WAR 05-02-2020-to-05-08-24-2020___****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

Zagdid

Veteran Member
With the Turks getting frisky the Russians can't rely on getting in and out of the Black Sea. That being said, with the amount of maintenance per days at sea a Russian ship needs, if they're looking at being a player in the Med, they're going to have to invest a lot into Tartus....


US Calls on Cyprus to Halt Visits of Russian Navy Vessels
By Tasos Kokkinidis-May 2, 2020

The US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Matthew Palmer called earlier in the week on Cyprus to halt regular navy port calls by Russia.
Palmer was responding to a letter by the president of the American Hellenic Institute (AHI) Nick Larigakis who asked the US administration to remove the arms prohibition on Cyprus.
The U.S. Congress laid out specific criteria that Cyprus needs to fulfill before it is allowed to procure arms from the U.S. if it ever chooses to.
The law requires Cyprus to deny Russian military vessels to its ports despite a 2015 agreement with Moscow to do so. It also requires Cyprus — a financial haven for wealthy Russians to evade US sanctions — to comply with anti-money laundering regulations.

Palmer said that the US welcomed Cyprus’ “anti-money laundering measures, which showed important progress in strengthening AML [anti-money laundering] efforts and combatting illicit financial flows”.
But he added that “the United States continues to urge a halt in Russia’s regular navy port calls to the ROC. There is no doubt these vessels contribute to destabilizing actions in Syria.”
When Cyprus signed an agreement with Moscow to give Russian navy ships access to Cypriot ports Russian President Vladimir Putin said that other countries should not be concerned and that the port’s main use would be for counter-terrorism and anti-piracy.
 

jward

passin' thru
Special Report: U.S. rearms to nullify China's missile supremacy
World News
May 6, 2020 / 4:32 AM / Updated 15 hours ago

David Lague
16 Min Read



HONG KONG (Reuters) - As Washington and Beijing trade barbs over the coronavirus pandemic, a longer-term struggle between the two Pacific powers is at a turning point, as the United States rolls out new weapons and strategy in a bid to close a wide missile gap with China.

FILE PHOTO: With the USS-Wasp in the background, U.S. Marines ride an amphibious assault vehicle during the amphibious landing exercises of the U.S.-Philippines war games promoting bilateral ties at a military camp in Zambales province, Philippines, April 11, 2019. REUTERS/Eloisa Lopez/File Photo
The United States has largely stood by in recent decades as China dramatically expanded its military firepower. Now, having shed the constraints of a Cold War-era arms control treaty, the Trump administration is planning to deploy long-range, ground-launched cruise missiles in the Asia-Pacific region.

The Pentagon intends to arm its Marines with versions of the Tomahawk cruise missile now carried on U.S. warships, according to the White House budget requests for 2021 and Congressional testimony in March of senior U.S. military commanders. It is also accelerating deliveries of its first new long-range anti-ship missiles in decades.

In a statement to Reuters about the latest U.S. moves, Beijing urged Washington to “be cautious in word and deed,” to “stop moving chess pieces around” the region, and to “stop flexing its military muscles around China.”

The U.S. moves are aimed at countering China’s overwhelming advantage in land-based cruise and ballistic missiles. The Pentagon also intends to dial back China’s lead in what strategists refer to as the “range war.” The People’s Liberation Army (PLA), China’s military, has built up a huge force of missiles that mostly outrange those of the U.S. and its regional allies, according to senior U.S. commanders and strategic advisers to the Pentagon, who have been warning that China holds a clear advantage in these weapons.

And, in a radical shift in tactics, the Marines will join forces with the U.S. Navy in attacking an enemy’s warships. Small and mobile units of U.S. Marines armed with anti-ship missiles will become ship killers.

In a conflict, these units will be dispersed at key points in the Western Pacific and along the so-called first island chain, commanders said. The first island chain is the string of islands that run from the Japanese archipelago, through Taiwan, the Philippines and on to Borneo, enclosing China’s coastal seas.

Top U.S. military commanders explained the new tactics to Congress in March in a series of budget hearings. The commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps, General David Berger, told the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 5 that small units of Marines armed with precision missiles could assist the U.S. Navy to gain control of the seas, particularly in the Western Pacific. “The Tomahawk missile is one of the tools that is going to allow us to do that,” he said.

The Tomahawk - which first gained fame when launched in massed strikes during the 1991 Gulf War - has been carried on U.S. warships and used to attack land targets in recent decades. The Marines would test fire the cruise missile through 2022 with the aim of making it operational the following year, top Pentagon commanders testified.

At first, a relatively small number of land-based cruise missiles will not change the balance of power. But such a shift would send a strong political signal that Washington is preparing to compete with China’s massive arsenal, according to senior U.S. and other Western strategists. Longer term, bigger numbers of these weapons combined with similar Japanese and Taiwanese missiles would pose a serious threat to Chinese forces, they say. The biggest immediate threat to the PLA comes from new, long-range anti-ship missiles now entering service with U.S. Navy and Air Force strike aircraft.

“The Americans are coming back strongly,” said Ross Babbage, a former senior Australian government defense official and now a non-resident fellow at the Washington-based Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, a security research group. “By 2024 or 2025 there is a serious risk for the PLA that their military developments will be obsolete.”


A Chinese military spokesman, Senior Colonel Wu Qian, warned last October that Beijing would “not stand by” if Washington deployed land-based, long-range missiles in the Asia-Pacific region.

China’s foreign ministry accused the United States of sticking “to its cold war mentality” and “constantly increasing military deployment” in the region.

“Recently, the United States has gotten worse, stepping up its pursuit of a so-called ‘Indo-Pacific strategy’ that seeks to deploy new weapons, including ground-launched intermediate-range missiles, in the Asia-Pacific region,” the ministry said in a statement to Reuters. “China firmly opposes that.”

Pentagon spokesman Lieutenant Colonel Dave Eastburn said he would not comment on statements by the Chinese government or the PLA.

U.S. MILITARY UNSHACKLED
While the coronavirus pandemic rages, Beijing has increased its military pressure on Taiwan and exercises in the South China Sea. In a show of strength, on April 11 the Chinese aircraft carrier Liaoning led a flotilla of five other warships into the Western Pacific through the Miyako Strait to the northeast of Taiwan, according to Taiwan’s Defense Ministry. On April 12, the Chinese warships exercised in waters east and south of Taiwan, the ministry said.

Meanwhile, the U.S. Navy was forced to tie up the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt at Guam while it battles to contain a coronavirus outbreak among the crew of the giant warship. However, the U.S. Navy managed to maintain a powerful presence off the Chinese coast. The guided-missile destroyer USS Barry passed through the Taiwan Strait twice in April. And the amphibious assault ship USS America last month exercised in the East China Sea and South China Sea, the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command said.

In a series last year, Reuters reported that while the U.S. was distracted by almost two decades of war in the Middle East and Afghanistan, the PLA had built a missile force designed to attack the aircraft carriers, other surface warships and network of bases that form the backbone of American power in Asia. Over that period, Chinese shipyards built the world’s biggest navy, which is now capable of dominating the country’s coastal waters and keeping U.S. forces at bay.

The series also revealed that in most categories, China’s missiles now rival or outperform counterparts in the armories of the U.S. alliance.

To read the series, click here

China derived an advantage because it was not party to a Cold War-era treaty - the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) - that banned the United States and Russia from possessing ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges from 500 kilometers to 5,500 kilometers. Unrestrained by the INF pact, China has deployed about 2,000 of these weapons, according to U.S. and other Western estimates.


While building up its missile forces on land, the PLA also fitted powerful, long-range anti-ship missiles to its warships and strike aircraft.

This accumulated firepower has shifted the regional balance of power in China’s favor. The United States, long the dominant military power in Asia, can no longer be confident of victory in a military clash in waters off the Chinese coast, according to senior retired U.S. military officers.

But the decision by President Donald Trump last year to exit the INF treaty has given American military planners new leeway. Almost immediately after withdrawing from the pact on August 2, the administration signaled it would respond to China’s missile force. The next day, U.S. Secretary for Defense Mark Esper said he would like to see ground-based missiles deployed in Asia within months, but he acknowledged it would take longer.

Later that month, the Pentagon tested a ground-launched Tomahawk cruise missile. In December, it tested a ground-launched ballistic missile. The INF treaty banned such ground-launched weapons, and thus both tests would have been forbidden.

A senior Marines commander, Lieutenant General Eric Smith, told the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 11 that the Pentagon leadership had instructed the Marines to field a ground-launched cruise missile “very quickly.”

The budget documents show that the Marines have requested $125 million to buy 48 Tomahawk missiles from next year. The Tomahawk has a range of 1,600km, according to its manufacturer, Raytheon Company.

Smith said the cruise missile may not ultimately prove to be the most suitable weapon for the Marines. “It may be a little too heavy for us,” he told the Senate Armed Services Committee, but experience gained from the tests could be transferred to the army.

Smith also said the Marines had successfully tested a new shorter-range anti-ship weapon, the Naval Strike Missile, from a ground launcher and would conduct another test in June. He said if that test was successful, the Marines intended to order 36 of these missiles in 2022. The U.S. Army is also testing a new long-range, land-based missile that can target warships. This missile would have been prohibited under the INF treaty.

The Marine Corps said in a statement it was evaluating the Naval Strike Missile to target ships and the Tomahawk for attacking targets on land. Eventually, the Marines aimed to field a system “that could engage long-range moving targets either on land or sea,” the statement said.

The Defense Department also has research underway on new, long-range strike weapons, with a budget request of $3.2 billion for hypersonic technology, mostly for missiles.

China’s foreign ministry drew a distinction between the PLA’s arsenal of missiles and the planned U.S. deployment. It said China’s missiles were “located in its territory, especially short and medium-range missiles, which cannot reach the mainland of the United States. This is fundamentally different from the U.S., which is vigorously pushing forward deployment.”


Slideshow (14 Images)
BOTTLING UP CHINA’S NAVY
Military strategists James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara suggested almost a decade ago that the first island chain was a natural barrier that could be exploited by the American military to counter the Chinese naval build-up. Ground-based anti-ship missiles could command key passages through the island chain into the Western Pacific as part of a strategy to keep the rapidly expanding Chinese navy bottled up, they suggested.

In embracing this strategy, Washington is attempting to turn Chinese tactics back on the PLA. Senior U.S. commanders have warned that China’s land-based cruise and ballistic missiles would make it difficult for U.S. and allied navies to operate near China’s coastal waters.

But deploying ground-based U.S. and allied missiles in the island chain would pose a similar threat to Chinese warships - to vessels operating in the South China Sea, East China Sea and Yellow Sea, or ships attempting to break out into the Western Pacific. Japan and Taiwan have already deployed ground-based anti-ship missiles for this purpose.

“We need to be able to plug up the straits,” said Holmes, a professor at the U.S. Naval War College. “We can, in effect, ask them if they want Taiwan or the Senkakus badly enough to see their economy and armed forces cut off from the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean. In all likelihood the answer will be no.”

Holmes was referring to the uninhabited group of isles in the East China Sea - known as the Senkaku islands in Japan and the Diaoyu islands in China - that are claimed by both Tokyo and Beijing.

The United States faces challenges in plugging the first island chain. Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte’s decision to distance himself from the United States and forge closer ties with China is a potential obstacle to American plans. U.S. forces could face barriers to operating from strategically important islands in the Philippines archipelago after Duterte in February scrapped a key security agreement with Washington.

And if U.S. forces do deploy in the first island chain with anti-ship missiles, some U.S. strategists believe this won’t be decisive, as the Marines would be vulnerable to strikes from the Chinese military.

The United States has other counterweights. The firepower of long-range U.S. Air Force bombers could pose a bigger threat to Chinese forces than the Marines, the strategists said. Particularly effective, they said, could be the stealthy B-21 bomber, which is due to enter service in the middle of this decade, armed with long-range missiles.

The Pentagon is already moving to boost the firepower of its existing strike aircraft in Asia. U.S. Navy Super Hornet jets and Air Force B-1 bombers are now being armed with early deliveries of Lockheed Martin’s new Long Range Anti-Ship Missile, according to the budget request documents. The new missile is being deployed in response to an “urgent operational need” for the U.S. Pacific Command, the documents explain.

The new missile carries a 450 kilogram warhead and is capable of “semi-autonomous” targeting, giving it some ability to steer itself, according to the budget request. Details of the stealthy cruise missile’s range are classified. But U.S. and other Western military officials estimate it can strike targets at distances greater than 800 kilometers.

The budget documents show the Pentagon is seeking $224 million to order another 53 of these missiles in 2021. The U.S. Navy and Air Force expect to have more than 400 of them in service by 2025, according to orders projected in the documents.

