WAR 03-23-2024-to-03-29-2024__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment

(337) 03-02-2024-to-03-09-2024__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

(338) 03-09-2024-to-03-15-2024__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

(339) 03-16-2024-to-03-22-2024__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****


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AFRICA

Achieving peace in Sahel requires multilateral support for Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger​


BY KESTER KENN KLOMEGAH
MARCH 23, 2024

Russia has now started calling for combined strategic partnership and international efforts to drastically address the complexities of rising insecurity and adopting a multilateral military force for countering terrorism in Africa, particularly in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. An official statement from the Russian Foreign Ministry called for finding common solutions and that peace can only be achieved through international efforts in the Sahara Sahel region.

Burkina Faso has had several military coup d’états, the latest took place in Jan. 2022. Mali (May 24, 2021) and Niger (July 26, 2023) witnessed similar political trends, and both now under military administrations and share startling critical accusations of corruption and malfunctioning of state governance against previous governments. Currently in its bilateral relations, Russia strongly considers Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali and Niger as conduits to penetrate into the Sahel region, an elongated landlocked territory located between north Africa (Maghreb) and West Africa region, and also stretches from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea.

As a matter of fact, searching for common solutions to pertinent issues in a multi-polar world requires an extensive mutual cooperation with regional African associations and support from international community. After disparaging, using derogatory language for foreign military forces for their failure in ensuring security in the West African Saharan region, and encouraging a number of French-speaking West African countries to abruptly abrogate military relations with United States and France, Russia has now started calling for international efforts to help Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger.

The situation relating to frequency of militant activities and insecurity might have a different approach. Now the Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry in mid-March, 2024 said there was the necessity to drastically address the rising insecurity in the Sahel region, but in order to attain peace requires engaging the global support and international security institutions.

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Vershinin drew the attention of Special Representative and Head of the UN Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS) Leonardo Santos Simao to the fact that achieving peace in the Sahel Region hinges on international efforts to help Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, according to the Russian Foreign Ministry’s statement made available at the official website.

“We specifically drew Simao’s attention to the fact that a sustainable settlement in the Sahel Region requires international support, namely for Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, which are simultaneously engaged in countering terrorism in Africa and defending their own sovereignty,” the ministry emphasized.

In addition, the work of UNOWAS in promoting stability and responding to a wide range of challenges in West Africa and the Sahel was discussed in detail. “Russia expressed support for their efforts. We noted the importance of building them in a neutral and constructive manner in the interests of all countries of the region,” the statement noted.

Sergey Vershinin and Leonardo Santos Simao further noted the situation in West Africa and Sahel, “focusing on humanitarian and socio-economic challenges, uncontrolled migration, the lack of resources necessary for development, integration processes, including activities within the Economic Community of West African States and the Sahel Alliance.”

In the latest emerging developments in mid-March 2024, Col. Maj. Amadou Abdramane, spokesperson for Niger’s ruling junta, official announced the expulsion of the United States – ending the long-standing counterterrorism partnership between the two countries. “The government of Niger, taking into account the aspirations and interests of its people, revokes, with immediate effect, the agreement concerning the status of United States military personnel and civilian Defense Department employees,” he said, declaring that the security pact, in effect since 2012, violated Niger’s constitution.

The United States has roughly 1,000 military personnel and civilian contractors deployed to Niger, most of them clustered near the town of Agadez, on the southern fringe of the Sahara desert, at Air Base 201. Known locally as “Base Americaine” – the outpost serves as the linchpin of the military’s archipelago of bases in North and West Africa and a key part of America’s wide-ranging surveillance and security efforts in the region. Since the 2010s, the United States has sunk roughly a quarter billion dollars into the outpost. It has trained several military personnel for Niger.

As monitored by this article author, Mali also terminated its military contract with France. Mali together with its deep-seated impoverished neighbouring countries, under the governance of fragile military juntas, are potentially breeding grounds for extremist activities. Niger shares distinctive borders with Burkina Faso and Mali, as well as Chad and Algeria in Sahel region. These countries have pledged their support to Niger, as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) continually looks for mechanisms to resolve the crisis in the entire region.

Suffice to note here that ECOWAS has declared fierce opposition to military’s infiltration into politics and primarily eager to restore constitutional order. It shares the same position with the 54-member continental organization, the African Union. Critics, however, say Russia has noticeably declared its support for the military appearance into political scene, and further weighed in absolutely on their delay to set deadlines for transition to constitutional government in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger.

Notwithstanding all that, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger have exited the regional bloc, ECOWAS and are also dismembered out of the African Union. The African Union has issued the Africa Governance Report 2023 which focuses on unconstitutional changes of government in Africa. The Malabo declaration (April 2022) also urged to strictly adhere to what was referred as the Lomé Declaration and the Johannesburg Declaration on ‘Silencing the Guns’ in Africa, adopted at the 14th Extraordinary Session on 6 December 2020.

The Accra Forum II also underscored commitment to facilitate the consolidation of constitutionalism in Africa through stakeholder engagement. A number of external countries, dealing with military governments within bilateral framework, have utterly ignored the standing protocol guidelines and declarations of both the ECOWAS and the African Union.

Given the case of and with particular reference to Russia, the Accra Forum II condemned external interference on peace and security matters in Africa. In addition, African leaders have expressed grave concern over the resurgence of military takeovers and further urged adoption of serious measures to intensify efforts at addressing the root causes of coup d’etats. In pursuit of geopolitical clout, Russia is expanding its military tentacles aggressively beyond its horizons, penetrating into Sahel Sahara where mostly are the Francophone.

Paradoxically, Russia has never come under military rule since Soviet’s collapse. On March 15-17, Russia held the presidential election as stipulated by the constitution. On the contrary, Russia has been encouraging West African military rulers to hold on to power, these leaders shuttle between their capitals and Moscow. For instance, Malian Foreign Affairs Minister, Abdoulaye Diop, had already visited five or six times, seeking political consultation with Moscow officials, since his government took over power. Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea and Niger have followed suit, most often taken political advice from Moscow. While under Moscow politico-military directions, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger have allegedly accused ECOWAS leaders being manipulated by the West and Europe. Due to the rift between the regional bloc and the Francophones, ECOWAS is partially fragmented, African unity is stake as a result, so says policy experts interviewed for this article.

“The fact that terrorist groups have been increasingly active, especially in the north of the country, does not offer a favourable environment for launching an election campaign,” Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov told the joint media conference in 2021 with Abdoulaye Diop. “We do understand the need to reinforce Mali’s counter-terrorism potential. In this connection, the Russian state supplies the necessary equipment, weapons and ammunition. We will do everything we can to prevent any threat to Mali’s statehood and territorial integrity,” he reassured his Malian counterpart. As for the nervous reaction of the French and some other Western representatives to Mali’s plans to work with a private military company from Russia (something the Prime Minister of Mali spoke openly about at the UN General Assembly session), this question is exclusively within the competence of the lawful Malian government. (Transcript available at the ministry’s website).

There have been several debates, academic discussions and propositions for adopting multilateral force to deal with the complexities of rising terrorism and ethnic conflicts in Africa. The South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) has a detailed report with excellent suggestions. Southern African Development Community (SADC) has also offered an excellent example how to deal swiftly with terrorism.

