WAR 02-11-2022-to-02-17-2022__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****

[Housecarl]

(279) 01-21-2022-to-01-27-2022__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****​

(280) 01-28-2022-to-02-03-2022__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****​

(281) 02-04-2022-to-02-10-2022__****THE****WINDS****of****WAR****​

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BRKG - NORAD - NEW "Object" Detected and Shot Down Over Canada!

Breaking on Fox - Stand By!

www.timebomb2000.com

BRKG - Another object shot down over Alaska

While were waiting for more info, if it ever comes, does anyone have an idea of what this "object" could be? Or if it even exists. For all we know, this Alaska "thing" could just be a fabricated show, so they can show Joey being "macho" and not so wimpy, to show him to the public as being...

www.timebomb2000.com

BRKG - Suspected Chinese spy balloon found over northern U.S. - Shot Down on Saturday 2/4/23

No one is going to nuke anyone over a balloon unless the balloon of which you speak is a nuke. Russia shot down KAL-007, China Bumped a P-3, etc. Most of the overflights that have occurred have been the US overflying the "them" and never resulted in a nuke. Have you ever heard of a RUssian spy...

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ALERT - RUSSIA INVADES UKRAINE - Consolidated Thread

ZELENSKY, Have Pity For Your Men in BAKHMUT View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pW38cLZ-tOc Runtime - 18:00 Feb 11, 2023 The Siege of Bakhmut takes a dramatic turn, as both the vital M03 and T0504 roads are now under Russian control. The cold and a lack of supplies affect the morale of the...

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ALERT - The Winds of War Blow in Korea and The Far East

Philippine Coast Guard to Bolster Its South China Sea Presence By Sebastian Strangio for The Diplomat ASEAN Beat | Security | Southeast Asia...

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WAR - CHINA THREATENS TO INVADE TAIWAN

Faytuks News Δ @Faytuks Jan 8 The US and Japanese armed forces are rapidly integrating their command structure and scaling up combined operations as the US and its Asian allies prepare for a possible conflict with China such as a war over Taiwan, according to the top Marine Corps general in...

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Posted for fair use.....

UN Calls ISIS Threat in A Number of Regions Remains High

loading… UN Calls ISIS Threat in A Number of Regions Remains High. PHOTO/Reuters NEW YORK – The threat posed by Daesh extremists ( ISIS ) remains high and has increased in and around conflict zones. The group’s expansion is also particularly worrying in the central, southern and Sahel regions...

www.ruetir.com

UN Calls ISIS Threat in A Number of Regions Remains High​

by Ruetir

February 11, 2023

in World

UN Calls ISIS Threat in A Number of Regions Remains High. PHOTO/Reuters


NEW YORK – The threat posed by Daesh extremists ( ISIS ) remains high and has increased in and around conflict zones. The group’s expansion is also particularly worrying in the central, southern and Sahel regions Africa .


UN Deputy Secretary-General Vladimir Voronkov told the UN Security Council that ISIS continues to use the internet, social media, video games and gaming platforms to expand its propaganda reach to radicalize and recruit new supporters.


Baca: US Troops Arrest 3 ISIS Leaders in East Syria


“ISIS’s use of new and developing technologies also remains a major concern,” Voronkov said, as quoted by AP, Friday (10/2/2023). He referred to the continued use of drones for surveillance and reconnaissance and “virtual assets” to raise money.


Voronkov also said the high level of threat posed by ISIS and its affiliates, including their continued expansion in parts of Africa, underscores the need for a multifaceted approach to response – not only focusing on security but also on preventive measures including preventing conflict.


IS declared a self-styled caliphate over large swathes of Syria and Iraq it captured in 2014. The extremist group was officially declared defeated in Iraq in 2017 after three years of bloody fighting that left tens of thousands of people dead and cities in ruins, but its sleeper cells remain exist in both countries.


Baca: 10 ISIS Branches in the World Apart from ISIS-K, All Are Actively Spreading Terror


Some 65,600 suspected ISIS members and their families – both Syrians and foreigners – are still being held in camps and prisons in northeastern Syria run by our allied Kurdish groups, according to a Human Rights Watch report released in December.


Voronkov said the pace of repatriation was still too slow and children continued to bear the brunt of the disaster. “At the same time, foreign terrorist fighters who join extremist groups are not limited to Iraq and Syria and move between different conflict fronts,” he said.


Voronkov, who heads the UN Counter-Terrorism Office, said “foreign terrorist fighters with battlefield experience moving to their homes or to a third country further adds to the threat” from Daesh.


(esn)

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use.....

Colombia to establish areas for armed groups as part of peace process

Colombia will establish areas where members of four armed groups who have agreed to ceasefires can gather, another step in efforts to reach peace or surrender deals, the country's defense minister and military said on Thursday.

www.reuters.com

2 minute read February 9, 202312:36 PM PST Last Updated 2 days ago

Colombia to establish areas for armed groups as part of peace process​

By Luis Jaime Acosta

BOGOTA, Feb 9 (Reuters) - Colombia will establish areas where members of four armed groups who have agreed to ceasefires can gather, another step in efforts to reach peace or surrender deals, the country's defense minister and military said on Thursday.

President Gustavo Petro, a leftist and former member of a guerilla group, has promised to seek agreements with armed groups to end nearly a six-decade conflict that has killed at least 450,000 people in the Andean nation.


The ceasefires with the Clan del Golfo and the Sierra Nevada gangs and two dissident groups founded by ex-members of the FARC rebels who rejected a 2016 peace deal have led to significant reductions in violence during their first month, the government has said.

"There should come a concentration of these organizations," Defense Minister Ivan Velasquez told journalists. "A territorial concentration which, on the one hand guarantees the possibility of effective control by the armed forces, and also to show that criminal activities are not continued."

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On Wednesday, Colombia's government said it had made a deal with the Estado Mayor Central, one of the FARC dissident groups, that was meant to encourage further talks and which would see the group have areas for its units to gather.

The group, which has some 3,200 members, also pledged to avoid populated areas and main roads.

Similar protocols are being negotiated with Segunda Marquetalia, the other FARC dissident group, and the two crime gangs, whose members could receive benefits like reduced sentences for surrendering to authorities.


"A large part of the success of this work should be that groups look for locations to concentrate, where they will stop committing crimes and where we can carry out a protocol that will allow the laying down of arms," said General Luis Mauricio Ospina, an army commander.

Troops will guard the outskirts of the areas to protect civilians and members of armed groups, said General Helder Fernan Giraldo, the commander of the armed forces.

Such areas have been used in previous peace processes with the FARC and paramilitary groups, many of whose members later joined crime gangs.

Reporting by Luis Jaime Acosta; Writing by Julia Symmes Cobb; Editing by Paul Simao

 

[Housecarl]

CRIME - Major Sheriff’s Associations Call for ‘Eradication’ of Mexican Drug Cartels

The largest sheriff’s associations in the country called for the eradication of Mexican drug cartels and for the public to pressure their elected officials to do something about it. The groups called for action to start against the two most powerful criminal organizations in Mexico. The call for...

www.timebomb2000.com

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China considering tripling stockpile of nuclear warheads, sources say

The blueprint, mapped out by the People's Liberation Army, has already been approved by President Xi Jinping, who has been eager to bolster Beijing's deterrence against Washington.

www.japantimes.co.jp

China considering tripling stockpile of nuclear warheads, sources say​

• KYODO
• Feb 11, 2023

China is considering tripling its stockpile of nuclear warheads to 900 by 2035, as tensions with the United States are expected to escalate further over Taiwan, sources close to the matter said Saturday.

The blueprint, mapped out by the People’s Liberation Army, has already been approved by President Xi Jinping, head of the military, who has been eager to bolster Beijing’s deterrence against Washington, the Chinese sources said.

With the ruling Communist Party strengthening the country’s military capabilities, the United States said last year that China is on course to increase its stockpile of nuclear warheads to 1,500 by 2035 when it aims to complete the modernization of its military.

Some foreign affairs experts warn that if China achieves the goal of modernizing its military, the Asian nation could abandon its “no first use” policy.

In November, the top body of the Chinese military reaffirmed the importance of lethal capabilities, determining that Russia’s strong nuclear deterrence has prevented a head-on conflict between NATO and Moscow despite its aggression against Ukraine, the sources said.

The number of nuclear warheads held by China is likely to rise to 550 in 2027, the 100th anniversary of the foundation of the country’s armed forces, and to 900 in 2035, the sources added.

Worldwide, Russia owns 5,977 nuclear warheads, while the United States possesses 5,428, according to estimates from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

Strains between China and the United States have been intensifying, especially after then-U.S. House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan in early August.

Fears have been growing that self-ruled democratic Taiwan may become a military flashpoint in the Asia-Pacific region in the near future, as Beijing regards the island as a renegade province to be reunified with the mainland, by force if necessary.

China and Taiwan have been governed separately since they split in 1949 as the result of a civil war.

Washington switched its diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing in 1979, but the United States maintains substantive, though unofficial, exchanges with Taiwan and supplies it with billions of dollars in arms and spare parts for its defense.

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use.....

South Korea’s Nuclear Flirtations Highlight the Growing Risks of Allied Proliferation

Yoon’s comments have fueled a debate in Washington over how to handle a problem that policymakers cannot wish away.

carnegieendowment.org

South Korea’s Nuclear Flirtations Highlight the Growing Risks of Allied Proliferation​

ERIC BREWER, TOBY DALTON

• FEBRUARY 13, 2023
• COMMENTARY

Source: Getty
Summary: Yoon’s comments have fueled a debate in Washington over how to handle a problem that policymakers cannot wish away.
Related Media and Tools

South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol’s January comments about his country possibly acquiring nuclear weapons adds to the mounting nuclear dangers in Asia. Though he subsequently walked back his statement, the underlying motives and risks remain that South Korea could one day decide to go nuclear.

Yoon’s nuclear threat also fueled a debate among security experts in Washington about how to respond. Many nonproliferation analysts highlighted the rarity of national leaders making public allusions to acquiring nuclear weapons and argued that the United States needs to remind South Korea of its commitments not to do so. Others highlighted the dangers of a rising tide of “nuclear populism” that is driving South Korea’s nuclear discourse. Conversely, some analysts argued that there is little the United States can do to prevent an inevitable South Korean weapon and that it is better to reduce U.S. extended deterrence commitments in conflicts that exceed vital U.S. interests. A few go even further and suggest that Washington should welcome or even facilitate a nuclear-armed Seoul.

Eric Brewer​

Eric Brewer is deputy vice president at the Nuclear Threat Initiative and has served on the National Security Council and National Intelligence Council.
This debate indicates a very unsettled dynamic that American and other policymakers cannot wish away or ignore. Yoon’s comments may simply be the leading edge of a trend in nuclear flirtations by U.S. allies and partners.

Since the dawn of the nuclear age, the United States has sought to stem the spread of nuclear weapons to adversaries and allies alike. This policy aims partly to preserve the U.S. nuclear advantage and to reduce the potential that nuclear weapons are used, which many experts judge increases if more states acquire them. Over the past few decades, the major proliferation fear has been about rogue actors: North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria, or potentially terrorist groups. The United States and the international community developed a policy tool kit to address these threats, including sanctions, technology denial, and even cyber and military attacks on nuclear facilities. Today, however, an increasing proliferation risk comes from U.S. allies and partners worried about their security and the credibility of U.S. commitments to their defense.

Toby Dalton​

Dalton is the co-director and a senior fellow of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment. An expert on nonproliferation and nuclear energy, his work addresses regional security challenges and the evolution of the global nuclear order.