This new anti-ship missile is derived from an existing Lockheed long-range, land attack weapon, the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile. The Pentagon is asking for $577 million next year to order another 400 of these land-attack missiles.


“The U.S. and allied focus on long-range land-attack and anti-ship cruise missiles was the quickest way to rebuild long-range conventional firepower in the Western Pacific region,” said Robert Haddick, a former U.S. Marine Corps officer and now a visiting senior fellow at the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies based in Arlington, Virginia.

For the U.S. Navy in Asia, Super Hornet jets operating from aircraft carriers and armed with the new anti-ship missile would deliver a major boost in firepower while allowing the expensive warships to operate further away from potential threats, U.S. and other Western military officials say.

Current and retired U.S. Navy officers have been urging the Pentagon to equip American warships with longer-range anti-ship missiles that would allow them to compete with the latest, heavily armed Chinese cruisers, destroyers and frigates. Lockheed has said it successfully test-fired one of the new Long Range Anti-Ship Missiles from the type of launcher used on U.S. and allied warships.

Haddick, one of the first to draw attention to China’s firepower advantage in his 2014 book, “Fire on the Water,” said the threat from Chinese missiles had galvanized the Pentagon with new strategic thinking and budgets now directed at preparing for high-technology conflict with powerful nations like China.

Haddick said the new missiles were critical to the defensive plans of America and its allies in the Western Pacific. The gap won’t close immediately, but firepower would gradually improve, Haddick said. “This is especially true during the next half-decade and more, as successor hypersonic and other classified munition designs complete their long periods of development, testing, production, and deployment,” he said.

Additional reporting by the Beijing newsroom. Edited by Peter Hirschberg.
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jward

passin' thru
Japan scraps Aegis Ashore deployment plan in city of Akita


np_file_10535-870x562.jpeg
Defense Minister Taro Kono meets with executives of the Liberal Democratic Party's Akita prefectural chapter at the Defense Ministry in Tokyo on Feb. 12. | KYODO


The Defense Ministry has scrapped its plan to deploy the Aegis Ashore land-based missile defense system in a Self-Defense Force compound in the city of Akita, government officials said Wednesday.
Faced with strong opposition from local residents, the ministry will choose from other places listed as possible sites, mainly state-owned land within Akita Prefecture, the officials added.

In May last year, the ministry said its surveys found that the Ground SDF Araya training area in Akita was the most appropriate site for one of the two Aegis Ashore units to be deployed in Japan.
But briefing materials on the survey results presented to local residents contained errors.
This led the ministry to conduct fresh surveys at 20 locations on state-held land in Akita Prefecture and the neighboring prefectures of Yamagata and Aomori. The ministry plans to complete the surveys May 31.

Residents near the training area are concerned about the plan to deploy the Aegis Ashore system near residential and school districts. The sloppy past surveys also exacerbated the local opposition to the deployment.
Akita Gov. Norihisa Satake and the Liberal Democratic Party’s Akita prefectural chapter requested the ministry to reconsider the deployment plan.
The ministry will select an alternative to the Araya area. But possible sites outside Akita Prefecture are unlikely to be chosen because the locations would leave blind spots for the Aegis Ashore system’s radar equipment.
The other Aegis Ashore unit is to be installed in the GSDF Mutsumi training area in Yamaguchi Prefecture. Opposition to the deployment may also intensify after the ministry gave up the Akita plan.

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jward

passin' thru
Japan-Based Carrier USS Ronald Reagan is Underway as SECDEF Warns of Chinese Military Moves in South China Sea
By: Sam LaGrone
May 6, 2020 1:23 PM



USS Ronald Reagan (CVN-76) at Commander, Fleet Activities Yokosuka (CFAY), Japan on April 25, 2020. US Navy Photo
The U.S. aircraft carrier forward deployed to Japan is back at sea for trials after its annual repair period and ahead of its spring patrol in the Western Pacific, USNI News has learned.
USS Ronald Reagan (CVN-76) left on Monday from its berth in Yokosuka following an extended quarantine period for the crew of the carrier, as well as its escorts, as part of the Navy’s attempts to keep the COVID-19 virus off of the carrier, service officials confirmed to USNI News earlier this week.
Like the West Coast Nimitz Carrier Strike Group, Task Force 70 ordered the crew into a restriction of movement (ROM) period in Japan ahead of the sea trials. At the conclusion of the ROM period, U.S. 7th Fleet discovered several asymptomatic positive COVID-19 sailors in the quarantined crew and kept them off the carrier. The Navy did not disclose the number of cases, but The New York Times reported there have been at least 16 positive cases from sailors assigned to Reagan.

The quarantine period ahead of deployment is one of the lessons the Navy is absorbing from the outbreak on USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) that has sidelined the carrier in Guam since March 27. The carrier reported more than 1,000 positive cases stemming from what started out as just a handful of infected sailors. Curbing infections on deployed ships has become a top priority for the Navy.

Sailors assigned to USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71), who have tested negative twice for COVID-19 and are asymptomatic, arrive pierside and prepare to return to the ship following completion of their off-ship quarantine on May 1, 2020. US Navy Photo
“We have an enormous respect for this virus. It’s insidious, and the reason why it’s insidious is the asymptomatic spread,” Vice Adm. Richard Brown, the commander of Naval Surface Forces and Naval Surface Force Pacific, told USNI News in an interview Friday.
The underway comes as senior leaders have warned of increased Chinese military activity in the South China Sea.
“We continue to see aggressive behavior by the PLA in the South China Sea, from threatening a Philippine Navy ship to sinking a Vietnamese fishing boat and intimidating other nations from engaging in offshore oil and gas development,” Secretary of Defense Mark Esper told reporters at the Pentagon on Tuesday.
In turn, the U.S. has stepped up presence operations in the region, including conducting two freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea in April.

Additionally, while Roosevelt was pier-side in Guam, amphibious warship USS America (LHA-6) operated off the coast of Malaysia near a mineral claim dispute between Jakarta and Beijing.

Following the completion of sea trials, Reagan will begin its Western Pacific patrol.
“I think it means a lot not only to our sailors of our strike group but also to our nation as a whole and our partners and allies that we get Reagan back to sea and back out on deployment where she belongs,” Task Force 70 Commander Rear Adm. George Wikoff told Stars and Stripes on Friday.
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Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Hummm......

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Asia Defense | Risk Intelligence | Security | Southeast Asia
Will Vietnam Lease Cam Ranh Bay to the United States?

Is there any meat to the rumors that Vietnam would lease Cam Ranh Bay to the United States?

Carl Thayer


By Carl Thayer
May 06, 2020

This article is presented by
Diplomat Risk Intelligence, The Diplomat’s consulting and analysis division. Learn more here
Will Vietnam Lease Cam Ranh Bay to the United States?

CAM RANH BAY, Vietnam (Aug. 18, 2011) Military Sealift Command dry cargo/ammunition ship USNS Richard E. Byrd at anchor while undergoing a routine seven-day maintenance availability. Byrd is the first U.S. Navy ship to visit the port in more than 38 years. Byrd departed Cam Ranh Bay Aug. 23 to return to normal duties of supplying U.S. Navy ships at sea in the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean.
Credit: U.S. Navy photo by Anh HoAdvertisement

Rumors are circulating that Vietnam is considering leasing Cam Ranh Bay or some of its islands in the South China Sea to the United States on a long-term basis as a supply base and/or stop over point as a counter to recent aggressiveness in the South China Sea.

Assessment of the Situation
Vietnam has a long-standing defense policy of “three no’s” dating back to its first Defense White Paper in 1998. This White Paper, entitled Vietnam Consolidating National Defense Safeguarding the Homeland stated:
The national defense of Vietnam contributes to the policy of openness, diversification and multilateralization of external relations, without aligning with one country against another, without confrontation and offensive against any country…

Vietnam neither joins any military alliances nor engages in any military operations contrary to the spirit of safeguarding peace, nor in any operations of deterrence.
The spirit of the “three no’s” was reiterated in Vietnam’s next two Defense White Papers of 2004 and 2009. Vietnam’s most recent Defense White Paper published in late 2012 states:
Viet Nam consistently advocates neither joining any military alliances, siding with one country against another, giving any other countries permission to set up military bases or use its territory to carry out military activities against other countries nor using force or threatening to use force in international relations. Viet Nam also promotes defence cooperation with countries to improve its capabilities to protect the country and address common security challenges. (emphasis added)

On the face of it, Vietnam’s official defense policy precludes leasing Cam Ranh Bay or islands in the South China Sea to the United States or any other foreign country. Vietnam also has a policy of permitting foreign navies to make one port call a year. Several ships can make a port call at the same time. For example, U.S. Navy ships are permitted to call in at the Tien Sa military port in Da Nang and then visit Cam Ranh Bay. Military hospital ships, such as the USS Mercy that participates in Pacific Partnership humanitarian visits, are not included in this restriction.

According to the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at the Washington, D.C., based Center for Strategic and International Studies, which tracks developments in the South China Sea:

Vietnam occupies between 49 and 51 outposts (the status of two construction projects on Cornwallis South Reef is unclear) spread across 27 features in the South China Sea. These include facilities built on 21 rocks and reefs in the Spratly Islands.

Truong Son island is the largest of the 21 rocks with an area of 15 hectares. It has a small harbor and an airstrip of 1,200 metres. Vietnam’s other features are around eight hectares or less in area. In sum, it seems unlikely that any of Vietnam’s outposts and rocks in the Spratly Islands could provide a “supply base and/or stop over point” for U.S. Navy ships transiting the area due to their inadequate infrastructure and location near heavily militarized Chinese artificial islands.

A better prospect for the United States arose in the Philippines with the conclusion of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between the Philippines and the United States in April 2014. The EDCA has provisions for the United States to build and retain ownership of the physical infrastructure located on Philippine military bases. However, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte’s announcement of his termination of the Visiting Forces Agreement in February this year appear to have scuttled EDCA.

Duterte’s actions now make access to facilities in Vietnam by the United States Navy more attractive. There have been some straws in the wind over the past decade.

U.S. Returns to Cam Ranh
In 2009, Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung dramatically announced that Vietnam’s commercial repair facilities would be open to all navies of the world. The U.S. was the first country to take up the offer. The first repair was conducted on the USNS Safeguard in the port of Saigon in September 2009.

The following year, the United States and Vietnam signed a contract for the minor maintenance and repair of U.S. Navy Sealift ships. Five ship voyage repairs were subsequently completed. The USNS Richard E. Byrd underwent repairs in Van Phong Bay in February-March 2010. The other four voyage repairs were carried out at civilian facilities in Cam Ranh Bay:

USNS Richard E. Byrd in August 2011 and June 2012; the USNS Walter S. Diehl in October 2011 and the USNS Rappahannock in February 2012. The cost of the repairs was minor, just under a half million U.S. dollars each.

It should be noted that Cam Ranh Bay is divided into a military port and a civilian facility. Russia has special access rights to the military port because of its servicing and support of Vietnam’s largely Russian constructed naval fleet, including six Varshavyanka-class conventional submarines.

Cam Ranh International Port, a civilian facility, was officially established in March 2016. Three U.S. warships visited the commercial port that year – USS John S. McCain (DDG-56) and USS Frank Cable (AS-40) in October 2016) and the USS Mustin (DDG 89) in December 2016.

Vietnam’s 2019 White Paper raised the tantalizing prospect that Vietnam might consider altering its “three no’s” defense policy. The following passage sparked intense speculation that such was the case:

Depending on circumstances and specific conditions, Viet Nam will consider developing necessary, appropriate defence and military relations with other countries… (emphasis added)

For the U.S. side, however, the mantra of “places not bases” is a long-standing one. Bases are fixed locations vulnerable to attack, while places provide access at critical times, such as a natural disaster or crisis. It is more likely that the United States will seek more frequent access to Vietnamese ports by U.S. Navy ships than renting facilities for a supply base.

There is no operational imperative for the U.S. to acquire a “stop over point” between Singapore and Taiwan. The United States 7th Fleet is home ported in Yokosuka, Japan. The U.S. maintains Naval Base Guam, a major naval facility. Some of the U.S. Navy ships that visit the South China Sea are based in San Diego and Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. U.S. warships are capable of at-sea replenishment.

Vietnam and the United States have held on and off again discussions about raising their Obama era comprehensive partnership to a strategic partnership. In light of China’s persistent bullying of Vietnam over sovereignty, maritime disputes and oil exploration in the South China Sea some analysts argue that the “circumstances and specific conditions” may have arisen for a change of policy.

No doubt Vietnam’s leaders will be extremely cautious in their adoption of any changes to long-standing foreign and defense policies at the 13th national congress of the Vietnam Communist Party scheduled for the first quarter of 2021.
If the past is prologue, Vietnam likely will continue its policy of “diversification and multilateralization” of relations with the major powers. Vietnam will not align itself with the United States against China.

