WAR China to Embrace Nuclear Option and Counter ‘Warmonger U.S.’

Dennis Olson

Dennis Olson

Chief Curmudgeon
_______________
China Urged to Embrace Nuclear Option and Counter 'Warmonger U.S.'
Simon Kent

China should expand its stock of nuclear warheads to 1,000 sooner rather than later, the official newspaper of China’s ruling Communist Party said Friday, adding the latest class of intercontinental missiles capable of striking continental United States should be included in that expansion.

The Global Times published the piece making the strategic call. It is backed by the People’s Daily, the Communist mouthpiece known to float ideas and guide public sentiments, which tends to take a robust nationalistic stance on issues of geopolitics.

The editorial laid out the case for what it believed is part of the rise and rise and Communist China to become a global supowerpower. It said “it’s an urgent task for China to expand its nuclear arsenal and strengthen its strategic strike capacities.”

It referenced another piece in the Communist organ that pointed to “U.S. warmongers” and argued:

China needs to expand the number of its nuclear warheads to 1,000 in a relatively short time. It needs to have at least 100 Dongfeng-41 strategic missiles. We are a peace-loving nation and have committed to never being the first to use nuclear weapons, but we need a larger nuclear arsenal to curb US strategic ambitions and impulses toward China. Maybe we have to deal with challenges with stronger determination in the near future, which requires the support of the Dongfeng and Julang missiles.

Don’t be naïve. Don’t assume that nuclear warheads are useless. In fact, they are being used every day as a deterrent to shape the attitudes of US elites toward China. Some Chinese experts say we don’t need more nuclear weapons, I think they are as naïve as children.

Global Times editor-in-chief Hu Xijin later took to social media and built on his theme for a fully nuclear armed China, Reuters reports.

“We love peace and promise not to use nuclear weapons first, but we need a bigger nuclear arsenal to suppress U.S. strategic ambition and impulse against China,” Hu wrote in a Weibo post.

Hu added his own call for “at least 100 DF-41 strategic missiles”, a latest class of intercontinental missiles capable of striking continental United States, according to defense experts.

He wrote, “Don’t think that nuclear warheads are useless during peacetime. We are using them everyone, silently, to shape the attitudes of American elites towards us.”

Hu’s post on Weibo – a Twitter-like social media in China – came after the White House said Donald Trump called for “effective arms control” that includes China and Russia during a telephone call on Thursday with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin.

Follow Simon Kent on Twitter: Follow @SunSimonKent or e-mail to: skent@breitbart.com

www.breitbart.com

China Urged to Embrace Nuclear Option and Counter 'Warmonger U.S.'

China should expand its stock of nuclear warheads to 1,000, the official newspaper of China’s ruling Communist Party said Friday, adding...
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BassMan

BassMan

Veteran Member
Is Winnie the Pooh’s country one that bluffs? Art of War would suggest yes, but who knows.

I have this amusing picture in my head of the Chinese people wearing, rather than Guy Fawkes masks, Winnie the Pooh masks. Hasn’t the CCP screwed-up enough to have lost the “Mandate of Heaven”?
 
Elza

Elza

Veteran Member
They shouldn't have any problem doing it. The entire world is financing it by buying their poorly manufactured junk.
 
ShadowMan

ShadowMan

Designated Grumpy Old Fart
Sooooo, should we just nuke'em now and get it over with BEFORE they build more nukes?

15afea01c456f2730ac033504404180c_zpsmg88xtvx.jpg
 
Fenwick Babbitt

Fenwick Babbitt

Veteran Member
On a Good day they might have 20 functional ICBM'S that are decades old and no issue for the U.S. missile defense systems, they know this, they know we know this, the whole thing is nothing but bravado.

Hell they can't even build their own carrier or operate the old rust bucket they purchased from Russia, the only true threat they would offer is sub based missiles but you gotta guess we have a pretty good idea where they're subs are at all times.
 
Betty_Rose

Betty_Rose

Veteran Member
Fenwick Babbitt said:
On a Good day they might have 20 functional ICBM'S that are decades old and no issue for the U.S. missile defense systems, they know this, they know we know this, the whole thing is nothing but bravado.

Hell they can't even build their own carrier or operate the old rust bucket they purchased from Russia, the only true threat they would offer is sub based missiles but you gotta guess we have a pretty good idea where they're subs are at all times.
Click to expand...