The SAIIA report titled – Russia’s Private Military Diplomacy in Africa: High Risk, Low Reward, Limited Impact – says that Russia’s renewed interest in Africa is driven by its quest for global power status. Few expect Russia’s security engagement to bring peace and development to countries with which it has security partnerships. That report was based on more than 80 media publications dealing with Russia’s military-technical cooperation in Africa. He interrogates whether fragile African states advance their security, diplomatic and economic interests through a relationship with Russia.

The research report indicated that “Russia’s growing assertiveness in Africa is a driver of instability and that its approach to governance encourages pernicious practices, such as kleptocracy and autocracy in Africa.” It further says Moscow’s strategic incompetence and dominating opaque relations are adversely affecting sustainable developments in Africa. Russia, it appears, is a neo-colonial power dressed in anti-colonial clothes.

While Moscow’s opportunistic use of private military diplomacy has allowed it to gain a strategic foothold in partner countries successfully, the lack of transparency in interactions, the limited scope of impact and the high financial and diplomatic costs exposes the limitations of the partnership in addressing the peace and development challenges of African host countries, the report says.

The report explained the dimensions of Russian power projection in Africa, new frontiers of Russian influence and provided a roadmap towards understanding how Russia is perceived in Africa. It highlighted narratives about anti-colonialism and described how these sources of solidarity are transmitted by Russian elites to their African public. For seeking long-term influence, Russian elites have oftentimes used elements of anti-colonialism as part of the current policy to control the perceptions of Africans and primarily as new tactics for power projection in Africa.

In another related development and as well-known fact, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, addressing the 36th Ordinary Session of the African Union (AU) held in Addis Ababa, told the African leaders and other invited guests, that “all existing conflicts and disputes on the continent, it is necessary to mobilize collective efforts to resolve them and must be confined to this continent and quarantined from the contamination of non-African interference.”

In addition to West Africa, there are other African regions experiencing threats of terrorism, militant groups and an Islamic State-linked insurgencies. Southern African countries, particularly Mozambique, have had cases of that. Mozambique suffered armed attack in March 2017. The insurgency, which began in 2017, has left thousands of people dead and led to the suspension of a €20 billion liquefied natural gas (LNG) project by the French TotalEnergies SA.

Mozambique now enjoys relative peace due to the SADC regional force. President Filipe Nyusi has been sharing this valuable experiences about the use of well-constituted regional military force for enforcing peace and security in his country. Creating regional military forces to fight threats of terrorism will absolutely not require bartering the entire gold or diamond mines for the purchase of military equipment from external countries, Mozambican President Nyusi emphasized several times at different conferences.

The 16-member Southern African Development Community (SADC) joint military force has the primary responsibility of ensuring peace and stability and for restoring normalcy in the Cabo Delgado province, northern Mozambique. It involves troops from Rwanda and the Southern African Development Community Military Mission (SAMIM). Rwanda offered 1,000 in July 2021. South Africa has the largest contingent of around 1,500 troops. External countries have enormously supported to stabilize the situation in Mozambique.

The rules, standards and policies, provision of the assistance as well as the legal instruments and practices are based on the protocols of building security stipulated by the African Union. It therefore falls within the framework of peace and security requirements of the the Southern African Development Community and the African Union.

At his point, it necessary to remind that on 28 November 2023, the United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres and the African Union Commission Chairperson Moussa Faki Mahamat convened their seventh African Union-United Nations Annual Conference in New York. In a joint communiqué issued at the end of the meeting, both reviewed progress in the implementation of the UN-AU Joint Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security and the AU-UN Framework for the Implementation of Agenda 2063.

In particular, António Guterres and Moussa Mahamat again condemned the resurgence of unconstitutional changes of government in Africa and stressed the need for a timely and peaceful return to constitutional order in Burkina Faso, Gabon, Guinea, Mali, Niger and Sudan which are undergoing complex political transitions to sustain peace, development and human rights in the long term. There must be an extensive political awareness among the people in the Sahel region to focus on democracy, development, security and stability.

Against this backdrop, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger have to seriously consider adopting multilateral security cooperation. Ultimately, West Africans have to emulate Mozambican case and apply it in the Sahel. But Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger have displayed defiance to the sanctions and crafting number of approaches and making their own efforts toward addressing security and development-oriented issues.

Summarizing this article, the above points are related to the significance of adopting a multilateral approach in the March 20 discussions between Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Vershinin and Special Representative and Head of the UN Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS) Leonardo Santos Simao. As developments explicitly show, Russia has to stands in for multilateral force to speedily address the contradictions and complexities of security issues in that region. Constituting a regional force, rather than Russia continues playing monopoly, be interpreted a basic tenet in multipolar relations in which affected states, coordinating with foreign partners, pool resources together for a common goal. Basic principles of multipolar should be voiced on platforms in practical terms. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the African Union, the United Nations, and bilateral and multilateral partners have to act together to endorse and to support drastic measures in addressing security questions and, most importantly, to ensure a peaceful return to constitutional and democratic government in the Republics of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali and Niger in West Africa.
 

Housecarl

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Islamic State claims responsibility for attack on Niger army that killed dozens​

Niger is one of several West African countries battling an Islamist insurgency that has spread outwards from Mali over the past 12 years, killing thousands and uprooting millions of people.​

By REUTERS MARCH 23, 2024 23:08 Updated: MARCH 23, 2024 23:33

Islamic State on Saturday claimed responsibility for an attack on Niger's army that it said had killed 30 soldiers on Wednesday.

The group said in a statement carried by its AMAQ news agency and posted on its Telegram channel that the soldiers were killed in an ambush on a convoy near the town of Teguey in the Tillaberi region in the west of the country.

ISIS has also claimed responsibility for the fatal terror attack in Moscow on Saturday, which killed upward of 143 people.

Niger's defense ministry said late on Thursday that 23 soldiers were killed in the attack, which also wounded 17 more. Around 30 attackers were killed, it added.

Niger is one of several West African countries battling an Islamist insurgency that has spread outwards from Mali over the past 12 years, killing thousands and uprooting millions of people.

Anger at govt impotence has led to coups in region​

Frustrations over authorities' failure to protect civilians have spurred military coups in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger since 2020.

The juntas that seized power have cut ties with Western allies assisting local military efforts, kicking out French and other European forces and turning to Russia instead.

Niger's junta last week revoked with immediate effect a military accord that allows military personnel and civilian staff from the US Department of Defense on its soil.
 

Housecarl

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AMERICAN MILITARY-CIVIL FUSION AT RISK WITH THE LOSS OF THE SHIFT FELLOWSHIP​

JAKE CHAPMAN
MARCH 22, 2024
COMMENTARY

I often get asked by prospective investors, other venture capitalists, or Department of Defense officials why defense technology has suddenly become salient to venture capitalists and entrepreneurs. Over the last five years, venture capitalists have invested approximately $135 billion in defense technologies compared to a paltry $40 billion in the prior five-year period. The answer is Shift, and the Defense Ventures Program that Shift built. For the last five years, the Defense Ventures Program has been embedding high-potential active-duty, reserve, and civilian members of the Department of Defense inside the top venture capital firms and defense-focused startups around the country on one- or two-month high-impact fellowships.