The last time the United States faced serious allied proliferation risks was roughly forty years ago. In the 1960s and 1970s, South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, West Germany, and other allies and partners considered or pursued nuclear weapons. The United States used several strategies to keep those ambitions in check: pressing for their commitment to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and abstention from ever developing nuclear weapons; providing, and alternatively threatening to withhold, commercial nuclear technology; and, perhaps most importantly, offering security guarantees and other defense commitments. In effect, Washington pledged to use its military might, including nuclear weapons, in defense of many of these allies so they didn’t need to develop their own. These arrangements were part of a clearly conditional bargain. In return for help with civil nuclear power programs and security commitments, allies and partners would eschew nuclear weapons development.

Now, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, China’s military expansion and aggressive posturing, and North Korea’s nuclear expansion are changing allied threat perceptions, especially in Asia. These come on the heels of the Trump administration’s extortionate approach to alliances, which seriously damaged U.S. credibility, and which allies worry could re-emerge in a future U.S. administration. In the Middle East, Iran’s nuclear progress and its destabilizing activities—combined with fears of U.S. abandonment—are driving similar fears.

South Korea is exhibit A for the effects of these developments. Popular support for nuclear weapons there hovers around 70 percent. Over time, public discussion of developing nuclear weapons has moved from the political fringes to the mainstream, especially among conservative politicians and defense experts. In addition to South Korea’s advanced nuclear energy infrastructure, in recent years Seoul has invested in longer-range and more sophisticated conventional missile capabilities that could also be used for nuclear delivery. These capabilities may be what Yoon had in mind when he said that, if Seoul decided to do so, its “science and technology” would allow South Korea to acquire nuclear weapons “sooner rather than later.”

Until now, no South Korean president has talked about developing nuclear weapons as explicitly as Yoon. His comments—conditional on “problems” from North Korea becoming “more serious”—may have been intended to warn Pyongyang, appease pro-nuclear factions in his political party, or pressure Washington to provide Seoul with a larger role in the nuclear element of extended deterrence. Whatever his intent, they also threaten the very bargain that undergirds U.S. security guarantees.

The United States and South Korea have a shared interest in strengthening the alliance, adapting it to the evolving North Korean threat and broader challenges in the Indo-Pacific. To that end, the Biden administration has been actively working with South Korea, Japan, and other allies and partners to adjust military postures, including U.S. nuclear posture, to address the changing landscape and concerns about U.S. security commitments.

But disagreements about how to accomplish these adjustments—which are inevitable between allies—are best worked out behind the scenes. Yoon’s implicit threat that South Korea will seek nuclear weapons if the United States doesn’t provide what South Korea wants risks undermining the trust that acts as the glue in the alliance. It makes the assurance problem much harder to manage for both the United States and South Korea. It could also inadvertently become a self-fulfilling prophecy: Seoul’s loose proliferation talk may drive more U.S. politicians to believe that South Korea doesn’t need U.S. troops or the alliance.

Even if South Korea opts to withdraw from the NPT and produce nuclear weapons without violating international law, that can’t mitigate a range of other consequences from kicking in—including automatic U.S. sanctions, suspension of international cooperation with Seoul’s nuclear energy program, and a harsh reaction from China most likely in the form of economic sanctions. All of these reactions would further embroil Washington and Seoul and exacerbate strategic anxiety around the world.

Ideally, U.S. policies would both dissuade and reassure allies as a means of preventing further proliferation. “Maximum pressure” tactics aren’t politically realistic, will not work, and could further stimulate pro-nuclear inclinations among allies. Moreover, in an era of strategic competition, it is in the U.S. interest to sustain robust alliances. Yet maintaining the current rules-based system also means continuing efforts to restrain proliferation. To that end, it is time for Washington to update its nonproliferation policies with allies and partners in mind.

RELATED ANALYSIS FROM CARNEGIE

• U.S. Policy Should Reflect Its Own Quiet Acceptance of a Nuclear North Korea

Accordingly, the United States must craft new approaches to managing allies’ security in return for their continued promise not to seek nuclear weapons. For instance, Washington and Seoul together should flesh out a military concept of tighter integration between stronger allied conventional military capabilities alongside U.S. conventional and nuclear capabilities to align threat perceptions and better deal with probable escalation scenarios. Forthcoming military tabletop exercises are the perfect opportunity to work out this concept. In addition, it can institute new communications mechanisms that ensure allies have both a better understanding of U.S. deterrence planning and decisionmaking and a means to coordinate during a crisis. The hardest part will be repairing the political damage to U.S. credibility wreaked by the Trump administration. Given the deep polarization in U.S. domestic politics, there are no easy solutions here, apart from time and consistent political messaging toward the publics and policy elites in allied states about U.S. commitments.

As for South Korea, Yoon’s subsequent attempts to reassure the international community that his country doesn’t intend to go nuclear were a positive and necessary step. But the debates about allied nuclear weapons development and how Washington should respond are not going away. U.S. officials should find occasions to publicly and privately remind allies that the assurance bargain is a two-way street: that the United States will do everything within reason to guarantee their security, provided they don’t proliferate.

 

[jward]

Everything Japan vowed to give Marcos Jr​

Richard Javad Heydarian​

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MANILA – Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr triumphantly returned from his five-day trip to Japan with major economic and defense deals in his pocket.
It was the leader’s ninth foreign visit in just over eight months, with previous trips to the US and China, and proved to be his most fruitful yet.

In Tokyo, the Filipino president secured US$13 billion in investment pledges and another $3 billion in loans, which according to the official readout could create as many as 24,000 jobs in the Philippines.
The two sides discussed the status of a whole range of big-ticket Japanese infrastructure projects, including the North-South Commuter Railway for Malolos-Tutuban, and the North South-Commuter Railway Project Extension.
Japan is also currently building the Southeast Asian country’s first-ever underground metro system, which promises to revolutionize Manila’s decrepit and clogged public transportation system.

Japan also agreed to provide the Philippines comprehensive assistance in the areas of agriculture, digital economy, the peace process in Mindanao and training of Filipino civil servants.
Historically a top source of development aid and infrastructure investments, Japan hopes to take its bilateral relations with the Philippines to a new level. Accordingly, Tokyo is finalizing an unprecedented defense aid package as well as a Reciprocal Access Agreement with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).

The two sides also signaled their intent to expand joint military exercises, with an eye on a more robust US-Japan-Philippine triangular alliance amid rising geopolitical tensions with China in the region.
By several indications, Marcos Jr is cementing his country’s pivot back to traditional allies after six years of a Beijing-friendly foreign policy under the authoritarian populist regime of Rodrigo Duterte.

Trade and investment deals​

As expected, trade and commercial deals dominated Marcos Jr’s trip to Japan, which is the only country to have a bilateral free trade deal with the Philippines.
Since coming to power, the Filipino president has made commercial diplomacy a central theme of his administration, as the Southeast Asian nation aims to boost its post-pandemic recovery amid fears of global recession and heightened inflation at home.
“Coming back, we carry with us over 13 billion US dollars in contributions and pledges to benefit our people and create approximately 24,000 jobs, and further solidify the foundation of our economic environment,” declared Marcos Jr upon his arrival back in the Philippines.

Ferdinand Marcos Jr needs Japan’s economic helping hand. Image: Facebook
The Filipino president also declared that Japan is offering around $3 billion to finance big-ticket infrastructure projects such as the North-South Commuter Railway Project Extension and the North-South Commuter Railway for Malolos-Tutuban. Both aim to enhance connectivity among the country’s more industrialized regions.
“The completion of these projects along with other large-scale development assistance projects such as the Metro Manila Subway Project and many more across the country are expected to translate to better lives for Filipinos through improved facilitation of the movement of people of goods and services,” Marcos Jr added.

The two sides also welcomed progress in the Japan-led Metro Manila Subway Project while exploring further deals on the maintenance and rehabilitation of existing railway systems, most notably the Metro Rail Transit Line 3 (MRT-3).
Japan has also promised to help the Philippines modernize its failing air transport infrastructure under the New Communications, Navigation and Surveillance and Air Traffic Management (CNS/ATM) Development Project.
Last month, Marcos Jr attended the World Economic Forum in Davos with a large delegation of the country’s leading business and conglomerate leaders.

Cognizant of his country’s patchy reputation after six years of populist antics under his predecessor Duterte, Marcos Jr, who has also had to grapple with his family’s political notoriety, is bent on “reintroducing” the Philippines to the wider world while rehabilitating his family’s reputation.
In Tokyo, the Filipino president met top business leaders to discuss “the new and better business climate and investment environment in the Philippines.” He also met the relatively large Filipino community in Japan, including Filipino seafarers who constitute 70% of Japan’s maritime crew.

“The Japanese shipping companies also have investments and long-term partnerships with Filipino stakeholders in maritime education and welfare programs,” Marcos Jr added.
As the concurrent agriculture secretary, the Filipino president, who has been grappling with rising food inflation at home, also explored new cooperative deals with Japan, including the establishment of the Joint Committee on Agriculture and other forms of interagency mechanisms to help create “resilient and sustainable agriculture and food systems, smart technology, [and] strengthe[n] food value chain.”

Japan also offered to help the Philippines to realize its own Universal Health Coverage plan while also expanding its assistance to ongoing peacebuilding efforts in the historically restive island of Mindanao through, inter alia, “vocational training for livelihood improvement and industrial development.”
The two sides also agreed to expand people-to-people cooperation through initiatives such as the Japan Exchange and Teaching (JET) program, JENESYS (Japan–East Asia Network of Exchange for Students and Youths) and the Project for Human Resource Development Scholarship Grant Aid of Japan (JDS).

Integrated deterrence​

What made Marcos Jr’s trip particularly significant, however, was the expanded focus on defense cooperation, especially as Japan embarks on its own massive defense buildup and the Philippines restores military cooperation with its American mutual defense treaty ally.

During Marcos Jr’s trip, the two sides agreed to regularize high-level dialogues such as Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (“2+2”) and the Vice-Ministerial Strategic Dialogue and the Political-Military (PM) Dialogue.
The Filipino president largely welcomed Japan’s new “National Security Strategy (NSS),” the “National Defense Strategy (NDS),” and the “Defense Buildup Program (DBP)”, which collectively facilitate the Northeast Asian country’s re-emergence as a major defense player in the Indo-Pacific region.

The two sides also agreed to the terms of reference concerning Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) activities of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) in the Philippines, which simplifies joint military activities and exchanges between the two countries’ armed forces.
Philippine marines take position next to US marines Amphibious Assault Vehicles (AAV) during an amphibious landing exercise at the beach of the Philippine navy training center facing the south China sea in San Antonio town, Zambales province, north of Manila on October 6, 2018. Japanese troops stormed a South China Sea beach in the Philippines the same day in joint military exercises with US and Filipino troops that officials said marked the first time Tokyo’s armoured vehicles rolled on foreign soil after World War II. Photo: AFP / Ted Aljibe

Down the road, Japan and the Philippines hope to finalize a Visiting Forces Agreement, which would enable more large-scale joint military exercises in addition to pre-existing Philippine-US and Philippine-Australia defense agreements.
Crucially, Japan has also agreed to provide a new package of defense aid and other forms of defense equipment transfer programs. In particular, the two sides are exploring the transfer of new air-surveillance radar systems, Japan-made 97-meter-class patrol vessels and other forms of military hardware, which could enhance the Philippines domain awareness and maritime security capabilities vis-à-vis China.
Japan is also set to assist the development of a Philippine Coast Guard Subic Bay support base, which “could serve as the home of, and the installation of satellite communications system on patrol vessels.”
The Philippines and Japan are also exploring a tripartite security agreement with the US as part of a broader “integrated deterrence strategy” against China.