That's my thought as well. And if they really want the USA, they don't want it glowing in the dark. They want it for their own colonization. Blowing us all to radioactive bits isn't going to help that.
 
M

Matt

Veteran Member
I believe that the Corona is a bioweapon intentionally released. I also fully believe that war with China and Russia will be occurring in the near future.
I also believe that the US is not the prize....Africa and a consolidation in Asia is. The US is simply an impediment to their desires. Very little considerations will be given to US aftermath and there will definitely not be any sort of Marshall plan for us.

The Corona has absolutely prepared the battle space by throwing the US society into chaos. This has also been the reason for the synthetic drug push into the US by the Chineese. The 20 years of proxy war wear and tear on the US military in the middle east has also been encouraged to prepare the battle space. Ships, planes, and armor not combat ready is a real problem in the mil today.

Time is definitely short....
 
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Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Remember the rather public deployment of the W76-2s to the boomers?

This was partly why.

ETA: The "beauty" of the W76-2 is that it is a "tested" design and can be back filled onto all of the SLBM (at full "non treaty" loading a Trident 2 can throw 14 of these) and ICBM force. Add that to the B61-12 GPS "nuclear JDAM" into the mix and it changes all sorts of considerations.
 
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Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
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Fenwick Babbitt

Fenwick Babbitt

Veteran Member
China Connection said:
China is not the number one threat, Russia is and if you think they don't have the means you just make them happy.

We have world economic collapse around the corner. The Elite want most of us dead world wide.

Time to feed the chickens..................
Click to expand...
Been saying this for months, the dinks don't have the technology but the Russians absolutely do..
 
H

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Fenwick Babbitt said:
Been saying this for months, the dinks don't have the technology but the Russians absolutely do..
Click to expand...

Between what they got from the Russians and stole from US the ChiComs have more than enough wherewithal to FUBAR more than enough of CONUS or anywhere else.

IMHO about the only deterent counter isn't counter value targeting/MAD, but direct targeting of the CCP leadership. They may be willing to loose a good chunk of their population, but not themselves.
 
Texican

Texican

Live Free & Die Free.... God Freedom Country....
First strike and wipe out china and russia and let the missiles fall in America which will be mainly on the east and west coasts and large population centers across America. Less population, but sufficient population to rebuild. Just do it and get it over with.

Texican....
 
H

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Texican said:
First strike and wipe out china and russia and let the missiles fall in America which will be mainly on the east and west coasts and large population centers across America. Less population, but sufficient population to rebuild. Just do it and get it over with.

Texican....
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Glasstone-Samuel.-The-Effects-of-Nuclear-Weapons-April-1962-630-crop.jpg

Idealized ranges for effects of air burst with heights of burst optimized to give the maximum range for each individual effect. The Effects of Nuclear Weapons, April 1962, p. 630.
Spinning the Risk: ‘The Effects of Nuclear Weapons’ Handbook
June 4, 2018 ~ Evangelos Kotsioris
historyofknowledge.net

Spinning the Risk: ‘The Effects of Nuclear Weapons’ Handbook

The Effects of Nuclear Weapons was by far the most popular handbook of nuclear defense during the Cold War. Adapted from an original publication of the ...
historyofknowledge.net historyofknowledge.net

For more examples pull up one of the on-line nuclear "simulators".
 
Groucho

Groucho

Has No Life - Lives on TB
No need to over-think it. Put 10 of our 14 boomers in range of China. Each carries 20 missiles. Get within 1000 miles and launch. Follow up with half of our silo based missiles and then one third of our bomber force.
Light the bastards up big time. Hold back enough to discourage the "others," and enjoy the light show.

China is a pimple on the pr**k of progress. Erase them.
 
danielboon

danielboon

TB Fanatic
Groucho said:
No need to over-think it. Put 10 of our 14 boomers in range of China. Each carries 20 missiles. Get within 1000 miles and launch. Follow up with half of our silo based missiles and then one third of our bomber force.
Light the bastards up big time. Hold back enough to discourage the "others," and enjoy the light show.

China is a pimple on the pr**k of progress. Erase them.
Click to expand...
Just feed them some of your porridge that should do the trick.
 
H

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Hummm.....

