | Missile Threat.>
2. https://www.youtube.com/watch?reload=9&v=LKBpNW9rE44
3. <https://www.army.mil/e2/downloads/rv7/2019_army_modernization_strategy_final.pdf>
4. <https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/ref/FM/PDFs/FM44-2.PDF>,

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use.....

A reprieve for the US–Philippines military alliance | The Strategist

Long waits can let cooler heads prevail and reverse hot-headed decisions. In January, President Rodrigo Duterte of the Philippines threatened to terminate the 1998 Philippine–US Visiting Forces Agreement—a treaty-level pact that provides the operational framework ...

www.aspistrategist.org.au

A reprieve for the US–Philippines military alliance
16 Jun 2020 | Malcolm Cook

Long waits can let cooler heads prevail and reverse hot-headed decisions.

In January, President Rodrigo Duterte of the Philippines threatened to terminate the 1998 Philippine–US Visiting Forces Agreement—a treaty-level pact that provides the operational framework for the alliance between the two countries—unless the White House reversed the cancellation of Philippine Senator Ronald dela Rosa’s visitor visa. Dela Rosa is a close confidant of Duterte and the chief architect of his signature ‘war on drugs’.

On 11 February, the Philippine government informed the US embassy in Manila that it planned to withdraw from the VFA. That move triggered the agreement’s 180-day cooling off period before termination.

Fifteen weeks later, on 1 June, the Philippine government sent a letter to the US embassy in Manila freezing the countdown to termination until at least 1 December 2020. Fortunately, the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty and 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement between the two countries offer even longer periods for reconsideration. Both stipulate a one-year cooling off period in their termination clauses.

The 1 June temporary suspension came about despite the US side disappointing Duterte over his friend’s cancelled visa. The VFA, and by extension the US–Philippine alliance, will be safer from 1 December onwards if Duterte is disappointed again. He could be stripped of his power of termination. On 9 March, a majority of senators filed a petition with the country’s supreme court arguing that concurrence of the senate is required for terminating the VFA. The court has yet to hear this petition. If the court rules in favour of the senators, the VFA may well be taken off its suspended death clock.

It’s hard to envision a majority of senators supporting termination of the agreement, particularly given the depth of Philippine public opinion in favour of the US and against China. Duterte cannot run for re-election in 2022. Despite a super-majority of senators being aligned with the president, the Senate hasn’t done as he would wish before. Unlike the more pliant House of Representatives, the Senate has repeatedly blocked the president’s push for a federalist constitution and for reinstating the death penalty.

The supreme court, belying criticisms of being beholden to the president, also has issued rulings not favoured by the executive. In April 2019, it ruled against the solicitor-general and ordered the release of police files on thousands of alleged victims of the war on drugs.

It’s unlikely that US President Donald Trump’s administration or its successor will strengthen Manila’s support for the VFA by addressing a deeper Philippine disappointment with the alliance. The 2012 loss of control of Scarborough Shoal within the Philippine exclusive economic zone to China, and Beijing’s subsequent building of an artificial island and military base on the Philippine continental shelf at Mischief Reef, undercut the Philippine government’s belief in the bilateral alliance.

Secretary of National Defense Delfin Lorenzana expressed this alliance angst at his 2018 end-of-year press conference when he called for a review of the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty and pondered its possible cancellation. Manila wants a clearer and broader US commitment to support the Philippines in its territorial and maritime rights disputes with China in the South China Sea. It’s not clear what the Philippines is willing to offer the US in return, beyond not threatening to walk away from the alliance. Eighteen months on from Lorenzana’s call for a review, none has been announced.

The fate of the VFA and the US–Philippine alliance matters to Australia, the only other country with a status-of-forces agreement with the Philippines. Australia’s defence relationship with the Philippines works best when US–Philippine defence relations are strong. In 2017, Australia, under its agreement with the Philippines, provided vital aid to the country’s armed forces during the terrorist siege of Marawi City. Australian support complemented the much greater support provided by American forces under the VFA that no other country could have provided. Japan is currently negotiating a status-of-forces agreement with the Philippines; termination of the VFA could certainly dampen Tokyo’s interest.

Duterte’s disappointments with the US and the bilateral alliance were behind his January threats and his February decision to withdraw from the VFA. Disappointing Duterte again with a supreme court ruling in favour of the Senate may be the best way to ensure that the temporary suspension is transformed into a reversal of this ill-considered decision. Cooler heads then will have prevailed to the benefit of the Philippines, the US, Australia, Japan and Southeast Asia.

The author spoke at ASPI’s webinar on 16 June on the changing nature of Philippines–US defence relations, along with ASPI senior analyst Huong Le Thu; Jingdong Yuan, associate professor at the University of Sydney; John Powers, executive director of Intel Dynamics; and John Coyne, head of ASPI’s Strategic Policing and Law Enforcement and the North and Australia’s Security programs.

AUTHOR
Malcolm Cook is a visiting senior fellow at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore. Image: US Indo-Pacific Command/Flickr.

 

[jward]

Al-Qaeda Factions Create New Coalition In Idlib

Early on June 14, the Russian Aerospace Forces reportedly carried out airstrikes on positions of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham near the villages of al-Bara and Deir Sunbul in southern Idlib. Since the signing of the new de-escalation agreement with Turkey on March 5, the Russian military has halted active operations in Greater Idlib. Nonetheless, it continued isolated precise strikes on high value terrorist targets.


The June 14 airstrikes followed the creation of a new coalition by several al-Qaeda-linked groups operating in the region: Horas al-Din, Ansar al-Din, Ansar al-Islam, Liwa al-Muqatlin al-Ansar and Tansiqiyat al-Jihad. The coalition, dubbed “Fa Ithbatu”, is in fact an expanded variant of another al-Qaeda-linked coalition, Ghurfat Eamaliat wa-Harid al-Mu’minin. This very faction recently conducted a large attack on Syrian Army positions near Tanjarah and Fattirah killing several soldiers and destroying at least one BMP infantry fighting vehicle.


Therefore, despite the claims of pro-militant propaganda that militant groups are uniting their forces in order to fight back the possible aggression of the ‘bloody Assad regime’, the creation of Fa Ithbatu likely reveals preparations for more aggressive actions against government forces.


The Turkish leadership, which is also committed to pushing propaganda about the ‘evil Assad regime’, clearly understands the real situation on the ground. So, it has continued expanding the network of observation posts along the M4 highway in southern Idlib in an attempt to keep the situation under control. The most recent Turkish observation posts were created near the villages of Farkia, Bsanqul, Kafer Shalaya, Urum al-Jawz and Mareian. Nonetheless, even these extensive efforts did not allow Turkish forces to at least create the image of order in the so-called opposition-held area.


On June 13, fighting erupted between Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and a local armed group in the village of Salqin near the Turkish border. The conflict started after Hayat Tahrir al-Sham members assaulted a displaced civilian from Ma`arat al-Nu`man for setting a food stand near their shop. The fighting stopped only after Hayat Tahrir al-Sham deployed large reinforcements to the village. This was just the most recent incident in a long pattern of violence, which has been ongoing in the militant-held areas.


On June 14 and June 15, warplanes of the Syrian Air Force bombed ISIS hideouts near the town of Uqayribat in southeastern Hama. Last weekend, the Syrian Army, the National Defense Forces and Liwa al-Quds launched an anti-ISIS operation in the very same area. The operation came in response to ISIS attacks near the town on June 11 and June 12. However, it is unlikely that limited security operations in the desert area, which are being conducted by government forces, will fully remove the ISIS threat from the region.

video at source
posted for fair use

Al-Qaeda Factions Create New Coalition In Idlib

Early on June 14, the Russian Aerospace Forces reportedly carried out airstrikes on positions of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham near the...

southfront.org

 

[jward]

Taiwan warns off intruding Chinese aircraft for fourth time in nine days


2 Min Read

TAIPEI (Reuters) - Taiwan jets on Wednesday again had to warn off Chinese air force aircraft that approached the island, Taiwan’s military said, the fourth such encounter in nine days as China steps up its activity near the Chinese-claimed island.
The Chinese J-10, a fighter plane, and Y-8, a propeller aircraft often used for surveillance missions, entered Taiwan’s air defence identification zone around midday (0400GMT) to the southwest of the island, Taiwan’s air force said.
Patrolling Taiwanese fighters gave a verbal warning to the Chinese aircraft to leave, whereupon they “immediately left” the air defence identification zone, the air force said in a brief statement.
“At present the situation is normal,” it added, without giving further details.

Since June 9, China’s air force has flown at least three other similar missions, and were each time chased off by Taiwanese jets, according to Taiwan’s military.
Taiwan has complained that China, which claims the democratic island as its own, has stepped up military activities in recent months, menacing Taiwan even as the world deals with the coronavirus pandemic.
China has not commented publicly on the recent Chinese air force activity near Taiwan. Beijing routinely says such exercises are nothing unusual and are designed to show the country’s determination to defend its sovereignty.

China has never renounced the use of force to bring Taiwan under its control. One of China’s most senior generals last month said China would attack if there was no other way of stopping Taiwan becoming independent.
China is deeply suspicious of Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen, whom it accuses of being a separatist intent on declaring formal independence. Tsai says Taiwan is already an independent country called the Republic of China, its official name.
Reporting by Ben Blanchard; Editing by Simon Cameron-Moore

Taiwan warns off intruding Chinese aircraft for fourth time in nine days

Taiwan jets on Wednesday again had to warn off Chinese air force aircraft that approached the island, Taiwan's military said, the fourth such encounter in nine days as China steps up its activity near the Chinese-claimed island.

www.reuters.com

 

[jward]

Iran tests cruise missile, claims it can destroy targets 280 kilometers away
State media says test took place during naval exercise, the first Tehran has held since 19 soldiers were killed by friendly fire during drill in May

By AP Today, 2:27 pm

Illustrative: An Iranian warship fires a missile, reported to be a Noor long-range anti-ship missile, in an exercise in the southern waters of Iran, March 9, 2010. (AP Photo/IIPA, Ebrahim Norouzi)



TEHRAN, Iran — Iran test-fired cruise missiles in a naval exercise in the Gulf of Oman and northern Indian Ocean, state media reported Thursday.
The report by the official IRNA news agency said the missiles destroyed targets at a distance of 280 kilometers (170 miles). It said the tests came during a naval drill by Iran’s navy in the Gulf of Oman and Indian Ocean.
It said the missiles’ range can be extended but gave no details.