These fellowships, and the community that Shift built up around them, helped revitalize the defense technology movement. In addition to the major influx of private capital, founders and entrepreneurs have begun flocking to the industry, bringing with them hope for rapidly expanding both capability and capacity. A16z is one of the venture capital industry’s most prestigious firms. In January of 2022, they launched a billion-dollar American Dynamism sub-brandfocused on funding solutions to some of America’s toughest national security challenges. Before they started funding the revitalization of the defense industrial base, they were hosting Shift fellows who were contributing to a culture change. True Anomaly, a recent startup focused on space domain awareness and orbital conflict, has raised over $100 million from venture capital firms. Before True Anomaly landed mission-critical contracts with the department, they had hired a graduate of Shift’s fellowship. Apollo, a brand new company focused on getting undergraduates interested in solving national security challenges, hosted the El Segundo defense tech hackathon this past February, which captured imaginations and inspired over 400 engineers. Before the Apollo founders had plotted their course, they attended the Shift Defense Ventures Summit in Washington D.C. and were themselves inspired. Finally, even before I co-founded Marque Ventures as a pure-play national security focused venture firm or spent two years trying to save Army Venture Capital, I was one of the first investors in Shift and was hosting fellows at a sector-agnostic Alpha Bridge Ventures. As an investor in Shift, I have a financial interest in the success of the program but as an American and as a frequent host for fellows I also have a deep personal interest in it or a successor’s fortunes. While the renaissance in national security technology happening right now has many contributing factors, much of the momentum in industry can be traced to the Shift team and to Mike Slagh, Shift’s founder.

While it may seem shocking — especially to those new to the club — this story doesn’t have a happy ending for the fellowship or for Shift. Due to a combination of malignant neglect and gross incompetence inside the Department of Defense, the program was not renewed for 2024. The loss of this program is a perfect demonstration of the capriciousness of the valley of death in action and shows why even successful programs can fail to transition. Unfortunately, the fellowship’s death comes at a pivotal moment for the relationship between the department and the innovation ecosystem. It’s not hyperbole to say that the loss of this program, and what that tells founders and investors about the department’s credibility as a counterpart, is likely to destroy critical trust between the two sides.

To say that this is an “own goal” is an understatement. Just a few months ago, the Department of Defense’s own 2023 National Defense Science and Technology Strategy specifically mentioned Shift’s Defense Ventures Program as a critical component of the department’s technology strategy. In fact, the Defense Ventures Program was literally the only private effort called out by name in the official document. Now, just a few months removed from publication of that strategy, the department has killed the very program it was counting on.

Putting aside for a moment the value of the fellowship itself, the broader issue is that with this kind of callous disregard for a universally praised and innovative program the Department of Defense cannot possibly hope to win or maintain the trust of the private sector. If industry and investors can’t validate demand signals from the department, they will either try to intuit those signals and waste billions, eventually abandoning the industry entirely, or they will skip the first step and just move on to easier fishing. Repairing trust and regaining the momentum engendered by the fellowship can be accomplished with a few concrete steps. There should be a full accounting of what happened in order to inform policy changes that give industry confidence. A program like the fellowship should be enshrined in the fiscal year 2025 National Defense Authorization Act to keep key relationships alive. Finally, to minimize the devastating impacts that continuing resolutions have on nascent startups building for the Department of Defense, Congress should create a small, expiring, emergency bridge fund for non-traditional defense contractors whenever they pass a continuing resolution. Even a tiny fund can be the difference between a promising company surviving to deliver its capability and a company falling into the valley of death.

The Shift Defense Ventures Program and Fellowship

The Shift fellowship was a relatively straightforward program. High-potential active-duty, reserve, and civilian members of the Department of Defense applied on a cohort-by-cohort basis. Once selected, they were embedded within industry hosts who were also competitively selected. The hosts were startups and venture firms interested in working with the Department of Defense. The program facilitated a deep and meaningful exchange of cultures and best practices that resulted in measurable improvements both inside and outside the Department of Defense across retention, continuing education, industry engagement, and private investment. Several months ago, Shift conducted a survey of its hosts and graduated fellows. The results of that survey, which have not been published until now, were telling. On the retention front, of all graduated fellows, 92.2 percent reported either an increased desire (50 percent) or a greatly increased desire (42 percent) to continue serving. Anecdotally, one of the more innovative services was using the fellowship as a means of attracting new top talent into the service. The benefits didn’t stop at retention, the fellowship helped with education as well. At the conclusion of their program, 72 percent of the fellows reported between a threefold and a tenfold increase in technology proficiency and increased understanding of industry best practices. Fellows learned how to assess and evaluate the companies building the weapons and information systems that the Department of Defense relies on and they learned what it is like to interact with the Department of Defense as a non-traditional defense contractor.

While the fellows and the services for which they worked gained direct benefits, the hosts benefited as well, ultimately creating substantial indirect benefits for the Department of Defense. 96 percent of graduates and hosts report that industry would be disappointed or greatly disappointed if the fellowship went away. While the Defense Innovation Unit might have been founded to be the embassy to Silicon Valley (and the technology ecosystem writ large), it is the Shift fellows who are the department’s ambassadors, embedded within the ecosystem itself. Venture capital investment in defense has grown from roughly $12 billion in 2018 to roughly $30 billion in 2023. That is a net increase of $18 billion, which is roughly the size of 4.5 new Defense Advanced Research Projects Agencies. While Shift can’t claim to be responsible for all the increased funding, I don’t believe it’s an exaggeration to say that their program is one of the largest catalyzing factors in what can be described as a revolution in civil-military affairs. To the extent Silicon Valley continues to build without fellows in its midst, it will build products less aligned to warfighter needs and fewer of those products will successfully transition and be fielded. This will inevitably lead to huge cuts in private sector investment in defense relevant technologies, an outcome directly antithetical to the department’s stated goal of leveraging more private investment.

So What Went Wrong?

There are those who will read this and think that if the program were really as useful to industry and to the Department of Defense as described than it would not have failed. They will ask why industry didn’t fund the program or why it did not transition. Here is story of Shift’s failure to transition as relayed to me by company sources and folks on the Hill.The essential elements are that AFWERX made promises it couldn’t keep and pulled the rug out from under the program at the eleventh hour. This was the result of multiple personnel turnovers, an indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contracting process that stretched for over a year before it was abandoned, and a promised contract extension that was pulled without enough warning for the company to implement a back-up plan. Shift had plenty of interested buyers within the Department of Defense and the intelligence community for seats in the upcoming cohort but because of the continuing resolution, those buyers could not begin a contracting process or fund a new contract. Therefore, the national security customers had to rely on the AFWERX contract already in place, which AFWERX chose not to extend. While this train wreck was slowly unfolding, Shift had lined up millions in private capital from tier-one venture capital firms and defense industry executives. That capital was prepared to meet the department halfway, but when AFWERX announced its intention to drop the contract extension, private capital took the signal and walked away. Shift has died in the valley of death, the space where a program needs to transition from a research, development, and prototyping effort into an acquisition program. It has died not through intention but through inaction.

It might be fair to ask whether Shift has done what the United States needed it to do. There are now 450 fellows who have graduated, scores of firms now investing in defense, and hundreds of new companies building in the space. Maybe we should just say “mission accomplished” and move on. However, this would be a huge mistake. While we shall certainly reap the benefits of the program over the next decade, the program itself compounds. The value it has already created is not an argument that it has outlived its usefulness — it is proof that it was and remains sorely needed.

More importantly, the United States is at a critical point in civil-military relations and the loss of Shift may push things in the wrong direction. In the last two weeks several anecdotes have made me question whether America may already be at the peak of cooperation between the innovation ecosystem and the Department of Defense. In a conversation with a prospective limited partner, someone who is considering investing in our firm behind a defense-focused thesis, the prospective partner expressed grave concerns that continuing resolutions and general congressional dysfunction were risk factors that might prevent them from investing in venture firms investing in the defense space.