In recent years, Japan has regularly attended major joint drills in the Philippines, including the large-scale Philippines–US “Balikatan”, “KAMANDAG” and “Sama-Sama” exercises and the Philippines–Australia “Lumbas” drills.
Moving forward, the two sides also agreed to institutionalize the Japan-Philippines-US Land Forces Summit and underscored their commitment to deepening defense exchanges through trilateral mechanisms such as the Japan-Philippines-US Trilateral Joint Staff Talks and the Japan-Philippines-US Trilateral Defense Policy Dialogue, as well as the JSDF’s participation in Philippines-US joint exercises.

“It is something that we certainly are going to be studying upon my return to the Philippines. I think just part of the continuing process of strengthening our alliances because in this rather confusing, and I dare say dangerous situations, that we have,” Marcos Jr said, referring to ongoing discussions for a tripartite Philippine-US-Japan security agreement.
“So that is, I think, a central element to providing some sort of stability in the face of all these problems that we are seeing around us,” he said.

Everything Japan vowed to give Marcos Jr

MANILA – Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr triumphantly returned from his five-day trip to Japan with major economic and defense deals in his pocket. It was the leader’s ninth foreign …

asiatimes.com

 

[jward]

UN reports veteran al Qaeda leader likely back in action in Afghanistan​

By Bill Roggio and Caleb Weiss | February 14, 2023 | bill.roggio@longwarjournal.org |
​

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A new report from the United Nations’ Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team asserts that Abu Ikhlas al-Masri, a veteran al Qaeda leader in Afghanistan, is likely active again in the country’s east. Masri was arrested over a decade ago and only freed following the Taliban’s takeover.

Based on the reporting from one member state, the UN’s team notes that “al Qaeda-linked Katiba Umer Farooq (Red Unit) was possibly being reactivated in Kunar and Nuristan Provinces following the return of Abu Ikhlas al-Masri.” The UN does not provide any further information on Masri’s reported reactivation or Al Qaeda’s Red Unit.
Though the UN’s report notes this information came from only one member state, FDD’s Long War Journal assesses the potentiality of Masri’s return as likely given his long history in the jihad.

Before his arrest over a decade ago, Masri led al Qaeda’s men in Kunar. In this role, he maintained an extensive network in Kunar due to his close links with the local tribes. Abu Ikhlas was also named al Qaeda’s operations chief for Kunar province in the early to mid-2000s.
He assumed command of Kunar operations after his predecessor, Abu Ubaidah al-Masri, another Egyptian commander, was promoted to take over al Qaeda’s external operations branch (the latter Egyptian died of natural causes in 2008).
Under Abu Ikhlas, Afghanistan’s Kunar Province remained a significant sanctuary for al Qaeda and allied terror groups despite a heavy presence of US troops in the province for much of the US time in the country.

Al Qaeda operated in the districts of Pech, Shaikal Shate, Sarkani, Dangam, Asmar, Asadabad, Shigal, and Marawana; or nine of Kunar’s 15 districts.
During the US War in Afghanistan, US and allied troops killed or captured numerous al Qaeda commanders in the province. Kunar’s importance was demonstrated by al Qaeda itself, as the province was listed among the group’s most active areas by al Qaeda’s own leadership in a letter dated from 2010 recovered from Osama bin Laden’s compound.

Masri was initially captured by International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) members in Kunar in late 2010. He was then held in detention at Bagram airbase, just north of Kabul, until the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan during the summer of 2021.
Masri thus joined the ranks of hundreds of jihadists – from various different factions and nationalities – freed by the Taliban’s emptying of Bagram and other prisons during its takeover of Afghanistan. It is unclear how many other important al Qaeda figures were freed in these prison releases, though Masri’s freedom exemplifies the primary danger of the prison breaks.
Given his long ties to the jihad in Afghanistan, having reportedly been based in Kunar since the 1980s, it was unlikely that Masri would have given up the fight. Al Qaeda’s newfound latitude to more freely operate in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan means Masri had the freedom to return to his former stomping grounds to once again set up shop for al Qaeda.

Additionally, the Monitoring team mention of Masri’s unit in Kunar leaves many unanswered questions. For instance, the Taliban has long maintained its own Red Unit, which acts as its form a special forces unit. It has been active across the country since its formation around 2015 and has long been integrated with al Qaeda and other foreign cadres in Afghanistan. The Taliban’s Red Unit was instrumental in the Taliban’s capture of Afghanistan. It is unclear if the UN is indeed referring to the same Red Unit.
And Masri’s new group is itself, however, is ostensibly named after a killed al Qaeda leader who reportedly once led al Qaeda’s men in both Afghanistan and Pakistan and also was an alleged key deputy to now-deceased al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri.

But US officials speaking at the time of the purported Umar Farooq’s death in 2014 noted the confusion around that commander’s real identity. It is likewise unclear if this new group is named in honor of the deceased al Qaeda leader.
Nevertheless, that al-Masri is now reportedly back in action leading a new unit for al Qaeda in Afghanistan further demonstrates both the failure of the United State’s efforts in the country and how undersold al Qaeda’s activities remain in Afghanistan. US officials justified the withdrawal from Afghanistan by claiming al Qaeda was “defeated,” “degraded,” “decimated,” “down,” and “gone.” Former US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo even claimed that the Taliban would “destroy al Qaeda.” The Taliban never lifted a finger to fight al Qaeda, and instead the alliance is as strong as ever.
US intelligence and the Department of Defense have consistently underestimated al Qaeda’s presence in Afghanistan, despite the fact that dozens of key Al Qaeda leaders and thousands of fighters and operatives have been killed or captured since 2007.

But the facts do not support prior and current official assessments of al Qaeda’s presence in Afghanistan. For instance, in August 2022, US intelligence denied that al Qaeda was regrouping in Afghanistan, despite the fact that al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri was killed in a Taliban safe house in Kabul one month prior.
Al Qaeda isn’t regrouping in Afghanistan because, as FDD’s Long War Journal has reported for the past 13 years, al Qaeda is well established in the country. And emblematic of al Qaeda’s future in Afghanistan stands Abu Ikhlas al-Masri, a veteran al Qaeda leader now likely back in action in his former stronghold after more than a decade of incarceration.

Bill Roggio is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Editor of The Long War Journal. Caleb Weiss is a research analyst at FDD's Long War Journal and a senior analyst at the Bridgeway Foundation, where he focuses on the spread of the Islamic State in Central Africa.

UN reports veteran al Qaeda leader likely back in action in Afghanistan | FDD's Long War Journal

The U.S. captured al Qaeda key commander Abu Ikhlas al Masri in 2010. He was freed from Bagram prison after the Taliban takeover in 2021, and is thought to have reformed an Al Qaeda unit.

www.longwarjournal.org

 

[jward]

the rebalancin' o' power game o' musical chairs continues. . .w/ the risk o' US ending up seatless, or demoted to the kids table, when the music stops looking increasingly likely.

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It's Time for America to Revisit the Monroe Doctrine​

by Mike Coté​

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The American commentariat and public were abuzz over the transit of a Chinese government surveillance balloon across the United States, with social media tracking its path (and reverse-engineering it), debating whether to shoot it down, both overplaying and underplaying the story, and asking if it matters at all. There has since been verification that there are multiple Chinese balloons in the Western Hemisphere, including one located in South America.

As far as we know, the spy balloon crossed into U.S. airspace in the Aleutian Islands and passed over Alaska and Canada before reaching the continental United States, where it loitered over important military and government installations. Media reports have claimed it “poses no safety threat to civilians,” a statement that the Biden administration trotted out to avoid shooting down the balloon while it was over land. The Department of Defense stated that “this balloon has limited additive value from an intelligence collection perspective,” contributing to the choice not to down the vessel until it reached the Atlantic. Other officials stated that this was not an isolated incident, but was “different” because the balloon remained over American airspace for far longer than usual.

Besides the novel admission of previous incidents, this shows an escalation on the part of the Chinese regime. At the same time, Beijing averred that the military balloon is a civilian one and only accidentally entered American airspace—a contention that the U.S. military forcefully rebutted.

Eventually, the balloon was shot down over the Atlantic Ocean off the coast of South Carolina, but only after completing its journey across the continent. The only response, besides a belated shoot-down, that the Biden administration has thus proffered is canceling Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s planned trip to Beijing. The wording used by Blinken in addressing this provocative infiltration of American sovereign airspace was weak, labeling the deliberate sending of a surveillance balloon as merely “an irresponsible act.” The confusion and lack of response to this clear act of aggression have made the U.S. government look slow, unprepared, and timid. The cancellation of a meeting is doing the absolute minimum when this act—a deliberate test of our resolve—demands a stronger response.


As the Pentagon mentioned, this was not an isolated incident. America’s authoritarian foes have been steadily increasing their malign actions and military presence in the Western Hemisphere over the past few months.

In addition to sending these surveillance balloons across the American heartland, Beijing has courted countries across Latin America. One such target is Nicaragua, led by the brutal authoritarian Ortega regime, which sits at a strategically-critical part of Central America. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has used its economic largesse to flip Nicaragua from recognizing Taiwan to recognizing the People’s Republic of China, promising sweetheart deals for Ortega cronies, dual-use infrastructure projects, and military engagement. The deal may end up revitalizing the defunct Nicaragua Canal project, meant to be a Chinese-built waterway linking the Atlantic and Pacific, and competing directly with the Panama Canal. China has also wooed nations in South America, notably Argentina. Near the end of 2022, it was revealed that China was planning to establish a naval base at Ushuaia in the far south of the country near the Straits of Magellan and the critical Drake Passage. A military facility in Tierra del Fuego would allow the CCP to intercept communications across the region, monitor maritime transit in the South Atlantic, and enhance its ability to project power in the Western Hemisphere.

These actions are of a piece, both being concerned with establishing a permanent presence in the Western Hemisphere and monitoring important maritime traffic. Control of international waterways has been a paramount geostrategic concern for millennia, and China has already made it known that it subscribes to this idea—the militarization of the South China Sea is a prime example. The Belt and Road infrastructure program also falls into this category, as Beijing is investing in ports, canals, railways, and other potential dual-use projects. The military dimension of these relations is key, as China seeks to establish itself as a global power player. After building a naval base in Djibouti at the heavily-trafficked confluence of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, a facility at Ushuaia would expand this presence into another strategically-important region.
Iran has been engaging in aggressive incursions into the Western Hemisphere as well. The theocratic regime in Tehran works closely with nations like Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua to evade sanctions and launder money. The regime’s terrorist catspaw, Hezbollah, is also very active in Latin America, using it as a source of funds and support. Hezbollah gains intelligence on Western soft targets, profits from the illicit trade in drugs, and plans attacks, all within what many would consider America’s backyard. More provocatively, Iran has stated that it is sending two warships to the Western Hemisphere to visit its allies in the region and transit the Panama Canal. The Iranian Navy has been steadily growing its international operations, but this intrusion into the Western Hemisphere is novel and disturbing.

Russia, a perennial player in Latin America going back to the Soviet era, has also ramped up its interest in the Western Hemisphere since (re)invading Ukraine last February. Russia has expanded its ties with the anti-American regimes of the region throughout President Vladimir Putin’s tenure, and it has put those relationships to work over the past year. Russia, like its allies Iran and Venezuela, is evading international sanctions via the use of falsely-flagged vessels to ship its oil to another foe of American power, China. Russia has also called on its diplomatic ties with Latin America at the United Nations. In UN Resolution ES-11/4—a condemnation of the illegal Russian annexations of Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia in Ukraine—Russia’s Latin American friends either voted against the resolution (Nicaragua), abstained (Bolivia, Cuba, Honduras), or simply didn’t show up (Venezuela, El Salvador). The resolution was resoundingly passed, but the varying degrees of dissent from Latin American states were noticeable and worrying.