The report was the first of a drill since May, when a missile fired during an Iranian training exercise mistakenly struck an Iranian naval vessel instead of its intended target in waters near the strategic Strait of Hormuz, killing 19 sailors and wounding 15 others.
It also comes after a tense naval encounter between Iranian and US forces in the nearby Persian Gulf.

Iranian Revolutionary Guard vessels sail close to US military ships in the Persian Gulf near Kuwait, April 15, 2020. (US Navy via AP)

In April, the US accused Iran of conducting “dangerous and harassing” maneuvers near American warships in the northern Persian Gulf. Iran also was suspected of briefly seizing a Hong Kong-flagged oil tanker before that.
Iran regularly holds exercises in the Gulf of Oman, which is close to the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow mouth of the Persian Gulf through which 20% of the world’s oil trade passes.
The US has been actively campaigning to keep a United Nations arms embargo in place on Iran that is due to expire in November.
US President Donald Trump withdrew the United States from Tehran’s nuclear deal with world powers two years ago, launching a maximum pressure campaign against Iran that has pushed the arch-rivals to the verge of conflict.

posted for fair use

Iran tests cruise missile, claims it can destroy targets 280 kilometers away

State media says test took place during naval exercise, the first Tehran has held since 19 soldiers were killed by friendly fire during drill in May

www.timesofisrael.com

Iran navy test-fires new cruise missiles

Iran test-fired a "new generation" of cruise missiles Thursday, the navy said, in the first such military exercises since 19 sailors were killed last month in a friendly fire incident. The armed forces' website published pictures of the drill in the Gulf of Oman showing missiles being fired...

news.yahoo.com

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use.....

NATO Allies Push Back at U.S. Order to Pull Troops Out of Germany

U.S. allies in Europe are cautiously pushing against President Trump’s order to withdraw thousands of American troops from Germany by arguing that the U.S. needs them there as much as Europe does.

www.wsj.com

• World

NATO Allies Push Back at U.S. Order to Pull Troops Out of Germany
Cutting troops will signal to Russia that the U.S.’s commitment to its allies is weakening, European officials say

By James Marson

Updated June 17, 2020 3:20 pm ET

• 175

BRUSSELS—U.S. allies in Europe are cautiously pushing against President Trump’s order to withdraw thousands of American troops from Germany by arguing that the U.S. needs them there as much as Europe does......

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use.....

Russian Fighter Jet Activity in Libya Part of Larger Influence Campaign, General Says

A buildup of Russian fighter jets in Libya has U.S. officials concerned that Russia intends to escalate its foothold.

www.military.com

Russian Fighter Jet Activity in Libya Part of Larger Influence Campaign, General Says
18 Jun 2020

Military.com | By Oriana Pawlyk

A buildup of Russian fighter jets in Libya has made U.S. officials concerned that Russia intends to escalate its foothold in the region, similar to the way it did with its air campaign in Syria, according to a top general.

Speaking to reporters during a call Thursday, Gen. Jeffrey Harrigian, head of U.S. Air Forces Europe-Africa, said officials are particularly troubled that inexperienced mercenaries could be flying the jets, which may cause unnecessary collateral damage if the pilots are conducting bombing runs in densely populated areas.


Read Next: For 1st Time in Decades, Female Soldier Completes SF Training
"This naturally in my mind raises some concerns, particularly when you talk about civilian casualties," Harrigian said.

U.S. Africa Command earlier Thursday had released satellite images proving MiG-29 Fulcrum and Su-24 Fencer fighter aircraft have been operating in Libyan airspace. They also showed that the Russian-made "Spoon Rest" mobile early warning radar system had been deployed there.

"USAFRICOM has photographic evidence of a Russian aircraft taking off from al-Jufra, Libya; a MiG-29 was also photographed operating in the vicinity of the city of Sirte, Libya," according to an AFRICOM release.

In May, AFRICOM first observed the fighter aircraft arriving in Libya from an air base in Russia after transiting Syria, "where it is assessed they were repainted to camouflage their Russian origin."

The number of jets in the region now, including MiG-23s, is in the "upper teens," Harrigian added.

"As demonstrated by the release of the photos today, they've continued to build on what I would call their intent to have a better understanding of the air domain," Harrigian said. "[They're] looking to leverage those fighters in a manner that ultimately could influence the broader outcomes that could occur down there.
"My concern has been that should Russia gain a more permanent foothold, as they have demonstrated with what they have done in Syria, that's going to be a significant security concern to our European flank to the south," he said.

Russian militant activity in Libya has been partly carried out by the Wagner Group, U.S. officials have noted. The state-sponsored private military contractor is believed to be owned by Russian oligarch Yevgeny Prigozhin, who has close ties to President Vladimir Putin.

The Russian mercenaries have taken the side of the so-called Libyan National Army (LNA) led by Khalifa Haftar, a former Libyan field marshal who lived for nearly two decades in the U.S. and gained American citizenship. LNA holds sway in much of eastern Libya, but has recently suffered a series of setbacks in its long-stalled attempt to take Tripoli from the internationally recognized Government of National Accord (GNA).

Harrigian said the U.S. is not providing intelligence to GNA forces at this time. Regarding "any buildup of integrated air defense from a surface-to-air missile capability, we haven't seen any of that thus far," he said.

"What we're seeing play out in Africa is really more along the lines of global power competition," Harrigian said, adding extremist groups and Chinese activity make up a range of dynamic forces operating across the continent.

The goal is for its African partners to remain interoperable with the U.S., and not become reliant on adversary resources, he said.

"It's important that as the U.S., we remain engaged at the appropriate level, and look for opportunities that allow us to compete in a manner that supports our partners," Harrigian said.

"As we look across the continent, it's going to be a little bit different across the different regions, but importantly, we need to recognize that there is competition occurring down there, and we need to be in the game."

-- Richard Sisk contributed to this report.
-- Oriana Pawlyk can be reached at oriana.pawlyk@military.com. Follow her on Twitter at @oriana0214.
Related: Russia Sends Advanced Fighter Jets to Back Mercenaries in Libya

 

[Housecarl]

Interesting considering the source.....

Posted for fair use.....

US Report Claims China Intends Nuclear First Strike With Stolen Super-EMP Weapons

A congressional advisory board has warned that Beijing has developed at least three weapons capable of attacking the US electrical grid and intends on using them in a first-strike scenario, calling China’s “No First Use” policy “a...

sputniknews.com

US Report Claims China Intends Nuclear First Strike With Stolen Super-EMP Weapons
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A congressional advisory board has warned that Beijing has developed at least three weapons capable of attacking the US electrical grid and intends on using them in a first-strike scenario, calling China’s “No First Use” policy “a bodyguard of lies and disinformation.”

According to a June 10 report by the EMP Task Force on National and Homeland Security, China has developed three kinds of specialized nuclear weapons capable of delivering a massive electromagnetic pulse (EMP) that would knock out US electrical systems as a prelude to a full-scale attack.

“China’s alleged nuclear ‘No First Use’ doctrine, like the USSR’s during the Cold War, is almost certainly disinformation,” Peter Pry, the task force’s executive director, writes in the report.

Pry argues that considering China’s defensive capabilities and methods of detection, a “No First Use” policy “does not withstand the test of common sense.”

For example, China doesn’t have the same kind of ballistic missile early-warning systems and satellites detection systems as the US that could alert it to such an inbound attack, and its small nuclear arsenal - estimated at 320 nuclear warheads this past January by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) - would suffer a large percentage of losses in such a first strike, whether it comes from the US, Russia or even India.

In order to deliver such an attack, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has at least three methods, according to the report. One is a “Super EMP,” or a nuclear warhead designed to maximize the electromagnetic shockwave, rather than its raw destructive power. Such a weapon could be detonated high in the atmosphere - the US knows because it tested just such a weapon in the 1962 “Starfish Prime” test - and disable electronics devices for a large radius around it, from computers to power grids to aircraft in flight.

A second delivery method mentioned in the report is a hypersonic weapon, either a glide vehicle or cruise missile capable of traveling so fast that enemy air defenses cannot intercept it. China is believed to have created at least two hypersonic weapons.

The third kind of weapon is more theoretical, and Pry presents it as a logical possibility that China is technically capable of doing: mounting EMP nuclear weapons on satellites in orbit.

“The US should be very concerned about a scenario where China uses nuclear space weapons, perhaps ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles] and IRBMs [intermediate-range ballistic missiles] with specialized warheads, to quickly sweep the skies of US satellites, even at the risk of losing PRC [People’s Republic of China] satellites, which could then be replaced with a surge of satellites launched by China to capture the ‘high frontier’ and cripple US military capabilities,” Pry said.

According to the report, Chinese hackers have stolen the technologies for all these weapons from the United States.

The Trump administration has based arguments underpinning the creation of the US Space Force (USSF) on a response to moves by other nations, which have ostensibly already militarized space.

USSF Vice Commander Lt. Gen. David Thompson told the Mitchell Institute Space Power Forum last month, “It was not our choice to make space a warfighting domain. Our adversaries have made it very clear that they intend to limit or remove our use of space in crisis and conflict, and just as in every other domain, we will not allow that to happen, we can’t allow that to happen in space.”