Subsequently, an entrepreneur in residence (someone who is a skilled and experienced entrepreneur who is working for a venture firm while they think about their next company) told me that he is abandoning the company he had been working on for the last six months and pivoting outside of defense. Why? Because the department isn’t moving money to non-traditional defense contractors fast enough. Finally, another venture capital firm that had adopted a dual-use investment thesis last year told me that they are pausing their defense investment because their companies aren’t finding material traction.

These are just anecdotes, but they aren’t surprising, and they highlight how fragile the new détente between industry and the Department of Defense really is. The death of Shift will send shivers through this nascent bridge.

The Way Forward

A number of steps could begin to mitigate the damage. First, members of Congress should request a full report on why this program has been allowed to slip through the cracks and should demand accountability. There should be no world where the National Defense Science and Technology Strategy highlights a program or company as a lynchpin and then that same program is allowed to die a few months later. If the United States is going to be successful in harnessing its private sector, the signals it sends to industry must be backed by follow-through.

Next, as the FY25 National Defense Authorization Act begins to take shape, a program like the fellowship should be enshrined in law to ensure that its benefits are not permanently lost. The fellowship has done incredible good in the five years it has operated — that good should not be ignored, and it should be fostered through a successor program that continues the deep engagement with industry pioneered by Shift.

Finally, while the proximate cause of the fellowship’s failure to transition was essentially an acquisitions failure, there were numerous Department of Defense customers ready to step up and purchase access to the program who, due to the ongoing continuing resolution, could not begin their own contracting process in time. While Shift isn’t the first and won’t be the last company killed by the impact of a continuing resolution, Congress should act to minimize the damage caused by budget negotiations. Something as simple as an emergency fund in the tens of millions of dollars dedicated to bridging non-traditional defense companies could have averted this crisis and should be considered for all future defense continuing resolutions.

The Shift Defense Ventures Program was a crown jewel of a program. It was exactly what the United States needs more of today — asymmetric capability. For roughly two million dollars a year Shift delivered energized servicemembers, industry engagement, private capital alignment, counterintelligence in the heart of American innovation, and a whole host of less tangible benefits. That program is now gone and with it will go some of the fragile trust that the Department of Defense has worked hard to develop. There is no way to look at this situation as anything other than a profound failure of the acquisition process. I hope that we can all take this failure seriously and work diligently to address the cracks in the system so that this does not happen again. Even the most patriotic investors can only take so much friendly fire before succumbing. To end on a slightly brighter note, while the fellowship may not exist anymore, the fellows themselves are all hard at work fighting to support the United States. Some of the fellows are in industry, some are back in the Department of Defense, and several have joined me at Marque ventures. Wherever they are, I know that we have only begun to see the good that they can do.

Jake Chapman has been in and around the venture industry for almost 20 years as a lawyer, three-time founder of successful companies, and venture capitalist, including as managing director of the Army Venture Capital Corporation. He is the managing director of Marque Ventures, a venture capital firm focused on national security technology. He writes all too frequently on Twitter as @vc and somewhat less frequently on LinkedIn.
 

Housecarl

On TB every waking moment
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LEARNING FROM THE WAR ON TERROR​

KAREN M. SUDKAMP
MARCH 21, 2024
COMMENTARY

At the height of the “Global War on Terror,” I spent over 10 years as an intelligence analyst. My work informed military counter-terrorism operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and supported the development and implementation of counter-terrorism policy at the Pentagon.

As I watched Israel’s operations in Gaza against Hamas — designated as a terrorist organization by not just Israel, but also the United States, the European Union, Britain, and NATO — I couldn’t help but be stunned. The invasion of Gaza proceeded as if combatting a terrorist group in an urban environment was a novel experience. Frank Sobchak recently pointed out in these pages how Israel’s war echoes the U.S. failure to plan how to manage Iraq after the fall of president Saddam Hussein. My perspective is similar, but I might go further: What’s been happening in Gaza suggests none of the lessons from 20 years of global counter-terrorism conflicts were implemented.


After almost six months of military operations in Gaza, the lessons below are relevant whether a ceasefire is eventually reached between Hamas and Israel or not. (The latest reporting indicates negotiations are stalled.) In the event of a pause in fighting and hostage release, Israeli forces can review operations in Gaza and revise military strategy and doctrine using the lessons learned in two decades of the Global War on Terror. If hostilities continue, Israeli forces should learn from these same lessons and prioritize reducing civilian harm — which includes limiting civilian casualties and destruction of civilian infrastructure — in their operations.

Lessons Learned from the Global War on Terror

If lessons from the Global War on Terror were learned, Israel wouldn’t have commenced military operations in Gaza without a firm strategy and clear objective. “Destroy Hamas” was not, and is not, a sound military objective.

“Destroying” a terrorist organization through military force alone is impossible. The most common way for a terrorist group to be defeated, according to research, is through a transition to the political process. In 43 percent of the cases between 1968 and 2008 where terrorist groups were brought into the political process, political goals were achieved and the groups ended. Another 40 percent of the time, the arrest or killing of key leaders by law enforcement or intelligence agencies led to the end of terrorist groups. The self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant was territorially defeated in Syria in 2019 using military force, but its members are still carrying out attacks in Iraq and Syria. Likewise, Israel conducted four major military operations in Gaza in the last 15 years but never eliminated Hamas or even permanently reduced its military capabilities. Religiously motivated terrorist organizations are particularly persistent; only 32 percent of religiously motivated groups ended between 1968 and 2008, a rate half that of secularly motivated groups.

Hamas is a designated foreign terrorist organization, but it has also governed the Gaza Strip for over a decade. It is intertwined in the local economy, governance, and society. Thus, the group’s defeat calls for a military campaign with multiple, complementary lines of effort. One line is a direct targeting effort focusing on the capture or killing of Hamas leadership, such as the one conducted against al-Qaeda and the Islamic State throughout the Middle East and East Africa. While this can certainly cause splintering and decentralization of groups, the deaths of charismatic leaders such as Osama bin Ladin and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi also precipitated the overall decline in effectiveness for their groups. However, fully eradicating Hamas’ influence and presence will require a multifaceted effort, more akin to a counter-insurgency operation — Hamas is integrated into society in Gaza as many insurgent groups like the Taliban and the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka were. This effort would place a higher emphasis on reducing civilian harm and preserving and protecting local societies and economies, while also looking beyond the immediate stage of fighting.

If lessons from the Global War on Terror were learned, operations in Gaza would be precise, supported by detailed intelligence and precision weapons.

Instead, in just the first week following Hamas’ Oct. 7 attack on Israel, the Israel Defense Forces said it dropped 6,000 bombs on Gaza. (For comparison, the U.S.-led coalition fighting the Islamic State dropped 10,000 bombs in Raqqa, Syria, over a four-month period. Even that, using precision weaponry and targeting, left 60 to 80 percent of the city uninhabitable.) Despite the Israel Defense Forces’ public insistence that it was using precision weapons, 40 to 45 percent of the munitions it fired in the first two months of the war had no guidance system. Fighting in a densely populated urban environment against an adversary that uses civilians and their infrastructure as shields demands accuracy, as seen in Mosul and Raqqa against the Islamic State. This is the only way to limit civilian harm to humans and infrastructure and is required by international law, as previously noted by Amos Fox.