All of these bold actions by authoritarian, anti-American adversaries are meant not only to test their reach into our hemisphere so as to destabilize American hegemony and counter our interests, but also to test our response and resolve. How the United States responds to local provocations could be very informative as to how it may respond to more global provocations. As such, Washington’s response is vital for countering this influence and signaling U.S. resolve to do so wherever and whenever it interferes with our interests. There are plenty of concrete actions that can be taken beyond the immediacy of the shootdown and the cancellation of Blinken’s trip. America should interdict any further incursions of its territory, whether balloon-based or otherwise, to send a deterrent signal to U.S. adversaries. We should increase military patrols of the key waterways in our hemisphere, police falsely-flagged vessels, and work to productively engage with our neighbors on security and economic issues. In the case of more permanent issues like the Chinese base at Ushuaia, America should seek to respond in kind, potentially with a basing agreement with Britain at the Falkland Islands.
Still, since none of these actions by American rivals have crossed the threshold into direct aggression (yet), the signaling response should be even more powerful to deter escalation that passes beyond that line. The era of great power conflict has returned, with non-state actors taking a backseat to the danger of grander, more kinetic warfare. We have seen this change manifest over the past few years, but it has struck with a vengeance in the case of Ukraine.

American policymakers need to embrace this new reality of broad-based geopolitical competition if they seek to extend American hegemony into the future. The answer to this global—and regional—challenge lies in our past, when great power rivalry was the watchword of international affairs. It is time for a revitalization of the Monroe Doctrine and its Roosevelt Corollary.
200 years ago, in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars and during the Latin American revolutions, President James Monroe and Secretary of State John Quincy Adams promulgated the idea that would come to be known as the Monroe Doctrine. In his seventh annual address to Congress, Monroe declared that “the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers.” This message, which also decried the puppet monarchs of European states, was a sea change in how America conducted its foreign policy, asserting a strong stance against foreign interlopers in the Western Hemisphere. For the most part, the doctrine was successful, despite America being far weaker than the European states it sought to constrain.

In 1905, President Theodore Roosevelt added to the legacy of the Monroe Doctrine and brought it into a new century. In what became known as the Roosevelt Corollary, the president posited that:

Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power.

It's Time for America to Revisit the Monroe Doctrine

Recent events have shown America’s foes becoming more brazen in their penetration of the Western Hemisphere; the answer to this challenge lies in our past.

nationalinterest.org

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use.....

WSJ “Like it or not, the US is in a nuclear arms race with China” - News Rebeat

A U.S. nuclear and missile defense expert said, "The U.S. is exposed to China's nuclear threat, as China is rapidly increasing its nuclear arsenal and testing new technologies that neither the U.S. nor Russia possess." claimed. Patti-Jane Zeller, senior researcher for nuclear deterrence and...

newsrebeat.com

WORLD NEWS

WSJ “Like it or not, the US is in a nuclear arms race with China”​

By Mark
February 17, 2023

A U.S. nuclear and missile defense expert said, “The U.S. is exposed to China’s nuclear threat, as China is rapidly increasing its nuclear arsenal and testing new technologies that neither the U.S. nor Russia possess.” claimed.

Patti-Jane Zeller, senior researcher for nuclear deterrence and missile defense at the Center for National Defense of the Heritage Foundation, wrote an article on Wall Street (WSJ) on the 15th titled, “Whether we like it or not, the United States is engaged in a nuclear race with China.”

The United States is unprepared for a Chinese nuclear threat. The current US nuclear defense posture was created more than a decade ago and is primarily focused on deterring Russia. At the time, most people believed that China had around 200 nuclear weapons. However, the Pentagon estimates that China’s nuclear arsenal will reach 1,000 by 2030.


The modernization of US nuclear capabilities has remained at the level of replacing existing nuclear weapons. Even that has been very slow.

The United States must have a nuclear force that convinces China that the use of nuclear weapons will do more harm than good. Not sure if that’s possible right now. The US nuclear force is not strong enough to take on both Russia and China at the same time. As cooperation between the two countries intensifies, such concerns will only grow.

The United States should prioritize the following three priorities to strengthen its nuclear force.


First of all, we need to increase our nuclear arsenal. For deterrence to be sufficient, it must have nuclear weapons capable of attacking the assets the enemy values most, such as nuclear weapons. Given China’s hundreds of new nuclear launch pads, the United States must have nuclear weapons to attack them all. Nuclear deterrence is about numbers.

We need to increase the nuclear modernization defense budget to purchase land-launched missiles, Columbia-class submarines, and B-21 bombers. In addition, it must have the ability to increase nuclear warheads in the short term. Currently, it takes more than a few months, if not years, to increase the number of warheads mounted on intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).

Second, it must have the capabilities necessary to deter the threat posed by China. Current nuclear arsenals are geared towards Russian deterrence and are not sufficient to deter China. The goals of America’s adversaries may be different, and the circumstances in which nuclear weapons are used may also be different.

At the very least, the United States should accelerate the development of nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles. By strengthening nuclear forces in the Indo-Pacific region, we can provide a credible countermeasure for the US president to choose against China’s limited use of nuclear weapons, such as a tactical nuclear attack against the US on Guam.

The development budget of 45 million dollars (approximately 58.4 billion won) approved last year should be increased to 400 million dollars this year so that cruise missiles can be deployed by 2030.

Finally, given the uncertainty of the extent of China’s nuclear threat and the new situation in which the US, China, and Russia are in a nuclear race, the US should be able to change its nuclear arsenal.

The current US nuclear program is not designed to change quickly in response to changes in the new geopolitical environment. For example, it took 12 years to design the W93/Mark 7 nuclear warhead. In addition, the United States will not increase the plutonium stock needed to build nuclear warheads beyond 2030.

This wasn’t a problem until China’s nuclear arsenal surged, but the current situation makes it difficult to easily build up military power without spending a lot of money, and long-term investments are needed to rectify this. Investment and efforts to prepare for a nuclear war must be strengthened.

Source: Donga

Mark
Mark Jones is a world traveler and journalist for News Rebeat. With a curious mind and a love of adventure, Mark brings a unique perspective to the latest global events and provides in-depth and thought-provoking coverage of the world at large.

 

[Housecarl]

I'm posting this Op-Ed here in the WoW thread so it doesn't get lost in the big thread after I post it there....HC

Posted for fair use.....

Biden and NATO should do what it takes to stop Putin in Ukraine

If they don’t, it will mean U.S. troops on the ground, fighting Russians — somewhere.

thehill.com

Biden and NATO should do what it takes to stop Putin in Ukraine​

BY NEIL BARON, OPINION CONTRIBUTOR - 02/16/23 12:00 PM ET

Putin’s expected spring offensive has begun in Ukraine. If Russia conquers, U.S. efforts will be viewed as another defeat in a string of lost wars. NATO will have allowed Russia to subjugate a European neighbor, slaughter thousands of its civilians, decimate its infrastructure, and establish a sinister presence on the continent. Europe will live in fear of further Russian incursions powered by Putin’s nuclear threats. NATO will be blamed for prolonging Ukraine’s agony by doing too little for too long. The U.S. will be blamed for failing to protect its European allies. The grudge will not easily heal.

Views differ as to the outcome of the war, whether Russia wins, loses, compromises or persists indefinitely. But there’s plenty to worry about.

While Russia’s military hardware is aging, it’s still plentiful. While Ukraine has superior materiel and competent, motivated fighters, Russia’s expected call-up of 500,000 troops can negate those advantages. Meanwhile the pipeline of advanced weapons to Ukraine is slowing. The U.S. won’t send F-16 fighters or missiles and jets that can reach Russian territory.

Continued U.S. support of Ukraine is not certain. Some Republican lawmakers oppose it. Sen. J.D. Vance (R-Ohio) said he doesn’t much care what happens to Ukraine. Rep. Paul Gosar (R-Ariz.) voted against another $40 billion in aid, saying, “we have no business getting involved in another war.” Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene (R-Ga.) insisted, “not another penny will go to Ukraine.” Other Republicans question the amount of proposed aid.

A majority of Republican voters (53 percent) don’t see Ukraine as America’s responsibility and worry we’re doing too much. Opposition will grow as the predicted long war unfolds, spending increases, and Ukraine’s chances of victory fade.

By contrast, a credible international polling firm found 82 percent of Russians support Putin, and most support his war in Ukraine (U.S.-based FiveThirtyEight put the number at 58 percent). The poll factored in fear of reprisals and Putin’s massive disinformation campaign.

The results are consistent with prior invasions. Putin’s ratings rose to 84 percent during the second war in Chechnya and to 88 percent after he annexed Crimea. He has convinced his supporters that Russia is under siege, that the West is to blame for shortages, inflation, and the war’s escalation, and that he’s liberating Ukraine from “neo-Nazis.”

So, Russians stick with Putin despite their considerable economic pain.

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[Housecarl]

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Russia’s deficit hit nearly $25 Billion, 14 times higher than a year ago. Russians are experiencing shortages of goods and hobbled services, from slower internet speeds to shuttered crematoriums. A thousand companies have reportedly closed or left Russia, taking with them capital, technology, and expertise, leaving office and retail vacancies behind. Price caps imposed by the West sent oil prices plummeting 40 percent below the global benchmark of $80 a barrel to around $50. Slowing imports of parts has decimated Russian rail and auto production. Auto production fell by 67 percent, the lowest on record. Car and passenger train wagon exports declined by 96.7 percent and 59.8 percent respectively.

But Russians are more able than Westerners to endure the hardships of a long war. They’ve had worse, tolerating perpetual repression and suffering going back to Stalin, and more recently the 1998 and 2008 financial crises and the COVID pandemic. None of it unraveled Russia’s political structure.

The “Crimean consensus” holds that Russians are willing to endure hardship to recreate a Russian-led Eurasian empire. To counter it, the West needs to be more aggressive, even if it means testing Putin’s nuclear threat.

Opinions differ as to how seriously to take that threat. Putin has made them before. Some believe he won’t push the button for fear of provoking World War III. If he used nuclear weapons, he and his oligarchs would lose their 300 billion euros in foreign accounts, access to the international banking system, and their lives of luxury. Putin’s political support would disintegrate as radioactive fallout spread across Russia.

Leon Panetta wrote last October that the risk of Russia using nuclear weapons rose from 1 or 5 percent at the start of the Ukraine invasion to 20 or 25 percent. Could it go yet higher as the war drags on? Volodymyr Zelensky’s office rates the likelihood as “very high.” Biden has worried openly that Russia using tactical nukes in Ukraine could lead to “Armageddon.” Putin has said Russia would use nuclear weapons only to respond to a first strike by another country, yet he has also warned if Russia’s “territorial integrity” is threatened, “we will certainly use all the means at our disposal” to protect Russia and referred to his vast nuclear arsenal.

This certainly explains Biden’s reluctance to provide Ukraine with weapons that could reach Russian territory. But perhaps he has taken Putin’s threat too seriously and given him the result he wanted.

Former Military Director for European Affairs Alexander Vindman urges that Ukraine can and should recapture strategically important Crimea. But it’s doubtful that Biden or NATO would supply the hundreds of military vehicles or the troops needed, for fear of “heading down the road toward a third world war.” An analyst with the American Enterprise Institute called this fear “almost pathological.”

If Russia prevails in Ukraine without having to confront the West’s full military might, troops included, it could embolden Putin to invade NATO members Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Like Ukraine, they were formerly part of the Soviet Union and are home to many ethnic Russians. All three fear an invasion is likely.

Biden assured them that the U.S. would “deploy additional forces to defend them.” Secretary of State Antony Blinken promised them “The U.S. commitment to NATO’s mutual defense pact is sacrosanct.” Not honoring that commitment would be reputationally disastrous for the U.S.

Honoring it comes with the risks of heightening nuclear tensions and will face voter opposition: 60 percent of Americans generally support sending troops to defend NATO members, but support varies depending on which member is attacked. Only 35 percent support using military force to defend Latvia and Croatia. Less than half support a direct military confrontation in all other NATO members except the Germany, France and Great Britain.