It’s not clear how either Russia or China have done that, as even Pry’s argument is theoretical, but what is clear is that the US has long explored how to do so. As Sputnik has reported, the potential use of offensive satellite-based weapons goes back decades, to the testing of a particle beam in 1989, the testing of an anti-satellite missile in 2008 and even “Project Thor,” a kinetic energy concept weapon that would have dropped tungsten rods from satellites onto unsuspecting targets below, delivering the force of a nuclear strike without the radiation or the possibility of being intercepted.

Interestingly, Pry misses the obvious points that these horrible weapons would not exist if the US had not created them, and that the US was clearly just as much of a threat when it developed such technologies as he alleges China to be now that it’s stolen them. Moreover, Pry twists China’s obvious steps to avoid a nuclear arms race by keeping a small nuclear stockpile into proof that China somehow intends to use it.

The only conclusion is that Pry believes that US possession of 5,000 nuclear weapons somehow makes it less likely they will be used. But if anything, that just feeds the argument made by Chinese nationalists that Beijing should dramatically expand its nuclear stockpile - something Pry would undoubtedly twist into yet additional proof of China’s aggressive intent.

 

[Housecarl]

Hummm......

Posted for fair use.....

NATO chief sees no 'imminent threat' against allies in face of China, Russia tensions

The comments come amid the lowest point since the Cold War for relations between Russia and the West, and in the face of a rapidly rising China.

www.cnbc.com

Politics
NATO chief sees no ‘imminent threat’ against allies in face of China, Russia tensions
Published Thu, Jun 18 20203:12 PM EDTUpdated 2 hours ago

Natasha Turak@NatashaTurak

Key Points

• China and Russia “are two very different challenges for NATO. We don’t see any imminent threat against any NATO ally,” NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg told CNBC from Brussels.
• The comments come amid the lowest point since the Cold War for relations between Russia and the West.
• President Donald Trump this week announced plans to withdraw some U.S. troops from Germany, alarming many NATO officials and German ministers.

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg
DENIS LOVROVIC | AFP | Getty Images

NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg sees no imminent threats to members of the 30-country alliance, even in the face of a rising China and worsening relations with Russia, he told CNBC on Thursday.

“Those two nations [China and Russia] are two very different challenges for NATO. We don’t see any imminent threat against any NATO ally,” Stoltenberg told CNBC’s Hadley Gamble from Brussels.

“But we have to respond to a changing world where we see a more assertive Russia, we see a Russia which is investing heavily in new modern capabilities, including new missiles, and we have seen the aggressive actions of Russia against Ukraine.”

The comments come amid the lowest point since the Cold War for relations between Russia and the West, with Moscow still under U.S. and multilateral sanctions for its annexation of Crimea and war in eastern Ukraine as well as U.S. withdrawals from landmark weapons treaties.

“At the same time we see a fundamental shift in the global balance of power with the rise of China,” the secretary-general said. “They will soon have the largest economy in the world. They have the second-largest defense budget, and they’re investing heavily in missiles and nuclear weapons programs that can reach all NATO-allied countries.”

“There is one important message, and that is that we have to stand together, North America and United States, because together we are 50% of the world’s economic might and 50% of the world’s military might. So as long as North America and Europe stand together, we are safe and we are secure.”

The comments come at a time when unity across the alliance appears to be in an increasingly precarious position. Stoltenberg’s statements coincide with revelations from a soon-to-be-released tell-all book by President Donald Trump’s former national security advisor John Bolton, who alleges that Trump brought America to the brink of abandoning NATO.

Trump on Thursday tweeted that the book “is a compilation of lies and made up stories.”

The president has made no secret of his frustration with the 71-year-old alliance, and has disparaged and criticized it openly, to the opprobrium of many foreign policy and military veterans.

U.S. pulls out of arms agreements, reduces troops in Germany
NATO backers and Trump critics have also decried the president’s withdrawal from bilateral and multilateral arms agreements, warning that U.S. disappearance from its global leadership position threatens the security of the West and empowers its adversaries.

Last year Trump pulled the U.S. out of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, originally signed by former President Ronald Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev in 1987 — a treaty the NATO website describes as being “crucial to Euro-Atlantic security for decades” and eliminating “a whole category of nuclear weapons that threatened Europe in the 1980s.”

Washington and NATO accused Russia of violating the INF Treaty in early 2019 by deploying new 9M729 cruise missiles, which Moscow denies. Stoltenberg has described the missiles as nuclear capable, very difficult to detect and able to reach European capitals within minutes.

Trump also withdrew from the Open Skies Treaty and in May suggested he would let the New Strategic Arms Reduction (New START) Treaty expire in January, enabling the U.S. to quickly expand its atomic weaponry supply — something that’s already underway as the first new low-yield nuclear warheads rolled off production lines for the U.S. military in January.

Trump blamed noncompliance by Russia for the withdrawal from the treaties. Moscow said the U.S. moves were “regrettable,” and had already withdrawn from the INF Treaty in early 2019 in response to Trump’s warning that the U.S. would abandon it, calling in “formally dead” in August of that year.

Members of the U.S. Army 173rd Airborne Brigade demonstrate urban warfare techniques as Ukrainian soldiers look on on the second day of the ‘Rapid Trident’ bilateral military exercises between the United States and Ukraine that include troops from a variety of NATO and non-NATO countries on September 16, 2014 near Yavorov, Ukraine.
Getty Images

More recently Trump announced plans to withdraw U.S. troops from Germany, rupturing an arrangement that’s been a linchpin of the U.S. commitment to European security since the years following the Second World War. The announcement this week of a U.S. force reduction from roughly 35,000 troops to 25,000 alarmed many NATO members and German ministers, with some critics describing it as a major win for Russia.

The Trump administration meanwhile has emphasized its desire to “bring U.S. troops home” while berating Germany for not meeting its 2% defense spending target to which all NATO members are meant to adhere. German Chancellor Angela Merkel has emphasized her country’s aim to reach the 2% benchmark by 2031.

Asked if Trump’s position sends the wrong message as the alliance endeavors to face evolving threats, Stoltenberg replied, “We have seen adjustments in U.S. presence in Europe before. My message to European allies and and United States is that it is in the security interest of the United States to have military presence in Europe.”

The secretary-general and former Norwegian prime minister illustrated the U.S. presence in Europe as not only good for NATO and Europe, but also good for the U.S., allowing it force projection power and enabling operations that might otherwise be impossible.

“We have to remember that the U.S. presence in Europe is not only about protecting Europe, it is also a platform for projecting the military power of the United States beyond Europe, into the Middle East, into Africa, into into Afghanistan,” he said.

“For instance, the U.S. Africa Command, it’s not in Africa. It is in Europe,” Stoltenberg added. “So all this highlights that the U.S. presence in Europe is also in the security interest of the United States.”

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use.....

China quietly builds up its nuclear weapon arsenal - Asia Times

Has Beijing had a change of heart and revived its fondness for weapons of mass destruction while other world powers are in talks to reduce them? It seems

asiatimes.com

China quietly builds up its nuclear weapon arsenal

New arms race feared at a time US and Russia talk of scaling back their weapons of mass destruction inventories


by KG Chan June 17, 2020


Has Beijing had a change of heart and revived its fondness for weapons of mass destruction while other world powers are in talks to reduce them? It seems so.

China quietly added at least 30 nuclear warheads, some already deployable, to its stockpile in 2019, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute said, citing sources within the country and the Rocket Force of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

“China is in the middle of a significant modernization and expansion of its arsenal,” the think tank said.

At its annual session last month, China’s parliament approved a 1.27 trillion yuan (US$179 billion) budget for the PLA, up 6.6% year-on-year. The move came as Washington was aiming to include Beijing in talks with Moscow to cut each other’s inventory of nuclear and other strategic arms and dismantle retired stocks.

Details about the PLA’s nuclear tactics, especially related to production, capacity-building and deployment, are always concealed from overseas observers. But it is generally believed that the Chinese military houses its warheads across a number of bases in inland provinces, in particular the far-west Xinjiang, where China detonated its first atomic bomb in 1964 and its first hydrogen bomb three years later.

In July 1996, having conducted its 45th and final nuclear test at Lop Nur, a remote, largely dried up salt lake in an arid basin on the edge of a massive desert in southern Xinjiang, then-Chinese President Jiang Zemin declared a formal moratorium on nuclear testing, although further subcritical tests have likely been held over the following years.

The nuclear test base near Lop Nur has since been converted into a tourist attraction, as the PLA shifted its nuclear research and development elsewhere across Xinjiang and the western province of Sichuan.

Some military observers, including Jun Takada, a Japanese scientist and activist known for prominently opposing nuclear tests, note that large areas in backwater provinces like Xinjiang, Sichuan, Qinghai and Inner Mongolia are off-limits to locals and visitors. Some saw those closed areas as evidence of the PLA’s active nuclear stockpiling.

To be sure, the size of China’s nuclear arsenal lags way behind those of the United States and Russia. The US-based Federation of American Scientists estimated China had about 320 warheads, all stockpiled, as of 2019, compared with America’s 5,800 and Russia’s 6,370

Both countries also have more than 1,500 already deployed, either placed on missiles or on bases with operational forces

Earlier this year, Hu Xijin, the chief editor of China’s state-owned tabloid Global Times, stirred a commotion with his posts on Weibo that claimed there was not an atom of truth in the international media’s renewed smear campaign of China’s military modernization.

He suggested the PLA should more than triple its nuclear inventory to at least 1,000 warheads to match the US and reflect China’s overall strength. It is believed Hu was channeling calls from the military and the party’s hardcore faction for more funding and resources for the PLA.

When asked if Beijing had shifted its approach to nuclear development and nonproliferation, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying stressed that countries with much bigger arsenals should have a bigger responsibility and that Beijing would stand by its “no first use” pledge.