If lessons from the Global War on Terror were learned, the Israel Defense Forces also would take the time necessary to precisely target Hamas’ senior leadership. Establishing a pattern of life for such targets requires significant time and intelligence, but it is also the best way to correctly identify locations and targets and to limit civilian harm, including hostages.

The Israel Defense Forces’ continued use of the AI-enabled target-creation platform called “the Gospel” led to an unprecedented number of bombings in a short period of time. During the first month of operations, the Israel Defense Forces hit more than 12,000 targets. In a quickly changing environment, in which civilians, aid workers, and Hamas fighters and leadership are all on the move, it is difficult for humans to spend enough time verifying AI-recommended targets to ensure accuracy. Moreover, excessive reliance on AI removes what little human culpability and morality currently remains in the execution of war. In contrast to the widespread violence carried out in Gaza in the first weeks after Oct. 7 is the Jan. 2 targeted killing of senior Hamas official Saleh al Arouri in Beirut. Israeli officials refused to confirm or deny responsibility for the attack, but damage to civilians and infrastructure was minimal and proven to be within presumed Israeli military capabilities.

Israeli military and intelligence forces should review targeting processes and procedures to ensure they are allowing ample time to develop a pattern of life and prioritizing reducing civilian harm. Ryan Evans previously discussed how the Israel Defense Forces are not doing this in Gaza. During operations against the Islamic State, the U.S.-led coalition typically had a threshold for acceptable number of non-combatant deaths of zero or one. If any civilian could potentially die as a result of a military strike, the local commander was required to seek higher approval to conduct the operation. After U.S.-led coalition operations in Raqqa, military officials highlighted that they prioritized unplanned, dynamic airstrikes to support ongoing military operation. This placed primacy on the protection of the coalition-supported ground forces and reducing Islamic State capabilities, which reduced the amount of time to properly and effectively establish a pattern of life to reduce civilian harm.

Continued......
 

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If lessons from the Global War on Terror were learned, maintaining public accountability for military operations would be seen as a critical foundation and building block for long-term security in Gaza.

At several junctures during operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military launched investigations into allegations of misconduct and civilian casualties. Following events such as the detainee mistreatment at Abu Ghraib in Iraq or the accidental bombing of a civilian hospital in Kunduz, Afghanistan, the United States investigated the incident, prosecuted perpetrators as appropriate, and updated training or processes as required. Demonstrating a culture of adherence to the rule of law and rules of armed conflict was a critical step in rebuilding trust with Afghan and Iraqi partners. In early February, the Israel Defense Forces began to investigate claims of possible violations of international law concerning civilian casualties. This is a tentative first step toward demonstrating accountability, which may begin to ease global concerns over Israeli operations, including the case brought to the International Criminal Court by South Africa. Behaving in accordance with international laws and norms would also reduce the potential for retaliatory violence within Israel or the Gaza Strip by Hamas or other Palestinian terrorist groups.

Israel can and should do more to increase transparency. International press should be allowed to independently document military operations and communicate with Palestinian civilians in the Gaza Strip, in real time. To supplement Israel Defense Forces investigations, Israel should provide unimpeded access to Gaza by international human rights organizations like Human Rights Watch, Airwars, and Amnesty International so that they can investigate allegations of civilian harm and publish the results. Cooperation between the U.S. military and international human rights organizations during operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria pushed the United States to reduce civilian harm, to improve U.S. military investigations into civilian casualties, and to acknowledge higher numbers of civilian deaths.

If lessons from the Global War on Terror were learned, Israel would have recognized that protecting civilians is the only way to ensure its long-term security and counter support for Hamas.

The Gaza Ministry of Health data indicates that over 100,000 residents of Gaza have been killed or injured — about 4 in 100 Palestinians in the territory. The United Nations estimated in December that 60 percent of homes have been destroyed; others suggest that the war has destroyed more than 80 percent of all structures in northern Gaza. U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, drawing on his experience as a four-star general overseeing the battle against terrorist groups in Afghanistan and Iraq, summed up the risk that this kind of violence toward civilians presents on Dec. 12: “In this kind of a fight, the center of gravity is the civilian population. And if you drive them into the arms of the enemy, you replace a tactical victory with a strategic defeat.”

Polling indicates that more Palestinians now support Hamas than did before the Oct. 7 attack on Israel. But support for the terrorist organization still remains below 50 percent in both Gaza and the West Bank. To decrease support for terrorist and insurgent organizations, civilians should be given effective political and social options. They need homes, businesses, educational facilities, and communities to rebuild. Uneven and insufficient reconstruction efforts in northeastern Syria since 2017, coupled with the ongoing Syrian civil war, have provided the Islamic State an opportunity to maintain insurgent activities and pressure against civilians and local governing authorities.

Instead, 85 percent of Palestinians, almost 2 million people, have been displaced since Oct. 7. Many have moved multiple times. They have been pushed into areas of southern Gaza that have no humanitarian infrastructure. Evacuation routes are not safe and secure. Aid organizations say continued fighting and slow border crossings are producing a severe hunger and public health crisis. Over 90 percent of children under the age of 24 months as well as pregnant and breastfeeding women eat food of the “lowest nutritional value and from only two or fewer food groups,” a result of severe food insecurity. According to the same United Nations Children’s Fund report, 90 percent of children are suffering from one or more infectious diseases.

The current and next generations of Palestinians are at risk of disease, starvation and malnutrition, under-education, and generational trauma. The Gaza Strip is facing an imminent famine. Despite warnings that it would cause long-term environmental damage to local agriculture and the water table, Israel began pumping seawater to flood some of the tunnels under Gaza in early February. This will limit Gazans’ ability to restart the economy and maintain public health.

If lessons from the Global War on Terror were learned, Israel and its Western partners and allies would work with trusted and vetted aid organizations to create safe zones for civilians. These areas would remain as demilitarized humanitarian evacuation zones so Palestinians would not have to move again until they can return home. The safe zones would contain adequate housing, water and food supplies, sanitation and hygiene, and medical resources. Israel should also provide international aid organizations consistent and secure daily access to the Gaza Strip to support humanitarian aid deliveries. Humanitarian aid to Gaza prior to Oct. 7 was already insufficient, and now the situation is even more dire. Instead, the Israel Defense Forces plan to conduct military operations in Rafah, where almost half of Gaza’s population has sought refuge, having been told by Israeli authorities to evacuate there from northern and central Gaza.

If lessons from the Global War on Terrorism were learned, Israel would already be working with international and local partners to prepare for future governance, stabilization, and reconstruction in Gaza.

Planning for what happens after the end of hostilities should begin now. Reconstruction of Gaza is critical for the future stability and safety not only of Palestinians, but also of Israel. Ensuring that Gaza has a viable economy, government, and civil society respects the humanity of Palestinians, will provide them a future, and will help ensure the security of Israel. Both Israelis and Palestinians should be involved in any post-conflict stabilization planning, but this planning should not occur along separate paths. The United States and European partners, regional Arab countries, and trusted nongovernmental organizations and commercial partners should also be included in the planning to ensure success. Provincial reconstruction teams in Afghanistan and Iraq could provide a template for integrating multiple stakeholders into stabilization and reconstruction processes, especially local leaders. Plans for the reconstruction of Ukraine, Yemen, and Mosul could also provide roadmaps for Gaza.