But as former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and former Defense Secretary Robert Gates warned, “to avoid confrontation with Russia in the future is to help Ukraine push back the invader now … If this lesson is ignored and Ukraine is defeated, Russia will almost certainly … attack NATO member countries.”

Addressing cervical cancer disparities can save thousands of livesHow Biden can get ahead of the balloons
And that would mean U.S. troops on the ground, fighting Russians — somewhere.

To prevent this, Biden should change his mind and send the necessary weapons and troops to defeat Russia in Ukraine.

Neil Baron advised the Securities and Exchange Commission and congressional staff on rating agency reform. He represented Standard & Poor’s from 1968 to 1989 and was vice chairman and general counsel of Fitch Ratings from 1989 to 1998. He also served on the board of Assured Guaranty for a decade.

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use.....

Australian Greens press Labor over nuclear weapons, as AUKUS decision looms - Breaking Defense

An AUKUS announcement is "imminent," Australian Defense Minister Richard Marles said. "We're in conversation with both the UK and the US around the manner in which that is ultimately announced."

breakingdefense.com

• AIR WARFARE

Australian Greens press Labor over nuclear weapons, as AUKUS decision looms​

An AUKUS announcement is "imminent," Australian Defense Minister Richard Marles said. "We're in conversation with both the UK and the US around the manner in which that is ultimately announced."​

By COLIN CLARK on February 15, 2023 at 6:35 PM

SYDNEY — With an announcement on the way forward for Australia’s nuclear submarine “imminent,” a Tuesday senate hearing provided a reminder that nuclear weapons remain a touchy subject among the Australian public and its politicians.

During the hearing, Foreign Minister Penny Wong and the Department of Defense’s secretary, Greg Moriarty, took fire from members of the Green Party over the question of whether American B-52s have been bringing nuclear weapons to Australian soil when the decade-old planes land in the Lucky Country. B-52s are expected to periodically visit Tindal Air Base in the country’s north, where the US has committed funding to improve the facilities.

It’s the first time the issue of US nuclear weapons in Australia has been raised publicly under this government. While a minority party, the Greens are aligned with Wong’s Labor party and control 11 of the 75 Senate seats, meaning Wong can’t just dismiss their concerns as the government prepares for a major moment for the AUKUS agreement.

Several Green senators pressed for answers, including David Shoebridge, a first-term senator who sits on the defense committee. He tried using Australia’s adherence to the Treaty of Rarotonga — also known as the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty — to push the two officials on whether if Australia is complying with the treaty and also asking if visiting B-52s were nuclear capable.

Technically, all B-52Hs are nuclear capable. They may no longer carry nuclear gravity bombs, but they can be armed with nuclear-tipped cruise missiles. US policy is to neither confirm nor deny the presence of nuclear weapons.

RELATED: Growing signs Australia’s new nuclear sub will be British design

“I think more generally, it’s clear stationing of nuclear weapons in Australia is prohibited by the South Pacific nuclear free zone treaty, to which Australia is fully committed. There is no impediment under this treaty or the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty to the visit of foreign aircraft to Australian airfields or transit of Australia’s airspace, including in the context of our training and exercise programs, and the Australia and the Australian force posture cooperation with the United States,” Moriarty said.

“Australia’s long-standing arrangements to support visits by US strategic assets are consistent with our obligations under the South Pacific nuclear free zone trading,” he continued. “US bomber aircraft have been visiting Australia since the early 1980s and have conducted training in Australia since 2005. Successive Australian governments have understood and respected the longstanding US policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons on particular platforms. Australia will continue to fully comply with our international obligations, and the United States understand and respects Australia’s international obligations with respect to nuclear weapons.”

But Shoebridge was determined to make his point: “So, Mr. Moriarty, do I understand from that answer that defense does not believe that there is a restraint under Australia’s current treaty obligations meeting nuclear armed B-52 bombers to be present in Australia, provided it’s not a permanent presence?”

Wong would not have it and drew the exchanges to a close with this.

“I’m the minister, and I’m responding,” she said, a bit testily. “It is part of ensuring we maintain that interoperability that goes to us making Australia safe. We have tried to be helpful in indicating our commitment to the South Pacific nuclear free zone treaty. We are fully committed to that. And we’ve given you the answer that the secretary has given you. And I’m not going to engage in any more hypotheticals because I don’t actually think your questioning is anything more than trying to drum up concern, and I don’t think it’s responsible.”

So, basically, Australia accepts America’s policy of strategic ambiguity about whether or not its forces in any particular place have nuclear weapons, and that is unlikely to change. Neither answer was to the Green’s pleasure, but Shoebridge and his colleagues did not keep pressing.

Moriarty, asked about the just-completed Defense Strategic Review, said the defense budget was “under pressure” and raised the possibility that some large programs might be cut. Former defense force chief Sir Angus Houston and Stephen Smith presented the review Tuesday to Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and Defense Minister Richard Marles, but it will be at least several weeks before it is made public, Marles said Tuesday afternoon in an interview with the Australian Broadcasting Corporation.

“We’re very realistic about the challenges we face. The budget that we have is fully committed and the Defense Strategic Review will help us further sharpen those priorities and take hard decisions about what we need to focus on and what needs to be prioritized and perhaps even cut,” Moriarty said.

One of the interesting tidbits the secretary disclosed is that Australia used to assume it had a decade to respond to changing strategic imperatives. But “shrinking strategic warning times and rapidly advancing technology” now mean Australia must move much more quickly and place more emphasis on its own industrial base. The pressure from a rapidly modernizing Chinese military is clearly being felt.

In his interview, Marles confirmed that a major milestone for the AUKUS nuclear attack submarine program is nearing, saying a decision on the path forward is “imminent.” He added that “We’re in conversation with both the UK and the US around the manner in which that is ultimately announced and we expect that in the very near future.” That announcement is expected sometime in March.

 

[Housecarl]

Posted for fair use.....

The Most Powerful Weapon to use Against Democracies | Small Wars Journal

This paper argues that influence campaigns are becoming the most powerful weapon authoritarian regimes have against democracies. Authoritarian regimes have the ability to censor domestic information, which presents an opportunity that inherently places democracies on the defensive. Additionally...

smallwarsjournal.com

Tue, 02/14/2023 - 1:13pm
The Most Powerful Weapon to use Against Democracies

By Cole Herring​

In the year 2000 around one tenth of the world’s population had internet access, and global internet traffic was 2.5 million gigabytes of data per day. By 2025 over seventy-five percent of the world will have access and global internet traffic will be over 9.1 billion gigabytes of data per day.[1] Currently 93 percent of people that are connected to the internet use social media. Facebook, a predominate social media platform, can reach over half of the adults in the world between the ages of 18 to 34.[2] The surge in global connectivity has distributed influence in international politics to social groups that span multiple countries.[3] Recent advances in artificial intelligence have given state’s an unprecedented power to control and influence messaging domestically and abroad. China and Russia challenge the existing world order through traditional means that have existed for thousands of years, such as using military power, creating parallel institutions, and increasing economic ties through infrastructure projects. They also challenge the world order through means that were unfathomable just 20 years ago by leveraging artificial intelligence and global connectivity to conduct influence campaigns against democracies.

China and Russia challenge the existing world order by using military power, creating parallel institutions, and increasing economic ties through infrastructure projects. To support all of these means they use influence campaigns that leverage global connectivity, social media, and AI to change accepted behaviours and norms. Rapid technology developments in realistic image generation have outpaced general knowledge, which increases the effect of misinformation and is a disadvantage to democracies because of authoritarian regimes’ ability to censor content domestically.

The battles become changing the accepted behaviours and norms of other states into norms that are in one’s own interests. An example is the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the recognition of Taiwan. The PRC continually stives to change other state’s recognition and relations, both official and unofficial, with Taiwan.[4],[5] If one accepts that other states should not interfere in domestic issues, then the PRC must ensure the accepted international norm is that Taiwan is part of China. Sovereignty is the basis of the PRC’s argument regarding Taiwan and China’s 2019 national defence strategy states that Taiwan is a domestic issue under the One China Policy, and other states should not interfere with domestic issues.[6]

Before exploring how major powers like China and Russia challenge the existing world order, it is appropriate to consider what the existing world order is. According to the theory of constructivism a world order is a set of shared behaviours and norms conducted by states.[7] The behaviours and norms are established through social interaction to which international organizations and alliances are often the conduit. Dr. Lawrence Finkelstein served in the UN secretariat from 1946 to 1949 and had a career in international affairs and academia. He highlighted the ambiguity of the world order by saying “global governances appears to be virtually anything.”[8] Under this construct, shaping the accepted beliefs and norms through influence campaigns becomes a powerful lever.

Major powers like Russia and China argue that the existing world order favours European countries and specifically the United States of America. Since the United States of America was an undisputed and indispensable leader, it was able to shape an order out of its own interests and abuse its power. The leaders of China and Russia both want their nations to be national powers and view the current world order as being western dominated and holding back their progress. In 1999 the leader of Russia, Vladimir Putin, said “Russia has been a great power for centuries, and remains so. It has always had and still has legitimate zones of interest.”[9] When the leader of China, Ji Xing Ping, took office he said “The greatest Chinese Dream is the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” and in subsequent speeches he called for a stable international order in which China’s national rejuvenation could be achieved, a military capable of fighting and winning wars, and demonstrating the superior system of socialism with Chinese characteristics.[10]

While China is more insidious and traditionally uses soft power, Russia has relied more on hard military power. However, recent rhetoric suggests that China will increasingly rely on hard power.[11] Although their approaches vary, China and Russia use military, diplomatic, and economic means to challenge the existing world order. When Russia invaded Ukraine, it used its military power to challenge international law established by the United Nations. China’s one belt road initiative seeks to increase economic interdependence and make China the economic centre of the world. As part of the one belt one road initiative, China has also used investments and military aid to gain port access for its navy and army, known as the string of pearls that encircles India.[12] China and Russia also build parallel organizations, for example Russia’s Collective Security Treaty Organizations and China’s Shanghai Cooperation Organization parallels NATO. China has also created Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank, an alternative to the World Bank.[13] To accomplish these means both authoritarian regimes use influence campaigns, which are arguably becoming their most powerful weapon against democracies.

Globalization has caused the line between domestic and international issues to become difficult to define. An example is Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing (IUUF). While the PRC views the ability to feed its population as a domestic issue, the methods it uses have international implications. To feed its population the PRC uses around 800,000 fishing boats, which is half of the world’s fishers.[14] The boats fish by trawling, which uses nets that devastate the ocean floor and frequently fish in other countries exclusive economic zones. Every year, the PRC sends 350-600 deep water finish vessels to fish off the Galapagos islands, and account of 99% of the fishing conducted there.[15] Despite the environmental destruction and constant incursions on other countries economic exclusive zones, the PRC continues the practice and is the largest offender in IUUF.[16] With the aid of artificial intelligence systems that can replicate media throughout multiple social media platforms, the PRC can censor data domestically and influence it abroad to suppress information about the fishing fleets.

State actors weaponization and use of artificial intelligence in influence campaigns present a significant challenge. While the use of state propaganda is not a new concept, the scope and scale that it can be conducted is unpresented. Misinformation is “the purposeful distribution of fake, misleading, fabricated, or manipulated content.”[17] In the past the distribution of misinformation or propaganda across borders involved the costly process of opening a printing press, news outlets, or manually distributing content in the form of pamphlets.[18] The ability to spread content in mass to populations was not tenable until recently. In a democratic system the influence on people at scale will ultimately influence policy makers and international interest. This is product of democracy that major state powers seek to exploit. By influencing masses at scale, they can change the perception of norms and indirectly influence heads of state through the people.[19] The pace of growth in AI has outpaced education on misinformation, especially in the young democracies that often become a battleground for influence.