Whether the increase in Beijing’s nuclear inventory is a breach of its commitment to nuclear nonproliferation is a moot point. The fact is that China is not the only power investing in its nuclear arsenal.

India, Britain, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea are all increasing their capabilities, yet each country added fewer than 20 warheads last year.

But by taking the lead in an emerging new nuclear arms race, Beijing may have given the Pentagon more justification to restart its own nuclear testing, ending a decades-long hiatus since 1992.

Read more: Rally cry for more Chinese nuclear warheads

PLA expects funding hike despite falling revenue

Asia Times Financial is now live. Linking accurate news, insightful analysis and local knowledge with the ATF China Bond 50 Index, the world's first benchmark cross sector Chinese Bond Indices. Read ATF now.

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[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use.....

Russia: Dancing With Wolves

Russia is currently consorting with Turkey and Iran, two ancient enemies, in order to maintain a position of power in the Middle East This region has long been fought over and occupied by Turks and Iranians and it was a major achievement for Russia, whi

www.strategypage.com

Russia: Dancing With Wolves

June 18, 2020:
Russia is currently consorting with Turkey and Iran, two ancient enemies, in order to maintain a position of power in the Middle East. This region has long been fought over and occupied by Turks and Iranians and it is a major achievement for Russia, which lost its own empire in 1991, to take on the former (until 1918 ) Ottoman Empire and the former (until the Ottomans and Mongols showed up several times) Persian Empire. A century ago the growing economic importance of oil began changing the Middle Eastern political landscape. The Ottoman’s lost access to oil and the Iranians got a minority share of it. Most of the oil was now owned by Arabs, former subjects of the Ottoman’s and Persians. To defend their new wealth the Arabs made alliances with their biggest customers, the new superpowers in Europe, the United States and now China. Despite all that Russia, Turkey and Iran still want to play empire builder. This led to the three former foes becoming allies. It has been an unstable and unpredictable partnership but Russia still sees itself as the key player. Turkey and Iran quietly oppose these Russian plans.

Turkey also wants to avoid war with Israel yet portrays Israel an “enemy of Islam” and tried to ignore the fact that Russia and Israel have long been friends and that relationship continues. Turkey and Russia agree with Israel when it comes to Iran in Syria. Turkey would prefer that Iran go home. Many Iranians and Syrians openly agree with Russia and Turkey on this point. The Iranian government responds with “Israeli airstrikes are killing people in Syria.” Syrians note that most of the dead are Iranians or mercenaries (Arabs of Afghans) on the Iranian payroll. The Iranian government deliberately keeps as few Iranians as possible in bases likely to be hit. Iranians getting killed in Syria, even if they are IRGC (Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps) Iranians, is very unpopular back in Iran. Syrians just don’t like all these Syrians who are working for Iran or Turkey as mercenaries and getting killed by whoever.

Turkey and Syria are also angry at Russia over the poor performance of Russian air defense systems. The Syrians frequently claim to have intercepted Israeli air-launched, often from inside Lebanon or Israel, missiles but the reality is that few of the Israeli missiles fail to hit their targets. Commercial satellite photos are available to determine damage and there is always a lot of it. Iran and Syria complain that the formidable Russian air defense system in Syria is not used to stop the Israelis. The Russians don’t want a fight with the Israelis, if only because the Israelis might publicly demonstrate the ineffectiveness of Russian air defense systems. These systems are a major export item for Russia and the Israelis could reduce those export sales with demonstrations of how to get past the Russian air defenses.

Russia and Turkey are actually fighting each other in Libya, where Turkey recently (late 2019) intervened on the side of the UN backed government there. That government is weak and backs Islamic rule, which is why it was about to be eliminated by the Russian backed Libyan government and its more capable army. This force was backed by Egypt, the UAE and Saudi Arabia. Turkey intervened in return for a signed agreement giving Russia the right to drill for oil in disputed waters between Libya and Turkey. In Syria Russian airstrikes have killed Turkish troops while the Turks have killed Syrian troops. Turkey, Russia and Iran continue to pretend they are all friends and allies of Syria but the reality is different and becoming more visible and violent.

​

American intel in Libya estimate that Russia still has 2,000 troops (mostly military contractors) there while the Turks have at least 10,000 Syrian Arab mercenaries, fighting for the good pay and the promise of permanent resident status in Turkey for their families.

The War At Home

Russia continues to have the third highest number of confirmed covid18 cases in absolute terms. In relative terms Russia has 3,800 cases per million population (up from 1,700 a month ago) and 51 deaths per million (up from 15). In relative terms Russia is way down the list in cases, at about the same level as Italy. In terms of deaths Russia is even farther down in the rankings. Russia attributes the relatively low number of cases to the fact that it is a big country and much of the population is normally isolated. The lower death rate is another matter and Russia explains that it does not automatically classify each death in which the deceased had covid18 as a covid19 death. Most covid19 deaths are people who already have other serious health problems and covid19 comes along and becomes one too many. Russian medical statistics rank the medical problems that cause a death and give the main one as the “cause.” Often there are multiple causes of death, especially among the most common covid19 victims; the elderly and chronically ill.

​

Russia also recognizes that, overall, covid19 is not a major (in the top three) cause of death. In the United States this can be seen in the government (CDC) weekly total of deaths. These numbers are remarkably stable in the short term (the last decade) and you can see those years where there is a larger number of deaths. This is normal and unusual increases in weekly deaths are usually caused by a bad strain of influenza, which is another covid type disease. Influenza appears every year and is considered a major cause of deaths. Some years, like 2018 and 2020, these covid type flu strains are particularly bad and there are a larger number of weekly deaths during the “flu season” (October through May). So far covid19 has caused fewer deaths per million population in the U.S. than the annual flu did in 1957-58 and 1968-69. Covid19 has caused twice as many deaths as the last “dangerous” flu strain that hit in 2017-18.

Russia experienced a similar pattern and medical statisticians did not see covid19 as anything exceptional. But some suspected covid19 could be something similar to the 1918-19 “Spanish Flu” that killed 18 times as many people in the U.S. than covid19. In other nations politicians sought to highlight the covid19 threat by attributing more deaths to covid19 that was warranted by the medical facts. In the future, most medical historians will side with Russia in assessing the impact of covid19, as was done with all other covid type viruses.

In late March Russia shut down most businesses to deal with the epidemic and that reduced economic activity to crises levels. In response, throughout May Russia reduced the quarantine restrictions and in early June began ending the quarantine altogether. Throughout May and into June weekly covid19 deaths remained about the same and are now declining each week. The quarantine related financial losses, plus the much-reduced oil income created problems that could not be ignored. Given the current poor economic condition of Russia, that added expense threatened to do permanent damage. For example, Russia has about $22o billion in reserves but by law this reserve cannot be drawn on freely when the price of oil falls below $42 a barrel. Changing the law would be difficult and the government has to consider painful cuts to government spending. But with oil now at under $30 a barrel the Russian cash reserve can be used. The population has responded to the quarantine by reducing their spending by about a third. This is expected to reduce annual GDP by at least five percent for 2020. To remedy this the government has abandoned the quarantine and most Russians went along with that. After all, during World War II Russia lost 14 percent of its population while the U.S. lost 0.3 percent.

​

June 16, 2020: The U.S. has agreed to sell Ukraine sixteen Mk VI patrol boats. When Russia seized Crimea in 2014 they got most of the Ukrainian fleet with it. All Ukraine had left was armed patrol boats, most of them smaller and much older than the Mk IV, which comes armed with two 30mm autocannon RWS (remote weapons system) operated from inside the boat. There is also an extensive array of electronics. Ukraine would pay about $38 million per boat. The Mk VI can also have anti-ship missiles added as well as operating small UAVs from it.

June 15, 2020: Russia is speeding up its issuance of passports to nearly all the million people living in the half of eastern Ukraine (Donbas) occupied by Russian forces. In early 2019 Russia changed the rules and made it easier for residents of rebel-controlled Donbas to receive Russian passports and in effect become dual citizens. This is a step Russia takes when it is about to annex part of a neighboring country, as it earlier did with Crimea in 2014 and portions of Georgia after the 2008 invasion. The 2019 Donbas passport deal was later expanded to include Ukrainians living in the portion of Donbas that the Russians were not able to take because of the unexpectedly quick and determined resistance by Ukrainian troops and armed civilians. Back then the newly elected Ukrainian president remarked that a Russian passport provides, “the right to be arrested for a peaceful protest” and “the right not to have free and competitive elections”. Few people in Ukrainian controlled Donbas took advantage of the Russian offer. The EU responded by making it difficult, if not impossible, for Donbas residents to use their Russian passports in Europe.

Russia forces in Donbas continue violating the ceasefire with machine-gun, mortar and artillery fire. Not every day but often enough to cause casualties on both sides because the Ukrainians fire back. Neither side escalates. The Ukrainians expect to eventually push the Russians out while the Russians are moving along with absorbing their half of Donbas into Russia. This is recognized as illegal by most of the world and economic sanctions will remain in place and be increased, as long as Russia is in Ukraine.

June 13, 2020: Israel is being asked to openly take sides in the Libyan civil war. An official of the Egypt-backed LNA (Libyan National Army) made the announcement asking Israel for help. Since 2014 the LNA has been fighting Islamic terrorist groups and later the UN backed GNA (Government of National Accord) in Tripoli. There are two Libyan governments and the other one is the HoR (House of Representatives) government based in eastern Libya. The H0R has effective military capabilities in the LNA, which has been fighting since April 2019 to take the last GNA stronghold of Tripoli. This is the largest city in Libya and the traditional capital. Egypt has long backed the HoR because the LNA had taken control of the Egyptian border and helped keep Islamic terrorists out of Egypt. By 2018 Egypt was certain that the LNA had pacified eastern Libya up to and including the Egyptian border. That was always the main Egyptian concern. Egypt worked with the UAE to support the LNA and while Egypt is less active but the UAE and Saudi Arabia are still major supporters of the LNA, as is Russia.....