Posted for fair use.....
thehill.com

Caution: China’s nuclear strategy may be ‘nuclear thoughtlessness’

China was ‘born’ into a nuclear world that it didn’t control — with two superpowers when it was neither nuclear nor a superpower.
thehill.com thehill.com

Caution: China's nuclear strategy may be 'nuclear thoughtlessness'
By Paul Bracken, opinion contributor — 05/07/20 04:00 PM EDT 63 Comments
The views expressed by contributors are their own and not the view of The Hill

China’s nuclear strategy is more complex than most public discussions or academic studies suggest. Most of these treat China as a growing “missile farm” with intercontinental ballistic missiles. This view is not irrelevant, but it misses the most important dangers of China in this second nuclear age.

A clear-eyed reassessment of China as a nuclear power is timely now because Beijing’s forces are expected to double in size over the next decade. China is shifting to a full-blown triad of ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and bombers, much as the United States has had since the 1960s. This has many new implications — for example, command and control now must manage mobile weapons, something far removed from China’s “classic” minimum deterrent force of a few missiles.

There are three especially significant aspects to China’s nuclear buildup. First, the crisis management behavior of this force is likely something the Chinese themselves do not understand. Crises are defined more by uncontrollable factors than doctrine. The whole point of crisis management is to understand, as best we can, what these behaviors look like. For example, nuclear alerts now mean moving live weapons around at sea, on the ground and in the air — a juggling act that can lead to many surprises for which there is no doctrine.

Second, there are foreign policy implications to the Chinese buildup. The role of nuclear weapons is not only to deter war, but to influence the behavior of other nations in peacetime. Japan, India, Australia and South Korea are not going to dismiss the Chinese buildup. Moreover, actions far short of war — threats, alerts, flyovers of nuclear-capable bombers — bolster national resolve. This is precisely how nuclear weapons were used in the Cold War. China’s nuclear buildup will shape the postures of the United States, Japan, India, Russia and others. “Rocking the boat” in Asia will look much different in a “heavy” nuclear world than it did when China was barely a nuclear weapon state.

Finally, China’s nuclear strategy doesn’t cover a wide range of possible scenarios beyond what it was built for. It may be very good (or not) in “standard” scenarios, such as deterrence involving Taiwan or anti-access conflicts aimed at keeping U.S. forces out of the western Pacific. But it may lead to a systems failure in non-standard wars. It is important for the United States to get a handle on these non-standard wars and what shape they may take. China’s leaders are likely subject to “nuclear thoughtlessness,” just as leaders in Washington and Moscow were during the Cold War.

An understanding of China’s nuclear strategy needs to appreciate the geopolitics of nuclear arms. China was “born” into a threatening nuclear world that it didn’t control. Beijing had to play in the nuclear big leagues with two superpowers when China was neither nuclear nor a superpower. It had no technology to deal with its immediate enemy, the United States. Washington threatened China with a nuclear attack to end the Korean War, and Beijing could do nothing to counter this.

In the 1958 Taiwan crisis, China had to back down in the face of U.S. threats. Beijing thought it had nuclear protection from Moscow against Washington, but quickly learned otherwise. Moscow refused to extend its nuclear umbrella to protect China against an atomic enemy. Worse, China was left high and dry when Russia abruptly withdrew technical assistance to build a bomb. This experience was the stimulus for their own nuclear weapon. By the late 1960s, when China had its own bomb, these two “allies” almost came to blows. China even put its nascent 1969 force on nuclear alert, not against Washington but against Moscow.

Today the “Taiwan crisis” refers less to past events than to present-day historical feelings of humiliation, the dangers of dependence, and technological backwardness. The Taiwan crisis has become a metaphor, a story, about these sentiments. The power of historical metaphor is considerable. Think of the powerful grip that “Munich” had on U.S. policy in the Cold War. The Cuban Missile Crisis is still a controlling metaphor for U.S. nuclear operations. The politics and technology of that crisis are ancient, but the crisis remains a model of calculated risk management and de-escalation.

Another geopolitical reality that many analysts overlook is that China is the only major power surrounded by five nuclear weapon states. Three of these — Russia, North Korea and Pakistan — are its “allies,” but only in a technical sense. To suggest that Chinese relations with any of them are like the United States and its European allies is to misunderstand the danger that China faces. “Allies” such as these are more likely to bring catastrophe on China than the United States is. Every one of them has targets inside China for their nuclear weapons — just as China surely has targets in North Korea, Pakistan and elsewhere.