If Vietnam decides to loosen up on its present restrictions it will do so gradually and in line with the following prescription in the 2019 Defence White Book that follows immediately after the passage quoted above, “on the basis of respecting each other’s independence, sovereignty, territorial unity and integrity as well as fundamental principles of international law, cooperation for mutual benefits and common interests of the region and international community.”

In sum, Vietnam is highly unlikely to lease Cam Ranh Bay or some of its islands in the South China Sea to the United States on a long-term basis as a supply base and/or stop over point.

DRI — Intelligence, on Demand.
Diplomat Risk Intelligence


Diplomat Risk Intelligence is the consulting and analysis division of The Diplomat. It offers you dedicated access to an exclusive network of subject matter experts versed in geopolitical, security, economic, and political trends covering the wider Asia-Pacific region.
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Authors

Carl Thayer
Contributing Author
Carl Thayer


Carl Thayer is Emeritus Professor at The University of New South Wales and Director of Thayer Consultancy.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
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The Evolving Nature of War
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By Douglas J. Feith & Shaul Chorev
May 07, 2020
The Evolving Nature of War
By Douglas J. Feith & Shaul Chorev
May 07, 2020
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Douglas J. Feith is a Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute and served as Under Secretary of Defense for Policy from July 2001 until August 2005. Admiral Chorev, who heads the Research Center for Maritime Strategy at the University of Haifa, served as Deputy Chief of the Israeli Navy and as head of Israel’s Atomic Energy Commission. This article is excerpted and adapted from a recent report entitled “The Eastern Mediterranean in the New Era of Major-Power Competition” by the University of Haifa-Hudson Institute Consortium on the Eastern Mediterranean. [1]
Throughout history, wars generally hinged on clashes of arms. To win, a party had to defeat its enemy’s military forces. For the United States since the Vietnam War of the 1960s and 1970s, however, the only conflict of this conventional model was the Gulf War of 1990-91. Israeli wars have not conformed to that model since the end of the 1973 October (Yom Kippur) War. Having remained largely unchanged for millennia, the character of war has changed radically only in recent decades. Inter-state battlefield clashes of arms are now rare, although the amount of tanks, mechanized weapons and fighter aircraft that exist in arsenals around the world means that traditional arms clashes remain possible.

The United States and Israel have been more active in wars than have most countries, and in general now the aim of war against them has been to change a foe’s policies without having to defeat that foe’s military forces. Political and military decision-makers have not fully adapted to the new reality.

To be sure, the 2018 U.S. National Defense Strategy highlights military threats from China and Russia and says, “Inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S. national security.” The point is well grounded. Nonetheless, democratic countries are particularly vulnerable to asymmetric strategies – those using military operations and techniques mainly designed for political rather than military effects. And even major state powers use asymmetric strategies, as Russia did with its “hybrid” warfare in Ukraine[2] and China has done with its armed civilian reserve force in the South China Sea.[3]

By enormously increasing information flow around the world, the Internet, small satellites, drones, improved sensors, cell phone video cameras and broadband connectivity, are transforming both war and politics. These technologies allow military forces to find targets and strike them with great precision from long distances. They open the way for cyber warfare, hacking and manipulation of foreign political systems. They allow individuals to broadcast not just text but also photos and videos instantaneously and globally in ways that many states cannot control. And, at the same time, they give authoritarian states instruments for political control and repression that exceed anything ever imagined even by George Orwell.

Information operations can be far more potent than ever before. They are not just technical. They do not simply facilitate war by functioning as “force multipliers.” Rather, substantive information operations – propaganda, arguments, images, and “narratives” – can serve as primary instruments for achieving war aims, especially against democratic countries.

Such operations often focus on news media – mainstream and otherwise – to influence elite and popular opinion. In democratic countries, the news media are especially rich targets for manipulation because public opinion there matters more and the news outlets are more likely to be independent of the government.

In all events, news media are important because people in general have little understanding of foreign conflicts except what they gather from the news as the conflict is underway. They usually have no relevant personal experience, and their knowledge of history is often negligible. This is true of elites also, including government officials and news reporters themselves. News media reports shape public opinion directly and through influencing other news media. In other words, journalists tend to reinforce one another. Their reports often blend into self-affirming conventional wisdom, despite errors of fact and context. This is the point of the humorous quip that journalists often operate as a “herd of independent minds.” Non-state actors manipulate that “herd” to counter the military superiority of their enemies. Those who fail to take this into account can find themselves defeated by a weaker opponent.

In the past, battlefield events were intended to influence international politics only indirectly and in the long run. Combat’s immediate goal was military: to damage the other side’s ability to fight. Now, however, an attack’s immediate purpose is often to produce news reports that will put pressure on enemy decision-makers without actually reducing their ability to fight. The target is the enemy’s will rather than capability. Ironically, battlefield success, if it results in negative news media coverage, may do a party more harm than good.

The United States and Israel in recent decades have continually been at war with insurgent movements and terrorist organizations. Generally lacking the kind of strategic “center of gravity” that conventional armies (and other highly organized bodies) possess, such movements and organizations have been able to keep fighting under circumstances that would compel a conventional army to surrender. They use information – both truthful and false – as an invaluable weapon of war. Sometimes, as with ISIS, they use it to intensify and spread fear, increasing the effect of terrorist acts. Sometimes they present themselves as victims of inhumane enemies, as when Hamas in Gaza deliberately attacks Israel from populated areas to draw Israeli retaliation that inevitably destroys homes, schools or hospitals and kills or injures civilians. Both strategies can be used simultaneously to produce news media images that strengthen the weaker side and weaken the stronger.

Groups that depict themselves as victims of Western powers win automatic support from Western news media. Images that reinforce simple notions – “narratives” – of this kind of victimization can exercise powerful influence. With certain types of audiences, such images cannot be countered quickly and effectively. Explanations about context, history and other complexities don’t work.

Continued.....
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Continued.....

Consider, for example, the image of a child facing an American or Israeli tank. Mainstream news media can be counted on to feature it prominently. It will likely “go viral” on social media. And it can generate immediate, widespread, unthinking sympathy. A single image of this kind can generate substantial worldwide support for the child’s side in a conflict against the United States or Israel.

War thus becomes a morality tale or “reality show” in which violence is provoked to produce horrifying images to influence other people’s political opinions. Skillful military action taken by a technologically advanced state to defend its territory and people can generate images that make its defensive action look aggressive, offensive and inhumane – in a word, villainous. The effective use of force can produce a strategic loss.

As violent non-state actors wage battles with political rather than military goals – to demoralize their enemies and persuade them to quit fighting and retreat – the other side must also operate politically. Counter-insurgency strategy recognizes the importance of military operations with immediate political goals. It aims to curtail support that insurgents or terrorists receive from the population that either harbors them voluntarily or submits to their intimidation.

Each side in such a conflict has an interest in understanding its adversary’s society – its aspirations, needs and internal composition. The enemy’s “home front” can be the war’s most important theater.

Terrorist organizations target their enemies’ civilians on the home front. Meanwhile, terrorists locate their own personnel and weapons among civilians on their own side’s home front. Both of these tactics test the social resilience of the country fighting the terrorists. That country may find itself without an option for quick victory. This also requires resilience, patience and cohesiveness rooted in strong morale. Sustained domestic political support for the war effort is the country’s strategic center of gravity. If it can keep such support, it can prevail; if it loses it, the terrorists win.

In such wars, heterogeneous democratic societies have particular challenges. Their resilience is a function of trust among their different communities of citizens. The war effort needs broad popular support, which it can lose if the war comes to be viewed as the project of an elite or a special interest group or if the burdens are seen as unfairly distributed. Healthy democratic institutions can be crucial to overcoming these challenges. It is especially important that democratic countries respect the distinction between combatants and civilian population, as this can be crucial to maintaining popular support for a war effort.

When a country, especially a democratic country, is fighting a war against terrorists, opinion abroad – views voiced by foreign officials and journalists, for example, or incorporated in resolutions of the United Nations or other international organizations – can influence domestic public opinion and affect the willingness of foreign governments to provide help.
The contest for public opinion highlights one of the remarkable paradoxes of terrorist warfare: Though terrorists flout law, they rely heavily on legalism. They exploit the reverence for law in democratic countries. Terrorists violate the most important principle of the law of war by deliberately harming civilians. They target those of the enemy and often endanger their own side’s civilians by hiding among them, using them as human shields and locating weapons and equipment in civilian hospitals, schools, apartment buildings and the like. At the same time, the terrorists’ political strategy hinges on the argument that their enemies, in fighting back, harm civilians and fail to respect the law of war.

Such cynicism wins rewards when officials in the European Union, the UN General Assembly and other bodies, for example, condemn Israeli responses to terrorist attacks. Such condemnations are political in nature – voiced by political officials in political forums. But they are often interpreted as disinterested legal judgments. EU and UN resolutions are commonly (though incorrectly) taken as signs of legitimacy. In fact, they are simply the opinions of interested parties.

Because people generally know and care little about other people’s conflicts, “world opinion” can easily be swayed and misled by a simple line of argument or a single powerful image – recall the point made above about the image of a child facing an American or Israeli tank. Such an image may be out of context – or it may be bogus altogether – but it may nevertheless strongly sway opinion in a world full of people who are ill informed or predisposed to sympathize with the ostensible victim. It is a crucial and difficult strategic challenge to counter the information operations of terrorist groups that are skillful in depicting themselves as victims of strong Western powers.

Terrorist groups adopt war strategies that blur lines between the domestic and the international, between civilian and military, between diplomacy and armed conflict and between crime and war. Often, the goal is “no surrender” – denying victory to their adversary. Since the first intifada began in 1987, in more than three decades of continuous Israeli struggle against terrorism, no terror organization has ever raised a white flag. Hamas and Hezbollah have provoked Israeli military operations and then converted them, despite the operations’ military effectiveness, into greater local popular support for themselves.

After the initial phase of “classical” warfare to overthrow the regimes, U.S.-led coalition forces In Iraq and Afghanistan had difficulty devising a strategy for decisive, sustainable military victory over the insurgents. Eventually, the coalition resolved to win the support of local populations – in Iraq, principally Sunni tribes – by protecting them from the insurgents. This involved patient interaction with the local people, activity that was in many ways the opposite of what would have been done if the goal were a quick and devastating military strike against the insurgents.

Unlike conventional wars, the campaigns of violent non-state actors often lack a clear beginning and end point. Such campaigns are not rare or exceptional, but are an ongoing, virtually constant phenomenon in the world today. Americans remain engaged in such a campaign in Afghanistan, and Israelis are so engaged on multiple fronts. Such campaigns have forced military strategists to focus on concepts such as “military operations other than war” and “the campaign between wars.”

War against terrorist organizations tends to involve short periods of high intensity fighting, preceded and followed by periods of lower intensity. The shifts to high intensity can be purposeful or unintended by the party that provides the trigger.

The standard for success in a war against terrorists may be similar to that for domestic crime fighting. The standard is not elimination of all terrorism – or of all crime. Rather, it is to lower the violence to a level that allows society to function normally, while preserving its essential character and principles. After 9/11, the U.S. government set the aim of the war on terrorism as defeating terrorism as a threat to America’s way of life as a free and open society.

Among the sensible military objectives in such a war are defending the state’s population, territory and infrastructure; disrupting and deterring attacks through activities at home and abroad; lengthening the time between high-intensity peaks; and countering ideological support for terrorism.

America’s enemies in the war on terrorism were mainly non-state jihadist groups functioning as a network of networks. They did not have much organizational structure. Israel, however, has terrorist enemies that have substantial organizational structure. Special strategic challenges face Israel as a result of Hamas’s control over Gaza and Hezbollah’s political role within Lebanon. In response, Israel’s war on terrorism has developed the concept of “flexible deterrence,” which relies on threats of measured military force combined with various economic, political and diplomatic sanctions and incentives. This concept is based on distinguishing between the terrorist group and the population within which it operates. The key challenge is to find political, economic or other ways to influence the general population so that they have the will and courage to constrain the terrorists’ power. This could lower the risk that minor skirmishes will ignite major confrontations. It could help Israel prevent successful terrorist operations and also incentivize the local population to free itself from terrorist control.

American and Israeli planners have yet to assess how all these changes in the nature of modern war should alter the ways we develop and use military force.

The foregoing discussion illuminates what is meant by the term “asymmetric war” – conflicts of the militarily weak against the strong. As noted, the weak party pursues a strategy that aims directly at political results, rather than trying to achieve such results through military victories.