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use..... (Warning: Long)

Decapitating the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force and the Implication for US policy in Iraq and Beyond | Small Wars Journal

This paper examines the emerging realignment within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force (IRGC-QF), its control over the PMF, and the greater implications for US policy towards Iraq and Iran.

smallwarsjournal.com

Decapitating the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force and the Implication for US policy in Iraq and Beyond

1. Articles

Tue, 06/16/2020 - 10:14am

Decapitating the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force and the Implication for US policy in Iraq and Beyond
Dr. Peter K. Forster
Dr. Gregory J. Kruczek
Ms. Ava Sullivan ​

Introduction
On January 3, 2020 an American drone strike killed Iranian Brigadier General Qasem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, leader of Katai’b Hezbollah militia (KH) and the deputy commander and chief of staff of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). The assassinations were the latest in an on-going tit-for-tat between the US and Iran, escalating already tense relations between the two countries. The attacks succeeded in sowing discord within the PMF, which is directly related to Tehran’s struggle to replace Soleimani’s operational genius and charismatic personality. However, the assassinations have not dissuaded Iran and its proxies from continuing to target U.S. interests in Iraq. This paper examines the emerging realignment within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force (IRGC-QF), its control over the PMF, and the greater implications for US policy towards Iraq and Iran.
Who was Qasem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis?
Qasem Soleimani was a Brigadier General in Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and head of the Quds Force, the IRGC’s paramilitary wing. The IRGC was created by the late Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979 with dual mandates to defend the country’s Islamic political system and provide an effective counterweight to the armed forces. Soleimani was often described as Iran’s second most powerful man behind Khamenei.[1] He transformed the IRGC-QF into centralized and stable organization capable of effectively countering U.S. forces.[2] Crucially, to both his foot soldiers and segments of the Iranian populace alike, Soleimani was more than a leader: He was “brother Qasem.”[3]
Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, as the KH leader and PMF deputy, was seen as a key Iranian ally. Tehran stood firmly behind both KH, formed in 2003 to combat U.S. forces, and the PMF, established in 2014 to combat the Islamic State. Al-Muhandis was often called Soleimani’s right hand man[4] in Iraq.
At the time of their deaths Soleimani and al-Muhandis were working to consolidate all elements of the PMFs, a task that included not just preventing their incorporation into the Iraqi security forces, but also the centralization of key directorates, such as finance, internal security, and intelligence. This goal has not changed. Neither has Tehran’s and its Iraqi proxies’ overall aim of expelling American forces from the country and region at large.[5]
Center of Gravity and Decapitation
In On War, Karl von Clausewitz eluded to the “center of gravity” (Schwerpunkt) as, “…(the) hub of all power and movement….the point at which all our energies should be directed.”[6] The “hub of power” offers physical strength and the will to act.[7] In the context of PMFs and IRGC-QF force operational capability in Iraq, Soleimani and al-Muhandis personified the center of gravity. As a result, their deaths unites the center of gravity with the effectiveness of tactical decapitation—the removing of key figures to disrupt organizational capability, which is discussed extensively in the literature.[8] The case provides an interesting opportunity to understand how individuals emerge as the “hub of power.” More importantly, it offers potential indicators and warnings of their replacement’s action and how such groups evolve and respond to setbacks. Crucially, it permits the assessment of the tactic of decapitation in a strategic context.
Together Soleimani and al-Muhandis were the political and military central node of IRGC-QF influence in Iraq. Their stature was enhanced partly because of Iran’s asymmetric strategy that focuses on proxies to cover their lack of conventional strength[9] and partly because of their intense efforts at consolidating the PMFs’ key directorates and its estimated $2.1 billion budget.[10] In assessing al-Muhandis and Soleimani’s criticality, three variable are examined -- individual influence, operational value, and the level of organizational resilience.
Soleimani was an efficient and decisive decision-maker who enjoyed the unwavering support of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei.[11] This provided freedom of action which he used to extend his individual influence. Built upon charisma, contextual knowledge of his (strategic/operation?) “area of responsibility,” and Arabic language skills, Soleimani established a network of trusted individuals, such as current Iranian ambassador/former senior official in IRGC-QF, Iraj Masjedi, to spread his influence and entice organizations such as the Asai’ib Ahl Al Haq (AHH) into his orbit.[12]
His personality traits directly affected the operational arena. Personality influences operations through different leadership methods. For example, It was said of Mullah Dadullah, the Taliban military commander killed in 2007, that he drew people to the cause because he was constant, trustworthy, and decision.[13] In the wake of the Chechen terrorist Shamil Basayev’s death, Doku Umarov, his successor, sought to demonstrate leadership by promising attacks to re-assert Chechen resistance.[14] Soleimani personified the former and it appears that PMF leadership has embraced the latter following his demise. Soleimani developed a strategy of “sovereign capability to conduct remote warfare and influence operations.”[15] His operational value was directly tied to transforming the IRGC-QF into an organization that was seen as to counter US influence and his reputed responsibility for a significant number of American deaths. His operational status was further demonstrated in October 2019, when he provided sophisticated weapons to and ordered al-Muhandis to increase attacks on US targets.[16] The IRGC-QF designation as a terrorist group was due to Soleimani’s actions, thus reflecting his operational prowess. To a great extent al-Muhandis legitimacy emanated from his privileged relationship with Soleimani. However, in his own right he was the commander of Katai’b Hezbollah (KH), arguably the most influential pro-Iranian militia in Iraq, and demonstrated an ability to centralize and consolidate the PMFs, albeit under Soleimani’s tutelage. In short, he displayed both individual and operational efficacy.
The third variable is organizational resilience or decline. It reflects the impact of the leader’s death on the organization. Some initial reports theorized that Soleimani, again, due to his charisma and operational competence, was irreplaceable.[17] Notwithstanding, organizational resilience is best judged by the messaging and actions following the assassination. Reminiscent of Umarov’s efforts to establish legitimacy, Abu Ali al-Askari, KH’s security official, warned Iraqis not to work with the US.[18] But other groups such as the AAH also intensified their anti-US rhetoric, perhaps seeking a more prominent role in the post-Soleimani Iraq. In addition to in-fighting, the Iranian-back militias sought to marginalize non-Shi’a groups by threatening Sunni and Kurdish legislators.[19] So, while Iran continues to exert influence, increased threats of violence, dichotomous spokesmen, and multiple commanders reflect a struggle to maintain organizational resilience. Hence in the short-term, eliminating Soleimani has had negative effects which support his designation as a strategic center of gravity.
Iran’s Way Forward
Soleimani and al-Muhandis may have been the epicenter of Iranian influence in Iraq. But the significance of Soleimani’s death in particular had wider regional implications. It threatened the very cohesion of the anti-U.S. “axis of resistance,” a Tehran-backed coalition of mostly Shia groups operating in Yemen, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon.[20] Outside of Iraq the most notable of these groups are Lebanese Hezbollah. Inside Iraq that position goes to Katai’b Hezbollah.
It was not surprising then that Tehran’s immediate response to the assassinations was to publicly emphasize unity among its allies as it earnestly worked to appoint replacements capable of maintaining cohesion within the PMF ranks without sacrificing battlefield success against U.S. forces. Tehran’s strategy was and remains further complicated by political paralysis in Baghdad. Tehran has more influence in Baghdad than the U.S., whose policy is inconsistent at best and needs a complete retooling at worst. Yet Tehran struggled to advance a candidate for the premiership capable of unifying a Shia political bloc with wide support among laypersons. This is of critical importance considering that a principle aim of the months-long Iraqi protest movement is expelling all foreign influence from the country, not just the U.S. Tehran’s effort to bring influential Iraqi-Shia cleric Muqtada al Sadr into the fold as a unifying voice (but not a candidate) in mid-January was vigorously resisted by a significant elements of the anti-government movement, Shia Muslims included, who saw Sadr and his backers as directly responsible for violent reprisals against protestors.