Unfortunately, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s latest plan for post-conflict Gaza does not provide for stabilization or reconstruction. It prioritizes Israeli security control, access, and demilitarization — at the expense of Palestinians — of the Gaza Strip. It does not give Palestinians agency or a voice in their own future, which will likely undercut long-term security in Israel, the Gaza Strip, and possibly the West Bank. Credible Palestinian political representatives, identified by Palestinians themselves, should also be involved in crafting a reconstruction and governance structure following the end of hostilities. In Afghanistan and Iraq, U.S.-led coalitions appointed interim, mostly formerly expatriate, leaders, prior to national elections, which did not provide accurate or effective representation. There should be free and fair elections in Gaza — the first since 2006 — which would provide Palestinians a voice in their leadership.

In Syria, local partners to the U.S.-led coalition prioritized protecting civilians and pushed the military to do the same during counter–Islamic State operations. This partnership with the Syrian Democratic Forces brought together local Arab and Kurdish leaders and fighting forces. While combatting the Islamic State was the priority, these coalition forces also were concerned about stabilization and reconstruction upon the territorial defeat of the terrorist organization. Unfortunately, in Gaza, Israel has few local partners of the same stature. Palestinians in the Gaza Strip also lack a government that prioritizes their interests, welfare, and security. And yet, local support is the only way to achieve long-lasting security. After the end of fighting and during the reconstruction of Gaza, the establishment of a truth and reconciliation committee could help achieve peace and identify local partners committed to stability. These have been successful globally, such as in South Africa, Canada, and throughout Latin America.

If lessons from the Global War on Terror were learned, warnings by veteran soldiers, intelligence officers, diplomats, and humanitarian workers about these and other issues with the war in Gaza would have been heeded. Their calls for a ceasefire would have been answered. These experts — including myself — have 20 years of experience trying to keep the world secure. In addition to the needless destruction and tragic loss of life in Gaza, from a military and intelligence perspective, all the hard-gained lessons from the Global War on Terror have been wasted.

Karen M. Sudkamp is a national security researcher at RAND, a nonprofit, non-partisan policy think tank, with a focus on how to limit the impacts of conflict on civilian populations. She spent over a decade in the U.S. intelligence community supporting political-military and counter-terrorism analysis, operations, and policy focused on the Middle East.
 

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‘Extremely concerned’: American generals raise alarm over Iran’s tightening ties with Russia, China

"They're trying to get what they want. They're trying to replace the West and, moreover, the United States in our access and influence across this crucial continent," US Africa Command chief Gen. Michael Langley told lawmakers.​

By AGNES HELOU on March 22, 2024 at 1:42 PM

BEIRUT — As wars rage in Gaza and Ukraine, senior US military officials sounded the alarm to lawmakers about the renewed relationships between China, Russia and Iran in both the Middle East and Africa, suggesting alliances of geopolitical convenience intertwining the three could threaten America’s position in both regions.

“I’m very concerned about this renewed relationship between Russia, China and Iran,” US Central Command head Gen. Michael Kurilla told a House Armed Services hearing Thursday. “What we’re seeing is Iran is reliant on China and Russia is reliant on Iran.”

Kurilla explained that China buys “90 percent” of Iran’s oil, which is sanctioned by the US. In return, China uses Iran’s influence as part of an effort to “replace the US as one of the dominant forces in the Middle East.”

“So in effect, China is funding Iran’s subversive and malign behavior in the region,” he said.

Iran, meanwhile, has provided thousands of one-way attack drones to Russia for its war in Ukraine and now has even “built a factory in Russia” to produce more locally, Kurilla said. The general said he couldn’t discuss in an open setting what Russia is providing Iran for this help, but said that it was “concerning.”

In his testimony Kurilla didn’t get complete the triangle, but US officials contend that China has provided at least non-lethal aid to Russia since Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and just prior to the invasion Russia’s Vladimir Putin and China’s Xi Jinping announced a “no limits” partnership.

Earlier this month, Iran conducted maritime exercise with Russia and China, dubbed as Maritime Security Belt. The exercise reportedly took place in the North Indian Ocean and the Sea of Oman.

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From BREAKING DEFENSE

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Similarly US Africa Command chief Gen. Michael Langley said the US also should be worried about Russian and Chinese increased footprint in Africa.

“We should be extremely concerned because I would say that both are very, very much exploitative when possible, but they are also coercive when necessary,” he said. “They’re trying to get what they want. They’re trying to replace the West and, moreover, the United States in our access and influence across this crucial continent.”

Langley said Beijing and Moscow are offering “shiny objects” to “our African partners.” The US counters those temptations, he said, with a “whole government approach with USAID and the State Department” as well as the military there.

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Army, CENTCOM ask Congress for spending jump for counter-drone mission

The Army has sent lawmakers a $2.2 billion unfunded priority list for FY25, while US Central Command says it would happily funnel an additional $450 million towards regional security.
By ASHLEY ROQUE and VALERIE INSINNA

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Back in the Middle East, Kurilla said the region “faces its most volatile security situation in the past half century” in the wake of Hamas’s Oct. 7 attack on Israel, Israel’s massive, deadly counter-attack and the months-long campaign of Yemen-based Houthis to strike at commercial shipping targets in the Red Sea.

“The events of [Oct. 7] not only permanently changed Israel and Gaza. They created the conditions for malign actors to sow instability throughout the region and beyond,” Kurilla said.

He added that Iran, which backs Hamas and the Houthis as well as Hezbollah in Lebanon, has exploited “what they saw as a once-in-a-generation opportunity to reshape the Middle East to their advantage.

“Iran has worked for decades to encircle the region with its proxies. And in the past six months, we have seen every proxy and the Iranian threat network operationalized in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Gaza, the West Bank, and Yemen,” he said. “Iran’s expansive network of proxies is equipped with advanced sophisticated weaponry, and threaten some of the most vital trade in the world with global and US implications.”

Kurilla stressed that Iran knows that its “decade-long vision cannot be realized if countries in the region continue to expand integration with each other and deepen their partnership with United States.”

He said that American “partners” in the region “are committed to advancing the region, and the United States remains their partner of choice for now.”

The US leads two operations in the Red Sea: the defensive Operation Prosperity Guardian, meant to protect ships from incoming Houthi missiles and drones, and Operation Poseidon Archer, an offensive series of strikes undertaken along with the UK on Houthi targets in Yemen. Kurilla said a third effort is aimed at interdicting Iran’s supply of arms to the Houthis.

Prosperity Guardian’s international membership has fluctuated since its launch in December, but Kurilla said Thursday it currently has 24 partners, 17 of which were “public.”

RELATED: Crowded waters: Who’s doing what in the international hot spot of the Red Sea

But it’s Iran that’s the source of much of the problem, Kurilla said.

“Iran must be compelled to cease their malign behavior and their actions of directing and supplying funding and training these proxies,” he said. “We want to deny [the Houthi’s] ability to be resupplied. That will take a whole tougher and actually international effort much like we did with counter piracy, to be able to go after that because only two ships can resupply the vast majority of the equipment that we’ve destroyed so far of the Houthis.

“We have to stop that we have to increase the international effort to be able to do the inspections on the vessels that are going into Hodeidah [port in Yemen],” he said. “We need to isolate the Houthis in the information environment, we have to impose costs on Iran. So there’s consequences to their behavior.”
 