In such conflicts, the key war weapons can be arguments and actions that are diplomatic, legal and moral – domestic and international. The decisive arena is less likely to be a military battlefield than the U.S. Congress or the Israeli Knesset. The most important wins may be scored with a heartrending videotape of civilian casualties, in a CNN interview, a UN Security Council meeting or a New York Times editorial.

This means that military preparedness is not enough. War preparations do not take the asymmetrical nature of warfare nowadays properly into account.

The United States and Israel should strategize, train and exercise the information aspects of conflict. Their officials should anticipate diplomatic, legal and moral arguments they will need for future conflicts. Both countries stockpile military equipment and munitions. They train their forces to use these items and conduct exercises with them. They should do the same regarding political weapons. They should prepare in advance the necessary political and legal arguments. They should train diplomats and legislative and public affairs officials for their roles as “warriors.” They should routinely and seriously exercise war-related political operations together with their military exercises.

For nearly a century, military thinkers have stressed the crucial importance of “jointness” – that is, changing the mentality, planning and practices of military officers so that the army, navy, marines, air force and coast guard can all operate together, and not just separately. To meet the challenges of asymmetric political-military conflict, those responsible for the political aspects should plan, train and exercise jointly with those responsible for the military aspects.

“Gray Zone” conflict is now an important asymmetric strategy. The term “gray zone” applies to a category of conflicts in world affairs. In such affairs, there is a spectrum of competition. It runs from peaceful pursuit of advantages through limited use of force to the outright warfare between established armed forces. “Gray zone” conflicts are not peaceful, but they are short of outright warfare.

For many years, analysts have noted the importance of activities in this spectrum’s mid-section. These include irregular warfare of the Yugoslav partisans or the French resistance in World War II; anti-imperial “national liberation” struggles fought in the period of decolonization; and the terrorism of radical groups in Europe, Japan and elsewhere from the late 1960s forward.

In the 1980s, the term “low-intensity conflict” became popular as a way of referring to violent campaigns that were not large-scale or intense enough to qualify simply as wars. The term “gray zone” gained currency after Russia conquered Crimea through the use of soldiers that wore uniforms without insignia so that they could not readily be identified definitively as Russians.

Western strategists should refine their understanding of the ‘gray zone’ construct. Why does it work? Where might it be replicated or adapted? What vulnerabilities does it exploit? How can it be countered? Can we stymie adversary gray zone strategy and tactics if we collectively think anew?

Military commanders and civilian security officials should be trained to consider the broader and longer-term consequences of all their actions. In addition, they should avoid the common mistake of “mirror imaging” – that is, assuming that adversaries are just like you.

Strategy is ultimately about influencing the actions of individuals. It’s crucial to know as much as possible about the individuals you are trying to influence. A successful strategy that incorporates these tenets will go a long way toward ensuring national security in an era of dynamically changing warfare.

Notes:
[1]. Mr. Feith and Admiral Chorev co-chaired the team that produced the report on “The Eastern Mediterranean in the New Era of Major-Power Competition” (http://s3.amazonaws.com/media.hudso...in the New Era of Major-Power Competition.pdf). The other principal members were Dr. Seth Cropsey, Hudson Institute senior fellow and former Deputy Under Secretary of the U.S. Navy; Vice Admiral Jack Dorsett (USN, ret.), vice president for cyber and C4 at Northrop Grumman, former Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information Dominance and Director of Naval Intelligence; and Admiral Gary Roughead (USN, ret.), Robert and Marion Oster Distinguished Military Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, and former Chief of Naval Operations.
[2]. See Andrew E. Kramer, “Russian General Pitches ‘Information’ Operations as a Form of War,” New York Times, March 2, 2019 (In a recent speech, Russian General Valery Gerasimov, chief of the general staff, “said Russia’s armed forces must maintain both ‘classical’ and ‘asymmetrical’ potential, using jargon for the mix of combat, intelligence and propaganda tools that the Kremlin has deployed in conflicts such as Syria and Ukraine.” The speech echoed themes from his 2013 article in an army journal “which many now see as a foreshadowing of the country’s embrace of ‘hybrid war’ in Ukraine, where Russia has backed separatist rebels and used soldiers in unmarked uniforms to seize Crimea.”).
[3]. See Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019, p. 53 (Regarding the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM), “an armed reserve force of civilians:” “In the South China Sea, the PAFMM plays a major role in coercive activities to achieve China’s political goals without fighting, part of broader Chinese military theory that sees confrontational operations short of war as an effective means of accomplishing political objectives.”).
The National Institute for Public Policy’s Information Series is a periodic publication focusing on contemporary strategic issues affecting U.S. foreign and defense policy. It is a forum for promoting critical thinking on the evolving international security environment and how the dynamic geostrategic landscape affects U.S. national security. Contributors are recognized experts in the field of national security.
The views in this Information Series are those of the author and should not be construed as official U.S. Government policy, the official policy of the National Institute for Public Policy or any of its sponsors. For additional information about this publication or other publications by the National Institute Press, contact: Editor, National Institute Press, 9302 Lee Highway, Suite 750 |Fairfax, VA 22031 | (703) 293-9181 |www.nipp.org. For access to previous issues of the National Institute Press Information Series, please visit Information Series | National Institute for Public Policy.
© National Institute Press, 2020
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Posted for fair use.....

Top Kashmir rebel leader killed; India claims major success
By AIJAZ HUSSAIN
yesterday

SRINAGAR, India (AP) — Indian government forces killed a top rebel commander and his aide in disputed Kashmir on Wednesday and shut down cellphone and mobile internet services during subsequent anti-India protests, officials and residents said.

India’s security officials and some members of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party called his death as a major victory against insurgents. The killing could spark more unrest in the region.

Naikoo, 35, was the chief of operations of the region’s largest indigenous rebel group, Hizbul Mujahideen, which has spearheaded an armed rebellion against Indian rule.

He was the group’s top commander for almost eight years and was responsible for recruiting dozens of Kashmiris to fight against India, according to officials. He shot into prominence after a 2016 public uprising following the killing of the group’s charismatic leader, Burhan Wani.

After Wani’s death, Naikoo helped give new life to the militant movement. He unified rebel ranks, which had been divided by splinter factions.

A large contingent of police and army soldiers in armored vehicles launched an operation in the Awantipora area in southern Kashmir late Tuesday based on a tip that militant commanders were sheltering there. They used earth movers to dig up several patches of land, including a school playground, looking for possible underground hideouts, residents said.

Troops blasted at least two civilian homes with explosives, a common tactic employed by Indian troops in Kashmir.

On Wednesday, as the government forces began house-to-house searches in the area, they came under gunfire from rebels, police said. In the ensuing firefight, two militants were killed, a police official said on condition of anonymity, keeping with government policy. He identified one of the slain rebels as Naikoo. The officer said Naikoo was the most wanted militant in Kashmir, and troops had conducted dozens of operations to get him.

Before joining the group, Naikoo was a popular mathematics teacher.

Some anti-India protests and clashes between protesters and government forces were also reported in the area where the gunfight occurred.

Government forces fired bullets, shotgun pellets and teargas at a large anti-India protest that hit the streets and threw stones at the troops shortly after the news of the rebel leader’s killing spread. At least a dozen civilians were injured in the clashes, locals and medics said. One among the injured was critical with a gunfire injury.

Authorities did not hand over the bodies of the two slain rebels to their families under a new government policy designed to thwart large-scale funerals that had become a norm and a rallying point for anti-India protests.

The police officer said the slain rebels were buried in a remote mountainous graveyard some 100 kilometers (62 miles) away from the gunfight site, which has also happened to be Naikoo’s native village.

Authorities first blocked mobile internet service, a common Indian tactic in the region when such fighting erupts. As the fighting continued and word spread that Naikoo was trapped, they also stopped mobile phone service.

Authorities say it is necessary to halt cellphone and internet service to prevent anti-India protesters from assembling.

In 2019, the government imposed a monthslong total communication blackout during an unprecedented military crackdown in the strife-torn region.

India has stepped up its counterinsurgency operations across Kashmir in recent months during a coronavirus lockdown. Militants have also continued their attacks on government forces and alleged informants. More than two dozen militants and about a dozen Indian troops were killed in April, the most in any month since August 2019, when India revoked the region’s semi-autonomous status and statehood and imposed direct federal rule.

There also has been almost daily fighting over the last several months along the rugged and mountainous frontier that divides Kashmir between India and Pakistan, leaving soldiers and civilians dead on both sides of Kashmir.

India and Pakistan both claim the territory in its entirety. Most Kashmiris support the rebel goal of uniting the territory, either under Pakistani rule or as an independent country, while also participating in civilian street protests against Indian control.

India accuses Pakistan of arming and training the anti-India rebels. Pakistan denies this, saying it offers only moral and diplomatic support to the militants and to Kashmiris who oppose Indian rule.

Rebels have been fighting Indian rule since 1989. About 70,000 people have been killed in the uprising and the ensuing Indian military crackdown.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Hummm…..

Posted for fair use.....

On Point: Why the Wuhan Virus Threatens the Chinese Communist Party's Imperial Dreams

by Austin Bay
May 5, 2020
If it acts, the Free World has the opportunity to condemn another communist dictatorship to Karl Marx's dustbin of history and avoid a war with a totalitarian superpower circa 2035.

The Chinese Communist Party knows the COVID-19/Wuhan virus pandemic has exposed its imperial war to conquer the world, so it is frantically engaged in psychological and political damage control.

Why? The strategic exposure (a cruel pun) of Beijing's goal occurs at least 10 years too early. If the CCP and Emperor/President/Dictator Xi Jinping just had another decade of gross domestic product growth; of military modernization; of intellectual property theft; of trade rigging; of bribing crooked EU and American politicians and Ivy League academics; of stroking elite U.S. media; of narrative warfare crafted to undermine democracy and erode free speech -- with another 10 to 15 years of unrestricted "all lines of operation" warfare, China could hogtie America and have the military power to dominate Asia and the western Pacific.

If the CCP were to achieve strategic diplomatic, information, military and economic (DIME) power superiority in Asia, the nefarious economic, media, political, academic and cultural lines of operation camouflaging the strategic expansion could be dropped.

Unfortunately, the Wuhan pandemic imperils the CCP's strategic plan to dominate the globe. Yes, call it the Wuhan pandemic. Damn Obama administration toady Ben Rhodes, who, hair on fire, condemns the moniker as racist. Rhodes is a Beltway clerk with heavy political baggage.

Ebola virus? The Ebola is a river in the Congo. Old Lyme (Lyme disease) is in Connecticut. Rhodes spews CCP narrative warfare tropes. That's not slander; that's fact. The disease plaguing us originated in the mainland Chinese city of Wuhan. It's an origin, not an ethnic slur.

Rhodes gives us as an instructive example of a CCP narrative warfare scheme designed to sow doubt and discord. COVID-19 is an anodyne, antiseptic and distanced name -- narrative warfare camouflage, or a distraction to buy time and avoid consequences. Wuhan identifies the perpetrator. The CCP knows anti-Chinese communist sentiment is at its highest level since the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre.
Which exposes another weakness: The CCP faces discord in China, for the Chinese people know who ordered Tiananmen.

The Daily Telegraph in Australia has published an article based on a 15-page analysis documenting the CCP's Wuhan virus lies. My summary: China's government covered up the virus "by silencing" or "disappearing doctors ... destroying evidence ... and refusing to provide live samples to international scientists" developing vaccines. Bottom-line evil: The CCP knowingly endangered other countries.

The Telegraph report supports U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo's ABC News interview during which he said "enormous evidence" exists the pandemic began in a Wuhan bio lab. He added, "China has a history of infecting the world, and they have a history of running substandard laboratories."

Pompeo did not call the virus a bio weapon -- that is, a manmade virus. Incompetence and stupidity by lab personnel likely spread the pathogen.

However, that charge alone undermines the CCP narrative that its system is superior to all others on planet Earth.

The CCP leadership lied about the virus, denied the outbreak and, failing, let it infect the world. CCP calculation: Every other nation must suffer the medical and economic consequences so China's imperial plan does not suffer a serious setback.

Miscalculation: The pandemic has wreaked global, war-level havoc, but the CCP's lie has been exposed.

The world must make the CCP pay. The operational trade advantages and intellectual property theft schemes mainland China has exploited since 1978, and definitely since it joined the World Trade Organization in December 2001, must be closed. Mainland Chinese corporations ultimately serve CCP interests, serving as intelligence and economic assets both domestically and internationally. Beijing changed China's economic structure to comply with WTO requirements. However, the Wuhan virus crisis makes it clear the CCP didn't change.
So penalize Beijing. Do it for global peace circa 2035.

 

jward

passin' thru
Is China’s Stealth Bomber Due to Make an Appearance Soon?