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In early April Iraqi president Barham Salah, hoping to end months of political gridlock, nominated Mustafa al Kazimi, the director of the country’s national intelligence service, to be the country’s next prime minister. Washington approved, seeing Al Kazimi as a committed Iraqi nationalist. But KH accussed al Kazemi of being pro- American, anti-Iranian, and culpable in the assassinations of Soleimani and al Muhandis. It then threatened war. Nevertheless, other pro-Iranian Shia parties in Baghdad backed the nomination. So too did the Iraqi parliament’s largest Sunni bloc, the Coalition of Iraqi Forces.[21] On May 7, after the Iraqi parliament approved most of his cabinet pics, al Kazimi was sworn in as prime minister. Together, the fissure within the pro-Iranian Shia establishment in Baghdad, the new Iraqi government, the Iraqi parliament’s rejection of KH’s threats, Tehran’s acceptance of al Kazimi, may indicate that Iran’s grip over the country is loosening.[22]
Brigadier General Esmail Qaani, the new head of the IRGC-QF is an old friend and aid to Soleimani. Qaani may lack Soleimani’s extensive accolades but is nonetheless accomplished. He is perhaps best known for working with Afghan units in the Iran-Iraq War and later overseeing his country’s efforts to topple the Taliban. He retains extensive experience in intelligence operations. However, serious doubts remain as to whether he retains the charisma and interpersonal skills necessary to navigate Iraqi Shia politics. This is particularly important when one considers that Tehran’s main goal is to continue to consolidate Iraq’s PMFs at a time when signs of fragmentation exist and tensions with the U.S. continue to rise.
The PMF, by its very nature, was never a fully cohesive force. Many groups begrudgingly accepted al-Muhandis and Soleimani as “kingmakers.” Again, this speaks to the political acumen and power of the two men.[23] But without them, old fissures have reappeared and in some cases deepened. Within weeks of the assassinations pro-Iranian elements of the PMF appointed Abu-Fadak al-Muhammadawi as al-Muhandis replacement. Abu Fadak, the former Katai’b Hezbollah General Secretary, was a close friend of Soleimani. He was also top aide to Hadi al-Amiri, the secretary general of the Badr Organization, arguably Iraq’s most powerful Iranian-backed Shia political parties and U.S. designated terrorist organization. Currently, those loyal to the Najaf-based Ayatollah Sistani, often described as one of the most powerful senior cleric in Shia Islam and whose 2014 fatwa legitimized the formation of the PMF, did not embrace the appointment. Sistani has grown weary of Iranian interference in Iraq.[24] In mid-March four Sistani-aligned PMF groups— the Imam Ali Brigade, Imam Ali Combat Division, Al-Abbas Combat Division, and Ansar of Al-Murj'ayia—announced their intent to withdraw from the PMF and integrate into the country’s official security forces.[25] Since the initial friction, the fissure between the two factions of the PMF has only grown. In early April, Sistani and Muqtada al Sadr both allegedly refused to meet with Qaani.[26]
Meanwhile, Prime Minister al Kazimi has signaled his intent to reign in the PMF in accordance with the 2016 PMF Law and the 2019 PMF Decree. The 2016 Law, among other things, states that the PMF is under the command of the prime minister and outlaws their participation in economic and political affairs.[27] In Iraq’s May 2018 parliamentary elections several factions of the PMF, including KH, united as the Fatah Coalition, which secured 47 parliamentary seats.[28] Leaders have since used their political power to increase the PFM budget and the salaries of their fighters. The PMF has also been acussed of, among other things, stealing oil and running protection racquets.[29] It should be no surprise then that the tension between the prime minister and segments of the PMF is rapidly increasing.[30]
“New” Shia militias also have emerged. In March Usbat al Thayireen claimed responsibility for an attack against U.S. forces. The PMF quickly denied any connection to the group.[31] However, on April 8, 2020 MEMRI cited a report from the London-based al-Quds al-Arabiya newspaper that claimed the group was trained and funded by the IRGC.[32] Schisms within any radical group can emerge over a range of issues. On the other hand, the decision to field additional non-PMF groups in Iraq could be meant to provide Iran plausibility deniability. Nevertheless, the group’s origins and affiliation(s) are still unclear.
Meanwhile, Tehran’s threats against U.S. and Iraqi personnel that collaborate with Washington persist. So too have PMF-perpetrated attacks against U.S. forces. There are a few explanations as to what this increasingly complicated dynamic means, none of which needs to be mutually exclusive. An initial explanation may be that Iran’s grip over the PMF and Shia politics in Iraq is indeed splintering and attempts by Qaani and his backers in Tehran to maintain unity are failing. The lack of control over splinter groups seeking legitimacy may lead to miscalculations resulting in an escalation with Washington. Increased confrontation between the PMF and US forces only serves to undermine Iran’s long-term goal of getting the U.S. out of Iraq. Former Iraqi Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, in a recent interview with MEMRI, indicated as much.[33] Perhaps more importantly, Defense Secretary Marc Esper, speaking just after the assassinations, stated the U.S. had no plans to leave Iraq.[34]
A second possibility is that continued Iranian threats and attacks against Washington are meant to distract attention from Iranian efforts to maintain cohesion by (re)establishing the common villain. Again, such a strategy is delicate and difficult to control. It is only a matter of time until continued low-intensity conflict spirals out of Tehran and Washington’s control. And like always, the Iraqi people will suffer the worst.
Third, Iran is using actual and threatened violence in Iraq to distract attention from the coronavirus epidemic in Iran. No country was prepared to respond to the pandemic. However, Iran, under the weight of crippling sanctions, low oil prices, and the decision to prioritize expanding influence abroad at the expense of providing basic health service, was acutely unprepared. If this is the case, Iran is not just risking an escalation with Washington, but also another round of domestic upheaval similar to that which occurred in late 2019.
Iran’s operations are unclear but it goals remain consistent -- continued consolidation of Iran’s “Axis of Resistance”, diminished US regional presence, and the exportation of Iran’s Islamic militancy. However, these objectives collide with the US, who refuses to pull back its “maximum pressure campaign.” Hence, the current state of affairs has significant implications for US interests.

Implications for US Interests in Iraq and Beyond
The implications of Soleimani and al-Muhandis’ deaths are far reaching and fluid. It is quite possible that the strike was the Trump Administration’s attempt to declare victory paving the way for the US to extricate itself from Iraq. However, US strategy encompasses somewhat contradictory messages with regard to influence and interest in Iraq. Second, tactical shifts within Iraq including apparent competition among Iranian-backed militia are creating a new dynamic of conflict. Finally, the elevated role of Lebanese Hezbollah both in Iraq and generally, raises the spectrum of broader regional and global retaliation against American interests and the US itself.
According to Ranj Alaaldin at Brookings, US strategic policy is going through a “tectonic shift” which is best explained as declining interest in state-building which affords Iran an opportunity at consolidation.[35] Notwithstanding Alaaldin’s regional expertise, actions on the ground and contradictory policy directions from Washington do not wholly support this prognosis. While the administration might like to disengage from Iraq, it is loath to abandon the Iraqi government and face the blowback of ceding Iraq to Iran. Moreover, ISIS, despite what the Trump administration says, remains a threat. In 2017, Lt. General Townsend, commander of the US-led coalition against the Islamic State (IS), said the US should stay to avoid another Iraqi meltdown.[36] At Davos, in January 2020, the Trump administration apparently laid out a strategy of limiting investment in Iraq but maintaining a military posture in the Kurdistan region, where various PMF forces operate in “disputed” areas.[37] The March 2020 United States Central Command (CentCom) posture statement, although less explicit than Townsend’s personal comment, defines its key task as working with partners to neutralize Iran’s “malign activity.”[38] When combined with CentCom’s announcement of KH as a main target, [39] and Defense Secretary Esper’s previously noted comments, a quick US exit seems remote.
Continuing tit-for-tat escalation further ensnares the US in Iraq while increasing the opportunity for miscalculation resulting in a more costly conflict. Soleimani’s death was preceded by a series of strikes and counterstrikes but following Iran’s response on January 8, against the Ain al-Asad base, other Iranian-backed militia forces took action. For example, in February 2020, the PMF-affiliated Harakat al-Nujaba launched missiles at the Green Zone in Baghdad and additional attacks followed on March 2. On March 11, an attack on Camp Taji killed two US and one UK soldier and wounded fourteen others. The US retaliated against KH storage facilities across Iraq and firmly identified KH as a primary target. While commending the attack on Camp Taji, KH sought to distance itself by calling on the perpetrators (the aforementioned Usbat al-Thayireen claimed responsibility) to identify themselves and accept KH protection.[40]

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KH’s distancing from the attack allowed other groups to seek to increase their local and Iranian support. Al-Nujaba accused the US of hitting Iraq headquarters and a civilian airport and calling for retaliation. [41] In an effort to attract sympathy, al-A’taba al-Hussieyia, a website covering activities related to Imam Hussein shrine in Karbala and affiliated with al-Sistani, commented on the US bombing the Karbala airport, a project sponsored by al-Sistani.[42] Perhaps most disconcerting is the emergence of Lebanese Hezbollah as a player with in Iraq with IRGC-QF support. Hezbollah’s presence raises a number of unanswered questions – is the IRGC-QF relying on Hezbollah capabilities which have been honed during its conflict in Syria? Does Hezbollah provide Tehran with level of plausible deniability as it pursues increasing violence through its proxy? Third, did the death of Soleimani mean that IRGC-QF internal security had been compromised and Hezbollah offered a more secure avenue to action? All of these remain to be answered. However, Iranian-backed militia and US forces maintain a low intensity conflict as the militias seek to define their status; the IRGC-QF remains a critical weapon supplier, instigator, and benefactor in Iraq; and continuing US involvement in Iraq seems likely.
The third dynamic impacting US policy is regionalization and possible globalization of conflict. Regionally, the use of Russian SA-6 surface-to-air missile against Saudi aircraft and the disruption of an attack on a Saudi oil tanker off Yemen are indicative of continued Iranian support for the Houthis.[43] In Syria, Iranian–backed militia have reportedly clashed with US allies in Syria and are in close proximity to the small US force near Deir al-Zour and Bukamal in eastern Syria.[44]
Regional clashes are a concern. But they are not the only one, Iran remains a patient adversary with multiple options, including striking within the US. In the immediate aftermath of Soleimani’s assassination, Homeland Security warned of potential cyber strikes on the US.[45] Iran has had a history of asymmetrical responses that provide sufficient plausible deniability to usually avoid overt US responses. One such effort is using the IRGC’s offensive cyber operations as an extension of foreign policy. These attacks have a variety of targets and attack vectors. In 2018, nine members of the Mabna Institute were indicted for conducting numerous intrusions on behalf of the IRGC.[46] Also in 2018, two Iranians, operating in Iran, were indicted for Ransomware attacks that resulted in $6 million in payments and $30 million in damages.[47] Judging from the sophisticated nature of “SamSam Ransomware” it is highly likely the perpetrators were IRGC agents.
Additionally, the Iranians maintain an active intelligence presence in the US. In 2013, former USAF intelligence officer, Monica Witt defected to Iran. In a more recent incidents, Ahmadreza Mohammadi-Doostdar, a dual citizen of Iran and the US and Majid Ghorbani, an Iranian with permanent US residency, were charged with collecting information on US citizens who were members of the Iranian-opposition Mujahedin-e Khalq and Merdad Ansari was extradited to US for illegally exporting dual-use technology.[48] His co-conspirator Frank Foomanie remains at-large.[49]
Another concern is the disruption that Lebanese Hezbollah could cause on Iran’s behalf. In April 2020, the US offering of a $10 million reward for information on Sheikh Mohammad al-Kawtharni.[50] This is indicative of both Hezbollah’s influence in Iraq and US concerns with it. Hezbollah also potentially threatens the US domestically. The Hizballah aka Islamic Jihad Organization (IJO) FBI report, declassified in 2008, documented Hezbollah’s role in anti-US behavior internationally and domestically for a 20 year period. The IJO is reasonable for coordinating Hezbollah intelligence and operations outside of Lebanon.[51] In 2009, four men were arrest in Pennsylvania for attempting to purchase heavy weapons for Hezbollah.[52] In 2011, IJO plotted to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to the US in a Washington DC restaurant.[53] In 2013, Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms broke up $400 million Hezbollah illegal cigarette smuggling ring operating between North Carolina and Michigan.[54] In 2019, the indictments of sleeper cell members, Ali Kourani and Alexei Saab, were made public. Although unconnected, the two recruited for Hezbollah in the US, conducted surveillance on domestic targets, and attended Hezbollah military camps in Lebanon to enable further violent activity.[55] A third individual Samer EL-Debek also started work for Hezbollah’s IJO in 2007.[56] Kourani was placed in the US shortly after the US killed IJO commander Imad Mughniyeh, for whose death Hezbollah pledged revenge. His assignments included finding domestic weapon dealers who might be sympathetic to Hezbollah’s needs and to identify Israelis in the US for potential targeting. Saab, a naturalized US citizen who held a teaching position at Baruch College, was trained in bomb-making and critical infrastructure surveillance.[57] El-Debek, who was paid by Hezbollah, was responsible for surveilling US targets outside of the US.[58] Finally in early 2020, Mariam Taha Thompson, a contract linguist In Irbil, Iraq, passed the names of confidential US informants on to Hezbollah.[59] The extent of Hezbollah’s US network is not publicly known; however, from available information it appears to be active and perhaps a source of domestic violence if properly inspired.
The implications facing the US are diverse and require a multi-faceted approach. Regionally, US appears to be consumed with countering Iran with a combination of deterrence and targeted strikes. Deterrence is the credible threat of sufficient retaliation in response to an attack that a rational actor will avoid hostilities.[60] US efforts at deterrence, or perhaps response to escalation, are visible in the diversion of sea-based assets from European Command and deployment of the Harry S. Truman carrier group to the Arabian Peninsula. U.S. troops also are renewing operations in Saudi Arabia, where officials hope that F-15 jets, along with protection from a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system and Patriot missile batteries, in hopes of deterring September’s assault on Saudi oil facilities.[61]