Having studied China’s military doctrine, I find no evidence of seriously thinking through the dynamics of such non-standard conflicts. It surely doesn’t show up in high-level speeches. Major fault lines easily could develop in this alliance, not unlike the fault line between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

Finally, technology is changing in ways that spill over into China’s nuclear strategy. Beijing has moved out smartly in building advanced technologies for reconnaissance, prompt strike and intelligence. The complexity of this system is extraordinary; it is one of the drivers behind China’s push into artificial intelligence. The complexity is so great, and the timing for tracking mobile targets so tight, that only an AI-driven system can absorb the voluminous data and direct the responses.
Advanced technology is spilling over into the nuclear arena. The most systemically important targets for China are other people’s nuclear weapons — the United States, obviously, but also India, Russia, North Korea and Pakistan. The interactions of this reconnaissance-nuclear system are tightening. That these couplings are overlooked doesn’t make them unimportant. It only means that technology — once again — is racing ahead of strategy.

A broader assessment of China’s nuclear strategy is needed. China no longer is a rising power with around 20 ICBMs, a minimum deterrent. The days of looking at it as a “simple” missile exchange are long gone. China’s nuclear strategy has more far-reaching effects on peace and war than the stick man theories that are usually offered to describe it. The chance that the strategy is itself dangerously mis-designed for the political and technological contours ahead must be taken seriously in any sober assessment of international security.

Paul Bracken is a professor of management and political science at Yale University.
 
H

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Posted for fair use.....
www.aspistrategist.org.au

The future of China’s nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine force | The Strategist

China finally achieved an operational underwater nuclear capability in recent years, almost six decades after it first launched its nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) program in the late 1950s. The deployment of the Jin-class (Type ...
www.aspistrategist.org.au www.aspistrategist.org.au


The future of China’s nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine force

8 May 2020 | Adam Ni
Undersea deterrence

China finally achieved an operational underwater nuclear capability in recent years, almost six decades after it first launched its nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) program in the late 1950s. The deployment of the Jin-class (Type 094) SSBNs armed with JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) marks a new stage in the evolution of China’s sea-based nuclear force. According to the Pentagon’s 2018 annual report to Congress on China’s military capabilities, this recent development constitutes ‘China’s first credible sea-based nuclear deterrent’.

However, the effectiveness of China’s current sea-based nuclear force still faces serious challenges from geographic, operational and technological factors. But if China develops a larger and more invulnerable SSBN capability, incorporating continuous at-sea deterrence (CASD), how would this build-up affect strategic stability in the Indo-Pacific?

Driven by Beijing’s perceived nuclear insecurity, and enabled by the availability of resources to the People’s Liberation Army, China’s SSBN fleet, SLBM program, and supporting capabilities and systems have developed quickly since the early 2000s. Chinese military experts believe that developing an effective sea-based nuclear force is critical for ensuring the credibility of China’s overall nuclear deterrent.

The steady growth in the size and sophistication of China’s SSBN fleet will continue. Indeed, by all indications, a larger and more survivable SSBN force is high on the PLA Navy’s list of priorities.

China had at least four operational Jin-class SSBNs in 2018, and two more have reportedly just joined the fleet. The PLA Navy will likely build a total of six to eight Jin-class SSBNs before shifting production towards its next (third) generation SSBN, the Type 096, from the early 2020s. From the mid- to late 2020s onwards, it will likely operate an SSBN fleet consisting of both the Type 094 and Type 096.

The future of China’s SSBN force depends largely on China’s threat perception. At one end of the spectrum, Beijing may believe that a small SSBN fleet that complements its land-based nuclear force is enough to maintain the credibility of its nuclear deterrent. On the other end, China may seek to address perceived vulnerabilities in its land-based force with a significant build-up of its SSBN force with supporting infrastructure and systems.

Another important determinant is whether China intends to pursue a CASD capability with one or more SSBNs on patrol at all times. China is unlikely to adopt such a posture in the near term due to operational constraints. Even if the PLA Navy was operationally capable, there are serious doubts as to whether Beijing is ready to make such a major shift in its nuclear posture.

The precise number of SSBNs required for CASD would depend on a variety of factors, including the efficiency of the PLA Navy’s logistics support for its SSBN fleet, and the technical specifications of Chinese nuclear reactor cores. But if Beijing’s aim is to achieve CASD with at least two or three SSBNs on patrol at all times, China’s SSBN force will need to expand to around 12.