The Xian H-20 has people talking again. Will it show up in November this year?

Robert Farley


By Robert Farley

May 07, 2020









Is China’s Stealth Bomber Due to Make an Appearance Soon?

Credit: Flickr/ Jamie DaviesAdvertisement


Is the Xian H-20 stealth bomber set to make its first public appearance in November? Reports from several outlets indicate yes, and the timeline of the bomber’s development would seem to make the appearance plausible.

The H-20 is a large, subsonic stealth bomber similar in form and appearance to the B-2 Spirit, as well as the projected Russian PAK DA and the B-21 Raider. It will reportedly have an advanced electronics suite similar to that expected on the Raider, and a combat radius that would put U.S. bases in Hawaii and Australia at risk. Specifics of range, payload, and speed remain unknown, but would probably not vary significantly from those of other aircraft in its class.

The H-20 will be the first dedicated strategic bomber developed solely by China. Previously, the PLAAF and the PLAN relied to the Xian H-6 bomber, itself a derivative of the Soviet Tupolev-16. The H-6 has, over the years, been tasked with the same missions as most other strategic bombers, including recon, conventional strike, nuclear strike, and naval interdiction. Given the lifespans of modern bombers, reliance on an old design is hardly unusual; the U.S. continues to fly B-52s, while Russia flies Tu-95s, both of which were designed around the same time as the H-6. Indeed, most analysts expect the H-6 to remain in service even after the H-20 become operational.

The expectation that bombers will contribute to naval operations has increased worldwide, although generally air forces have allocated this mission to older, conventionally shaped bombers rather than newer stealth aircraft. The H-20, using both long and short-ranged weapons, could contribute to China’s anti-access system of systems by extending its range, lethality, and penetration capabilities. Putting US staging areas, such as Pearl Harbor, at risk of strike would complicate U.S. operational and force planning across the Pacific.

The first appearance of the H-20 does not imply that it will enter service anytime soon. The first public flight of the B-2 came eight years before initial service, and the J-20 stealth fighter had its first flight six years before entering regular service. Moreover, the introduction of the H-20 is not obviously a response to any particular U.S. action. Still, given the increasing political tensions between China and the United States, including the very public demonstration flight of two B-1Bs near Taiwan earlier this week, it makes sense for the PLAAF to make obvious its own contribution to China’s long-range strategic defense.

Authors
Robert Farley
Contributing Author
Robert Farley


Robert Farley is an assistant professor at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce.
posted for fair use
 

energy_wave

Has No Life - Lives on TB
Is China’s Stealth Bomber Due to Make an Appearance Soon?

The Xian H-20 has people talking again. Will it show up in November this year?

Robert Farley


By Robert Farley

May 07, 2020









Is China’s Stealth Bomber Due to Make an Appearance Soon?

Credit: Flickr/ Jamie DaviesAdvertisement


Is the Xian H-20 stealth bomber set to make its first public appearance in November? Reports from several outlets indicate yes, and the timeline of the bomber’s development would seem to make the appearance plausible.

The H-20 is a large, subsonic stealth bomber similar in form and appearance to the B-2 Spirit, as well as the projected Russian PAK DA and the B-21 Raider. It will reportedly have an advanced electronics suite similar to that expected on the Raider, and a combat radius that would put U.S. bases in Hawaii and Australia at risk. Specifics of range, payload, and speed remain unknown, but would probably not vary significantly from those of other aircraft in its class.

The H-20 will be the first dedicated strategic bomber developed solely by China. Previously, the PLAAF and the PLAN relied to the Xian H-6 bomber, itself a derivative of the Soviet Tupolev-16. The H-6 has, over the years, been tasked with the same missions as most other strategic bombers, including recon, conventional strike, nuclear strike, and naval interdiction. Given the lifespans of modern bombers, reliance on an old design is hardly unusual; the U.S. continues to fly B-52s, while Russia flies Tu-95s, both of which were designed around the same time as the H-6. Indeed, most analysts expect the H-6 to remain in service even after the H-20 become operational.

The expectation that bombers will contribute to naval operations has increased worldwide, although generally air forces have allocated this mission to older, conventionally shaped bombers rather than newer stealth aircraft. The H-20, using both long and short-ranged weapons, could contribute to China’s anti-access system of systems by extending its range, lethality, and penetration capabilities. Putting US staging areas, such as Pearl Harbor, at risk of strike would complicate U.S. operational and force planning across the Pacific.

The first appearance of the H-20 does not imply that it will enter service anytime soon. The first public flight of the B-2 came eight years before initial service, and the J-20 stealth fighter had its first flight six years before entering regular service. Moreover, the introduction of the H-20 is not obviously a response to any particular U.S. action. Still, given the increasing political tensions between China and the United States, including the very public demonstration flight of two B-1Bs near Taiwan earlier this week, it makes sense for the PLAAF to make obvious its own contribution to China’s long-range strategic defense.

Authors
Robert Farley
Contributing Author
Robert Farley


Robert Farley is an assistant professor at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce.
posted for fair use

The H-20 has wing tip fins that stand straight up like a tail fin. Not very stealthy, imo.
 

jward

passin' thru
S. Korea tests new ballistic missile, one misfires

All Headlines 23:45 May 07, 2020





SEOUL, May 7 (Yonhap) -- South Korea conducted the first test-firing of a new ballistic missile with a longer range and higher payload capability last month, a government source said Thursday.
The test-firing of the Hyunmoo-4 took place at the Anheung test site run by the state-run Agency for Defense Development in Taean on South Korea's west coast, but one of two projectiles that were tested reportedly misfired.
The new missile is presumed to have a range of up to 800 kilometers and be capable of carrying a 2-ton payload.
Its development began following the adoption of revised missile guidelines in 2017 to remove payload restrictions on South Korea's ballistic missiles.
scaaet@yna.co.kr
(END)
 

jward

passin' thru
China and Gulf Security: Conspicuous By Its Absence

Countries from Europe to East Asia are conducting patrols to ensure safe shipping lanes through the Gulf. Why isn’t China taking part?

Bonnie Girard


By Bonnie Girard

May 07, 2020
This article is presented by
Diplomat Risk Intelligence, The Diplomat’s consulting and analysis division. Learn more here
China and Gulf Security: Conspicuous By Its Absence

Sailors from the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy and the U.S. Navy train together during a U.S.-China counter piracy exercise, August 25, 2013.

Credit: U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Gary M. Keen
When China turned down an opportunity to join the United States and other partners in naval patrols to protect its oil tankers in the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz last year, despite the heavy reliance which it now has on Middle East oil, Beijing signaled its confidence that it has nothing to defend against in what for others have been volatile waters.

Since May of last year, Iran has been the main culprit (although Tehran denies it) in a string of attacks on oil shipping in the Gulf and its nearby waters. But those attacks have primarily targeted American, British, and Saudi assets.

Were oil shipping out of the Gulf to be interrupted by armed conflict, China, though highly vulnerable, is likely to feel that its long-term commitments to Iran, including an ostensible $400 billion investment pledge to Iran’s oil and gas sector, are its armor against any foul play that Iran may visit on oil shipments under other flags.

Fortune reported in January of this year that 13.6 million barrels of oil per day are shipped out of the Persian Gulf and through the Strait of Hormuz to shipping routes that cross the globe.

Through that strait sails a major part of the energy that fuels the economies of countries around the globe.

Of the daily 13.6 million barrels that pass through Hormuz, 3.5 million barrels, or nearly 26 percent, go to China, according to the Fortune report.

For China, those 3.5 million barrels a day represent more than 38 percent of its total daily imports of oil. Fortune cited a Wood Mackenzie report that projected that China would import 9.1 million barrels per day in 2020.

A final statistic to ponder is that China is now the largest oil importer in the world, relying on supplies abroad for approximately 75 percent of its crude. So that 38 percent that it brings through the Strait of Hormuz is a big deal.

Given those statistics, therefore, we might expect that China would have a vested interest in making sure that not only its own oil supplies, but also those of other countries, are protected from the escalated threats to tanker shipping in the Gulf, Hormuz, and the Gulf of Oman. Even if Chinese ships are not targeted by Iran on the strength of the two nations’ cozy relationship, a conflict among third-party actors could severely impact shipping for all.

Indeed, two coalitions of several nations each are now actively patrolling the waters of the Strait of Hormuz to ensure the security of oil supplies traversing the often-risky waterway.

France is leading an eight-member coalition of EU countries, which became fully operational in February of this year. Supporting France are Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, and Portugal. Titled the European Maritime Awareness in the Strait of Hormuz (EMASoH), the coalition’s stated aim is “ensuring the freedom of navigation in the Gulf.”

The military component of the EU initiative, Operation Agenor, is based in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), where France has a base in Abu Dhabi. France says the mission of EMASoH is de-escalation of tensions and “is not aimed at any particular state,” a disingenuous denial of the coalition’s goal to counter Iran’s attacks on oil tankers.

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The second coalition, led by the United States, includes Australia, Bahrain, Israel, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom. The grouping’s mission, dubbed Operation Sentinel, is “to promote maritime stability, ensure safe passage, and de-escalate tensions in international waters throughout the Arabian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait (BAM) and the Gulf of Oman.”

Most member states of the EU’s Operation Agenor had been wary of joining a U.S.-led security framework, “fearful of undermining their efforts to save the landmark Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action nuclear deal with Iran that was signed in 2015,” The Defense Post reported last November.

Japan and South Korea, both big buyers of, and heavily dependent on, Persian Gulf oil, are conducting independent patrols to ensure freedom of navigation in the Gulf.

And, to the surprise of many, as recently as last summer, China was contemplating joining the American-led coalition. Ni Jian, the Chinese ambassador to the UAE, said on August 6, 2019 that “If there happens to be a very unsafe situation we will consider having our navy escort our commercial vessels,” Reuters reported. The Chinese Embassy in Abu Dhabi went on to comment, “We are studying the U.S. proposal on Gulf escort arrangements.”

Ultimately, China demurred, and does not seem to have changed its mind.

When Xinhua, the state-run Chinese news service, reported on the French-led EMASoH on January 20, it made no reference to any plans that China itself might have to join in the international effort to safeguard oil shipping in the Middle East.

On the surface, therefore, China seems to have nothing to fear from Iran’s mischief in Middle Eastern waters. But other reasons may factor into China’s decision to either go it alone or stay out of the security framework for the Gulf and its waters altogether.

The first is that China may not be altogether confident of its relationship with Iran. Despite the 25-year comprehensive strategic partnership agreement signed in 2016, to which the purported $400 billion oil and gas sector pledge was added, figures show that the Chinese-Iranian trade relationship has actually deteriorated since 2016. “Exports to Iran have now stabilized at just under $1 billion each month,” writes Jacopo Scita in Bourse & Bazaar. The strategic partnership “included agreements intended to boost bilateral trade to $600 billion within a decade,” Scita writes.

With only six years left in that decade, the ability to achieve $600 billion in trade per year, with volumes at less than $1 billion a month now, seems diminished, if not impossible.

Second, the $400 billion oil pledge from China may itself not be true. Scita writes that Iranian officials and business leaders have variously said that they had not heard about it, and that the news of its existence was “a joke.”

Those two reasons combined suggest that the future of the Chinese-Iranian relationship may hit some turbulence, as both sides grapple with promises made, but potentially not kept, and pledges reported, but possibly not true.

The potential onset of disappointment and displeasure in the relationship is definitely not the time for China to suggest to Iran that it doesn’t trust Tehran to behave in the Gulf, as engaging in security patrols would certainly signal.

China has naval capability in the region, by virtue of its base in Djibouti. That base is in range of the Bab al-Mandab Strait at the mouth of the Red Sea, which controls access to the Suez Canal, and the Strait of Hormuz. China therefore could support a go-alone mission or a coalition of international partners; indeed, the base’s stated purpose is to provide logistical support for China’s ongoing participation in international anti-piracy missions in the Gulf of Aden.

The fact China is refraining from joining or starting its own patrols in the Middle East suggests that it feels its best course is to hold to the status quo. By doing nothing that could appear confrontational to one side, and by refraining from cooperation with those with whom confrontation would almost certainly arise on the other, China is neither committing to reducing risk in the Gulf, nor taking a share of the responsibility should something untoward happen. Governments around the globe would do well to apply the lessons learned from China’s stance on Gulf security to analysis of other aspects of China’s engagement with the world.

 

jward

passin' thru
Discontinued: America’s Continuous Bomber Presence
Peter Layton

May 8, 2020


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Editor’s Note: A version of this article was originally published by The Interpreter, which is published by the Lowy Institute, an independent, nonpartisan think tank based in Sydney. War on the Rocks is proud to be publishing select articles from The Interpreter.