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  1. Blog
Sun, 03/24/2024 - 5:27pm

Frontera: A Journey across the US-Mexico Border, a new illustrated book chronicling the US−Mexico frontier, has been released. The text by Guadalupe Correa-Cabrera, a SWJ−El Centro Fellow and Sergio Chapa, a freelance journalist and oil and gas expert, examines social, cultural, political, and security situation along the US-Mexico border from the Rio Grande Valley to the Pacific Ocean, stoping at border towns and cities along the way.
Frontera

Publisher's description:
Following the border formed by the Rio Grande and moving cross-country to the Pacific Ocean, Frontera is a lavishly illustrated book that offers a comprehensive examination of the nearly two thousand-mile border shared by the United States and Mexico. The region has a reputation for being a dangerous place, with US Border Patrol and Mexican authorities playing cat and mouse with smugglers and undocumented migrants, and with drug cartels inflicting unspeakable violence on the region. Frontera takes an unblinking look at those dangers, but it goes beyond stereotypes and offers the reader vivid portraits of the beauty and complexity of the area—its history, its contemporary attractions, its rich cultural life. Moving through thirty-eight municipalities on the Mexican side and twenty-four counties in the US, Frontera includes maps, key cities, points of interest, border crossings, festivals, local cuisines, and more, along with analyses of local politics and security issues. Despite its troubles, the US-Mexico border is a beautiful place, the home of welcoming and warm people. It is a land of contrasts—austere landscapes and lush oases, thunderstorms and rainbows in the desert, robust industry and ghost towns, great wealth and aching poverty. Frontera is both a feast for the eyes and an encyclopedic reference that offers readers a clear-eyed perspective on a subject of critical importance to the United States and its southern neighbor.
Co-author Sergio Chapa describes the book in his article "Border Angels and Magic Moments" at the Texas Observer (26 January 2024).
Source: Guadalupe Correa-Cabrera and Sergio Chapa, Frontera: A Journey across the US-Mexico Border. Fort Worth: TCU Press, 2024 (Hardcover, 516 pages).
Categories: El Centro
 

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Britain developing new, sovereign nuclear warhead​

By
George Allison
-
March 25, 2024
83 Comments

The United Kingdom has confirmed that it is developing a replacement UK sovereign nuclear warhead for its Trident missiles.​

The Ministry of Defence says in the ‘Defence Nuclear Enterprise Command Paper’ that “Replacing the UK’s warhead will ensure the UK’s deterrent remains cutting-edge, safe and effective”.

In the paper released today, they state:

“The UK committed to replacing our sovereign warhead in parliament in February 2021. Using modern and innovative developments in science, engineering, manufacturing and production at AWE, we will ensure the UK maintains an effective deterrent for as long as required.

The Replacement Warhead Programme has been designated the A21/Mk7 (also known as Astraea). It is being delivered in parallel with the US W93/Mk7 warhead and each nation is developing a sovereign design. This will be the first UK warhead developed in an era where we no longer test our weapons underground, upholding our voluntary moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions.

This is possible because of the long history of technical expertise and extensive investment in UK modelling and simulation, supercomputing, materials science, shock and laser physics at AWE. Replacing the UK warhead is a long-term programme, driving modernisation and construction at AWE, HMNB Clyde and the hydrodynamics facility at EPURE, in France.”


For those unaware, the Trident II D5 missile is manufactured in the US. It comprises the missiles and supporting systems fitted on the submarine as well as training and shore
support equipment.

Under the agreement with the United States, the UK accesses a shared missile pool.
Missiles are loaded into our submarines in Kings Bay, Georgia, US. The UK-manufactured
warheads are mated to the missiles at HMNB Clyde.

How will it be tested?​

Well, the paper covers that too, stating:

“We have developed unique and world‑leading technology to validate the UK’s warhead stockpile. The Orion laser helps our physicists and scientists research the physics of those extreme temperatures and pressures found in a nuclear explosion to better understand the safety, reliability and performance of nuclear warheads. Orion is used collaboratively with UK academia and US teams in their National Laboratories.

Supercomputing is also a crucial capability, enabling simulations that allow us to develop a safe, assured warhead without detonation. AWE has recently commissioned a supercomputer named Valiant, one of the most powerful computers in the UK, to validate the design, performance and reliability of our nuclear warhead. These facilities will be used to bring our next warhead into service, upholding our voluntary moratorium on nuclear weapons test explosions.”
 

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  1. NP Comment

David Oliver: Donald Trump's subtle warning to allies — buy nukes​

If the U.S. can't guarantee security to friendly anti-nuclear nations, they might just arm up
Author of the article:
Special to National Post
Published Mar 25, 2024 • Last updated 16 hours ago • 4 minute read

Isolationism in the United States could bring to life one the biggest fears of its foreign and defence establishment — nuclear proliferation to many previously anti-nuclear states.

A pointed conversation about nuclear arms has commenced in Europe, largely out of fear of a second Donald Trump presidency, but also thanks to the delaying of the US$60 billion (C$80 billion) Ukrainian aid package by boneheaded Republicans in the U.S. House of Representatives.

Europe has realized that it can no longer mortgage its collective security on the whims and wanes of U.S. politics. What previously seemed unthinkable — the U.S. abandonment of its own stridently fought economic and security apparatus — is now both a likely reality under a future Trump presidency and a significant strand in U.S. popular opinion.

Trump was always a NATO skeptic. His first term was characterized by berating other NATO members for not doing and paying enough to defend themselves. With Trump now in full campaign mode, his antics have continued. Speaking in February in South Carolina, he appeared to recall an exchange he had with a president “of a big country,” who asked, “‘If we don’t pay and we’re attacked by Russia, will you protect us?'”

Trump claims to have replied, “‘No, I would not protect you, in fact, I would encourage them to do whatever the hell they want.… You don’t pay your bills, you get no protection, it’s very simple.” This would undermine the NATO treaty’s Article 5, which guarantees members’ rights to collective defence.

This week, Trump appeared to row back a little with half-heated reassurances to his friend Nigel Farage, stating that the U.S. would “100 per cent” help NATO members who pay their fair share.

It is no coincidence that revulsion at American “forever wars” of the 2000s and 2010s in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the treatment of jaded veterans has combined with anti-globalism in the “fly-over states” that are both deeply patriotic and hostile to U.S. foreign involvement.

This new sensitivity in Washington is why President Joe Biden has largely kept Trump’s tariffs, immigration restrictions and executed its clumsy exit from Afghanistan. It’s also why the U.S. national security advisor, Jake Sullivan, sets course by thinking of a “foreign policy for the middle class.”

For Ukraine, Taiwan, the Baltic states, Japan and South Korea, the blowing of these recent political winds in the U.S. are unsettling — and existential. If the U.S. can no longer be relied on to enforce both the letter and spirit of their defence agreements, allies know they must resort to defending themselves or risk facing aggression from Russia, China and volatile states like North Korea.

In Europe, this debate has come into sharp focus after Ukraine failed to deliver a decisive blow to Russia. In the fall of 2023, it could be seen that the offensive had stalled and time was running out. It was only one year until the potential return of Trump, giving him the power to settle the Ukraine war in “one day” as he suggested last spring.

Not only will Russian President Vladimir Putin play for time while Ukraine faces perilously low supplies of ammunition, he will also threaten other nations if he feels that U.S. security guarantees no longer exist.