In 2019, a neural network created by Nvidia could produce images of human faces that are indistinguishable from photographs. In 2021, google released Imagen, a text to image model with unprecedented photorealism. Photorealism refers to an image that appears to have been taken by a human with a camera. A user can enter text and the model will generate a realistic image, in seconds, to the user. One example is “a cute corgi lives in a house made out of sushi.”[20] The image generated combines all the aspects in the text to create a realistic image, one that is so realistic humans cannot distinguish a computer-generated image with a photograph taken by a human with a camera. What previously would have taken hours of labour using photoshop software can be accomplished in seconds. When this model is combined with a traditional algorithm to input key words and automate the process of posting the content on social media it gives the users the ability to flood an information environment with fake content.

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[Housecarl]

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Major powers like China and Russia have already shown that they are capable and willing to use technology to fuel their propaganda, disinformation, and public opinion campaigns. In 2020 Twitter deleted 32,000 accounts linked to state sponsored propaganda from China, Russia, and Turkey.[21] The power and influence appears to be acknowledged by all governments, with recent claims in 2022 that pro-west social media networks were discovered distributing propaganda.[22] Using AI models that can produce photorealistic images and bot networks state powers can create and distribute propaganda and disinformation campaigns throughout the world in a cheap and efficient manner. The developing countries where the understanding of AI is lower will likely be easier to influence.

Compounding the power of using AI to influence perceptions to change norms and behaviour is the ability to target specific populations and beliefs on social media. The marketing and advertising business have led to the creation of powerful tools that can show advertisements based on a person’s likes and interests.[23] The same tools can be used to target a population with specific beliefs for a desired effect. A major state power could target a country that has traditionally been neutral on the recognition of Taiwan. They could then rapidly create content targeting people that believe in the one China policy, and those that support Taiwanese independence. The social influence campaign would seek to reinforce the beliefs of those that support it while discrediting those that oppose it.

China’s great firewall has made it more resilient to influence campaigns because of its extensive censorship. The ability to censor the internet presents a major advantage for authoritarian regimes against democracies because they can simultaneously control a domestic narrative while influencing a global narrative. A small and mundane example is with the book Bend, not Break by Ping Fu. A negative review campaign was launched from China to reduce the popularity of the book and discredit the author.[24] The negative review campaign was aimed to reduce the book’s popularity in foreign markets, yet there was not a mechanism to promote the book within China because it was simply banned.

Major state actors also use influence campaigns with the intended effect of dismantling and discrediting alliances or states from within. The United States select committee on intelligence investigated Russian interference in the 2016 election.[25] The committee found numerous cases, outside the scope of the election, where Russian state sponsored actors in Russia orchestrated divisive protests at the same location as counter protests in the United States of America. They also spread disinformation and encouraged the use of violence to both parties.[26]
The influence campaign conducted by Russia against the United States of America in 2016 included Russian agent’s use of social media to organize protests in the United States from Russia, messaging people to encourage violent participation, and financially reimbursing members that would participate if they fit the mould of being extreme. In the example from 2016, state sponsored Russian activity specifically targeted the Black Lives Matter movement to create negative and emotional reactions. The activities explicitly sought to exploit and exasperate a racial divide and targeted both left and right wing parties.[27]

The campaign was especially effective because it created content based on users known likes and interests. A book written by Estonian academics and published in 2021 describes Russia’s information warfare doctrine and strategy, and it notes that Russian information campaigns “are targeted at particular audiences in a considerably narrowed-down manner and with unprecedented precision.”[28] Global connectivity, especially in social media, is what makes an unprecedented level of precision possible.

Another example that highlights the use of information campaigns in conjunction with traditional levers of power is the Russian campaign to preserve their influence in energy. In 2017, the US Congressional Committee on Science, Space, and Technology wrote to US Department of the Treasury stating that “U.S. presidential candidates, European officials, and the U.S. intelligence community have all publicly noted that Russia and its government corporations are funding a covert anti-fracking campaign to suppress the widespread adoption of fracking in Europe and the U.S.—all in an effort to safeguard the influence of the Russian oil and gas sector.”[29] Russia was providing funding and influencing environmental groups to counter fracking in the United States, which Russian policy makers saw as threat to their economy due to Russia’s reliance on exporting energy.

Russia influence campaigns have made attempts to cause divides with the EU by manipulating political groups.[30] Several examples of Russian disinformation can be found in Poland, where Russian actors targeted the local population. In 2020 during a rotation of US troops as part of a NATO battalion, the slogan “No US troops in Poland!” was posted on a mayor’s official website, along with encouragement to march in protest. Russian sponsored news agencies and unattributed social media networks disseminated the information about the movement. By the time the mayor could declare they had been hacked two days had passed, and the story had already been propagated. Another example used the same technique of combining a cyber hack with immediate news stories that are spread through social media. In this example a fake letter with the heading “A Polish General Calls on Polish Soldiers to Fight the US Occupation,” was circulated. Both were aimed to divide the local population in Poland against the US presence, in an attempt to weaken NATO.[31] Following the events, a spokesman for the Polish Prime Minster said Russia was using methods to “break the security measures and hijack social media accounts or websites in Poland and use such infrastructure to sow disinformation.”[32]

There are several implications from the challenges on the existing world order. A study from the Rand Corporation on Russian influence campaigns found that social media education could prove to be an effective counter and recommended creating a counter-disinformation strategy with a commitment to the freedom of speech.[33] Providing education to people on how to analyse information critically and the capabilities of AI are an enormous challenge when compared to the low cost of an automated disinformation campaign. Another implication is an increase in instability from the decoupling of economies. For example, while China and the US both benefit from their large economic trade and dependency, they are beginning to go through a technological decoupling.[34] NATO allies reducing their dependence on Russian gas also created a level of instability that impacted the civilians in all the countries involved with the decoupling.

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[1] “Recent Trends in the Data Driven Economy,” in Digital Economy Report 2019: Value Creation and Capture: Implications for Developing Countries (New York, New York: United Nations, 2019), 13-14.
[2] Simon Kemp, “Digital 2020: Global Digital Overview - DataReportal – Global Digital Insights,” DataReportal (DataReportal – Global Digital Insights, February 11, 2021), Digital 2020: Global Digital Overview — DataReportal – Global Digital Insights.

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[3] Dylan Kissane, “A Theory of Complexity,” in Beyond Anarchy: The Complex and Chaotic Dynamics of International Politics (Stuttgart, Germany: Columbia University Press, 2018), 208-220.
[4] Bill Chou, “China-Taiwan-Portugal Relations and Macau in Cultural Revolution: A Year of Advance, Withdrawal and Isolation,” East Asia 37, no. 2 (2020): 107-120, https://doi.org/10.1007/s12140-020-09331-0.
[5] Wong, Edward, and Amy Qin. "Report Urges U.S. to Act To Curb Taiwan Isolation." New York Times, March 25, 2022, A7(L). Gale OneFile: News (accessed September 24, 2022). Report Urges U.S. to Act To Curb Taiwan Isolation. - Document - Gale OneFile: News.
[6] China's National Defence in the New Era. Beijing, China: Foreign Languages Press, 2019, 6-7.
[7] Alexandra Gheciu, William Curti Wohlforth, and Michael Barnett, “Constructivism,” in The Oxford Handbook of International Security (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2020).
[8] Shridath Sir Ramphal and Lawrence S. Finkelstein, “What Is Global Governance?,” in Global Governance, 3rd ed., vol. 1 (Cambridge England: Global Security Programme, 1995), 367-372.
[9] Nelli Babayan, Special Issue: Democracy Promotion and the Challenges of Illiberal Regional Powers (Abingdon, Virginia: Taylor & Francis, 2015), 30-36.
[10] Elizabeth C. Economy, The Third Revolution: Xi Jinping and the New Chinese State (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2019), 3-6.
[11] Xi Jinping, “Full Text of Xi Jinping's Speech on the CCP's 100th Anniversary,” (Nikkei Asia, July 1, 2021), Full text of Xi Jinping's speech on the CCP's 100th anniversary.
[12] Petrovski, Aleksandar, and Nenad Taneski. “One Belt One Road - How Does It Affect the Eurasian Economic and Security Issue.” Contemporary Macedonian Defense / Sovremena Makedonska Odbrana 19, no. 37 (December 1, 2019), 69–77.
[13] Marc Lanteigne. China and International Institutions: Alternate Paths to Global Power. London: Routledge, 2005, 26-29.
[14] Judith Bergman, “China's Fishing Fleet Is Vacuuming the Oceans,” Gatestone Institute, April 22, 2021, China's Fishing Fleet Is Vacuuming the Oceans.
[15] Bergman, “China's Fishing Fleet Is Vacuuming the Oceans.”
[16] U.S. Mission Ecuador, “Remarks: General Laura Richardson, Commander of U.S. Southern Command at South American Defense Conference, SOUTHDEC,” U.S. Embassy & Consulate in Ecuador (U.S. Embassy & Consulate in Ecuador, September 14, 2022), https://ec.usembassy.gov/remarks-ge...t-south-american-defense-conference-southdec/.
[17] Bradshaw, Samantha, and Philip N. Howard. “The Global Organization of Social Media Disinformation Campaigns.” Journal of International Affairs 71 (January 2, 2018): 23–31.
[18] Marshall Soules, Media, Persuasion and Propaganda (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015), 1-9.
[19] Soules, 119-130.
[20] Chitwan Saharia, “Photorealistic Text-to-Image Diffusion Models with Deep Language Understanding,” Photorealistic Text-to-Image Diffusion Models with Deep Language Understanding, May 23, 2022, http://export.arxiv.org/abs/2205.
[21] Mary Papenfuss, “Twitter Axes 32,000 State-Linked Propaganda Accounts from Russia, China and Turkey,” HuffPost (HuffPost, June 12, 2020), Twitter Axes 32,000 State-Linked Propaganda Accounts From Russia, China And Turkey.
[22] Isobel Asher Hamilton, “Meta and Twitter Discovered a Network of pro-West Propaganda Accounts That Criticized Russia, China, and Iran, Researchers Say,” Business Insider (Business Insider), accessed September 24, 2022, Meta and Twitter discovered a network of pro-West propaganda accounts that criticized Russia, China, and Iran, researchers say.
[23] Eric Butow, Jenn Herman, Stephanie Liu, Amanda Robinson, and Mike Allton. Ultimate Guide to Social Media Marketing. Irvine: Entrepreneur Press, 2020. Results - OpenURL Connection - EBSCO.
[24] Rongbin Han, “Debating China beyond the Great Firewall: Digital Disenchantment and Authoritarian Resilience,” Journal of Chinese Political Science, May 2022, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11366-022-09812-4.
[25] Select Committee on Intelligence, Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence, United States Senate, on Russian active measures, campaigns and interference in the 2016 U.S. election, 5-11.