Since 2004, the U.S. Air Force has rotated heavy bombers through the Western Pacific island of Guam. But no more. The continuous bomber presence, which started in President George W. Bush’s first term and continued through President Barack Obama’s two terms, has now been abruptly terminated in this fourth year of President Donald Trump. The world hasn’t changed — the United States has. This appears another step in its withdrawal from the world in general, and the Western Pacific in particular.

For the last 16 years, B-52, and more recently B-1 and B-2, bombers have been deployed to Guam to undertake the descriptively titled Bomber Assurance and Deterrence mission (BAAD). “Assurance” in the sense of reassuring worried allies, partners and friends that the United States is firmly committed to the Western Pacific region. “Deterrence” in the sense of being well-positioned to be able to quickly take swift retaliatory action if any nation decided to attack a U.S. ally, partner, or friend. The threat of such Air Force bomber strikes would hopefully deter any aggressor from military adventurism. Having the bombers at Guam, deep in the Western Pacific region, was a highly visible reminder to all of American capabilities to apply considerable military power at short notice, to both reassure and deter.

Various rationales are advanced for the bombers’ sudden withdrawal, most based on then–U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis’ 2018 National Defense Strategy. The rationales draw attention to this document’s direction that U.S. force deployments must be “operationally unpredictable” to “challenge competitors by maneuvering them into unfavorable positions, frustrating their efforts, precluding their options while expanding our own, and forcing them to confront conflict under adverse conditions.” The dense military doctrinal language highlights that this guidance is really meant for the tactical and operational levels of war, not the strategic level. The guidance arguably is being misused.


The rationales given are excuses rather than reasons. When he was Defense Secretary from 2017–2018, Mattis did not withdraw the bombers, even though he had ample time to do so. Indeed, the use now made of the phrase “operationally unpredictable” appears out of context. The full sentence, “Be strategically predictable, but operationally unpredictable,” highlights that it refers to behaving differently at the strategic level and at the tactical and operational levels.
In the BAAD acronym, the first half of the bomber’s strategic mission was “assurance” — to reassure everyone about America’s commitment to the region. Suddenly withdrawing the bombers sends the opposite message. The unilateral ending of the continuous bomber presence without replacement is telling U.S. allies, partners, and friends that it is strategically unpredictable. They may now be left in the lurch at a moment’s notice.

This message is made worse by arguments from the RAND Corporation and other U.S. analysts that America is withdrawing the bombers because Guam has become overly vulnerable to Chinese military power. This suggests China is now regionally superior and is forcing U.S. combat forces out of the Western Pacific. The United States, instead of investing in defending Guam, is going home. The problem is that allies, partners, and friends can’t just leave — their home is the Western Pacific.
The move is also unusual in terms of BAAD’s second strategic mission, “deterrence,” convincing potential aggressors not to attack friendly regional nations on threat of swift retaliatory punishment. The official statement implies the bombers might come back for short periods to deter potential regional aggressors at some time in the future if needed. It is here where the impacts of ending the continuous bomber presence become really apparent.

The distance from the bombers’ Midwestern American airbases to Guam is about 11,000–13,000 kilometers, some 13–16 hours flying time and requiring support from KC-135 tanker aircraft en route. Under the continuous bomber presence, there were bomber maintenance personnel in Guam to provide support, but now these will need to be flown in separately, adding time and complexity. Realistically, to return bombers to Guam and commence combat operations would take about a week. An aggressor would by then be in place and waiting for the bombers.
Such constraints highlight that in the future, Air Force bombers exercising with regional air forces and patrolling trouble spots like the East or South China Sea will become rare. The costs of deploying to Guam to just get them into the region to start beginning one-off exercises and patrols will be prohibitive. Missions flown from the Midwest and recovering back there are more publicity stunts than operationally realistic. The recent 32-hour round-trip mission flown by two B-1s with KC-135 tanker support is an example. Under continuous bomber presence, multiple exercises and patrols were carried out each time a new bomber detachment was in situ, thus maximizing the operational training value while minimizing deployment costs.

For bombers, Guam is a most useful central location. For example, bombers from Guam used to exercise regularly with Australia, flying into and out of Darwin, Australia only 3,300 kilometers away (about 4-5 hours flying time) and as such not requiring tanker support. Singapore (4,700 kilometers from Guam) and Japan (3,300 kilometers) are similarly easily accessible. The South China Sea is less than 4,000 kilometers. However, if you have to first fly from the Midwest to Guam, this makes regional training and patrol missions impractical and unreasonable.
Perhaps the worst aspect of ending the continuous bomber presence is the remarkably poor timing of the announcement. In the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, China is increasingly flexing its geopolitical muscle in the Western Pacific, into the South China Sea, and now rather worryingly around Taiwan. The symbolism of the Chinese sending their brand-new aircraft carrier to exercise in the South China Sea while the United States simultaneously returns its only long-range bombers in the Pacific to America is striking.

The public withdrawal of the bombers seems to have been regrettably timed to reinforce regional perceptions of a rising China and a withdrawing America. The United States now appears not to be competing with China, but rather declining to race.
The end of the continuous bomber presence will be well received in Beijing, Moscow, and Pyongyang. In contrast, the continuous bomber presence’s demise sends a clear strategic message to U.S. Pacific allies. Bit by bit, little by little, America is leaving.


Dr. Peter Layton is a Visiting Fellow at the Griffith Asia Institute, Griffith University. A retired RAAF Group Captain, Peter has extensive experience in force structure development and taught national security strategy at the U.S. National Defense University. He has written extensively on defense and security matters, and was awarded the U.S. Exceptional Public Service medal for force structure planning work. In 2006, he won the RUSI Trench Gascoigne Essay Prize for original writing on contemporary issues of defense and international security. He is the author of the book Grand Strategy.

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Middle East
Libya: Turkish strategy leaves Haftar on the defensive

The tides have turned in Libya's conflict as Turkish intervention has tilted the balance of power. What options do Khalifa Haftar and his foreign backers now have?


A fighter of the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) fires his gun out of an apartment window in Tripoli, Libya


The conflict in Libya has entered a new phase with Khalifa Haftar's eastern forces suffering significant reversals due to a new Turkish-backed strategy.

Since 2014, Libya has been split between two rival factions and their governments in the east and west. In April last year, Haftar and his militias under the banner of the Libyan National Army (LNA) began a major push from the east to take Tripoli, with air support from the UAE and mercenaries from Russia, among others.

Read more: Khalifa Haftar's repressive proto-state and the 'myth' of stability

In recent months however, Turkey's technological and tactical backing for the militias aligned with Fayez Serraj's Government of National Accord (GNA) in the west has seen Haftar's advance stopped and even reversed in some strategic areas.

"There has been a shift in the conflict — in the general paradigm in Libya and the balance of power — and it was quite abrupt really," said Tarek Megerisi, a policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations.

Turkish strategy 'strangles' Haftar's war

Turkey signed a maritime and military deal with the GNA late last year, and it started bearing fruit in April, with GNA forces making significant gains over the last month.

Part of that strategy was installing new air defense systems, which allowed Turkish drones to start a major campaign of air strikes, crippling Haftar's ability to resupply and the UAE's own drone strikes.

Then GNA ground forces began making sweeping gains, reestablishing control over the west coast from Tunisia to the GNA's seat in Tripoli and waging assaults on the well-defended bases Haftar had used to stage his siege of the city, at al-Watiya and Tarhuna.

A map of Libya showing what territory is controlled by GNA and LNA forces


Bolstered by some 4,000 Syrian mercenaries, GNA forces have also made slow but steady progress on the Tripoli front. Turkey's intervention has shown it can match the UAE in Libya and will not allow Haftar to succeed in taking the city, analysts say.

"If everything goes on like this, Turkey should be able to strangle the war effort of Khalifa Haftar in Tripolitania," said Jalel Harchaoui, a Libya research fellow at the Netherlands-based Clingendael Institute, referring to the historic western region around Tripoli.

Few options remain

The escalation has left Haftar and his backers without an apparent way to respond.

As more accurate LNA-backed air strikes have been curbed, Libya observers have noted a rise in indiscriminate shelling from the ground in Tripoli.



While a UN report confirmed on Thursday there are as many as 1,200 Russian and 2,000 Syrian mercenaries fighting for Haftar, bringing in more, along with further heavy-duty weapons, will be difficult because they can't physically get to the frontlines without being hit, Megerisi said.

Aside from Haftar shifting his focus further to the east, around Misrata, "the only other option would be to directly intervene with the UAE's air force — their own F-16s — which would be a massive escalation that can't go unresponded to by Turkey," he said.

Political solutions remain distant

Now on the back foot militarily, Haftar has rushed to make gains on the political front.

Late last month he attempted to double down on his authority in eastern Libya by declaring himself the country's ruler by "popular mandate," thereby sidelining the nominal eastern government and paving his way to take further control of the country's massive oil revenues.

Khalifa Haftar
Haftar's forces have suffered painful setbacks recently

That may backfire on him by giving potential rivals in the east the impression he is panicked, opening him up to challenges to his rule, Megerisi said.

Overriding the civilian government in Benghazi may also work against Haftar in presenting himself as a possible alternative to the UN-recognized GNA as an international partner. But at the same time, his backers in France and the UAE have worked to paint Turkey as the source of all Libya's problems, Megerisi said.

Those dynamics have also meant that EU efforts to enforce a UN arms embargo haven't amounted to much. Both sides have flouted the restrictions, and an EU naval operation to stem the flow of weapons has been criticized as neglecting UAE shipments by air and land.



Watch video 01:53

Violated on a daily basis: the Libyan ceasefire

While Haftar continues to enjoy support from a wide range of states and Turkey weighs in more heavily, a clear division between the east and west looks set to deepen, leading to a new stage of "slow, grinding conflict," said Harchaoui.

"He's switching to a new phase, which is to get help from the UAE to discredit the internationally recognized government, because now, Turkey is likely there to stay."

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  • Date 07.05.2020
  • Author Tom Allinson
 

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Jihadist groups in Sahel exploiting pandemic to step up attacks: UN chief

AFP May 8, 2020

United Nations (United States) (AFP) - UN General Secretary Antonio Guterres has warned that jihadist groups in the Sahel area of North Africa are exploiting the coronavirus pandemic to step up attacks, according to documents seen by AFP.

The United Nations chief called for better coordination among the various anti-jihadist forces fighting an array of armed groups.

"Terrorist groups are taking advantage of the COVID-19 pandemic to intensify their attacks and to challenge state authority throughout the sub-region," said Guterres.

He noted the problem was particularly acute in the area known as the Liptako-Gourma triangle, a border zone between Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso.

"Evidence also suggests that there is increased coordination and cooperation between some of the terrorist groups operating throughout the Sahel, from Mauritania to the Lake Chad basin," he said.

"The dire situation in the Sahel region is further compounded by the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic in Africa, with terrorist groups exploiting it for both propaganda and action purposes, with potential grave impact on the region," the secretary general added.

Because of the pandemic, which led to the border between Mali and Mauritania being shut, operations of the so-called G5-Sahel anti-jihadist force have been put off.

The G5 is a 5,000-strong force with troops from Chad, Burkina Faso, Niger, Mali and Mauritania cooperating with French troops to combat a growing Islamist insurgency.

"The impact of the pandemic on the ability of the Joint Force and international forces to conduct operations in the coming months is difficult to ascertain at this point and will need to be carefully and continuously assessed," said Guterres.

The secretary general's report on recent security developments in the Sahel region stressed that "the number of people who died from terrorist attacks has increased five-fold since 2016, with more than 4,000 deaths reported in 2019 alone as compared with an estimated 770 deaths in 2016."

Since November the reality on the ground "was marked by a deterioration of the security situation in Mali and the Sahel region, characterized by a rise in increasingly complex terrorist attacks, primarily targeting armed and security forces," the report warned.

Guterres called for "stronger coordination between the different forces and clarity with regard to command and control."

Besides the various national armies and the G5 force deployed in the Sahel area, the region also has a 5,100-strong French force and a 15,000-member UN peacekeeping group operating there.

There is also a new international force being launched after a French initiative and dubbed Takuba, which groups special forces from different countries.
 

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Satellite images reveal North Korea is building a giant facility which could hold nuclear missiles capable of hitting the United States

tcolson@businessinsider.com (Thomas Colson)
,
Business InsiderMay 7, 2020

nuclear north korea

nuclear north korea
Getty
  • Satellite imagery suggests North Korea is building a new facility near Pyongyang Airport large enough to store all of its nuclear missiles.
  • The Center for Strategic and International Studies think tank say that the facility, 17 miles north-west of Pyongyang is "nearing completion" and "is almost certainly related to North Korea's expanding ballistic missiles program."
  • The facility is large enough to hold North Korea's Hwasong-15 intercontinental ballistic missile, capable of hitting the United States.
  • The development comes after talks between Kim Jong Un, the North Korean leader, and Donald Trump, the US president, broke down last year.
  • Visit Business Insider's homepage for more stories.
North Korea has almost completed construction of a giant facility large enough to hold nuclear missiles capable of reaching the United States, according to a new analysis of satellite photography.