In late February, President Emmanuel Macron stated that the possibility of moving European troops into Ukraine should not be ruled out. His recent maneuvering reflects a long-held French view that Europe should only rely on itself for its own security. But his “journey” from arch-appeaser to arch-adversary of Putin also demonstrates France’s status as the only European country with a fully independent nuclear deterrent (the United Kingdom is increasingly reliant on the U.S.).

Figures from the U.K. establishment, typically in lockstep with U.S. foreign policy, have joined this debate with Malcolm Rifkind, who served as defence and foreign secretary under former prime minister John Major. They call for the U.K. and France to develop a new nuclear deterrent strategy that is entirely independent of the U.S.

Germany, Europe’s largest economic power and funder of Ukraine, may also reconsider its previous renouncement of nuclear weapons. It does not have nuclear weapons at the moment, and it is, after all, far closer to areas of potential Russian land aggression than France and the U.K.

Meanwhile in Asia Pacific, Japan and South Korea are already having to deal with direct threats on their doorstep not just from China, but much more pointedly and unpredictably from North Korea.

U.S. isolationism in the 1930s proved to be an epic failure, and that was before the dawn of the nuclear age. The U.S. politicians who believe the country should close itself off from the world and “let the others sort it out for themselves” will be met with a rude awakening when an even more serious crisis starts in Europe and Asia, whose ultimately escalation point is a nuclear one.

For now, the U.S. can largely call the nuclear shots among allied nations — even those that have independent deterrents. Nuclear weapons are also still a deeply held taboo in nations like Germany and Japan. But, in walking away from those same nations it will also be handing the strongest possible incentive for the rest to develop their own nuclear deterrents, which the U.S. will no longer be able to control.

Republicans can play the shortest-term, most cynical game to curry favor with Trump, but they will rue the day that the U.S. ceded its role in global defence to a multi-polar, multi-nuclear world.

National Post
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Swiss Politics

Swiss government again declines to sign nuclear weapons treaty​

The Swiss government is sticking to its guns: it still does not want to sign and ratify the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). It reckons participation within the framework of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is more effective.

This content was published onMarch 28, 2024 - 13:42
4 minutes
Keystone-SDA

A change of strategy at the present time is not advisable for several reasons, the government said on Wednesday. Ministers explained that joining the TPNW was not in Switzerland’s best interests in the current climate, in which a new war in Europe has once again brought security policy to the fore.

Furthermore, the government considers the TPNW to be of little impact since it is not recognised by nuclear powers; neither do almost all Western and European countries participate. “A world without nuclear weapons can only be achieved with and not against states with nuclear weapons,” the Federal Council said.

+ Opinion: Swiss ‘wait-and-see’ nuclear approach is sensible

Latest assessment​

The TPNW came into force in 2021 and contains a comprehensive and explicit ban on nuclear weapons, i.e. prohibiting the use, threat of use, production, stockpiling, acquisition, possession, deployment, transfer and testing of nuclear weapons as well as support for these activities.

To date, the TPNW has been ratified by 70 states, but not by those with nuclear weapons and their allies. The Swiss government already rejected the idea of acceding in 2018 and 2019. Its latest assessment was based on an analysis by an interdepartmental working group and assessments by external experts.

According to the government, the rejection of TPNW accession does not mean that Switzerland will remain passive, as “the use of nuclear weapons would hardly be compatible with international humanitarian law.” Ten days ago, Switzerland made its position clear in the UN Security Council, declaring that there would be no winners of a nuclear war, which should never be allowed to happen.

No nuclear powers​

In its Foreign Policy Strategy 2024-2027, the government spoke unequivocally in favour of a world free of nuclear weapons. Despite the current stagnation in nuclear disarmament, it said, Switzerland will continue to demand that the states concerned fulfil their disarmament obligations.

Switzerland has also been a member of the NPT since 1977, which was signed by 191 member states, including nuclear powers such as USA, Russia, China, France and the UK. The NPT is regarded as the cornerstone of nuclear arms control and the global security architecture.

According to figures from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) from 2023, nine states possess nuclear weapons: Russia has the most warheads with 5,889, followed by the USA with 5,244, then China with 410.

In Europe, the nuclear powers of France and the UK have 290 and 225 warheads, respectively. They are followed by Pakistan (170) and India (164). Israel is estimated to have 90 warheads and North Korea 30. In total, SIPRI puts the global nuclear arsenal at 12,512 warheads.

Pressure remains high​

The question of how the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons can be realised is also the subject of controversial domestic political debate in Switzerland. Over five years ago, parliament called on the government to sign the TPNW as quickly as possible and submit it to parliamentarians for approval, as by ratifying it, Switzerland would show a clear commitment to international humanitarian law and the values associated with it.

The further postponement of the decision on the ratification of the treaty is unlikely to satisfy many. At the beginning of November 2023, the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) launched a people’s initiative to join the TPNW. The Group for a Switzerland without an Army (GSoA) also announced that it would join the NGO alliance.

Adapted from German by DeepL/kp
 

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Macron makes nuclear offer to BRICS nation​


Brazil is developing its own nuclear-powered submarine based on a French design
ByRT

28 March 2024

French President Emmanuel Macron has offered to help Brazil with the development of a nuclear-powered submarine during an official visit to the South American country.

Macron was speaking at a launch ceremony on Wednesday, hosted by his Brazilian counterpart, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, for Brazil’s third Riachuelo class diesel-electric submarine, which is based on the French Scorpene class.


Read more: Macron faces backlash over U-turn on rape law

“I want us to open the chapter for new submarines,” moving towards nuclear propulsion “while being perfectly respectful of all non-proliferation commitments,” Macron said, adding: “you want it, France will be at your side.”

Brazil’s Submarine Development Program (PROSUB) was laid out in 2008, after a security pact between Lula and then-President Nicolas Sarkozy led to plans to modernize Brazil’s navy. The fifth vessel of the program, the Alvaro Alberto, is planned to be nuclear-powered.

With an enormous coastline, and 95% of its imports and 90% of its national supplies of oil coming from the sea, PROSUB was set up to defend Brazil’s strategic resources, while developing the country’s shipbuilding and providing thousands of jobs.


French defense company Naval Group has provided support in designing modifications to the hull to fit a nuclear reactor – but Paris has been hesitant to provide Brasilia nuclear propulsion technology due to fears of breaking non-proliferation commitments.

Read more: Macron is a ‘coward’ – Medvedev

Thus far, only the five permanent members of the UN Security Council – Russia, the US, UK, China, and France – and India, possess nuclear-powered submarines. Brazil is a non-nuclear-weapon state party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), but its norms do not technically prohibit it from building its own naval nuclear reactors and enriching its own uranium to fuel it.

Brazil’s peaceful atomic energy program is entirely homegrown, with a full cycle of uranium fuel enrichment and two nuclear power stations. The design of the nuclear boiler for the prospective vessel has also so far been completely Brazilian.

China has raised fears that the NPT could be compromised after the US and UK announced the trilateral AUKUS security pact with Australia in 2021, along with the sale of three US nuclear subs and the transfer of US nuclear technology.

Beijing has warned that the AUKUS pact undermines the NPT, noting that it marks a dangerous precedent of handing over nuclear propulsion reactors and large-amounts of weapons-grade enriched uranium to a non-nuclear weapon state. It has expressed concern that there is no guarantee that Australia could not divert the uranium to build nuclear weapons.
 
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