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A second part of US strategy is the “maximum pressure” campaign on Iran. In addition to withdrawing from the nuclear agreement and sanctions, two operational approaches are evident. The first is an intentional blurring of the distinction between IRGC and Lebanese Hezbollah. While not recognized as the same organizations, a counter-strategy that draws limited differences in operational and tactical actions serves the broader strategic goal of weakening Iranian influence. Related to the first, are efforts at compressing the IRGC and Hezbollah’s operational space through more traditional counterterrorism approaches – counter-financing and targeting senior leadership. The US is investing up to $15 million to obtain information that can be used to disrupt the IRGC’s financial mechanisms.[62] Although he survived, Abdul Reza Shahlai, the commander of the attack on the Saudi ambassador in DC in 2011 and a key IRGC financier, was targeted on the day Soleimani was killed.[63] The reward for information on Kawtharani is meant to identify location where he can be eliminated or exfiltrated.
It is the US perspective that international operations serve to weaken Hezbollah’s threat to the homeland. Notwithstanding, the continued detection and prosecution of illegal activities such illegal cigarette smuggling is important. Third, intelligence gathering and sharing among law enforcement entities in order to identify and disrupt Hezbollah sleeper cells and sympathizers remains critical.

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Conclusions
The assassination of Soleimani and al-Muhandis in January 2020 contributed to increased discord in the PMF, challenged the IRGC-QF efforts to increase influence in Iraq and arguably has increased the low-intensity conflict in Iraq and perhaps elsewhere.. Strategically, US policy seems focused on deterring with Iran complemented by a proportional decline in interest in nation-building in Iraq. Notwithstanding, the unintended consequence of the Iran first strategy is a continued presence of US forces in the region which may stop Iraq from descending into sectarian conflict again. Within this context, the current events in Iraq raise multiple questions regarding US Iraq policy going forward. First, can a strategy of deterrence be successful? Second, how effective was the decapitation strategy? Third, and most importantly, what are the US goals in Iraq going forward?
Efforts at deterrence are outlined above but part of a successful deterrence strategy is the contingency plan and willingness to execute it if deterrence fails. The US retains the capability to inflict significant damage on Iraqi PMF and Iran itself. In the former, striking the PMFs without a follow-on requiring significant US troops is a recipe for Iraq descending into anarchy again. In the latter case, it may be better to allow the COVID-19 pandemic, Iran’s aging theocratic leadership, and pain of sanctions to erode the regime’s control rather than uniting Iranians behind a disliked regime because they have been attacked by the US. Thus, understanding what is to be done if deterrence fails is critical.
Second, as discussed herein, decapitation has tactical advantages as a deterrent strategy but the inability to control its ripple effects weaken its strategic application in the short and long-term. In removing Soleimani, the US eliminated an Iranian center of gravity in Iraq and disrupted Iranian influence but its strategic benefit has been less clear. Iran is having difficulty replacing Soleimani and al Muhandis. Yet attacks against U.S. forces have persisted largely unabated. Regional instability and potential broad geographic reprisals are unknown variables. Until the factors of regional instability and the potential for more global violence are clearer, it is difficult to assess whether the decapitation offered more strategic results.
Third, Washington, now more than ever it must figure out what is worth fighting for in Iraq and what is not. The Islamic State has not been defeated. It has simply evolved into a low-level insurgency. Iranian-backed attacks and COVID-19 fears have led to a drawdown and repositioning of U.S. assets. Fighting to prevent a resurgence of ISIS is worth it. So too is working to strengthen the country’s official security forces at the expense of the PMF. Fighting for control over the Iraqi government to the same extent that Iran has is a lost cause. But there are signs of optimism on this latter front. Many see the current candidate for prime minister as a patriot and honest broker among whose primary concerns is his country’s sovereignty. Regardless, the chief policy goals in Iraq, which can only be achieved in coordination by treating Baghdad as equal partners, should revolve around 1) what future role U.S. forces will play in counterterrorism efforts and 2) how official Iraqi security forces will factor into this equation, both as partners and protectors.[64]