The growth of China’s SSBN fleet, as part of its broader nuclear modernisation effort, has a number of implications for China’s nuclear strategy and strategic stability in Asia. First and foremost, China’s SSBN force has become more important to its nuclear strategy and posture than at any time in the past. With the diversification away from an exclusive reliance on land-based nuclear missiles, SLBMs have grown to constitute about half of China’s total number of ballistic missiles that could target the continental US.

This relative importance is likely to grow along with the size and survivability of China’s SSBN fleet as China progresses along the path towards building an effective nuclear triad. Currently, China possesses a well-established, albeit relatively small, land-based nuclear force, a nascent sea-based nuclear force, and a program to develop a new strategic bomber, the H-20.

Given the growing importance of China’s SSBNs, decisions about how they’re deployed may have far-reaching strategic implications. For instance, if Beijing decided to adopt CASD, that would constitute an important shift in China’s nuclear posture. Currently, nuclear authority is highly centralised under the Central Military Commission, with nuclear warheads stored separately from missile launchers. In addition, China’s land-based nuclear force doesn’t maintain a high alert status under normal peacetime conditions.

With CASD, patrolling Chinese SSBNs would carry nuclear weapons to sea, and Beijing would need to work out crucial command and control questions, such as how much authority to delegate to submarine commanders. Such a shift in posture might be interpreted by other states as evidence that Beijing was moving away from its policy to refrain from the first use of nuclear weapons.

In the short to medium term, the PLA Navy will continue to adopt a strategy that heavily emphasises SSBN deployments to selected ‘bastions’ near the Chinese mainland, including areas of the South China Sea, East China Sea and Yellow Sea. However, over the longer term, Chinese SSBNs are likely to be increasingly active in conducting open-ocean patrols in the Pacific Ocean.

Given the advantages of open-ocean deployment, the PLA Navy will continue to develop the capabilities and experience required for effective deterrence patrols, especially in the Pacific Ocean.

A key risk to strategic stability is that Beijing’s self-perceived defensive build-up could be interpreted by the US and others as aggressive efforts aimed at altering the relative strategic balance of force in China’s favour. This would be especially likely if Beijing rushes to adopt CASD in the near future.

This piece was produced as part of the Indo-Pacific Strategy: Undersea Deterrence Project, undertaken by the ANU National Security College. This article is a shortened version of chapter 8, ‘The future of China’s new SSBN force’, as published in the 2020 edited volume The future of the undersea deterrent: a global survey. Support for this project was provided by a grant from Carnegie Corporation of New York.

Author
Adam Ni is a researcher at Macquarie University in Sydney and consultant, working on issues including China’s military reform and modernisation, strategic forces and military strategy. Image: US Navy/ Wikimedia Commons.

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Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
Posted for fair use.....
defense.info

Deterrence in the Pacific: The Chinese Nuclear Dimension | Defense.info

In my recent discussion with Dr. Paul Bracken, we focused on what is often the too neglected aspect of the nuclear dimension to Pacific deterrence. How does the nuclear dimension impact on the entire spectrum of crisis management? With the land wars of the past twenty years, except for the...
defense.info defense.info

Deterrence in the Pacific: The Chinese Nuclear Dimension

05/08/2020
By Robbin Laird






In my recent discussion with Dr. Paul Bracken, we focused on what is often the too neglected aspect of the nuclear dimension to Pacific deterrence. How does the nuclear dimension impact on the entire spectrum of crisis management?

With the land wars of the past twenty years, except for the possible and horrifying threat of terrorists acquiring some kind of nuclear capability, conventional operations have been executed and planned without a nuclear planning factor.

Unfortunately, this historical experience is becoming a strategic assumption for some American policy planners and general officers when looking at the Pacific.

The threat of nuclear conflict would only become relevant towards the end game of a conventional conflict is a faulty assumption.

Crisis management involving nuclear powers is about escalation management with the specter of nuclear engagement woven into the process.

Just because you ignore this fact does not mean that it is not true.

Conventional force planning for a major contingency in the Pacific for the United States and its allies, has no less than three nuclear powers to consider with regard to crisis management planning.

And each of these nuclear powers have very different perspectives on how nuclear weapons can come into play.

What certainly cannot be done is to shape a way ahead with regard to high end warfare as if it is primarily or soley a conventional engagement.

Even a conventional engagement has nuclear consequences, notably with regard to embedded C2 systems and networks being relied upon in conflict.