The facility "is almost certainly related to North Korea's expanding ballistic missiles program," according to the analysis by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington-based think tank.

One building within the facility "is large enough to accommodate an elevated Hwasong-15 intercontinental ballistic missile and, therefore, the entirety of North Korea's known ballistic missile variants," the report states.

CSIS suggests the facility is located 11 miles north-west of Pyongyang and features an underground storage facility large enough to house all known North Korean ballistic missiles as well as their support vehicles. The site's existence had not previously been disclosed.

It also features an "unusually large" covered rail terminal, which could be used to transport missiles and supporting equipment, and interconnected buildings designed for drive-through access, the report states.
Sil li Ballistic Missile Support Facility 03

Sil li Ballistic Missile Support Facility 03
Maxar Technologies

The site is also relatively close to ballistic component manufacturing plants near Pyongyang.

"Taken as a whole, these characteristics suggest that this facility is likely designed to support ballistic missile operations and for the interim is identified as the Sil-li (신리) Ballistic Missile Support Facility," said Joseph Bermudez, the report's author.

"As such, it is another component of the North Korean ballistic missile infrastructure that has been undergoing both modernization and expansion during the past 10 years."

North Korea debuted its most powerful ballistic missile, the Hwasong-15, in 2017, which experts say could reach "any part of the continental United States."

Donald. Trump has since met with Kim Jong Un on three occasions as he tried to broker a deal designed to halt North Korea's nuclear missile program.

But talks between the two powers broke down in February last year at a summit in Hanoi, Vietnam.

Trump was said to have handed Kim Jong Un a piece of paper which included a blunt call for the transfer of Pyongyang's nuclear weapons and bomb fuel to the United States in return for the lifting of economic sanctions.

A lunch between the two leaders was subsequently cancelled, and a North Korean official subsequently accused the US of issuing "gangster-like" demands, heralding a significant cooling in relations since.

Read the original article on Business Insider
 

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News
French cajole Chadian partners to continue counterterrorism fight


by Steve Balestrieri
10 hours ago

France and the countries of G5 Sahel — Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Mauritania — have requested that Chad, also a member of the coalition, continues to take part in it. The G5 countries also “highlighted the importance of sending a Chadian battalion to the Three-Borders area as soon as possible,” according to a joint statement issued by G5 Sahel and France after a meeting last week.

The “Three Borders” area, where Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso meet, has suffered a tremendous amount of violence by Islamist militants that have pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. The effects of climate change have also been a factor in the violence as nomadic Fulani peoples have seen their lands disappear because of drought and overpopulation and have been drifting into other lands, taking them by force.

A misunderstanding may be at the base of the request to Chad to remain involved in the G5. Back in mid-April, after heavy fighting between Chadian military forces and Boko Haram terrorists in the Lake Chad region where 98 Chadian soldiers were killed, Chadian President Idriss Deby said, “From today, no Chadian soldier will take part in an external military operation.”

However, a statement released through the Chadian Foreign Affairs ministry said President Deby’s remarks had been misunderstood and he only meant the army would no longer conduct unilateral operations beyond its borders in the Lake Chad Basin.

“It was never a question for Chad of disengaging from the (Boko Haram) Multinational Joint Task Force or from the G5 Sahel joint force, much less from (MINUSMA),” the ministry’s statement said.

Chad’s military plays a significant role in the 5,000-strong G5 coalition military force, which is led by France. The French have been active in the Sahel since launching Operation Barkhane to counter the active and violent Jihadist insurgency in Mali in 2012.

French officials recognize the importance of Chad to the coalition. Chad’s counter-terrorism efforts have played a major part in the G5’s efforts to combat the extremism that has wracked the region. Chad’s military is among the most effective of the G5 thanks to its significant operational and combat experience.

The added factor of the coronavirus is compounding matters for the countries involved. With little oversight and government presence in the region, the jihadist insurgents have tried to take advantage of the virus to gather more support and attack isolated government outposts and towns.

Following one such attack in late March by Boko Haram terrorists that killed 98 Chadian soldiers, it was feared by many in the region that Chad would shift its priorities and focus its resources in the Lake Chad Basin. The basin is where Islamist groups are increasingly active and have the strength to attack in force.

While Boko Haram jihadists operating in Chad are a pressing concern for the government, violence in the Sahel threatens the security and stability of all the neighboring nations and could easily spread.

That is why France was so concerned about the possibility of Chad pulling back some of its support in the Sahel region.

France has also created the European Special Operations Task Force Takuba. The European Force is tasked with training and accompanying Sahel host nations’ troops in an effort to eradicate the violence on the ground. But it will take more than military force to end the cycle of violence in the Sahel.

With thousands of people killed and millions being displaced by drought and the fighting, the situation will not be fixed easily. Political and economic assistance is needed to stop the root causes of violence in the region.

More from SOFREP

Joint counterterrorism operation kills over 120 terrorists in the Sahel
Joint counterterrorism operation kills over 120 terrorists in the Sahel


Deadly attack on Niger military base leaves at least 73 dead
Deadly attack on Niger military base leaves at least 73 dead


French Commando seriously wounded battling ISIS in Mali
French Commando seriously wounded battling ISIS in Mali


Doing the good work: French troops kill more than 30 Jihadists
Doing the good work: French troops kill more than 30 Jihadists


Islamic Militants attack Nigerien base, kill 25 soldiers
Islamic Militants attack Nigerien base, kill 25 soldiers


Terrorists In Burkina Faso attack town and military base, kill 31 women
Terrorists In Burkina Faso attack town and military base, kill 31 women
 

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Sahel: Africom says it lost drone in Niger due to technical failure

Posted On May 7, 2020


US-drone.gif


1161 issue: week ending 7 May 2020

Niamey, May 7, 2020 – The US military in Niger said Thursday they had lost a second drone in two months, both through technical failure rather than from hostile action in the conflict-torn country. “A… remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) was lost near Agadez, Niger, April 23,” US Africa Command said in an email to AFP. “U.S. forces secured the RPA on April 24. Reports indicate the RPA experienced mechanical failure. The RPA was not lost due to any hostile action,” it said.

A drone crashed in the Agadez region on February 29, the US military announced after that loss, saying that the incident was also due to mechanical failure. According to the website Military Times, the drone lost in February was an MQ-1 Predator, a long-endurance aircraft.

US Africa Command operate a specialised drone base in Agadez that provides them with a major surveillance platform in the Sahel, where fragile governments backed by France are battling a jihadist insurgency. The US has also flown drones from near Niamey, the capital of Niger, which is in the southwest of the country. Niger has given the US permission to base armed drones on its soil. The US presence in Niger was revealed on October 4, 2017, when four US soldiers and five Nigerien troops were killed in an ambush by fighters affiliated with the Islamic State group.

The Agadez base was completed last year at a cost around $100 million. Earlier this year, its closure was reported to be among options being considered by the Pentagon to reduce the US mililtary presence in Africa. Washington has some 7,000 special forces on rotation in Africa carrying out joint operations with national forces against jihadists, particularly in Somalia.

AFP
 

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Mexican Cartels Along U.S. Border Have Access to Grenades, Mortars, and Rocket-Propelled Grenades, Seizure Data Reveal
Cartel Mortar
Mexico's National Guard
Ildefonso Ortiz and Brandon Darby8 May 202057

2:56

Recent seizures by authorities in two Mexican border states demonstrate how cartels still have access to mortars, rocket-propelled grenades, and other explosives as violent turf wars spread terror in large swaths of the nation.

In Chihuahua this week, Mexican National Guardsmen seized 25 grenades and 15,000 rounds of ammunition hidden in a pickup with Colorado license plates. The driver was a U.S. citizen traveling along the Ciudad Juarez-Chihuahua Highway when authorities pulled him over.
Aseguramos en #Chihuahua a un ciudadano estadounidense quien trasladaba en compartimentos ocultos de una camioneta, alrededor de 15 mil cartuchos útiles y 25 granadas. Con ello prevenimos la violencia generada por el uso de las armas. #JusticiaYPaz pic.twitter.com/GbQf4fIshs
— Guardia Nacional (@GN_MEXICO_) May 8, 2020

In another bust, National Guardsmen in the municipality of San Buenaventura spotted a suspicious vehicle on dirt roads. As the troops approached, the driver sped away and managed to escape. Soon after, authorities found the vehicle in a rural field. A search turned up two rocket-propelled grenades, a disassembled launcher, and a fragmentation grenade.

In the days prior to that seizure, rival groups of gunmen clashed in the region contested by La Linea faction of the Juarez Cartel and allies of the Sinaloa Cartel.

In another seizure this week in the border city of Tijuana, Mexican authorities used police dogs to search a package shipping company. One of the dogs alerted to a package sent from Mexico state containing a working mortar round.

The three seizures in areas controlled or disputed by factions of the Sinaloa Cartel demonstrate organization’s capabilities to acquire and move restricted military equipment inaccessible to the citizens of the U.S. or Mexico.

Ildefonso Ortiz is an award-winning journalist with Breitbart Texas. He co-founded Breitbart Texas’ Cartel Chronicles project with Brandon Darby and senior Breitbart management. You can follow him on Twitter and on Facebook. He can be contacted at Iortiz@breitbart.com.
Brandon Darby is the managing director and editor-in-chief of Breitbart Texas. He co-founded Breitbart Texas’ Cartel Chronicles project with Ildefonso Ortiz and senior Breitbart management. Follow him on
Twitter and Facebook. He can be contacted at bdarby@breitbart.com.
Tony Aranda from Breitbart Texas’ Cartel Chronicles project contributed to this report



Border / Cartel Chronicles
 

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Spain: police arrest man suspected of planning terror attack
Spanish police say they have arrested a Moroccan man suspected of planning a terror attack in the name of the Islamic State group during Spain’s coronavirus crisis
By The Associated Press
May 8, 2020, 5:43 AM
1 min read

BARCELONA, Spain -- Spanish police arrested a Moroccan man on Friday suspected of planning a terror attack in the name of the Islamic State group during Spain’s coronavirus crisis.

Spain’s Civil Guard said that the arrest carried out in Barcelona was aided by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation and Morocco’s state security forces.

The Civil Guard said that they had been watching the suspect for four years but that his “process of radicalization” had been accelerated during Spain’s lockdown that started in mid-March to control its COVID-19 outbreak.

Investigators suspected the man had been motivated by calls made by IS for followers to carry out attacks in their countries of residence. Police said the suspect had made “public declarations” of his allegiance to IS and hatred for Western countries on social media.

Investigators feared he was planning an attack, perhaps using a knife or with a vehicle, in Barcelona after observing him breaking virus confinement rules to move around the city, possibly searching for a target.
 

jward

passin' thru
Israel steps up military campaign against Iran’s military entrenchment in Syria

By Joe Truzman | May 4, 2020 | Joe.Truzman@longwarjournal.org | @Jtruzmah


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Destroyed storage facilities near Palmyra, Syria (Planet imagery analysis by AuroraIntel)
Over recent weeks, Israel has intensified its military operations against suspected Iran-backed militia positions in Syria. Airstrikes against areas in southern and central Syria were reported on an almost weekly basis from the end of March through the end of April.
The latest round of airstrikes started March 31 when Israel Defense Forces’ (IDF) jets purportedly struck the Shayrat airbase located 15 miles southeast of the city of Homs. Post-strike satellite imagery of the airbase revealed the base’s runways were targeted in the attack. It is believed the intent was to temporarily disrupt Iran’s weapons transfer operation at the airbase.
As previously detailed in FDD’s Long War Journal, two weeks after the Shayrat strike, a missile struck a Jeep in the Syrian town of Jdaidit Yabws, near the Lebanese border. It is suspected the vehicle carried precision guided missile components from Iran intended for Hezbollah in Lebanon.
On April 20, Syria’s state-run news agency (SANA) reported Syrian air defense units opened fire and shot down several missiles launched by Israeli warplanes near Palmyra. Additionally, satellite imagery suggests the airstrikes were successful in destroying warehouses that may have contained missiles or advanced weapons.
A week after the airstrikes in central Syria, the Mezzah military airport near Damascus came under attack. Analysis of satellite imagery indicated a section of the airport suspected of being an underground Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) facility was attacked.
Furthermore, on the night of April 30, explosions were reported in Quneitra, located in southern Syria abutting the Golan. Syrian state-run media blamed the attack on Israel.
“Enemy Israeli helicopters attacked with several missiles from the airspace of the occupied Syrian-Golan against locations in the southern region and material damage was limited,” read the statement from SANA.