[26] Select Committee on Intelligence, 67.
[27] Select Committee on Intelligence, 4.
[28] Mölder Holger et al., “Mass Media Instrumentalization in Foreign Policy of States: Russian Strategic Toolset,” in The Russian Federation in Global Knowledge Warfare: Influence Operations in Europe and Its Neighbourhood (Cham: Springer, 2022), 84-91.
[29] Lamar Smith and Randy Weber, “Letter to the Honorable Steven T. Mnuchin,” US Congress Committee on Science, Space, and Technology. (2017), pp. 1-6, https://republicans-science.house.g...155B1E86D9.06-29-2017-cls-weber---mnuchin.pdf.
[30] Abrams, Steve. "Beyond Propaganda: Soviet Active Measures in Putin’s Russia." Connections: The Quarterly Journal 15, no. 1 (2016): 5-11.
[31] Ray, Arthur. “Poland and the Baltic States under the Gun of Russian Disinformation.” Democratic Europe without Borders, December 9, 2020. https://democratic-europe.eu/2020/1...ates-under-the-gun-of-russian-disinformation/.
[32] Telewizja Polska, “Russia Uses Cyber Measures to Attack Other States: Polish Official,” TVP World, July 28, 2022, https://tvpworld.com/61532517/russia-uses-cyber-measures-to-attack-other-states-polish-official.
[33] Cohen, Raphael S., Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, Joe Cheravitch, Alyssa Demus, Scott W. Harold, Jeffrey W. Hornung, Jenny Jun, Michael Schwille, Elina Treyger, and Nathan Vest, Combating Foreign Disinformation on Social Media: Study Overview and Conclusions. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2021. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR4373z1.html. Also available in print form.
[34] Bateman, Jon. U.S.-China Technological Decoupling: A Strategy and Policy Framework. Carnegie. Endowment for International Peace. Accessed October 9, 2022. https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/...pling-strategy-and-policy-framework-pub-86897.

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About the Author(s)​

Cole Herring
Cole Herring is an Army Special Forces Officer with over 17 years of experience with multiple deployments to Afghanistan, Iraq, and South America. He believes in balancing experience from past wars with the need to adapt and prepare for future conflicts.

 

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Mercenary Shocks: What the War in Ukraine Will Eventually Mean for Africa - War on the Rocks

At some point the war in Ukraine will end, and when it does, the resulting influx of mercenaries will send shockwaves through Africa. As the current

warontherocks.com

MERCENARY SHOCKS: WHAT THE WAR IN UKRAINE WILL EVENTUALLY MEAN FOR AFRICA​

RAPHAEL PARENS
FEBRUARY 17, 2023
COMMENTARY

At some point the war in Ukraine will end, and when it does, the resulting influx of mercenaries will send shockwaves through Africa. As the current conflict grinds toward its grim one-year anniversary, experts disagree on what might happen next. But eventually one side will win, or the fighting will morph into a low-intensity conflict. At this point, thousands of former soldiers with combat experience will hit the open market. These soldiers will find limited job prospects in Ukraine or Russia, as both armies cut down on active-duty troops. The Wagner Group and other private military companies from South Africa, France, and the United Kingdom offer these former soldiers an option to support their families and escape their circumstances. The consequences of this will fall heavily on African countries, which have already begun to employ mercenaries at a rate not seen since the Cold War. If countries choose to recruit them, these new mercenaries will cause widespread instability, weakening governments and likely increasing the number and scale of insurgencies across the continent.

Africa, particularly the Sahel region, is acutely vulnerable to mercenary interventions because of a lack of trust in government alongside a number of local and regional insurgencies. The continent has a history of employing mercenaries. Such mercenaries often commit human rights violations and aim for monetary gain over durable peace and security. Mercenaries, particularly the Wagner Group, have recently intervened in Mali, the Central African Republic, Sudan, and Libya, in each case escalating local conflicts and killing civilians. Africa’s stability is at stake, as a deluge of mercenaries from the war in Ukraine could send even more countries teetering over the edge into authoritarianism, civil war, and foreign resource theft.

Africa’s mercenary challenge requires innovative solutions. Countering disinformation is key in building civilian trust and local buy-in. Naming and shaming mercenary violence could be a useful tactic, particularly in combination with moves against disinformation. Sanctions are a valuable tool as well, yet they should be calibrated to the correct circumstances and set of actors. African and Western governments should act now to address the threat posed by mercenaries before it gets substantially worse.

Post-War Opportunities

The length and severity of the war in Ukraine will determine the volume of the mercenary influx in Africa. If the war in Ukraine continues for a significant period, particularly as both sides continue to sustain high casualty rates, the number of potential recruits for post-conflict mercenary could be diminished. The conflict’s attrition rate is astronomical, with approximately 280,000 military casualties and tens of thousands of civilian deaths. Despite Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin’s publicized recruitment of prisoners to fill the void, manpower constraints will limit future mercenary capabilities. If the conflict ends more quickly, regardless of the victor, former soldiers on both sides will be interested in mercenary work. Alternatively, if the war returns to pre-2022 levels of low intensity “frozen conflict,” new African deployments would also be on the horizon.

On the Ukrainian side, foreign troops ranging from European anarchists to the ultra-right Azov Regiment will be incentivized to continue military activities abroad. On the Russian side, former Wagner Group mercenaries and new recruits to the organization, including prisoners, will be interested in pursuing military work outside of the Russian and Ukrainian states. Many thousands of recently called-up conscripts may likewise be interested. On both sides, soldiers will be motivated by money or simply a skillset and a desire to fight. Russian veterans in particular can “rally around the flag” — supporting the Russian expansionist narrative through the grievance of defeat or the thirst for continued victories. Should Ukrainian or NATO-supported private military companies come into being, veterans will flock to these organizations for the same reasons. Private military companies fill a vocational gap and perhaps an ideological gap as well for veterans of the war in Ukraine.

Likely only a fraction of Ukrainian war veterans will choose to join private military companies or take on new contracts. However, the statistics on the Wagner Group suggest that the mercenary phenomenon has already begun to expand massively. Before the war began, the Wagner Group employed an estimated 5,000 mercenaries, yet today the U.K. and U.S. governments believe that the group employs approximately 50,000 mercenaries in Ukraine alone. Before the conflict began, Russia and Ukraine were believed to have 1.1 million active-duty troops combined. If only 20 percent of Wagner Group troops in Ukraine accept new contracts in Africa, the group would double in size relative to its pre-war strength. Likewise, if a tiny percentage of regular army or volunteer forces join the Wagner Group or other private military companies after the war, the impact on Africa will be dramatic.

Whatever happens in Ukraine, the Russian government will likely have an incentive to escalate its use of mercenaries in Africa in an effort to destabilize Western strategic relationships while building the Kremlin’s own. Private military companies hold the keys to unlocking military-to-military relationships without “boots on the ground.” The Wagner Group has demonstrated a suite of strategies in its African operations, including disinformation campaigns, resource extraction concessions, and the initiation of military-to-military training, weapons sales, and protection details. These strategies have successfully strong-armed French counterterror support out of Mali and the Central African Republic, while ensconcing the Wagner Group in both countries as a security guarantor. With a significant influx of Ukraine war veterans, the Wagner Group can expand its operations to more locations and at a greater scale.

Wagner Group leadership, including Prigozhin, benefit from African interventions through lucrative resource extraction contracts in host countries and political prestige within Russia. The Wagner Group exchanges its military support for mining and petroleum contracts, gaining resources in Syria, the Central African Republic, and Sudan. The group uses a variety of shell companies to facilitate these operations, including Meroe Gold and Lobaye Invest. Further, the group’s advances in Africa provide Prigozhin and his cohort with political leverage in Russian President Vladimir Putin’s ever-changing inner circle, as these advances provide key military-to-military relations for the Russian state including weapons sales, key infrastructure access, and geopolitical advances against the West.

Why to Worry

Expanded mercenary deployments will aggravate the recent pattern of political instability in Africa. Leaders will become bolder in their internal security operations. Wagner Group interventions in Mali and the Central African Republic already led to French withdrawal. Now, Burkina Faso’s junta has called on French military forces to leave their counterterror mission, with some government leaders citing an interest in working with Russia instead. If more private military companies with more mercenaries move into African markets, more African countries will force out their Western security partners in favor of these mercenary groups. In addition, more coups could occur as democratically elected leaders are perceived to be failing against jihadist movements. Both outcomes will encourage instability across the continent, as junta leadership and mercenary operations provide band-aid solutions for deeper wounds.

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African states have also turned to the Wagner Group and other mercenary organizations because these groups are willing to do their dirty work. States have hired the Wagner Group to kill enemies of the state and those who aid and abet them. In Mali and the Central Africa Republic, governments have encouraged attacks on civilians, many of them members of minority Muslim Fulani communities. Attacking civilians will only stoke the flames of separatist and religious-based extremism, discouraging trust in national governance and encouraging regional instability.

Finally, the Wagner Group and other private military companies will expand their parasitical relationships to new governments across Africa. These organizations will follow the Wagner Group model, ensconcing themselves in countries through long-term resource extraction projects. In the Central African Republic, the Wagner Group has turned an artisanal gold mine into an eight-zoned, heavily defended industrial extraction site. Center for Strategic and Internationals Studies expert Catrina Doxsee points out that the group is planning for the long term and nurturing the government’s dependence. These relationships will continue to drain African states of their natural resources, while aggrandizing the role of mercenary groups in national politics.

Who is Fighting: A Brief Mercenary History in Africa

The Wagner Group has redefined mercenary objectives in Africa, with the accompanying publicity to boot, yet the mercenary phenomenon is not new on the continent. After the Cold War, numerous mercenary groups sprung up, composed of ex-soldiers from South Africa, Mozambique, and elsewhere. Executive Outcomes, formed by South African officer Eben Barlow in 1989, rose to infamy as a racist yet brutally effective outfit, only dissolved in 1999. These mercenaries were paid on average $3,500 for soldiers and $4,000 for officers per month. Most were veterans of the post-colonial, apartheid, and Cold War conflicts in southern Africa during the 1970s and 1980s, just as today’s Wagner Group members are veterans of the wars in Syria and Ukraine.

Regardless of the country of origin, mercenary activity across Africa is on the rise. A recent study by the Group for Research and Information on Peace and Security found that private military companies have increased their control and political influence in Africa. This rise may be linked to the growth of Islamist insurgencies in Africa, which have gathered steam through the establishment of Islamic State affiliates across the continent. It is no coincidence that Executive Outcomes was restarted in 2020. More recently, South Africa-based organizations have included Osprey Asset Management and Black Hawk, both of which are composed mainly of ex-apartheid soldiers in the 55–65 age range, veterans of the last conventional conflicts in Africa. In a losing bid to the Wagner Group for the Cabo Delgado contract in Mozambique, Osprey Asset Management reportedly asked for $15,000–$25,000 per person per month, while the Wagner Group reportedly paid a fraction of that: $1,800–$4,700 per person per month.

European, American, and Ukrainian veterans of the Ukraine war may also be interested in joining a variety of Western-based mercenary groups already operating in Africa. American-based CACI and Academi operate across the continent. German-based Asgaard operates in Egypt, Mauritania, Libya, and Sudan. French-based SECOPEX has operated in Somalia, the Central African Republic, and, formerly, in Libya alongside Muammar Gaddafi’s forces. British-based Aegis Defense Services has worked in 18 African countries, while provoking ire for employing Sierra Leonean former child soldiers alongside U.S. forces in Iraq. And then, of course, there are also smaller regional outfits, including the Dyck Advisory Group, based in Zimbabwe, the Paramount Group, based in South Africa, and Burnham Global, based in Dubai.

Losing Wars, Making Money

Recent history shows that these mercenary groups are far more effective at exacerbating conflicts than solving them. In the Central African Republic, a U.N. mission was unable to defeat Seleka insurgents and a variety of other groups outside the capital, Bangui. Wagner Group forces have failed as well, while also committing gross human rights violations against civilians and journalists. In the Sahel region, insurgencies are tied to religion and local grievances. Over the course of a decade, a pair of French counterterror programs, Operations Serval and Barkhane, were unable to dislodge Jamaa Nusrat ul-Islam wal-Muslimin and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara from Mali and neighboring Sahel states. The Wagner Group has run into similar difficulties, as its own casualties and attacks on civilians mount. Meanwhile in Mozambique, Wagner Group forces failed spectacularly in the Cabo Delgado region. They failed to understand the local culture, were hampered by their relations with government forces, and proved unprepared for jungle warfare. Subsequent European mercenary operations were unable to dislodge the same Islamic State affiliates. Renewed or continuing conflict in Somalia, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Libya, and in many other hot zones may trigger mercenary operations. Yet, Mali, the Central African Republic, and Mozambique demonstrate that African insurgencies and civil conflict are difficult to resolve even with recent mercenary approaches.