Notably any US Army or USMC thinking about the way ahead in the Pacific needs to return them to their Cold War roots where there was no expectation that one could do land engagements without considerations for the overhang of nuclear operations.

The dovetailing of the current US Navy and USAF efforts to shape a distributed integrated force operating as a kill web is a key element of the way ahead for deterrence in the Pacific. This allows for building a more resilient yet more lethal force able to operate across a kill web to deliver strike at the point of greatest value with diverse networks of sensors is a base line from which to operate.

When considering strike, the question is where and for what purpose, up to and including nuclear weapons, a clear consideration for both US Navy and USAF forces within a Pacific deterrence strategy.

Recently, Bracken wrote an op ed in The Hill which further developed some of the themes we discussed in his interview.

In this op ed he underscored the challenge of understanding, anticipating and preparing for the evolving Chinese approach to nuclear war as part of the broader context how do we shape an effective deterrent strategy.

In his article, he focused on the Chinese nuclear buildup within the context of their overall military modernization efforts.

And he highlighted a key challenge: “The crisis management behavior of this force is likely something the Chinese themselves do not understand.

“Crises are defined more by uncontrollable factors than doctrine.

“The whole point of crisis management is to understand, as best we can, what these behaviors look like.

“For example, nuclear alerts now mean moving live weapons around at sea, on the ground and in the air — a juggling act that can lead to many surprises for which there is no doctrine.”

He highlighted as well the significance of nuclear weapons even if they are NOT used in shaping how the United States and its allies will need to act with a much more robust Chinese nuclear force in play.

“China’s nuclear buildup will shape the postures of the United States, Japan, India, Russia and others.

“Rocking the boat” in Asia will look much different in a “heavy” nuclear world than it did when China was barely a nuclear weapon state.”

Bracken then highlighted a key intersection between conventional and nuclear systems driven by technology in the reconnaissance-strike enterprise.

“Advanced technology is spilling over into the nuclear arena. The most systemically important targets for China are other people’s nuclear weapons — the United States, obviously, but also India, Russia, North Korea and Pakistan.

“The interactions of this reconnaissance-nuclear system are tightening. That these couplings are overlooked doesn’t make them unimportant. It only means that technology — once again — is racing ahead of strategy.”

How then can the United States shape a primarily conventional force driven strategy for high end conflict in the Pacific?

And how can it be shaped without a very clear working through with allies how to manage crises in ways that escalation can be handled effectively without going to the highest end of nuclear conflict?

What clearly needs to happen is a thoughtful working through of how U.S .force transformation is embedded in a broader Pacific strategy, rather than one off modernization efforts, like the US Army’s 1,000 mile gun as pop up option.

As Lt. General (Retired) Deptula put it: Clearly, we need to implement the new nuclear strategy, and notably insure that the standoff weapons piece in the modernization program is fully funded, both for today’s bomber force and for the B-21.

“And, for me, shaping the comprehensive C2/ISR integratability piece is crucial, which I refer to as the combat cloud.

“If we can get to that kind of a vision for joint force operations then no service like the Army or the Marine Corps needs to feel that they have to justify their relevancy, but they’re part and parcel of an entire panoply of capabilities that’s formed by this intelligence surveillance, reconnaissance, strike, maneuver sustainment complex that’s extraordinarily difficult for any adversary to derail.

“Even if an adversary is able to take out a couple of elements of the combat cloud, the rest of the elements re-form and re-heal and continue to operate.

“It’s the diversity of domains and particular threats coming from each of those domains, air, sea, land, space, subsea, that will complicate an adversary’s calculus, which is crucial to achieve deterrence.

“The problem of achieving deterrence is that it is an intangible.

“And so people have a difficulty putting their hands on it, when in fact it’s the most cost-effective means to avoiding conflict and win it, because you’re winning without having to fight.

“And this requires for us to have an ability to integrate nuclear weapons into this strategic calculus.”

Note: Recently, in Global Times, a PRC newspaper, the editor called for China to increase its number of nuclear warheads”
“We don’t have much time debating the need for increased nuclear warheads, we just need to accelerate the steps that make it happen.”

The featured Photo: A formation of Dongfeng-41 intercontinental strategic nuclear missiles takes part in a military parade celebrating the 70th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China in Beijing, capital of China, Oct. 1, 2019. (Xinhua/Tao Liang)
 
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