​

[1] Natasha Turak, “‘The Puppet Master is Dead’: Iranian Gen. Qasem Soleimani’s Power and Why his Death is such a Big Deal,” CNBC.com, January 3, 2020, accessed April 9, 2020, 'The puppet master is dead': Iranian Gen. Qasem Soleimani's power, and why his death is such a big deal
.
[2] Ariane M. Tabatabai, “After Soleimani: What’s Next for Iran’s Quds Force?” CTC Sentinel, January 2020, pp. 29, accessed April 9, 2020, January 2020 – Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
.
[3] Ahmad al Asani, Spokesman for Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces, quoted in “General Soleimani to Assist Mosul Operations,” Financial Times, August 7, 2016, accessed April 8, 2020, General Soleimani to Assist Mosul Operations
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[4] Ranj Alaadin, “What will happen to Iraqi Shiite Militias after one key Leader’s Death?” Brookings Institution Order in Chaos (blog), March 3, 2020, accessed April 8, 2020, What will happen to Iraqi Shiite militias after one key leader’s death?
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[5] See Michael Knights, “Soleimani is Dead: The Road Ahead for Iranian-Backed Militias in Iraq,” CTC Sentinel, January 2020, pp. 1-10, accessed April 8, 2020, January 2020 – Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
.
[6] Karl Von Clausewitz, On War, ed. And trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton Press 1976
[7] Robert Dixon. (2015).”Clausewitz, Center of Gravity, and the Confusion of a Generation of Planners.” Small Wars Journal online at Clausewitz, Center of Gravity, and the Confusion of a Generation of Planners | Small Wars Journal accessed 3/29/20.
[8] See Patrick B. Johnston. (2012) The Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation in Combating Insurgencies
; Jenna Jordan (2009) When Heads Roll: Assessing the Effectiveness of Leadership Decapitation, Security Studies, 18:4, 719-755, DOI: 10.1080/0963641090336906
; Price, B. (2019). Targeting Top Terrorists: Understanding Leadership Removal in Counterterrorism Strategy. New York; Chichester, West Sussex: Columbia University Press. doi:10.7312/pric18822.
[9] Daniel Byman in Around the halls: Experts react to the killing of Iranian commander Qassem Soleimani, Brookings 1/3/20 Around the halls: Experts react to the killing of Iranian commander Qassem Soleimani
accessed 3/30/20.
[10] Michael McKnight (2020). “Soleimani is Dead: The Road Ahead for Iranian-backed Militias in Iraq”. CTC Sentinal Volume 13 Issue 1. West Point, NY. January 2020.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Waliuallah Rahmani, “Afghanistan’s Veteran Jihad Leader: An Interview with Qazi Mohammad Amin Waqad” Terrorism Monitor Jamestown Fdn 5/3/07 www.jamestown.org
accessed June 2007.
[14] The Ingush Jamaat: identity and Resistance in the North Caucasus. Jamestown Fdn 8/1/07 www.jamestown.org
accessed September 2007.
[15] “Conflict with Iran” (2020). The Economist January 11 p. 15.
[16] Reuters Staff (2020). Inside Soleimani’s plot to attack US forces in Iraq. January 4. online @ https://taskandpurpose.com/news/iran-soleimani-attacks accessed March 31
, 2020.
[17] Frederick Kempe (2020). 3 reasons slain General Soleimani is irreplaceable loss for the Iranian regime. CNBC January 11. 3 reasons slain General Soleimani is irreplaceable loss for Iranian regime
accessed March 31, 2020 and Mehdi Parpanchi (2020). Analysis: Slain Quds Force Commander ‘Irreplaceable’ for Iran. RFE/RL January 3 Analysis: Slain Quds Force Commander 'Irreplaceable' For Iran
accessed March 31, 2020.
[18] Missile Attack Targets U.S. Embassy As Shi'ite Factions Escalate Threats Against U.S. For Designating Militia Leader As Global Terrorist MEMRI 3/2/20 and MEMRI - Countries
accessed March 4, 2020.
[19] Battle For Iraq's Premiership: Iran-Backed Shi'ite Factions Seek To Marginalize Al-Sistani, Obstruct Appointment of Pro-U.S. Intelligence Chief Al-Kadhemi As PM, And Reinstate Pro-Iran Abdul Mahdi MEMRI 3/3/20 20 MEMRI - Countries
accessed March 4, 2020.
[20] Seth Frantzman, “Iran’s ‘Axis of Resistance” after Soleimani,” Austrailia/Israel and Jewish Affairs Council, February 3. 2020, accessed April 8, 2020, Iran’s “Axis of Resistance” after Soleimani - AIJAC
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[21] Alex MacDonald, “Iraq’s intelligence chief named as new Prime Minister-designate,” Middle East Eye, April 9 2020, accessed April 13, 2020, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/intelligence-chief-named-new-prime-minister-designate-iraq
.
[22] Eli Lake, “How Iran is losing its grip in Iraq,” Gulf News, May 11, 2020, accessed May 23, 2020, https://gulfnews.com/opinion/op-eds/how-iran-is-losing-its-grip-in-iraq-1.71433771.
[23] Michael Knights, “Soleimani is Dead: The Road Ahead for Iranian-Backed Militias in Iraq,” CTC Sentinel, January 2020, pp. 5-6, accessed April 8, 2020, January 2020 – Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
.
[24] Suadad al Sulhy, “Iran and Najaf struggle for control over Hashd al-Shaabi after Muhandi’s killing,” Middle East Eye, February 16, 2020, accessed April 8, 2020, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/...l-over-hashd-al-shaabi-after-muhandis-killing
.
[25] “Anti-Iran political forces in Iraq move to free Iraq from decades-long submission to Iranian Hegemony,” MEMRI Special Dispatch 8648, March 19, 2020, accessed April 8, 2020, https://www.memri.org/reports/anti-...-iraq-decade-long-submission-iranian-hegemony
.
[26] “Report: Sistani and Sadr refused to meet with Qaani,” Rudaw, April 8, 2020, accessed April 15, 2020, https://www.rudaw.net/arabic/middleeast/iraq/080420201.
[27] Ali Mamouri, “Iraqi Prime Minister stressed PMU should be Iraqi Institution under State Authority,” Al Monitor, May 22, 2020, accessed May 23, 2020, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/05/iraq-kadimi-pmu-iran.html
; “Shia cleric Moqtada Sadr’s bloc wins Iraq Elections,” BBC News, May 19, 2018, accessed May 23, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-44178771
.
[28] Damian Doyle, “Iraq’s evolving Paramilitaries will have an Impact on State and Society,” E-International Relations, April 29, 2019, accessed May 23, 2020, https://www.e-ir.info/2019/04/29/ir...ies-will-have-an-impact-on-state-and-society/
.
[29] Nabih Bulos, “In Iraq, Iran-affiliated Militias that helped route Islamic State wield growing Clout,” Los Angeles Times, February 13, 2019, accessed May 23, 2020, https://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-iraq-militia-party-20190213-story.html
.
[30] Ali Mamouri, “Iraqi Prime Minister stressed PMU should be Iraqi Institution under State Authority,” Al Monitor, May 22, 2020, accessed May 23, 2020, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/05/iraq-kadimi-pmu-iran.html
.
[31] Tom O’Connor, “New Iraq Group Claiming Attacks on U.S. Troops says it can strike Israel,” Newsweek.com, March 19, 2020, accessed April 13, 2020, https://www.newsweek.com/new-iraq-group-claiming-attacks-us-troops-says-it-can-strike-israel-1493335
.
[32] “Jihad and Terrorism Threat Monitor Weekend Summary: Week of April 4-11, 2020,” MEMRI, Special Announcements No. 895, April 11, 2020, accessed April 13, 2020, https://www.memri.org/reports/jihad...ior-jttm-weekend-summary-week-april-4-11-2020.
[33] Former Iraqi PM Ayad Allawi: Iran Does Not Want Iraq To Have a Strong Army; The Americans Will Not Leave Iraq; The Int'l Coalition, Not Iran, Defeated ISIS, Memri@memri.org, April 5, 2020.
[34] Tom Bowman, “Pentagon Chief says there is no plan for U.S. Forces to leave Iraq,” NPR Morning Edition (audio transcript), January 7, 2020, accessed April 13, 2020, https://www.npr.org/2020/01/07/7941...there-is-no-plan-for-u-s-forces-to-leave-iraq.
[35] Around the halls: Experts react to the killing of Iranian commander Qassem Soleimani
)
[36] https://www.kurdistan24.net/en/news...term-us-military-presence-likely-in-kurdistan

[37] https://www.aei.org/op-eds/why-a-us-military-base-in-iraqi-kurdistan-is-a-bad-idea/

[38] https://www.centcom.mil/ABOUT-US/POSTURE-STATEMENT/

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[39] US-Led Airstrikes Underway in Iraq; Retaliation Against Iran-Backed Group That Killed Americans
)
[40] Special Dispatch No. 8634. Iraqi Leaders React with Concern and Some Relief to U.S. Airstrikes; Iran-Backed Militia: 'America Has Proven Its Failure, Its Weakness in Its Response' MEMRI Daily March 16 2020.
[41] https://www.washingtonpost.com/nati...-national--alert-world--alert-politics&wpmk=1

[42] Special Dispatch No. 8634. Iraqi Leaders React With Concern And Some Relief To U.S. Airstrikes; Iran-Backed Militia: 'America Has Proven Its Failure, Its Weakness In Its Response' MEMRI Daily March 16 2020
[43] https://www.washingtonpost.com/nati...=wp_main&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter

[44] Ibid.
[45] CISA Alert AA20-006A 1/6/20.
[46] https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/p...g-massive-cyber-theft-campaign-behalf-islamic
. March 28, 2018.
[47] https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-...re-extort-hospitals-municipalities-and-public
. November 28, 2018.
[48] https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/two-individuals-sentenced-connection-work-behalf-iran
. January 15. 2020 and https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/iran...-texas-illegally-exporting-military-sensitive
. March 17, 2020.
[49] https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/iran...-texas-illegally-exporting-military-sensitive
. March 17, 2020.
[50] https://www.reuters.com/article/us-...-on-hezbollah-commander-in-iraq-idUSKCN21S233

[51] US v. Samer El Debek, Southern District of NY, 18USC subsect 2339B 2339D, 371, 924 and 2 and 50 USC 1705 May 31, 2017.
[52] Klein, M. & Dorn, S. (n.d.). (2019) Alexei Saab allegations highlight disturbing hiring pattern at CUNY. https://nypost.com/2019/09/21/alexe...-disturbing-pattern-of-dubious-hires-at-cuny/
. Accessed April 12, 2020.
[53] US v. Manssor Arbabsiar and Gholam Shakuri; Southern District of NY; 18 USC subsect 117, 1958, 2 2332a, 2332
[54] “The Problem.” (2016). The Problem, RAI Services Co. http://www.thenewtobaccoroad.com
. Accessed April 18.
[55] US District Court Southern District NY US v. Ali Kourani Indictment 1:17-cr-00417-AKH and US v. Alexei Saab; US District Court Southern District of NY Indictment 19 cr.
[56] US v. Samer El Debek, Southern District of NY, 18USC subsect 2339B 2339D, 371, 924 and 2 and 50 USC 1705 May 31, 2017.
[57] Coughlin, K. (n.d.). Morristown man indicted on terrorism charges, allegedly scouted NYC targets for Hezbollah|Morristown Green. 2019. Retrieved April 12, 2020, from https://morristowngreen.com/2019/09...ted-nyc-targets-for-hezbollah/comment-page-1/
.
[58] US v. Samer El Debek, Southern District of NY, 18USC subsect 2339B 2339D, 371, 924 and 2 and 50 USC 1705 May 31, 2017.
[59] https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/defense-department-linguist-charged-espionage
. March 4, 2020.
[60] Schelling, T.C. (1960). The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, Harvard University Press.
[61] https://www.washingtonpost.com/nati...9bfe5a-60a8-11ea-b014-4fafa866bb81_story.html

[62] https://www.politico.com/story/2019/09/04/us-iran-military-reward-program-1480620

[63] https://www.washingtonpost.com/worl...f86dbc-3245-11ea-898f-eb846b7e9feb_story.html

[64] See Michael Knights, “Iraq goes from Zurfi to Kadhami: U.S. policy Implications,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Watch 3295, April 9, 2020, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org...rom-zurfi-to-kadhimi-u.s.-policy-implications
.

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About the Author(s)
Ava Sullivan
Ms. Ava Sullivan is a junior at The Pennsylvania State University majoring in Global and International Studies with a focus in Global Conflict and minors in Arabic and Spanish Language. Her main research interests are in Middle East conflicts and terrorism.
Gregory J. Kruczek
Dr. Gregory J. Kruczek is an Assistant Teaching Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at Penn State University. His research interests include second-order minorities, ethnic conflict, stateless nations and homeland claims, Middle Eastern Christians.

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