Israel’s role in the conflict
The IDF has operated against Iran and its proxy militias in Syria for the better half of the last decade. The conflict intensified when Hezbollah and other Iran-backed groups started military operations near the Golan Heights.
As fighting between Syria’s allies, anti-government rebels and ISIS flared-up along the Golan during the civil war, spillover from fighting on the Syrian side triggered Israeli retaliation.
In a documented example, Liwa Fatemiyoun (Iran-backed Afghan militia) claimed the IDF targeted their position as it conducted an anti-ISIS operation near the Golan.
It is also noteworthy that the IDF conducted operations against Hezbollah during the civil war. Senior members such as Jihad Mughniyeh (son of Imad Mughniyeh) and Samir Kuntar, were killed by IDF airstrikes as they operated in Syrian territory.
After the Syrian government and its allies successfully reclaimed territories it lost in southern Syria, Israel adjusted its strategy. It was forced to step up its efforts of denying Iran the transfer of advanced weapons to its proxies. Israel also had to thwart the attempt to turn the Israel-Syrian border into a front for Iran-backed militias, as Iran had successfully done in Lebanon with Hezbollah.

Military pressure has not deterred Iran
Iran has not been discouraged from achieving its goals in Syria. Years of advanced weapons transfers followed by Israeli airstrikes and attacks along the Syrian-Golan bolsters this assessment.
Undeterred by Iran’s activity in Syria, Israel’s government remains confident that it will succeed in removing Iran from Syria.
“We have moved on from blocking Iran’s entrenchment in Syria to muscling it out of there, and we shall not stop. We won’t allow further strategic threats to sprout just across our borders without taking decisive action,” Israel’s outgoing Defense Minister Naftali Bennett stated April 28.
It is unlikely Israel will be able to remove Iran from Syria by airstrikes alone. Iran has entrenched itself in Syria having heavily invested in its government financially and militarily.
For Israel’s objective of removing Iran and its proxies from Syria to be achieved, Iran must be forced to believe that its military interests in Syria are outweighed by its cost. This is why the effort, primarily led by the U.S. of imposing sanctions on Iran is important to Israel. The effect of sanctions including Israeli military action in Syria could lead Iran to rethink its current strategy.
Israel will continue its military operations as long it views Iran as a threat in Syria. The two foes have seemingly reached a point of inevitable wide-scale conflict.
It is the assessment of FDD’s Long War Journal that if both sides continue their current military strategies, the risk of a breakout of conflict between Iran, its Shiite proxies and Israel is substantial.


Joe Truzman is a contributor to FDD's Long War Journal.

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jward

passin' thru
Analysis: Islamic State claims al-Qaeda started a war in West Africa

By Thomas Joscelyn and Caleb Weiss | May 8, 2020 | tjoscelyn@hotmail.com |

The Islamic State claims in the latest edition of its weekly Al-Naba newsletter that al-Qaeda started a “war” against the so-called caliphate’s men in West Africa. Independent reporting confirms that the two sides have clashed in recent weeks.


Al-Naba’s editors say that al-Qaeda’s men “never miss the chance for treachery,” as they recently “started a war against” the caliphate’s men in the middle of a “raging Crusader campaign.” In other words, the Islamic State accuses al-Qaeda of launching attacks on its fighters as they were battling the “Crusader” France and its allies.


Al-Qaeda’s branch in West Africa, the Group for Support of Islam and Muslims (or “JNIM”), has a significant presence in Mali and the surrounding countries. JNIM grew out of an al-Qaeda effort to embed the jihadist’s cause within the fabric of local movements and organizations. And Al-Naba’s authors accuse JNIM of working with local parties to get the upper hand in the intra-jihadist rivalry.


Al-Naba’s authors write that al-Qaeda’s men “organized their armed movements and fronts in northern Mali” from “all kinds” of groups, including both those who are opposed to the “apostate government” and those who are “loyal to it.” Al-Qaeda has even worked with the “idolatrous” “tribal movements,” according to Al-Naba’s contributors.


The self-declared caliphate bristles that JNIM “accepted an invitation by the apostate Malian government to negotiate and to set themselves up as guards of the borders of Algeria and Mauritania.”


This is similar to the Islamic State’s criticisms of the Taliban, which negotiated a withdrawal deal with the Americans and claims to prevent jihadists from using Afghan soil to threaten other countries.


Al-Naba’s editors also accuse the “Crusader campaign in the region” of failing to “target [JNIM’s] soldiers or the areas in which they are stationed.” This again parallels the Islamic State’s critique of the jihad in Afghanistan, as the caliphate’s men accuse the Taliban of focusing on them, while pledging not to fight the “Crusaders.”


Al-Naba makes it clear that its criticisms are pointed directly at JNIM’s leadership, namely Iyad Ag Ghaly and Amadou Kouffa. Both of these “apostate leaders” began planning their war against their jihadist rivals “long ago,” the weekly newsletter’s authors claims. JNIM is attempting to counter the “Rogue Khawarij,” Al-Naba’s authors write — this dismissive phrasing is intended to undermine al-Qaeda’s claim that the Islamic State is filled with Kharijites, or extremists.


Ghaly is the overall leader of JNIM. When announcing JNIM’s formation in 2017, he affirmed his allegiance to the emir of AQIM (Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud, a.k.a. Abdelmalek Droukdel), al-Qaeda’s global emir (Ayman al-Zawahiri), as well as the Taliban’s overall leader (Haibatullah Akhundzada).


JNIM has said it is willing to negotiate with the Malian government – as Al-Naba claims – but only on the condition that French forces are withdrawn from the country and the surrounding region. This is basically the same negotiating tactic employed by the Taliban, which secured an American commitment to withdraw from Afghanistan before “intra-Afghan” talks have taken place. Of course, ejecting Western forces from the region greatly increases the jihadists’ chances of success. Both JNIM and the Taliban seek to build or resurrect Islamic emirates in their respective countries.


Al-Naba’s article is consistent with the same criticisms levied by the Islamic State’s Yemen “province” in a video released in late April. In that video, the Islamic State’s men accused Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) of working with “apostates.” The video’s producers critiqued the Taliban’s negotiations with the U.S., its supposed commitment to prevent attacks against the “Crusaders,” and its ongoing alliance with al-Qaeda. Similar motifs appear in the latest Al-Naba.


Independent reporting on the fighting in West Africa


The Al-Naba article was published in the wake of a French offensive in the Liptako-Gourma area of Mali and Burkina Faso.


Since early April, the French have conducted several operations targeting the Islamic State in this area. It was during this same timeframe that Al-Naba alleges the French avoided operations against JNIM.


A French Foreign Legionnaire was recently killed by an IED as part of this offensive. That blast was also claimed by the Islamic State in Al-Naba.


The Islamic State claims to have conducted several attacks against al-Qaeda’s men in the Sahel, from northern and central Mali to northern Burkina Faso. In central Mali, the Islamic State reports that its men “repulsed two attacks” by al-Qaeda in the Mopti region.


Al-Naba’s authors specifically mentions the area near Nampala, which sits close to the borders with Mauritania, and the areas “east of Macina” in the Segou region.


Local media has reported intense fighting between the jihadist groups in these same areas over the last few weeks. In early April, clashes were reported in the localities of Dialloube, Koubi, Djantakai, and Nigua in the Mopti region. And in March, fighting between the two was reported near the Mauritanian town of Fassala, which sits on the border with Mali.


This area has also seen defections from JNIM to the Islamic State in the past. Earlier this year, a unit belonging to JNIM in the Nampala area defected and pledged loyalty to the Islamic State’s new emir, Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi.


Not long after, other Fulani members were also alleged to have gone to the so-called caliphate. And in 2017, another group of Fulani fighters loyal to al-Qaeda’s Katibat Macina also defected in central Mali.


The Islamic State’s media team also discusses fighting in the border regions between Mali and Burkina Faso. In the first claim, the group mentions that after the alleged “repulsed attacks” in Mopti, further clashes south of Boulikessi, Mali “left behind more than 35 dead and a number of wounded” among al-Qaeda’s ranks.


Much like the infighting in Mali’s Mopti region, battles have also been widely reported in the Liptako-Gourma area of Mali and Burkina Faso. On April 13, the Islamic State launched an attack on JNIM’s men near the locality of Tin-Tabakat.


On April 20th, a firefight was recorded near the locality of Pobe inside Burkina Faso’s Soum province, while another occurred in Keraboule in the Koutougou department of the same province. Further battles in Arbinda and Nassoumbou have also been alleged.


On April 18, however, one of the largest battles between the two was reported in the Ndaki area of Mali’s Gossi commune. According to local media, a large contingent of JNIM fighters targeted the Islamic State’s men in four different towns in the area.


Malian and Burkinabe media have stated as many as 40 vehicles were in the JNIM convoy. The Islamic State appears to confirm these events, albeit on a different date.


According to the Islamic State, JNIM targeted Islamic State positions on the Mali-Burkina Faso border area with “dozens of motorcycles and vehicles” on April 10. The jihadist group alleges that its men thwarted the assault after gaining the momentum following a suicide car bomb against al-Qaeda’s men.


It also claims to have captured 40 motorcycles and three vehicles, a claim that is generally consistent with what was reported in local media. However, it is unclear if this is indeed the same event given the discrepancies in the date.


Lastly, Al-Naba also reports a firefight with JNIM between Mali’s northern Gao region near the village of In-Tillit and the village of Aghay in Niger’s Tillaberi region on April 16. The Islamic State reportedly killed 4 members of JNIM and captured 3 others.


Furthermore, the Islamic State accuses JNIM of establishing checkpoints in the area to prevent oil tankers from providing fuel to the Islamic State. Al-Naba also provides a story that, on April 18, JNIM arrested several truck drivers for allegedly selling oil to the rival jihadist group.


As retaliation, the Islamic State’s men attempted to confront JNIM near In-Tillit, but al-Qaeda’s forces reportedly fled. FDD’s Long War Journal has not independently confirmed this story.


While this clash itself does not appear to have been confirmed by local media, its occurrence would not be surprising. The Islamic State has long had a presence inside Mali’s Gao and Menaka regions, where various attacks have been claimed by the group.


The Islamic State also fought a full-fledged war against two Malian-backed Tuareg militias in the nearby Menaka region in the past. And in March, the UN also noted that the Islamic State increased its presence inside Gao earlier this year.



Clashes or other tensions between JNIM and the Islamic State’s men have occurred sporadically since last fall, with the tempo occurring more rapidly in recent weeks.


JNIM attempted to mitigate this situation earlier this year with a series of booklets addressed to Islamic State-sympathetic members of its own organization and the Islamic State itself.


JNIM’s call for unity has so far fallen on deaf ears.





Thomas Joscelyn is a Senior Fellow at Foundation for Defense of Democracy and the Senior Editor for The Long War Journal. Caleb Weiss is an intern at Foundation for Defense of Democracy and a contributor to The Long War Journal.

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jward

passin' thru
Manufacturing of multiple ICBMs detected in N. Korea, say U.S. authorities
Posted May. 09, 2020 07:56,

Updated May. 09, 2020 07:56


음성듣기



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Amid the prolonged suspension of U.S.-North Korea denuclearization talks, it was reported on Friday that multiple intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) have been newly manufactured in Sain-ri, Pyongsong in North Korea.

It has been reported that the U.S. authorities have detected the assembly and completion of ICBMs at an automobile plant in Sain-ri, along with a transporter erector launcher (TEL). Sain-ri is where North Korea launched ICBMs in 2017. “We are keeping an eye on future developments,” said a member of the U.S. government. “Multiple possibilities, such as ICBM test launches or a military parade to showcase the country’s power, are under review.”

The political landscape on the Korean Peninsula will become destabilized in the case of North Korea’s provocations with ICBMs that can reach the U.S. territory given the upcoming presidential election in the U.S. in November. U.S. President Donald Trump picks the suspension of ICBM launches and nuclear tests in North Korea as the biggest achievement since he made a switch in terms of the U.S. policies toward North Korea from “fire and fury,” which includes military options, to “negotiation-first.”

Experts are also worried about potential provocations by North Korea. “ICBMs in Sain-ri may be the upgraded version of the North’s existing ICBMs, such as Hwasong-14 and Hwasong-15, but we cannot exclude the possibility that they may be the missiles of a completely new weapon system,” said Professor Kim Dong-yeop of the Institute for Far Eastern Studies at Kyungnam University. “Provocations may be likely before the beginning of summer training of North Korean military – before June at the latest.”


jkim@donga.com

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