Instead of resolving conflict or supporting legitimate government institutions, the Wagner Group and other private military companies tend to fill their own coffers while degrading the rule of law in countries where they interfere. Some experts argue that such organizations will prolong conflicts to continue profiting from lucrative contracts. At the same time, the Wagner Group threatens government legitimacy by targeting and killing civilians in Mali and the Central African Republic, particularly ethnic minorities. Thus, private military companies are often a poison pill for their employers, threatening the long-term stability of governments.

How to Respond

To make sure Africa doesn’t pay the price for peace in Ukraine, NATO countries should begin by developing a comprehensive response to the Wagner Group’s disinformation and state capture strategies. The first step is addressing misinformation with proof. France has already set the tone for such responses in Mali, using photographic evidence to rebut a Wagner Group disinformation operation that blamed a massacre of civilians on exiting French forces.

Second, Western states should lobby African regional and continental bodies, including the Economic Community of African States and the African Union, to halt mercenary operations. They can point to Mali, Mozambique, and the Central African Republic as clear examples of mercenary-driven instability and parasitical relationships. They should encourage these organizations to sanction states that use and are used by mercenary groups. While new U.S. sanctions against the Wagner Group are a useful first step, the group has a variety of ways to skirt these sanctions, including the use of shell companies. To prevent this, sanctions should be directed at governments working with mercenary groups.

Beyond this, NATO and other bodies should continue naming and shaming mercenary activities. The U.S. State Department has taken the lead, publicly distributing a cable on the Wagner Group’s expanded mining activities in the Central African Republic. Although news media and private sector investigations are essential, government buy-in plays a vital role in amplifying their work.

Finally, NATO members and African states should also be prepared to deploy sanctions and travel bans against Western-based mercenary groups that commit human rights violations as well. Regardless of their origin, mercenaries are not the answer to Africa’s problems, offering at best a short-term solution for instability while undermining effective governance. Instead, leaders should demonstrate a long-term commitment to rebuilding security sectors and promoting economic development.

Africa’s stability is at stake. The violence and jihadism seen in Mali and the Central African Republic may spread across the continent. Mercenary organizations flush with a wave of post-Ukraine war recruits will only exacerbate the problem.



BECOME A MEMBER


Raphael Parens is an independent researcher living in Republic of the Congo. He studies African conflict, Russian military policy, and paramilitary groups. He has published papers on the Wagner Group, food insecurity in Africa, and conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo through the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He has been cited in numerous other articles, studies, and U.S. congressional testimony. He has also appeared on France24 to discuss Russia’s latest moves in Africa.

 

[jward]

China set to eclipse US air superiority in Pacific​

Gabriel Honrada​

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China is on pace to surpass the United States in 5th generation fighter production, a dynamic shift with significant implications for the balance of air power in the Pacific.

This month, Nikkei reported that China’s inventory of J-20A 5th generation fighters could soon overtake the US inventory of 187 F-22 Raptors, with China already having 150 airframes designed to match the F-22 in air-to-air combat.
Although the report notes that while the US has 360 F-35As, it notes that China’s J-20A production is gaining speed and that if current delivery rates are sustained China is on track to exceed the number of US F-22 airframes within this year.
The F-22, the world’s first 5th generation fighter, was designed in the 1990s and is still touted as the US’ most advanced air superiority jet. It is the first air superiority fighter designed around stealth to give it an advantage over previous fighters.

Entering service in 2005, the F-22 was meant to replace the 4th generation F-15 Eagle in frontline service, combining stealth, integrated avionics, and super maneuverability.
Sandboxx notes in an article this month that the F-22 can carry two AIM-9X Sidewinder heat-seeking missiles and six AIM-120 AMRAAM radar-guided ones in an internal weapons bay alongside an M61A2 20-mm cannon with 480 rounds for dogfights.

For close air support, the report says that the F-22 can carry two 450-kilogram GBU-32 JDAM smart bombs or eight 113-kilogram Small Diameter Bombs.
Developments in China’s manufacturing techniques and jet engine technology have recently accelerated production of the rival J-20. In that direction, South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported in November 2022 that China is using world-class pulsating production lines to speed up its J-20 fighter deliveries.
SCMP notes that the new pulsating production techniques and improved domestic engines have pushed the number of J-20 airframes to equal or even exceed the numbers of the US F-22 Raptor, whose production was stopped in 2011 with only 187 airframes built.

China’s J-20 is gaining ground on the F-22. Image: Facebook

In contrast, SCMP mentions that China may already have up to 200 J-20s based on serial numbers on the aircraft displayed during the 2022 Zhuhai Air Show.

China may also be close to solving key problems with its jet engine technology, which to date has been a significant handicap for its jet fighters. SCMP reported in March 2022 that the J-20 has been tested with afterburning WS-15J engines in a bid to improve its maneuverability and combat capability.
The same report notes that China’s WS-15J will eventually replace Russian AL-31F engines currently installed in its J-20 fleet, an indication of China’s increased confidence in its jet engine manufacturing methods and metallurgy.
Asia Times noted in October 2022 that China’s incremental approach to jet fighter development through reverse-engineering and 5th generation fighter technology research.

The J-20’s upgrade potential makes the type a viable basis for China’s 6th generation fighter program, which would conceivably facilitate faster development timelines than similar UK and US projects, including the US Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) project, which is slated to be fielded in the 2030s.
But despite fast-growing aircraft numbers, the J-20 may have qualitative flaws. In a September 2021 article for National Defense Magazine, Jon Harper notes that the J-20 is the largest low-observability fighter in production, which may imply it is a heavier, less-agile aircraft.
Harper also states that China may still need to solve challenges in true sensor fusion and seamless passive sensor integration. However, future J-20 variants are widely expected to continue to narrow the technology gap between the US and China.

US military leaders are publicly downplaying that threat, however. US Air Force head of Pacific Forces General Kenneth Wilsbach noted that China’s fighter programs were “not anything to lose sleep over.”
Similarly, US Air Force Chief of Staff General Charles Brown has pooh-poohed China’s J-20, noting that while China has impressive command and control over its J-20s in operations involving F-35s in the East China Sea, the type’s capabilities were nothing he would worry too much about.
However, the US decision to stop F-22 production may have significant consequences for US airpower in an era of renewed great power competition.

Defense channel Task and Purpose explains in a December 2022 episode the many factors that stopped F-22 production, which included the perceived irrelevance of the F-22 in counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the view that China and Russia will not be able to field 5th generation fighters until after the 2020s, and that the F-22 was a competitor to the newer and more versatile US-made F-35.

That decision, Task and Purpose notes, has subsequently overstretched the US Air Force, as its current force structure needs to generate more sorties for a possible fight against China including over Taiwan.
An F-22 Raptor performs at the Thunder Over New Hampshire Air Show at Pease Air National Guard Base in Portsmouth, N.H., Sept. 11, 2021. Photo: US Air National Guard / Sgt. Steven Tucker
The report also notes that the US reconsidered restarting F-22 production in 2016, but its production lines had already been reallocated for F-35 production. It suggested it might be cheaper at this point to develop a new aircraft such as the NGA) 6th generation fighter.

Task and Purpose also mentions that since the US never exported the F-22 due to security concerns about its stealth technology falling into the hands of US adversaries, US allies may not have the air capabilities needed to operate effectively alongside US forces to defend themselves against increasingly advanced enemy fighters.
At a higher strategic level, this may mean that China has already reached parity or even surpassed US airpower in the Pacific, both qualitatively and quantitatively.

The US now fields only 48 of 60 “multirole” fighter squadrons, with the fighter shortage most felt in the Pacific where it fields just 11 out of 13 needed. Moreover, the US fighter fleet’s readiness is steadily declining, with the average age of its fighters now 28.8 years old and pilots getting just 9.7 flight hours per month, compared with 22.3 hours before the 1991 Gulf War.

To maintain minimal fighter strength levels, the US must produce 72 fighters a year and keep its allies at a comparable level of readiness, a calculation, of course, that risks mistaking quantity for capability.

China set to eclipse US air superiority in Pacific

 

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India poised to become manufacturing hub for cutting edge artillery ammunition​

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Photo Credit: IANS

IANSLive

New Delhi, Feb 18: India is slated to become the prime manufacturing hub for advanced 155mm artillery ammunition for all types of [155mm] artillery guns which are operated by over 75 armies worldwide.

The Ministry of Defence (MoD) has recently selected five domestic ammunition manufacturers to supply around two thousand 155mm terminally guided munitions (TGMs) for the Army's in-service 155mm guns of 39/45/52 calibre artillery guns.
The 155mm TGM is the most advanced artillery ammunition and its technology was denied to India in the past.
Each indigenously made-in-India 155mm TGM projectile would cost around Rs.80 Lac which is expected to be the most advanced and cheapest globally. Typically, a western and Russian TGM projectile costs just double while the US-made artillery ammunition costs three times more.

To achieve full self-reliance in ammunition manufacturing, MoD is now encouraging private companies to set up new production facilities to meet the ammunition demands of armed forces and paramilitary forces, which was the earlier monopoly of the erstwhile government-controlled Ordnance Factory Board. Besides, the Army has been solely dependent on the import of advanced artillery ammunition from overseas.

Therefore, the private sector is now invited to fill critical shortages in some areas of ammunition and companies will be given long-term demand contracts for supply of a varletry of ammunition Five domestic companies - state-run Munitions India Ltd, and private sector companies Adani Defence Systems and Technologies Ltd (ADSTL), Bharat Forge Ltd, Economic Explosive Ltd, Premier Explosives and SMPP Ltd have been issued Project Sanction Orders (PSOs) by Army under the industry funder Make-II procurement scheme to develop 25 rounds of 155 mm TGMs along with four fire control systems in one year and participate in the trials on a cost-no-commitment basis. The porotypes must have 50 per cent indigenous technology.

Industry analysts said a host of overseas original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) - Nexter of France, Rosoboronexport of Russia, Nammo AS of Norway, of the United Kingdom, Saab Bofors Dynamics. of Sweden, Elbit Systems of Israel, Diehl Defence of Germany, Denel of South Africa, Yugoimport SDPR of Serbia, Arsenal of Bulgaria, and Raytheon/ BAE Systems Inc of the US are exploring industrial partnership for bulk production of 155mm TGM projectiles with domestic companies in India.

The Army intends to place contracts with two companies for the supply of around two thousand 155mm TGM projectiles (delivered at the rate of 197 TGM per year), 170 fire control systems, 87 projectile simulators, and 87 projectiles for its in-service artillery guns. The entire programme is expected to cost around Rs. 1600 crore and formal contracts will be placed in mid-2024.

The Expression of Interest (EoI) for 155mm TGM says the requirement of this ammunition will increase manifold as the majority of artillery regiments convert to 155mm calibre [in line with] the upgrade of Indian artillery [capability]. Thus, the sustenance of industry will be ensured due to continuous demand.

Indian Army inducted GPS-guided M982 Excalibur rounds from Raytheon Technologies of the US for its M777 155 mm/39-calibre ultra-light howitzers only in 2019. The Indian Army's artillery regiment currently has no TGM capability.
(Vivek Raghuvanshi specialises in Indian and global military industry. He had been the India Bureau Chief of Defense News, a US weekly publication from 1995-2018.)

(The content is being carried under an arrangement with indianarrative.com)
--indianarrative


Update: 18-February-2023

India poised to become manufacturing hub for cutting edge artillery ammunition

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